SPECIAL INTERVIEW

DATE: March 20, 1989

INTERVIEWEE: LIVINGSTON BIDDLE

INTERVIEWER: Louann Temple

PLACE: Unknown

Tape 1 of 1, Side 1

T: . . . Mr. Biddle, one of the things I am curious about is that in the memos that I have read in 1964 when President Johnson first went into office, the aides and people outside of the office are continually pressing him to make appointments to the advisory council and to act on the Heckscher report, and he seems as if he doesn't respond at that time and that there is not an interest on his part at that time. And I know that in March of that year he did receive a letter from Senator Pell asking him to be active in seeing that the Senate bill is given close attention in the House. Do you remember if he responded to that or in what way he responded?

B: Well, let me give you my impression, because I wasn't within the White House at that time but I did know most of the people involved, and I know that President Johnson was being--his support was being sought early on and Harry McPherson, your friend, was one of the ones who was involved. Harry, I think at that time, was assistant secretary of state for cultural affairs in the State Department. But Harry and the President knew each other and I think that Harry's voice was being listened to, but the main person who was in the White House at that time and giving the President a lot of advice on many subjects was Abe Fortas. Abe Fortas was the closest adviser to President Johnson who was also concerned

about the arts, and in my book you'll find that Senator Pell sent me to see Abe Fortas to get his help, and that was at a time that I got a sneezing attack and spilled my cup of coffee all over him. (Laughter) Mr. Fortas was so nice and so kind at that point. He just rang the little bell and said, "Mr. Biddle needs another cup of coffee and I need a napkin," because the coffee was all over him. But I had brought a draft of the proposal legislation to him.

T: Now, this is in 1964. The first bill.

B: Yes. It might even have been in 1963, 1963-64. 1964 probably is correct and I'm trying to think within that framework. But Abe saw some of our preliminary proposals, and as you know the legislation started to germinate in 1962 and 1963 and 1964, and finally in 1965 it was passed. So there was a momentum going in the Congress and the people involved--primarily involved--were Claiborne Pell and Senator Jake Javits in the Senate, because it always seemed essential to me that there be bipartisan support. In the House it was Frank Thompson who had a different kind of conclusion to his career in the House; you may be familiar with that.

T: Right.

B: I was very fond of Frank and I think he did a wonderful job for the arts and his counterpart in the Republican side was Ogden Reid from New York. You see, Javits and Reid were interested in the arts because the arts were focused in their district, really, because Ogden Reid was suburban New York City and in Javits' district, in Javits' area of New York City. That was, and still is, really, the cultural center of the arts world.

So that was politically acceptable to those two individuals. With Claiborne Pell it was really his desire to do something for the public good that led him--and also his old friend who persuaded him to take on this assignment. But Claiborne became really very

much involved with the arts and had been in the beginning of his political career, because he always loved museums and he used to take an old station wagon around Rhode Island with paintings and show them. So that his--

T: You mean that he carried the paintings and showed them in small towns?

B: In small towns. He was--and his love was always for museums. But he said, "This is going to be my effort *pro bono publico*," and then one day when I showed him how the arts had grown in Rhode Island in ten years, and how all these organizations were forming because there had been an encouragement from the national level and from the state level also. He said, "Well, *pro bono publico* is changing into *pro bono politico*!" And it has over the years, for him and for others who have supported the arts, and it did for Senator Javits, and Pell and Javits were very close together. All this is to sort of suggest to you that the White House under President Johnson was hearing about this momentum that was ongoing. When Pell wrote to President Johnson in March, I think that was, of 1965, it wasn't really until the beginning of June that the President fully responded.

T: I think that he did not write a letter to McCormack until August.

B: Well, the Senate passed the bill first, and then it went over to the House. But the President's letter of transmittal--what happened was that we had our hearings on the proposal that I had made for the Senate--that I had drafted for the Senate, and which Claiborne Pell and I had worked on. And his contribution and mine, I think, was that instead of there being a single foundation for the arts it was already decided that there should be also equal attention given to the humanities.

T: Oh. Okay. I'm sorry. I was talking about 1964 still.

B: Oh, 1964.

T: That he did not say it--write to McCormack supporting the bill until August of 1964, the first bill.

B: Yes. But it was the June 1965 statement from the White House that really had a measurable effect on the passage of the legislation, and that was the statement that said, "This Congress may consider many important pieces of legislation, but it may well be that this proposal, modest as it is, will ensure for the 89th Congress a sure and lasting place in the story of the advance of our civilization," or words to that effect. I've quoted it precisely, but--that couldn't have been a more glowing, supportive message.

