

(Mr. Braddock has seen)

This document consists of 2 page.  
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No 1 to Mr. Rubottoms  
Miro Cardona

30

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
July 6, 1960.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

The asylum of José Miró Cardona is, I think, very good news from our point of view. Miró Cardona had a couple of talks with President Dorticós last week. There was complete disagreement on (a) the University situation and (b) international relations. Miró Cardona was deeply shocked by the President's point of view. (I do not know why these should have come as a surprise to him, but apparently they did.) Dorticós told Miró that the Government would probably find it necessary to "intervene" the courts in view of the failure of the courts to cooperate with INRA and other revolutionary organisms. This information was relayed to me by Amoedo.

According to Amoedo, Miro's final decision to take asylum resulted from an attempt by the Government to involve him in the University situation. He was called on late on the afternoon of July 4 by a student group who told him that Fidel Castro, Dorticós, Cubela and others wanted him to be the man who would purify the faculties in the University. He managed to defer a decision for 24 hours although the students were very insistent that he make up his mind at once. Very early the next morning, acting by pre-arrangement with Amoedo, he achieved asylum.

Amoedo thinks that Miró will be the next President of Cuba and that the situation is deteriorating very rapidly so far as Castro is concerned. I hope he is right, but I

am

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

43

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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By ra/jc NARA, Date 3-16-09

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~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

am afraid Castro still has reserves in the form of more or less disciplined and well-armed mobs. Also I have not yet been impressed by the energy and courage or the organizational ability of opposition elements.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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*No 1 to Mr. Rubottom  
Junk w/ Prof. Roland  
T. Ely re Cuba / Communist  
Relations*

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
July 6, 1960.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

I took Professor Roland T. Ely home to lunch with me yesterday. Ely is the man who arranged for Fidel Castro's appearance at Princeton a year ago last April. He has always had a great interest in Cuba and in Latin American affairs generally. He has many Cuban relatives. He is on his way to Buenos Aires where, I understand, he is to give some lectures on economic topics. He is not particularly well thought of by members of my staff who have known him in the past.

I tend to consider him as a more or less well-meaning person, something like Bill Barnes of Harvard. He does apparently see a good many people of some influence at home, but I expect you know more about that than I do.

Ely, I think, just as Barnes did, fancies himself as a diplomat and believes that perhaps he can do something to improve relations between Cuba and the United States. He came to my Fourth of July party and told me that he had been seeing people high up in the Cuban Government. I asked him to lunch yesterday with the following results.

Ely refused to give the names of the people whom he saw since he had solemnly promised that he would not do so. This made the conversation less interesting to me than it might have been otherwise. He claimed that these

people

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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people are high up in the regime. He said that he posed the problem of Cuban-American relations, and that they told him that all could be settled if the United States could only agree to the following:

1. The United States should admit that the Cuban revolution is here to stay and should make a public statement to that effect, which would have the result of discouraging Carrillo and others from plotting against the regime.
2. The United States should admit that it is legitimate for Cubans to have objectives which are not reflected in the "American way of life."
3. The United States should take no economic actions because the Cuban Government has taken certain measures.

Dr. Ely stated that after these three points have been accepted by us the Cubans would be delighted to negotiate with us on a bilateral basis.

I gave Ely as much background on this whole situation as I could in the time available. He was not strongly impressed with his ability to absorb the realities of this situation as we see them. I do think, however, that I discouraged him from the belief that he could be a successful intermediary under present circumstances. I told him that the channel between the Embassy and the Foreign Office, as well as with other Ministries, is open and that if the Cubans have anything to say to us there is no reason why they should not do so directly.

By the way, Bill Barnes dropped in just before he left last week. He is thoroughly convinced that the illusions which he had when he came down here have no foundation.

Sincerely yours,

  
Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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- 1 - note in agreement w/ local rep.
- 2 - urgent treatment (beaten country)

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 By 9/10, NARA, Date 3/6/09

(1) U.S. admit resolution here to stop —  
 publicly — Cavillo, etc. are Ben though  
 stop plotting.  
~~no more~~

(2) admit. Cubans can have objectives which  
 are not  $\equiv$  as Amer. way of life.

(3) no economic sanctions for differing —  
~~no loans~~ just have mkt. have  
 feel for Cuban products — no handouts  
 — free trade — bilateral negotiations — not  
 unilateral.

after these 3 pts will discuss  
 anything.  
 1 → bonds — will give convertible.  $\equiv$  Germany  
~~not~~ can't pay back if unit buy. WWII debt

open U.S. Mkt. to competition w/ protection  
 for domestic producers & abolish  
 premium →

— restricting of Mex buy - threaten ("big stick") / Fidel Castro

Mr. Bradlock has seen

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Unilateral Actions;  
Sugar Quotas

No 1 to Mr. Rubottom

32

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 28, 1960.

JUN 29 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

The situation here is of course pretty hopeless. We are getting more and more into the field of unilateral actions by each party designed to retaliate for actions or attitudes of the other party and carried out with little or no prior discussion.

I venture the suggestion that we make a last attempt, when the question of fixing Cuban sugar quotas in accordance with currently proposed legislation comes up, to have some useful discussion. Before we make any determination, I would suggest that I be given an instruction to discuss with the Cubans at the highest possible level our proposed action and reasons therefor so that before we make any final decisions we can have the benefit of their views and possibly modify our action in the light of their reaction to my approaches.

I refer to the memorandum of your conversation on June 10 with Mr. Dillon. People here are already talking about the diversion of Cuba's expected quota additions to meet electoral commitments in the United States.

I doubt very much if we want to operate this business in such a way as "to take a good solid slap at Cuba". My view is that what we want is to be able to take action in defense of our interests as we see them and in a way that

will

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED  
3355

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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Authority FRUS 1958-60, Vol. VI  
By *Q* NARA Date 8/24/93

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

will be as convincing as possible to public opinion in Cuba as well as convincing to our own public opinion and to that in the other American republics.

Of course, the uncertainty that exists with regard to this whole matter is probably more helpful than not. But I would like to be able to discuss our proposed action with the Cubans before we take it.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

SECRET - EYES ONLY

*Call w/ Wm Barnes  
Copy No. 20 Cuban Situation*

34

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 28, 1960.

SECRET

Dear Dick:

I had a talk with William Barnes, the Assistant Dean of the Harvard Law School, yesterday. He and a professor Manning of Yale came to lunch with me. I think they are well-meaning but wholly uninformed about the realities of the Cuban situation. I am hopeful that they have learned a good deal about it, and that they will do relatively little harm. Of course, Barnes has a very high opinion of his diplomatic talents and of his ability to succeed where the rest of us have failed.

Dihigo is playing this International Law Academy thing in a very minor key, and there has been little or no publicity about it. But, of course, if the Cuban Government can get some of these professors, particularly those from the United States, to say some kind words about the Cuban revolution and some unkind words about the State Department they will be delighted.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

SECRET

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By *g/jc*, NARA, Date 3-16-09

# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

OUTGOING

AMBASSADOR

340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classification~~

Charge:

*[Handwritten signature]*

Control:

*Dictation*

Date: 277

June 14, 1960

SENT TO Secstate WASHINGTON - PRIORITY

3607

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

this afternoon

I had telephone call from William Barnes, Assistant Dean Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass, asking my view regarding proposed meeting of International Law Academy at Habana scheduled for June 22. Ernesto Dihigo, former Cuban Ambassador in Washington, is interested. Idea apparently is for a number of distinguished American lawyers to proceed with Barnes to Habana for this meeting. I told Barnes by telephone that conditions here had changed considerably as he would realize from reading papers and that I would convey views to him through Department. Suggest that Department telephone Barnes telling him that, while under normal circumstances, presence in Habana of distinguished American lawyers under his sponsorship and that of Dihigo would be most constructive, probability is, under conditions prevailing here, GOC would exploit fact of this meeting for its own purposes even through organization of private in view relations between our two governments, particularly since Dorticos tour and recent Castro tirades. I believe he will agree that he and his group should suspend trip to Cuba for present. Emphasize undesirability my advice this respect being publicized and stress

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*By g/jc* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

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# TELEGRAM

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Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

Charge:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

Control: 277

Date: June 15, 1960

-2-

my appreciation Barnes' constructive interest in inter-American relations. I have not discussed this with Dihigo.

BONSAL  
1003

PWBonsal:vk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM FS 413P  
3-1-55

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AIR MAIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1960  
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA,  
HABANA

JUN 23 1960

Dear Phil:

I was interested in the comments in your letter of June 2 concerning the invitation that Mrs. Lord received to visit Habana in the near future. I agree with your estimate of Mrs. Lord's intelligence, discretion and good will. When Mrs. Lord called on me recently she told me about the invitation. She was doubtful that it was timely for her to go to Cuba. I agreed and suggested that she find an excuse to stay away at this time.

Since receiving your letter we have checked with the interested people and have been informed that Mrs. Lord has already declined the invitation. I believe this was the proper decision, since I believe that the disadvantages of a trip of this kind would probably outweigh the advantages at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

*Dick*  
R. R. Rubottom, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

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By *g/jc* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

*Possible Visit of Mary Lord (Mrs Oswald B. Lord) to Havana*

36a

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 2, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

It has been suggested to me that it might be desirable for Mary Lord (Mrs. Oswald B. Lord) to visit Habana in the near future. She has an invitation from Mrs. Gilbert Smith, a prominent member of the American colony and a person who is very active in all sorts of good causes. The idea would be that Mary would make an informal visit here and would get in touch with a number of people who could tell her about the present state of human rights, including the rights of political prisoners, in Cuba; and might perhaps thereafter be able to play a useful role in telling the truth about Cuba.

