INTERVIEW I

DATE: JUNE 6, 1984

INTERVIEWEE: M. J. ANDERSON

INTERVIEWER: Roland C. Hayes

PLACE: Mr. Anderson's office, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

H: . . . the LBJ Library of Mr. M. J. Anderson, June 4, 1984, approximately ten o'clock a.m. in his office on Airport Boulevard in Austin, Texas. We can get started now.

[inaudible] When did you become involved, let's say, in politics to the point where it led to being associated with people like LBJ?

A: It started really with Dr. Everett Givens back in about the 1940s, the early 1940s. Dr. Givens was a very personal friend of LBJ's and had been for a large number of years, so the doctor was a dentist here. Dr. Givens was a local dentist here, but he was one of the, I think, most influential people that we had in the city at that time, and, also, the relationship between Dr. Givens and Mayor [Robert Thomas "Tom"] Miller of the city was very close, and Mayor Miller was a very close friend to Lyndon Baines Johnson, so all of this fit in together to make [inaudible] combination of me getting to know Lyndon Johnson through Dr. Givens, and I give him total credit for the beginning of that.

H: Was Dr. Givens your personal [inaudible]?

A: No, he was my personal friend. I mean, we knew each other. He was a rugged individualist and--Givens was, and he would always say, "Come on. Let's go," wouldn't give any warning or anything like that. "Let's go down. Let's go to the Council

meeting," or "Let's go over here and see this official," or "--go see Lyndon." I mean that's the way he operated, but he was very effective at that time, which would not work in today's political arena, but it did work back then.

H: Well, was he a native of Austin?

A: Oh, yes, he was very definitely a native of Austin, yes, yes, and held sway for quite a number of years back then.

H: So Givens Park is named for him?

A: That's right. Givens Park is named for Dr. Givens. That's right.

H: When did he pass?

A: I'm not sure, but I think it was the late--around 1960. I would say about 1960 to 1969, something like that. I'm not quite sure. [Givens died November 1962.]

H: Quite an influential man.

A: Oh, yes, very influential, a very influential man. Yes.

H: Well, it was through him that you met LBJ?

A: Right. It was definitely through him, and that was the beginning of the thing, and Doc, just like all of us, me and you, have your high points, your ascendancy, you get to the top of the mountain, and then after-while, you start down the mountain . . .

H: Yes.

A: --and that's what happened to Doc. Now I proceeded on to move on then to move into the political arena because teaching at Huston, Samuel Huston College [later renamed Huston-Tillotson University], was why I came to Texas, and then later on, and deciding that since I taught in the field of history and political science, I said, "Look. I'm going out here to get a political organization going." So then I got hold of all the--basically the

students that I had taught, and there was a large number of them who had graduated, and that was after I came back from the service, and then we started building an organizational unit, and we did build probably one of the strongest political organizations in the country, which was the state entity, the United Political Organization of Texas, and they were ready to get involved. They were just eager beavers, you know what I mean. So they got involved, and we then started moving in the political arena.

I think another thing that has been my philosophy we went to--also with the students' involvement rather. Then we went to the people with people, organizational heads, and that's the way we built the United Political Organization. We went to the General Missionary Baptist convention head, and then we went to the Methodist organizational heads, and then we went to the ushers' heads, and we put all those people on the board.

H: Okay.

A: And I fundamentally believe that that's the only way. You've got to have people with people, and I think we will admit that the churches still are the units through which we get our greatest participation, and they have their hands on people. We went to medical groups, also, professional groups, and that was really the way that we started the chain reaction.

H: Did these people, these young students, that you taught at Samuel Huston, were they in Austin or were they scattered?

A: No, they were scattered all over. I found some . . . most of them were scattered around into the bigger cities, but most of them though, I guess, were still in the teaching profession. We had a few lawyers, a few doctors, but Samuel Huston was basically

turning out teachers at that time, so that's the profession that they went into as such.

H: Well, how did you keep track of them?

A: I went to the various alumni records and sought it out and found them, and as I said, it wasn't very difficult to get them in because they said, "Look, I want to do something, and here's an opportunity to do something," and Johnson made the kind of appeal to black folks that were very interested.

I think what also tied into that, Roland, is the NYA. That was very definitely tied in. Johnson was head of the NYA, and consequently, he was the kind of person that had always had the feel for doing something for the downtrodden and the poor people. He taught in school for one thing, and he taught most poor schools, districts and such, so Johnson then in NYA would always say, "Look, if I've got any money left over, you know, and we maybe have a little left over, you know, I'll shift a little over here to Samuel Huston," and I didn't really say I got to know him as well through that, but nevertheless, I got to know what he was doing. I got to know what he stood for, and this was very important because there wasn't any question about that, and Dr. Givens was again an instrumentality in getting him to do it because he was on the board of Samuel Huston.

H: Oh, okay.

A: So all of this fit in together, so it made a very good combination, and Lyndon was just a very gregarious person, "hail well, hearty met" person, and that made you--it made you feel comfortable around him although he was a big person, held in high office and all of that, and the senator . . . whatever it was at a particular time, a representative, but he just made you feel as, "Look ahere. You're somebody." He knew how to stroke you right to

make you feel good, so I think that is the key to his really great success.

H: In order for you to get the count made, did you keep a record of the students that you contacted? You did this all yourself? Most of the students . . .

A: No, no. No, no. No, no. Through the--as I said, the board itself was made up of these people. One of the fundamental policies that I always followed and that is, "Involve people, and let them work," and that was the key to it. In other words, you'd say to the head of the organization, "This is what we want to do. We decided this is what we're going to do," and this is what we would do, and they would in turn set out to do whatever we decided as a group that we would do, and through them, with your board, you were able to keep the organization running very well.

H: Okay. Were you the president of the organization?

A: Yes, I was the president of the organization.

H: When these organizations were formed, what position did LBJ hold? Was he a senator or a representative?

A: I believe at that time he was a senator, and--no. Really he was the vice president at the time. He was vice president at the beginning because UPO [United Planning Organization] was not really totally organized and set up until about the early 1960s, about 1964 and 1965, maybe 1962 to be exact [December 10, 1962]. I think that's the formation date of it, so he would have been, I believe, at that time either vice president or senator either one. I think he was vice president at that time.

H: That's pretty interesting.

A: Yes.

H: What kind of contact did you have with him as far as--I know he talked to you personally

as president, but did he just pick the phone up and call you when he wanted to talk to you or ask you something?

A: Basically, no. Basically it was done through his administrative staff. In other words--Cliff Carter was one of the ones that would do most of the early contacts that we had, being administrative assistant to Johnson. I see a number of letters here that I have from Cliff Carter, notes that I have from Cliff Carter here. Here's one thanking me for the invitation of Carter to come down in May 5 of 1965, and Cliff Carter at that time was head of the National Democratic--the Democratic National Committee, so that is one of the beginnings of the situation, but that was an invitation to come and meet with the United Political Organization, and give us some insight into what was going on. I think that was another thing. With Lyndon, we were able to get people who could come down and hold our seminars and get us into them, let us understand the political process, and I think that's most important, understanding the political process, because we had not been involved in the political process in depth. We'd been only on the fringe edges. So I think that's the most important thing here of them, but most generally, it's through those kind of people like Cliff Carter, Marvin Watson, Jake Jacobsen, and all of that group. They would meet with--he would send it through them, and they in turn would get in contact with me.

H: I notice you have a stack on your folder there, a quite large folder. Do you want to brief me on it? Anything that you want me to lead to that, just listening [inaudible]?

