

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

OFFICE OF EDUCATION

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INTERVIEW WITH WALTER MYLECRAINE

by

Mrs. Jan Sofokidis

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THIS TRANSCRIPT
PREPARED FROM A
TAPE RECORDING.

Many more references
to "Louis" should be
changed to Louis in
Hoyt's transcript.
(Some already corrected)

1 MR. MYLECRAINE: Just for your notes of what to
2 talk to Henry Loomis about:

3 There is a whole background that he may want to or
4 may not want to discuss that comes on in the Johnson-Loomis
5 relationship before he ever came to the Office of Education.

6 And there is mentioned in the Bailey Report the
7 interview that he had with Mary McRory that got published
8 in the EVENING STAR the day he left VOA to come to the
9 Office of Education. And that -- in the public press -- has
10 been known as the reason that the President was very much
11 dissatisfied with his appointment. But there is more to it
12 than that, and you will have to ask Henry whether he wants
13 to go into it.

14 Okay. Now, so far as I'm concerned in reading --
15 and I use the Bailey text here that I just read yesterday
16 as the sort of sounding board I bounce against -- I see a
17 couple of things in there that I think, people wanting a full
18 history, might usefully be recorded.

19 The emphasis in the Bailey Report is on the eighth ^{ink}
20 task force reorganization. There's more to it than appears
21 in the Bailey piece -- more to it in the sense of what
22 importantly took place here in a very, very short period of
23 time.

24 Loomis came here as deputy, as I recall it, on the

1 as I recall on the 14th of April 1965. It had a 60-day life-
2 term and it did use up its life-term and did complete its
3 report within the 60 days. But there's a very interesting
4 thing about it, particularly about the organizational structure
5 that showed up, and that is that between the 8th of March
6 and the 14th of April I can remember that Russ Wood and John
7 Hughes and Henry Loewus and I had developed the organizational
8 structure down to almost the last details that eventually
9 came out in the task force report, as the report of the 14th
10 of June. So that the homework on the reorganization was done
11 almost completely before the task force got here.
12 They then worked against that. They thought of other ways of
13 doing business, and they considered other alternatives and
14 thought the answer was just about identical with the piece
15 that had been done by John Hughes' shop, with Russ Wood, and
16 Henry and myself.

17 MR. SOFOKIDIS: Are you saying, Walter, that the
18 () report gave substance to what was done in --

19 MR. MYLECRAINE: It gave validation to it.

20 MR. SOFOKIDIS: Yes.

21 MR. MYLECRAINE: And it gave the aspects of it having
22 been outside the consideration of all the problems and there-
23 fore an outside answer. But it wasn't. It was an absolutely--
24 That was a pretty active three weeks-- I guess it was five
25 weeks -- six weeks. But the reorganization plan, I can

1 remember that flip chart that Russ had. And I don't remember
2 whether he's got the same-- I don't remember whether he's
3 got the old copies of that or not. Maybe not.

4 MR. SOFOKIDIS: He might have. You might ask him.

5 MR. MYLECRAINE: But the job was done before the
6 task force got here, about reorganization.

7 Now, validation and confirmation of what needed to
8 be done in administration here, this the (LWC) task force
9 did do -- had some pretty incisive looks at administrative
10 procedure, administrative performance in the Office of Educa-
11 tion, and there they were creative.

12 But the interesting thing to me has always been at
13 the time that the organizational structure was done before
14 they got here.

15 Now, I notice also from Bailey's piece -- that is to
16 say, again using this as a sounding board -- that the Bailey
17 piece is that the educational community is, I'm sure, and I
18 guess a lot of the Office of Education community, thinks of
19 as an accurate reflection of the sort of traumatic time --
20 he mentions "traumatic" a good many times in his text -- the
21 traumatic time that took place here. We didn't see it that way.
22 We knew it was somewhat traumatic for some of the people we
23 ran into in the course of taking charge. But the idea was
24 not to come in here and bust up a lot of relationships and
25 cause trauma.

1 The thing that we saw was that the Office of Educa-
2 tion was not managed. It was professional bureaucracy ensconced
3 over a long period of time, and an archaic approach to the
4 needs of education as of 1965.

5 We were used to much more rigorous management, in
6 the backgrounds of the USA, the Voice of America than the
7 Office of Education has ever seen, or has ever seen yet to
8 date. That is one of the observations that I continue to have:
9 The Office of Education continues not to be managed in a
10 rigorous sense such as defense contractors' operation or
11 -- I don't know what you would say -- perhaps even FAA, or
12 some of the line organizations of public administration.

13 But our approach when we got here was to be con-
14 cerned with the application of all the dollars, particularly
15 the S&E dollars, to the public performance of educational
16 management. That is, management of the Federal dollar for
17 the benefit of education.

18 We had-- At least, I had little contact with the
19 whys and wherefores of how Title I, Elementary and Secondary
20 great bulk of funds would be used, or for what purposes.
21 We weren't much concerned -- or as much concerned. Certainly
22 I wasn't.

23 Henry became increasingly concerned with Keppel
24 about some of the issues of the Title I administration that
25 Bailey goes into a good bit. He did substantively get

1 concerned about concentration of money on disadvantages
2 versus layout of the money in a general aid fashion. But
3 even so Henry himself-- We were concerned with the internal
4 management of OE. We were sort of nonplussed because we found
5 it very difficult to find any management tools to grab in
6 order to operate financial planning, in order to operate
7 personnel systems and the staffing pattern. There wasn't,
8 and as far as I know there has hardly ever been since, a top-
9 level quarterly operational financial plan operated, versus
10 the S&E resources in the Office, for instance.

11 We were used to, in the foreign affairs background
12 of USIA to reallocating resources as those reallocations be-
13 came necessary over a period of time. We were used to
14 meeting with a set annual fiscal year amount of funding for
15 expenses. We were used to meeting all sorts of crises that
16 might develop anyplace. If in the beginning of the year we
17 laid out operating expenses and personnel ceilings and so on
18 for the 38 language services in the Voice of America, we were
19 quite prepared in September to reallocate those resources if
20 the President couldn't go to Japan (TAPE BLANKED OUT HERE.)

21 MR. SOFOKIDIS: I would pick it up with the President.
22 You were talking about the President in Japan. I think it
23 broke just about in there.