I must say that the idea rather appeals to me but I do not wish to give it even my unofficial blessing without checking with you. You may wish to have Francis Wilcox or some of his people consulted, as well perhaps, on an informal and very discreet basis, Ambassador Lodge. I have a very high opinion of Mary Lord's intelligence, discretion, and good will.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

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By *rg/jc*, NARA, Date *3-16-09*

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(Mr. Braddock has seen)  
Jety w/  
ECLA Rep re his lunch  
w/ Boti

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 20, 1960.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

Alfonso Santa Cruz came to see me today. He is a Chilean who represents the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL) in Mexico City. His brother is Hernan Santa Cruz who is connected with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.

Santa Cruz is spending a very few days here looking into the work of the ECLA men who were sent here to assist Boti in the Ministry of Economy. He said he had just been having lunch with Boti. The latter had told him that the Cuban Government is disposed to negotiate with us on all pending points but that we should make a categorical statement to the effect that we would not invade Cuba militarily. I gave Santa Cruz as many of the facts of life as I could in the brief time at our disposal. I told him that since these ECLA people had been sent here a very radical change had taken place in the orientation and policies of the Cuban Government. I said that in its dealings with the United States the Cuban Government has shown profound hostility, expressed in the most cynical and unscrupulous terms. I told him that there was no difference between the treatment of the United States by the Communist daily here, by Revolución, and by Pravda. I said that increasing numbers of Cubans were convinced of the Communist orientation of the regime in domestic matters. I asked him if he had heard Guevara's speech on June 18. He said that he had.

I think

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED  
3258

JUN 22 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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By g/jc NARA, Date 3-16-09

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

I think Santa Cruz was quite impressed by what I told him. He said that he was aware of my sound, generally liberal outlook, and of the policies which I had favored and worked for in Bolivia. He will, I think, convey to Prebisch, whom he is meeting in New York, my very strong views on the present orientation of the Government to which I am accredited. I do not see any point in pulling any punches on this at this very late date.

Sincerely yours,



Philip W. Bonsal

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PWBonsal:vk

PRESERVATION COPY

(Mr. Braddock has seen)

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 20, 1960.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Dick:

I have just had a call from Tex Brewer of ESSO. He states that neither his company nor Shell nor Texas has had any reply to their letters to Ché Guevara declining the offer of Russian crude. There have, of course, been threatening statements by Castro, Guevara and others on the subject. Undoubtedly the Cubans are engaged in exploring the question of alternative sources and in making action plans based on their findings.

Tex tells me that by the end of the month, the American personnel of his company will be reduced to two individuals. He anticipates that the Government may issue a law making it a criminal offense for an oil company to refuse to refine crude offered by the Government. In this case, the Americans will be removed, and the Cuban employees left in charge will comply with the law. However, at the same time, the companies will shut off crude from traditional sources, thus bringing about a serious crisis, and making it essential for the Government to find large amounts of additional crude from Russian or other sources. (As I understand it, the currently acquired Russian crude for the last half of this calendar year amounts to 900,000 tons and the balance which would have been supplied by the companies, in the event they accepted the Russian crude, would have been 1,100,000 tons.)

There are rumors here to the effect that Shell may be thinking of breaking the united front of the companies. Brewer discounts these rumors and so do I. I have seen the Shell Manager within the last couple of days. On the other hand,

Shell

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED  
3256 JUN 22 1960

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By g/jc NARA, Date 3-16-09

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Shell is in a more vulnerable position with the Cuban Government than are the American companies, according to Brewer. It is therefore possible that the Government may resolve this situation by intervening Shell, in which case, Brewer tells me, the other companies would cut off traditional supplies. Brewer is quite pleased with the most recent Venezuelan reaction (Perez Alfonso's statement last week). Brewer thinks that the crisis will develop in the first 10 or 15 days of July.

I assume that we are in close touch with the British Government and that you will keep me informed of developments which come to the Department's attention from British or from oil company sources as well as from other circles.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET~~

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Copy no 2  
Gib's Chron  
Italian Arms Deal

39

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 18, 1960.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Dick:

On the Italian arms deal, my understanding is that the Cuban Government did succeed in blackmailing the Italians on the Barletta matter, and that they got 12 105 Howitzers in return for Barletta's release. My Italian colleague tells me that all this was fully communicated to the Department and discussed by Ambassador Brosio. I have had no information on any such discussions. I told the Italian Ambassador, Livio Theodoli, that I thought it was extremely regrettable that these Howitzers had been released. I asked him when they would arrive here. He does not know.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET~~

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*Ecuadorian Amb's  
Plan to go to Ecuador*

41

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 13, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

I have just been lunching with my good friend Virgilio Chiriboga, the Ecuadorian Ambassador here. He is planning to return to Ecuador for a visit of some six weeks. He should be arriving in Quito about June 23. The principal purpose of his trip is to brief President-elect Velasco Ibarra about the Cuban situation.

Chiriboga has been here for about four years. He is one of my most valued colleagues. He is a good friend of the United States. He is fully aware of the threat to the entire Western position implicit in what is going on here. He is very hopeful that the attitude of Velasco Ibarra and his Government will be constructive from our point of view. He himself intends to make an all-out effort to that end.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Chris Ravndal so that, if he has an opportunity, he can keep in touch with Chiriboga (a cousin of the Washington Chiriboga) and feed him any available new information which may develop on happenings in Cuba, and our reaction to them, during Chiriboga's stay in Quito.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

cc: Amb. Ravndal

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

PWBonsal:vk

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By rg/jc, NARA, Date 3/16-09

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4/a

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 18, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

I refer to my letter of June 13 regarding the plan of my Ecuadorian colleague, Virgilio Chiriboga, to visit his country next month. He has now canceled that plan. I gather that some friends have told him that it would not look well for him to go back at this at this time; it would be considered an attempt to insure his position with the new regime. He, therefore, does not plan to make this trip until after the inauguration of Velasco Ibarra on September 1.

However, Chiriboga is planning to visit the United States and will probably be in Washington some time in the next ten days or two weeks. He will be staying at the Alban Towers. I will advise Bob Stevenson of his exact plans by telegram. I think it would be useful for some of you in Washington to talk to him. He would, I gather, prefer not to go to the Department but perhaps something could be worked out in somebody's home.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

cc: Ambassador Ravndal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Mr. Bradlock  
has seen 6/23*

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA,  
HABANA

June 13, 1960

42

JUN 23 1960

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Dear Phil:

This is in reply to your letters of May 19, May 31, June 3 and June 6. With respect to the word you received from Dr. Wendell S. Dove, who in all honesty I do not recall, I think you are on sound ground in thinking it not worthwhile to try to do anything about the episode he described. I can imagine how such news makes you feel but, even assuming the complete authenticity of the report, you are capable of lifting yourself above that kind of talk. This will give you no satisfaction, I fully realize, since I have gone through some of the same experience.

My hour of meeting with Pujol on Saturday was very interesting. He is an articulate person with a ring of genuineness which should be heard by many of our Latin American friends. He had already been in touch with a few of the Cuban dissidents in the Florida area and was expecting to see some more in New York. He is convinced that Cuba is under communist domination. It was reassuring to hear him say that our policy up until now had been correct and to add his belief that no one with a touch of the Batista brush on him should participate in the "new Cuba".

I am shocked that your Latin American colleagues have heard nothing about the Dorticos visit except the Prensa Latina line which has done a complete brainwashing of the Cuban public. You are dead right in taking a pessimistic line with Miró Cardona. If Castro had ever considered shifting his policy lines, he has obviously given up such an idea. The rantings of the past few days have reached a new high in stridency and a new low in vilification of the United States.

With respect to your talk with Tex Brewer I can well understand how you felt on learning what had transpired here. You are correct in assuming that the course of action had been laid out before you received the text of the Aide Memoire, and I do not challenge at all your modest suggestion that the Embassy might have helped in drafting the paper.

Actually,

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

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By *g/jc* NARA, Date 8-16-09

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Actually, the die was cast at the meeting in Secretary Anderson's office on June 3. Tom Mann had returned from Mexico that weekend and went into the meeting completely cold. I knew about the meeting only because Tom was good enough to call me a few minutes before he departed for it, and we did try to come up with a common line. Once the Anderson statement had been made, and the companies had agreed not to go along with the processing of Russian crude, we had to determine the best way to deal with a situation which would soon be de hecho.

Here my own views largely prevailed. Rather than react to the Cuban blast, which had to be expected, when the government learned of the oil companies' decision, I thought we ought to have a backdrop covering the whole gamut of our relations with Cuba so that the oil companies' decision would come into better perspective. The statement was designed to serve as a backdrop and concomitantly to take the offensive in the light of Dorticos' disgraceful attacks on us in his first 3 stops. I also thought that it would be helpful to us in the all out effort we are having to make to get the Administration's version of the sugar bill, or at least a satisfactory compromise with the Cooley version. In this regard, I was glad to have your analysis on page 4 about some of the possible advantages that might flow from the decision that was taken. Incidentally, that decision was thoroughly ironed out with the Justice Department (Anti-Trust Division) and our own Legal Adviser.

Of course, we want the Embassy's advice on Cuban policy and we undertake to obtain it wherever possible. You struck a particularly sensitive point with me in the final paragraph of your June 6 letter. The safety of Americans in Cuba practically never eludes my mind and conscience. While I thought that we could take the calculated risk that this decision involved, it was obvious that the Texas Company wanted to cut its own dependents down to the absolute minimum, and Esso has already been doing that. In fact, any American enterprise in Cuba should be quietly taking similar steps, it seems to me.

Wishing you all the best,

Sincerely,



R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

*4th of July Reception*

43

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 11, 1960.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dear Dick:

Under present circumstances, I do not contemplate giving the usual Fourth of July reception for Cuban officials, the Diplomatic Corps, etc. I will probably confine myself to a reception for the leading Americans in Cuba but even that is not firm yet.

