INTERVIEWEE: AMBASSADOR CHESTER BOWLES

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

November 11, 1969

F: This is an interview with former Ambassador to India Chester Bowles in his home in Essex, Connecticut, on November 11, 1969. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz.

Mr. Ambassador--it's kind of hard to know what to call you, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Governor--you've had too many careers. Let's talk a bit about what you were telling me just a moment ago, and that is Mr. Johnson and Indian aid.

B: You've started with a big subject. In his long record in Congress Mr. Johnson demonstrated that he was for the aid program, I think, very fundamentally. He supported it in the Senate and also in the House. I first knew him when he was elected to the House and kept in touch after he was elected to the Senate. But after he became President he seemed so focused on the problems here at home that he did very little for the aid program. As President he continued the AID program but didn't work very hard for it.

There was one aspect of foreign aid that I don't think he, as well as many other people, understood very well. For twenty years or so we gave the American people the wrong reasons for foreign aid. I'm not talking about

specific programs, but it was as if we always felt we were doing "them" a favor, on a personal basis, and they ought to be grateful to us.

F: It was a kind of charity in a way.

B: Yes, and that of course is not what it should be. We told the American people that the world would like us better, which it won't. Nations, like people, don't like those they owe something to.

F: No one likes the banker.

B: We also told the American people that it would buy votes for us in the U.N. On the contrary, as a sensitive state when you get aid from America, you're inclined to disagree with America to prove that you're sovereign. We also told them that foreign assistance would be over pretty soon, which was not true. And finally we said that economic growth assured political stability, which it certainly doesn't do. On the contrary, economic progress creates internal conflicts over who should get what share.

I remember Dean Rusk saying to me a couple of years ago, with great irritation, "Just tell me one damned thing those Indians have ever done for us." And I said, "They've survived for twenty-two years as a democracy, as a vast common market, independent, and that's a fantastic contribution to a stable world." All you're ever going to get out of

the aid program in India is the chance of a viable and independent India; maybe its leaders and people will like us, maybe they won't, but it will be free to operate as an independent nation that will resist outside pressures from any source. That's an awful lot. If you can help assure independence for one-sixth of mankind who live in India, you've done a great deal.

I remember talking with LBJ on this subject one time and I said, "I'm not sure that you understand the aid program in India thoroughly, but I know your grandfather would." He asked, "What do you mean by that?" I said, "Your grandfather was a Populist, an agrarian non-Marxist radical. He believed in lower freight rates and lower interest rates; he believed in schools and more doctors and rural roads. He believed in a better break for the little guy. Now that's all our foreign economic assistance is all about. These countries don't want Communism or any other totalitarian ideology. They're much more likely to be with us than the Russians on these things. They just want a better break. They want to see their resources used to their own benefit."

Johnson asked me to write a speech about this, and I agreed to do it. I heard that he wanted to give it at the Associated Press dinner in April, I think, '66 or '67, but I got through with it too late and missed my chance. It could have been a good speech though, which might have provided a fresh insight.

I remember Ted Sorensen one time jokingly told me never to speak about foreign aid in Nebraska, which is his home state. He said, "They'll lynch you out there if you talk about foreign aid." But I went there, a little nervous, to speak to a large audience in Lincoln, and I opened my speech by saying, "I'm not sure you'll understand what I am going to say, but I know your grandfathers would understand." It was the same theme I had brought up with LBJ. I went on to describe the populist Nebraskans of fifty-sixty years ago, and I concluded, "Your inability to understand what I'm going to talk about indicates how far you are away from your grandparents in your perspective and ideas." In this framework, my remarks were warmly received.

I think that this idea was also effective with Johnson. He didn't work for the aid program in the last two or three years; but this was chiefly because he felt there were so many other problems on the agenda. My own feeling is we don't have to choose between good programs abroad and good programs at home--we've got nearly a trillion dollar gross

national income. Nevertheless, we know the difficulty of getting these domestic problems through and how difficult it is to keep Congress in line.

I go back to the fact that we never really told Congress the whole story. Only on rare occasions have we really been honest about foreign aid with Congress. Each year, rather, it has been an expedient effort to get the bill through at any cost, and wild promises are made that can't be kept.

Too frequently, the aid program has been in the hands of the country desks in the State Department, which have used it politically. Instead of striving for economic growth, the objective has been to quiet down this general or to buy that admiral, to avoid a revolution or to encourage whatever you're after. My own belief is that AID's sole purpose is to help the recipient country function better, stand on its own feet, and maintain its independence. There should be no assumption of gratitude expected for it. Our country has no right to say to another country, "You've got to vote with us in the UN." We would have a right, however, to say,"You've got to spend the loan or grant we're giving you in an intelligent way, not waste it; and you've got to see that it goes to the priority needs. You've got to see that your tax program really taxes

your people, that your people are allowed to own the land they farm, that you're doing all you can to make the best use of the aid." I've always felt that aid given to countries that just aren't doing their share or their own part in their own behalf is wasted. This is true in large measure in Latin America, where they have taken aid from us, but in the meantime have not taxed their own well-to-do people very much. And a lot of the money we give to Latin America promptly goes abroad to be invested in Wall Street or tucked away in a Swiss bank. This makes no sense. I would have been a lot tougher on demanding economic criteria to prevent this misuse of our funds.

