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10 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
11 Washington, D. C.
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Interview of:

DR. SAMUEL HALVERIN

by

STEVE TRACHTENBERG

(This transcript was prepared from a tape recording.)

1 DR. HALPERN: I am Dr. Samuel Halpern. At the
2 time of recording, July 24th, 1968, I am Deputy Assistant
3 Secretary for Legislation in the Department of HED. I joined
4 the Office of Education in October of 1961 as a legislative
5 specialist, and I have worked in that unit under various
6 organizational forms. In 1965 I was appointed Assistant
7 Commissioner for Legislation and Director of the Office
8 of Legislation and Congressional Relations. In March 1966,
9 I left the Office of Education for my present position.

10 MR. TRACHTENBERG: I am Stephen Trachtenberg,
11 Special Assistant to the U.S. Education Commissioner, Harold
12 Howe, formerly Legislative Assistant to Congressman John
13 Brademas, Democrat, of Indiana, a member of the Education
14 and Labor Committee in the House.

15 Sam, some of the most exciting legislators in
16 American Congressional history have been involved in educa-
17 tion legislation. I am thinking particularly of gentlemen
18 like Senator Wayne Morse, or Congressman Adam Clayton Powell,
19 or Congresswoman Edith Green. I wonder if you could give us
20 some of your observations about people of this sort.

21 DR. HALPERN: A student of federal aid to education
22 legislation in recent years should first note that on both
23 sides of the Hill, in fact in both political parties, most
24 of the members of the House Committee on Legislation and
25 Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare

1 ha been substantially more liberal on this question than
2 the full House and full Senate. That is to say, they have
3 been more in favor of a larger federal role than their
4 colleagues in those bodies. And one of the interesting
5 things about the recent history of federal aid to legisla-
6 tion has been the willingness of these committees, parti-
7 cularly the Senate Committee, to turn out a large volume of
8 rather significant education legislation. This has been
9 done, as I said earlier, without regard to party labels.

10 I would say that these committees are not really
11 representative in the last decade or so of the constitution-
12 of the House and of the Senate. They have been more urban
13 oriented, they have been more education conscious, than the
14 full bodies.

15 Now when we talk about individuals we, of course,
16 are aware of the very critical role of Adam Clayton Powell.

17 Mr. Powell rose to the chairmanship in 1951 of
18 the Committee on Education and Labor, the same time that
19 on the other side of the Hill Wayne Morse became chairman.
20 The scholars and the newspapermen of the period doubted that
21 much could happen with two such unlikely leaders. Wayne
22 Morse had never passed a bill bearing his name, and
23 Mr. Powell had been known as a great playboy and ne'er-do-well
24 and the like. The fact of the matter is that during
25 Mr. Powell's succeeding years in the Congress his Committee

1 of Education and Labor compiled a rather enviable record
2 in both quantitative and qualitative terms. I do not have
3 figures at my fingertips, although the Committee has issued
4 progress reports from time to time indicating a colossal
5 number of statutes in education, in labor, in welfare-related
6 fields.

7 The same is, of course, true on the other side
8 of the Hill.

9 Mr. Powell was a firm Chairman in that he had
10 the rare ability to keep a number of rather cantankerous
11 individuals in his own Democratic party in line and working
12 behind constructive social programs. There were many
13 personality cleavages within the Committee, some on purely
14 personality grounds -- people not liking each other -- some
15 based upon questions of who should be Subcommittee Chairmen
16 and which bill should go first, some perhaps a little more
17 substantively based as to the appropriate role of the
18 Federal Government in education. But, in any case,
19 Mr. Powell showed that he could get his committee to meet
20 in the morning and in the afternoon and in the evening, and
21 on weekends if necessary. He didn't often stay those long
22 hours, but he laid down the law that his committee
23 was to meet and was to work and was to bring forth legisla-
24 tion. And with the kind of members that he had, all dedicated
25 to building strong and new and good social programs, they

1 see to follow through.

2 On a number of occasions Mr. Powell took his
3 frequent trips to the Bahamas or to Puerto Rico or to
4 Europe, and one soon saw the inevitable effect: the members
5 got to warring with each other, or didn't meet the quorum
6 specifications, and there were inevitable delays and a good
7 deal of anguish on the part of Administration forces who
8 were trying to get a bill out of the Committee.