I will have to appear at the July fourth breakfast of the American Club and will be called upon for some remarks. I am working on this matter and will be in touch with you later.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*Assessment of  
material re Cuba*

This document consists of 1 page.  
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*No 1 to Mr. Rubottom  
No 3 ~~Amherst~~ ~~Pending~~*

44

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 10, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

SECRET

Dear Dick:

*attached*  
I received your official-informal secret letter of June 9. I am in the fullest agreement as to the importance of the effort and will be glad to cooperate to the extent possible. I am sure that you agree that this type of information channeled through respectable Cuban sources or respectable Latin American sources is apt to be most effective--much more so than if it comes from United States sources, even unofficial.


I believe that the WRUL programs with Vargas Gomez, Tony Varona and others are being useful. If it were possible to have these programs reproduced and circulated here on a clandestine hand-to-hand basis, this would be most valuable.

Sincerely yours,

*PWB*

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Mr. R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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OFFICIAL INFORMAL  
~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1960  
Rec'd 6/9 Reply by 6/10/60  
B-W Bonsal:VR

Dear Phil:

Our discussions about Cuba with the Secretary, Livie Merchant, and others--as well as the NSC discussions of the situation there-- have made clear the firm decision of the Government to do everything possible to get the true, discrediting facts about the Castro regime into public information media in the other American Republics as well as to Latin American governments.

Underlying this concept is the belief that the wire services do not report on Cuban developments with sufficient depth and with sufficient creditability to influence Latin American opinion to the extent necessary and that an under-staffed diplomatic representation of Latin American countries in Habana also cannot be counted on to get the full story to their own governments. It is, therefore, essential that the United States, using the utmost discretion, play an active role in getting the facts to the rest of the hemisphere; otherwise we cannot expect the other American Republics to see the situation in the same light as we do.

As I believe you are aware, we long ago established a Task Force which has the primary task of coordinating the dissemination of un-attributed information between the Department, the USIA, and another agency of the Government. In addition, we have now established within ARA a small section under Harry Sylvester (who succeeded Dick Cushing) to prepare and disseminate material on an unattributed basis

through

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS 1958-60, Vol. VI pp. 932-933  
By [initials], NARA, Date 8/24/93

~~SECRET~~

-2-

through these channels on a daily basis. To date the efforts of the various agencies have, in my opinion, made an important contribution to the increasing realization in Latin America of what is actually going on in Cuba. We are generally satisfied with the trend of the public and governmental opinion in the area, but believe that this effort must be further accelerated if we are effectively to isolate Castro and to neutralize and counter the extensive propaganda effort which he, and the Communists on his behalf, are mounting everywhere. Perhaps the most important remaining task in this field is to dissolve or at least dilute the remaining pro-Castro sentiment among such groups as students and labor leaders. It is apprehension about the reaction of these pro-Castro elements that more than anything else inhibits governments from taking a more forceful anti-Castro line.

Your Embassy is expected to play an important role in this effort, especially by making available an adequate amount of information of low enough security classification to be used in unattributed ways. The Embassy has sent in many valuable reports which, however, are of such high classification that they cannot readily be used for this purpose. We also need, on a daily basis, usable information--including human interest material--which will illustrate what is actually going on in the universities, the militarization of labor, the cost of living, arrests, and violations of human rights, etc.

I would be grateful if you would take personal charge of this effort and assure that we have the material that we need to carry forward this part of our work, which I believe to be indispensable if we are to have the support of the American Republics in our policy. We have spoken here with the representatives of USIA and of the other agencies, and I am sure that you will find them more than willing to have their representatives play a full role in the project.

Sincerely yours,

  
R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

~~SECRET~~

45g

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Bonne Mtg w/ Cardona  
re US / Cu Retation  
(Long Rail, La Coubre, Trade Retation,  
Argarion Reform Law, )

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
May 23, 1960.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

MAY 25 1960

Dear Dick:

José Miró Cardona, the Cuban Ambassador designate to Washington, lunched with me on Saturday, the 21st. We were together for about three hours. The conversation was cordial and I hope constructive.

Miró Cardona made a point of the fact that he would not have accepted the appointment to Washington unless he thought he could make a real contribution to the improvement in relations. He referred to his own convictions, which he described as Catholic, Democratic, and, in general, pro-United States.

After we had finished with the preliminary platitudes, I gave Miró Cardona as full a description of the current state of United States-Cuban relations as I could. I described our early sympathy with the revolution, our attempts to establish a basis for cooperation with Castro and his regime, and the malevolent and often cynical attitude of hostility adopted toward the United States by Castro and his leading followers. I described particularly such incidents as the Diaz Lanz leaflet raid of last October and Castro's accusations in connection with La Coubre. I also dwelt on the use which has been made of our property identification notice to slander and to vilify the Embassy, our Government and myself. I said that I knew that this latter action had been taken with Castro's own approval.

I then

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED  
2975

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *gjc* NARA, Date 3-16-07

I then described to Miró Cardona our current trade relations. I recalled that we had been willing last summer to engage in tariff negotiations and that we had indicated a constructive understanding of the Cuban desire to use their tariff for a stimulation of industrialization and the diversification of agricultural production in Cuba with the object of producing the high level of unemployment here. I stated that these negotiations had been dropped because the Cuban Government eventually decided to proceed on a unilateral basis to curtail imports from the United States by means of exchange taxes and also to take other steps which have had the result of diverting imports from the United States to other countries, including countries behind the Iron Curtain. I told him that I was not raising the right of the Cuban Government to take these steps, although I regretted that they were being taken unilaterally and generally in an atmosphere of hostility toward us. I told him that the trade relationship between our two countries was being seriously altered by these actions. Heretofore, the two countries have enjoyed a preferential relationship under which Cuba gets a market in the United States for a considerable amount of sugar at a price well above the world market. In return the United States enjoys certain preferential duties in Cuba for American exports. The relationship is a reciprocal one which is now being destroyed by unilateral Cuban action. I said that if the process continues, I could envisage the possibility of our having to recognize that the old preferential relationship no longer exists and that we would have to request that the Cubans give us most favored nation treatment. Under this, we would agree to buy a certain amount of sugar from Cuba at the world price and, in turn, Cuba would accept payment for 80 per cent of the value of this sugar in American goods. Those are the Russian terms of trade. I made clear, of course, that I was not talking of any official or imminent position, but was trying to give him an idea of the way we were traveling.

I then took up with Dr. Miró Cardona the problem created by the Agrarian Reform law. I described the presentation which we have made on this subject. I told him that our communications to the Cuban Government

regarding

regarding numerous cases, in which our citizens had been despoiled without even the protection of Cuban law, had been practically disregarded. I stressed our view as to the treatment which our nationals should receive. In my next talk with Miró Cardona I will go over these questions in considerably more detail.

I then reverted to the highly unfavorable atmosphere created by the Cuban Government's constant harping on the theme of imminent aggression from the United States. I said that I did not see how Cuban-American relations could be normalized if the Cuban Government's propaganda policy toward us, as expressed through its leaders and through its diplomatic representatives in many countries, as well as through the Government-financed press and radio, continued to reflect hostility through unscrupulous and cynical calumny and slander.

Dr. Miró Cardona was somewhat taken aback by the picture which I painted for him. He said that he hoped to see Dr. Castro in the near future in order to discuss his mission to Washington. He attempted in some measure to excuse some of the Government's excesses by allusions to the fact of the revolution and also to such things as illegal plane flights and the activities of the notorious Senate Subcommittee. He said that these facts had caused serious disturbance among the Cuban people.

Miró Cardona agreed, however, that an improvement in Cuban-American relations could hardly be expected against the present backdrop of anti-United States propaganda on the part of Cuba. He said that he would talk very seriously to Dr. Castro on this subject, and that he would endeavor to obtain some definite commitments prior to his departure.

I am frankly keeping my fingers crossed about Miró's real attitude and the extent to which he may be expected to play a courageous role. I intend to continue meeting with him from time to time. He is a good deal more pleasant to talk with than the other people in the Government. I doubt whether he will proceed to Washington before Dorticós' return from his South American trip on June 14, but I have not definite information.

Roa and Miró are definitely not friends. In fact, if Miró's views are as stated by him, I do not see how he

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-4-

can work for this government; but we live in an age of miracles!

Incidentally, Miró is a bitter enemy of Waldo Medina, the recently deposed head of the legal department of INRA. This is all to the good.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

PRESERVATION COPY

*Pujol Mtg w/ Board  
re Cuba/US Relations*

This document consists of 2 pages.

Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series A.

No 1 to Mrs. Rubottom

45h

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
May 24, 1960.

MAY 25 1960

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

This will supplement the letter in which I gave Ambassador Amoedo's account of the dinner which he, his Brazilian colleague, and Guillermo Alonso Pujol had with former President Prio.

Pujol has just lunched with me. He was loud in his praise of the way in which the Brazilian Ambassador particularly expounded the doctrine of the Inter-American System, the Communist menace, and the need for good relations between Cuba and the United States against a background of the course being taken by the present Cuban Government. Pujol says, however, that the only commitment which Prio made was that he would have a talk with Castro prior to his (Prio's) forthcoming trip to Hawaii and Japan, and that in the course of the trip he would refrain from making pro-Castro statements as he has done in the past. Pujol himself is leaving here next Wednesday, June 1. He intends to spend a few days in Palm Beach and will then go to New York and Washington. When in Washington he will try to call on you. I recommend that you see him if you possibly can. He is a former Senator and was Prio's Vice President. He is now 61 years old and in precarious health. He regards himself as an elder statesman.

Pujol asked why we are not doing more in Cuba to counteract the warped version of the Cuban-American history which the Government is putting out. I told him

that

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED

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~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *gpc*, NARA, Date *3-16-09*

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

that perhaps we should be doing something in this line but that I thought the truth about Cuban-American relations was primarily a Cuban problem. How long, I asked him, will the Cubans permit their live statesmen and the fathers and grandfathers of those statesmen to be presented to Cuban public opinion as traitors, bribe takers, tools of imperialism, and, in general, "vende-patrias"? The correction of the present campaign of falsehood is a Cuban responsibility so far as Cuba is concerned.

