

21  
OCTOBER 14, 1968

MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS

The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary Clifford  
General Wheeler

General Taylor  
Director Helms  
Walt Rostow  
George Christian  
Tom Johnson

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NOTES ON  
MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1968

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary Clifford  
General Wheeler  
General Taylor  
CIA Director Helms  
Walt Rostow  
George Christian  
Tom Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 87-33  
By 40 NARA, Date 5-19-89

General Wheeler: German military are working hard to improve their armed forces in face of the Czech crisis. The visit to Berlin by Secretary Clifford and myself was excellent.

Secretary Rusk: Europeans now realize that use of nuclear weapons is serious business and reliance on this won't necessarily save them.

The President: What about the NPT?

Secretary Clifford: The matter wasn't raised.

The President: What do you think of Abrams views?

General Wheeler: I agree with Abrams' views.

The President: Do you anticipate problems if we stop bombing if they include the Government of South Vietnam at the Conference Table, assuming we believe they will A. Stop shelling of cities and B. not take advantage of the DMZ.

General Wheeler: No sir.

The President: Can we restart the bombing easily if they violate the cities or the DMZ?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir.

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The President: What would happen militarily

- if the DMZ is not violated,
- if cities are not shelled, and they go "all out" on the ground?

General Wheeler: They couldn't get off the ground if they try to step up attacks. I agree with Abrams that it would take them two months to get back up to strength.

The President: I hear we are only operating in the cities.

General Wheeler: That's not true. We are out in the countryside.

The ARVN are doing an excellent job. We captured more weapons and killed many enemy last week.

If we get these three conditions it's okay. If they mount an offensive across the DMZ or on cities, we restart.

The President: You've been in this pause before. You're no virgin, Bus. Who will help you get started back.

General Wheeler: You, Sir, and me, and Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford.

The President: How will the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel?

General Wheeler: They will not be opposed to it. At least one will favor it. One will be reluctant. Others won't object to it.

I remember 37-day pause well. It was undertaken on the basis of pious hope. This is undertaken on the basis of three points.

The President: The Soviets said they needed at least 12 days and no more than 20 to get serious talks going.

What about the Soviets?

Secretary Rusk: We should hear soon.

Walt Rostow: The Communists will test us with minor violations. There should be rules of engagement for Abrams. I doubt that they would start with attacks across the DMZ or on the cities. We should tell the Soviets we have given field commanders freedom to respond to violations.

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The President: I thought we had told Abrams that.

General Wheeler: We have put that in cable.

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Walt Rostow: We must have this.

Secretary Rusk: If we get 15 rounds Abrams should be able to plaster the area from which this attack was launched.

Walt Rostow: If they will accept the GVN and are ready for serious talks, they won't break them up over engagements in the field.

The President: I feel they are hurting as a result of tenacity and endurance of our people. The ARVN has improved, but I doubt they feel they are going to bring about peace very quickly.

We must have solid answers to back up our taking this action. I won't continue fighting if there is reasonable prospect for getting terms. But I am not as optimistic as my colleagues.

If we expect they won't hit cities, violate the DMZ, and they will accept the GVN at the table, we can accept this as "almost anything." This will give us an opportunity for substantive discussions. All we have for taking firepower away is talks.

General Wheeler: The weather is bad in the DMZ area. There is six inches of rain predicted today. If the integrity of the DMZ is maintained, this is a military advantage to us. We can use sorties in Laos along the trail that would be used otherwise along the DMZ.

The President: What do we give up?

General Wheeler: Some pressure.

The President: But you shift it to Laos.

General Wheeler: That is correct.

Secretary Rusk: Abrams expresses considerable confidence. But if Hanoi demands new government in Saigon it might appeal to the New York Times. We will reject it. We do not want a "give away" schedule.

George Christian: They will cooperate for a period because they have endorsed the Vice President.

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The President: It's hard to sell a house at my price of \$40,000 if Lady Bird tells the buyer at the door that she would sell it for \$35,000 -- or if a Mac Bundy would sell it for \$30,000 -- or another Administration man wants to sell it for \$25,000.

We must sell our case on: 1. We don't give up much. 2. We can get back if it doesn't work.

Secretary Rusk: A speech by Bundy at this time was bad. This might throw Hanoi off the track.

