INTERVIEW I

DATE: May 30, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM G. BOWDLER

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

PLACE: Ambassador Bowdler's residence in San Salvador, El Salvador

Tape 1 of 1

F: Mr. Ambassador, first of all, tell us a little bit about your background, where you're from, where you were educated, how you came to be associated with the White House in the first place.

B: I was born and raised in Argentina, in Buenos Aires and Patagonia. I was educated in New York and Virginia and Massachusetts at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. During my last year at the Fletcher School I was offered a job in the State Department. This was in January of 1950.

F: How did you happen to be born in Argentina?

B: My parents were missionaries down there.

While at the Fletcher School I was offered this job in the Latin America area, and I accepted it and went to work in the State Department in July of 1950. My entire career in the State Department has been in the Latin American area. That's almost nineteen years now. Only four and a half of those years have been abroad; four years in Cuba from 1957 to 1961 when Castro threw us out.

F: You picked a vital time to be there, didn't you?

B: That's right. But a most interesting time to have been in the country. Then the other six months I've been here in San Salvador. In 1965 I was the deputy coordinator for Cuban Affairs in the State Department when Jack Vaughn, who at that time was assistant secretary, asked me to take the White House Latin American adviser job, which Robert B. Sayre had occupied for about nine months previous to that.

F: Had you known Walt Rostow or the President at all before this time?

B: I had not known the President, but I had met Walt in the series of inter-American conferences that we'd had on the Cuban problem, beginning in January 1962. When I went over to the White House Walt was not there; he was the head of the Policy Planning staff, but Mac [McGeorge] Bundy was the special assistant.

On April 19, 1965, it was my first day at the White House. I remember that six days later the balloon went up in the Dominican Republic. That was the first crisis that I had to face.

F: You really didn't get shaken down then, did you?

B: That's right.

F: About all you missed in the Johnson years was the Panama crisis.

B: That's right, the Panama crisis. Six days after that on May 1, Mac Bundy sent me down to the Dominican Republic with the OAS [Organization of American States] Commission that went down to look into the situation. I was selected because of my OAS background. I had been on the OAS delegation from 1950 to 1956, and then again from 1961 when I came out of Cuba until 1963 when I went over to take the Cuban coordinator's job. I knew the Latin American ambassadors that were going on this

mission. The United States was not represented, so my role was really one of liaison between the OAS Commission and our embassy in Santo Domingo and the 82nd [Division] that was going in at the time.

F: On this OAS delegation the United States was not an official participant in the delegation.

B: That's right. We were not a member of the five-man delegation, and my role was to serve as a go-between the OAS mission and the embassy and the American forces that were moving into Santo Domingo at the time.

F: What was your reception, as far as the delegation was concerned? Were you *simpatico*, were you treated as an outsider, or what?

B: I had a very special position. I knew the Latin American ambassadors. I had their confidence. While not officially being a member of the commission, I knew exactly what was going on by virtue of what various members told me.

F: By virtue of having friends and not having to sort of make a place.

B: That's right. So it was a unique position for me.

F: What was their attitude as they went down? Did they go critically or were they sincerely concerned in being objective, or what?

B: I think that they were sincerely concerned in being objective. It was a brand new experience for them. The OAS had not done this type of a thing before. I remember we landed at the airport in between C-130s that were arriving, one about every five minutes, disgorging and taking off; and as one was taking off left the field, the landing strip, another one was coming in down at the other end. Because of transportation difficulties from the San Isidro airport into the international zone, we had to spend the better part of

two hours at San Isidro. I think the ambassadors were perfectly amazed at the might of the United States as represented by this highly systematic arrival and departure of these mammoth planes, bringing in men, ammunition, food, trucks, armored cars. It really was a fantastic display of power, and they were very much impressed by it.

F: And I presume with comparatively little confusion.

B: That's right. The only confusion actually I think was getting our transportation. We had to go by helicopter from San Isidro, fly over the rebel zone into the International Security Zone.

F: Was there concern for your safety?

B: You couldn't go overland because the roads went through the rebel area, and there were not roads that would take you around the city of Santo Domingo, so the only effective way would be to go by helicopter. We had to wait for our turn on the chopper. Once we got over there and we began talking to the Dominicans, looking into the situation and talking to the diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio, they did realize that this was a serious situation and that our coming into Santo Domingo the way we did had avoided bloodshed, loss of life. And they so reported in their reports back to the council in Washington.