Since my lunch with Pujol, I am a little more pessimistic about the dynamics of the formation of a broad anti-Castro front than I was, although Pujol assures me that a great deal of work is being done in this direction. He is particularly anxious to get the church into the picture. I have suggested that he talk with the Nuncio and he has agreed to do so. He might also see Tardini in Rome later on in the summer. Would it be helpful for him to see Cicognani in Washington?

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsale

PWBonsal:vk

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(Seen by Mr. Braddock 4/6/60)

This document consists of 5 pages.  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series A.  
No. 1 - to Mr. Rubottom

46

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 6, 1960.

JUN 8 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

It was indeed thoughtful of you to ask Tex Brewer, the Standard Oil of New Jersey representative here, to fill me in on certain developments of interest to me with regard to the Cuban policy of our Government. For the record and for your confirmation or correction, I am summarizing what Brewer told me--and I am adding some comments of my own which, of course, were not discussed with Brewer.

Brewer called on me at the residence at 3:00 p. m. Saturday, June 4. When I offered to show him the aide memoire delivered to the Cuban Government that morning he told me that he had already seen it the previous afternoon in Washington. He read over my copy of the text and indicated that it seemed to him about the same as that he had read in your office.

From this I gather that the Department was already committed a good many hours before the Embassy received the text of the aide memoire to the publication of the document in the general form and on the date in question and that this fact was known to people outside our Government. In all modesty, I believe that we in the Embassy could have made useful suggestions as to the timing, content and drafting of this paper. But that is water over the dam.

Brewer told me that the aide memoire was part of a series of positive steps to be taken in our Cuban policy.

(You

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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Authority FRUS 1958-60, Vol. VI, pp. 935-

By *J*, NARA, Date 8/24/93 939

REGISTERED

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

(You had intimated as much to me in our telephone conversation that same morning--June 4.) He then discussed the policy that was worked out in Washington in the matter of the attitude to be assumed by the three foreign oil companies owning refineries here with respect to the refining of Russian crude acquired by Cuba in accordance with the trade agreement with the Soviets. The American companies are ESSO and Texaco; Shell is British-Dutch.

Brewer stated that the policy of his company had been, on the assumption that the U. S. Government would take no stand in the matter, that it would be inevitable to refine the Russian crude as desired by the Cuban Government. The assumption, however, turned out to be contrary to fact. At a meeting held perhaps on June 3 in Secretary Anderson's office with Tom Mann representing the Department and Mr. Barnes CIA, Texaco and Standard (ESSO) were told by Secretary Anderson the following:

1. That a refusal on their part to refine Russian crude in Cuba would be consistent with over-all U. S. policy toward the Cuban Government.
2. That an agreement to make such a refusal by the American companies concerned would not be considered in violation of the U. S. anti-trust laws.
3. That if the Cuban Government were to intervene one of the American refineries to handle Russian crude, leaving the other to refine its own crude from its own sources, our Government would agree that the latter, without incurring any consequences from our anti-trust laws, could refuse to furnish any more crude from its own sources.

On the basis of this statement of U. S. Government policy, Standard (ESSO) and Texaco have decided to refuse to refine Soviet crude.

The effect of the policy which the companies now plan to adopt of refusing to refine the Russian crude will be to present the Cuban Government with the alternative of either

accepting

accepting the decision or of assuming full responsibility for the operation of the refineries and for the procuring of the necessary crude from Russian or other available sources.

Brewer added, however, that the Shell position is still being discussed at high levels in London with the British Government presumably involved. It is hoped that a reply from London will be received on Monday, June 6. In the event that Shell goes along with the refusal to refine Russian crude, the three companies will communicate their decision to the Cuban Government on that same day. If Shell does not go along with the refusal, it will then be necessary to reconsider the whole matter and Brewer will probably go to New York for the purpose.

Brewer showed me a draft of the letter which his company plans to send to Ché Guevara in the event refusal to refine Russian crude is agreed upon by all three companies. It is a well drafted, courteous document stressing that ESSO has been in Cuba 78 years, that it has its traditional sources of petroleum in Venezuela, that it has been most cooperative in extending dollar credits for crude imports in the current exchange crisis and that it respectfully refuses to refine the Soviet crude offered by the Cuban Government.

Brewer, Morrison and I discussed briefly the situation as it may develop if the refusal is made. The Government will no doubt treat it as a serious challenge and a test of its strength as indeed it will be. Drastic measures can be anticipated since in the present temper of the Government there will be no moderating voices heard. I think the companies will be intervened and that the Government will make every effort to increase shipments of Russian crude. These are currently estimated at some 900,000 tons from June 1 to December 31 of this year, or about 45 per cent of the estimated refinery runs for the period. The Government will have to find 1,100,000 tons of crude from Russian and independent sources to make up for the lack of crude which the companies are supposed to furnish. The evidence on whether this can be done is conflicting. Normal stocks of

crude

crude in the country are the equivalent of 14 to 16 days supply. So the margin is not great.

It is my belief that the Government will try to meet the challenge<sup>to</sup> its authority "by imperialist oil companies backed by imperialist Governments" in drastic fashion. In addition to possible help from the U. S. S. R. or from the U. A. R. and perhaps others, the Government will, in my judgment, try to make of this a big popular, political issue under the "Patria o Muerte" slogan with rationing of gasoline and other petroleum products, intervention of service stations in addition to refineries, etc. We will hear a lot from the students, campesinos, workers and their militia.

On the other hand, this test of strength will not take place under wholly unfavorable circumstances from our point of view. I am sure that many people here will understand why, under present world circumstances, American refineries should refuse to accept crude from what are in effect enemy sources. The issue of Cuban involvement with the Communist world will be brought out with the greatest clarity. I am sure an overwhelming majority of Cubans oppose this. If any real hardships develop and persist, the Government will lose a good deal. On the other hand, if the Government manages to operate the refineries and to maintain an adequate flow of products, it will have gained a significant victory, comparable to that of Egypt when it demonstrated its ability to operate the Suez Canal. I doubt if the Government's decision in the matter will be made on the basis of a cold appraisal of possibilities. Nationalistic emotions will predominate.

Brewer tells me that his company is encouraged by the Venezuelan Government's attitude toward this matter. While Foreign Minister Arcaya favors the Cuban Government's position on this and many other matters and pretends to regard the replacement of Venezuelan by Soviet crude as a matter of little importance, President Betancourt and Petroleum Minister Perez Alonso are very displeased at the prospective loss of the Cuban market because of the Cuban-Soviet pact.

The outcome of this situation, if the refineries refuse to handle Russian crude, is hard to forecast. A number of highly complex political and technical factors are involved

which

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-5-

which have, I am sure, been carefully considered by our Government. I certainly hope for the best. A show-down is unavoidable if not on this issue, then on some other. Perhaps this is as good as any.

I hope that you will keep us as closely as possibly informed on our Government's development of its Cuban policy. You, of course, will have to be the judge as to how far it is possible or desirable to get us into the decision-making stage of the various steps in what can be called the show-down phase. We may and perhaps do tend to exaggerate the degree to which we in the field can be useful in this respect.

There is, however, one point on which I am sure we are fully agreed. That is the importance of bearing constantly in mind the security of the lives of Americans in Cuba in connection with any drastic steps or statements we may be contemplating. You know as well as I do that our enemies are anxious to provoke an intervention on our part. As the Cuban Government's position becomes more desperate, the temptation to cause a serious incident which could cause an act of force by us and thus identify the increasing difficulties of the regime or even its eventual fall with Yankee intervention will become greater all the time. Give us as much advance warning as you can of proposed steps and let us join with you in appraising their possible impact on the security of Americans in Cuba.

Sincerely yours,

P.

Philip W. Bonsal

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PWBonsal:vk

(Sum by Mr. Braddock 6/4/60)

Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series A.

No 1 to Mr. Rubottom

Laicheon w/ Salvadoran,  
Costa Rican & Panamanian Amb  
& Cardona

47

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
June 3, 1960.

JUN 8 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

I have just been to a lunch given by my Salvadoran colleague (Rafael Eguizabal) at which the Panamanian, Costa Rican and Honduran Ambassadors, as well as José Miró Cardona, were also present. Miró Cardona has no plans as yet to proceed to Washington. He states that he is awaiting the return of President Dorticós before he makes any plans. (By the way, I gather from various sources that Roa is supposed to be definitely on the skids; Miró Cardona tells me that Boti is thoroughly reorganizing the Ministry.)

In the course of the general conversation, one of my colleagues remarked that he was much encouraged by the moderation with which Dorticós had been expressing himself, and that he thought that evidently the talks which Dorticós has been having with the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil have produced a calming effect. I said that I hoped that Prensa Latina was giving, in accordance with its regular line, an exaggerated view of what Dorticós has been saying but I could certainly not find any grounds for optimism in the reports which I had seen.

At a later point in the lunch, I told Miró that I continue extremely pessimistic in the light of the hostility and cynicism shown by Cuban leaders and the Government press toward the United States. He reiterated that he was

going

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED  
3098

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By LJC, NARA, Date 3/6/09

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

going to try hard to change the situation and intimated that he would not go to Washington unless he thought he had some chance of doing so after having discussed matters with Castro and Dorticós. I wonder.

I did not hesitate in the presence of Miró Cardona and of my Central American colleagues to express myself in a most straightforward fashion regarding the current state of Cuban-American relations both political and economic. These people are, I am afraid, trying hard to delude themselves into the notion that a few amiable words or perhaps even the failure to give vent to the customary slander and insult would be an indication of a real improvement in the situation.