Walt Rostow: I told him that. He said he must decide on the timing for himself.

Secretary Rusk: Hanoi could have come unhooked because of this.

Secretary Rusk: We must go to troop-contributing countries first to consult them.

The President: I do not know what I want to do yet here. This is not an easy decision for me. Many people will call it a "cheap political trick."

General Taylor: The pitfalls and loopholes are there. We must look at the contingencies and how we deal with them -- the marginal infractions and rocket attacks.

Secretary Rusk: We made it clear to the Russians and to Hanoi.

General Taylor: Abrams and Thieu said they may propose a ceasefire. We can't take off pressure in the South. They would be another Panmunjom.

Also, air reconnaissance must be part of the deal. We must also determine how the NLF will fit into that.

The President: Does "acts of war" include reconnaissance?

Secretary Rusk: It has been interpreted that way at times. We must and will have reconnaissance, particularly along the DMZ.

The President: Should we talk to the candidates first?

General Taylor: If elected, I would.

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- 5 -  
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk: Nixon is aware of all three points. He has great interest in getting this as far down the line as possible. Nixon wants a little more time if we move.

The President: He made that clear to me.

Secretary Rusk: I am concerned about the troop contributors. Thailand and Korea will understand. Gorton is more of a problem.

Secretary Rusk: The Sequence:

1. Go to troop contributors today.
2. Go to Vance-Harriman on instructions.

The President: Go to Vance-Harriman first.

Secretary Rusk: Go to:

1. Harriman- Vance.
2. Troop contributors.
3. Go to Hanoi.
4. If okay with Hanoi, go to candidates and key leaders.

1. Mansfield, 2. Dirksen, 3. Russell, 4. Albert, 5. Ford
6. Speaker.

The President: How many in State know.

Secretary Rusk: Four.

Secretary Clifford: The major equation is elementary.  
Taking Hanoi at its word and seeing if it really means what it says.

They said if we stop bombing North of the DMZ they will get down to serious talks.

I think they have dropped their four points in Paris.

The President: Do you think stopping the bombing will do it? What about "other acts of war."

Secretary Clifford: I think "stopping bombing" and "acts of war" does not include that. It includes planes dropping bombs and naval shelling.

The President: I thought other acts of war would include reconnaissance.

Secretary Clifford: I cannot go into it blindfolded. We have must have

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high-level, low-level and drones. We are going to test their good faith.

You keep three conditions. 1. GVN 2. Cities 3. DMZ.

There has been a shift by them on 1. The GVN. It is a condition precedent. And we have made 2. DMZ and 3. Cities assumptions. (Conditions subsequent).

We must let them know we will not accept mass infiltration across the DMZ or attacks on the cities.

If they do either, we restart the bombing. You can lay firm predicate for resumption.

The President: Would you favor resumption of bombing if they violate any of these three?

Secretary Clifford: Yes, Sir, I would.

The President: If they know what will happen and we know what will happen then that's good.

The President: They have implied they would have the GVN in talks and understand the other two points. Don't we have more today than ever before?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, we do.

Secretary Clifford: Yes, we do have.

I think there will be a lowering of level of combat when this happens.

Abrams has shown more flexibility and mobility than Westmoreland.

The President: I do not agree. I think Abrams has inherited most of this from Westmoreland.

The President: When Secretary Clifford came in, we made decisions on M16's and other things that has helped.

Secretary Clifford: There will be diminution in level of combat. I would not let up.

The President: What does "respect the DMZ" mean? What does "shelling cities" mean.

Secretary Clifford: The shelling of cities is easy to ascertain.

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Secretary Rusk: With the first rocket -- we would raise hell with the Hanoi delegation. With 20 rockets -- we would do some bombing.

The President: Abrams lists four rules of engagement. Do you agree with them?

Secretary Rusk: Yes.

Secretary Clifford: Yes.

The real threat is staging of 20,000 men or so North of the DMZ. We would warn the delegation and slug them.

The President: Why does Abrams feel different today than he did in August about the bombing.

1. The DMZ agreement -- will respect the deal.
2. The weather is much worse in October than in August.

General Wheeler: That is right, Sir.

We are going to test their faith.

Secretary Clifford: Kosygin's letter said if you stopped the bombing substantial benefits would flow. We now are taking him up. We need to send a letter to Kosygin from the President. It gives them a continuing responsibility.

