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#57 notes	Notes from 6/19/68 - 1 p.m. meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors - Clifford, Katzenbach, Helms, Wheeler [Sanitized NLJ 87-31] Secret 4 pp.	6/19/68	<b>A</b> =
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Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 3

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## JUNE 19, 1968 - 1 p.m.

## MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

The President
Secretary Clifford
Under Sec. Vatronbase

Under Sec. Katzenbach CIA DIrector Helms General Wheeler George Christian Walt Rostow

Tom Johnson

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## Mr. President:

Here are the notes of your Tuesday Luncheon Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers.

(35)

Tom Johnson June 19, 1968 6:30 p.m.

## NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS

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June 19, 1968 l p.m. In the Mansion

SANITIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NU 87-31 

Attending:

The President Secretary Clifford Undersecretary Katzenbach CIA Director Helms

General Wheeler George Christian Walt Rostow Tom Johnson

President: Are you concerned about Jorden's conversation?

Undersecretary Katzenbach: I am encouraged by it.

The President: Does he indicate we might change our position?

Walt Rostow: He did change our position. Our first position was for clean DMZ, no infiltration. He went back somewhat. On the whole, it was an appropriate time to change and show some flexibility. We would settle, I am sure, for a stop in the infiltration for a halt in the bombing.

General Wheeler: I am not disturbed by this small shift in our position.

The proposed reply to the Indian Ambassador did not say what we would settle for in return for bombing cessation.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: The question is - would you cease bombing for re-establishment of the DMZ with ICC inspection. The answer is either "yes" or "no" or "maybe."

Director Helms: Laos is not mentioned.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: It was put in by implication.

I would consider saying that restoration of DMZ might be worth it from our point.

Secretary Clifford: I thought Jorden's position was well within the President's statements. It was useful. It was a forward development.

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On India, I do not want to take the "back-door" approach through India. I would prefer keeping it in Paris. It might come out.

Are Vance and Harriman for the Indian approach?

Undersecretary Katzenbach: Yes, they are for it.

(NYN)

The Indians are saying the U.S. has done something now they should do something.

Secretary Clifford: What can Mrs. Gandhi do that our negotiators cannot do?

I am concerned she will say this is it. She will be our negotiator not knowing or understanding the nuances.

<u>Undersecretary Katzenbach:</u> I think it is good for Hanoi to know that the Indians believe they should do something militarily. The Indians have a function in this.

Secretary Clifford: If Mrs. Gandhi could make her views known to Hanoi, that's good. This has to be worked out in Paris, I believe. I would welcome the Indian offer.

General Wheeler: Indians have been untrustworthy in the past. They could undercut the efforts in Paris.

Walt Rostow: Permit the Indians to say that it is our impression that DMZ would be a major concession for a cessation of bombing. We could also express our concerns over infiltration and Saigon. India would say it would assume operating responsibility for the policing of the DMZ.

Say this should be worked out between the parties directly.

We gave the Harriman-Vance mission examples of what we considered taking advantage of the pause. The Indians can't handle definition of what is meant by 'demilitarization'.

Secretary Clifford: That makes a lot of sense to me.

The President: I have sympathy with that (Rostow proposal).

I don't want another front from Paris. We should be cautious on this. All of you agree and come back to me on it.

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Undersecretary Katzenbach: You could give very clear definition of what DMZ means.

### 1. Abrams' Plan

1.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: We have no problem except public relations one.

#### 3. Berlin Crisis:

Undersecretary Katzenbach: You were briefed on this at the NSC.

#### NPT Scheduling 5.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: There is a statement you would make on this and we need to know the date. Russians want July 1. There will be 30-40 signatures by then. It will give us more time for Congress.

The President: July 1 is O.K. with me.

#### UN Seabed Debate 6.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: Russians want to demilitarize the Seabed. We want to have a cautious statement.

Walt Rostow: There is an agreed statement.

Secretary Clifford: The JCS do not like this language.

The President: All of you get together on this first.

### Korean Civilians and Korean Light Division to Vietnam 8.

Secretary Clifford: Pak will send 5,000 civilians Wheeler says we could use the civilians.

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General Wheeler: have no assurance Pak is willing to go ahead with a light division. We will get \$100 million for Korea.

We still

#### 9. Russell Letter

The President: Get on that right away.

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Secretary Clifford: I had a good talk with Senator Dirksen.

The President: I was surprised Symington was against us. Cannon seems against us.

Rowland Evans said we furnished Hart the language on this. That's not true. I asked a man here to talk to Hart. He said President and no one in the White House had talked to him about this.

There are 25 Senators for ABM. Cannon is reluctant.

When this appeared, the President made it clear there was no foundation. We called Senator Hart. He said nobody in the White House called on this.

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## Lunch Meeting With the President Wednesday, June 19, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

## **AGENDA**

- 1. Abrams' Plan. (Sec. Clifford; Gen. Wheeler; Under Sec. Katzenbach)
  - -- Military aspects.
  - -- Press handling.
  - -- Relation to Paris contacts.
- 2. Indian Proposal. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)
  Stop bombing for DMZ monitored by ICC.
- 3. Berlin crisis. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)
  Situation report.
- 4. NATO Meeting: NPT Statement. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)
  Tab A.
- NPT Scheduling. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)

  When open to signature: July 1 as Kuznetsov suggests or July 15?
- 6. UN Seabed Debate. (Under Sec. Katzenbach; Sec. Clifford; Gen. Wheeler)
  An agreed U.S. position?
- 7. Phantoms for Israel. (Under Sec. Katzenbach; Sec. Clifford)

  Symington pressure in Senate and increasing pressure from Israel, the candidates, etc.
- 8. Korean Civilians and Korean Light Division to Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford)

  Defense paper will be available tomorrow morning (June 19)
- 9. <u>Sentinel AMB System</u>. (Sec. Clifford)

  Report on letter to Senator Russell. (Tab B)
- 10. Lederer Article in Saturday Evening Post. (Sec. Clifford; Under Sec. Katzenbach
  Tab C. Questions and Answers
  Tab D. Letter to Sen. Russell from Sec. Clifford
- 11. Other.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cl., NAPA, Data 4-17-00

Walk. Rostow

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