I was told by the Honduran Ambassador (Francisco Aleman), whom I drove home, that while I was absent answering a telephone call, Miró had said that, based on his own intimate knowledge of Fidel Castro who was his pupil in law school days, he believes that Fidel may be about to make a considerable and favorable shift in his policy line. I do not know what this can be based on. I know that Miró has not yet seen Castro.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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No 1 to Mr. Rubottom

*Pujol arrival in  
Washington* 48

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
May 31, 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

JUN 1 1960

Dear Dick:

Guillermo Alonso Pujol expects to arrive in Washington on June 7 or June 8 and will be staying either at the Mayflower or the Shoreham. I believe that it would be worth while for you to talk to him. He is, after all, a former Senator and Vice President of Cuba. He is certainly an intelligent man and, by and large, a friend of ours.

Pujol is very discouraged about former President Prio's antics. As you know, Prio appeared with Fidel Castro at a memorial celebration on May 28 and also made a statement disassociating himself from Tony Varona's recent Caracas statement. Apparently Pujol and others have been working on Prio in order to make him see that it is his duty to disassociate himself from the Castro regime. They have not been nearly as successful as they at one time thought.

Pujol is also very dissatisfied with Miró Cardona's having accepted the Embassy in Washington. He thinks that Miró has destroyed his prestige and reputation by doing this.

Pujol is highly critical of the attitude of the other American republics with regard to the Cuban regime. He thinks, and I agree with him, that they are being very shortsighted in appeasing their extremist elements by

playing

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

REGISTERED

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *g/jc* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

playing up to Dorticos and Roa. He is also very skeptical about the role which the OAS may be able to play in this picture. He is going to Palm Beach to talk to Justo Carrillo and other Cubans who are there and hopes to see a number of Latin American diplomats in Washington.

As you probably know, former President Prio is supposed to go to San Francisco and Honolulu about June 15. His eventual destination is Japan. Pujol thinks that Prio is motivated, first, by the pressures and flattery which Castro brings to bear on him; second, by a certain hostility toward the United States; and, third, by his belief that American diplomacy is not being successful in the cold war throughout the world. I myself believe that Prio's principal motivations are personal and opportunistic. If he ever thinks that Castro is really losing ground, he will come out against him, but not before.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

P.S. If you agree, you might ask Bob Stevenson to get in touch with Pujol and arrange for him perhaps to come to see you at your house before dinner on some convenient day.

PWB

PWBonsal:vk

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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*GoC Relationship  
Relations w/ Che Com Gov  
& Breaking Relations w/  
Che Nat Gov*

This document consists of 1 page.  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series A.

*No 1 to Mr. Rubottom*

49

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
May 31, 1960.

JUN 1 1960

SECRET - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Dear Dick:

Although I have no specific information on the subject, it appears to me very likely that the Cuban Government will establish relations with the Chinese Communist Government and break relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government within the next few weeks. We have had a good many Chinese Communists here and more are expected. William Galvez, Inspector General of the Cuban Army, has been visiting Communist China and North Viet-nam. Recognition of Communist China would be consistent with the general Cuban foreign policy. It seems to me that this would be a very serious development from our point of view. Do you wish me to discuss it with Roa and have you any instructions as to the attitude we would take in such an eventuality? I must say that I myself am rather barren of suggestions, but do not wish this matter to go by default.

Sincerely yours,

REGISTERED  
3042

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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PWBonsal:vk

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *gjc*, NARA, Date *3/6/09*

5/27/60

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

7. Latin America

Disaster Relief Program for Chile -

1. Ambassador Walter Howe at Santiago, who is coordinating the U. S. role in the Chilean disaster relief effort, reports that the Minister of Interior and Health was extremely grateful for the prompt U. S. efforts to airlift the field hospitals and has decided to locate them at Puerto Montt and at Valdivia.

2. Ten helicopters are being airlifted to Santiago in answer to an urgent request by President Alessandri for such vehicles in order to facilitate relief operations in isolated coastal areas struck by the disaster.

3. In addition to U. S. Army field hospitals with medical personnel and the helicopters, the United States is also airlifting water purification units and medical supplies including blood plasma. The Caribbean Command at the Canal Zone airlifted blankets and tents. The ICA has coordinated various donations from the Voluntary Agencies totalling nearly \$350,000. ICA has offered the services of public health officials in Peru and Guatemala. ICA has arranged to replace commodities borrowed from voluntary agencies for direct free distribution to disaster victims, such as PL 480 Title III stocks from Colombia and Ecuador.

4. The Chilean Government has accepted the offer of the American Red Cross to make available the services of a disaster relief expert.

5. In addition to the \$10,000 used by the Ambassador for disaster relief purposes as soon as the extent of the damage became known, \$1.75 million has been authorized by the United States for this relief operation.

6. The EXIM bank has authorized a \$10 million credit to Chile for reconstruction in connection with the disaster.

FAR EAST

8. Korea

Correction of Last Week's Entry on Korean Aid Program -  
State and ICA strongly support the efforts of the Embassy and USOM/ Seoul to review the economic aid program and economic problems in Korea. Not only must basic U. S. interests and objectives be considered but also the widespread view that economic aid to Korea is excessive. The U. S. looks forward to a progressively declining level of Defense support and termination of U. S. marginal activities and those that are maturing.

1 Social interview w/ Rivero  
of Marina & Otazo of  
Prensa Libre 51f

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 25, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

The other evening José Ignacio Rivero of the Diario de la Marina spent about an hour with me. I had sent him a message of appreciation for a courageous editorial in the Diario regarding the letter in reply to that addressed to President Eisenhower by the Chilean students.

I was impressed by Rivero's determination and spirits. He says that the Marina is becoming increasingly a symbol of resistance and independence from Government pressures. He adds that, contrary to the general opinion, his family has very little in the way of resources abroad. His mother, according to him, invested all of her savings in the new Marina building, drawing down her balances from for the purpose. Rivero tells me that the circulations of the paper is going up rapidly but that advertising is down about 50 per cent. From a business point of view, the situation is bad. He hopes, however, to be able to last out. He made no suggestion of requiring help from any non-Cuban source.

I have recently also had a talk with Julio Otazo of Prensa Libre. He thinks the paper is in very serious danger from Governmental pressures, but, like Rivero, indicated a determination to keep on fighting.

I have

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By g/jc, NARA, Date 3-16-09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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I have been much encouraged at the attitude of these two people and thought you would like to know about it.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Dr. Wendell Dove ltr  
re USAF Col verbal attack  
on Bonsal

This document consists of 4 pages. <sup>with</sup>  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies. Series A. <sup>Enc.</sup>  
Copy no 1 to Mrs. Rubottom

53

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
May 19, 1960.

MAY 25 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

I expect you knew Dr. Wendell S. Dove when you were in Bogotá. Margaret and I knew and liked the Doves, although I believe that he was, in some respects, a controversial figure from a personality point of view.

Here is an extract from a letter which I recently received from him--the first news I have had from him since he departed from Bogotá in 1955 or 1956.

I do not just know who this Air Force Colonel might be. Perhaps it is Colonel Benoid E. Glawe who is listed as Air Attaché in the January 1960 Foreign Service List. If he is the man, I do not know him. I suppose that he is not an original thinker. So far as the Cuban situation is concerned, I am inclined to doubt whether it is either worth while or feasible to do anything about this very unfortunate situation. I have no reason to think that Dr. Dove would make up a thing of this kind.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable

Ray R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

epicodes  
REGISTERED  
2957  
MAY 25 1960

PWBonsal:vk

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By JK NARA Date 3-16-09

"Recently I was in Chihuahua City, Chihuahua, Mexico on the occasion of a big Rotary Club International get-together at which our Ambassador Hill and Governor Teofilo Romunda were the main guests of honor.

"Accompanying Ambassador Hill was his Air Attache, a Colonel in U.S. Air Force. At a cocktail party in the Hilton Palacio Hotel on Saturday night May 7, this Colonel (I can't get his name but he was only full Colonel there with Ambassador's party--and his Major told me his job was Chief of Air there--I think you can easily verify what full Colonel in Air Force accompanied Ambassador Hill.) talked loudly and abusively of my old and good friend Ambassador Bonsal, criticism of you personally (profanely), officially, seriously questioned your loyalty to U.S.A. and seriously questioned the integrity of our government in placing you in the job you have.

"I think you have long known the high esteem in which I have held you and my high regard for the jobs you have done on behalf of our government.

"My concern here involves two questions:

"1. That a high ranking officer of our Armed Forces at a cocktail party in a foreign country could talk so loosely and

"2. That his loose talk involved criticism of someone high in our Government's service, and I am sure high in the esteem of our President and his closest advisers."

**PRESERVATION COPY**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By gjk NARA, Date 3-16-09

*Negotiations for a possible  
meeting between President  
Eisenhower &  
Castro*

This document consists of 1 page.  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies, Series A.

No. 1. to Mr. Rubottom

54

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 25, 1960.

OFFICIAL- INFORMAL

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

APR 27 1960

Bud Arvey, the Bat Guano man, came in to see me on Saturday. He mentioned a "negotiation" in which he had been involved for setting up a meeting between President Eisenhower and Fidel Castro. According to young Arvey, the possibility was conveyed via Bud's father Jake Arvey, a Democratic leader in Chicago, and Illinois Senator Dirksen, a Republican. The upshot was that it was made clear that such an interview could only be considered on the basis of a formal suggestion in writing from Castro to this Embassy.

Young Arvey apparently thought he had spoken to me about this but on discussion agreed I was away at the time. I gather that he did make an oral statement to Braddock and Gilmore at a cocktail party in the latter's house to the effect that such an interview might be desirable but without exploring it further.

Did this ever get to you?