The President: We said to Kosygin a meeting could bring about a start on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. We said we would give thought to continuing to pursue these things despite Czechoslovakia.

Secretary Rusk talked to Gromyko and leveled with him on three points. He got no contract on it.

Secretary Clifford: In view of that we need to keep this working with Kosygin.

Secretary Clifford: The timing of it is important.

The desire of people to try this road is overwhelming. We will have much support.

The three candidates should not be notified ahead of time. A leak now would be damaging.

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Secretary Rusk: My view of all this will be rather simple if true negotiating starts.

1. We have invested 28,000 dead and \$75 billion.
2. I will not accept giving North Vietnam one-half of South Vietnam or a part of South Vietnam or a coalition government.
3. I will insist that the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam go home; that the North Vietnamese in Laos go home. And a return to the 1962 Geneva Accords.

Electoral tricks we must watch for. Nixon has been honorable on Vietnam. We must give him a chance to roll with this. We must give him a chance to know about this.

He has actually been more responsible on this than our own candidate.

Secretary Clifford: He must be told a day in advance that this is a decision the President has made.

Secretary Rusk: I would have the President call him and emphasize the need for discretion and gravity of the situation.

Secretary Clifford: As soon as the decision is made don't let the date of the election concern you. The weight of public opinion is for this. It is too unwise to brief candidates on this much ahead.

I expect Nixon would play it fair with you. The security factor is so important.

Secretary Clifford: Troop contributing countries: We do not have to get commitments from them. We have carried the whole load. Australians have lost few. The Thais have lost only a few hundred. We could get a lead too easily. We could notify them about the time of release.

Secretary Rusk: We have had excellent results with Park, New Zealand, and Australia. I do not trust Marcos at all to hold it.

Walt Rostow: The Australian relationship is important.

Secretary Clifford: I recommend the President proceed on this. As soon as possible. There is more benefit than detriment. It will leave not a single stone unturned in your quest for peace.

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General Wheeler: 1. Get comments of Harriman and Vance. 2. Based on that, go ahead and make a decision to stop bombing on the basis of three points. We must have Hanoi agreement on GVN.

The President: You do not think the military risks are significant?

General Wheeler: Abrams and his people can handle it.

I prefer these conditions to those at the time of the 37-day pause.

General Taylor: I would make sure the GVN are at the Conference Table -- that reconnaissance will continue -- that cities and the DMZ are respected.

The President: What will you get today that you won't get three weeks from now.

General Taylor: I do not have the same sense of urgency.

Secretary Clifford: There comes a time in the tide of men's affairs that it is a time to move.

It is away (three weeks) from the election. It will receive commendation of the world and the country. I consider it a very real point to get the job done now.

CIA Director Helms: Bunker and Abrams point to the stake of North Vietnam in this. Negotiations will be miserable. They are not down yet. Still, I would take this step.

Secretary Rusk: I agree you should go ahead as soon as possible.

The President: Why, Dean?

Secretary Rusk: There is a major shift on Hanoi's part on role of GVN. There also is a good chance of performance on cities and the DMZ.

On the negative side, if we don't move we will be destroyed by the record now that they have agreed to do this. But, Hanoi is not buttoned up.

The President: I doubt if Hanoi is serious, but we must test if they are.

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The President: Le Duc Tho left Paris this morning for Moscow.  
What is the significance of it?

CIA Director Helms: There may be disagreement with the Soviets  
in light of Bundy's speech.

Secretary Rusk: Hanoi may have gotten unhorsed and the Soviets are  
trying to stay on the horse.

The President: What are the facts on the two times Drew Pearson says  
we blew peace.

Secretary Rusk: I never heard of it.

Secretary Clifford: Neither have I.

The President: Get the Bunker-Abrams wire to Vance - Harriman.  
I want them on board.

The President: Let's meet again this afternoon.

# # #

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Monday, Oct 14

10 A.M.

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Pres	Talfer
Rusk	Helms
Clifford	Christian
Wheeler	Rostow
	Johnson

Wheeler: German military are working  
hard to improve their armed forces  
in face of Czech crisis. The  
visit to Berlin by Clifford and  
me was excellent

Rusk: Europeans now realize that use  
of nuclear weapons is serious business  
and reliance on this won't necessarily  
save them

Pres: what about NPT

CC: Matter wasn't raised.