F: Did they feel on the way down that President Johnson had overreacted, or did they keep at least a neutral outer face on this?

B: There was no indication to me of any attitude of overreaction on the part of the President. What was so new to them was having the OAS cast in this role.

F: It had really been a debating society rather than a peacekeeping society this time.

B: That's right. And they were very unsure of themselves. There was a certain group that wanted to make specific recommendations for action back to the council, and there were others who got very juridical and didn't want to recommend any type of action.

F: They were quite precedent-making conscious.

B: That's right, very much so. The first commission, because of this division, was not a very effective body. The lack of effectiveness of the group resulted in the council deciding not to send the group back. Then later on the council sent the three-man commission of Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker, the Brazilian and the Salvadorian ambassadors, and they were the ones who carried through the negotiations with both sides, setting up a provisional government, the elections, and finally the withdrawal of the troops.

F: Did you go back with this second group?

B: I went there for one week with the first commission. I stayed for four months. I stayed during the life of that first commission, and another role that I had was in helping to set up the Inter-American Peace Force, working out the legal instruments for doing this. I was there at the time that the second commission came back with Ambassador Bunker, and I worked along with them in the preliminary stages of the development of what became the [Hector] García-Godoy government. I left in September of 1965.

F: On this first commission did anyone emerge as the natural leader of the group, who sort of, you might say, managed what decisions were made, or was it just in a sense five quarterbacks?

B: The Argentine was the chairman.

F: Who was he?

B: I forget the man's name now.

F: It doesn't matter.

B: He was the chairman, and he was quite vacillating. There were two other ambassadors who were highly legalistic in their approach, and two other ones who favored action--the Brazilian and the Panamanian. The others were the Guatemalan and the Colombian.

F: They were the legalistic ones.

B: They were the legalistic ones.

F: So really in a sense you had two opposing sets and an Argentine who just sort of hovered.

B: Didn't want to take a firm position. You probably are aware that before I left the White House the President asked that I document the crises that he was involved with, and I spent the last two months that I was there, literally morning, afternoon, and night, sifting through all the documentation on these crises and making a *précis* of the basic elements in the crisis, the President's role, and what the decisions finally were.

F: I wasn't so interested in going into the detail of it as your general impressions of people you dealt with during the crisis.

In the second group did Bunker tend to take leadership, or again, was this three men more or less of even stature?

B: Clearly, Bunker stood out. It was a very close working relationship. He didn't play it alone; it was always a team effort. But he was clearly the leader of the three.

F: But you didn't have any deep schisms here?

B: Not at all. They worked together beautifully.

F: Everyone could talk.

B: That's right. And each one of the other two members made positive contributions to the settlement that was worked out.

F: How did you make contact with the rebels?

B: Initially it was done through the Papal Nuncio. After the OAS came in some of the contacts were done through the OAS. And then of course once García-Godoy entered the picture, he was the go-between on both sides.

F: You had no great problem then in communication? You may have had trouble communicating, but in getting in touch with people?

B: No, not at all.

F: In retrospect do you think that the United States' role in this was justifiable? Do you think it worked? From your other relationships what did it do to our role in Latin America? What did it do, for instance, to the Good Neighbor Policy?

B: I have a very special focus on this, I think, by virtue of my experience in Cuba during the last two years of the Batista regime and the first two years of Castro. I think that my judgment is undoubtedly colored by that experience. I personally feel that if the President had not intervened the way he did, that there was a good chance that the Dominican revolution would have gone the way of the Cuban revolution. It wouldn't have been an exact carbon copy, but I think that the elements were there and the drift had already set in by the time that he took the decision to move forces in and bring the OAS behind it. I had a chance to participate in some of the initial talks between Mac Bundy and the group that he took with him and the [Francisco Albert] Caamaño [Deñó] group. Again, probably reflecting my Cuban conditioning, I thought that in the manner of acting and in the dialectic of some of the people who were on the Caamaño team, that there were parallels that could be drawn with the Cuban experience. Therefore, I do think that

if the situation had been allowed to take its course, the rebels would have won, and there was a good chance that this would have gone the way of the Cuban revolution.

F: Do you have any evidence that Cuba was playing an active role in this?

B: No. There was no clear evidence of that.

F: What was [Juan] Bosch's role in all of this?