9 When he returned he soon mastered the situation
10 once again and was able to get the necessary quorums and
11 work continued.

12 Observers of Mr. Powell have asked whether he used
13 the carrot or the stick, and in my own opinion it was
14 essentially a carrot technique. He was very gracious about
15 creating a large number of subcommittees. He had usually,
16 and that pattern continues to this day, three education sub-
17 committees and three labor subcommittees, and a whole host
18 of ad hoc subcommittees, whereas, on the Senate side, as you
19 know, there is only one Education Subcommittee, and sub-
20 committees for health, and so on, of course.

21 Mr. Powell did this so that various members of
22 his committee, the senior members, could have their own
23 staff, their own publicity, their own travel funds, so that
24 they could handle the legislation which would give them ink,
25 or publicity, which would bring their name before the public.

1 An often carried this to relatively junior members, such
2 as the time he gave your old boss, John Brademas, an ad hoc
3 committee to deal with international education. And earlier
4 than that some of the junior members were able to go to the
5 Soviet Union and elsewhere to study Soviet technical educa-
6 tion.

7 And so by using subcommittee chairmanships and
8 the staff, and ad hoc committees, and travel funds, he was
9 able to win a measure of consent on the part of the
10 government, you might say, to allow him to be the overall
11 chairman, to have the prerogatives of referring bills to
12 subcommittee, until the so-called "democratization" of 1966
13 where the leadership of the Committee was effectively taken
14 from him.

15 There were many statements circulating as to how
16 Powell got along with the Administration and the White House.
17 I'm not the best person to comment; but he certainly
18 reminded the Administration frequently of his great achieve-
19 ments as Chairman in terms of getting the numbers of bills
20 out of committees that he had. He insisted that his district,
21 Harlem, be rewarded with an optimum number of federal grants,
22 patronage of various types. He was a very insistent Congress-
23 man in the sense of getting Negroes and women hired by the
24 agencies that came under his jurisdiction, such as OEO and
25 the Office of Education, and he did lead a campaign in 1965

1 in particular to staff a reorganized and reorganizing Office
2 of Education with a larger number of Negroes and women in
3 supergrade positions.

4 Mr. Powell's shift was predicted by many to produce
5 chaos since the No. 2 man, Carl D. Perkins of Kentucky is
6 a mild-mannered, soft-spoken gentleman from eastern Kentucky,
7 who, many had the impression, could easily be run over. He
8 did not have the charisma of Mr. Powell nor the strong
9 clout in the use of the various prerogatives of the Chairman,
10 and many people predicted that the committee would fall apart.

11 That has not proven to be the case. On the contrary,
12 Mr. Perkins has been able by dint of extremely hard work to
13 visit literally hundreds of Congressmen, to appeal for their
14 support, to make the necessary accommodations and negotiations,
15 to take amendments from Republicans when necessary to over-
16 come obstacles. He has, as a border state Congressman, been
17 able to work more closely with the southerners than his
18 predecessor. And I would say that, if anything, he was
19 even more pro-Administration than his predecessor, Mr. Powell.

20 Mr. Perkins has been a very strong proponent of
21 Administration programs. This is perhaps natural in that
22 he represents one of the most poverty-stricken areas in
23 the country, and he has a natural affinity for many of the
24 Great Society programs which were directed at poverty
25 related areas.

I would say that Mr. Perkins was able to lead by virtue of the characteristics I have mentioned, but also the fact that many people felt that he was a nice guy who ought to be given a chance. Many southerners had a stake in proving that one of their own, or one of their border state types could do at least as well as the predecessor, Chairman Powell. Many other members of the Committee viewed Mr. Perkins' leadership as infinitely to be desired and appreciated to that which they might get if he were no longer chairman, namely the next ranking member, Mrs. Edith Green of Portland, Oregon.

Which brings us to a very complex, very controversial and a very significant figure in the education arena.

I would say that next to Senator Wayne Morse, whose imprint exists on all the education statutes since 1961, no single member of the Congress has had more lasting impact on the education statutes than Mrs. Green.

