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#16 paper	NSC Paper re 23rd UN General Assembly Confidential 7 p. <i>Open 1-10-89 NLS 86-159</i>	n.d.	A

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Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 4

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11/
SEPTEMBER 25, 1968

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

The President
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Ball
General Wheeler

CIA Director Helms
Secretary Fowler
USIA Director Marks
Assistant Secretary of
State Sisco
Tom Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Meeting began: 12:17 p.m.
Meeting ended: 1:40 p.m.

By isp, NARA. Date 11-23-88

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NOTES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
SEPTEMBER 25, 1968

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THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Ball
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Secretary Fowler
USIA Director Marks
Assistant Secretary of State Sisco
Tom Johnson

Ambassador Ball: The issues before the U. N. are:

1. The debate on Czechoslovakia. The Arabs won't support it.
2. The Middle East:

... Foreign Ministers of Arabs and Israel will be present at the General Assembly.

... The Arabs say no to direct talk with Israelis.

... Jarring will be present at the U. N.

... Israelis are still far from movement.

... Arabs are far ahead in propaganda race. They at least have given ideas for a form of settlement.

3. Biafra

... Hardships and suffering are enormous.

... Both sides are willing to sacrifice millions of lives to win political position.

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NO SET

... Very little food getting in.

... Africans do not want the U. N. in on it -- they say it's an African problem.

... I propose the President designate somebody to deal with humanitarian problems.

... There is great pressure to do something on it. We must help the ICRC and other international agencies.

... There is no change in the Chinese representation.

In summary, it will be routine.

Secretary Rusk: Major votes on major questions will not take place before the election.

Ambassador Ball: U Thant meddled too much in affairs with the Vietnam statement. All except the Communists see it that way. I do not expect a vote on this.

Assistant Secretary of State Sisco: That is the way most all nations see it.

The President: The President does not know of any plans for a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. I read Clifford and Wheeler's testimony. It doesn't say that.

Secretary Clifford: A Marine RLT is coming back, but it is being replaced by other troops. Congressman Lipscomb asked about the decrease in troops. We have no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. I cannot predict the return of any troops.

Secretary Clifford: We are preparing a statement to clarify this. There is no sort of plan to bring the number down.

General Wheeler: The examination of forces in Vietnam by Abrams was of logistic and administrative troops. We won't pull down -- we are able to knock this story down flatly.

Secretary Rusk: The prospects for peace in Paris are still dim.

The President: What does "other acts of war" include in the Hanoi demand?

CIA Director Helms: Overflights.

Secretary Rusk: Reconnaissance.

Secretary Rusk: There is still no progress on negotiations over the Spanish bases. They want \$500 - \$600 million.

They say the menace to Spain is greater because of the United States presence there. I have asked an extension of existing agreement for six months.

Ambassador Ball: General debate in the U. N. starts October 2.

The President: I would like us to review the following areas precisely:

1. Instructions to U. S. negotiators in Paris.
2. Their position on the bombing halt.
3. Their reaction to our instructions.

Secretary Rusk: The United States is in Paris on the basis of the March 31 speech. There is no agreed agenda. Our purpose -- peace in Southeast Asia (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia). We want to determine how the bombing can be stopped so it can lead us toward peace? -- So we want to know what will happen if we stop the bombing.

1. The Liberation Front can sit at the table. North Vietnam won't let South Vietnam sit at the table.
2. An agreement on Laos is important to us.
3. The territorial neutrality of Cambodia also is important.

Hanoi's delegation comes back with:

- ...stop bombing.
- ... get out of South Vietnam.
- ... The U. S. is the aggressor, they are the "victim."

There are three important points if the bombing is halted:

1. We could not keep up the halt if North Vietnam flooded across the DMZ.
2. If there were attacks on cities.
3. If talks proceeded without the South Vietnamese at the table.

North Vietnam still refuses to say what will happen if the bombing halts.

Therefore, what would happen if we stopped the bombing?