B: As you know, Bosch sat over in Puerto Rico--

F: It was not a period I thought he covered himself with glory particularly.

B: I think everybody who was connected with this crisis agrees that if he had had the courage to fly from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo in those first few days after the revolt, that he could have taken over hands-down. But he just didn't do it.

F: This is a shortage of personal courage, you think? I don't know him. Is he a reflexive man, slow to move? In other words, was he just racked by indecision or did he just not feel up to it as far as you would conjecture?

B: I think it was a matter of indecision. During the brief time that he was president, I think that he reflected that, that he was not a decisive executive.

F: What induced you to leave?

B: To leave Santo Domingo?

F: Yes.

B: I had been away for four months, and that meant that there was nobody in the White House attending the Latin American store during that period, and I felt that my place was really back there with Mac Bundy. So I asked permission to come back; Bunker originally delayed it for several weeks. Then after the situation with García-Godoy jelled, he thought the time was propitious for me to go, and I went back.

F: How did Mac Bundy work in Santo Domingo? He's known of course for his sort of crispness and preciseness, and I wondered how that would work in a situation like this which is so highly fluid and delicate.

B: I think he worked very well. He surprised everybody by his command of Spanish, which was a big asset in his conversations with the other side. But the other side had not yet reached the point where they thought that it was necessary for them to reach a compromise. They still thought that international public opinion could be mobilized in their favor and used for them to eventually gain control. They were not prepared at the time that Bundy was there to make the concessions which they did subsequently, after it became evident to them that they were not going to have their way in the Dominican Republic. Therefore, Bundy gave it a good college try but the circumstances, the conditions, weren't ripe yet for the type of negotiated settlement that Bunker was able to work out in July and in August.

F: From what you saw of him, and you saw it at close range, what sort of *modus operandi* does Bunker work in these crises? How does he handle them? We think he's extraordinarily effective, but--

B: He was very firm, decisive, patient, and low pressure. I think these were the qualities that were the key in the Dominican situation. He realized that the situation had to jell a little more in the sense that the rebels had to realize that international forces were not going to bring about the victory that had been denied them by the intervention. So he waited them out. He was patient with them, I think, much more patient than his colleagues were. They were more prepared to try to crack down militarily on the rebels in the small zone

that they occupied in the city. But he was patient. He said: "Now, we must wait, we must negotiate," and he did this week after week after week, and it finally paid off.

F: When you've had one of these negotiating sessions and all it turns into is a repetition of hard positions, I have often wondered when you come away from it and you've heard all of it now fifteen times and there has been no change, what your attitude is toward going back tomorrow to try again.

B: After one of those sessions Bunker would go back to the hotel and we would all sit down and have a good drink and chat awhile and just make up your mind that you'd go back again the following day with the same formula, or if a variance seemed advisable, go back with that and just keep on trying.

F: Do you do a sort of nighttime searching out of some vagrant or fugitive word that might have gotten in that might be a lead to a new opening?

B: That's right. There were daily sessions with his two colleagues and the staff members of the three delegates, at which we examined the state of play at the end of each day and decided what strategy to follow on the next one; what formulas, what words, what language would be used.

F: It has been almost four years now since that took place. What has it done to our relationships with Latin America in general? I was in Chile at the time.

B: I remember at the time they predicted dire consequences. I think that the way that the crisis was handled, bringing the OAS into it, reaching a solution with the rebels going to free elections supervised by the OAS, and the prompt withdrawal of all forces within a matter of three months after the elections, I think, really dulled the attacks that were made against the intervention. People like [José Antonio] Mayobre of Venezuela who were

sent down by Secretary U Thant to be the U.N. man on the spot, who had been highly critical of the U.S. intervention in this instance, subsequently was interviewed by the *New York Times*--this was in 1966--and he acknowledged that the intervention had been a salutary action on the part of the United States and had turned out for the benefit of the Dominicans.

F: Were you around the President at the time that he made the decision to intervene?

B: No, I wasn't. At that time I was brand new, and Bundy asked me to man the Situation Room and keep track of all the traffic that was coming in from different sources and keep him up-to-date on what the state of play was. I did not participate in the meetings that he had with Tom Mann and Jack Vaughn and Dick Helms and others that played the key role in the decision making.

F: This is a little bit tangential, but something I have wondered. We have had a new assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs just about every year on the nose. Why have we changed so often? I'm talking about in recent times. I don't want to make a historical generalization, but in this Johnson period.