Mrs. Green is an extremely intelligent, extremely hard working person, with a great deal of knowledge about education. She puts in extremely long hours, and she has -- particularly in recent years -- developed the ability to work with Republicans and with southern Democrats to an extent that I think is unmatched by any of her northern liberal colleagues. Mrs. Green does not suffer from what has been observed to be a problem with many liberals; she

1 does know how to count, and she spends a great deal of time
2 sensing the mood of the House and making the necessary
3 accommodations to it.

4 Mrs. Green has been controversial because from
5 the very beginning, certainly under President Kennedy but
6 particularly under President Johnson, she has seriously
7 questioned the wisdom of many Administration proposals. She
8 was one of the few Democrats to question the adequacy of
9 the formula in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
10 Education Act of 1965, also the so-called Church-State
11 settlement in that legislation. And she had the courage,
12 or as some people would say, the gall, to offer amendments
13 which would seriously interfere with the Administration
14 objectives in that legislation. She has also been a very
15 persistent critic and, you might say, gadfly, in the affairs
16 of the Office of Economic Opportunity, a committee which
17 is also -- whose legislation is also considered by the
18 Committee on Education and Labor.

19 Mrs. Green has not prized her relations with the
20 White House. She has gone out of her way to work for what
21 she considers sound legislation, and has not been a promoter
22 of Great Society programs per se merely because they were
23 Great Society programs. In that regard she differs markedly
24 from her Committee chairman, Mr. Perkins.

25 Mrs. Green's relationships, as I have indicated,

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1 have tended to be of a much more bipartisan character, and even
2 when the Administration and Democratic Party had large lop-
3 ped majorities in the Committee and in the House she
4 preferred to do business on what may ultimately prove to have
5 been a more wise and lasting arrangement by dealing with the
6 Republican members of her Committee, particularly Representa-
7 tive Albert Quie, Republican, of Minnesota.

I do believe that the historian of this period
would be amply rewarded were to spend a good deal of time
interviewing other members of the Committee on Education and
Labor concerning Mrs. Green and her relationships concerning
the numerous personality type articles which appeared in
national magazines and in the Washington newspapers concern-
ing her activities, for example on the ESEA in '65, on the
extension of the Elementary and Secondary Education amend-
ments in 1957, and on the Economic Opportunity Act. I will
only point out that in general Mrs. Green's major philosophy
has seemed to be that she sees the necessity for strengthen-
ing the existing public school system. She has been a
persistent critic of various Administration efforts, whether
by labor or OEO or OE, to build remedial systems outside
of the public school area. To that extent she has been a
critic of the Job Corps, of the Neighborhood Youth Corps, of
Head Start, not going by the public school system, and
then, of course, the leading and ultimately the most effective

1 of the Title III ESMA program, Supplementary Centers
2 and Services. After some initial criticisms she took on
3 herself the task of building a coalition of educational
4 associations such as the National Education Association, the
5 American Association of School Administrators, the Council
6 of Chief State School Officers, the National Association of
7 State Boards of Education, the National Congress of PTA's
8 and the National School Board Association, the so-called
9 "Bix Six" for the purpose of reducing the prerogatives of
10 the U.S. Commissioner of Education and for, conversely,
11 building up the leverage and the influence of the State
12 Departments of Education.

13 She has consistently resisted a major role, such
14 as that desired by former Commissioner Keppel and that
15 desired by former Secretary Gardner of the Federal Government
16 as innovator, as prodder of change and redirection in the
17 educational system, and has preferred to see the Federal
18 Government being primarily a strengthener of institutions
19 of learning, the duly established institutions, plus a
20 trainer of teachers through colleges and universities, and
21 tholike, and a promoter of some educational research and
22 development. She has, similarly, not been a strong fan
23 of the movement in recent years to regionalize the Office
24 of Education to provide effective staff services in nine
25 regions but has, rather, preferred to concentrate upon the

1 role of state departments of education as the critical focal
2 point for what needs to be done to strengthen the system.

