

DEPARTMENTS OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE  
Washington, D.C.

Interview of:

HENRY LOOMIS

former  
Deputy Commissioner of Education

at  
Washington, D.C.  
August 15, 1968

Interviewed by:

Harry L. Selden

(This transcript was  
prepared from a  
tape recording.)

P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 MR. SELDEN: This is Harry L. Selden. This is an  
3 interview with Henry Loomis, former deputy United States  
4 Commissioner of Education.

5 Before you left the Office of Education, did you  
6 know Stephen K. Bailey of Syracuse University, Mr. Loomis?

7 MR. LOOMIS: I think I met him once, but I won't  
8 guarantee it. I certainly -- I knew who he -- yes, I did  
9 meet him once. I will tell you where I met him. I met him  
10 at a meeting in the Catskills where he had been one of the  
11 lecturers and I had been one of the lecturers.

12 MR. SELDEN: After you left the Office, he talked  
13 to you at quite some length, I guess.

14 MR. LOOMIS: That is correct.

15 MR. SELDEN: And subsequently did his paper for the  
16 American Political Science Association, which I believe you  
17 said you had read?

18 MR. LOOMIS: Right.

19 MR. SELDEN: In it he has devoted some attention  
20 to you and particularly to the changes you -- were brought  
21 into the Office of Education to effect.

22 Would you tell me, first of all, how you came to  
23 the Office. Had you decided to join the Office before you  
24 entered the OA?  
25

MR. LOOMIS: No. I will tell you how I came to the



1 Office.

2 I got a call from Rufus Miles, who was then the  
3 Assistant Secretary for Administration for HEW, a man I had  
4 known on and off for ten or fifteen years and with whom I had  
5 been in friendly rivalry, trying to get space in HEW because  
6 the Voice of America is really like a cancer and HEW only gets  
7 so much room and so we kept up a running, moderately friendly,  
8 but running battle on that score.

9 And, when he called me up, I assumed that it was  
10 something about space or something like that. So he asked to  
11 come down to see me, rather than the reverse, which amused  
12 me. And so I said, "Sure". And so he came on down. And  
13 he allowed that there was a gentleman by the name of Kepple  
14 who was commissioner of education who sorely needed a deputy  
15 to do the management and reorganization, et cetera, et cetera.

16 And I said, "Jesus Christ, not me! What the Hell,  
17 I don't know anything about education. I never heard of -- "  
18 well, I had heard of Kepple, but I didn't know him.

19 So it ended up that I agreed to see Kepple and he  
20 outlined his problems, which were basically that he was getting  
21 a hell of a lot of dough awful quickly. That he himself  
22 was not particularly interested in administration and even if  
23 he were, he wouldn't have enough time to do it and that Wayne  
24 Reed was a very nice guy, but had no backbone or managerial  
25 drive. Now, Wayne's idea of perfection was to paper over



1 error so there would be, "no flap", or "No fuss", or something  
2 like that. And it was clear that there was going to have  
3 to be an awful lot of fuss around there if the -- if that 97-  
4 ear old machine was going to go in a different direction.

5 Well I told him that I was having my problems in  
6 the Voice on a matter of policy control. That I thought,  
7 since I had been at the Voice so long and had my own contacts  
8 on the Hill, that I was probably in a better position to  
9 protect the Voice than anybody else. Just because of longevity.  
10 And that to me the Voice came first and thank you very much.  
11 And that was in '64 and I forget the month.

12 MR. SELDEN: Actually you came to the Office. You  
13 quite the Voice in March of '65 --

14 MR. LOOMIS: That's right. This was a good year.

15 MR. SELDEN: \_\_\_\_\_.

16 MR. LOOMIS: Yeah. I think it was a good year and  
17 I am not sure that it wasn't the fall of '63, actually be-  
18 cause I -- I just forget the months, you know. But anyway, I  
19 think it was probably the fall of '63 because it was the fall  
20 of '64, I think -- it was about November, it may possibly  
21 have been January of '65. It was, you know, in there a few  
22 months.

23 And I don't know to this day whether it was an  
24 accident or whether it was deliberate, but the day after  
25 the head of policy with whom I had been feuding, resigned, a  
man by the name of Ted Sorenson, who is the brother of Tom



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5

1     Son. I got a call from Frank, would I have lunch with  
2     him. So, I agreed to do that and he said that the same thing  
3     existed. I had advised him to go and look for somebody else,  
4     the year before. And he said that he had, but he hadn't  
5     found anything that was satisfactory.

6             Well, in the intervening year I had come to the  
7     conclusion that I had outlived my usefulness with the Voice.  
8     That I was probably more damaging to it than anyone else would  
9     be, that they were so mad at me that if I said the walls of  
10    this room were white, they would have said, "The hell they are  
11    they are black." You know.

12            And, once there was that situation, I thought that  
13    for the Voice's good that I ought to get out and I hadn't  
14    really thought of it that way because, until he sort of came  
15    along. I think I would have eventually. I was getting madder  
16    by the minute, and less effective by the minute.

17            So, we went through this again by the numbers and  
18    I said, "All right. How the hell do you find out about me,  
19    anyway?" He said that he had gone to the Civil Service  
20    Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and that he had decided  
21    that he wanted someone within Government as compared to an  
22    educator and they had recommended me, and so forth.

23            So, I said, "All right." The key to this issue now  
24    is Mr. Wayne Reed. "What are you going to do about him?"

25            MR. SELDEN: How did you know about Reed?



1 MR. LOOMIS: Well I knew there was a deputy and

2 I was being hired to do another man's job, you  
3 better find out what's happening to him. And it wasn't --

4 MR. SELDEN: Did you know anything about Reed at  
5 that time?

6 MR. LOOMIS: No. I just knew that there was a  
7 deputy with whom he was dissatisfied. I said, "All right.  
8 The first thing I have got to know, are you firing him? Is  
9 he leaving the Office? Well, what is going to happen? And  
10 before I mosey around this and before I really think about  
11 it, you better solve that one. And you better solve it without  
12 me in mind because if you can't solve it, there is no job.  
13 It's better than to have anybody have any idea that it is me  
14 versus Reed. You clear the decks and then when you hire me,  
15 or Tom, Dick or Harry, it is your problem. But you have got  
16 to clear the decks, first. And they ought to be well cleared  
17 in order to be \_\_\_\_\_ before you start looking for  
18 other people, otherwise you live got -- the new guy has got  
19 no chance. Otherwise anyone who likes Reed is by definition  
20 your enemy and you have enough problems anyway."

21 So, he agreed to that and I didn't hear any more  
22 about that for about a month, I guess. Six weeks or a month.  
23 Then he came back and told me that they had established a  
24 new job, laterally, and that Reed had been moved laterally  
25 and had agreed to do it. And that the decks were clear and  
would I now consider it?



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1           And I said, "All right. I will now take a real  
2 look at it and my first job is to talk to Reed." And then  
3 I wanted to talk to some of his other assistant, associate  
4 commissioner types. "And then I will let you know."