B: I think it was really a variety of reasons.

F: Is it complicated enough that it uses up men?

B: Certainly I think that's true. But there were instances where the President wanted to put a person in that job into another position, like moving Jack Vaughn over to be the director of the Peace Corps. He wanted out a long time before he actually left.

F: Why do you think he wanted out?

B: He [Thomas Mann] had wanted to retire at the time he was ambassador to Mexico. He was thinking of retiring then, and after the assassination of Kennedy and President

Johnson's assumption of power, then he asked Tom to come to Washington and be his assistant secretary. Tom said, "I'll do it for a year," and it lasted almost two years.

In the case of Linc [Lincoln] Gordon, he was in the job for a little over a year, and he was offered the presidency of Johns Hopkins. He told me that one of his lifelong ambitions had been to be the president of one of the outstanding American universities, and this was just an opportunity that he couldn't turn down. He went to the President on that basis, and the President said, "I understand."

F: Now to get back to our own topic in your career, what was your next crisis as far as Latin America was concerned and your role in it?

B: I was trying to think. There was really no major crisis after that. We did go ahead with the meeting of presidents.

F: Were you involved in the Punta del Este--?

B: I was involved; I did all of the planning for the Punta del Este meeting, together with Linc Gordon. I did all of the programming; I worked along with Linc Gordon on the substantive preparations for the meeting. I think that as an international conference that was a highly successful operation, if I'm permitted to say so.

F: How did [President Otto] Arosemena [of Ecuador] slip up on you? I judge that was a surprise, was it not?

B: In a way it was a surprise, although the Ecuadorian delegate--at the meeting of foreign ministers in Buenos Aires in February, which preceded the meeting of presidents, as well as the meeting of foreign ministers in Punta del Este just prior to the meeting--the Ecuadorian representatives had already indicated a certain unwillingness to go along. I

think that we thought that when the chips were down and the presidents were together that they wouldn't be as obstreperous as they were.

F: Of course you had the problem in the planning as I recall. In the planning site was the fact that you had the problem of whether Bolivia would play, the problem at one time you had Ecuadorian-Peruvian difficulties, and so on. And all of these things had resolved themselves, and I'm sure that made you somewhat more optimistic that things would work out.

B: In the case of Bolivia, this was due to a position which Barrientos had taken on the access to the sea. He had burned his bridges behind him, and he had said: "Unless this is taken up, I'm not going to go," and he didn't go, despite everything that we and the Latin Americans did to turn him around. The dispute between Ecuador and Peru was more over the site. At one time we thought of holding it in Lima, in which case the Ecuadorians probably would not have gone. But once the decision was taken to hold it in Punta del Este, that was no longer an issue.

F: Why Punta del Este, which is not convenient?

B: Politically, it was a convenient place because this was one place where all the countries would go without a problem. Actually it turned out to be a convenient place because it was apart from other populated centers, and it was easy to maintain security for twenty chiefs of state, which is always a problem.

F: You didn't have students coming in after class to--

B: They did have a student march that started from Montevideo to Punta del Este, but it fizzled out along the way.

F: What sort of arrangements did you set up for the President?

B: You mean physical arrangements for him?

F: Yes. Were you involved in that?

B: Not directly because there was a series of homes that were considered, and one was finally chosen as the most adequate.

F: Did you stay there or did you stay in town?

B: Walt and I had our little command post in a motel that had been reserved for the U.S. delegation.

F: In a case like that, do you send down U.S. technicians to set up the necessary telephone lines, telegraph lines, *et cetera*?

B: Yes, that was all done in advance, a fantastic operation, but I didn't get into that part of it.

F: That's not your role.

B: That's right.

F: What did you hope to get out of Punta del Este?

B: I think the single most important thing was to draw up an outline of action and priorities for the second decade of the Alliance for Progress, and the ten points in the Declaration of Punta del Este constitute that blueprint for the second decade.

F: You've had nearly a decade of the *Alianza* and you've had of course a change of party in Washington. Do you think the *Alianza* has been a disillusioning process; do you think that people have had to change their understanding of it? In other words, what do you think the status of it is at the moment, and where do you think it's going? I know the dangers of predicting, but you've got fair hindsight on this.