3 Mrs. Green has been a persistent critic of
4 administration policy-making in the guise of regulations
5 and guidelines and has felt significantly and substantially
6 and continuously that federal bureaucrats tended to take to
7 themselves too much authority to guide the effective use of
8 federal funds out in the states and localities. Obviously
9 these kinds of questions, the whole nature of the federal
10 system, the whole role of the U.S. Office of Education
11 bear very careful study.

12 Another area that has had her particular imprint
13 has been the whole question of the role of the Federal Govern-
14 ment as a whole in the strengthening of education. I believe
15 in 1962 she carved some landmark trails by issuing a study
16 called "The Federal Government and Education," and then in
17 1967 her subcommittee issued another landmark report on
18 the Office of Education and its mission and functions. Both
19 of these reports have been scholarly, have had a great deal
20 of data. I would say that, in my opinion, they are about
21 the best example of legislative oversight in the field of
22 education that I am aware of. And these studies have tended
23 to argue that the proliferation of federal programs among
24 thirty or forty different agencies, a hundred or more dif-
25 ferent programs with many different guidelines, many different

matching requirement, many different forms and cut-off dates, was simply an untenable position. And so she has argued for consolidation of federal programs and block grants. She has also been perhaps the first and most influential of all of the advocates of a Federal Department of Education. In recent years you can see that her influence has been accepted on this issue by some of the ranking Republicans, such as Mr. Quig and Mr. Harris, and they too have become advocates of a Federal Department of Education.

She continues to believe very strongly that the present arrangements are untenable, that there are too many people in the education business, to the detriment of the taxpayers, and particularly to the detriment of the various institutions that are involved.

I will say a word about Senator Morse. Senator Morse, as I indicated earlier, had never passed a bill bearing his name. At the time he became subcommittee chairman in 1951 he was regarded as a billy in a china shop, or worse. Books had been written about the "Tiger in the Senate" who was the maverick and the critic and the cantankerous and irascible scoundrel. He surprised everyone by bringing forth successfully every single education bill assigned to his subcommittee. He did this by long and patient study and by putting staff work on the part of Charles Lee, special staff member since 1951. He did this also by the simple device

of bipartisanship, the kind of bipartisanship that Mr. Powell and Chairman Perkins didn't always stress. He had a large measure of pro-education members on the Republican side, and with them he was able to say, in effect, "I'll take almost any amendment you offer that is reasonably constructive and does not gut the Administration program that I am trying to bring through."

And so it's an interesting exercise for scholars to check the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee reports on the various education statutes, and there the scholar will see how year after year the Republican members of Senator Morse's subcommittee and the Republican members of the full Committee pride themselves on the large number of amendments -- seventeen contributions of the minority, twenty-three contributions of the minority -- that they have been able to work into the various federal statutes coming before the Morse committee. And time and time again Senator Morse has negotiated with the Republicans to bring them along, with the result that in 1968, for example, we saw the Vocational Education Act of 1968 passed by a vote of 88 to zero, and the higher education amendments of '68 passed by a vote of 83 to zero.

Senator Morse has also been working, as he did in 1957, with southerners so that in return for honorable, conscientious compromises, as the Senator calls them, he has

1 ha been able to get southern support for education legisla-
2 ti Of course we know that southerners were pro-education
3 le slation until about 1954 with the impact of the
4 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision. Senator Morse
5 I think by making education legislation feasible and
6 respectable and, I might add, profitable -- particularly
7 for the southern states -- has been able to bring about this
8 wide-spread support in the Senate for his bills.

9 Senator Morse, as a former law school dean, prides
10 himself on his reputation as being a great constitutional
11 lawyer, and I do think that the scholar would again be
12 profitably repaid were he to study Senator Morse's position
13 on church-state issues. That position has shifted over the
14 years, but he has always covered himself by saying that
15 ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States should
16 test the constitutionality of the statutes in this area.
17 And he has been a persistent advocate of judicial review.

18 Senator Morse continues to this day, as does
19 Chairman Perkins, to be a great proponent of more and more
20 federal aid. While he has enabled the various categorical
21 statutes of the Administration to become law, he has never
22 given up his overall commitment to getting some form of
23 general aid, or bloc grant aid, or broad scale aid for all
24 children and not merely those who are disadvantaged or
25 handicapped.