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PW Bonsal:vk

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By h/jc NARA, Date 3-16-09

REGISTERED

2694 APR 27 1960

PRESERVATION COPY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Add 2 help for Embassy*

57

April 27, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Dear Phil:

I have just learned of the requirement for the assignment of four additional people to your Embassy due to the increased workload on some of the people presently on duty. Normally, I am extremely reluctant to see Government personnel increased at any of our posts and can understand your reluctance to approve this rather substantial addition. Nevertheless, I believe the unique conditions now existing in Cuba require that these people be sent there. In order partially to alleviate the problem, it has been arranged that these additional people will, for the present, be assigned on a temporary duty basis without their families. This will, among other things, make it possible to avoid increasing the Diplomatic List, etc.

We are fully aware of the heavy responsibilities which you are so courageously and effectively bearing at this time, and I regret that the additional labors being imposed on you and your staff have, at the top level of the Government, been deemed necessary.

You should feel perfectly free to write me regarding your own analysis of the personnel situation in the Embassy, and we shall as always give your views serious consideration. However, I am sure you realize the many pressures including that of time, which are bearing down on all of us in the Government. I doubt that we can effectively challenge the need for these people, although I can well understand your desire to cut personnel to the absolute minimum.

Very sincerely yours,

*Dick*  
R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *rg/jc*, NARA, Date 3-16-09

CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

**PRESERVATION COPY**

*Add'l help for Embassy*

57a

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 30, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR MR. RUBOTTOM ONLY

Dear Dick:

I have your letter of April 27 in which you indicate that four additional people will be assigned to this Embassy "due to the increased workload on some of the people presently on duty." I note also that you understand my reluctance to approve this rather substantial addition.

This decision appears to me hardly consistent with the statement that I should feel perfectly free to write regarding my analysis of the personnel situation in the Embassy. It seems to me that this particular decision has been taken without any but the most casual attempt to get my views through the medium of a brief conversation with the chief of section concerned. I cannot feel that my opinion is regarded as of any particular importance in the matter.

I wish also to state that the action taken in this particular case appears to me to have definite bearing on my responsibility in connection with CG-540 of February 29 in which I am asked to submit prior to June 30 my personal views on the U.S. Government personnel, civilian and military, assigned here, especially my judgment as to whether any of these are excessive in the light of the functions to be performed. I believe we are in some respects overstaffed here and that some of the requirements which enter into our work load could be reduced. But I do not feel encouraged to undertake the arduous analysis and the numerous discussions which would be needed to substantiate my view and to formulate definite recommendations.

I am

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *rg/jc*, NARA, Date 3-16-09

RUBOTTOM, R. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I am increasingly impressed with the difference between the executive theory of what an Ambassador is and the bureaucratic practice with regard to his functions and responsibilities. Thanks anyway for your kind words about the job here. I am also very much aware of the responsibilities and the problems which you confront and wish to be as helpful as possible to you.

Sincerely yours,



Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

CONFIDENTIAL

**PRESERVATION COPY**



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

57b

*my file*  
*[Signature]*

May 26, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Dear Phil:

Lest you think that your letter of April 30 for me only went astray, I wish to acknowledge it and to say that I do understand your rather strong reaction to my letter of April 27. I also appreciate your awareness of what we are confronting here.

Sincerely yours,

*Dick*

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *gjc*, NARA, Date *3-16-09*

No 2 Blue to files

Barleta Case

58

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 25, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

~~SECRET~~

"Barleta"  
corrected  
on other copies

Dear Dick:

The Italian Ambassador came to see me on Saturday morning, the 23rd, to bring me up to date on the Barleta case. He said that when the Cuban Government made trouble about Barleta's departure, the Italian Government decided to suspend the shipment of arms already contracted to the Cubans. (I am sure that our people in ARA will be familiar with this matter. I gather that the Italians told us they would carry existing contracts but would not make any more. The Barleta case has induced them to pull their horns in even further.)

As a result of this decision, the Cubans sent two military men to Rome in order to try to get the contracts reinstated. The Italian Ambassador tells me they were unsuccessful. Now, however, the Cuban Government has taken the position that unless agreement is reached to ship these arms, Barleta will not be allowed to leave. The Italians are endeavoring to persuade the Cubans to let Barleta go and then to talk about the arms. Theodoli assures me that the negative decision on the balance of the arms contract will be maintained.

This looks like something of an impasse.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *raj/c* NARA, Date 3-16-09

PRESERVATION COPY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*U.S. Support of  
Anti-Castro Gyps*

60

This document consists of 2 pages  
No. 1 of 3 copies, Series A

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

April 8, 1960

*Leary*

Dear Phil:

Thank you for calling to my attention the impression in certain Cuban circles that the "U. S. is supporting Batista."

I hope that the fact that Pedraza abandoned his own efforts here to organize an anti-Castro movement (FYI only, with a little indirect prodding) and got out of the country may help somewhat in this regard and that the news that we have cancelled his visa will also be beneficial. I am not too hopeful, however, that we can rise entirely above these suspicions until a more appealing and respectable opposition to the trend of Cuban policy manifests itself effectively. When that time comes, we might expect that at least the more reasonable and benevolent Cubans--if they must conjecture about U. S. support to anybody--might be disposed to think we would prefer the better leadership. Meantime, we can expect to be victims of all of the hostile elements who so assiduously try to build up the impression that we are behind such elements as Pedraza, as well as victims of Pedraza and his like who themselves are known tendentiously to claim U. S. backing in order to rally support among exile elements.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that perhaps our most important responsibility now is to identify and use the whole range of our policies to develop an effective Cuban leadership which realistically has the potential to reverse sharply at an early date those elements of Cuban policy which are bringing us daily closer to a showdown not only in Cuban-U.S. relations but in our whole relationship with the hemisphere. We are persuaded that there is no reasonable hope that

this

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana, Cuba.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 1958-60, Vol. VI, pp 890-891

By JP, NARA, Date 8/24/93

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

this sharp turn can be brought about by negotiations and accommodations and that, in the long run, the only way that adventurers can be prevented from establishing leadership over anti-Castro forces is for a better leadership to emerge. I think you can rest assured that all who work with us share, along with you, an appreciation of the type of leadership we should not support if it can be helped and would welcome positive indications of where more desirable leadership might be found and what we should do to assure that it comes forward as rapidly as possible.

Sincerely yours,



R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Conversation w/ Pepin  
Copy No. 1 to Mr. Rubottom  
Copy No. 2 to his files  
Bosch re Castro Regime

61

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 7, 1960.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

I had a call the other day from Pepin Bosch whom I had not seen for some weeks. He is the head of the Bacardi Company and a very influential, liberal Cuban businessman. I have known him well and favorably since 1933. Pepin accompanied Dr. Castro on his trip to the United States last year at Castro's special request.

Pepin Bosch is very disillusioned with the progress of the revolution and particularly at the inefficiency and disorganization. He tells me that he would not be at all surprised to see his firm intervened fairly soon. He spends very little of his time in Habana.

Pepin believes that opposition to the regime is now growing quite rapidly, particularly among workers and peasants who have not received what was promised them and who are witnesses of the incompetency and wastefulness with which their affairs are being conducted by the revolutionary leaders. I get this sense of growing skepticism about the revolution in the lower classes from many sources, and I would say that it is the most significant change which has taken place here since my departure in January. You can really sense a quite different atmosphere. Nevertheless, Dr. Castro still enjoys a very considerable fanatical support, and the steady organization of different types of militias, plus strengthening of police and military forces, makes the problem of the opposition a very difficult one. It is clear, however, that a growing proportion of

the

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

BY 9/16 NARA, Date 3-16-09

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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REGISTERED

2515

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

the people who have been ~~formed~~ by Castro cannot be counted on to fight for him.

Although I do not see anything dramatic immediately in sight, I do think that this Government is facing extremely serious internal problems which it did not face as recently as three months ago. It can be counted on to continue to try to solve its problems by blaming us for everything and by trying to foment anti-American feeling by all possible means. I do think, however, that more and more people are getting tired of the "aggression-invasion" racket.

Sincerely yours,

P W B

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

*Conte Aguerro Leaving  
Cuba*

63

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 4, 1960.

APR 5 1960

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

As I am sure you are aware, this Conte Aguerro business is very important. Here is a man who has something of a reputation as a politician, political analyst, and radio commentator, and who has been very close to Castro and the revolution, taking a very strong anti-Castro position.

I am reliably informed that Conte Aguerro, who, perhaps fortunately, I do not know personally, is a cool headed person with more than the normal concern for "No. 1." The fact that he made his move at the time he did indicates not an idealistic gesture but the calculated tactic of an ambitious man with a fairly profound knowledge of the political conditions of the country in which he expects to achieve his ambitions.

I do not yet know under what conditions Conte Aguerro will be permitted to leave Cuba. I understand that he wants to go out as a political asylee from the Argentine Embassy while the Government wishes to take the position that he is quite free to leave at any time under more or less normal circumstances. No matter how this is settled, I assume that he will turn up in the United States before too long.

It seems to me very important that Conte Aguerro keep out of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee circuit. He should make contact with our more influential commentators (Lippmann, Childs, Reston, and Drummond for example). He might be encouraged to lecture at some of our leading universities.  
He

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *gjc*, NARA, Date *3-16-09*

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-2-

He could write a series of articles for the New York Times or for some other paper of similar stature.

I will write you any further thoughts which occur to me.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

P.S. A usually quite knowledgeable source has just suggested to me that Castro himself urged Conte Aguero to make anti-Communist pronouncements and then chopped him down in order to do away with a dangerous rival. Everything is possible here but I doubt this one.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PWBonsal:v\*

PRESERVATION COPY

*Facilitate Bonsal Trip  
thru Cuba*

64

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

APR 2 1960

Dear Phil:

It occurs to me that in the present uneasy state of relations with Cuba it might be most useful if you could very soon undertake a rather extensive trip, or series of trips, by automobile to various parts of the country. Such trips would help to reassure American residents that we are alert to and keenly interested in the problems of both their business and personal welfare. Your physical presence would also tend, I think, to bolster and encourage Cuban elements who are opposed to the Castro Government's anti-American line. My idea would be that you would not make formal announcement or publicize your itinerary—just quietly begin to travel, making calls on various Americans and American properties along the way, not excluding those which have been intervened, as you deem feasible.