24 MR. MYLECRAINE: Okay. Well, we were used in, of
25 course, in the Voice of America business to reallocate the

1 resources over a period of time because of events that might
2 transpire that couldn't have been predicted. And we were
3 used to making rather massive reallocations.

4 In affairs in Africa or Asia came to a crisis point,
5 well then we figured that we would take resources that haven't
6 been expended in Latin American affairs, by the time we got
7 to maybe October, in order to accommodate the new crisis in
8 Africa. And this meant that everybody who was in that milieu
9 in either USIA or the Voice was accustomed to having their
10 resource availability changed, owing to the practical needs
11 that everybody, whether he was a Latin American specialist
12 or Asian specialist, could see had an impact on the totality,
13 and therefore adjustments had to be made.

14 Now, in the Office of Education -- and this is still
15 the case -- there has never been a perception of management
16 on that count. We don't really reallocate resources even
17 of staffing or expense monies because there is a series of
18 riots in major metropolitan areas. Basically the allocation
19 of resource starts at the beginning of the year and carries
20 on in the pattern of its initial allocation until the end of
21 the year. Everybody gets rather an arbitrary -- arbitrarily
22 determined; sometimes I think not thoughtfully determined --
23 packet of resources to work with, and that stays stuck.

24 If somebody has a crisis over in some other section,
25 that's his problem, and there's no coordinating, demanding

1 participative management which says, "Well, now, the big
2 problem now is something of a different nature than we had
3 originally thought, so we're going to concentrate resources
4 here."

5 We don't move people about on that account, which
6 we very much used to do in the Voice and in USIA. We were
7 used in the USIA to a widespread field of operation --
8 around the world -- many different sorts of installations.
9 They might be large technical bases with all sorts of foreign
10 third national personnel, foreign service officers, civil
11 service, wage board people. They had the whole range employed,
12 of the government, represented in USIA.

13 In OE the use of personnel was basically of one
14 sort: a career appointed group springing from only one source
15 of recruitment, almost as so many peas in a pod. We were
16 interested in revising that, and Bailey does mention it, and
17 it was a very key thing to us, that we get new blood into
18 the Office of Education.

19 As a matter of fact, that did happen. The FSLE
20 registers^{as a} and source of recruitment was very heavily stressed
21 and it has had a very lasting impact on the Office of Educa-
22 tion -- one of the things I think that has been most influ-
23 ential has been the continuing drive or input of new employees.
24 One of the people most responsible for that, in cooperatively
25 working with us about that, was Charlie Bryant, whom we did

1 hire -- one of the more successful hirings. But we had--
2 All across the board in OE we had no fixes of management
3 approaches that we had been used to. Well, we tried to
4 establish them.

5 Now, these establishings were what caused the trauma.
6 I think to fully establish them would cause just as much
7 trauma today as was attempted to be caused in those days.
8 But I don't know that it was fair for the history to date to
9 record that it was such a hard-driving, cold, non-thinking
10 kind of a management imposition. It was simply that what
11 came to the Office of Education were some careerists of public
12 administration management who had plenty of heart, but who
13 were already trained a whole echelon ahead of what the
14 Office of Education was then used to and in many ways still is.

15 The trauma it seemed to me occurred because the
16 people who were in the public administration of the educa-
17 tional dollar were not used to operating as public adminis-
18 trators. I think this is in many ways still true of education
19 in the Nation. We all are quite aware these days -- talk
20 about it, talk about the facts, participate in situations
21 which show education operating in isolation -- at the higher
22 education levels, the cities, the State departments of educa-
23 tion, and in the segmentations of OE. We find isolated
24 activity being the mode of public administration -- not
25 cohesive and coordinated and manipulative of resource

1 characterization.

2 Now, that's a problem as I say that I don't think
3 has been cured yet. I don't know that education wants it
4 cured. I think a lot of the people in the nation, the younger
5 people, want it cured. They're not particularly adept at
6 the techniques of management, but I do think that people --
7 communities in general -- do find increasing advantage in
8 bringing education out of isolation. That's why we have
9 things called community schools, coordination of municipal
10 efforts, education and others, decentralization in big cities
11 like New York. They're trying to get education within com-
12 munity activity, perhaps as a leading edge of it, but engaged
13 in the community.

14 Well, in order to pull that kind of thing off-- Take
15 say a different breed of resource management than education
16 has had generally, and in the Office of Education.

17 Another thing that interested us that I mentioned
18 a little while ago was our experience of field management
19 coming from the USIA as compared to the Office of Education's
20 basic void and incapacity versus field operation at that time.
21 That's why there was a big emphasis in the Eighth Task Force
22 report result that there be a strong establishment of field
23 operation.

24 Here was a department which had-- I suppose that
25 HEW has more field installations in its various precincts --

1 public health, social security, the regional office setup of
2 tradition in the department -- probably has more of a spread
3 throughout the nation than any other domestic department. Maybe
4 the Veterans Affairs people do; maybe the Agriculture people do,
5 but certainly HEW is comparable.

6 Now, with the field potential of the HEW nature and
7 with our background as field operations could be, we were
8 very much insistant that the potential be realized, that the
9 advantages be picked up. So we did go strong for decentraliza-
10 tion. This has never really been a very popular thing since,
11 but it has always been continued. It hasn't been disbanded.
12 It has moved ahead stumblingly, but it has never moved back.

13 Now, at the present time -- and we haven't yet
14 come forward with the production of the field operation which
15 we had envisioned in 1965. And this particularly related to
16 production of knowledgeable guidance to headquarters, based
17 upon knowledgeable evaluation and relationship with the field.
18 In some precincts this is called an intelligence operation.
19 In others it's called a public relations operation. But what
20 we were after was being sure that what we did do at decision
21 sources in Washington was in keeping with the needs of the
22 community. And we needed to have feelers into the community,
23 all across the land, in order to be accurately informed of
24 what the -- you know, the public opinion, the professional
25 opinion, the actual educational community opinion was, all

1 across the land.

2 Well, this depends on two things: One, you have to
3 have the organization mechanism, which was established. And,
4 two, you have to have installed in that mechanism people
5 of sensitivity, of public administration capacity and per-
6 spective and wisdom in a bigger sense than isolated education
7 affairs.

8 We haven't been too successful in coming up with
9 that kind of talent installed in the mechanism which has
10 been installed. We don't know enough about the operations
11 of poor people and poverty and militant organizations and
12 teachers' organizations, and PTA organizations, city halls,
13 university communities, student communities -- we don't know
14 enough of the real mix, the conflict and problems that are
15 being represented in the land every day in all the educational
16 activities. We don't get a report here, we don't get a feel-
17 ing of it here, on an organized, communicating, adult educa-
18 tional basis to the staff of the Office of Education.