The President: If we stopped the bombing, nobody knows whether or not:

- A. The DMZ would be respected.
- B. South Vietnam could come to the table.
- C. The attacks on the cities would halt.

The President: What effect would this have on the morale of the men? (Referring to a bombing pause).

General Wheeler: It would have an adverse effect on:

- ... our troops
- ... South Vietnamese troops
- ... South Vietnamese people.

The President: What will the United Nations do on Vietnam?

Ambassador Ball: It will be mentioned. U Thant believes the bombing will be halted. He is intoxicated by microphone.

Secretary Clifford: Of the three items mentioned by Dean (Secretary Rusk), the shelling of cities can be a condition. Make it a "serious matter."

The DMZ and GVN -- presence of the GVN at the table should be an absolute condition.

The demilitarization at the DMZ -- proceed on an assumption of if we stop the bombing, they will not take advantage of it. It goes back to the San Antonio speech. I think the President should assume they will not take advantage of the pause.

(Bombing between 19th and 17th parallels constitutes 5000 men in effort. 95% of our force is preserved).

I think the President can give up 5% to take whatever risk -- to get substantive talks going. We could risk it. I think this is a minimal risk. I think there is a 65% chance this will pay off. The bombing could restart if it had to.

The morale of the troops could go down if nothing results. The troops want peace, I want peace.

We preserve 95% of our forces. We gamble with 5%. I think it will be successful.

Secretary Rusk: The incentives of North Vietnam would be affected -- what it takes to move us. They would move on to another point.

The President: They would move on to reconnaissance.

Ambassador Ball: I share Clark's (Secretary Clifford) view emphatically.

We are each "dug in" to doctrinal position, like Arabs and Israelis. There always are risks in war and peace. I do not think the risks are great. You can make assumptions on these points. We have blown the importance of this part of North Vietnam far out of proportion. We were told earlier that this is not very significant. Only 5% of our assets to damage the enemy would be at stake. I quarrel with Dean. There is an element of "face."

Secretary Rusk: What about "face" of other Orientals in the area -- Koreans, Thais, and others?

Ambassador Ball: We are doing the most in the war. The Communist theory of war is that they are helping out a revolution in the South. When they are attacked they are outraged. I think the Soviets want to help. They can't until war is reduced to war in the South.

Time pressures are on them to do something. We will kill a lot of American boys rather needlessly.

Secretary Rusk: Would you restart the bombing?

Ambassador Ball: I would ask for demilitarization at DMZ, bombing of cities. I would stop bombing to test their "good faith." I would stop it for a couple of weeks. The position of the United States will be infinitely better.

We are in a box. I believe they want a peace. They are scared to hell of Nixon -- afraid of his use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Fowler: What happens if we threaten to stop talk if they don't move?

Ambassador Ball: That would be terrible. I have spoken very indiscreetly here.

Secretary Rusk: There would be a lot of votes for Nixon if we get nothing for the bombing pause.

Ambassador Ball: He'll get them anyway.

The President: I am not hell-bent on agreement. We have done things

before on assumptions. We have been disappointed. When I make an assumption, I want a reason to make it. I doubt if all three things are sufficient to get us to stop it -- shelling, DMZ, South Vietnam.

Ambassador Ball: The situation is changed now. These tests haven't cost us that much. They give us strength in the eyes of the world.

The President: It will not be done now unless they indicate something.

General Wheeler: 1. We are in a strong position in Vietnam. There is good hard evidence of that. 2. The offensive operations against the North are far higher than 5%.

Secretary Clifford: I would place it about 5%.

General Wheeler: Naval and air campaigns are the only pressure we put on the North.

Ambassador Ball: The pressure is the men they are losing in the South.

General Wheeler: GIAP says they can go on losing men. Our operations are hurting him. The enemy can move forces and supplies right down to the combat area. War is nothing more than pressure. We can't resume bombing easily once we stop it. The morale of our forces would suffer.

Friends and enemies would interpret this as victory for Hanoi.