This activity by you will of course be the subject of considerable curiosity and public comment. So much the better. From your side my thought would be little or no comment—let the people and the Government guess and speculate.

I have discussed this idea with the Secretary who agrees that from here, at least, it would seem to have merit. However, we would certainly leave the decision to you. I would appreciate hearing your reaction and comments, by cable if you agree and early implementation is possible.

Sincerely,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *kg/jc* NARA, Date 3-16-09

PRESERVATION COPY

*Personal Attorney*

64a

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 7, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

Your letter of April 1 is a very interesting example of parallel thinking. I am definitely planning trips along the lines which you propose. I am going to the Isle of Pines next week, which is Holy Week, for a day. The following week includes the Annual American Chamber of Commerce meeting, at which I am making a speech, as well as the opening of the International Baseball League season. I am attending the opening and also giving a luncheon for some Cuban and American baseball people. Perhaps in that week I could get in a one-day trip to certain areas of Pinar del Rio. Thereafter I will plan a trip to the Santiago area and other trips as possible. I fully agree with your useful suggestions as to certain aspects.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *g/jc* NARA, Date 3-16-09

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Original to Mr. Rubottom  
This document consists of 1 page.  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies, Series A.

*U.S. support of Pedraza  
invade Cuba.*

65

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
April 1, 1960.

EYES ONLY - ~~SECRET~~

APR 1 - 1960

Dear Dick:


There is an impression prevalent in certain Cuban circles that "the United States is supporting Pedraza in his plans to invade Cuba." I do not know what if anything can be done about this. Support by us of Pedraza or of any military adventurer would be, in my judgment, a disastrous mistake on our part.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk EYES ONLY - ~~SECRET~~



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Authority JFK #177-10001-10388

By fw NARA. Date 2-26-98

*Heizer*

66

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
March 30, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

I have just finished reading the Cuban Government's pamphlet entitled "The Position of Cuban Sugar in the United States." I regret some of the intemperances of language in the pamphlet but believe that by and large it is a pretty effective setting forth of the strongly held Cuban view on this subject.

It is, of course, true that the effects of the depression and of the Hawley-Smoot tariff on Cuba's position in our market were not completely counteracted by the Sugar Act of 1934. They could not have been without serious curtailments in the production of the domestic insular areas (Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico) which would have involved the dismantling of an important sector in the economy of those areas. Such a course was a practical impossibility. The Cubans did not get a bad deal from any realistic point of view, either from the angle of quota or from that of price.

Most of Cuba's markets are to be found in countries which, like our own, are themselves producers of sugar and have various forms of protection for the benefit of the domestic producer. In most cases that protection redounds to the exclusive benefit of the importing country in the form of either a tariff or a profit on purchase of imported sugar, generally, by Government agencies. In our case, most of the "protection" is returned to Cuba in the form of purchasing power. Incidentally, I believe that the difference between the price at which the Soviet Union buys Cuban raw sugar and the price at which the Soviet Union permits its citizens to buy limited quantities of refined sugar is very great. In other words,

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *lg/jc*, NARA, Date 3-16-09

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-2-

there is a tremendous, presumably readily ascertainable profit for the Soviet Government. Now I believe that the current Soviet five or seven year plan includes the construction of a large number of sugar beet factories and the extension of sugar beet acreage to a point where Russia may become eventually self-sustaining in sugar and do without purchases from Cuba. Assuming that the facts bear this out, might it not be interesting to demonstrate how the profits in the Soviet purchases of Cuban sugar are contributing to make the Soviet Union eventually independent of Cuba from a sugar point of view.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

CONFIDENTIAL

FWBonsalrvk

PRESERVATION COPY

*Counter-Revolutionary  
Group*

This document consists of 1 page  
Copy No. 2 of 2 copies made,  
with 2 page enclosure.

67

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
March 30, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

MAR 31 1960

~~SECRET~~

Dear Dick:

I am sending you herewith a memorandum from Henry Hammond on a counter-revolutionary group that may be of interest for you to know about. Because of the extremely sensitive character of such information, I am sending it to you only by this means, and in single copy. If you are agreeable, I will follow the same procedure with other information of this type which comes my way.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

*PW3*

Philip W. Bonsal

Enclosure:

Memorandum of March 29, 1960.

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,


Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

DMBraddock:vk

~~SECRET~~



*JB*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFK #177-10001-10389

By fw, NARA. Date 2-26-98

*to Dept. of State  
Crown Park. 4/1-9*

67a

March 29, 1960

To: The Ambassador  
 From: Henry S. Hammond  
 Subj: Counter-Revolutionary Activities of Highly Placed Cuban Group

The following is a summary statement of the plans and present activities of a group of prominent professional people contemplating the overthrow of the Castro regime. This information has been obtained over a period of nearly four months, primarily from Augusto Cuervo Fernandez, son of Augusto Cuervo Rubio. Cuervo Rubio is a prominent physicist and was Vice President under Batista for a period of about a month before he broke with Batista. The substance of this information has been passed on to Mr. Moel and Mr. Topping, piece meal as it has come to my attention over the past months. During recent weeks the plans of the Cuban group seem to have been maturing and taking more specific form:

(1) Augusto Cuervo Fernandez is a member of the "action" wing headed by a man named Millarez who is underground. Cuervo Fernandez says they have a potential force of some 2000 men, mostly ex-army and unemployed construction workers. He says about 300 are now armed and of these about 200 are in Habana and 100 scattered through the country.

(2) Seven men all of whom Cuervo Fernandez says are free of any Batista taint have agreed to form a "Junta". These men are now in Cuba but are prepared to go into exile. The only name he could give me was that of Dr. Rubio Palillo, a cousin of Cuervo Rubio and one time Minister of Health under Prío. When the uprising they plan takes place the "Junta" plans to take over the civil government until elections can be held.

(3) They want no ties with ex-Batista elements but they are prepared to accept Pedraza's help on the military side "if that is what the U.S. wants". Pedraza, Cuervo Fernandez says has forces in Santo Domingo and Yucatan but, more importantly, the large numbers of the old army still in Cuba would rally to him. Rubio Palillo seems to be at odds on this point and there is some doubt whether he would agree to head the "Junta" if Pedraza is a participant in the uprising.

(4) Cuervo Fernandez says they have been told that Pedraza recently had conversations with someone identified only as "someone close to Vice President Nixon" and this he says has greatly upset the "Junta". According to him, if the U.S. has decided to accept Pedraza the "Junta" too will do so but it may be hard to swallow.

(5) Rubio Palillo wants to go to the United States to talk "to the people in the State Department and the Pentagon". However, he feels he must go clandestinely and left the inference that in their minds the U.S. might be able to help on this.

(6) On the evening of March 28 Rubio Palillo dined with José Rivero,

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 NARA. Date 2-26-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Director of Diario de la Marina and according to Cuervo Fernandez among the things they intended to discuss, were whether to call on you to inform you of their plans and if to the extent of the assistance they should seek from you. ( This is the first time Rivero's name has been mentioned to me although it had been intimated previously that he was in some way involved in the scheme.)

Comment:

Cuervo Fernandez is young, about 28, and completely absorbed in this plan. So far as I can determine the Cuervo Rubio is an old, prominent and respected family in all of its branches. Its name would probably lend prestige to the plan should it be carried through successfully.

I got the impression that the group believes that should a counter-revolution of force be launched the members of the old army would join with it. Similarly they believe, or seem to, that sizable groups both civil and military now at least nominally supporting the Castro regime would defect to a movement free of Batista associations. This is based on the assumption that many of these now supporting Castro are becoming increasingly fearful of the growing Communist influence and would support a movement dedicated to "salvaging the Revolution".

It is difficult to assess just what strength beyond good intention this movement has. Nevertheless the following points seem to emerge:

- (1) There is an organization of sorts both in the "action" and the political aspects.
- (2) The persons presumably involved are reputable and would lend the movement prestige. There may however, be others whose names have not been mentioned who would be less of an asset.
- (3) My only source in this is Cuervo Fernandez, young and perhaps given to over-enthusiasm.
- (4) While I believe there is much shadow I think there is the possibility of sufficient substance to warrant keeping it under discreet observation.

*Export of Helicopters  
& parts to Cuba*

69

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
March 25, 1960.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Dick:

The purpose of this letter is to ask you if you can help us to rationalize our policy regarding the export of helicopters and spare parts for helicopters to Cuba. The variations in our policy give Castro plenty of material with which to attack us in very plausible fashion. Also, I assume that our discussions with the British on this matter sooner or later will become known.

We permitted the export of 10 or 12 helicopters to Cuba during the last few months of 1959. Recently we denied export licenses for additional helicopters. Also, I understand that we have denied licenses for additional spare parts to be used in connection with the helicopters already here. These two denials put us in a silly position from the practical point of view as well as give Castro ammunition for creating attitudes and opinions in Cuba about us which we are trying hard to counter.

I would be extremely grateful for any help you could give us in this matter. The press here has published stories about the United States sending helicopters to the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviet Union is sending helicopters to Cuba, but the United States will not send helicopters to Cuba!

Sincerely,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PWBonsal:vk

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *h/jc* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

PRESERVATION COPY

March 23, 1960

70

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Phil:

I noticed the Embassy telegram 2461 respecting the revocation of the license for two helicopters. While there is no question that Castro has been given additional ground for attacking the United States, it is quite obvious that his attacks, and those from others around him, are unceasing. If there is not one basis for attack, another is found, and frequently invented.

Since it is becoming increasingly clear that Castro and his government have chosen deliberately not to cooperate with the United States, notwithstanding the proffered hand of cooperation from us, there is some advantage to be gained from our standpoint in their making it crystal clear that they are just as deliberately choosing to cooperate with the USSR.

