

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a notes	Notes from 7/24/68 - 1:30 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Policy Advisors [Sanitized NLJ 87-31] Secret 3 pp.	7/24/68	A
#66 notes	Handwritten notes from 7/24/68 meeting Secret 11 pp.	7/24/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 3

RESTRICTION CODES

- 1) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- 2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- 3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 1429 (6-85)

SERVICE SET

64
JULY 24, 1968 - 1:30 p.m.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY
ADVISERS _ LUNCH

President
Sec. Rusk
Sec. Clifford
Gen. Taylor
Gen. Wheeler

Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1968

2 p.m.

65
rec'd
2/3/8

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of your meeting at the Tuesday lunch with your foreign policy advisers, July 24, 1968 in the Mansion.

Those attending the meeting were:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Maxwell Taylor
General Earle Wheeler

CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The meeting began at 1:30 p.m. The meeting ended at 3:50 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Det, NARA, Date 3-6-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting began: 1:30 p.m.
Meeting ended: 3:50 p.m.

LSa

NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT
WITH HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
AT LUNCH

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED

Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

July 24, 1968
In the Mansion 2nd Floor

Attending the meeting were:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Maxwell Taylor
General Earle Wheeler

CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The President: I want to sit down with Mr. Nixon to see what kind of world he really wants. When he gets the nomination he may be more responsible. He says he is for our position in Vietnam. He thinks Democrats will go the other way.

What should we do about the Democratic platform on Vietnam? Senator Mansfield rejects the "straws in the wind" statements.

The GOP may be of more help to us than the Democrats in the last few months.

Secretary Clifford: Ike said he would be glad to see me.

The President: Eisenhower has helped me in every critical thing I have asked him to help on. You would be good to talk with him.

Secretary Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking.

The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint.

Secretary Clifford: Every B-52 flight costs [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] \$48,000 from Guam.

The bombs cost \$31,000. I hope the targets are worth it.

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED

Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-31

By [REDACTED] NARA, Date 6/20/89

LIBRARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

- 2 -

General Wheeler: The commanders swear by them.

Secretary Rusk: I am for the use of equipment rather than men.

Secretary Clifford: \$1.2 billion will be spent in the B-52 program alone.

The President: Any comment on Paris?

Secretary Rusk: Hanoi is considering it.

The President: How did we come out with Honolulu?

Secretary Rusk: Pluses in Saigon. I was pleased with the conference.

The President: Chal Roberts built up false hopes.

Secretary Rusk: Nobody in our department thought the conference was anything other than Walt Rostow's backgrounder over there. said it was.

The President: Study Mansfield's letter and draft a reply.

The Czechoslovakian situation

Mr. Rostow: The Soviets will not move militarily against them, I do not think. I told House we are on the Czech side.

We should hold off on "Most Favored Nations" legislation in order not to cause a problem for the Czechs.

The continuing resolution - what does it do to DoD, Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy things. See what kind of resolution they will get.

Draft agreements on German nuclear consultations.

Secretary Clifford: We have letters between the President and the German Chancellor.

Secretary Rusk: This is an unavoidable step. We do not have any understanding with the Germans on this. This is in the right direction.

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY LOW LIBRARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

- 3 -

Secretary Clifford: I had hoped this might go away. I hoped we could maintain current establishment.

The President: Why do they require it now?

Mr. Rostow: Nuclear weapons were a toy, up until recent years.

The President: This is a good letter, well written.

Secretary Rusk: We saw the Czech situation as nearly over. The real crisis has subsided. We don't want to spoil the deal.

The President: Are you satisfied with our posture?

Belgian Tank Deal

Secretary Rusk: We should go ahead on that.

The President: O.K., go ahead with that. [REDACTED]

(A)(4)

Director Helms: We'll have to see the reply to your letter.

Gevena Disarmament Talks

Secretary Rusk: You couldn't get 20 votes for the offensive test ban treaty. Cutoff of fashionable material for peaceful purposes. [REDACTED]

(A)(4)

General Wheeler: I agree with what Dean Rusk has said. Security would be jeopardized by this.

I have no problem with what Dean says.

Secretary Rusk: We need to avoid public posture of pulling back from test bans

General Wheeler: The fashionable material report has never been circulated.