19 The Commissioner gets it, because he's out talking
20 to leaders, no matter where. And some of us others get it in
21 our own fields, because we're out. But the Office of Educa-
22 tion does not come up with a well-informed, purposeful daily
23 action on the part of every employee here, because he's
24 been briefed, because he's aware -- kept aware -- of a
25 perspective of all the problems that exist in education, in

1 the context of the country. So that as much as we did
2 establish a mechanism, I don't think we've become adept at
3 using it.

4 I don't know enough about HEW to say whether there
5 are other shops than HEW that do. I sort of suspect that the
6 Social Security Administration does have this performance
7 out of a field mechanism. I've had a few associations with some
8 fellows there which we tried to establish early along, and
9 which were fruitful to us. And I sort of got the impression
10 that that organization out of Baltimore knew what its
11 clientele situation was, on an informed basis.

12 I think probably that Public Health Service and
13 the Office of Education are characterized by the same kind
14 of a problem. I still have the feeling that we're an
15 isolated professionalism versus the needs of the community.

16 I think perhaps the Welfare areas of HEW are
17 more like the Social Security area in the way of being
18 informed and reacting to that information.

19 Well, in any event, one of the main reasons that
20 the field organization was developed in OE, as I say, has
21 been maintained in a stumbling sense was because of our
22 familiarity from the USIA with the value of field operation
23 which can keep headquarters informed. This is a character-
24 istic of the Foreign Affairs area in which the Office of
25 Education has not in the least been characterized by.

1 Now, to get back to the point of humaneness -- you
2 know, whether there was humaneness at all in this time of
3 travail, so frequently called travail. As Bob points out here,
4 if you look back at the time of reorganization -- as a matter
5 of fact there was a time in July when I think there was some
6 80 per cent of the people moved -- physically moved --
7 organizationally on the same two days. And there was a time
8 of confusion when telephones -- you know, when they didn't
9 know what telephone they would have. As a matter of fact,
10 they all got a little slip of paper, as I recall, saying,
11 "You are now assigned--" "Your name is so-and-so, your
12 grade is so-and-so." You are now assigned to organization
13 so-and-so and it is located in Room so-and-so. Please report."

14 Well, to the educators this looked to be a very
15 insensitive way to handle all their relationships they had
16 comfortably built up and were suddenly being torn away from.
17 All right. And I'm sure it was traumatic. I've never been
18 embarrassed about it because I quite agree with Loomis and
19 Keppel that in this milieu reorganization is such a generally
20 threatening thing in educational circles, university circles,
21 that if you have got to do it, you do it. And let's not have
22 a whole waste of time -- lose the public benefit of having
23 done it -- by arguing it out tediously for ever and ever
24 and ever. Just do it. It's the kindest thing you can do.
25 for people, if decisions have been made about them, is to tell

1 them about them and let them know about them and experience
2 them and then they will have their own opportunity to make
3 their own minds up in their own new context.

4 Now, I think we did do that. I don't myself recall
5 any, well you might say any brutalizing of public employees
6 in the whole process -- none. All of the senior grade
7 people received assignments which were mutually acceptable.
8 They true enough were desired on the part of management, but
9 I don't recall a case of any of the senior structure saying,
10 "I just won't do that. I will go to my Congressman or
11 what-have-you before I will accept that." There weren't any
12 such cases as I recall.

13 Now this seems to me that there had to be a humanism
14 of having achieved some of the real changes that were made.

15 Secondly, with regard to the people who were the
16 mass of the employment and not the senior structure, I don't
17 recall -- there may have been a case or so, but I can't recall
18 it now -- I don't recall any drive at any individuals, any
19 seeking out to sack actions. We had one big advantage: Russ
20 Wood had been in the Office of Education since 1960, and
21 John Hughes had been here longer than that. They were very
22 knowledgeable about all the employment. Of course the
23 employment was a lot lower then, in those days. But they
24 basically knew about everybody. Theirs was a very responsible
25 attitude toward the people and they had no difficulty in

1 getting Lewis or I or Keppel to have the basic regard for
2 the integrity of the public service that people had rendered
3 and for the continuing utilization of these people in a
4 new business which was echelons above in importance than they
5 theretofore been involved in.

6 Now, true enough the comfortableness of prior
7 relationships got interrupted. This was traumatic for a
8 period of time. But there was no actual economic, career
9 or other damage that was planned into the process.

10 I think it can be said, and legitimately -- these
11 things do happen in any large-scale organization -- that
12 some people's status in the structure was revised. But their
13 basic well-being was not revised. And as a matter of fact,
14 as one looks at it in 1968 versus 1965, there have been a
15 great many rejuvenations that have taken place because of
16 that reorganization. And I think that there have been a
17 great many protective actions taken and sustained about
18 people who were involved in that reorganization.

19 I don't know if there has been much of an attri-
20 tion except where decided by an individual in his time and
21 in his discretion, in the time of things. I don't know of
22 any -- what do you call it -- any overturning or throwing
23 people out of the Office of Education.

24 QUESTION: Retirements of people who had been
25 around a long time and who might have intended to stay in

1 that area another 20 years?

2 MR. MYLECRAINE: No forced retirements. No forced
3 retirements. We were both-- As a matter of fact, Lewis and
4 I were much more familiar with the civil service system pro-
5 tection than the Office of Education was, and certainly than
6 the HEW personnel shop was, in those days. All these things
7 have gotten to be much improved in three years -- HEW and OE
8 personnel systems. But we came in and had to find ourselves
9 continually amazed by the non-knowledgeability about civil
10 service and government employment that did exist in these
11 things. So if-- I suppose there was one hidden asset that
12 nobody has quite recognized, and that was that Lewis and I
13 were merely more able to operate the Civil Service the way
14 the Civil Service was meant to be operated, than it had been
15 operating prior to that -- prior to the time of our arrival.

16 This was also-- Again, Charlie Bryant comes in
17 here very strongly, because he came in-- I got here in March,
18 and I guess he got here in April, about, and we always there
19 after had Bryant's advice, knowledgeability. He was a prior
20 Civil Service Inspector across the nation. He was very well
21 respected in the Commission.