1 Senator Morse seems to be enamoured with the
2 philosophy that many streams a mighty river make. By this
3 we simply mean that he has been less careful, perhaps, about
4 the question of overlapping duplication than his Oregon
5 colleague, Mrs. Green, and has taken the view that money
6 spent on education is the best investment our society can
7 make, the more education you can get the better, and he has
8 passed all of those statutes figuring this money would be
9 money well spent, and that it would be money that will improve
10 the system. He has been less concerned about neatness,
11 packaging and consolidation than have some other members of
12 the Congress.

13 MR. TRACEREDERG: Sam, the two Commissioners of
14 Education during the Johnson Administration have been
15 Frank Kappel, formerly the Dean of the Harvard Graduate
16 School of Education, and Hal Howe, II, formerly the
17 Superintendent of Schools in Scarsdale, New York, and the
18 Director of the Learning Institute of North Carolina. One
19 point: I heard Commissioner Kappel referred to as the
20 Commissioner who constructed the rocket and Commissioner Howe
21 referred to as the man who tried to send the rocket aloft.
22 I wonder if you would care to comment on these gentlemen and
23 your experiences in working with them.

24 DR. HALPERIN: I would like to comment on that
25 question. I don't know about the metaphor, however.

Let me say a word, if I may, about Commissioner Sterling McMurray, who preceded Commissioner Keppel, although he did not serve in the Johnson administration. I think a sense of history would require one to say that he had a very important role in the changing atmosphere and attitudes of the Office of Education. He was perhaps the first Commissioner to be drawn from the ranks of higher education rather than elementary and secondary education; he is the first commissioner in recent times. He had very rough sailing with the education organizations. Possibly the blame is a mutual one. In any case, he did not get along with these organizations. He did not care for the type of legislation of the general aid type that they were seeking in the field of elementary and secondary education. And he was the one who, to a large extent, initiated what might be called the quality in education themes.

He was in favor of categorical programs to improve teacher training, to expand educational research, to take care of certain specific problems such as adult illiteracy, education of the handicapped.

He did bring in an independence of the New Type of atmosphere that critics of OE had frequently harped upon. He did bring in more of a higher education orientation than his colleagues, and, to my way of thinking, kind of set the stage for Frank Keppel.

Frank Koppell has been described by Steve Bailey

an --and Bailey's place on the Office of Education
at the Education Act of 1965 is, of course, required reading.
He was the politician par excellence, particularly in
the sense of being able to work effectively with small groups
of influential people in informal settings, behind the
scenes. Keppel was the great political broker. He had a
very keen sense of why Federal education legislation had
failed in the past. He took it upon himself -- and in fact
I understand was given a specific assignment by President
Kennedy -- to bring some order out of chaos in the education
community, to try to get educators working together instead
of sniping at each other which had been the case for many,
many years, and to try to find a way around the church-
state impasse.

And so from his earliest days in office Frank
Keppel spent a lot of his time talking not with persons in
the Office of Education but with education association
leaders and influential members of the church groups,
individual higher education authorities, and the like, with
a view toward getting some common notion about ways in which
the Federal Government could operate. He didn't spend time
drafting bills with associations, but he did try to reach a
set of principles on which men could agree or, at the very
least, some principles that would not cause the various

1 interests to come into collision and open warfare.' And he
2 spent, as I said, a great deal of time with those groups.

3 He also spent a great deal of time building up
4 relationships with the Bureau of the Budget and with other
5 parts of the Federal Government, such as Jerry Weissner,
6 President Kennedy's science advisor, the head of the
7 National Science Foundation, and other federal agencies who
8 had tended to downgrade, and sniff and ignore the Office
9 of Education. By working with them and convincing them of
10 his own intellectual sharpness and the quality of his vision,
11 he was able to win some very valuable allies within
12 Washington, so that when legislation was ultimately shaped
13 for the President that legislation had the endorsement,
14 explicit or at least tacit, of key groups and of key policy
15 makers beyond the Office of Education.