5           So I had a lunch with Reed and was very impressed  
6 with him, that he really wanted to get out of a job that he  
7 felt inadequate in as well and he welcomed not only me, but  
8 anyone that would come in from the outside and he promised that  
9 he would cooperate and that he would not try to cut my balls  
10 off. And he, I must admit, has done that. He has been an  
11 absolutely superb, has been a help -- we have disagreed on  
12 things, which is fine, and he will say that he disagreed, and  
13 when the decision went against it, he would be -- he was loyal  
14 for it.

15           In a most remarkable way, I think it was his ability  
16 to do that that made him a poor deputy. If he was the feisty  
17 kind of guy that would make a good deputy, he could no more  
18 have stood still for the treatment he got in having someone  
19 else come in than fly, but this, he did, and he did beautifully  
20 and I think he -- this is one of the best personnel appoint-  
21 ments Frank did, because Wayne could do this, and do it better  
22 than anybody else because he was one of them and he had been  
23 in Nebraska, or something like that, and he had known them  
24 all for years and years. He could be a liaison with the  
25 chief state school officers. Frank couldn't be because he was



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1 a hard man, an outsider-type. I certainly couldn't be and  
2 ve few others in the Office, virtually none in the Office,  
3 could be as good as Wayne.

4 I talked to the other -- some of the others. Most  
5 of the others. And, by and large, they were a pretty dispirit-  
6 ing lot. They were being very polite because by this time  
7 the word was spread that I might come, so they wanted to be  
8 sure the butter was on the right side, but it made it really  
9 apparent what the job was -- they were going to be horrendous.

10 But I figured that I was -- the question was whether  
11 to leave Government and to say, "The Hell with it, anyway,"  
12 and do this on the way out and it was so horrible that it  
13 sounded that it would be pretty good fun. So I went to  
14 Frank and said just about that and said, "Are you sure that  
15 you want me? Because it will be a shake. It's got to be  
16 a shake."

17 And, the point which he kept reminding me of, which  
18 I wasn't that conscious of until I had been there a little  
19 while, was that a billion and a half of the elementary and  
20 secondary was coming in about six weeks, which was going to  
21 about double the budget to deal with and there was absolutely  
22 no machinery to deal with it at all.

23 MR. SELDEN: Let's see how we are doing --

24 (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

25 MR. SELDEN: The press, about the time you left



1 the OA, they had a few things to say about your departure.  
2 I am interested in that only in so far as it has any relevance  
3 to the Office of Education. Did you find that the repercussions  
4 that got in the way of your tenure at the Office?

5 MR. LOONIS: Without question, it did. I will put  
6 it this way. My problems with Lyndon Johnson got in the way.  
7 How much of that, with that speech, and how much of that were  
8 previous things, I don't know, as my first run-in with him  
9 had been back in '58 when he was Senator Johnson on a matter  
10 involving his personal honesty and he and Jenkins and I had  
11 a knock-down, drag-out, to put it mildly and I considered I  
12 won it in that the contract that we had been required to do  
13 was cut in half at -- that year and ceased thereafter. Now  
14 how much he remembers that, I don't know.

15 The speech, I don't know whether you read it or  
16 not, had absolutely -- at least in my mind -- absolutely  
17 nothing to do with Johnson. I was concerned that a speech  
18 tried to examine impartially and fairly the intrinsic problems  
19 of any Government overseas radio and the real problem is how  
20 to report diversity honestly and effectively. And it tried to  
21 examine that and, if anything, I think I was rougher on the  
22 broadcasters than I was on the others and the analogy that I  
23 used was of the blind men and the elephant.

24 Now -- and I suppose the person that I was most  
25 annoyed with was the policy people of the information agency,



clh10

10

1 an particularly Carl Rowen who had been just -- in my judg-  
2 ment, totally inept at understanding this instrument and they  
3 had a rapier and they were trying to use it like a sabre and  
4 it just wouldn't cut and it was ruining the instrument.

5 And, I had, frankly, no concept of Johnson. But,  
6 then I saw the McGrory piece the next morning. I was leaving --  
7 I was on my way up to New York. And, I saw the McGrory piece  
8 and I said, "Oh Christ." Here, you got an extra copy of  
9 this? Here. "It sure has hit the fan."

10 So, from the airport I called up Frank and told him  
11 about this. And I said that I was sending over a copy of the  
12 report and a copy of my speech and that if my coming to him  
13 with it was an embarrassment, for Christ's sake, say so. I  
14 was perfectly happy. I was fed to the teeth anyway and, feel  
15 absolutely free. And then I got on the airplane. And I  
16 didn't hear anymore from him until I reported for duty Monday  
17 morning and said, "Do you still want me?"

18 And he laughed and said, "Yes."

19 Since then -- and that's all he ever would say on  
20 the subject -- since then over a period of time I have pieced  
21 together a little bit what happened and I have been told that  
22 Mr. Johnson called him up about an hour or two after the  
23 papers I sent to him had gotten there and instructed him not  
24 to hire me.

25 MR. SELDEN: Oh.



1 MR. LOOMIS: And that he had replied, "Very well,  
2 Mr. President, then you have two jobs to fill." And that  
3 Mr. Johnson had backed down.

4 Mr. Johnson had then called Colebreeze and told  
5 Colebreeze to order Kepple not to hire me. And Tony, who is  
6 not normally considered a man of guts said, "Mr. President,  
7 my Commissioner of Education can choose whoever he wishes for  
8 deputy" -- or words to that effect.

9 So the President backed off again.

10 MR. SELDEN: It doesn't sound like the President.

11 MR. LOOMIS: No, it doesn't, but these have been  
12 told to me by people who I think would know. As far as I  
13 observed, or could observe, there was no problem. I certainly  
14 dealt with the White House staff --

15 MR. SELDEN: Cader?

16 MR. LOOMIS: Cader and company, I think perfectly  
17 effectively. And, in fact, they were key to the reorganiza-  
18 tion, and were necessary for the reorganization. And then  
19 I dealt with them on other matters and I was -- I had really  
20 forgotten about the thing until John Gardner came along and  
21 John had only been there a couple of weeks when he asked me  
22 to come see him.

23 And he said, "What are we going to do about your  
24 problem with the President?" And I said, "Oh, Christ, don't  
25 tell me that's still floating around?"



clh12

1 And he said, "Well, yes, it still is." That the  
2 President raised the issue with me when he was asked to be  
3 the secretary of HHS.

4 Incidentally, John had been the one who had finally  
5 persuaded me to take Kepple's job. Because I could argue  
6 both sides of the case up one side and down the other and it  
7 was a fifty-fifty thing, I was going crazy. And I went to see  
8 John in New York because I had known him for some years and  
9 discuss the pros and cons and I was leaving his office in the  
10 rain walking down Madison Avenue that I decided that I couldn't  
11 sit on things, I had to go one way or the other, I said, "Hell,  
12 I will go".

13 And, he was aware that he had been that and so he  
14 apparently, and I am sure this is true, he said it, discussed  
15 this with the President and the President's staff repeatedly.  
16 I was asked such questions as, "Was I loyal to the President?"  
17 And I said, "I don't know what you mean by that." "If you  
18 mean, am I loyal to the individual, I can't answer yes or no.  
19 I don't really know the guy. I have seen him on television.  
20 I hve been in rooms where a thousand people are shaking his  
21 hand in a line, but I don't know him. So I don't consider  
22 myself loyal or disloyal to him.