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By            NARA, Date 3-4-01



Pres. What do you think of  
Abrams views

Wheeler. I agree with Abrams'  
views. We are in excellent

Pres: Do you anticipate problems  
if we stop bombing if they  
include the GVN at conference table  
assuming we believe they will  
A) stop shelling of cities  
B) not take advantage of DMZ

Wheeler: No S.R.

Pres: Can we restart bombing  
easily if they violate  
the cities or the DMZ

Wheeler: Yes, sir

Pres What would happen  
militarily

- if DMZ not violated  
- if cities not shelled  
and they go "all out"  
on ground?

Wheeler: They couldn't get off  
the ground if they  
try to step up attacks.  
I agree with Abrams  
that it would take them  
2 months to get back up  
to strength

Pres: I hear we are only  
operating in the cities.

Wheeler: That's not true.  
We are out in countryside  
Arms are doing excellent job.

We captured more weapons and  
killed many enemy last week.

If we get these <sup>3</sup> conditions  
it's OK. If they ~~stay~~ mount  
offensive across DMZ or on cities, we retreat.  
Pres. You've been in this prase  
~~prase~~ before. You're no  
virgin, Bus. Who will  
help you get started  
back

Wheeler : You, sir, and me  
and Sec. Rush +  
Sec. Clifford

Pres. If assumptions don't  
work out

Pres. How will JCS feel

wheelers. They will not be  
opposed to it

at least I will favor it  
One will be reluctant  
Others won't object to it

I remember 37 days are  
well. It was undertaken  
on basis of pious hope.  
This is undertaken on  
basis of 3 points.

Pres. Soviets said they needed  
at least 12 days and no more than  
20 to get serious talks going.

Pres: what about Soviets?

Rush: we should hear soon.

Rostow: Communists will test us  
with minor violations

There should be rules of  
engagement for Abrams

I doubt they would start  
with attacks across DMZ  
or on cities. We should  
tell Soviets we have  
given field commanders  
freedom to respond to  
violations.

Ross: I thought we had told  
Abrams that

Wheeler: we have put that in cable.

Rostow: we must have this

Rusk: If we get 15 rounds  
Abrams should be able  
to plaster the area  
from which this  
attack was launched.

Rostow: If they will accept GVN  
and are ready for serious  
talks they won't break them  
up over engagements in  
field

Pres: I feel they are hurting  
as result of tenacity and  
endurance of our people.

Arvo has improved. But I doubt they feel they are going to bring about peace very quickly.

We must have solid answers to back up our taking this action.

I won't continue fighting if there is reasonable prospect for getting terms. But I am not as optimistic as my colleagues.

If we expect they won't hit dies, violate DMZ, and they will accept GVN at table we can accept this as "almost anything."

This will give us opportunity  
for substantive discussions.

all we have for taking firepower  
away is talks.

Weather: Weather is bad in DMZ  
area. There is 6 inches of  
rain predicted today.

If integrity of DMZ is  
maintained, this is a  
military advantage to us.

We can use sorties in  
Lars along the trail.  
that would be used otherwise  
along DMZ.



Pres: What do we give up?

Wheeler: Some pressure

Pres: But you shift it to Laos

Wheeler: That is correct.

Rusk: Abrams expresses considerable confidence.

But if Hanoi demands new govt. in Saigon it might appeal to N.Y. Times. We will reject it. We do not want a "give away" schedule.

Christian: They will cooperate for a period because they have endorsed HHH.

Pres: It's hard to sell a house  
at my price of \$40,000 if  
Lady Bird tells buyer at  
door she would sell it  
for \$35,000 — or if a  
Mac Bundy would sell it for  
\$30,000 — or another administrator  
man wants to sell it for \$25,000.

We must sell our case on:

- (1) we don't give up much
- (2) we can get back if it doesn't work

~~Do we expect to stop something~~

Rusk: A speech by Bundy  
at this time was bad.  
This might throw Hawaii off  
track.

Reston: I told him that. He said  
he must decide on timing for himself.

Rusk: Hanoi could have come unhooked because of this.

Rusk: We must go to troop-contributing countries first to consult them.