T: Well, did the administration choose to introduce a bill on its own or did they do so at the request of Senator Pell?

B: Well, what happened was that the Pell and Javits bill was already through its hearings process and we had not received any word, really, from the White House--any official word on how it was going to react. And the Pell proposal--I had investigated what the White House reaction might be, and I had been told by what then was known as the Bureau of the Budget--and now is the Office of Management and Budget--that the President might consider one new government agency.

And we have to remember also [something] which sometimes is forgotten or overlooked or not given enough attention, but both President Johnson and later on President Carter were deeply concerned about the budget, and Lyndon Johnson's budget deficit was something like five million dollars. Think of that. (Laughter) And yet he didn't want to--the word was passed back to me that the President would possibly consider one new agency but certainly not two, so it seemed to me that my job was to combine the arts and the humanities into one program, into one foundation, to simplify choosing between one side or

the other or maybe losing both sides. So that became the Pell legislation, one national foundation with two separate but equal branches. And then we sought around for terms that would identify the two branches, the two national branches of the one foundation, and we tried out the word "endowment" in the hearings and that received no disapproval.

But when the legislation was ready to be considered almost by the full Senate, that message of support that I quoted came from the White House with an administration bill for Senator Pell to introduce in the Senate and Frank Thompson to introduce in the House, and that refined what we had been doing. But there was not a request from Senator Pell to the White House for a bill. It was really the White House reacting, in my view, to what we had already moved ahead on.

T: It seems like there is a very big transition in the White House from the Bureau of the Budget telling you early in 1965 that probably the President would only consider a cultural adviser and not any kind of an agency at all to then presenting an administration bill. It seems as if--

B: A sea change.

T: --a big [inaudible] occurred in a short space of time.

B: I think that was occurring because we were constantly in touch with the people within the President's immediate office but with the Bureau of the Budget, who were very interested in this as well and were working with me as the staff person to help along. And each step I would report to them and they would--whatever they did. But it seemed to me that more and more a feeling of support was forthcoming, and of course Mr. Fortas was also advising the President on this. Then a man named Richard Goodwin was appointed to look after the cultural areas as well as other fields, but primarily the cultural areas, and he became

eventually convinced that this was necessary to the President's overall program. And when that final bill was transmitted to Pell and to Thompson for introduction, it had become part of the President's Great Society program.

So you're right, there was quite a sharp contrast between initial reluctance to go along with the idea and final full support, but I think it was not an about-face in any way. I think it was a gradually evolving point of view, and I think Mrs. Johnson was involved with it also. History has a way of rewriting itself from time to time and I know that Mrs. Johnson, after Lyndon's death, became more and more convinced that this was one of his most important legislative proposals and did not emphasize that this had come out of the congress initially. She had a big symposium in Texas, in Austin. I think we met each other there.

T: I think we probably did.

B: I think, yes, when you came in the door I said, "I remember that lady."

T: Well, you have a long memory.

B: I am blessed with a pretty good memory.

T: I think you must be.

B: I can remember events, and that helped me a lot with this book, because I saved my old memos and some of them were rather cryptic but as soon as I read them I could in my mind reconstruct the surroundings for the memo. And I'm not trying to--in your thesis, in your dissertation--not trying to suggest that there wasn't strong White House support for this.

T: No, I understand exactly what you're saying.

B: But what I am saying is that the Congress took the initiative and the White House elaborated on the initiative.

T: In 1964 Abe Fortas went to a good bit of trouble to develop a plan which he would have passed by executive order which would enhance the kinds of things that could be done on behalf of the arts. Was he thinking that as a stopgap measure or--I guess I'm asking you to read his mind, but--or was that a substitute for--

B: I think Abe was concerned that there might be delays and that he might be able to kind of seize the initiative for the President himself. But that executive order was never implemented, and it lay on also on John Kennedy's desk without being implemented.

T: Well, that was not ever seen in any way as being competitive with passing something through Congress.

B: Right. I think it was seen as something that might substitute for what the Congress might not accomplish. Because, as you can remember from your research, in 1964 the Senate passed legislation to establish arts and humanities together--no, I beg your pardon, the arts. And the House cut it back to just the advisory council. So I think Fortas was thinking, "Well, that may happen again and again." And it was in that year that the humanities--[the] whole effort was started and got rolling.