23 As far as the Office of the President is concerned,  
24 to the best of my knowledge, I have been loyal to that ever  
25 since I have been in Government. So John said a couple of times,



1 " , let me see if I can't fix it up."

2 So, eventually, about October, I guess it was, he  
3 said, "I really think this is --", -- I said, "By the way, if  
4 it's hurting the program or Frank, for Christ's sake, let me  
5 know, and I will quit." And so about October or November,  
6 something like that, he said that I think it really is hurting  
7 Frank more than Frank knows, and I, incidentally, had kept  
8 Frank informed of these conversations and he was hopping mad.

9 So I said, "Okay, John, that settle's it, I quit  
10 right now."

11 "Now, the next question is: What's the cover story?  
12 What do I say? I will say anything within reason that you  
13 want me to say. How do I get out of here with honor without  
14 having a heart attack? And I can't very well fake that. Am  
15 I mad at you? Or are you mad at me? Or what?"

16 Poor John, I think, hadn't thought of it in those  
17 terms. And he said, "Well, let me think about it." And I  
18 said, "Okay, you think about it. But I just want you to know  
19 that as far as I am concerned, I am through right now. I will  
20 continue there, because there is a job to do, but I want to  
21 get out, but I don't want to damage the program or Kepple or  
22 you. But let's see if we can figure out how the Hell to do  
23 it."

24 Well, the way they did it was by putting Frank into  
25 the assistant secretaryship, without his knowledge, when he



clh14

1 was on vacation, which was the final thing.

2 So, the day after that happened, I called up John  
3 and I said, "Okay, this is fine. Now we better announce that  
4 right off the bat so it is clearly tied to it and that's that."  
5 And, that was done and then I was asked to stay a month or  
6 two to get the new Commissioner straightened out.

7 MR. SELDEN: Bailey says that furthermore Loomis  
8 had been uncooperative in buying and selling tickets for the  
9 Democratic party dinners --

10 MR. LOOMIS: Well, that's false. But I am glad that  
11 you mentioned that. In all my time in Government I was never  
12 asked by either party to ever buy or sell any tickets or to  
13 go to any dinner or function. Period. I think they both  
14 knew that I wouldn't. And I was never embarrassed or never  
15 asked to. I am glad that you reminded me of that.

16 MR. SELDEN: But --

17 MR. LOOMIS: Incidentally, I made rather a point of  
18 not belonging to either party. I considered myself a Civil  
19 Servant. I voted different parties and I contributed to  
20 different people and I did my best to mask the contributions  
21 so that they would not be known and therefore affect what I  
22 did one way or the other.

23 MR. SELDEN: Well, Bailey goes on to say that one  
24 of the problems that you had thereafter was the wide chasm  
25 between Kepple and you, who he describes as "Ivy types" and



1 and the \_\_\_\_\_ specialists. What is your background?

2 Is there Ivy in it?

3 MR. LOOMIS: Yeah. Harvard. University of California.

4 MR. SELDEN: But you don't -- my recollection of  
5 my career is that you didn't work at Ivy and neither, for  
6 that matter, did Frank Kepple.

7 MR. LOOMIS: Well, he didn't since he was head of  
8 the education school at Harvard. I worked at MIT, I don't  
9 know whether you call that Ivy or not.

10 MR. SELDEN: Well, it doesn't matter, anyway.

11 It is so close to it, it is hard to --

12 MR. LOOMIS: Yeah. \_\_\_\_\_ the President  
13 of MIT. I don't think it's the college, per se --

14 MR. SELDEN: No, I don't --

15 MR. LOOMIS: I think what it is, is the people that  
16 are used to excellence, who are used to striving for "the  
17 best", who go around with "the best", as compared to the  
18 professional educator who basically knows he is second-class  
19 and most of the people around him are second-class and he  
20 doesn't want to admit that to himself and I think that where  
21 you happen to go to college is moderately immaterial.

22 I think there probably is some, also, of -- our  
23 Victorian grandpeople would have called, being a gentleman or  
24 not -- and the things that go with that.

25 MR. SELDEN: The implication of a connotation, here,  
is that -- not that the school makes a difference, but that



1 the frame of mind that was engendered by the school might  
2 have made a difference. One of the old-timers at the Office  
3 say that when you -- soon after you came in, you had a meeting  
4 with the new Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education  
5 people and told them that the Office didn't need educators,  
6 it needed managers.

7 MR. LOOMIS: I suspect that I did, which I think is  
8 true.

9 MR. SELDEN: Did you see it then as a one-or-the-  
10 other sort of situation, or did you see room for both in the --

11 MR. LOOMIS: Well, put it this way. With the Voice --  
12 not with the Voice -- with the Department of Education, Office  
13 of Education, had been, was a musty, statistical thing that  
14 turned out statistics that were too old to be of any use and  
15 a free consulting bureau.

16 And, this is what I meant by an educator, a consultant  
17 presumably had to know what he -- he or she -- had to know  
18 what they were talking about. I think in many cases they  
19 didn't, be that as it may. But they didn't have to be conscious  
20 of money. They didn't have to be conscious of control and all  
21 the problems of how much control is right and how much is too  
22 much and what are the rules on Title III of Act 21, or what-  
23 ever it is. It is an entirely different thing. You know that  
24 you need little children to sit them in corners rather than  
25 in circles, or whatever it is. It is an entirely different



1 kind of knowledge.

2 And the point that I was trying to make to them then  
3 was that they now had money and if you start talking about  
4 three billion and a half per year and take time off for week-  
5 ends and holidays and eight hours a day and you do the mathe-  
6 matics, the amount of money that you have to physically shovel  
7 out that door, every hour, is pretty startling and it requires  
8 a different kind of guy, or woman, to make those judgments as  
9 to who gets it and under what ground rules, is this proposal  
10 adequate or isn't it?

11 Not only adequate from the teaching point of view,  
12 but is it legal? Is the fiscal things make sense, et cetera,  
13 et cetera. And that's an entirely different kind of fellow  
14 and very few professional teachers are suitable to do that  
15 job, not that they couldn't be, but they are just different.  
16 And the fact that they are teachers doesn't help them at all.  
17 I would rather have a guy from the business end of the school  
18 if he is going to be in that kind of stuff.

19 MR. SELDEN: Well, some of the people who were on  
20 the staff then had been school administrators, rather than  
21 pedagogues.

22 MR. LOOMIS: Some of them had, yes. But usually  
23 they were pretty second-rate schools with about, you know,  
24 two cents to rub together. When you are talking of billions,  
25 it requires, again, a different standard. This is like saying



clh18

1 the man who is running a little, country, local bank had  
2 be asked to come be head of Morgan's. Sure, he was a  
3 banker, but the problems are of an utterly different scale.

4 I think an example of this was that when I came  
5 there, the average age of new recruits into the Office of  
6 Education was 54, because you went there as an expert and you  
7 weren't an expert until you had been around for a while and  
8 you went there to be made a gentleman or lady by Act of  
9 Congress and retire from there.