A: Oh, there's a number of things here that we have. I, as a result of LBJ--I think we can say that Adam Clayton Powell--we got a contact with Adam Clayton Powell--is one of the outstanding things. We invited him down to speak. Also, we were able--here, I have a

picture here of Francine Moore and LBJ. Francine Moore was the first black that we were able to get to handle the music, to sing, before the State Democratic Committee, and there's Lyndon Johnson greeting her. These were all the kind of participations that were very, very important, I thought, as we looked to beginning to be involved in the situation, and then probably the greatest thing that, back in 1964, when Johnson was running for the presidency of the United States, and I became the vice chairman for the state Johnson-Humphrey organization, and this is the kind of thing--and here's a letter from Harlem McQuain who was the chairman, saying that--he's thanking all of us for the contribution that we made in the successful campaign in Texas. We've got Johnson, went for Johnson rather than Humphrey in the election. That was when he was running, I believe, against Goldwater as such.

H: That was the landslide.

A: That was the landslide situation, yes, so that becomes to me very, very important.

H: You were the coach of all what, the state?

A: Vice chairman for the state, yes. Vice chairman for the state, and that just makes you feel good that you had some kind of participation. We became--we, we got into the decision-making, and that's the key. If you don't get into the decision-making, you can forget it.

And we did call. Now the one policy that I always followed when I would sit down with Lyndon or with any of the officials, I always had somebody else there sitting with me because it's always good to have someone else because I might not interpret what he said, and they might interpret it differently than I interpreted, but there's no question if you said it there in the presence of

somebody else that the other people could help me in turn go ahead and get the kind of interpretation we could relate it back to the people.

H: Well, who were some of the people who, after Mr. Givens--Dr. Givens--left the scene--who were some of your cohorts in working with you and somebody else?

A: The greatest one I think was George Washington, who graduated--Junior--who graduated from UT Law School. George was not the first graduate, but he was about the second or the third that graduated, and George was very articulate, and he could put the words together very well. He could write. He did our research, and that's one of the key things. When you go out into the political arena, you better do your research well, and we had our research on Lyndon very well. We knew a great deal about him as a result of the research and so on, so we could go to our people and say, "This is what it's all about. This is the name of the game." When we went out for Lyndon, to get to be the president of the United States, four years earlier--I think it was in Frisco we tried to get him there--and there again black folks said right away, "Oh, he's from Texas. He's a southerner." Consequently a southerner is no good. But we knew Johnson's record. We knew what he'd been doing, but we could not sell him to black folk at all. They said, "That's all." They wrote him off. And, consequently, Roland, we became the "Uncle Toms." Here you are out here promoting someone, and this is the unfortunate thing in the political arena. A guy can be doing many things to help your race relations, many things to help minorities. But he's got to do it at that time under the table, and if he got out there, he wouldn't get elected. I'm not so sure that we have a lot of that now even existing today, so you had to hide a lot of those good things, but we were able to say, "This is what he did do." Or "These are the things that he did do." You know what he

has done. So, consequently, we just couldn't sell Johnson. We couldn't sell him at all.

H: How well--I mean--I remember where Johnson was--in the 1960s he ran and—Kennedy was the choice, and he came back with him.

A: That's right. That's right.

H: Well, that--you-all were at the convention in San Francisco at the Cow Palace?

A: That' s right.

H: How difficult--you say that it was really difficult, but were these southern black states--I mean blacks--did they go along with you other than you on Lyndon?

A: Basically, no. We didn't get even to first base at all. They wouldn't even hear. Their minds were closed, I mean, and later on some of them came back and apologized after Johnson became the President. They said, "Well, we just didn't understand." We said, "You didn't listen. We knew the man." And that, in effect--honest, we did not get any support of any blacks of any importance. Of course, you've got to remember another thing. The times that we're talking about the blacks didn't have any power hardly. I don't care. Even the key blacks didn't have power, so there's not much they could say either one way or the other. The one that I was really too concerned with here, or interested in, was the Mississippi delegation, the National--when they went out and set up the National Democratic Party, an opportunity of being represented as you remember. So they in the convention, they went ahead and worked out some arrangements, and that's the key. That's the kind of thing that Raymond Godford [?] stood for, giving people equal justice, giving people equal opportunities because there's no question that they had been denied their rights. So here it is. They call it The Mississippi [Summer] Project [Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party] Parent Committee that was set up.

H: Well, that had a lot to do with [inaudible]?

A: Oh, yes. There's no question about it at all. I'll be happy to furnish you with a copy of that, so you might be interested in that.

H: How many committees have you--conventions have you attended?

A: I've been delegates to two. The Frisco one, I was not a delegate. I was just there, but the one in Atlantic City and the one in Chicago. Those I was a delegate to.

Another interesting thing to you. Back in 1983--1963 rather, of April, I've a letter here from Lyndon Johnson--and I think, too, you need to get a copy of that so you can take it along. I'm going to give you a copy of that. Is that all right with you?

H: Yes, yes.

A: All right. Good. Here's a letter that--from Lyndon personally himself. "I'm very much interested in seeing Dr. [W.R.] Banks"--that's of Prairie View [University]--"honored, but April, May, and June are out of the question for me because of an unusually heavy schedule. When I get back down, I would like to talk to you about this. Enormous regards, Lyndon Baines Johnson." You see, that's the type of thing that he was interested in. Now surely the idea came from us, you know, to him, but that's the kind of response that we got from Lyndon when we wanted to, so these are some of the things that I think that--

H: Do you remember how--how--he was an insistent man--

A: That' s right.

H: --for the needs of the downtrod--about people who hadn't had the opportunity to go as far as he had.

A: Here's a letter, too, from James Marsh from the White House. This was dated--no, this is

a little bit later. This was dated on August 15, 1967, and it's--we sent a telegram commending President Johnson for appointing Clifford L. Alexander as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. You see, these are the kind of things that Lyndon responded to. He's got that force, and you know there's no question that most of the appointments and people we got into key positions like Equal Employment Opportunities Commission went through Lyndon. And lot of times we forget this; so this letter, I think, should--you should take a copy of it along with you, too.

It's a little bit out of the sequence here, and you'll have to go back and put it in. This is a picture where we were mapping strategy for the convention, the 1964 convention, and this is a copy of Louis Martin, who was the black head of minorities in the Democratic National Committee, you know, and Louis, of course--and there's Ralph Yarborough, and that's our mapping of strategy as such.

H: Yes. I have seen this guy before on TV.

A: Louis's quite a guy. He's one of the most knowledgeable blacks that we have. He's over at Howard University now working over there. Louis is independently wealthy, and he's able to do some things that we couldn't, but I've never worked with a nicer guy. I headed up--during the beginning of the Johnson campaign, and then when Humphrey came in--I headed up, was made national chairman for fraternal organizations--

H: Yes.

A: --of the country, for the Democratic party, so that was again, I thought, a highlight of what was going on and showed the cooperation that we had in working in that area, so . . .

H: A little--political opportunities--who were some of the, I guess, giants that you have met

other than Lyndon Johnson in civil rights? Did you know Humphrey pretty well?