22 As a matter of fact, the Office will never know
23 how valuable Bryant's relationships in the Civil Service
24 Commission have been to the Agency, in those early times
25 and right up to the current time.

1 Now, what else is there to emphasize?

2 I keep thinking of the Bailey thing I read yesterday
3 as a checkpoint.

4 There was another element that I don't think is
5 mentioned there, but I think might well be recorded: One,
6 the President, in demanding Lewis', you know, retirement from
7 his Administration seems to me-- You know. How could anybody
8 judge. But I have to see the Office of Education versus what
9 his assessment was about Lewis.

10 I think that the Office of Education a good bit of
11 momentum that it quite never realized that it had had, and
12 therefore doesn't realize till the present day that it had
13 had the benefit of. But when the-- When Lewis became aware--

14 Incidentally, Frank Keppel and Celebrezze were very
15 protective of ^{from} Lewis. They had their problems with the White
16 House, but Lewis was not aware of it, and it took until some-
17 time along in the summertime -- say August or September -- be-
18 fore Lewis realized that the Secretary and Keppel had been
19 under great pressure and under damage -- you know -- damage
20 in the relationship because of the ^{from} Lewis situation.

21 Now, when Lewis did realize this in the late summer
22 or early fall of 1965, I who knew him very well was not
23 aware either. I don't become aware of the situation until
24 about November or December of 1965. But I noticed in the
25 work of the place that Lewis became a bit dispirited compared

1 to what I had known him to be over many years, and he is a
2 man who is very hard to bend the spirit of. But this did have
3 a breaking effect on, as I say, the momentum which was up.
4 This became even more obvious when Frank began to have to
5 think about being Assistant Secretary of Education rather
6 than Commissioner, so that we began a big drive in March of
7 1966. We came up with in public administration a tremendous
8 achievement, in July of '65. We were at it hardgoing and
9 making real impact right on through August and September of
10 '65, but then the spirit of both Frank and Henry began to
11 sag a bit, and you could notice that the pace was a bit off,
12 the enthusiasm was a bit down. And this I think, in the
13 long run -- whoever knows what more perfect circumstances or
14 better circumstances might have emerged; I can't measure that --
15 but I do know that the pace slowed, and the impact of new
16 and change lessened.

17 And I think particularly the momentum that was lost
18 was the momentum of management. We didn't really recoup it
19 until somebody like (Cisco) arrived -- didn't really recoup it.
20 There was a long time of vacancy in the Deputy shop after
21 Henry left in March. () didn't get here until August.
22 That was a long time not to have a Deputy of-- Or a new
23 Commissioner. Furthermore, we needed a Deputy and we needed
24 internal management. But basically after the whole thing was
25 started, I'm afraid you would have to say there was as much as

1 eight months of a sag in internal management capacity, and
2 this is a -- you know -- a damage that I don't know the cost
3 of.

4 Now, what else is there that might occur to you?

5 QUESTION: Well, how do you see things now -- the
6 unfinished business in relation to what you have already
7 mentioned as we go along?

8 MR. MYLECRAINE: Well, the new management-- You know
9 it has been my carping theme of -- I guess I've worn out a
10 few welcomes on the point. The need for management still per-
11 sists as to the internal resources in our cases, in the Office
12 of Education.

13 The outside events of the dying days of this Ad-
14 ministration, the whole social events in the nation, the
15 Congressional activities in this fiscal year, and the nibbling
16 away of the elementary and secondary Act of '65 that has
17 taken place over the last year or so -- these things become
18 very massive versus the internal working of OE, and who is
19 to say whether the outside events are having more effect on
20 us -- would have as much effect on us -- even if we did have
21 a much better internal management. I can't say that. I think
22 it would be-- Myself, I think it would be very much more
23 helpful and would have sustained us against all these outside
24 events more than we're being sustained today. But that's
25 just my opinion.

QUESTION: Have you had a chance to read the Green

1 Report in detail?

2 MR. HYLECRANE: Yes. I think that's a waste of
3 time. Yes. You know what a committee is: It's a horse
4 put together by-- Well, it's a camel. A camel is a horse
5 put together by a committee. I think that's what they gave
6 the name for it.

7 They didn't really talk too much about the area
8 affairs I'm talking about, the Green Committee-- All they--
9 Education is very peculiar for somebody with a public ad-
10 ministration background, as mine, because the orientation
11 of the whole effort is so much more clientele-minded and
12 the bureaucracy that does relate to that clientele is so
13 victimized by its fear of being in Federal control.

14 I know the community, you know, is very susceptible
15 to complaints about federalism. But I think that the lasting
16 things of this era in education that have been achieved by
17 the Office of Education have been per se Federal control --
18 the tremendous, courageous leading action, completely develop-
19 mental that both Keppel and Howe put together about the
20 civil rights implementation was Federal control. And it's
21 provided the meat to the bones of the Supreme Court decision.

22 The evolution of Title I administration, where
23 you know the Commissioner -- Commissioner Howe and John
24 Hughes and the Bureau over there -- are insisting on, you know,
25 the evolutionary coming along to concentration of resources

1 toward those who need it. That's Federal control. And the
2 communities need it.

3 We have not got much of an evaluation process under
4 way in the event, but we need it. And I just attended the
5 Tuesday school office meeting -- it took place this spring
6 here -- where Joe (Fromkin) in his own kind of way made a
7 very impressive presentation to that group of people -- not
8 very friendly to his concept.

9 Now, why we had to have some sort of a benchmark--
10 Well, if we hadn't been so worried about Federal control
11 heretofore, we would have had that benchmark before, and then
12 we would have had maybe a second benchmark, and then we'd
13 know more as a community. It only would have been achieved --
14 it hasn't been achieved yet -- but it only would have been
15 achieved if there had been some of what is known as Federal
16 control.

17 I think that Federal control is a red herring as
18 a phrase. The Office-- I have found in most of my work in
19 government that the government community-- After all, you
20 know, it's a two-and-a-half million people -- two-and-a-half-
21 million-member community and it has got behind it all those
22 dependents, so basically you're talking about something in
23 the neighborhood of eight million people. That community is
24 just as diverse, just as characteristic of the conflicts,
25 and so on, that go on in any other part of the American

1 community. It may well be a bit more educated, and it may
2 be a bit more purposefully cohesive. But the society needs
3 guidance. Any society needs guidance. And if what we say is
4 that we don't want guidance because we don't want Federal
5 control, then I'm going to start looking around about whether
6 we don't really want Federal control. We need guidance. It's
7 when things drift in society that we get to a scattering of
8 resources, you know, a wastage of effort, a non-concentration,
9 a non-effectiveness. It's when we drift that we get in that
10 trouble. And it takes control not to drift.