In summary, I cannot agree. 60% of the people think we should get concessions before. It is wrong militarily to stop pressure on the enemy who is increasingly weak.

I think it unwise politically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on what I have said.

Under Secretary Nitze: The alternatives are:

1. Proceed as we do now.
2. Ambassador Ball's alternative, but
 - ... continue reconnaissance
 - ... bring South Vietnamese to table on Day 1.

I don't think they would shoot down reconnaissance planes. I don't think they would appear with the South Vietnamese on Day 1. They would appear later.

USIA Director Marks: What would be military costs for two weeks if Ball's suggestion is adopted?

General Wheeler: It would take two or three weeks to mount up force. They could move artillery in two weeks.

USIA Director Marks: Reinforcements, but not offensive?

General Wheeler: Not a large attack.

Director Marks: How about casualties?

General Wheeler: There might be a large increase in casualties.

Secretary Rusk: Holding South Vietnam together would be the big problem.

USIA Director Marks: You would not have high costs for two weeks.

The President: If I thought they would do something I would jump at it.

USIA Director Marks: I would take the risk if Harriman and Vance thought it would pay off.

Secretary Clifford: This would be a test. We could raise three points. The Soviets think benefits would follow. But points are academic.

1. We stop the bombing.
2. We sit down to negotiate.

If they build up, they don't intend to negotiate. We then have done everything. We restart bombing and you can go as far as you want to.

The President: No, we will debate it as we did before. They will move all the time.

The President: We will not take this course if they don't

Secretary Clifford: If they agree GVN can come in to the table, I would pursue it.

The President: I want negotiators to pursue all three points.

- ... cities not attacked.
- ... DMZ re-established.
- ... GVN sit at table.

Those present voiced opinions as follows:

FOR

Clifford
Ball
Marks
Nitze

AGAINST

Rusk
Wheeler
The President

#

BALL: Issues before U.N.:

① get item on Czechoslovakia
Arabs won't support it.

② Middle East:

- + FM's of Arabs and Israel will be present at G.A.
- + Arabs say no direct talk with Israel.
- + Tarring will be present at U.N.
- + Israelis still far from movement.
- + Arabs far ahead in propaganda race. Give ideas for form of settlement.

③ Biafra

- + Hardships and suffering are enormous.
- + Both sides willing to sacrifice millions of lives to win political position.
- + Very little food getting in.
- + Africans do not want U.N. in on it - say it's an African problem.

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By JD NARA Date 7/10/91

+ I propose Pres. designate somebody to deal with humanitarian problems.

+ Great pressure to do something on it. We must help ICRC AND other international agencies

+ No change in Chinese representation

In summary, will be routine.

Secretary Rusk:

Major votes on major questions will not take place before election

Ball:

U Thant meddled too much in Affairs with Vietnam statement. All except Communists see it that way. I do not expect a vote on this.

Sisco:

U.N.

President:

President does not know of any troop withdrawal.

I read Clifford and Wheeler's testimony. That doesn't say it.

Clifford:

MARINE RLT coming back, but being replaced by other troops. Lipscomb asked about decrease in troops. We have no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. I cannot predict the return of any troops.

CC: We Are preparing A
statement to clarify this.
There is no sort of plan
to bring number down.

Wheeler:

Examination of forces in Un.
by Abrams of logistic
And administrative troops.
We won't pull down —
[REDACTED] we are able to
knock this down.

Rusk:

Prospects for peace in
Paris still dim.

Pres: What does "Acts
of war" include

Helm: Overflights

Rusk: Reconnaissance

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Jones call Ball About apt.

6

Rusk:

No progress on Spanish bases.
 They want \$500-\$600 million
 Say menace to Spain is greater
 because of US presence there.
 I have asked extension of
 existing [REDACTED] agreement
 for 6 months.

Ball:

General Debate starts Oct 20

Instructions to Negotiators
 Position on Bombing Halt
 Their reaction to our instructions

RUSK

- UN in Paris on basis of M 31
- No agreed agenda.
- Our purpose - Peace in SEA
 (Laos - Thailand - Cambodia)
- How can bombing be stopped
 so it can lead us towards peace.