A: Oh, yes. In fact, as I said, I worked for Humphrey after President Johnson decided that he wasn't going to run. Then I went ahead and moved over and started working for Humphrey, and I handled for Humphrey I handled New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, of course, and I had Michigan, and out of those states, I think I lost one, so I felt real good, and I was under [Endicott] Peabody, the old name of the Peabody's, you know, one of the older families. Now he was head of it, and I was the vice under him, and headquarters was in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We worked out of there. So it was very interesting, but Humphrey was a very, very, very articulate, long-winded--could never shut him off. He used to laugh about it. We'd tell him, "Look. You talk too long." His wife would tell him the same, but he'd still go on and do it the same way next time, but very nicely. His record was just good. It had been good down through the years. He had been out there fighting on the lines, and I think that's one of the reasons President Johnson picked him as his running mate because he knew he'd been there. He understood the program you want to carry out. He needed someone like Humphrey to carry that program out as such, but he did a beautiful job, I thought.

H: But it was even though Lyndon and Humphrey were compatible and pretty good friends other than politically in your thinking?

A: Oh, I think so. I mean, of course, the press made a great deal about that. Many articles were written that Johnson didn't give Humphrey in the beginning the kind of support that he should have given him and all of that. I don't know that back behind the scenes--but I don't believe there is any validity to him not wanting Humphrey to run for the presidency of the United States. I think the situation was fluid at that time with the Vietnam War

situation. Everybody uptight about this, and I honestly believe that Johnson thought it would be better that he didn't get so close to Humphrey at that time because that was the thing that the people were against--the Vietnams. I think he sort of said, "Let me keep my distance." Now there's no question that with Humphrey being the vice president of the United States and with Johnson being the president, surely he's going to get indicted, too, as being part of that particular situation, but I always liked him. I thoroughly enjoyed him. I did travel with him some on the campaign trail on that plane, *Air Force One*, or whatever it was, but I got good vibes from him. I thought he was a very excellent person, and I will never say I got to know him real well as such, but I did get to work and do some things for him under, again, Louis Martin, you know. So that was basically it.

Now the other thing that I think we've said, but I'll repeat it again, the Texas organization was about one of the best organized units when Lyndon was running for the first time for the presidency of the United States that I've ever had the opportunity of working with, and you had kind of a claim with another person who was a chairman and was just down-to-earth and a person that was approachable, a person that was a gentleman, and consequently, he said, "Look," you know, "Andy, you're the vice chairman. This is your area to work in. If anybody comes in here talking about it, then I send them to see you." And that's what he did, so we had that kind of working relationship, because in those days--I think it's pretty true today--people will try to go around you, but he never would let that happen. That's another thing about Lyndon Johnson. Lyndon Johnson would never let that happen either. In other words, "You go see M. J. Anderson" or "Andy," or whatever you may have been called, "because that's

his area," and that's one thing about the old-line politicians that I love. The loyalty was there! And tenure was there. If you worked within the framework of their organizations, that's it. We don't have that today. We don't have that today as we did then. I think we have lost something, Roland, in that transmittal today, to what we find today, because I find that I think the politicians today, the office holders, want division. They want to keep us divided as such. They don't want the one, though, coming right through that. They will talk to the person instead of going to the person that they put in charge of something else. I think we've lost in that area really.

H: Do you think that the--how much influence do you think that Sam Rayburn had on Johnson's side?

A: Oh, I think a lot. I, you know, I'd never--I didn't know Sam Rayburn so I'm not in a position really to analyze this very well, but I think the very fact that Sam Rayburn was a great presider, I think also that Johnson knew how to accumulate power, and he knew how to administrate it, handle it very well. Power can be a dangerous thing if you don't know what to do with it after you have it, but the interesting thing about Lyndon you could go in, he could give you the devil about something one day if you didn't do right according to the way he thought it ought to be done, the next day he'd call you, "Come on in," and then he'd stroke you and tell you how great you are, but you can understand that.

H: Did you ever have any difficult moments like that?

A: Not many. Every once in a while we disagreed on a few things, but not many. I remember Clifford Alexander tells the story of how he did something one time, and Johnson gave him hell, you know, just talked to him, like he had a ten-year-old, but the next day he sent his wife some flowers and had him in, but that's his technique and you

had to come to know him. But it was just a wonderful thing, Roland, in being able to work the little bit that I worked with him and close enough to him.

Here's one, too, that we had in Lubbock when we were working in the campaign, in the 1964 campaign, so here they're honoring me as the vice chair for that campaign.

H: Yes. [rustle of paper] Are these of you or--?

A: Yes. Those are some of the people that worked with us. In other words, we organized in every city. I had a UPO unit. Every city of any size--

H: Yes.

A: --had a UPO chapter if you want to say that.

H: Oh, yes. How did you--how long did you stretch to that? Did they pay dues or something?

A: Again, yes. We stayed away from much due paying because we know that that's the first thing that sort of breaks an organization up, so when we had an affair, anything like that, everybody paid whatever the *pro rata* share was. We did it on a local basis. Whenever we had a state affair, we did it on a--registration fees and things like that, but we never got into the due paying as such. We did have a dollar, I think it was, a dollar a year to be a member of UPO, which was, "You know, don't mean nothing," you know.

H: Well, what's happened to UPO since?

A: We just have not been active with it very little, every once in a while. It still exists but not doing anything--

H: Then you're still the same--?

A: --Yes. I'm still the president of it. But you still--the same story, you go up, and then you come down.

H: That' s true.

A: And that's just life for you, and then I don't have the energy, and none of the rest of the people back there have the energy, and the unfortunate thing is, Roland, the youngsters will not pick up the gauntlet and move with it. Now we tried. We set up the black Strategy Group, you know, of the young people here back about in the late 1970s, and we had some of the brightest youngsters in Texas. We said, "The only thing we want to do is to get you going." "Well, you've got to be the chairman." "I don't want to be chairman." I had, for example, with Mack [Hannah], we had to become co-chairmen, because nobody would accept it, and they had the fears, they couldn't do it, but we had a lot of youngsters there who could have done it, but they didn't go any place because we would not--the only thing we wanted to do--well, we said, "We'll give you all the help from behind scenes that you need." But that's a problem that we have today.

Now back in the period of [rustle of paper]--that's the wrong one--in August of 1964, I was appointed to the National Citizen's Committee for Community Relations by Johnson so that [rustle of paper].

H: How did Johnson--I mean, did Johnson hear about the UPO? Did you all come back to him--

A: Yes.

H: --or did they just say that, "This is a force to be reckoned with, and--"?

A: No. We contacted him, and told him and invited him down, and I'm going to show you in a minute a letter where we invited him to come down to speak to UPO, and--but UPO--here! Here's the thing I think that got us with Johnson more than anything else. The people of UPO and on the board were fairly influential as well as having money,

quite a number of them. If they didn't have it, their organizations had it. So we started out with the philosophy that we were going to put in the pot. In other words, if we decided that Johnson was going to run for the president of the United [States] and we were going to support him, we put dollars in, and the fee was a thousand dollars that you had to give to the Democratic party, the National Democratic Committee. That's the way we operated, and if it was working within the framework of the state Democratic party, and they were doing the operation as much, everybody had to put money into the state Democratic party. We were no beggars. You see, it's a different thing to always take out of something or ask the man to give you something because then if he's giving you something, he's bought you basically, and he doesn't owe you anything, but we would not take any money. That was the key to the organization. Nobody--but we put in. So when we put in, we could demand certain things back, so that's the way we operated. There was no question about that. We made it that way--

H: --paid the way?

A: That's right. We paid our way, and, "Boy, don't come about and giving us tickets and things like that. Well, you insult our group giving tickets. We buy our tickets!" And that was impressive because that was a new--they'd never had black folks do that before.

H: Was the UPO totally black, all black?

