

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#61a notes	of President's meeting with Tuesday Luncheon Group secret [sanitized NLJ 87-31, 6/20/89] <i>Closing removed 12/3/12</i>	5 p 06/25/68	A & C
#61d cable	to Paris (ref. 16928 and 16929) secret	3 p undated	A
#61f memo	to Mr. Clifford re: Arms control on the Seabed-proposed language secret	1 p 06/25/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings
June 25, 1968 - 1:20 p.m., Tuesday luncheon

Box 3

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✓ JUNE 25, 1968

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MEETING WITH TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler

General Taylor
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1968
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom
FROM: Tom Johnson

Enclosed are the notes of the President's Meeting with the Tuesday Luncheon group on June 25, 1968.

Those attending the meeting were:

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The meeting began at 1:20 p.m. and ended at 2:35 p.m.

Attachment

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP
JUNE 25, 1968

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-31
By JS, NARA, Date 6-20-89

Walt Rostow: The first item is the cable to Vance following up on Zoran-Shriver talk.

Under Secretary Katzenbach provided a copy of the cable (Appendix A).

The President: Have they let up on civilian attacks on Saigon.

General Wheeler: It has been about four days since they have attacked Saigon with rockets.

The President: Is that significant?

General Wheeler: No, I do not think so.

Secretary Clifford: Could it be the lull before the storm?

General Wheeler: It sure could.

The President: I think it may be.

CIA Director Helms: I agree.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The response time of Abrams to mortars is fantastic. It takes only 90 seconds.

General Wheeler: The 122 mm mortars have a range of seven miles.

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Secretary Clifford: We hope the Russians won't give them longer rockets.

General Wheeler: Saigon is 28 miles in size. It isn't hard to hit.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Ambassador Harriman has a theory about the Soviets which has merit. There is no use in dealing with them anywhere except at the top.

Walt Rostow: Proposal of language to India.

Ambassador Ball: We agree on the language.

General Taylor: Yes, I agree although all we are getting is old stuff about stopping the bombing.

The President: Does this sign us on to stop bombing if they do this.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: It comes close to it, but we have a way out.

If they agree to the DMZ, we will stop bombing. This is a complete demilitarization.

The President: Are you for this, Bus?

General Wheeler: Yes sir.

The President: Are we adequately protected?

General Wheeler: Yes sir. I believe so.

General Taylor: I would have difficulty with stopping the bombing in exchange for the DMZ. I don't think we should equate bombing to re-establishment of the DMZ.

Also, who will verify demilitarization of DMZ.

Walt Rostow: I have some uneasiness. It looks like a softer position than the one we gave Vance.

CIA Director Helms: I do not think a third party should decide what the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should assure us.

The President: Let them wait. Let's see what Vance gets out of the other one.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We can do that.

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Secretary Clifford: India as Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) will have some role to play in the final analysis. Maybe we should get them in on it now.

Walt Rostow: If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) will talk to us about conditions -- as the Soviets tell us -- we won't need this section on conditions.

The President: I do not want to make a proposal to stop the bombing through India.

Walt Rostow: We now have language agreed to by all bureaucracy on Seabed project. (Appendix B)

Ambassador Ball: We can live with this.

The President: What about the Pope's appeal for a ceasefire.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: This thing has taken us off the hook here.

The President: Draft him (the Pope) a letter saying we have gone along with a ceasefire in fourteen points -- in U Thant proposal, and in the State of the Union Message.

MIDDLE EAST

The President: George Ball is our Middle East man.

Ambassador Ball: We're getting in a trap in the Middle East. Jarring will come back with nothing.

The Russians and the UAR will come back into the Security Council asking for sanction.

If we veto, we're dead in the Middle East. I cannot today give you a proposal.

An American position must be made. It will take intense diplomacy.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The British want us to take joint initiative.

The President: Aren't they in a deep internal crisis?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes. To push them may create a crisis in their Cabinet.

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Under Secretary Katzenbach: You may want to send Arthur (Ambassador Goldberg) to Tel Aviv.

The President: Would he go?

Ambassador Ball: He would go.

The President: I am against the trip. Can't you give Jarring some imaginative innovations.

What about Battle or Sisco?

Ambassador Ball: Battle was Ambassador to the UAR.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Sisco would be good.

Ambassador Ball: Jarring

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The President: What about Vance?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: He would be fine. Also McGeorge Bundy would be good.

Secretary Clifford: We had a good vote on Sentinel. This was valuable to us. I talked to Senator Russell this morning. The Symington Amendment to cut our NATO forces to 50,000 will be attached to the Senate Appropriation Resolution as a rider.

The President: I do not want to de-escalate as long as I am here. I want to negotiate with the other side -- not throw in the towel as I go out. I will get rid of the fat. I don't want to lose any muscle.

I do not have much confidence in Symington's strategy on dealing with the Soviet.

I know Russell, Hill, and Mansfield and their views.

We need to trade hard with the Germans. I do not want to lose strength.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The NATO Resolution comes up today.

The President: Russell is against our involvement in the world. He thinks we cause trouble with our foreign aid.

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The President: Why did we have only 12,000 dependents when we said up to 25,000.

General Wheeler: We have said no to many dependents.

Secretary Clifford: We are bringing back 35,000.

We will get an alternative plan.

The President: Let's don't initiate a plan that weakens us.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: It has problems.

General Wheeler: Very serious problems.

Walt Rostow: We can't have a slippery-slope mentality.

The President: I do not want to yield this front from July to January.

General Wheeler: The Symington proposal is extreme.

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SERVICE SET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, June 25, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

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Agenda

1. Vietnam: Soviet response to President's letter. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Ambassador Thompson has a suggestion which will be presented by Katzenbach.

2. Indian Proposal. (Under Sect. Katzenbach; Sect. Clifford)

An agreed proposal or clear points for your decision should be available tomorrow.

3. Sea-bed Proposal. (Under Sect. Katzenbach; Sect. Clifford; Gen. Wheeler)

An agreed proposal should be available or clear points for your decision.

4. Cease-fire Situation: the Pope's Appeal, etc. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Sitrep.

5. Middle-East Report. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Sitrep, with growing concern that border fighting will increase.

6. Other.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3 4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DUA NARA, Date 3-7-91

W. Rostow

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memorandum for the President
Tuesday, June 12, 1956, 1:05 p.m.

1. Summary

2. Review of Border Response to Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

3. Admission of Thompson's letter as a suggestion which will be presented by
Katzenbach.

4. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

5. An agreed proposal for points for your decision should be
available tomorrow.

6. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

7. An agreed proposal for points for your decision

8. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

(Under Sec. 8, 1954)

9. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

10. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

11. Admission of Thompson's letter (Under Sec. 8, 1954) (Under Sec. 8, 1954)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982
B. D. W. NARA Date 2-7-91

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