10 MR. SELDEN: Credentials were important.

11 MR. LOOMIS: Credentials and really knowledge,  
12 knowing being a friend of Joe Jones, or some thing -- I mean,  
13 that kind of knowledge, not knowledge of the subject.

14 That, when I said, "Let's get some younger blood  
15 in here," this was impossible, because a younger person, by  
16 definition, wouldn't know what he was doing and I felt strongly  
17 that you had to have some of the junior-manager-intern types  
18 and the young lawyer types in at junior level so that you  
19 can begin to get some distribution of age and experience  
20 throughout the shop and eventually we did over their dead  
21 bodies and they worked out fine.

22 MR. SELDEN: How much study did you give to the  
23 existing organization of OA before you began to shuffle  
24 things?

25 MR. LOOMIS: Well, in the first day or two it became



clh19 1 apparent that this couldn't be a gradual change or even a  
2 minor change, that it had to be really basic. For example:

3 The first thing that happened to me when I had been  
4 in the Office about ten minutes was Wayne Reed came in and  
5 gave me the paper as deputy and so forth and he said, "Now  
6 here is your first job, sign these chits for tax \_\_\_\_\_."

7 I said, "What!"

8 He said, "Well this is the job --."

9 I said, "Well, it may have been your job, but it  
10 sure as hell isn't mine." That any deputy that spends his  
11 time learning about 50 cents tax \_\_\_\_\_ might as well  
12 give up -- I said to myself. So I never got another one of  
13 those. I didn't sign that one either, I may say.

14 And then the second thing that happened was that  
15 I was trying to find out who had responsibility for this new  
16 Elementary and Secondary that was coming down. And, in the  
17 matter of an hour I had two separate groups tell me, unequiv-  
18 cally, that they had responsibility for Title III. They  
19 were two different groups and two different bureaus, each  
20 with their staff, each working like mad, and each on a com-  
21 pletely differing assignments --

22 MR. SELDEN: Could you tell if they were working on  
23 parallel lines or --

24 MR. LOONIS: Oh, they knew the others were there,  
25 but they weren't about to admit it and they knew they were in



h20

1 they were in competition with each other.

2 MR. SELDEN: Were their ideas similar or --

3 MR. LOOMIS: Not particularly. No. Because, again,  
4 Title III is a good one. One of them wanted to make it  
5 regular school and the other one wanted to make it research  
6 and it was that major fight, which is the fight of Title III  
7 anyway. But each had their group, each staffing it, going  
8 ahead, writing papers, writing directives, et cetera, et  
9 cetera, right parallel.

10 MR. SELDEN: Well, how did you resolve that?

11 MR. LOOMIS: We resolved that one by, first of all,  
12 setting up a group, which I think was called executive  
13 committee, or something like this, which -- an executive  
14 group or an executive committee -- to get them all together  
15 in one room which they hadn't previously done. And  
16 went down and said, all right, now this Act is just a whole  
17 series of things. All right, now who is going to have Title  
18 I and who is going to have Title II and so forth? And there  
19 were different opinions on every title.

20 So we said, all right. Each of you who think you  
21 ought to have any title, make a brief on why you think you  
22 ought to have it and we will circulate that and we will come --  
23 this was on a Tuesday -- we will come back on a Friday and  
24 we will go through these briefs and we will try to make some  
25 decisions. Well, we decided \_\_\_\_\_ for title III, which



clh21

21

1 wa till a knock-down, drag-out, and so I gave them another  
2 chance to make one more brief and we couldn't resolve it there,  
3 so I said, all right, I will take it to Frank and you will have  
4 a decision this afternoon.

5 MR. SELDEN: Mr. Kepple did not sit in on the group  
6 meeting?

7 MR. LOOMIS: He did when he could, but he was in and  
8 out a good deal and on this one, I advised him not to. Let's  
9 thrash this out so you can be Olympian. If you are in it,  
10 it's more difficult. You stay out of this and I think I will  
11 be able to resolve most of it and then you can be Olympian,  
12 but the main point is, act upon it. I don't really give a  
13 damn which way you come down, I think this is the right way,  
14 but I don't -- it is more important for you to come down so  
15 that everybody knows it now than to sit and try to figure out  
16 which is slightly better than the other.

17 And he did follow my advice on that one. But, he  
18 didn't have to be there long to see that this whole thing was  
19 geared in a very wrong way for distributing money. For  
20 getting -- for distributing it carefully when new acts were  
21 coming every time you turned around. If the thing had been  
22 static you might have been all right where you were, but you  
23 had to design an organization that could accept whole new  
24 acts, whole basic changes in philosophy, in function -- be-  
25 cause money was only one of your problems. One of your major



1 problems was Federal intervention or whatever you want to  
2 with local.

3 And, one of our problems with the, "educators", was  
4 that most of them have been brought up, since they were knee-  
5 high to a grasshopper, were convinced that it was immoral for  
6 the Federal Government to have anything to do with locals and  
7 therefore they were emotionally, almost religiously, against  
8 the act which they were trying to administer and many of them  
9 didn't recognize this, which was another problem and why I  
10 kept wanting managers and not educators.

11 I mean, the point is, the Congress has said it.  
12 This is the damn law, whether you think it is right or wrong,  
13 that is your problem. If you think it is wrong, then get the  
14 hell out of here.

15 MR. SELDEN: Did they?

16 MR. LOOMIS: After the reorganization, quite a  
17 number of them did.

18 MR. SELDEN: By retirement or --

19 MR. LOOMIS: On their own. We didn't fire anybody.  
20 But, most of them had a -- were unhappy enough with the  
21 new jobs, which were quite different from their old jobs,  
22 particularly when we cut all consulting, so they couldn't  
23 travel to Hawaii in the summer and remain in the Winter -- or  
24 the other way around. They got really quite unhappy. And  
25 said, "Now we have to sit here and shuffle papers."



1 MR. SELDEN: What did -- then did you work up a  
2 reorganization plan -- I gather from what Koppie and  
3 and others have said, that a reorganization plan had been  
4 in the works for a while before the new commission

5 MR. LOOMIS: Yes. Well, what happened there is I  
6 brought Mylecraine with me --

7 MR. SELDEN: Mylecraine worked with you at the  
8 Voice?

9 MR. LOOMIS: Yes and Mylecraine has been with me  
10 before that in the intelligence operation. I picked him up  
11 in '54, then he had been away for a while in the U. S.  
12 Information and the Bureau of the Budget.

13 MR. SELDEN: By the intelligence operation, do you  
14 mean the Department of Defense?

15 MR. LOOMIS: No, I had set up an intelligence  
16 office in the --

17 MR. SELDEN: Oh, the U.S.I.A.

18 MR. LOOMIS: And I brought him in as the administra-  
19 tive -- as a GS7, actually. He is first-class. I wanted to  
20 bring with me my own management team -- people that I could  
21 trust and I could use as eyes and ears. I brought a  
22 secretary and I brought Walter and I brought my research person,  
23 \_\_\_\_\_. And that was part of the package that I  
24 agreed to come with. There was no point in coming here alone.  
25 It is just ineffective. These are people that I know who know



1 me. They don't know -- none of us knew education. But we  
2 will find our way around through this jungle and the four of  
3 us working together will be a lot better than any one of us  
4 alone.