A: Yes, well, predominantly black, and almost 99.9 per cent. We had a few Mexicans and a few whites but not enough to say, so we'd have to say it was a black organization. Yes, you look at some of the things, the facts sheet that was put out here in 1964, "New Opportunities for Young Americans," by the Democratic Committee, the national committee, and in there, of course, the emphasis is on the Poverty Act; the emphasis is on

vocational training. Well, there's no reason--on juvenile delinquency here and school drop-outs. These are the things that we could relate to, black folk could relate to. They got a special *Economic Bulletin* in there because surely with higher wages and income, for example, more savings, holding prices down. Well, we could relate to that, and consequently there wasn't any question about our going along with Johnson with that kind of approach, that he made, so this was really, really good.

H: Did you also think with the--do you-all think you influenced some of his platform writing, too?

A: Maybe. I don't know. At least we were--we had our position papers, too.

H: Right.

A: So I would say it just happened--let me put it this way--I think our position papers in a lot of areas agreed with his position papers, so maybe he was thinking ahead of us. I don't know, but anyway, we were [inaudible].

H: All coincide?

A: Yes. So those are just a few of the many things, you see. Now the smears that they made with Johnson back in 1964 before the convention, accusing Johnson of so many things that it was--we tried to get him off. You know what I mean, but we were able to win, as you know, in Atlantic City and win big, and got him nominated in that, but I just saved a few of these "The fanatics of the right accuse LBJ" smears. They're on him. He's posing as a liberal, and I don't--I think Johnson was more of a moderate than a liberal. I never would say that at all. They call him a "crackpot." Thus says *Life* magazine. So many things that happened here; you know, that is *Life* magazine is quoting, you know, what Haley said about him--that's not the Haley that you're familiar with. This is a

different Haley altogether, but those are the things that happened through the years.

Here is a rather interesting piece of literature that was put out. It's a biographical sketch, and Lyndon Johnson's position to papers, and I thought that was well-done, well-done. That was put out to all of us who were working in the political arena. It just tells the whole story. It definitely tells the whole story, and back here is "Lyndon Johnson, The Politician," for example. I'll give you some copies of that, because I think [inaudible]. I'll make you copies of that, too.

H: Did you ever go out to his ranch?

A: Oh, any number of times. Yes, we were--I have some letters here, invitations that I will share with you very shortly to the ranch. Yes. And we've been, fortunately, we've been the honored guests--

H: Oh!

A: --out there a number of times. That is when I say "honored," I don't mean that we were the top people, but when somebody like the president of Mexico or something like that, we were there, you know. And so I've been to the White House so many times that, that I don't think that--as I said, we've been to the top, so, consequently . . . I was in and out there a lot of times because, first of all, Louis Martin was over there working for Lyndon for a while, and then--they worked for Kennedy first and then moved to Lyndon--and consequently, that would bring me into contact with them. I don't mean to say that I was there to see Lyndon all those times, but a few times I did get there to see him.

H: You--in the 1960s when you all went to California as a unit, Kennedy ended up getting the nomination; you all went out for Johnson, I believe.

A: Oh, yes. We went--we tried to get the nomination for Johnson.

H: After you saw he couldn't get it, did you-all react? Did you have a problem with the . . .?

A: Well, we were so disappointed. And we were on the outside and basically looking in anyhow, so we didn't have any input into--. We did encourage him to take the vice presidency, though, and I think that is one of the smartest things that Kennedy did was to offer him the--run Johnson for vice president. I don't think--Kennedy might not have been president if he hadn't run.

H: Did Johnson have to be per--more or less persuaded to take that position?

A: Yes, he did. He really did. Now, Johnson was such a good politician, and so--but I would say yes, he did have to be persuaded to take it.

H: Did you-all have anything to do with talking to him about taking it?

A: Dr. Givens did but not me. I was not in on that conversation at all, but Doctor did, and he was out there, too, at that particular time, and he could get in and out where many people could not. He just walked through, and Grace would see him and say, "Dr. Givens is out there." "Put him on through."

H: [Inaudible] had got influence?

A: Yes, and, consequently, it made some of our white friends a little envious, too, him being able to walk through . . .

H: Oh, it did?

A: --and they couldn't get in. That's mad but not furious, but that's the kind of relationship that he had with Dr. Givens.

Here's another interesting thing here. Lyndon Johnson's civil rights speech that he made--it was back in March 16. I think he made it really a little bit early in 1965--I think that should be read by everybody. It's one of the greatest speeches that I have heard. Let

me give you a copy of that, too. I know you have they have it out there.

H: Is that the one he made at Howard?

A: Yes, it's one that--no, this was made to the joint session of the House and Senate on civil rights. No, the one he made to Howard is great, too. I don't think this one would equal the one he made in Howard. I think Howard's may be greater, but this is--he's laying down what he wants them to do at this joint session of Congress, and he says, "We cannot refuse to protect the rights of Americans to vote," for example. He goes into that thing. "Everybody should have a vote--a right to vote. You should open your polling places to all people." You see, this he demands, and he lays it down here to them. He tells them in fact, "This is what we've got to do." [inaudible] and "God will not favor everything we do. It is rather our duty to divine His will, but I cannot help believing he truly favors the understanding we begin tonight." You see, that to me just says so much. He says, "The heart of the battle for--"

Tape 1 of 2, Side 2

A: [inaudible] Go ahead. I'm sorry.

H: No, go ahead.

A: Okay. The great thing was the getting us black folk involved into going to the--first of all, getting invited to the inaugural ceremony. You know, Kennedy, I think, started it, and I think Louis Martin had a great deal to do with getting the list in to the people, but here in January of 1965, here is the list that we sent. [rustle of paper] You may keep that. That's a copy--I have another one--of the list that we sent. That's getting black folk involved, you see, and they were there.

H: You had a good representation?

A: Yes, they were there. We had the biggest delegation that we've ever had, ever had. [inaudible] Mack was an integral part of UPO.

H: He was?

A: Oh, yes. He was a [inaudible]. He was on the board, a board.

H: I didn't know that.

A: Yes.

H: It might be good to interview him.

A: He was at Waco, but he's made practically all those White House deals, and he's made most of the Ranch deals, and I'll say again, that was for keeps. You see, you can't get up here--[tape stops] [inaudible] You can have that because that's just a--I'd say I have another one, but that's--

H: Well, Mack Hannah was your co-chairman?

A: Mack Hannah was--we worked together. No, Mack and I--Mack was at one sphere of influence, and UPO had a different sphere of influence. Now Mack did not work with UPO. He was back there with the Durham group.

H: Oh--

A: --and so on. Remember, Durham had probably the only other organization of any strength in Texas. He was the first out there with an organizational unit. I don't know--over the state. I don't know what they called it. I don't remember. I used to belong to it, but, again, when we came along, we decided, "Well, they don't move fast," and this [inaudible] against the old folks. "They don't move fast enough," so we decided we'd better do something and get moving, and we had a different approach. We were more frontal and direct. They would go down and talk to the head people--about us.

H: I see.

A: We were ready to picket and do some of these other things that would get it done, so that was just a difference in approach, but Mack and I are very good friends and very close friends. We work together on any number of things. You've got to do that in the political ring. You have your differences or your philosophies, but you've still got to--you must go ahead and work together, but all of those people were there then.

H: What relation did O. H. Elliott have with the--

A: O. H. Elliot was a very good friend to Doc Givens, the same way that I was. O. H. was probably closer to Dr. Givens than I was. O. H. was the business manager of Sam Huston College, so O. H., then, would have to work real close to Doc as trustee, so they had a very close relationship, and O. H. did get involved, just like I did, with Lyndon through Dr. Givens, but O. H. was--was a business man, was a finance man, and most of the finance people are very close to the chest. They don't say very much. They're not outgoing, and we used to call ourselves--they all were at Sam Huston, and I was the outside, and he was the inside person, because our personalities differed. But we were very close friends, too.