16 He also spent a great deal of time building up
17 relationships with the Office of the Secretary. There had
18 been a great deal of criticism of OE for running its own
19 independent shop, a great deal of suspicion in the Office
20 of Education against the Department; and unlike the situation
21 in 1961-62 when Secretary Ribicoff really ran the legislative
22 program for the Office of Education with relatively few
23 inputs from Commissioner of Education McMurray, by building
24 up his relationships with Secretary Celebrezze and with
25 Assistant Secretary for Legislation Cohen, Keppel was allowed

3 a in free or hand with important policy makers than any of
4 his successors, I am sure.

5 Koppel was also an intellectual aristocrat. He
6 had many, many friends in high places, whether it was
7 McGeorge Bundy in the White House, now head of the Ford
8 Foundation, or Sorenson, or Peter Fruylingheusen, the
9 aristocratic Republican Congressman from New Jersey, and
10 others. He was able to mingle with these people socially
11 and was able to bring their authority and their notions
12 to bear.

13 I heard it said that Frank Koppel never had an
14 original thought in his mind. I don't suspect that there is
15 any truth in that. But what the person was trying to convey
16 by the assertion was that Koppel was the synthesizer par
17 excellence; he could take bits and pieces of information,
18 insights, problems, from a whole host of areas, things
19 gleaned in all kinds of contacts, whether political or
20 social, and put them into a kind of a picture of how things
21 could be made to happen. And he was, in that sense, the
22 great synthesizer, the great broker, who put together
23 combinations like no one I have ever seen.

24 He was outwardly retiring, not pushy and combative,
25 although he saw himself as having an important role in the
outside world, and for the first few months as Commissioner
he made a tremendous number of flying visits and many, many

1 spoke all around the country. His real work, as he saw
2 it, was behind the scenes, causing groups of people and
3 interests to come into alignment with each other. And he did
4 not see himself as primarily an administrator of the Office
5 of Education or as the great educational spokesman for
6 leading ideas of our time, although he was substantially
7 ahead of his time when he said, for example, in a very
8 famous speech in about 1965, I believe, "Thank God for the
9 civil rights movement," and when he tried to point out that
10 the civil rights movement had a great deal of motive force
11 and power which could be harnessed in the improvement of
12 our schools.

13 I think Frank Koppell loved the challenge of
14 politics, the smell of the greasepaint; I think he was not a
15 particularly artful Congressional witness. But he was able
16 to work quietly and personally with the Congressmen, so that
17 he was very much respected, very much admired, and was
18 regarded as quite a cool customer. And many of the members
19 understood that this was a force to be reckoned with, that
20 this was a guy to be taken seriously.

21 Now we come to Commissioner Howe. And people have
22 often said to me, and I am sure have said to others, "Why
23 don't you compare the two, and who is the better Commissioner
24 of Education?" I think the question really is not an apt one.
25 These men are very different in temperament, in ability, in -

1 perhaps in priorities; and perhaps that was the meaning of
2 the metaphor you put to me.

3 Howe has been, of course, the inheritor of a vast
4 agency. When Keppel became Commissioner he had perhaps four
5 five hundred million dollars worth of programs at most to
6 administer; Howe had roughly three and a half to four billion
7 dollarsworth. And so Howe's responsibility was for a much
8 larger organization, many, many more programs, a great deal
9 of money, and it was Howe's responsibility to make those
10 programs work, to attract good people to the Office of
11 Education, to make these programs viable in the Congress,
12 to get appropriations for them, and to avoid dismantling
13 of the more controversial aspects of those programs.

14 I think that Howe is a brilliant Congressional
15 witness. I would say that he is a fearless and courageous
16 one. Most Congressmen that I know of say that he is perhaps
17 too brilliant, or too fearless, that he ought to be a little
18 more condescending, a little bit more retiring in the face
19 of the Congress, that he ought not to be so much of a great
20 policy maker and leader. Be that as it may, the fact is
21 that Howe is Howe: he has set a pattern for the Office of
22 Education, he has set some standards of excellence which
23 are pretty well appreciated in the Congress, even among those
24 congressmen who don't agree with him. And he has made these
25 programs take off and hopefully one day succeed.
(end of tape recording)