5 So one of the first jobs I told Walter to do was  
6 to go fiddling around, as fast as he could, through the admin-  
7 istrative section and other parts of the organization and see  
8 if we could locate some bright young people somewhere along  
9 the line so we could get some professional ideas from them.

10 We knew -- it was self-evident that all the things  
11 that you meant, normally, by going to the tops of charts  
12 were virtually a dead loss. And he came up with this guy,

13 Russ Wood, who was then in the Office of Management  
14 or some title such as that, who was a hell of a bright guy  
15 and, incidentally, is Harry Singleton's brother-in-law, who  
16 is president of Teledyne --

17 MR. SELDEN: Oh.

18 MR. LOMES: And he is a smart guy. And he had  
19 been doing quite a lot of thinking on this subject and they  
20 had been fussing in the Office of Management with varying  
21 ideas. Sort of a \_\_\_\_\_ on their own, as much as  
22 anything else.

23 But he had been doing the thinking and he was a  
24 smart guy and no educator and a younger fellow -- I don't  
25 know, thirty, thirty-two or three, something like that and so



1 Walter found him and asked Russ to come see us and he made  
2 eminent sense. So I said, "Okay. Now you go away and lock  
3 yourself up for a week and come back with a complete organi-  
4 zation. You have just given me pieces of it. Come back with  
5 a complete one where everything that now exists is either  
6 -- has knowingly been abolished or has gone somewhere. And  
7 then, also indicate what new things there may be that now  
8 don't exist at all."

9 And he did that in about a week.

10 And that is, I would think, 90 percent of the Ink  
11 report. It is the concept of the Ink report. It is the  
12 concept of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary, the Bureau  
13 of Higher Education, which didn't then exist and the concept  
14 of Adults and Vocational.

15 MR. SELDEN: What then was the purpose of the Ink  
16 report? Was it, as Bailey says, to take the heat off you?

17 MR. LOOMIS: Well, it was perfectly clear, when  
18 you looked at this thing, that you had violated every sacred  
19 cow in the pasture, of which there are a great many. It was  
20 perfectly clear that it was going to cause a hell of a stink  
21 on the Hill. Because one of the advantages from the Hill's  
22 point of view in the old organization was that each Title of  
23 each Act had its little section, which meant that there was  
24 complete liaison back and forth between the House of that  
25 section and the Senator or representative on the Hill who was



1 concerned with that particular Title and the fact that these  
2 things overlapped in function was immaterial to them.

3 So, once the whole -- you are breaking that down,  
4 it is no longer organized by Title and Act, it is organized  
5 by function, that everyone on the Hill that was involved with  
6 this was going to be madder than hell, that was self-evident.

7 It was clear that the adult education educators were going  
8 to be furious because you put them in the same box as voca-  
9 tional, et cetera, et cetera.

10 Also, Frank felt strongly that the previous re-  
11 organization that had been two or three years before, that  
12 had been done by an internal group -- first of all, he thought  
13 it was a pretty poor organization. But, secondly, it was  
14 all the ins reorganizing themselves and time was an absolute  
15 necessity and I felt that if we were going to have the White  
16 House with us on this, \_\_\_\_\_ when Senator So-and-  
17 So yekked to them, that they had to be part of it.

18 Well, there were two possible ways to do it. You  
19 could go out and do a contract with one of these consulting  
20 firms, or you could get Government types and I felt that the  
21 latter was essential. The time was now down to a month. Time  
22 was essential. I also felt that the Government people would  
23 be far better -- and I had a very dim view of private con-  
24 sultants when they come to government problems -- and the  
25 President, after all, is head of the executive branch and he



can order anybody he wants to get tomorrow and I really mean tomorrow. I don't mean after his leave or after he has finished this job. I mean, tomorrow.

And, we have got to convince the White House that they have got a teaching president, and et cetera, et cetera, had gotten all this legislation and we better damn well defend his -- himself on a management level, otherwise this whole house of cards is going to come crashing down.

One of the things that we had done through Woods, what came to be known as the shadow organization, we had some idea of how many super grades we needed, we had some idea of the number of people we needed, so --

MR. SELDEN: From what previous --

MR. LOOMIS: From this Week thing. When he did what we came to call the shadow organization. And we had 25 or 26 super grades then in existence and it was clear that we needed, oh, at least double, if not three times. I mean after all, you are talking this kind of money. You got to have -- you got to be able to pay some salaries to get people interested. So we went to Cater and talked to him about this and he saw the light and he set up a meeting about the next day and we had the Civil Service types there and we had your other budget types and he was there and Frank and I were there and I think that was it. I think there were some more White House -- but I made the pitch and I will never forget



1 Mr. Irons, who was retired shortly thereafter, but he was  
2 number two in the Civil Service Commission and I said we needed  
3 fifty super grades, fifty additional super grades.

4 And he has a jowly thing -- it just sort of quivered.  
5 He said, "It is impossible. There are only five in the  
6 Government."

7 I said, "I don't give a God Damn how many there are  
8 in the Government and you know it. You know you can make it.  
9 Otherwise, you want this thing to fail? You want the President  
10 to be discredited? You going to tell me, sitting here, that  
11 you can't get fifty? That's absurd."

12 And he jowled back and forth -- (laughing) -- but  
13 that was done deliberately to be a shocker to say that this  
14 wasn't business as usual. That if this was to succeed, it  
15 was going to have to be an extraordinary effort with no holds  
16 barred. With complete White House backing. This wasn't  
17 working for the Office of Education, which was a sub-section  
18 of an unknown department. This was working for the White  
19 House. This was the only possible way of getting this thing  
20 done.

21 And so, they bought it and they said, did we have  
22 anyone in mind to do it? He said, "No, we did not." "But  
23 we thought you could look through John Macey, at the top-  
24 level administrators within Government, and that one should  
25 be chairman, there should be someone from the Bureau of the



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1 Budget on it, there should be someone from the Civil Service  
2 Commission on it and that you should have task forces under  
3 this, all of whom are Government types, so you can order them,  
4 (snapping fingers), just bam. And no clearance problems and  
5 all this kind of stuff.

6 So they called us up that afternoon and said would  
7 we accept Dwight Ink? And I said, give us an hour. I had  
8 never heard of him. So I knew some people in AC and we  
9 fiddled around and it sounded good as any. So we said, "Fine."

10 And then we worked very closely with him and showed  
11 him the shadow -- we asked him, "Well, do you want to see the  
12 Shadow pattern, or shadow organization?" And he said, "Yes,  
13 let's see it." And then, they had, oh I guess they had as  
14 many as fifty at one point working for them.

15 MR. SELDEN: Did they?

16 MR. LOOMIS: And they had something like five or  
17 six super grades pulled in and when they were stewing about  
18 contracts, they would get a guy from ONR or something that  
19 was good on contracts. That was a shifting group, in and out.  
20 And, they had this deadline of June 1.