H: Well, I notice in these two Walter Jones letters to you. Was he--?

A: Walter Jones was--that was Deacon Jones.

H: Oh, of the church?

A: No, used to be an Ebenezer here who died. That's who they're talking about. That's the Walter Jones that they're talking about.

H: Is he the one who had a--?

A: A barbecue.

H: Across the street from the lodge?

A: That's right. That's it.

H: He was involved with the--

A: Well, what happened was that when any affairs or anything was served we used Deacon's, and Lyndon got to know Deacon as a result not of the [inaudible]--Deacon was before us, because the white folks used to come out there and eat at Deacon's place. We could hardly get in for the white folks being out there. So that was the thing, and then later on, Deacon became the Grand Treasurer of St. Joseph Grand Lodge, and I was the head of it, so that put us in--

H: Ah, okay.

A: --into--I did not bring Deacon in. Marshall brought him in, who was Grand Master, and I later brought--or rather kept him on as treasurer, so that made a close relationship, and that's another thing that my base, my political base--Masonry can't be--can't be a political base, but nevertheless, because I was Grandmaster of the Masons, it gave me control, you know what I mean, of at least a whole lot of people, so that helped tremendously, so that was my base and relationship to having people with the--into the Johnson arena, but I was--I am real elated, real elated, over the participation of black folk in the inaugural, and going to Washington, and you have to pay your real money there. You know you pay your own way and get there. But we were there in--

H: Big numbers.

A: --big numbers is right. And, as I say, there's another thing that I had--UPO had at least twenty people on that board that all we needed to do was say, "Let's put a thousand dollars in, each of us," and that's what they did. Now that doesn't sound like much money

in today's money market, but it was a whole lot of money back then, and so all you had to do was make the call, and that was it. The money would fall in, so sometimes you had to make it twice for the same candidate, but they paid. They paid their way.

H: Well, were most of these people in UPO, were they in--were they not--were they independent business men and people?

A: Most of them were either independent business men, or they were the preachers. I think UPO had more preachers--

H: Oh, okay, so--

A: --than anything else. I think that would--if I had to say who was the backbone of UPO, I'd have to say it was the religious group of preachers and so on.

H: Were there women involved?

A: Oh, yes. We had very few though because that was the time when women didn't get involved with much in UPO. On a local level, they had women in the local UPO chapters and such, but not a great involvement from the standpoint of the board. We had--I don't think we had a woman on the board really, honestly, at that particular time, but locally, participation was a lot--most of them were women involved on a local level.

H: Didn't you-all have an office--

A: Oh, yes, we--

H: --operate out of the--

A: out of the local Grand Lodge office. I mean, that's where we put it up there as our office. Yes, that was the headquarters for UPO. Here's one of the invitations for the ball, and--there again, Roland, you see the idea of going and being a part, we dared. This just makes it so different, and Lyndon is responsible for it. No question about that. The

doors are open. The only thing you had to do was when he opened it to get in there . . .

H: Yes.

A: --go on in.

H: That' s right.

A: That was not an easy thing either to go on in after being out so many years because you figured it didn't belong to you.

H: That' s right.

A: You know--

H: I know what you're saying.

A: Yes, and here are the--for example, here's the inaugural activities, and that's the--see. that's the activity schedule. That's for the one in--that's Atlantic City--I mean, that's in Washington, naturally, but--

H: Did he--I know there are quite a few balls, so he comes to all--

A: He goes to all the balls--

H: [inaudible]

A: --yes, and we always tried to get an understanding of which was going to be the best one, and that's where we got into the hotels, but it's a guessing game. Of course they could pretty well tell you, though, where it was. Another thing about Lyndon. Lyndon would dance with you.

H: Bobby told me that. That's right.

A: He'd dance with a woman. He'd go up--he knew how to stroke them. Yes, he knew how to stroke them.

H: Well, he always seems as quite a amorous individual.

A: Yes. He knew how to stroke you very well.

H: Yes. He's just a good guy.

A: I just wish more people had an opportunity of knowing Lyndon, and really--

H: What effect do you think the--why didn't he run the second time?

A: I think health reasons, and then I think the Vietnam war situation. I think all of those fit into the scheme of things as such what he did, and then I think he was tired. Lyndon's been in public life all his life, and you just get tired, and you say, "To hell with it!" You know what I mean. "I just don't want to do it anymore." You know what I mean. I think that had a great deal to do with it, and no telling what his family was telling him too--"that you need to get out." And what else--where else could he go?

H: Right.

A: Let's face it. Been President of the United States. He'd been--you know--how high--you can't go any higher, so that--that--I think that is the reason for it.

Here is a--[rummaging sound]. Well, this doesn't really fit in. This is when we were working for, Humphrey as Lyndon got out, and we had--at the beginning, it was very difficult to raise money, so finally we--they were able to get LBJ's Hundred Dollar--members of the LBJ's Hundred Dollar President's Club, and we agreed to raise four million dollars for Humphrey there.

H: That was the LBJ Hundred Dollars--or Thousand Dollar Club?

A: A thousand dollars. It was a thousand dollars club.

H: Yours?

A: Oh, yes.

H: It was a black club?

A: Oh, yes. We had--as I say, there was about twenty of us who were in that, which entitled us to many things. When you go to the inaugural it really entitles you to go to. I still have my card; I don't have it with me now, but, naturally, it's one of the keepsakes.

H: Yes.

A: All card-carrying members.

One of the other highlights, I think, was the appointment of Hobart Taylor. Taylors come from Houston, and Hobart Taylor's dad, really through Dr. Givens, got to know Lyndon very well, and Hobart Taylor, Jr., of course, became administrative assistant to Johnson, and then later went on to the World Bank, I believe it was, I mean, [inaudible] there. Here's a letter from Hobart to me about speaking before the United Political Organization. I always cite that because, again, those were the kind of people that we were made accessible to, as a result of it. He got the key brain, the top brain of the country--we brought them in so that they could tell us again, as I say, things that we needed to know that we didn't know. (Rustling sounds) Letters from Hobart, of course.

H: Hobart's still--he just died not [inaudible]--was it June?

A: Not so long ago. Not so long ago. Yes. He had a very serious illness there. Whatever it was, it took him on in.

Here's a telegram from Hobart Taylor inviting me to the ranch. That's one. I'll give you a copy of that one, too (more rustling sounds). But that's the only one of those that--so . . .

The real highlight, I think, of Lyndon, too, was beshone when Andrew Brimmer--

H: I know Andrew.

A: Andrew Brimmer was appointed to the--

H: W elfare?

A: Federal Reserve Board. We went up to his swearing in for Andrew Brimmer, and Lyndon, after the swearing-in, "Come on up to the Blue Room," or White Room, whatever room it was, "and bring your Texas delegation up. I just want to visit with them a while." So we did, and here's the story that Lyndon told.