In my book I find out that Barnaby Keeney, who was then the president of Brown University, had become a good friend of President Johnson. So Barnaby had an impact also on the White House, because Johnson, it was made known to me, wanted Keeney to head up the humanities if that should happen. And of course Roger Stevens was already in position as chairman of the National Council on the Arts, for that job, and he was a close friend of Abe Fortas and becoming well known to Johnson.

T: How did Roger Stevens work with your office in 1964 and 1965?

B: Well, that is remembered somewhat differently by Roger and me. Roger--and this is a little bit off the record, but it can be on the tape--I think Roger sees, in retrospect and in terms of his own memories of this, a more vigorous role than I think he actually played at that time. Certainly he was involved with the beginning of the Kennedy Center which the President laid the cornerstone--President Johnson had given support to and Kennedy finally laid the cornerstone for--I mean Johnson did. But the involvement of Roger was less politically successful than I think he remembers. Because he remembers, for instance, going to see the chairman of the Rules Committee when the legislation was being blocked in the House of Representatives in 1965 and gaining the support of old Judge [Howard W.] Smith, who was the chairman of the Rules Committee. That just--it is something he remembers but it was actually the Congress that overwhelmed the old judge and defeated him, in essence. And that's in my book, too.

T: Can you explain to me on the night that the House did get the bill out of the Rules Committee, what specifically happened that night that made him--that gave him, first of all, the courage to buck--his objection?

B: Well, the whole battle that night was between a very powerful--and I think perhaps in my memory and certainly in terms of today--a more powerful single member of the House of Representatives than there is right now and that applies to the Senate as well. Judge Smith, the chairman of the Rules Committee, was really the dominant force. And what defeated him that day was a combination of a good supportive group for the arts that had gradually been organized and was epitomized by Frank Thompson's leadership but it was bipartisan beginning to have that quality of bipartisanship as well. But arrayed also against the judge

that night were a group that wanted civil rights legislation, and that was Adam Clayton Powell, who was very, very powerful.

So to have the legislation for the arts considered was one of several bills that were being what is known as petitioned out of the Rules Committee. And if the petition had not succeeded that would have buried this legislation [until] goodness knows what term, because it had to succeed that night in order to gain approval in that Congress; otherwise it would have had to be started all over again and hearings and the whole procedure would have had to start again. So it was that night or really nothing, and that was the critical--to me one of the great critical moments in the history of evolving the arts and humanities. But there was also the civil rights program that was at stake as well, or *a* civil rights.

T: Are you saying that Adam Clayton Powell was willing to lend his support to voting to bring the bill out of committee if people then would lend their support to his civil rights bill?

B: Yes, but he also agreed with Frank that he would bring--Frank Thompson--that he would bring the arts bill up first, because there was much more acrimony around his bill, and he was the chairman concerned with the arts and the humanities. And then there's that story that I tell about his seeming to have imbibed a great quantity of milk laced with something else, and yet when he went out on the floor he made this eloquent statement about the need for the arts and how important they were.

And gradually that evening, influential people, including John Fogarty, who was one of the key people in education in the House, who was very much interested in the humanities, not so much the arts, but a very, very powerful figure--I tell this story about my going initially to see him and walking into the wall--(Laughter)--but gaining support because I persuaded him that the pope had a big arts collection, and he liked that. He hadn't

realized that and he of course, was a very, very staunch Catholic and Rhode Island was 65 per cent Catholic in those days. But John Fogarty became a supporter of this program, and I could see--I was in the balcony--I could see him moving around the floor. It really took a lot of courage, because he himself was the chairman of an influential committee, and to go against a judge at this point was certainly not a very wise thing to do.

T: Because his bills could be held up in the Rules Committee also.

B: Exactly. But I also should tell you--and it's in the book, too--that as this evening and day wore on, the judge was trying to block it by a series of quorum calls and whenever there was an absence of quorum he would suggest it, and then the clerk would have to call the roll and that all took about 45 minutes of time. And one after another of these, just blocking any procedure, and the day wore on, and the evening wore on, and if he had succeeded in carrying through this procedure to the end of the legislative day--which I had not realized could last after midnight. I thought midnight was the witching hour. Cinderella returned to her poor estate. But the legislative day can go until the Congress calls for its own adjournment.

T: Well, was he thinking he would just wear the Congress down and they'd finally get tired and say, "Let's go home."

B: Saying, "Let's go home. Let's forget it."

T: Will you explain--

B: But the other point that I wanted to make to you was that during this long day and evening it was suddenly apparent to me that members who were moving--or people who were moving around the floor of the House were not members, and these were people that

Lyndon Johnson had sent out to buttonhole people so that the White House interest was manifest in that crucial evening.