So, we want to know what will happen if we stop bombing.

1. Liberation Front can sit at table. NVN won't let SUN sit at table.
2. Agreements on CAOS
3. Territorial neutrality of Cambodia.

They come back -

- stop bombing.
- get out of SUN.
- US is aggressor. They: "victim"

3 important points if bombing halted:

- 1) Could not keep up halt if NVN flooded across DMZ
- 2) if attacks on cities.
- 3) if talks proceeded without SUN at table.

NUN still refuses to say what will happen if bombing halts.

- What would happen if we stopped the bombing.

Pres:

If we stopped bombing, nobody knows if:

- A). DMZ would be respected.
- B). SUN could come to table.
- C). Attacks on cities would halt.

P: What effect would this have on morale of men
 (bombing pause)

Wheeler:

Adverse Effect on

- our troops
- SUN troops
- SUN people

P: What will UN do on Vietnam?

Ball: It will be mentioned.
U THANT believes bombing will
be halted. He is intoxicated by
micro phone.

Clifford:

Of 3 items mentioned
by Dean, shelling of cities
can be a "condition."
Make it a serious matter."

DMZ and GUN -
Presence of GUN at
table should be absolute
condition.

DMZ or DMZ: Proceed
on an assumption of
if we stop bombing they
will not take advantage of it.
Goes back to S. A. speech.

I think Pres. should assume they will not take advantage of pause.

[Bombing between 14th + 17th parallel constitutes 5,000 men in effort. 95% of our force is preserved

I think Pres. can give up 5% to take whatever risk - to get substantive talks going. We could risk it.

I think this is a minimal risk.

I think 65% chance this will pay off.

Bombing could restart.

Morale of troops could go down if nothing results. Troops want peace. I want peace.

(11)

We preserve 95% of force. We gamble with 5%. I think it will be successful.

Rusk: Incentives of NUN would be affected—what it takes to move us. They would move on to another point.

Pres: They would move on to reconnaissance

Ball: I share Clark's views emphatically.

We are each "dug in" to doctrinal position, like ARABS AND Israelis.

There Always are risk in warfare and Peace

(12.)

I do not think risks are great.

You can make assumptions on these points.

We have blown the importance of this part of WUN far out of proportion.

We were told earlier, this is not very significant. Only 5% of our assets to damage enemy are there

I agree / with Dean.

There is an element of "face."

Rusk: What about "face" of other Orientals in area - Koreans, Thais, and others.

Ball: We are doing the most in the WAR.

(13).

Communist theory of war
is that they are helping
out a revolution in South.
When they are attacked, they are outraged.
I think ~~that~~ Soviets
want to help. They
can't until war is
reduced to war in
South.

Time pressures are on them to do
something.

We will kill a lot of American
boys rather needlessly.

Rusk: would you restart
bombing?

Ball: I would ask for DMZ,
bombing of cities,

(14)

I would stop bombing to test
their "good faith."

- for couple of weeks.

Position of U.S. will be infinitely
better.

We are in a box. I believe they
want a peace. They are
scared to hell of Nixon -
afraid of his use of nuclear
weapons.

Fowler: What happens if we
threaten to stop talk
if they don't move.

Ball: That would be terrible

(15)

Ball: I have spoken very indiscreetly here.

Rusk: There would be a lot of votes for Nixon if we get nothing for bombing pause.

Ball: He'll get them anyway.

Pres: I am not hell-bent on agreement. We have done things before on assumptions. We have been disappointed.

When I make an assumption, I want a reason to make it.

I doubt if ~~any~~^{all} 3 things are sufficient to get us to stop it -

shelling

DMZ

SUN

(16)

Ball: Situation is changed now.

These tests haven't cost us that much.

They give us strength in eyes of world.

Pres: It will not be done now unless they indicate something.

Wheeler:

- 1- We are in strong pos. in Un. good hard evidence of that.
- 2- Offensive operations against North far higher than 5%.