11 So I've never been much impressed with the fears
12 of Federal control. I think we need more than we have. And
13 I wouldn't use the term. You know, I wouldn't want to call
14 you in and say, "Well, I'm going to give you some more Federal
15 control, whether you like it or not." That's not important.
16 But guidance, yes. Assistance, yes. Comparative analysis,
17 yes.

18 Again, the -- what I call in my own phrase -- the
19 intelligence system that we could-- We haven't got the
20 capacity in the Office -- the mechanism to achieve -- could
21 give us a lot more meaningfulness in headquarters decision-
22 making which would make our guidance more apt -- applicable.

23 I remember a kid stood up here one night -- it was
24 last night -- when Secretary Cohen was answering questions
25 of the employees. Incidentally, he's a great guy. He's the

1 only Secretary in town I know that can walk around in front
2 of the auditorium sort of chewing on his glasses and just
3 carrying on a conversation with 600 people. Well, not that
4 many -- maybe 400 people. And, you know, out in the audience
5 just time after time after time say, "Yes, Helen?" or "Yes,
6 Marvin?" or "Yes, Bob, what do you--" You know. Tremendous.

7 Well, one kid stood up and wanted to know of the
8 Secretary whether there wasn't something missing in the HEW
9 operation if it took a Poverty March to cause HEW to review
10 its approaches and find things that it could do, without
11 legislation, without big -- big revised efforts -- just
12 couldn't do better about the needs of the poor. Why should
13 a Poverty March have to do that? Why wasn't HEW within itself
14 achieving these things on an ongoing basis?

15 Well, I think there's a point to that. And I
16 think that the field operation, made sensitive, could provide
17 a good bit of that. And then we'd be better guided. And I
18 suppose somebody in the precinct would complain about Federal
19 control when there was an Office of Education observer in
20 the militants' meeting in Bedford-Stuyvessant. Okay. For
21 that I'll take a little bit of Federal control complaint if
22 I can get the guidance. Well. You might stop that until
23 we figure what else we're going to talk about.

24 There's one other area which Bailey -- in this
25 Bailey thing which I read yesterday which had some

1 knowle'geability which is not related to the Lewis area. He
2 wasn't here by the time we got started. And that has to do
3 with educational laboratory work.

4 I don't know how I got into that one, because maybe
5 when he was still here in his last month or so -- I guess
6 maybe it was -- because I guess in January of 1966 it became
7 apparent-- Yes, he was still there then. It became apparent
8 that the educational lab program wasn't developing and the
9 end of the first year -- well, halfway through the year --
10 the labs hadn't been started. And somehow or other I got
11 into it. I've forgotten how. But I guess I did have a lot
12 to do with the establishment of the laboratories in the manner
13 that they were established, and in a manner which became
14 quite a thorn in the side of the educational community and
15 I guess of Harold Howe and Gardner. And this had to do with
16 again public administration management point of view.

17 For some reason or other in January of '66 there
18 were-- It was necessary to have some meetings around the
19 country. As I recall they might have been in-- Where was
20 it? In Kansas City. It was in San Francisco. There was
21 in Chicago I think some meetings about that time -- January
22 or February of '66, to bring on the establishment of the
23 educational labs. And I was working with some people in
24 Bureau Research -- particularly June (Gillis), who I think
25 has got a lot of credit for having started off the educational

1 labs the way they were started off. They haven't wound up
2 the way he started off and the way I helped him start them
3 off. But anyway, Jim (Gillis) and I, I guess, were-- We
4 moved into sort of a vacuum in the Bureau of Research about
5 these laboratory things. () was interested, but
6 he was already beginning to wonder what he was going to do
7 next. The-- Frank Keppel and Henry had gone out to the
8 private enterprise market to get a Chief of Research. And
9 Fritz didn't want to be some new guy's deputy. But he was
10 beginning to think of those things he was going to do. And
11 he finally I think did them about March. He went to
12 Columbia. But he was interested at the time, too, with Gillis
13 and I, about, you know, "We'd better get on the lab program."

14 Now, we took-- That is Gillis and I mainly, and
15 Herb Duffy, who was contracting officer. Hal (Cutler) --
16 Hal Cutler was even here in those days. Yes, Hal Cutler.
17 We took the approach that the labs would be a new thing in
18 education and were not to be ivy-covered adjuncts to univer-
19 sity installations that were already in the research and
20 development business. There was a whole system of -- four or
21 six or so -- R&D centers. It was our consideration that,
22 fine, R&D centers were supported and they supported to be
23 a long-term research effort about education -- the learning
24 process, computer system instruction, the () things that
25 prominence of staff and research capacity had to be dedicated

1 to.

2 We were concerned that the nation be provided with
3 a network of facilities -- labs -- which could be much more
4 pragmatically and problem-solving-oriented than the R&D
5 centers, and that these labs should be characterized in their
6 management -- that is, their broad consistency -- by almost
7 a minority of the educational profession. Not an absence of
8 them, certainly, but a minority, so that the community re-
9 sources that needed the results of educational process could
10 be in managerial control of the educational problem-solving
11 that the labs were established to undertake. And this meant
12 to us Catholics and laymen and city halls and the community
13 action or the community integration, the community coordina-
14 tion resources that could serve to draw education out of
15 isolation.

16 Now, we pursued a pretty Socratic method of lab
17 establishment. It was one of the more effective exercises
18 of Federal control that developed by almost a complete absence
19 of the thing that I've seen happen around here.

20 Now, our Federal control was, the labs were going
21 to be-- Does any group want to be one? We had only the
22 insistence that the groups that might be established be
23 representative of the community in this managerial sense I
24 referred to. But we weren't about to state that, "Yes,
25 University of so-and-so, you can be a lab," and "Yes, University

1 of so-and-so, you can be a lab," "But your university can't
2 be a lab." We weren't about to do that. We do enough about
3 the educational politics -- not to pick favors. Didn't want
4 to and knew that it wasn't productive to do so, although it
5 had been characteristic of education to do so.