21 MR. SELDEN: \_\_\_\_\_.

22 MR. LOOMIS: Yeah. And we went with them all the  
23 way through and they -- well, the first week or two they  
24 didn't see us too much because they were out talking to people,  
25 getting educated themselves, so then they would come and see



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1 But then after that they began seeing me every day  
2 and Frank and I maybe every -- two or three times a week,  
3 when they were trying to figure out their index and the tough-  
4 est one of all was the Bureau of Research, with the basic  
5 issue of whether to make it a Bureau or whether to put  
6 research components into each of the other bureaus.

7 And that was fifty-fifty. You could argue that  
8 either way, right down to the end. Eventually they said we  
9 will basically do it either way that you think, because we  
10 think that it's -- you can make argument either way.

11 MR. SELDEN: But what, then, tipped the scale in  
12 favor of the Bureau?

13 MR. LOOMIS: In my judgment, there were two  
14 things. One is that I thought that the research could teach  
15 could learn a lot from each other, which they would get  
16 together in one place and that's why we said by setting up  
17 your divisions of your division within the bureau, I think  
18 you can do the liaison. But the most important thing is you  
19 have got to have another Bureau Chief and encourage and we  
20 are short of senior, capable people.

21 Now, if you get the bureau chief that you ought  
22 to have in this kind of business, you will have a different  
23 dimension in your top staff than if the research is buried  
24 down in the different divisions. And that was really it.

25 I also felt that if you had such a thing as pure



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33

1 research, which you don't do \_\_\_\_\_, if you ever  
2 could conceive of pure research, you would never conceive  
3 of it if you didn't have a Bureau. You see, otherwise, it  
4 would be all pragmatic research for the particular bureau  
5 you were in. And if it was in elementary and secondary, you  
6 would only be thinking of problems of elementary and secondary  
7 and so forth.

8 MR. SELDEN: Did you arrive at that judgment even  
9 though Title III and Title IV, Elementary and Secondary  
10 Education, had these enormous research components?

11 MR. LOONIS: Yeah. We were aware of that. But you  
12 also -- you had a hundred million dollars of research money  
13 which, after all, in this kind of \_\_\_\_\_ monkey world,  
14 a hundred million is more than you can spend, really. It's  
15 a lot.

16 MR. SELDEN: They haven't had any difficulty spending  
17 it.

18 MR. LOONIS: But you also can see -- I said wisely  
19 -- to conceive of a concept of national laboratories. This  
20 is a difficult thing to conceive of. You can conceive of  
21 laboratories of higher education and laboratories of lower  
22 education, but this concept of national laboratories, and the  
23 function of the laboratories -- I think I, myself, always  
24 felt that the Bureau of Research was at least 51 percent, but  
25 that was as compared to not having any -- but that was the end



1 that they struggled on. And then, there were a few other  
2 little ones that wouldn't fit in neatly like construction  
3 and contracts and whether or not that should be part of  
4 administration or not. I really didn't give a damn. But  
5 they were too little to be bureaus, but they were odd things  
6 that just wouldn't fit, but so be it.

7 So it ended up by that being done and I felt a  
8 few of \_\_\_\_\_ like construction were wrong. I am  
9 sure Frank thought they were wrong. Everybody else thought  
10 there was a lot wrong. I said, it doesn't make any difference,  
11 we have got to buy as it. If we change one sentence, we  
12 have had it because then everything is open and everyone is  
13 going to be wanting to change things.

14 And, we have got implemented, right now, while  
15 people are in shock and while we are in shock, we were able  
16 to get four or five voluntary demotions from super grades  
17 which people don't do unless they are in shock. As of now,  
18 right now, while they don't know what the hell has hit them  
19 you will do it, and it will be done with, and it will be a  
20 fait accompli. And then, they can bitch and scream and you  
21 may take on that advisement or you may not, we will see.

22 And, he bought that. So we did it. That was that.  
23 And then there really was pandemonium, because I was told  
24 the statistics were something like 85 percent of the people  
25 physically changed location. Because we had started -- once  
we did this, we figured we might as well put our divisions



1 that are in the same bureau next to each other, essentially  
2 they are in the same division, next to each other and people  
3 that are in the same section next to each other, which we  
4 did and more or less \_\_\_\_\_. We ended up by  
5 percent being physically in a different place. So no one  
6 had any telephones -- which is probably pretty good. But it  
7 was pandemonium.

8 One point that you would be in a better position.  
9 to judge than I, but I think Bailey slightly overstated  
10 this, that I was generally feared or hated, or words to that  
11 effect. \_\_\_\_\_

12 MR. SELDEN: Bailey says, "...to the traditional  
13 educational establishment, Loomis is alien, cold, domineering  
14 and ruthless. This image was never dispelled. In fact,  
15 it was reinforced by the attitude and behavior of Loomis'  
16 hand-picked deputy, Walter Milegran, who had the unlovely  
17 responsibility of wielding the hatchets handed to him almost  
18 daily by his superior..."

19 MR. LOOMIS: I think there is a good deal of  
20 truth in that. Again, I think you divided it out. I think  
21 those that were basically against what we were trying to do  
22 for a variety of reasons, or who felt inadequate to the new  
23 job and the new challenge undoubtedly resented it and many  
24 that I dealt with most, which were the new team, the new  
25 group that were in agreement with what we were trying to do



1 and were anxious to get on with the job, I don't think felt  
2 that way. And I think they were in the majority. Or, at least,  
3 they were in the effective majority. You had maybe a bunch  
4 of drones that were there in the process of retiring  
5 or in the process of leaving because they were mad.

6 And, I don't think that this was necessarily  
7 personal as compared to the job that had to be done. But  
8 I think you are in a better position to judge that than I am.

9 MR. SELDEN: I have not heard very much in the way  
10 of adverse criticism of you in the short time that I have  
11 been there. I have heard reference to the treatment and the  
12 traumatic shakeup, but apparently the people that I have heard  
13 from didn't take it personally.

14 MR. LOOMIS: Well, this is the one thing that  
15

16  
17 MR. SELDEN: Of course, Bailey has talked to a  
18 great many more people than I have.

19 MR. LOOMIS: Yeah. And there was  
20 And the reorganization was traumatic. There is no issue on  
21 that. And I am sure it caused a lot of distress, both for  
22 "What happened to me" kind of distress and "I think the office  
23 is going in the wrong direction" kind of distress throughout  
24 the place and this I respect and can sympathize with.

25 MR. SELDEN: For the time that you were there  
after the reorganization, how would you evaluate the conduct



1 of the programs under the old legislation?

2 MR. LOOMIS: I think it was getting better all the  
3 time. It was shaking down. For the first couple of months  
4 it was obviously pretty shaky, because the whole thing  
5 was new and they figured out where it went and so forth.

6 I think the executive group developed into a  
7 pretty useful management tool and certainly a good  
8 communications tool. Before I came there none of these  
9 people had any communications with each other. It all went  
10 via Frank and Frank wasn't there very much and Frank, being  
11 a nice guy, would listen to somebody telling him something  
12 and say, "Well that sounds great." Well that guy would  
13 interpret that as an approval to go ahead with the project  
14 and then the next night Frank would see someone else who  
15 would tell him something else, "That sounds great" and that  
16 guy would assume it was a go-ahead for the project and  
17 neither would know the other was going to do it.