T: So, in effect, the White House came in to help out at crucial points but was really not instrumental in the development of the ideas.

B: That's my impression. My thesis. Yes.

T: Was Speaker [John] McCormack for the bill?

B: Well, that was one of those--and this is in the book too if you look under him. Speaker McCormack was very close to the Mellon interest, and his interest was really in getting the director of the National Gallery to be very much involved with the new legislation. So yes, he was interested, but he was only interested in one aspect of it. But he also, because of that, was supporting the whole endeavor.

T: I guess the reason I asked the question was because it occurred to me that when you got to the point of having to get appropriations, that the committee you were assigned to seemed so unfavorable. I wondered--and I assumed that Speaker McCormack made committee assignments as to where your appropriations should have been heard or--

B: I really think that that just came about in a sort of--

T: Accidental fashion?

B: Well, partly accidental, partly natural, because here was a new agency that was concerned with cultural endeavors and brand new--never had been one like it before, and people looked at it and said, "Well, let's put it where the Smithsonian is because the Smithsonian is also concerned with these areas.

T: Can you explain a little procedure to me? I had looked at a memo from Henry Wilson to the President, and this is dated August 20, 1965, and he says, "The Speaker has decided not

to move under the twenty-one day rule until September 13, when presumably Frank Thompson will be back in action. I doubt Smith will grant a rule." To what does that refer?

B: That refers to this particular evening when the--and Smith did not grant a rule. The rule that would have been granted would have allowed the legislation to be considered.

T: Oh, that's exactly what we've been talking about. I somehow was under the impression that was a different incident, but it's not.

B: No. It's the same thing.

T: I see. Let me go back to 1964 and ask you a question about something that puzzled me a little bit when I came across it. I also found a memo from Myer Feldman to the President dated August 1964--August 21, which was the day the bill went before the Senate--after it had passed the House it came back to the Senate. He says Hubert Humphrey had called saying that if he could assure Senators Pell and Javits that they would have a say in the appointment of NCA [?] members that the Senate would then accept the House bill. And that is very puzzling to me because that sounds as if the White House were promoting the legislation and the senators were resistant to it. I know you had indicated that Pell obviously saw that if they didn't accept the bill as it was that it might not get passed at all.

B: Yes. This is only my own recollection but I think that Senator Javits in particular was interested in a couple of people for the national council and may have--I don't want to be on record for this--I could have suggested to Hubert Humphrey that he would be more willing to accept the House version. We all knew that we more or less had to do this, because if we delayed, if we insisted on the Senate version and it went to conference in an election year, in 1964, that--I saw it just dying. I thought one-half or one-third of a loaf of bread is better than nothing, and I advised Claiborne to that effect and he--and I think Javits was a very

practical politician saw the same thing. But he may have said to Humphrey, "I'd like some say on who gets on the council." And he did have [his] say--Javits. So there is that factor in there too, but I don't think that indicates any lack of--any opposition to the idea of the passage of the bill, [but] simply that they were trying to do the best they could and get as much as they could from the passage.

T: It seems through the history of the NEA that Senator Pell has consistently been called on by whoever the President was to discuss the appointment of the chairman of the NEA. Was he involved in the appointment of the first chairman?

B: Yes. He certainly was. He knew Roger Stevens very well and Roger, as you know, had been the finance chairman for Adlai Stevenson in his campaigns. So Pell and Roger knew each other way back in time and were good friends all the way through. I don't think that any--well, in the book here, the regard of Pell towards Stevens is indicated by that strange call that I got from Dick Goodwin that President Johnson might veto the legislation because the way I had drafted it made Roger automatically chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts. Do you remember that?

T: I do remember that and that was puzzling and I at the time jumped to the conclusion that perhaps Richard Goodwin wanted the position himself.

B: I think that's true. I think Dick may even have had some assurance that that might happen.

T: Well, he apparently did have assurance from President Kennedy that he would be appointed chairman of the advisory council.

B: But that just never came about. Dick had become very much interested in this whole endeavor, and I--you know, in the difficult time between the Kennedys and the Johnson transition it just seemed to me that Dick did not quite have the purchase in the new

administration that he believed he had and that he--because Lyndon Johnson could have said, "No, no, you're taking away my prerogative to appoint a chairman to this new agency," but since he didn't say that, it just seemed to me that Dick didn't quite have the moxie, the power to make it happen, and then did nothing to further that particular effort.