6 So, the -- I don't know how many people might
7 consider this history. Some of the lab directors early on
8 might be very usefully interviewed about this lab development,
9 because I think it's a lasting development that will be part
10 of the Johnson heritage. And some of the lab people ought
11 to be interviewed, people like Becker in Philadelphia and
12 Stan (Sieberman) -- not Stan; I think his name is Hank, or
13 something like that -- in Los Angeles, and a good guy named
14 Glen (Nunicht) who was one of the original organizers of
15 the Rocky Mountain Lab. He's now with the Far West Lab,
16 in Berkeley. And a guy named Gagnier who is with the Univer-
17 sity of California; I'm not sure he's still with the lab there.
18 A few people like that you might usefully get your interview.

19 But let me tell you what happened. Gillis and I
20 were aware that the educational community wanted to grab onto
21 the labs and sort of graft it into the R&D business, as added
22 adjuncts to educational hierarchy, the educational establishment.
23 We were interested in having this community action management
24 versus education. So we took one ploy. And instead of going
25 to the Northeast, where the educational establishment was

1 not so well ensconced or so sort of confident that the lab
2 system was going to be a, you know, new and expanded channel
3 of all the established powers -- we went to the West Coast,
4 first thing off the bat, as I recall, it was the West Coast.
5 And we came back across the nation, establishing labs, holding -
6 not establishing labs, but holding conversations, holding
7 conferences about what labs were going to be and briefing
8 groups on what their problem was. They were basically bidding
9 against -- every group was informed to bid against his own
10 vision of what a lab should be. Now our only assistance was
11 that the management must be representative of a wide spectrum
12 of the community.

13 So we went to the West Coast and I remember -- I
14 guess that's right; we went first to San Francisco, and then
15 we got to Denver, then we got to Kansas City, then we went
16 to Chicago, and we finally got back East. And, by this time
17 we had gotten a lot of enthusiasm. We went to-- I guess
18 the Albuquerque people went to Denver. That's right.
19 Oh, man, that was some session. But Byron Hansford, as
20 a matter of fact, from Colorado can give you some-- He's
21 the Chief State School Officer there. He was in on the
22 thing in Denver, and he'd have a very good memory of it.

23 Well, we got back to the East, and we had gotten
24 all these groups enthused, and they saw the concept, and
25 we had surprisingly cut out a lot of educational infighting,

1 because we had put it in a larger context of new relationships
2 having to be in effect in these labs. And of course the cats
3 were out of the bag by that time, and the Northeast suddenly
4 began to get intelligence, communication of all these de-
5 velopments in other parts of the country out of the normal
6 channels of the power structure, and I-- They eventually
7 did (crimp) the approach and get the labs back more into
8 the more traditionally expected operation than it is now
9 as a lab network, much more traditionally operated that we
10 really had in mind. But we did make one input that never did
11 get changed, and that was the labs did get established nation-
12 wide. The attitude of the establishment was that there wasn't
13 enough talent, there weren't enough respectable figures available.
14 The talent in educational research was so faint that to
15 establish these things right across the board just spread
16 the talent so much that there would be not much accomplished.

17 We weren't-- Given time, we're not too much
18 concerned with that. We thought there was plenty of talent
19 that had never been surfaced, and we'd find it, we thought,
20 in dioceses, in labor unions, in other public structure and
21 private industry. If we could get these representations on
22 these boards then we thought we could draw from the community
23 all sorts of what the establishment might consider unorthodox
24 but which we were quite willing to gamble was going to be
25 competent talent about education. Well, it was a gamble.

1 We won about half of it. We did get the things established
2 and some boards are surprisingly still characteristic of
3 this mix that we called for. I'm not up on the boards-- I
4 don't know absolutely what the situation on the boards is,
5 but I think, for instance, the Philadelphia Board is still
6 characterized by industry as well as disease as well as
7 other community forces -- public forces. And that may be
8 so also in Los Angeles. I'm not sure.

9 In any event, it was a gamble that did pay off and
10 it was done right on purpose and it was done in a vacuum.
11 Lewis knew what we were doing and supported it and insofar
12 as he was in, as I say, in rather dispirited -- the situation
13 he was in. But he heard it and he applauded it and we went
14 ahead with it.

15 Fritz was on his way to Columbia and became dis-
16 interested. And I'm afraid the Commissioner and John Gardner
17 were so busy, taken up with the HEW problem -- the totality
18 problem -- the civil rights was on the Commissioner's neck
19 day in and day out -- and they came in for an awful lot of
20 abuse, both Gardner and Howe, from the established educational
21 community, because of the mushrooming of the labs and the
22 widespread distribution of them that took place I suppose
23 even beyond their knowing what they were doing. We were
24 working authentically under the direction of Lewis who was
25 on his way out but still was qualified to give directions.

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23 even beyond their knowing what they were doing. We were
24 working authentically under the direction of Lewis who was
25 on his way out but still was qualified to give directions.

1 But by the time Harold Howe and John Gardner caught up with
2 it, what they got was flak, never having been in on the
3 kind of philosophy that Lewis supported us in applying.
4 So that came to a sort of difficult impasse and left a lot of
5 sores around. But I think it was in the public interest,
6 and wise for the nature of the lab system, if the community
7 areas of our labs will be a big help in having been established
8 that way, because people do have access to 20 sources and
9 they may not all be as great as the, some of the more estab-
10 lished sources. I think they all would have been quite up
11 to snuff and would have been quite revolutionary in the whole
12 educational management process, the educational production
13 process, if they had been implemented under the kind of
14 concept that we sort of thrashed together with the people on
15 a Socratic basis.

16 QUESTION: Walter, is there any relationship with
17 your approach here with what OEO tried to do with Head Start,
18 some of those programs?

19 MR. MYLECRAINE: Yes, in a way I guess it was. As
20 a matter of fact, Jim Gillis came from OEO. And I suppose that
21 there would have been that philosophy there.

22 QUESTION: Represented there?

23 MR. MYLECRAINE: And Lewis and I were just catching
24 on to what OEO concepts were. Now, OEO, as you know, is an
25 odd sort of place. There are all sorts of philosophies that

1 float around in it, but the philosophy of the OEO Act was
2 community action representation -- one of the greatest things
3 that Act ever achieved, without having been put into the
4 legislation of any other agency -- was that it stood there
5 as a purpose of public administration. It has now been
6 adopted by all of the balance of the public administration
7 structure. And we pursued it. I guess that's where it was.
8 The OEO philosophy impregnated the establishment process of
9 the educational lab system. I don't think it came to us
10 full fruit, and I would bet right today that we have more
11 production and the country would be better off if we did have
12 a complete, meaningful, driving implementation of what that
13 was. But at least we got some of it.