Clifford:

I would place it about 5%

(17)

Wheeler: NAVAL + Air campaign
is only pressure we put
on North.

Ball:

Pressure is men they are
losing in South.

Wheeler: Giap says they can go on
losing men.

Our operations are hating
him.

Enemy can move forces +
supplies right down to
combat area.

War is nothing more
than pressure.

We can't resume
bombing easy once
we stop it

(18)

Morale of our forces would suffer.

Friends and enemies would interpret this as victory for Hanoi - as long as

In summary, I cannot agree. 60% of people think we should get concessions before

It is wrong militarily to stop pressure on enemy who is increasing weak.

Think it unwise politically

JCS agree on what I have said.

19

Undersecretary Nitze:

Alternatives

① Proceed as we do now

② Ball's alternative, but
- continue reconnaissance
- bring SUN to table
on Day 1.

- don't think they would shoot down recon. planes.
- don't think they would appear w/ SUN on Day one. would appear later.
- I think we can get

USIA Director Marks:

What would be mil. costs for 2 weeks if Ball's suggestion adopted?

Wheeler: It would take 2-3 weeks to mount up force. Could move artillery in 2 weeks.

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(20)

Marks: Reemployment, but
not offensive?

Wheeler: Not A large Attack.
Marks: How about casualties?

Wheeler:

Might be - large increase in
casualties.

Rush: Holding SUN together
would be big problem.

Marks: You would not have high
costs for 2 weeks.

Pres: If I thought they
would do something I would
jump at it.

Marks: I would take risk if
Harriman + Vance thought
it would pay off.

(21)

Clifford: This would be a test.

- We could raise 3 points.
- Soviets think benefits would follow
- Bus' points are academic.

- ① we stop bombing
- ② we sit down to neg.

If they build up, they don't
intend to negotiate

X We then have done
everything.

X we restart bombing
+ you can go as far
as you want.

X President: No, we
will debate it as
we did before.

They will move all the time.

(22)

P: We will not take this
course if they don't

A: If they agree GUN
come in on table
I would pursue it.

Pres: I want negotiators
to pursue all 3
points -

- cities not a Hack
- DMZ reestablished
- GUN sit at table.

(FOR:
Clifford
Ball
Marks
Nitze

Against:
Rust
Wheeler
Pres.

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Mr. Tom Johnson 14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

September 23, 1968

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING NO. 590

September 25, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

AGENDA

The 23rd UN General Assembly

Discussion of State Department paper circulated to Council members on September 23, 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 14, 1993
By VC/H NARS, Date 4-22-96

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached paper prepared by the State Department will serve as the basis of a National Security Council discussion of issues facing the UN General Assembly which opens this week. The Council meeting is now scheduled for 12:00 noon, September 25.

Bromley Smith

Bromley Smith

Attachment

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Deaf NARS, Date 4-22-86

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-11-VICE SET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NSC PAPERTHE 23RD UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLYI. Introduction

The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia will be the dominant theme of the general debate at the 23rd General Assembly, which opens on September 24. The Soviets would like to sweep the matter under the rug, but will surely react to criticism coming from a wide spectrum of countries by trying to divert attention with issues such as Viet-Nam and to reduce any discussion of Czechoslovakia to simple cold war terms. We can expect strident polemics on contentious international problems.

Although the situation in the Middle East remains a major problem, efforts to move toward a settlement will take place on the margin of the Assembly in the form of negotiations by Ambassador Jarring with the Arab and Israeli Foreign Ministers in New York at the beginning of the session. There will be a full debate on disarmament issues, but we do not expect any major initiatives or significant achievements. Discussion of Viet-Nam should be somewhat moderated by a desire to avoid complicating the Paris talks on that subject. There will be a desire to extend UN humanitarian assistance to the peoples of Nigeria, despite African sensitivities over outside intervention in the Nigerian civil war.