Pres: I do not know what I want to do yet here.

This is not an easy decision for me. Many people will call it a "cheap political track"

MAX Taylor: The pitfalls and  
loopholes are there. We must  
look at contingencies and how we  
deal with them

- marginal infractions  
rocket attacks

Rusk: We made it clear to  
Russians and Hanoi.

Taylor: Abrams and Thieu said they  
may propose a ceasefire

We can't take off pressure  
in South. That would  
be another Panmunjon.

Also, Air reconnaissance must be  
part of deal.

Taylor: We must also determine  
how NLF will fit into that.

Pres: Does "acts of war" include  
reconnaissance.

Rusk: It has been interpreted that  
way at times.

We must and will have  
reconnaissance, particularly  
along DMZ.

Pres: Should we talk to  
candidates 1st?

Taylor: If elected, I would.  
It would be that can't put to all three

Rusk: Nixon is aware of all 3 points. He has great interest in getting this as far down line as possible.

Nixon wants a little time if we move.

Pres: He made that clear to me.

Rusk: I am concerned about troop contributors. Thailand and Koreans will understand. Gorton is more of a problem.

Rusk:  
Sequence

- ① go to troop contributors today
- ② go to Vance-Harriman on instructions

Pres: go to Vance-Harriman 1st

Rusk: go to:  
① Harriman-Vance  
② Troop contributors  
③ go to Hanoi  
④ IF OK with Hanoi,  
go to candidates  
and key leaders

① Mansfield-② Dickson-③ Russell  
④ Albert-⑤ Ford-⑥ Specker

Pres: How many in State know

Rusk: four.

Clifford: Major equation is elementary.

Taking Hanoi at its word  
and seeing if it really means  
what it says.

They said if we stop bombing  
North of DMZ they will  
get down to serious talks.

I think they have dropped  
their 4 points in Paris.

Pres: Do you think stopping  
bombing only will do it?  
What about "other acts of war."



Clifford: I think "stopping bombing" And "Acts of war" does not include that. It includes planes dropping bombs And Naval shelling

Pres: I thought other acts of war would include reconnaissance

CC: I cannot go into it blind-folded. We must have high-level, low-level + drones

We Are going to test their good faith.

You keep 3 conditions

- (1) GUN
- (2) Cities
- (3) DMZ

There has been shift by them  
 on (1) GUN <sup>It is a condition precedent.</sup> and we have made  
 (2) DMZ And (3) Cities Assumptions  
 (CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT).

We must let them know we  
will not accept mass infiltration  
across DMZ or attacks on cities.

IF they do either, we start bombing.  
You can lay firm predicate for  
resumption.

Pres: would you favor resumption  
of bombing if they violate  
any of these 3?

CC: Yes, sir, I would.

Pres: If they know what will happen  
and we know what will happen  
then that's good.

Pres: They have implied they  
would have GUN in talks  
And understand the other 2  
points. Don't we have more today  
than ever before?  
Rusk: Yes, we do

Clifford: Yes, we do have.

I think there will be a lowering  
of level of COMBAT when THIS  
HAPPENS.

Abrams has shown more flexibility  
and mobility than ~~Abrams~~  
Westmoreland.

Pres: I do not agree. I think Abrams  
has inherited most of this from  
Westmoreland.

Pres: When C.C. came in, we made decisions on MIBs and other things that has helped.

CC: There will be diminution in level of combat. I would not let up.

Pres: What does "respect the DMZ" mean? What does "shelling cities" means.

CC: Shelling of cities is easy to ascertain.

Rusk: 1st rocket = we would raise hell with Hanoi delegation.  
20 rockets = we would do some bombing.

Pres: Abrams list 4 rules of engagement  
Do you agree with them?

Rusk: Yes

Clifford: Yes.

Real threat is staying of  
20,000 men also north of  
DMZ. We would warn  
delegation and slug them.

Pres: Why does Abrams feel different  
today than he did in August about bombing.

- 1) DMZ agreement - will respect the deal
- 2) Weather much worse in October  
than in August.

Whaler: That is right, sir.

We are going to test their faith.

CC: Kosygin's letter said if you stopped bombing substantial benefits would flow.

We now<sup>3</sup> are taking him up.  
We need to send a letter to Kosygin from President. It gives them a continuing responsibility.