14 I'm not sure that we're in favor in the
15 least bit, because we did get some of it. At least Jim Gillis
16 and I.

17 Those are sorts of the things that I remember, that
18 I could tell you about, that might -- that you wouldn't get
19 in other places. There are a lot of bodies buried around here.
20 I don't want to --

21 QUESTION: The Johnson Administration.

22 MR. MYLECRAINE: Let me put one of the --

23 QUESTION (FROM AUDIENCE): . . . is the word that
24 you have prototype programs that could be used. . .

25 MR. MYLECRAINE: Bob makes a very good point, that one

1 of the problems that we faced when we came in here, --
2 We're quite aware of the amount of problems there was going
3 to be -- was that the educational people didn't feel that
4 any people, any management or any of those others, from any
5 other fields -- could have wise utilization in the field of
6 education. Now, this isn't so. This is a self-isolating,
7 high-priest philosophy which characterizes education too much
8 in this community and is only, you know, breaking down a little
9 bit. I don't think it's breaking down very much, and I
10 don't Harold thinks it's breaking down very much.

11 But that was the problem that we didn't realize
12 we were going to have here. We were -- we thought when we
13 came in -- the Office of Education certainly needed some
14 public administration -- but at least it would be charac-
15 terized by people who were used to public administration.
16 And it's not so. It wasn't so at all.

17 But, let me make another point about that: And as
18 my memory of it goes, there was a group established, you know,
19 called the executive group, that derived from an old system
20 we had in the Voice of America, called the Executive Board.
21 Frank Keppel thought the Executive Board was too strong a
22 semantic term so it became typically educational -- the
23 "executive group." Okay.

24 But anyway, we started the executive group. Well,
25 we became pretty ruddy executive. I can tell you that.

1 And I think if you go to the old minutes of the executive
2 group of the spring and summer of 1965 and find members
3 who were listed in those minutes as having been present
4 and interview them, you'll find that they consider that exe-
5 cutive group to be a terrible threat when it started, but
6 they enjoyed by the time it was in full swing. And I cer-
7 tainly know from having lived here for a long time after
8 Henry Lewis left that with increasing frequency I hear the
9 commentary from people who were there before we got there,
10 man, that if we just had Henry Lewis back. Now, he did carry
11 on that adult education in a very brief period of time, and
12 he won a loyalty in a very brief period of time, from a
13 number of people who weren't calculated to begin with, to
14 be very much impressed, because of all their backgrounds
15 and their philosophy of educational management -- weren't
16 apparently very impressed with him, but they became impressed
17 with him. They became impressed with the process. They
18 liked the process. They liked the clarity. They liked the
19 assumption of responsibility. They liked the knowledgeability
20 that the management was going to be involved in comparison
21 analysis. And it's on this count that I think that the
22 momentum did all of a sudden cease and diminish. And that's
23 where we lost a cohesion of public administration, of the
24 educational resources, in the best interest, in the best
25 public interest. And I think the public suffered. And I

1 wish the President hadn't made the judgment he did make.

2 Incidentally, the President refused ever to see
3 Henry Lewis. He tried. He didn't see him. He shouldn't have
4 been too busy. He should have seen him.

5 But there are people like Wayne (Reed), Peter (),
6 Ralph Flynn -- who else? Art Harris. -- that, you know, were
7 not in the least bit-- You couldn't just expect that they
8 would take to Henry Lewis, but if you check with them, you'll
9 find they all look back on that time as the time they had a
10 leadership which they could balance against, get answers from,
11 get support from, and get achievement because of it.

12 QUESTION: One person that could fill you in on
13 history from the receiving end would be President Bill (Hurrell)
14 very important in terms of the management reserve, I should
15 think.

16 MR. MYLECRAINE: We lost a point in internal ad-
17 ministration because Henry left, and I think only Cisco's
18 return -- you know, advent -- got us back on the track there.

19 Norman Karsh, whom we picked and appointed, was
20 responsible to us while Lewis was here and was even learning
21 the Lewis kind of approach. But when Lewis left, Norman didn't
22 continue with whatever beginning education he picked up and
23 failed and refused to make use of the administrative structure
24 that exists in the Office of Education through the executive
25 office. Cisco -- it took Cisco to get here to, you know, put

into effect which is just as common in public administration

1 ministration, that you do turn on a meaningful communication
2 with your lieutenants in administration, in public administra-
3 tion, throughout the outfit.
4

5 Sure enough, an executive officer has a principal
6 loyalty to his chief. But his function is to well serve his
7 chief in public administration. And Cisco, the Chief of
8 Administration in the office, is always the, you know, the
9 focal point for the community, of public administration in
10 the office. So there is a natural alliance that these
11 figures should be -- should have in effect. Norman didn't
12 see it that way. Norman saw it as central administration is
13 -- makes its mind up and implements and carries on according
14 to its own pace and decision-making time and time of imple-
15 mentation, without-- Central administration happens to you,
16 was Norman's philosophy. If we have too much argument about
17 it, it might not even be -- we might not even get it imple-
18 mented.

19 Now, true enough, when we had the reorganization
20 plan, we did just that. (Simple) administration happens to
21 you. That's a matter, when you carry it on, when you have
22 to do that massive, one-time or so, central administration
23 happens to your performance. You stay in very close re-
24 lationship with all of the administrative mechanism which
25 is there available to you to implement those few times

1 of central administrative unilateral decision.

2 QUESTION: What you are saying is, you establish the
3 base first.

4 MR. MYLECRAINE: You establish the base. But
5 Norman kept very much too much in the business of all central
6 administration, it happens to be, and this broke down com-
7 munications, and he wound up without getting, you know, the
8 assets weren't in the outfit in order to implement what he
9 had in there.

10 Now, of course, Cisco sees it on the
11 other side of the point, and we've been in much better shape,
12 since he has put that kind of implementation in. And that's
13 what again public administration is all about. Basically,
14 these executive officers that are around are very, very
15 strong and essential thing to an Office of Education.

16 Educators don't rely upon somebody in public ad-
17 ministration, you know, in money management and resource
18 management. They're not schooled that way. Education deals
19 again always with itself and versus the community in isolation.