This will not be a historic General Assembly. The time is clearly not right for major new proposals for international cooperation. In the fields of international economic and scientific development and in disarmament there will be no outstanding new initiatives, though there may be some serious, realistic stocktaking as well as much inconsequential comment. There is nevertheless some scope for constructive movement on lesser matters of world concern.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4

NY 86-159By isp, NARA, Date 11-23-88~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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II. Major Issues

A. Czechoslovakia

On this subject, we fully intend to use the forum of the General Debate to concentrate the weight of the members' opprobrium on the Soviets. Our basic problem will be to maintain the psychological pressure in ways that give the Soviets the least scope for defending themselves. The Soviets will of course attempt to deflect attention by counterattacks on other issues (German "revanchism", Viet-Nam, and the Middle East) and generally will try to place Czech events in a cold war context in hopes of silencing the non-aligned countries that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention.

In determining what actions the Assembly might take concerning Czechoslovakia, there are at least three pertinent considerations for the U.S.: what would be helpful to the Czechs, what would keep world attention focused on the Soviet intervention, and what course of action would deter further Soviet adventures. On this basis, and bearing in mind the possibility of further developments inside Czechoslovakia before or during the session, we see four possible alternatives for General Assembly action on the Czech question:

(1) First, a specific agenda item on Czechoslovakia and an Assembly resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces.

(2) Second, a carefully phrased agenda item oriented to Europe which could serve to focus attention on the Czech question without specifically mentioning Czechoslovakia, while limiting Soviet ability to exploit non-European issues as a diversion.

(3) Third, a more broadly phrased agenda item calling, for example, on all states everywhere to refrain from interference in the affairs of others. This would presumably gain the greatest support for inscription, but would also

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be most difficult to steer toward the adoption of a meaningful resolution. It would give the greatest scope for Soviet counterattacks and major debates on issues such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.

(4) Fourth, avoiding a separate agenda item and instead concentrating our pressures on the Soviets in the general debate as well as in the discussion of every item relevant to the Soviets' misconduct--for example, those dealing with freedom of information, human rights, non-intervention, anti-colonialism, and friendly relations between states.

We have made soundings among delegations in New York and elsewhere to gauge the degree of interest in effective handling of the Czech question. Ambassador Ball and Assistant Secretary Sisco discussed this matter in the North Atlantic Council where they found great caution regarding the inscription of an item. The Latin Americans have similar reservations, as do Yugoslavia and Romania. The prospects thus are not good for a special agenda item centered on Czechoslovakia, unless the situation there deteriorates sharply.

B. The Middle East

The Arab-Israeli dispute in all its facets will be aired with customary polemics during the debate on the annual report of UNRWA (the Palestine refugee assistance organization). UNRWA's mandate expires in June 1969, and decisions regarding the future of the refugee relief organization will therefore have to be taken. In the end, we expect that UNRWA's mandate will be continued without substantial change for a period of three to five years. UNRWA is doing an effective job of caring for the refugees, and its dissolution, in the absence of a peaceful settlement, would only complicate present efforts to achieve peace and would add to instability in the area.

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The real center of action, however, will be off-stage, where we hope the gathering of Foreign Ministers will provide the occasion for serious substantive discussions between the Arabs and the Israelis through Ambassador Jarring, the Secretary-General's special representative. We continue to believe that a practicable Middle East settlement in the end must be based on the principles contained in the President's address of June 19, 1967 and the Security Council resolution of November 22. In short, the parties must be persuaded to engage in good-faith exchanges of views looking toward withdrawal of Israeli forces in the context of a real peace recognizing Israel's right to live, innocent maritime passage for its vessels in Suez and Tiran, and justice for the refugees. Given the increasing terrorism and violence in the area, there can be no certainty that Jarring will make any progress. If he fails to do so, the matter will again revert to the Security Council where the U.S. will face a very difficult situation.