18 And Frank really wasn't thinking in those terms.  
19 So that you had an awful lot of confusion and therefore  
20 built-in resentment. Who told you to go off into this  
21 damn field? Frank told me to. Well, Frank told me to.  
22 And, you know.

23 And I think that the executive group was really  
24 being pretty efficient and that kind of stuff was cut down.  
25 It was interesting to see that when it started, a lot of  
26 people like Ralph Flint thought it was another waste of time



1 rather pointedly didn't come and sent his deputy and  
2 that kind of stuff.

3 But then, when they saw that decisions were made  
4 there and that those decisions stuck and that these were  
5 money decisions and personnel decisions and organization  
6 decisions, I found that they all happened to be able to  
7 come there.

8 MR. SELDEN: What were your own relations with  
9 legislation and the Hill while you were there? Did you  
10 take part in the --

11 MR. LOOMIS: Minimal. Because the way Frank and  
12 I divided the job, was that he was Mr. Outside and I was  
13 Mr. Inside. He was doing fine on the Hill. He knew every-  
14 body and all the rest and there was just no point in both of  
15 us trying to do it.

16 I did do some testifying for him on some bills  
17 that came on matters of budget and things like that and I  
18 went with him a couple of times. He introduced me to all  
19 types. I got involved with some on personnel matters,  
20 particularly Adam Clayton Powell. I wish I had kept a  
rather interesting letter he wrote to the White House about  
my being a racist, which, incidentally, I do not consider  
myself to be and we were working hard to get Negroes in  
there, but I will be damned if I am going to take people  
just because he recommends them.

And he recommended as a bureau chief a man who



1 was in the Office of Education as a GS14. He had been in  
2 the U. S. Information Agency. I had known him there and  
3 he was the most stupid and venal guy I have seen in long  
4 time and he was overpaid at 14 and I would no more consider  
5 him as a bureau chief than fly and Mr. Powell and I had a  
6 rather knock-out drag-out on that one.

7 Then I did have some --

8 MR. SELDEN: You had him come to the Office --

9 MR. LOOMIS: No. He sent his boy -- what's his  
10 name -- begins with an S? Sloane, or some name like that.  
11 Who I see now in all these pictures with Carmicheal. And,  
12 it was straight, you know, blackmail threats, "I will get  
13 your job or I will get you fired," and so forth. And I  
14 said, "Fine, that would be great. You just go right ahead  
15 and do that little thing."

16 And, now we did use him. And he was very happy  
17 to write all the Negro colleges and ask for names of  
18 and suggestions of Negroes for jobs and so forth and we  
19 had, in fact, bent over backwards to get Negroes and the  
20 qualified ones at these higher levels are scarcer than hen's  
21 teeth. And we had, when he was getting particularly mad  
22 at us, we hadn't hired any, we had been turned down by  
23 four. We weren't about to tell him that. And we had two  
24 others that we were in the middle of negotiations with and  
25 I wasn't about to tell him that either. And we weren't going  
to promote his boy. Period. And we didn't.



1 MR. SELDEN: How about the other people on the  
2 Committee? Did they pressure you?

3 MR. LOONIS: Not significantly. Just --

4 MR. SELDEN: How about the Senate people?

5 MR. LOONIS: No. We did on Civil Rights which is  
6 a different row of beans and I got calls from Strom Thurman,  
7 Grover Mills, and a few other familiar names about their  
8 particular little districts that were getting screwed.

9 But those calls were really to Frank, but Frank  
10 was away, so I was the recipient and the Civil Rights  
11 business was an absolute shambles because we had no staff  
12 and this job came on and there 10,000 -- just the paperwork  
13 involved and to try to put the staff together, people that  
14 were competent, is most delicate a mission. It was diffi-  
15 cult and I think Seeley did a really remarkable job, though  
16 he got so tired and so exhausted near the end that you  
17 couldn't really expect him to be entirely rational. And  
18 he didn't have a sense of organization, either, which didn't  
19 help. He was a great guy sitting down and negotiating and  
20 talking out with a group and if the job had been just doing  
21 that with a few groups, he would have been superb. But you  
22 had hundreds of these people coming in at any one moment  
23 and you couldn't even answer the phone calls except for --  
24 it was a shame.

25 So they started to try to run to their congressmen  
about this and then some of that came back, but that wasn't



1 personal and I was just trying to hold the fort and say,  
2 "I will find out what the issues are and call you back".  
3 And so forth. And there were a few that got a little rough,  
4 but nothing out of the normal.

5 MR. SELDEN: Were you there after Howe too over?

6 MR. LOOMIS: Yes. I was there -- well, when I  
7 first met Doc -- incidentally, I knew of Doc, I knew his  
8 brother, and he had been brought up with my wife. The two  
9 families lived side by side, so they knew each other inti-  
10 mately. He asked me to stay on \_\_\_\_\_. I said,  
11 "Doc, that is impossible." And this was the first he had  
12 known about the Presidential \_\_\_\_\_. And so I  
13 said, "Well, I can't be ....". And he said, "Let me straighten  
14 it out." So I said, "Go ahead, Don Quixote, a lot of others  
15 have tried."

16 And so he came back in due time and said, "I  
17 can't understand it, so be it." "Will you stay just a month  
18 to help me out?" So I said, "Sure." "But I want to  
19 announce my departure so I don't get into a box of having  
20 been your guy and having been dissatisfied with you. I  
21 want it perfectly clear that I am going now, because of  
22 Frank.

23 MR. SELDEN: Then you didn't meet your successor,

24 \_\_\_\_\_?

25 MR. LOOMIS: No, I have met him since, spoken and  
had lunch with him once.



1 MR. SELDEN: Can you talk about Civil Rights?

2 MR. LOONIS: I think the Civil Rights effort in  
3 the Office of Education during that first year of the Act  
4 is one of the most significant things that was accomplished  
5 by the Office of Education. It was accomplished in spite  
6 of the fact that none of the responsible people, meaning  
7 the President, the Secretary of HEW, the Attorney General,  
8 the Bureau of the Budget, or the Civil Service Commission  
9 would admit that a problem existed. So you had no chance  
10 of setting up a mechanism to deal with this problem, even  
11 though you knew that it was coming and you had no guidelines  
12 as to what were the interpretation of these laws which had  
13 clearly been written with different interpretations in the  
14 minds of the people who were writing them.

15 Nor did you have any definition of what was the  
16 Office of Education responsibility, what was HEW responsibility,  
17 and what was Justice Department responsibility. And  
18 you had the clear idea that from your Southern Friends and  
19 white friends that nothing was going to happen and you had  
20 the clear implication from your black friends and your  
21 Northern and liberal friends that it God Damn well was going  
22 to happen and it was going to happen now. And this was  
23 just about the time I got there that this started and Secley  
24 who was on paper an assistant to Kepple had been given the  
25 job and there were about three people -- they didn't have



1 office space, they didn't have phones, they didn't have  
2 anything and the thing just sort of grew and we sort of  
3 dragged people out of other divisions just because they  
4 were there and they may have been the right ones and they  
5 may have been the wrong ones, but at least they were warm  
6 and bodies.