20 But, when you're talking about public administra-
21 tion and all these billions, in order to implement education,
22 you have to rely upon those who are experienced in public
23 administration. They're the exec officers.

24 Jim Kelly can give you a lot of guides on that
25 subject.

1 Incidentally, let me tell you about Jim Kelly.

2 QUESTION: Assistant Secretary, Comptroller.

3 MR. MYLECRAINE: Lewis and I began on a wrong footing
4 with Jim Kelly, I'm sure, in his opinion, because HEW was
5 characterized by a victimization of the Office of Education,
6 in its public administration. This has been traditional,
7 this is the way it happened. And the administrative managers
8 of the Department had learned early on, I suppose, that they
9 couldn't rely on the Office of Education for much administra-
10 tive performance, therefore they wouldn't allow it much --
11 much of any leeway.

12 So, when we arrived, we were the immediate source
13 of very strong competition versus the Comptroller, and that
14 led to a few confrontations, which Jim did very well in
15 (laughing) --

16 QUESTION: As usual.

17 MR. MYLECRAINE: -- as usual. But that's the way
18 it began. And I guess Lewis left before that relationship
19 came to much of a fruition either, but I must say that in
20 the three years that I've been here, since having come here,
21 Kelly has become a very great bulwark -- one to this organiza-
22 tion here, and Jim Kelly and I are absolute strong allies.
23 I respect him and wish he'd been made Under Secretary, frankly.
24 I think that's what we-- We have to have that kind of
25 internal managerial stability in this whole implementation of

1 this Department, in human resources.

2 So, however that relationship might have begun, it
3 wasn't too pleasant sometimes, because we were real competition
4 to Kelly.

5 QUESTION: This is another aspect of this history,
6 is the relationships with the Department then and now and
7 the relationship with the White House you had.

8 MR. MYLECRAINE: I don't know anything about the
9 White House, except-- Lewis --

10 QUESTION: With the Department.

11 MR. MYLECRAINE: But with the Department they began,
12 you know, pretty foolish as far as we were concerned, because
13 we found that the Department was a tremendous clamp on any
14 activity administratively that we felt it necessary to under-
15 take. Not so much with regard to budget. The Department's
16 always been pretty square, well, we figure, with the budget
17 resources of the Office of Education. So much of it comes
18 to the Office of Education and to the Commission anyway.
19 So it wasn't much in the budget area, so much.

20 But, certainly versus departmental personnel and
21 versus General Services, still a very bad thorn in the side
22 of the Office of Education. We had our difficulties because
23 of inability to do. Here was the Commissioner of Education
24 in charge of tremendous fund resources and significant
25 SEE resources, and he couldn't hardly buy a typewriter.

1 He testified about the money, he won the money, and then
2 when the money came to the Executive Branch, he couldn't
3 use the money unless he had all sorts of millions in the
4 HEW area second-guessing his performance as to whether he
5 could do this, that or the other thing.

6 This is slowly getting better. I don't think it's
7 gotten as better perhaps as it should. But it is slowly
8 getting better. And again, here's Cisco who's quite an
9 expert, and the Office owes a lot of its current better
10 being to the capacity of Cisco, to clean, you know, cut some
11 of those strings and be clear about it.

12 QUESTION: We're also providing I think an avenue
13 to improve relationships with our gatherings --

14 MR. MYLECRAINE: We happen to have a funny little
15 relationship with the Comptroller. It's funny. He's been
16 very, very helpful to the construction service. He comes
17 from an old predecessor of HUD background in his own career,
18 and he's always been interested in the construction activity
19 as such. I guess he came from FHA or Public Housing or
20 something. Somewhere like that. And he's always been
21 interested in this construction business. And when it was
22 established, he approved the transfer, thought it was the
23 right time to do it, and so on. He approved me, which was
24 a point that he didn't have to do. He approved me because
25 I confronted him one night. Remember the time we went over

1 to see him about the '68 Budget, and Norman (Karsh) was
2 the administrative officer then, and I knew that -- I thought,
3 anyway; I didn't know, but I thought -- we needed more
4 administrative resources in fiscal '68. And Norman had gotten
5 the word from the Comptroller's Office that there weren't
6 going to be any increases. So forget it. "You don't know
7 what you're doing yet, so you don't need more money."

8 And I thought we did need more money, so I went over to see
9 Kelly one night with (Karsh). (Karsh), of course, with great
10 trepidation; we went to see the Comptroller. It was eight
11 o'clock at night. And he gave us ten minutes. And I made
12 my pitch, and he said, "Well, I just don't believe you."

13 I said, "Well, Jim, we need to discuss --"

14 He said, "No, nothing to discuss. I've listened
15 to you, and I don't believe you."

16 I said, "Well, okay. But you just remember that
17 we did discuss -- I tried to discuss the () of those
18 funds." Okay. So, I concluded wrong, and we went ahead with
19 it, and we never had another discussion about it.

20 We established a construction service, and when '68
21 came around, it turned out that we did need the funds.
22 Now, true enough, we needed it in '68, but it was pretty tight,
23 and Jim was impressed with that. So this year --

24 QUESTION: We survived.

25 MR. MYLECRAINE: We survived, but we knew that it was

1 sort of a hard year.

2 QUESTION: Well, will you back us up?

3 MR. MYLECRAINE: So this year I came to the point--
4 We needed to have resources. Jim Kelly came through like
5 a saint.

6 QUESTION: There was no equivocating.

7 MR. MYLECRAINE: We were about the only shop in the
8 Office of Education that was allowed the full amount of our
9 requested increase that had been first requested in
10 the submission to the Bureau of the Budget last September. I
11 bet you there's not a figure in the whole budget today that
12 is still the same figure, at the same level in the President's
13 Budget when we proposed the budget to the Bureau of the
14 Budget in September. And Kelly stood for all this. So we're
15 in very good shape with the Comptroller, and very much re-
16 spect him, and have had an opportunity, in this business
17 particularly, to help him a great deal, which I'm sure he
18 appreciates.

19 QUESTION: We always seem to have access on mutual
20 problems at any time. I mean, within reason.

21 MR. MYLECRAINE: We probably have as good a re-
22 lationship with Kelly as anybody in the Department. So it's
23 a -- the man's a big man, and it certainly started out--
24 The relationship between myself and Kelly certainly didn't
25 start out in a manner from which you could predict the

1 current relationship. (Laughter)

2 (END OF TAPE.)

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