C. Nigeria

The humanitarian aspects of the Nigerian situation will be aired in the General Debate and under human rights items. However, a specific agenda item on this matter is likely to face African opposition, since the Africans fear that any consideration would inevitably infringe upon the political aspects of the problem. The recent summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) clearly opposed UN involvement on the political aspects. Because of the sensitive political issues of secession and civil war, the African states continue to want to deal with the issue as an African matter within the OAU. A specific agenda item limited to the humanitarian aspects is doubtful.

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D. Disarmament

We do not expect significant fresh initiatives on disarmament in the Assembly, which after a full debate will probably refer most resolutions to the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) for more specific discussion. The Non-Nuclear Conference (NNC) at Geneva has--as expected--considered a number of harmful proposals bearing very directly upon Western security and use of our nuclear deterrent for individual and collective defensive purposes. The Conference has also generated unhelpful demands for creation of new international bodies to administer peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We believe it would not be possible to create new bodies as effective or as well organized as the existing structure of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Conference is also flirting with unrealistic proposals for peaceful nuclear (Plowshare) explosives; ironclad guarantees for assurances against nuclear attack or threats; and sweeping commitments for nuclear disarmament.

Even though the NNC lacks focus and expertise, many of its members seem nevertheless determined to perpetuate the conference by having it meet every year or two. We strongly oppose continuation of the conference after it concludes this month, convinced that it is far better to have arms control discussions carried on in the General Assembly, and in the ENDC, where both nuclear and non-nuclear powers are well represented by relatively expert personnel.

In addition to dealing with the results of the NNC, the General Assembly will have before it the report of the ENDC as well as a last-minute Soviet disarmament item quoting in full an earlier Soviet memorandum loaded with propaganda. Unfortunately, the overshadowing influence of the Czech crisis will hamper Soviet-American cooperation of the type which produced the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which could lead to negotiations to limit strategic nuclear delivery systems.

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E. Seabeds

For the second time, the Assembly will be considering ways in which, through international cooperation, the deep ocean floor can be exploited for peaceful purposes and in the common interest. Last month, the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds appointed last year concluded its work with a report outlining the problems in this area and highlighting the deep differences of opinion which must be overcome if deep seabed development is to take place in an orderly and beneficial way. Our long term objectives are support for the U.S.-sponsored International Decade of Ocean Exploration; an acceptable statement of legal principles to govern the exploration and use of the deep seabed; and a sound and verifiable agreement to ban nuclear weapons from the deep seabed. We will attempt to persuade General Assembly members that proceeding through consensus rather than numerical majorities is the only alternative to a basic split between underdeveloped and advanced countries which would frustrate the whole exercise. This will mean that very little progress will be made this year; the work will be carried on in a continuing Assembly committee.

F. Southern Africa

The situation in southern Africa will continue to occupy much of the Assembly's time and to demand difficult decisions. On Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa we have reached the point where there is little room to maneuver. Measures designed to persuade the white minority regimes of the need for change have not succeeded and in fact have been undercut by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future.

The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly call for adoption by the Security Council of punitive economic measures against South Africa and Portugal for violation of Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, the

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Africans will want the Assembly to call upon the Security Council to use economic and military sanctions to force South Africa to hand over administration of South West Africa to the United Nations.

We are prepared to support the implementation of measures already in effect while discouraging impractical proposals. We cannot condone apartheid, but we cannot agree to extending sanctions. We will continue to urge South Africa to explore with us and with the United Nations the means to move the South West African and Southern Rhodesian questions onto more productive ground.

G. Chinese Representation

The continued disarray on the Chinese mainland, Peking's role in Viet-Nam, the divisions among the Communist countries, and the absence of any marked improvement in Communist China's relations abroad have contributed to a lack of enthusiasm among influential members for Peking's admission. All signs point toward a repeat performance in the General Assembly's handling of this issue this year. The usual agenda item has been introduced calling for the expulsion of the Republic of China and the seating of Chinese Communists. We expect that a resolution to this effect will again be defeated, after the Assembly has reaffirmed that this issue is an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. We see no indication that the Assembly will favor the resolution setting up a study committee on this question, which has been rejected by the last two Assemblies.

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