T: Do you think that either the controversy over the site selection for the Kennedy Center or the controversy caused by the White House Festival of the Arts contaminated the chances of the bill being passed? Did it give fuel to the opposition or--

B: I think the White House Festival on the Arts cast--certainly over the President--a feeling that maybe this was not the best constituency to cultivate. The trouble was that John Hersey, when he read his *Hiroshima*, did so with Mrs. Johnson sitting in the front row, and her face was just perfectly composed but so stern, listening to that, and she got up immediately and walked very elegantly out of the room. Didn't make a big fuss of leaving in the middle. So Lyndon Johnson did not come down to welcome all the artists as had been proposed. And Jack Valenti of course--he's also a figure here as advising the President toward the arts. And also Mike Feldman. They all had an affection and regard for the arts, but I still think it was Abe Fortas who was the most influential in this area. But--just as an aside, you see--in the Reagan administration, there was not a Mike Feldman, there was not a Harry McPherson, there was not a person who was close to the President and seeing him all the time who was making this kind of an overture about the importance of the arts. Certainly there wasn't an Abe Fortas nor a Leonard Garment, who served the same kind of purpose under Richard Nixon.

T: I guess Mrs. [Joan] Mondale did, then, under--

B: And of course, Lady Bird herself was always interested in this area, but more in the beautification end of things rather than in the performing arts area--though she could remember that differently as well. But the White House Festival, I think Lyndon Johnson felt, had insulted his wife, and that was a very bad thing to have happened because he felt very loyal to her and to her stature.

(Side 2, Tape 1)

B: In the debates in the Senate and House there was really no great reference to either of those problems. There was no rehashing of the White House Festival, and nobody said Lyndon Johnson was challenged on his Vietnam policies and the arts community rose up against him. The press played it up for a little while but not beyond that. But Congress--I don't recollect anybody getting up in either chamber and talking about the insult to the President. On the other hand, in the House there was a feeling that somehow Roger Stevens was going to profit by his dealing with the Kennedy Center, and there was Congressman [James] Broyhill who made that an issue. But again, that was a sort of in-house thing that--I mean, in-house between him and Roger--and it didn't hold water when you examined it. And that was my little account in the book that my old friend from the war, Newbold Noyes, who then was the--

T: Wrote for the *Star*. Or editor of the *Star*.

B: Editor of the *Star*. [He] took issue with Broyhill and said, "This is bunk." And that sort of quieted that. There has always been somebody in Congress, and mainly in the House who has found that the relationship of Roger Stevens to the theater and the fact that his presiding over the Kennedy Center--no longer that way because he's retired, but for many years there were people in the Congress who said this is conflict of interest, and Roger is profiting by

bringing plays to the Kennedy Center in which he has a financial interest. They are well received in Washington and then they go on and become successes in New York. And where are the books--where does all this resolve itself? Nobody has pushed beyond a certain sort of acrimony on that that fades away, and what the books are I couldn't say but I think the way it works is that when something is profitable to the Kennedy Center--and a few things have been, like "Annie"--and have then become box office successes, that profitability pays for the productions that are not profitable, and there's a balancing. Roger is adamant that this is the way it works and I have no reason to question that. But I think that the Kennedy Center, as an ambience, has been a concern of Congress and only a concern of Congress towards a National Endowment for the Arts when there was a Roger Stevens running the endowment. But that was early on and germane to your story. But I don't think the festival really affected the Congress.

T: Why was the panel structure not included in the bill?

B: It was.

T: But not made a permanent part of the structure of the NEA legislatively.

B: Well it just said that there shall be panels of experts. It didn't specify the responsibilities of the panels.

T: Because that was so key to maintaining the independence of the artists. I was a little surprised that it seems as if the populous states--more populous states went along rather easily with the idea of the states receiving money on an equal basis rather than a per-capita basis, and you did tell a story about Senator Javits.

B: Being quite magnanimous about the whole thing. But I think more populous states were doing something for the arts. Certainly New York State was, Massachusetts was a bit.

Texas, while not in the forefront then of a major arts organization, really did not see this as any area which would have benefited Texas over other, less populated states. There was no grass-roots complaint coming out of the states that they ought to be treated on a per-capita basis rather than equally.

T: And Senator Yarborough, for instance, didn't raise that question.

B: No. And a lot of this, you know, was because people were not reading every line in the legislation. Nor were their staffs. It was the idea of it that was more appealing than the details. So when Javits said, "We will make it equal," that carried the weight of the whole Republican side, and Pell carried the Democrats and it was to his advantage, obviously, that Rhode Island be given the same as New York. But when they made their peace, there weren't any other major critiques.