I hope that you and Margaret had a good flight back to Habana and regret that fate did not enable you to land in a completely altered situation from that which you left last January. Wishing you both all the best,

Sincerely yours,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

The Honorable  
Philip W. Bonsal,  
American Ambassador,  
Habana.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *raj/jc* NARA, Date 3-16-09

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3 3

Copies 1+2 to Mr Rubottom

74

ARA - Mr. Rubottom

March 11, 1960

Ambassador Bonsal

*My file*

My Return to Habana

I am completing my seventh week in Washington on consultation. We have received from the Cuban Government reasonably satisfactory assurances on the matters which led to my recall on consultation. For the reasons which I set forth to you orally the other day, I think it highly desirable that a prompt decision be reached as to my return which will become more difficult the longer it is delayed. I recognize that the recent ship incident has delayed consideration of this matter.

I would like at this time to make the following recommendations to the Secretary and to you:

(a) That if you approve the attached proposed statement regarding my return, it be sent to the Habana Embassy for any possible comment they may have and that the statement be made public as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) That you authorize Mrs. Bonsal and me to plan to return to Habana via New York on either Saturday, March 19th or Sunday, March 20th.

Enclosure:

Proposed statement.

ARA:FWBonsal:br

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *g/c* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

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~~SECRET~~

74a

March 19, 1960

DRAFT OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Ambassador Bonsal was called to Washington for consultations <sup>some weeks ago.</sup> ~~and arrived~~  
here ~~on January 23rd.~~ Charges had been made against the Ambassador by officials  
of the Cuban Government, and charges had been published in the newspaper  
"Revolucion" regarded as the official spokesman of the Cuban Government. The  
Cuban Government has now conveyed assurances to our Government to the effect  
that it has no charges against the Ambassador and has informed us that opinions  
expressed in the newspaper "Revolucion" are not to be considered as having an  
official character. In view of these assurances and of the importance which  
our Government, for its part, attaches to making every possible constructive  
contribution to the conduct of our relations with the Cuban Government,  
Ambassador Bonsal is being instructed to return to Habana at an early date.

ARA:PBonsal:br:mjf  
3/10/60

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *jjc*, NARA, Date 3-16-09

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(Cont. of Bonsal)

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

75

TO : ARA - Mr. Rubottom

DATE: March 11, 1960

THROUGH: CMA - Mr. Wieland

FROM : Ambassador Bonsal

PWB

my file

SUBJECT: [ Note to Cuban Government regarding Castro's Accusations Relative to Recent Ship Explosions. ]

I would like to express the following views regarding the note which we are planning to send to the Cuban Government regarding Prime Minister Castro's outrageous accusations that we were guilty in connection with the explosion of a French ship loaded with munitions in Habana Harbor on Friday, March 4th.

✓ 1. We do not need further publicity as to our attitude on this matter. Therefore, our note should be delivered through normal channels and not formally released to the press.

2. Our note should be confined to this specific incident with some reference to our general policy regarding the export of arms to the Caribbean. We should not take up other subjects which were raised by Castro in this and other speeches. We should state that we are willing to discuss these subjects if they are presented to us through the normal channels for communication between our Governments. We might add a statement to the effect that we deplore the constant systematic efforts of Castro in his public utterances to destroy the traditional friendship between the people of Cuba and the people of the United States.

3. I think we might state in our note that since Castro raised the sinking of the "Maine" in Habana Harbor in 1898, that that disaster took place on February 15 and that it was only on March 21st that a U.S. investigating group appointed for the purpose of handing down its conclusions based on careful investigation. This certainly contrasts with Castro's behavior.

4. I do not think that we should follow Embassy Habana's suggestion of including in our note information regarding Cuban arms purchases. This information is being made known through normal press channels and I see nothing to be gained from our point of view by including it in our note.

I repeat my recommendation that our note be not made public, although the fact that we have formalized the Secretary's oral statements to Chargé d'Affaires Patterson might be made known.

ARA:PWBonsal:br

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By RA/K, NARA, Date 3-16-09

RUBOTTOM

This document consists of 1 page  
with a two-page enclosure.  
Copy No. 3 of 3 copies, Series A.

80a

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
January 20, 1960.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Dick:

Here is a memorandum of conversation regarding  
Felipe Pazos' recently expressed views which I consider  
of interest. This should be held very closely.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

Enclosure:  
Memorandum of Conversation  
of January 20, 1960.

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

PWBonsal:vk

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By gjk, NARA, Date 3-16-09

PRESERVATION COPY

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
November 13, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

I have only just received a copy of the memorandum of your conversation on October 29 with Mr. George D. Diethelm of the American Sugar Refining Company. I am extremely favorably impressed by the statement contained in the first complete paragraph on page 2 on the subject of "punitive action". I congratulate you most heartily on this very statesman-like expression, which I am convinced is the sound point of view.

Of course, even in the absence of "punitive action", the Cuban share in our market is going to be under heavy attack, as it has been whenever the Sugar Act has come up for reconsideration regardless of the state of Cuban-American relations.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PWBonsal:vk

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *g/jc* NARA, Date *3-16-09*

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*Cuban-American  
Relations -  
Sugar*

84

American Embassy,  
Habana, Cuba,  
September 2, 1959.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Dick:

I have lunch with Felipe Pazos every two or three weeks. I was with him today. He is as much concerned as I am about the deterioration of Cuban-American relations. I stressed to him the degree to which I believed this resulted from the words and actions of the Cuban Government. You are familiar with the line on this subject and I will not repeat it.

Pazos appears to believe that Cuba is already running into a severe exchange crisis and that, in the absence of balance of payments credits, it will have to resort to such measures as exchange rate surcharges and other means to cut down imports.

This led to a discussion of the forthcoming tariff negotiations. José Antonio Guerra, who is very knowledgeable on this subject, was present. I stressed the importance of the Cubans letting us have their proposals for the very large number of items they have mentioned as soon as possible in order to permit (a) informal discussion of the situation before formal negotiations begin, and (b) to avoid the long delay to enable our delegation to study the proposals which would be the result of waiting until the beginning of formal negotiations to submit them. I think I made some impression. However, Guerra is very firm. His view that the ordinary process of reciprocity and compensatory concessions will not be applicable in view of Cuba's requirements. Those requirements are a blend of protection and balance of payments needs. Guerra believes that as a minimum Cuban duties will have to be put on ad valorem basis to restore the relationship which existed between the

present

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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Authority FRUS, 1958-60, Vol VI, pp. 593-595  
By J, NARA. Date 8/24/93

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

present specific duties and the 1935-39 price levels. I asked him what the impact would be if we were to adopt such a procedure with respect, for example, to the duty on Cuban sugar. I said that under the quota system a rise in the duty would probably not affect the price at which sugar is sold in the United States. He was not sure he agreed with me on this.

Guerra then raised the point that the United States quota on Cuban sugar, which is, of course, a major consideration for the customs treatment given to United States exports to Cuba, is not subject to negotiation, and that this is unfair to Cuba. I have heard this before and there may be some theoretical substance to it, but I do not see what can be done about it.

Pazos tells me that Castro still visits the National Bank once a week, usually on Thursdays, and stays for several hours, and that he is intensely interested in his economic education. Nevertheless, we have a long way to go before this becomes anything resembling a coordinated operation. Although Pazos did not mention it to me, I am hopeful that perhaps the World Bank will have an opening soon to bring a study of the Cuban economy, which was made some years ago by the Bank, up to date. As you are perhaps aware, and as we are reporting separately, the Cuban Consolidated Railway has been discussing the possibility of a loan with the Bank. These discussions are in a very preliminary stage but they may prove constructive if the World Bank can get into the picture.

I spoke very strongly to Pazos about the treatment of American utilities here without, of course, going into the specific merits. I am sure that he and the others agree fully as to the disastrous effect on Cuba's credit standing resulting from these arbitrary actions. I wish that there were some way of reaching an approximation to the truth about these situations. There has been such a long period of non-regulation in the rather loose atmosphere prevailing in Cuba that it is possible that a certain number of abuses have crept into these situations. On the other hand, it is highly probable that the action taken by the Government with respect to the Electric Company was vindictive and far too extreme. But how do you get an approximation to what would be fair?

Pazos

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-2-

Pazos is working on a number of minor industrialization projects. There is a possibility, by the way, that Ché Guevara may be given an important role in the country's industrialization programs, i. e., the channeling of public funds into industry, including basic industry such as steel. This would be very bad.

Pazos expressed the fear that United States policy toward Cuba was based on a conviction that the present Government could not last, that it would "break its neck" and that this would be a good thing. I quickly told him that this was not the case, that I was convinced of the Government's political strength and of the degree to which it symbolizes the hopes and aspirations of the great majority of the people. I said, however, that the words and actions of Cuban leaders were spreading so strong a sensation of anti-Americanism that an increasingly unfavorable atmosphere was being created in the United States. Pazos agreed with this, but did not seem to have any very constructive ideas. I shall keep after him.

Please forgive this rather rambling letter written under<sup>a</sup> certain amount of time pressure.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Bonsal

PWBonsal:vk

CONFIDENTIAL

American Embassy  
Havana, Cuba  
August 14, 1959

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Dick:

In reply to your letter of August (3 or 8) regarding Raul Castro's alleged attachment to the new China News Agency, I have not yet seen Mr. Castro, as you know. I have, however, shown an awareness of this item in my talks with Dr. (Ro - )and with Ambassador Dihigo. Instead of asking them how to explain this in my Government, I have tended to take the position that the report is very likely exaggerated if not in parts fabricated, but that it shows what happens when, as the Cubans have undoubtedly done, you give these Chinese Communists any kind of an opportunity. My idea is not so much to get an explanation of this particular incident as to try to create conditions under which Raul will be told to lay off this sort of thing.

Sincerely yours,

Phillip W. Bonsel

The Honorable  
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *rd/jc*, NARA, Date *3-16-09*

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