B: As you know, the Alliance has been heavily criticized for not achieving what it set out to accomplish. I think initially it was oversold. The transformation of the economic and

social pattern of a continent involving 200 million people or more is not something that you do in a ten-year period. I think that any cold analysis of the achievements, political, economic, and social, of the Alliance during those first seven or eight years reveals a substantial progress was made. To put it negatively, what would the hemisphere have been like if the steps that were taken had not been taken! I think really the Alliance is a program for a generation rather than for a decade, for twenty, for thirty years, and it should be looked at in those terms.

I think that the Alliance during this first partial decade has taken hold so strongly that it will be very difficult for anybody to really halt it. I can't predict what the new administration will do; I think it's significant that President Nixon has asked the Congress for $400 million in loan money and $82 million in technical assistance to continue the Alliance. I wouldn't be surprised if Governor [Nelson A.] Rockefeller will strongly recommend that the effort be continued, perhaps with modifications, perhaps with a different wrapping. But I think that the idea of working with our Latin American colleagues on a major effort to transform the society is rooted so deeply now that it would be very difficult to stop.

F: Do you think that President Johnson was as committed to the Alliance idea as President Kennedy?

B: I think he was. I think that during the five years that he was president, that he did more to consolidate the Alliance than President Kennedy did. Of course President Kennedy really just set the pattern, but it was President Johnson who took hold of the idea and gave it substance.

F: In what way?

B: In the amount of money that was put into it, the ideas, the focus that was given to it, the personal attention, the personal involvement of President Johnson in the Alliance. To me one of the ironies of the Johnson Administration is that if you go through the history of our relations with Latin America, I don't think that you will find a president who devoted more time, more energy, more effort, and more money to Latin America than President Johnson. And yet he didn't reap from that what he really should have.

F: You wouldn't buy the charge that's sometimes made then that he treated Latin America like a stepchild?

B: Not at all.

F: It has always seemed to me, looking at it from my own personal vantage point, that it's a more natural area for him to be interested in than almost anywhere else.

B: And I think part of this was the role of Secretary Rusk. I don't think that you'll find a secretary of state who spent as much time with Latin America and listened to them with greater sympathy than Dean Rusk. This was the other side of the presidential coin.

F: Why do you think Rusk showed this particular interest in Latin America? Is this coming out of his Rockefeller Foundation days, or just a feeling that here was a--?

B: I think that must be in part, the fact that he's a broad-gauged man who understood the role of Latin America in our security scheme. The fact that his son married an Argentine, I think, may have had something to do with it.

F: Were you on the trip--I know you were--that the President made to visit the presidents of Central America?

B: Yes, I was in on that right from the beginning.

F: Did you help with the planning?

B: Again, I did all the planning, much more so really on that one than I did on Punta del Este, much more so in the sense that that operation originated over at the White House, and the White House did much more of the programming and the substantive planning than had been done previously for the Punta del Este meeting. The President wanted to go, he wanted another trip, we suggested--and incidentally during my three and a half years in the White House I think I must have planned something like seven or eight trips for the President to Latin America, two of which came off, the Punta del Este meeting and the Central America meeting--

F: I suppose that's a good percentage.

B: --and in the files the researcher will find maps which I drew of itineraries and schedules to cover these various possible trips. The President would say, "I'd like to make a trip," and I would put one together; and then for one reason or another he couldn't go.

On the Central American trip he wanted to make a trip throughout Latin America. We'd planned to do one to both Central America and South America. That proved to be too ambitious and it was cut back to just the Central American part. It originally started out as just a trip to Salvador to meet with the presidents. One afternoon in talking to Covey Oliver we thought of the possibility of the President making a stop in each one of the other capitals. In 1963 President Kennedy had gone to Costa Rica and then gone straight back, and we thought it might be a nice touch for the President to stop in each one of the capitals and take the president of that country in *Air Force One* and spend an hour or so in each capital. We suggested this to the President and he bought it right away.

After we did this the people in the White House concerned with logistical problems, with the press, security, communications, just threw up their hands in holy horror and put a lot of pressure on Walt and me to go back to the President and say, "This just won't work." He went back to the President in a memorandum, pointing out the logistical problems, but the President just swept these aside and said, "I'm going to go."

F: He thought you had hold of a good idea.