T: There also did not seem to be any lengthy consideration of making it a cabinet post. Was that just something that was impossible from the beginning so it wasn't attempted?

B: Senator Pell still feels that a cabinet position is valid. But the mitigating thing against that is that there was a fear, always, that there would be a cultural czar, one person whose weight would permeate every phase of the arts, and that we would create what there is in Europe--an arbiter who would say, "This is good art. This is not," and make that kind of choice. That is why the panel system--and I think in my Senate report there was the panel--the fact that there would be panelists was spelled out more than--

T: Yes. You did spell it out in your report.

B: --in the legislation. And the report carries the weight of legislative interpretation.

T: I was surprised when the debate came up over the role of the federal council that they didn't immediately turn to your report, which so clearly said the intent was merely to coordinate--

B: Well, that's another indication, I think, that people don't read these things in detail.

T: Was Dillon Ripley terribly disappointed that the Smithsonian did not have the NEA under its direction and was trying to then find a bigger role for the Smithsonian?

B: I think that he expected it to happen that way. When it didn't happen, he then thought he would be head of the federal council and therefore the dominant force over the two chairmen of the two endowments. And when that--when they finally got around to looking at the Senate report and realized that the federal council was simply advisory, I think Dillon was disappointed, yes, because he got neither role. On the other hand, from time to time I see Dillon Ripley and from what I--all I can gather is that he really doesn't remember this any longer. Maybe it's a convenient lapse of memory, but I remember it at the time as being a very definite part of the whole scheme. But he is a very sophisticated man, and I think that he may have been disappointed but then he thought, "Well, I have enough to do anyway."

T: Reading his letters and memos one gets the impression that he's a person whose ideas spill out of him so fast that if one doesn't work out he goes on to the next one, and perhaps that's the kind of thing happening.

You talked about the wonderful remarks that Vice President Humphrey made at the act of signing ceremony, at the party. Do you recall if those seem to be prepared remarks that there might be any copy of?

B: Gosh. I wouldn't know where you would even begin to look for them. So much of Hubert's eloquence came *ad lib*.

T: Speaking of things spilling out, his enthusiasm did. So that probably is not--

B: If they're not preserved in Austin I don't know where they would--I'm sure they would not be in the archives of the National Endowment, though you could inquire. I have never seen them.

T: But do you recall whether he just got up and spoke extemporaneously or whether they were prepared?

B: Well, you know, he always spoke in the same way. He had some reminders of what he was going to say, but I don't think he ever spoke from a written text.

T: Okay. So I probably wouldn't be able to find that.

B: And I don't know that that was recorded in any way for posterity. I don't recall any tape recordings or any--

T: Are there other people you would especially think I would be wise to interview? I have an appointment with Jack Valenti, and I have an appointment with Roger Stevens, and I asked to see Mr. Feldman but he is not in town right now.

B: Well, I would think--and you've talked to Harry McPherson.

T: I will talk to him more lengthily later, yes.

B: And you've talked to Mrs. Johnson?

T: I've talked to her. I had intended to talk to Mrs. Johnson after I had finished all my research.

B: Joe Califano might be another one, because Joe--and this is published--put together for some occasion, may have been--let's see, when did Lyndon Johnson die?

T: 1973--It was four years after he went out of office--[inaudible]

B: I have a feeling that on the tenth anniversary of his death that Joe was asked by Mrs. Johnson and by the White House to put together a kind of a eulogy of the President under different headings, and one of those was the area of the arts.

T: I'm glad you told me that because I had not come across that.

B: But I don't--as I recall, I did quite a detailed paper for him covering the things we've covered today, not anything beyond that. I think I've given you more--this and what we've talked about today is in much more depth, and I was--but it did talk about the Hirshhorn Museum, and it talked about the Kennedy Center and the two endowments as being contributions to the cultural life of the country that had happened under Johnson.

T: All right. Now are you saying that there is a lengthy paper that you wrote for Joe and that then he has summarized it in a published form, so your more lengthy version he would--

B: He might have. But it wouldn't contain any more than we--the lengthy paper was maybe eight pages and was taken out of this material. The book wasn't written then.

T: Okay. Well, I appreciate very much your seeing me.

(End of Tape 1 and Interview I)

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LIVINGSTON BIDDLE

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(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcripts.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tape recordings.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Catharina B. Biddle — 8/03/02

Donor — Date

John W. Carlin — 8-23-02

Archivist of the United States — Date