Secretary Rusk: We need Senator Russell to go along with us on the Symington amendment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

COPY LOW LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President
Wednesday, July 24, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. German nuclear consultations (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

Presentation of draft agreement to the President, previously approved in principle (see attachment).

2. Czech situation (Sect. Rusk, Mr. Helms)

Sitrep.

3. Honolulu and Vietnam (Sect. Rusk)

Follow-up in Paris talks on Honolulu decisions.

4. Belgian tank deal for Paks (Sect. Rusk)

Should we proceed to offer Belgian tanks or await Ayub's response to President's letter?

5. Geneva disarmament talks (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

What positions should we take on previously agreed items not included in President's draft because of JCS and AEC objections: comprehensive test ban and nuclear materials production cut-off.

6. Symington Amendment (Sect. Clifford)

Sitrep on Congressional position.

7. Other.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Det, NARA. Date 3-6-91

W. Rostow

TOP SECRET

65-

Draft Language for Report

Since the early 1950's the United States has carried a larger share of the defense burden of the North Atlantic area for a longer period of time than was anticipated. Moreover, today this country has great responsibilities for defense of other areas of major importance to world stability. Now that our European allies are back on their feet and doing well economically, we can reasonably expect them to carry a bigger share of the common load of defense and to draw more on their own resources for the defense of Europe.

Since World War II our European allies have gradually undertaken a larger share of the total European defense burden. United States forces now constitute 12% of the ground manpower in NATO Europe (with French troops excluded), and about 1/4 of the air forces. Of the 1.6 billion dollars in current U.S. military costs in Europe, approximately 1.1 to 1.3 billion is currently offset through cash receipts from arms purchases by our NATO allies and through financial measures, such as bond purchases, which they undertake to help relieve the American balance of payments deficit on the military account.

With the redeployment of part of the 24th Division and four air squadron redeployment from Germany (REFORGER/CRESTED CAP), U.S. authorized strength in Europe by September 1968 will have been reduced by a total of 51,000 military personnel and 36,000 dependents. These recent reductions, undertaken after close consultation with our NATO allies and in accordance with agreed Alliance procedures, have been achieved without undermining the

cohesiveness and strength of NATO and with the U.S. adhering steadfastly to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Over the years, therefore, it has been possible to make some gradual reductions in American troop levels and costs in Europe. It is the judgment of this committee, however, that a prosperous Western Europe is not making a fully reciprocal self-help effort in its own defense.

This year, on the 10th of May in Brussels, Secretary Clifford told the NATO Defense Ministers:

"While I cannot speak for future Administrations, I do not believe that it is realistic to assume that the United States will maintain the same level of ready forces deployed in Europe indefinitely into the future. I think it is inevitable that the European members of the Alliance should plan increasingly over the coming years to assume greater responsibility for the direct and immediate defense of Europe."

We commend Secretary Clifford for his forthright statement. What appears to be lacking, however, is a NATO program for the orderly and fair adjustment over a period of years of burden sharing among all the allies. This task is at the heart of effective force planning under the Atlantic Council and in its Defense Planning Committee.

The Alliance agencies should move expeditiously to develop a forward-looking program to assure that prospective reductions in American forces in Europe can be kept in phase with technological developments and, as needed, with the replacement of American forces by those of our European allies, and to assure that U.S. reductions do not diminish the bargaining power of NATO vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and East Europe or otherwise prejudice the prospects for meaningful negotiations with Warsaw Pact nations on mutual East-West force reductions in Europe.

It is the judgment of this committee that the Secretary of Defense should proceed without delay -- in full consultation with our allies and in accordance with regular Alliance processes -- to initiate such a NATO program for the orderly and equitable adjustment over a period of years of burden-sharing by all the allies in the common defense of the North Atlantic area, and to report to Congress not later than January 15, 1969 on the steps he has taken and on the progress achieved.

In this connection, the Committee recommends that special attention be given to ways of maintaining NATO combat capability to the maximum extent, while paring down wherever practicable expensive support activities and consolidating and simplifying the many-layered overhead structures and headquarters. The Committee also recommends that our government move faster to ameliorate the U.S. balance of payments deficit on the military account and the over-all American deficit by exploring additional joint and other arrangements with NATO countries.