He said, "Now, black folk didn't ask for this one. I want you to know that." He said, "This is one that I did," he said, "on my own." He said, "Here's the story that happened." He said that--I think it was Russell Long, who then was senator from--

H: [inaudible]

A: --Louisiana. So Russell came in and said, "I want a--I want you to appoint so-and-so to this Federal Reserve slot." And Lyndon said, "I have a man." "Well, what do you mean 'you've got a man'?" He said, "Yes, I've got a man." He says, "He's from Louisiana, Andrew Brimmer." He said, "You disappointed us all in the assistant secretary [inaudible]." And he said, "He's a good Louisianan." "Oh, but I've got to have my man." So this went on for--Lyndon says, for a long time, so finally the last time he came up, Lyndon said, "Go down and get his folder," with the pictures in there. What do you call that thing--everything in it? The assistant went down, got it, and brought it up, so Lyndon just took the picture and turned it out to Rus--[inaudible]. He said, "Oh, my God!" He said, "That's a nigger, ain't it?" He said, "But that's a good one. He's from Louisiana." [laughter]. So Russell [inaudible]. He said, "You should have seen the expression on his face." He said, "I'll support him then." But that was really the highlights of the whole thing. You know what I mean. It's amazing, really. It's really amazing.

H: And you say it's about Brimmer?

A: Yes, Brimmer, yes. Andrew Brimmer, and Andrew's been down, too. We had Andrew down a number of times--well, once--to speak to us, too, in one of the meetings of UPO--

H: UPO?

A: --because we thought we ought to know something--we didn't know about the Federal Reserve system. So we did, and Brimmer made a nice presentation.

H: And Brimmer was appointed by Johnson?

A: That's who appointed him.

H: So not [inaudible]. He was the president.

A: Is that right?

H: I didn't know him, but I have pictures of him. I didn't know who he was. I met him--we had a symposium, and he came over to the symposium.

A: He [inaudible]

H: [inaudible] I didn't know--

A: Yes.

H: [inaudible].

A: That was--he was really not the biggest banker. He was just--he graduated from Wharton School of Finance [at the University of Pennsylvania].

H: Yes.

A: So he had a financial background, and Lyndon appointed him as a result of his financial background to the Federal Reserve Board, but insofar as actual banking is concerned, [inaudible]. I don't know what it was in. He has his own firm now.

H: JESSO [?]

A: Yes.

H: Is he still in Washington?

A: I think it's either Washington or New York. I'm not quite sure where he has his firm [inaudible]. That is what he's doing. I mean, one of the--who put him in prominence, I think Lyndon was totally responsible for putting him in prominence.

H: So Hobart, Jr. and Brimmer would be two people that you know?

A: Yes. Clifford Carter, too.

H: Clifford Carter?

A: I mean, Clifford Alexander.

H: Alexander.

A: Clifford Alexander.

H: [inaudible] Reed became the Secretary of Defense--I mean, Undersecretary of War, didn't he? Somebody on the Air Force or--

A: Yes. Admiral [inaudible] Yes. He did.

H: Adm iral [inaudible]?

A: Clifford is still in a legal firm up there now, working also. Of course, the other ones that Lyndon had a great deal to do with--and that was Carl Walker. Carl Walker's from Houston.

H: I know Carl.

A: And Carl, yes, Carl--

H: He' s [inaudible]

A: [inaudible]

H: Yes, I know Carl.

A: [inaudible] So Carl later became federal district attorney of whatever district that was. Well, that was one of Lyndon's influences that he got Carl. We sort of brought Carl along. Lyndon got to know him. Now it wasn't under Lyndon that Carl became that, but it was the result of Carl's participation with UPO that got him into the arena and got him known. The same way with Andrew Jemson [Jefferson?]. Andrew Jemson's appointment was definitely to Lyndon Johnson here in the federal, one of the federal district attorneys in San Antonio area, so those are the things that we know about very definitely happened to Lyndon. No question about it. But all of them seemed to have gotten to their base because, as I said, we just haven't been involved in the politics of it. Here's an opportunity to get involved. I said, "Where else?"

H: Do you think the door is closed now?

A: No, I don't think it's closed. I think we've got to get it open. I think the--the unfortunate thing, Roland, is we're at fault. We do not have any viable organization statewide, political organization. We don't have any. We don't have any period! Let's just face it. So, consequently, nobody's doing anything. I think this is our fault. There isn't any question about that. We don't even have them on the local level. What do you have here in Austin locally that's a viable organizational unit? You just don't have them, and so we've got to get back on track again and get some viable organizations going, and the youngsters are going to have to do it. There's no question about it at all, and you've got to get more trust and faith in each other and stop killing each other off by your little stupid persons with people--get on the personal differences that you may have, but until you do, I just don't see any hope at all other than that. I think we're lost these days, a lost cause almost. [inaudible]

And then our people that we put in office got to be more responsive to the constituency. If you've got a minority constituency that put you there, then you ought to be responsible to the minority constituency if they're the majority of the people that put you there. You've got to be responsive to all of them, but I'm talking about the people who put you there. So I think those are the things that I think that we've got to start doing now. Well, I didn't mean to [inaudible]--

H: Well, I'll say to you that--you were sent to Guyana as a ambassador, as a--

A: Yes, I headed up the delegation. They call it "heading up the delegation" to Guyana, yes. Yes , and I was in charge. That was quite an experience, Roland. I was on the P.O. Burnham, B-U-R-H-A-M, I think. B-U-R-N-H-A-M. [Forbes] Burnham was the--was at the time that--earlier, of course--was the black and Cheddi Jagan, who was an Indian, who was combatting with each other to see which one was going to be head of the government, so with the help that Lyndon gave Forbes Burnham, that's the reason that he is--really was now the prime minister of Guyana, but in heading up the delegation, it was surely a new experience for me, and the person who heads the delegation is a person that's--that they give all. I got to ride up front and do all the [inaudible]--

H: Oh, yes.

A: --wherever you ride.

H: Did Lyndon pick you to do that, or did you [inaudible]?

A: No, that was Lyndon.

H: Lyndon did that?

A: And so, we went down on one of those *Air Force Ones*. We've got more than one. I used to think there was only one, but there's more than one. So when I get there, of course,

and I'm met--we're met rather, all of us together except one. I think he kind of came late. He couldn't go with us at that particular time, and then I've got to get off of that plane in a certain manner, get all of the--

H: Protocol?

A: That's right. Protocol, you know, and I didn't wear it as well because--it was just something different and new, and I've sort of resented it, too, at times, you know, because [laughter]--I guess there's something my wife says, "A peon--once a peon, always a peon," you know, but, anyway--I did. I sort of resented all of that showing--I thought it was showing.

H: "Pomp and Circumstance."

A: That's right [inaudible], but as a result of that trip I got to meet a lot of people of the heads of the other nations, especially the Caribbean and that part of the world, and fortunately, a number of the people I knew either knew them or knew their wives, and it was amazing at how the education of those people came out of America, a whole lot of them, and a lot of them married American girls, too, so in that way--not many, but I did know some of them as a result of that, or we knew somebody that somebody else knew. You know how that goes.

H: Sure.

A: But it was a very unique experience, and as a result of that, we got to read the contract to do about five rice bins and about--oh, some miles of railroad or road; I think it was about five miles of road that we put in. I know nothing about it. I just happened to get with a group who knew how to do it, and we did, and that was a very definite experience to me: to get to know the people there and understand the people, and they would take a holiday.

At certain times of the year, they'd go home, and actually, it [inaudible], and everything shuts down. We know; we Americans are used to that, so--

H: There's a whole world.

A: But we would have made--I would have made, personally, some investments into the country. I'm glad I didn't because Burnham finally nationalized the country, so that would have been a tremendous loss to us. But he had to do what he had to do, and John Cain's [?] son--we got him down there to do his medical internship down in Guyana.

H: Oh, intern?

A: Yes., that's where some of those kids went when they went in there. There were [inaudible] of them [inaudible] frequency when they went [inaudible] to school in Guyana [inaudible].

H: They did, huh?