Pres: We said to Kosygin a meeting could bring about a start on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. We said we would give thought to continuing to pursue these things despite Czechoslovakia.

Rusk talked to Gromyko and  
leveled with him on 3 points.  
He got no contract on it.

CC: In view of that we need  
to keep this working with  
Kosygin.

CC: Timing of it is important.

| Desire of people to try this road  
is overwhelming. We will have  
much support.

3 candidates should not be notified  
ahead of time.

Leak now would be damaging.

Dean Rusk: My view of All  
this will be rather simple if true  
negotiating starts.

- ① we have invested 28,000  
US dead And \$75 Billion
- ② I will not accept giving  
NUN  $\frac{1}{2}$  of SUN or a part of SUN  
or a coalition government.
- ③ I will insist that NUN in  
SUN go home; that  
NUN in Laos go home.  
And a return to the 1962  
Geneva accords.



Rusk: Electoral tricks we must watch for. Nixon has been honorable on Vietnam. We must give him a chance to roll with this. We must give him a chance to know about this.

X He has actually been more responsible on this than our own candidate.

QC: He must be told a day in advance that this is a decision the President has made.

Rusk: I would have President call him and emphasize the need for discretion and gravity of the situation..

OC: As soon as decision is made  
don't let date of action concern you.  
Weight of public opinion is for this, too  
Unwise to brief candidates on this  
much ahead.

I expect Nixon would play it fair  
with you. Security factor is so  
important.

Troop-contributing countries: We do  
not have to get commitments  
from them. We have  
carried the whole load.  
Australians have lost few.  
That's only a few hundred.

We could get a leak too  
easily. We could notify  
them about time of release.

Rusk: We have had excellent results with PARK, New Zealand, and Australia. I do not trust MARCOS at all to hold it.

Rostow: Australian relationship is important.

CC: I recommend Pres. proceed on this as soon as possible. There is more benefit than detriment.

It will leave not a single stone unturned in your quest for peace

Wheeler:

- 1) Get comments of Harriman + Vance
- 2) Based on that, go ahead + make a decision to stop bombing on basis of 3 points. Must have Hanoi agreement on GUN.

Pres: You do not think military risks are significant?

Wheeler: Abrams + his people can handle it.

I prefer these conditions to those at time of 37-day pause.

Taylor: I would make sure  
GUN are at conference  
table - that reconnaissance  
will continue - that  
cities and DMZ are  
respected

Pres: What will you get today  
that you won't get 3  
weeks from now

Taylor: I do not have same  
sense of urgency

CC: There comes a time in  
the tide of men's affairs  
that it is time to move.

It is away (3 weeks) from  
election. It will receive  
commemoration of world court.

I consider it A very real point to get the job done now.

Helms: Bunker and Abrams point to stake of NUN in this. Negotiations will be miserable. They are not done yet.

Still, I would take this step.

Rusk: I agree you should go ahead AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Pres: Why, Dean?

DRusk: There is A major shift  
on Hanoi's part on role of  
GUN.

There also is good chance  
of performance on cities  
and DMZ.

On negative side, if we don't  
move we will be destroyed by  
the record now that they  
have agreed to do this.

But, Hanoi is not buttoned up

Pres: I doubt Hanoi is serious,  
but we must test if they  
are.

Pres: Le Duc Tho left Paris  
this morning for Moscow.  
What is significance of it.

Holms: There may be disagreement  
with Soviets in light of  
Bundy's speech.

Rusk: Hanoi may have gotten  
unhorsed and Soviets  
are trying to stay on the  
horse.

Pres: What are the facts on 2  
times Drew Pearson says  
we blow peace.

Rusk: Never heard of J. L.  
Clifford: Neither have I.



THE WHITE HOUSE

D.R. : Week in N.Y. : U.N. meeting

C.C. + : in Germany : NATO meeting  
BLO.

28,000 dead  
\$75 Billion ( + NUN in SUN go home  
+ NUN in Laos go home  
+ 62 Geneva records )

Arranged to have them report on

Nuclear  
Kinings  
Berlin

Bunker - ABYAMS

Pres: Bunker - Abrams get wine to Vance-Harriman

I WANT THEM ON BOARD

P- Let's meet again this afternoon.