7 We got temporary housing across the way. As the  
8 thing grew the organization of it came apart, because Seeley  
9 was so busy in the substantive meetings with different school  
10 boards that it -- that he wasn't thinking of the organization.  
11 So I sent Walter over to try to again say what kind of  
12 organization do you do? Do you do it regionally? Do you do  
13 it functionally? How do you set this thing up? How many  
14 kind of people do you need? To get enough phones, to get  
15 people to answer phones, to get -- they got a very fancy  
16 machine that was so fancy that when they brought it in, it  
17 fell through the floor of the temporary building, so that  
18 one didn't work, but -- (laughing) -- to try to get the  
19 thing on an efficient basis, the job was growing so fast  
20 that it never really caught up with itself till after the  
21 first hearing \_\_\_\_\_.

22 And we had less than sympathy from the White House  
23 because the one thing they wanted was no flaps. Well, you  
24 couldn't administer this law without a flap and you had the  
25 White House, to my judgment, be dishonest, as when they



indicated that we hadn't discussed Chicago with them before Mr. Daley blew.

And I was in the room when Kepple did, so that there is no question in my mind, whatsoever, that he did, as I was party to his side of the conversation.

I think that that, while it was in retrospect, many mistakes were made, I think it was really a superb accomplishment to get as much done as was done. And I think Seeley is to be very much congratulated.

MR. SELDEN: Here is Bailey and his version of Chicago: "...In September 1965 Kepple had had the temerity to hold up a grant to the Chicago school system on the issue of \_\_\_\_\_ segregation under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. He ran smack into the buzz saw of the big power politics. Mayor Daley, the political boss of Cook County called the President, \_\_\_\_\_ throw Kepple on the carpet and told him to adjust this one, fast. That funds were released pending a further study \_\_\_\_\_. Kepple's current \_\_\_\_\_ with the President was not enhanced by the episode."

MR. LOOMIS: Again, that sounds like Kepple had done it without informing the White House and that he was so naive that he didn't realize that Daley would get excited. Now both of the \_\_\_\_\_ are false. Kepple is a very astute political animal and any idiot knew that



1 this one was going to hit the fan, but the complaints that  
2 had been brought in was a masterful job done by lawyers with  
3 the law in mind and there was clear-cut and chapter and  
4 verse and you couldn't ignore it.

5 And we recognized that this was going to be a hellish  
6 one and we called the White House on the hope that they  
7 would call Daley before it came and tell him this --

8 MR. SELDEN: There is a curious anomaly about this.  
9 My recollection is that the appropriations for <sup>E</sup>ASEA had not  
10 even been enacted at that time, that there was no money to  
11 withhold.

12 MR. LOOMIS: No. This was later. Quite a bit  
13 later. This was actually the fall of '64.

14 MR. SELDEN: The fall of '65, it had to be --

15 MR. LOOMIS: '65, yes.

16 MR. SELDEN: The --

17 MR. LOOMIS: The fall of '65, yes.

18 MR. SELDEN: \_\_\_\_\_ any appropriation of --

19 MR. LOOMIS: In May or September.

20 MR. SELDEN: September '65. The bill itself  
21 was signed in April but the appropriations were delayed  
22 until fall, September.

23 MR. LOOMIS: Well, this was still after that. I  
24 think it was in the first -- in the distribution of the  
25 first --



1 MR. SELDEN: The record will show --

2 MR. LOOMIS: Yes.

3 MR. SELDEN: -- I thought that --

4 MR. LOOMIS: No. This was for real. There really  
5 was money coming and this was in the first distribution --  
6 the distribution of the first money.

7 MR. SELDEN: Let's talk about your relations with  
8 Kepple.

9 MR. LOOMIS: As far as I am concerned, the best  
10 part of this whole year of Alice in Wonderland was my re-  
11 lationship with Frank.

12 I had been there about a month, I think, when  
13 Marvin Watson arrived in the White House and one of his  
14 first acts was to call me and tell me that he knew of a  
15 gentleman that was the principal of the school in Danger-  
16 field, Texas and that he would be a great addition to our  
17 staff.

18 And I said that would be fine and please send  
19 his papers over and we would give him every consideration.  
20 So I reported this to Frank and then Frank said, "Go ahead  
21 and give it the regular, honest due and if the answer is  
yes, we do have a job for him, you call up Mr. Watson and  
say so. If the answer is no, I will call him up. And the  
number of bosses that you would do that rather than the  
reverse can be counted on the fingers of one hand if you  
are an executive



I liked Frank before that, but after that I would say God Damn thing for that guy at all. Incidentally, did not hire him.

MR. SELDEN: So Frank \_\_\_\_\_ --

MR. LOOMIS: \_\_\_\_\_, of course.

But I felt, and from some of the remarks, Frank felt, was that one of the interesting things that we were on the same wave length, right away. -I felt this, that my relationship with him as compared to my relationship with Bowen, he felt in his relationship with me as compared to with \_\_\_\_\_. And this is, I think, your Ivy League. We knew the same people. We knew the same clubs. We knew that I had gone to Groton and I had gone to St. Paul's, but they are the same kind of schools.

Our way of thinking, although it was quite different in the details, I being more of a management-organized guy, were similar enough so we could communicate in shorthand right off the bat and we developed what I had had in the Voice, my deputy in the Voice had irreverently called "Vespers", as a very good \_\_\_\_\_ management thing. After everyone else has gone home, so that usually in the Office of Education \_\_\_\_\_, it was maybe 6:30 or better of seven, you would spend a half hour or an hour either just kicking around, either informing him what I was doing or what was coming up or if I had a problem, what



1 did he think, or vice versa. During the day you didn't have  
2 a chance. We would sometimes be in meetings together, but  
3 more often you were at opposite ends. There is no point  
4 in writing memos in this kind of thing. And this, I think,  
5 was a very useful device that assured that we were doing  
6 things in concert and knowing what the other was doing.  
7 And I think we were a more efficient pair than either one  
8 of us would have been alone, because we were quite different  
9 and our strength and weaknesses melded pretty well.

10 MR. SELDEN: Have you been in touch with him  
11 since?

12 MR. LOOMIS: Oh, we see each other occasionally.  
13 Our families are friends and so forth. It just -- mechanically,  
14 he is New York and I am not there that much and --

15 MR. SELDEN: Do you spend much of your time in  
16 Massachusetts?

17 MR. LOOMIS: I vary. I am traveling a good deal  
18 to various places. I \_\_\_\_\_ in New York, but downtown  
19 or uptown where he is, when I am there I am on Wall Street  
20 and not uptown and we are friends. We have no professional  
21 relationship and, God knows, I never want to see Education  
22 again, except I am doing a job for colleges right now, but  
23 again, it is a management job. Thank God.

24 And these, next to the Office of Education, are  
25 about the most fowled-up thing I have ever seen in my life.



1 MR. SELDEN: How about \_\_\_\_\_ ?

2 MR. LOOMIS: I know. I run across him periodically  
3 and we have a great mutual friend in Middleburg that he  
4 sees -- he used to be his roommate at Yale, so he sees him  
5 more out there and -- John, well I was doing some business  
6 with him, but it was on a different thing. It was urban  
7 coalition and conservation, but not in education.

8 (End of interview)  
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