A: Yes, but that was quite an interesting experience. To say it was fun is repeating myself again. There's tremendous areas of learning.

H: Well, what did he do when he picked you? Would he cut back and actually make you head of delegation, or would he just say, "You do it."?

A: Yes. Well, he would--he would--they always contact and ask if you accept, yes, before they do, and of course, you know I would accept that without a moment's hesitation.

H: They pay all of your expenses and everything?

A: Yes, they--on the plane, yes. Everything was paid for. Yes.

H: You [inaudible] at the state's expense?

A: That's right, at the national expense.

H: [inaudible]

A: The interesting thing was that the head of the protocol--I'm trying to think of the man's name--was black. That's another thing [inaudible], and I can't think of the man's name, and Nicholas was the assistant to the black fellow, Nicholas was, but they were head of protocol, and so consequently, we went up for a briefing; I'd had my briefing and everything to know what to do and how to act, but I was briefed by the blacks because they were the heads [inaudible], so all of these were the breakthrough that we had at that time, and very rewarding, very rewarding.

H: Very good. In that [inaudible], when UPO was very involved, how did you go about getting the votes out, say, for Lyndon? You said--actually, I think you talked about--was it Connally? One of the political--how did you get him to [inaudible]? [inaudible] was more concise then and more of--most blacks. How did you get him to get people to participate in--especially when the knowledge was not there about the [inaudible] incident as much as maybe UPO knew about it?

A: What happened then, Roland, is entirely different than now because the people had not been exposed, so consequently, your local units--for example your chapter here. Bertha Means was one of the melting pots of the chapter here. Bertha Means, for example, would do it through the black precinct chairman, too--at that particular point. They may not have belonged in here. Most of them did though. So we'd do it there, and we--the NAACP would do their thing, too, except [inaudible]. We were all of us workers, so it was much easier than to contact the people--you see what I mean--than have people believe in certain leadership at that time. Now, you know, you've got so many people out there now, and nobody believes nobody hardly any more, but they would call people; after they got to know, they would call us and ask us the older [inaudible] should they

vote for, you know.

H: Yes.

A: Those were the kind of things, but it was not difficult at that point to get a--I don't mean that we got the kind of participation we should have had the numberwise, but at least those that did we voted in very large numbers. In fact, we voted in larger numbers than we're voting now, percentage-wise. We don't vote now, you know.

H: So you say that the trust factor was there, too?

A: I think so. I think that the trust plus, as I think, too, to say again, the level of sophistication. We think we have sophistication now. We don't have sophistication. We think we have. But I think all that played into making us definite. We accepted one of two or three people could be a leader in a community. That's not true involvement.

H That' s true.

A: So that made it easier, too. They accepted your leadership [inaudible], and now we have so many trying to be leaders, so that we fight for--

H: Yes.

A: --the realm of being. I think--I think that is the real answer that we got.

H: [inaudible] --after Lyndon left the White House, did you ever have occasion to ever go out to the Ranch--

A: [inaudible]

H: --be in his company after the pressure or so may have been off?

A: Yes, we--about once or twice, we were there, and, of course, when he came back here, the LBJ Library--I think that was where we had more contact with him there. It was the speech--the last speech that he ever made, in the celebration of the--or commemoration, I

think it was, of the Library was made out there, a very good speech, but you could tell that he wasn't the Lyndon that he used to be, but I would say the LBJ is the main reason we got to see him periodically.

The interesting thing, though, and this is a little highlight, too--Lyndon was very--a little disappointed that at those Library annual--whatever he had--

H: Sym posiums.

A: Yes, that they had out there, that we didn't get more blacks; people who had been with him didn't come in the numbers that he thought they should have come. You know, the man who headed up housing, Weaver, for example, and some of those people were not around. Some of them didn't show up and Lyndon was really disappointed, and he took the liberty of saying it to me, how disappointed he was. And Clifford Alexander didn't show up [inaudible], and so he was very disappointed then because he expected them to be there--

H: Yes. Right. Yes.

A: [inaudible]

Now the great, I think one of the--not for the last, but the other great highlight to me was when he--we were in Washington, and one of the--I think it was that community relations action. I was there, and he called me off, he and President Kennedy, and said that--he was vice president then--and said, "We're going to send John Connally back to be governor of Texas." I didn't even know who John Connally was so the first question out of the bat--I think there was three or four other people--my wife was there, too--standing around, and I said, "Wait a minute here now. We don't know this man, and what about it? You are making a recommendation, and we have confidence in your

recommendation, but tell us something about the man." And they went on to tell us about the man, and we said, "Well, suppose he doesn't do it? Well, he'll have a hard time getting the fund, federal funding." "Yes, but that's what he does." They said, "He'll do it." So that's why we supported Connally. We took their word, both Kennedy and Johnson, that they would send him back here, and that was one of the greatest struggles because they looked at Connally as a--you know what [inaudible].

H: Yes.

A: And that was unfortunate because here again they didn't know the man. Don't know him today, and John Connally--we were the five per center. We didn't even have five per cent of the vote when he first came back to run, but we came on in and won it, and consequently, we were there, so consequently, we were the ones then. There was no question about who was going to be the people he would look to. And Connally opened up more things than ever. We didn't have any jobs at that point on a state level, but he did open them up. There's no question about that, and I think the interesting story about that was when Connally called all the heads of the various boards and commissions in and said to them in no uncertain terms, he says, "I want a report on how many you have now, and I want in a month--or thirty days maybe, or sixty days, I want a report on how many you've hired then."

Connally told me--I was sitting there--he definitely said then that, "Andy, I want you to monitor it, and let me know what is happening," but that's the kind of thing, and that's unusual. You know, you don't have that done.

H: Right.

A: And they almost fell out of their chairs, too, the heads, when that was said, but that was

the kind of guy he was. He didn't have any fears because he was wealthy to begin with. Even we were no threat to him, not because he--I figured it was dumb [?], but he would always do those things, and he was another one who had carried out the law of this situation. If I was heading up, as I was at that particular time, the UPO, he'd [inaudible] through me. There wasn't nobody else that was going to sit down there, and he'd send me letters that people would send me giving me hell. You know. "Here it is now. Tell him about it." That's one of the ones you want to watch, you know. "Here's the letter." And some of my good friends would write the letters and that. You know, so these were the things that--

H: Was he and Johnson really that close?

A: Oh, yes. They were very close. Yes. They were very close. There's no question about that. Lot of things were said that they were not, but that's bull. What I mean now, they had differences later on down the line as you would have expected down the line because Connally was economically conservative, I think, but otherwise, I mean human rights and things like that, I think he was very, very much on target there. Now some people say, "Well, he--civil rights. Here's a speech he made opposing the Civil Rights Act." Well, I don't know how political that was or not, so I'm not going to try to judge that in the light of what he did. But I know what he did. We've never been--he opened up the inaugural. He had a black--what he said--let me tell you an interesting story about Connally, too.

In all of this country, in fact--he went into Marshall, Texas--had to when he was campaigning. He looked around and says, "There ain't no black folk here." He says, "Well, I ain't speaking. I'm gone." He says, "I'm not speaking. You go about and get some black folk, and when you get the black folk, then I'll come back and speak." Now

that's never heard of! And that's what happened. They went out, and they got the black folk, and then he spoke. Says, "Now we can have a meeting." But those are things that we never would understand. Never would understand. I mean, we'd understand, but we never would know.

H: Right.