B: That's right. George Christian was one of those who was most upset because he said, "You just can't imagine the logistical problems involved in getting all of the press together and onto a plane to take off after the President leaves, and to get ahead and land and be in position by the time he arrives, and to repeat this four different times in a period of eight hours!" George was very unhappy with me. But it worked out beautifully. I think it paid off. And as I told George at the end of the trip, "We didn't lose a single newsman in the process."

F: That may be a mixed blessing. Does the President work well with other presidents in a case like this?

B: He works very well. In Punta del Este he worked well in the group meetings, and he worked well in the individual meetings that he had with each president. Here in Salvador he didn't meet individually with the presidents, they were all group meetings in the very short time that he was here, but with his manner he gets along very well with them.

F: Does he essay any Spanish in that somewhat Texan accent of his?

B: No, not really. He knows his own limitations in the language. He will speak a few words, but he didn't make any effort to conduct conversations.

F: When he's mixing with the crowd, "pressing flesh," as he likes to say, in a group would he speak Spanish maybe to some *niño* who was standing by the fence or something?

B: Oh, yes, he would say, "Como está?" or "Adios," or use one or two words of greeting or goodbye. As you know, at these airport stops here in Central America he just had a field day going up and down the ropes talking to people, shaking hands.

F: You've got a problem here in Central America in that everything is an hour away. How did you handle the logistics of getting the press off after the President and then getting them to the next airport ahead of him?

B: That was George Christian's problem.

F: We haven't talked to George about that yet, but we will.

B: He, with his helpers, managed to do this very effectively. They were off the ground after *Air Force One* was off, and down on the ground fifteen minutes ahead of time and in position by the time that the President's plane came to a stop at the ramp.

F: How did you happen to be named ambassador to El Salvador? Were you anticipating that?

B: I just don't know. I think that there were people on the White House staff that knew that I was interested in an ambassadorship, and I think that they were the ones responsible for communicating that interest to the President. I understand that when this was brought to his attention he did approve it.

F: Did you have any long-range notice that it was in the fire, or was this sort of a sudden announcement to you?

B: It came as quite a surprise, actually. I was on vacation at my house in Virginia on August 14, and I received a phone call at about two o'clock in the afternoon from the White

House, notifying me and congratulating me that the President had approved my nomination for Salvador.

F: No trouble in confirmation?

B: None at all. The President didn't want to make the public announcement, he was in Texas at the time, and didn't want to make the announcement until he got back to Washington, which wasn't until the first few days of September, and I was afraid that there might be some leak because there had been some press speculation about it, but the lid held on until the announcement was made.

F: How long usually is there between one ambassador's leaving and the other one coming in in the period after confirmation? In other words you're confirmed on a certain day. About how much time do you usually have to get on down here?

B: That depends on the individual circumstances. I would have come down here much sooner than when I did, but I had to finish up the crises studies that the President wanted. When he signed my commission in October, he wrote Walt a little memorandum, saying, "I do this in the clear understanding that he will not leave town until all of those things are completed and turned in to you."

F: Did you inherit any particular problems here from the Johnson Administration?

B: No, not at all. I think what I inherited were the assets of his visit here in July of last year.

F: There was some carry-over good will?

B: That's right. I think one of the more exciting things that I inherited was the President's decision, taken at Punta del Este incidentally, to make El Salvador the pilot project for a nationwide instructional television program for the public schools. We've started that now and it has very exciting possibilities.

F: It's moving?

B: It's moving now.

F: Good. Why do you think he picked El Salvador? Because of its sort of cohesion?

B: It's a small country, and it lends itself to this type of an experiment.

F: Where do you think he got that idea?

B: I think that this came from Marks, USIA.

F: Leonard Marks.

B: Leonard Marks. He had been very active in the Educational TV Committee in Washington. And we went to Punta del Este with this idea, this proposal in mind. We hadn't fixed on a country quite as yet, but at Punta del Este the President did tell President-Elect Sánchez that Salvador would probably be the one selected for this.

F: The Salvadorians are buying the idea?

B: Yes.

F: Are they excited about it?

B: Very excited about it. They began using TV in the classrooms on February 17 of this year, and they have thirty classrooms now operating with a little over a thousand students in it.

F: Wonderful.

B: This is at the seventh grade level to begin with; they plan to extend it to the eighth and ninth grades to finish the junior high sector; and then go back and do the first six grades of grammar school and then step up to the three years of senior high school.

F: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

William G. Bowdler
Donor

12 August 2001
Date

John W. Carlin
Archivist of the United States

10-18-04
Date