A: They wouldn't believe it if I told them. I know people today, for example, wouldn't be in--wouldn't have their nursing home, wouldn't have--[inaudible] if it wouldn't be for John Connally. They were in difficulties, and John Connally said, "Look. Just give them some more time." And this saved them because they were just like all of us. In the beginning, they didn't know what they were doing. And times were difficult, and they couldn't get the patients, so they finally gave them a little more time, and they got the patients. Now they're multi-millionaires as a result of that, and boards and commissions, he opened every one of them. That is, not every--we opened numbers, not every--that's the wrong statement. We opened a few of them--

H: Yes.

A: --and the one that I never shall forget was Holliday. Reverend Holliday is--

H: I know Holliday. [inaudible]?

A: That's right. So Reverend Holliday was appointed to the board of Rex's[?].

H: [inaudible]

A: That's right. But let me tell you the story of that one though. When he was appointed, before he was appointed by Connally, I believe he had to be confirmed. So Senator Moore down at Bryan didn't want him on the board and tried to stop the confirmation. So Holliday had a brother-in-law down in the pen, so they brought that up, you know, about

how you "shouldn't appoint anybody with a brother--" Connally said, "I'm not appointing the brother-in-law. I'm appointing Holliday." So you know, he says, "It's not going to be like that." So he called in Senator Herring and said, "Look. I want this man confirmed." Charles Herring. He said, "You get out there and get him confirmed." And we did. I did not have that much, but at least I was sitting there when he told Herring. He said, "That's it, Charlie. You get out there." But this is a fact, and for many--Holliday went to four or five meetings, and they didn't even introduce him or speak to him. That was when old--I think Estelle [?] was down there--

H: Yes.

A: --I believe. They wouldn't even speak to him then. But these--but these are the things that we had to go through.

H: What--is--do you think--do you know Jack Brooks [Dr. Marion Jack Brooks] out of Ft. Worth?

A: Yes.

H. Did you work with him?

A: I know Jack. Yes. Let me put it this way. I know him, and Jack and I--you're talking about Dr.--Dr. Brooks the [inaudible]?

H: Yes. [inaudible]

A: Dr. Brooks and I--we are friendly. He was on one side, and he was on the other, and I think most generally--of course, we didn't have many people that were with us, white folk, when Connally first ran, so he was over there with the so-called liberal element, you know what I mean, at that time, and so that put us on opposite sides of--

H: Who ran against Connally?

A: I believe it was--no, it was Yarborough.

H: That's right.

A: Yes. Old Yellow Yarborough, yes.

H: Don. Was it Don Yarborough?

A: I--Don! Yes. Don [inaudible].

H: Yes.

A: First of all, the man himself who was governor ran. Price--didn't Price run? I think--yes.

H: Yes.

A: I think he ran, and then in the run-off, then there got to be--I think it got to be--I think that's the way the situation went there, and he beat him in the run-off, but he was over there with the fast liberals.

H: Jack was pretty involved in co-working the production[?]?

A: Yes, he was. He was back there early, of course, the--

H: Do you know--was he a member of the UPO?

A: No. Jack never was a member of the UPO. No. You may see him on some of those lists for invitations, but we didn't--you know, we just [inaudible]--

H: [inaudible] Holliday?

A: Well, let's see. Holliday was the--was one, and the minister there--

H: [inaudible]

A: No. [inaudible] wasn't around at that time. [inaudible] was a youngster.

H: [inaudible]

A: No. Its one of the ones that--you know, older man. He was old and short and dumpy, and--Forbes! [Arlin?] Forbes was one of them. Forbes. You may not have known

Forbes, but he was back there then.

H: I was going to say Dawson, but it wasn't Dawson.

A: Reverend--oh, it was the Methodist church. Carruthers!

H: Oh!

A: Byron Carruthers--

H: Okay.

A: --but the one I'm talking about you would know. He was [inaudible]--

H: I know it.

A: [Inaudible] He was something! He was something.

H: He was awful.

A: Yes, and later on became [inaudible]. Now he's running things. The minister--head of the ministers. I can't think of his name now. He was a little bit later on, who heads up the ministerial group now. You would know him if I could call his name. But all of those--that's one of the things, Roland. Most of those fellows are still around. A few of them are dead, but they're still around. They still have some interest. Just like Wright of Dallas you know.

H: Reverend Wright?

A: Reverend Wright, you see. Wright--Wright's a little later. See, Estelle in Dallas was the key man.

H: Yes, I remember Estelle.

A: He had, but he had the control, please believe me, down town.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

A: See, Estelle in Dallas was the key man.

H: Yes, I remember Estelle.

A: He had, but he had the control, please believe me, down town, so he, Wright, inherited it from Estelle, so--

H: He asked you to come up.

A: That's right. That's right. I'm sitting there when Estelle was real sick, and Estelle asked me to come on up because he knew he wasn't going to be there very long, which I did, and he had Wright there, and he said, "This is the person that I want to drop the mantle on." And then he told Wright because, here again, Estelle was a very brilliant man, and no--I--we haven't had anybody . . .

H: I didn't know him, but I've heard a lot about him.

A: --here to compare to his ability to handle the situation. He knew what to do with what he had. And then he didn't have his hands out . . . [Tape is shut off briefly and then repeats up to this point.] --either, you know.

H: Yes [laughter].

A: [inaudible], so those are the things, but it was--it's been a real, real interesting experience, and I'm glad that I went through the experience. I've thoroughly enjoyed it [inaudible]--

H: When you started out, did you ever envision that you'd meet all the peoples that you'd meet along the way?

A: No. No way.

H: Just followed [inaudible].

A: There's no way that I would have envisioned that UPO was going to make the kind of marks that it made, have the great impact; let me put it that way [inaudible]. There was no way that [inaudible], and the marvelous thing was getting the--in the beginning we did

not call them black folk--but getting the blacks together and sticking together. Now we had a rule now. You didn't mess up. If you went out there, and we caught you going out there, going behind after the decision was made, we undressed you. You were out. There wasn't any question about that. You were out of UPO. We--and we would not only tell it, we'd tell it to the world, you know, so we had everybody scared, man and there weren't no mess-ups.

H: Well, what kind of organ [?] did you all have to communicate with each other, by--

A: W ell--

H: --letter?

A: --telephone, usually, and letters, and those kinds of things, and basically the telephone. But we had periodic meetings. That's one of the things that--the board met quite frequently. The board usually was run--UPO was run through the board because you had all of the key people on board anyway, and the board was a very large board. You see the board was around thirty-some people, so they set the rules and regulations.

H: Did you have a constitution and by-laws?

A: No. We didn't go in much. You see, that's one thing that I'm definitely against, a whole lot of rules and regulations. I don't want nothing to do with any rules and regulations except those that are necessary to run the organization. And when you start that with me in an organization, I'm gone. I just don't fool with it because it's too much--too much red--too much interference. Dealing with conflict will tear up any organization.

H: It still will.

A: So we were very careful of that. As I said, the main purpose was political action with the end result being a job. That was our scope, and that made sense.

H: And to people who were in higher office. They looked at that and agreed with it, too?

A: That's right. That's right. They worked with us. As I say again, I think somebody should get it going again. I'm talking not necessarily to you--people with some unity going--unit going--rather, some organizational unit to do what we did because you've got to go to people who have people.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

MARCELLUS JACK "ANDY" ANDERSON, SR.

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Ada Anderson, of Austin, Texas, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of the personal interview conducted with my husband, Marcellus J. Anderson, Sr., on June 6, 1984, in Austin, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Ada C. Anderson 11-9-05

Donor Ada C. Anderson Date

Allen Weinstein 12/3/05

Archivist of the United States Date