Now, India, by and large, is pretty good on this score. Almost no capital gets out of the country. Foreign exchange is very scarce, and they're very rigid about it, very austere. They want it to go for essentials not for luxuries for a few. Put it around another way: If Latin America had been half as tough as India has been, Latin America would have been over the hump long ago.

One story concerning LBJ and American aid which might interest you concerns the Food for Peace Program. India in '65 and '66 had two droughts back to back. This was the first time that had occurred in a hundred years. And the horror of it was this: there are always a lot of unseen food reserves in India--tucked away in family reserves, dealer reserves

and government reserves; so when a drought hits they draw upon these reserves. But on the rare occasion when another drought occurs on top of the first, there are no reserves. As a result, the Indians needed about ten million tons of wheat a year, which could only come from us. At one point we were delivering wheat at the rate of three shiploads a day. The schedule was so tight that we called it a "ship-to-mouth" program; it just never went through a warehouse at all. It went right to the villages and towns where it was required. It was very close.

I told LBJ beforehand that such a massive request for assistance was going to come and that a positive response was going to be very crucial. I said, "You've got the authority to go ahead with this program through Congress already." And he replied, "Well, we ought to do all we can, I agree, but I should go back to Congress and talk to them further about it." I said, "Why? You've got the authority." But he, with a much better knowledge of politics than I, proved himself to be right. He called in twenty-eight or thirty senators, and gave them one of the most thoughtful talks I ever listened to on why we should agree to provide the wheat.

F: You were there?

B: I was there. He gave an extremely thoughtful presentation on why we wanted to do the right thing. He explained that if we were doing it simply to "stop the Communists", we would appear very cynical. There was not one sign of that sort of view in it. He said instead, "We've got a lot of wheat, and we've got some very poor human beings in deep trouble; we have the power to help them and give them some hope in the future. Shall we do it or shan't we?" And the whole room, including some pretty hard-boiled reactionary individuals who had never shown much interest in people of any kind----

F: Not exactly aid advocates?

B: The President turned to each one of them--particularly the ones he expected trouble from--and said, "Do you agree that we should go ahead with this?" He went right around the room and asked each one of them. And the response was unanimous. There was only one question raised and that was, "Why don't we give the wheat as a grant? Why don't we just give it to them?"

The next day he called in about sixty members of the House, including many of the doubters and rebels, and he put on the same performance. It was excellent.

Now, here's what puzzles me. Later, after the program of shipments had begun, he held this food up on many occasions. He took personal charge of many aspects of this program, when he might normally be expected to leave the

details to other officials, such as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Director of A.I.D. Even though he already had the authority to send the wheat and had the arrangements made, he would wait until the last moment before he would personally authorize the wheat shipments. As a result, the Indians found it very hard to maintain a rationing estimate, because they couldn't know what to count on. The American Embassy in New Delhi was in an awful jam, because we couldn't blame LBJ or blame the U.S. Government. Yet we had to explain to India why we weren't giving them wheat, or looked as through we were about not to give it to them. This has always puzzled me; I have never understood why he did it.

F: You never got any clue as to his method here?

B: One thing I think that caused it is that he felt, as I feel very strongly, that you should not help nations that don't help themselves. And I think he properly felt that Indians should modernize their agriculture and do all they could to feed themselves. Actually the Indians were making amazing changes in their agricultural techniques and were more eager to be self-sufficient than anyone. But Johnson was fed some utterly false information from some embittered businessmen who could not persuade the Indian Government to let them set up plants there. And he believed them instead

of those of us who had full access to the facts.

Now, to diverge just a minute. In the fifties, we also sent wheat to India--two or three million tons a year--for the purpose of holding down urban food prices. There's a mild Marxist strain in India, and the "proletariat" of the cities were supposed to be potential trouble-makers. So the Indian government came to us and said, "We've got to curb this worker discontent, and please give us some wheat so we can hold these prices down." This we did. But in holding down price to the consumer, which was good, we held down the incomes of the farmer, which was bad. The farmer had no incentive to produce at all. He had no way to market his surplus production. Therefore, he just raised enough to live on and remained backward. We inadvertently helped to create this situation, from which wrongly emerged the image of the Indian peasant as a hopelessly apathetic person who never tried new things.

Now, my AID director in India, John Lewis, and I and some of my other associates in India, I think to a degree, changed this. As prices started to go up in '64, '65 and '66, the incentive for the farmer went up too. And suddenly this supposed apathetic, dead-to-the-world peasant became interested in seeds and fertilizers and irrigation and all kinds of new things; his mind opened up incredibly. We reported on these changes, but I don't

think LBJ ever really took note of them. I think he persisted in the mistaken belief that the Indians weren't doing their part. This was part of the reason Johnson would wait until the last minute and we'd just barely get the food there in time. The result was that everybody would be panic-stricken; nobody would dare speak for fear that LBJ would become irritated and do something unpredictable; it was pretty rough.

In late 1966 I got a little angry about the reports on India's supposed lack of agricultural progress that I heard LBJ was getting and I cabled to him, "If you don't trust my own estimates with what's going on, you ought to get another Ambassador. In any event, please send out some people whom you know you can trust to see for themselves what is happening."

I received an apologetic reply stressing that it was not a question of lack of faith in the embassy but the need to convince Congress." Three or four Congressmen came out, including Jack Miller or Iowa, Poage of Texas, and several others, and they gave exactly the same report we had. After this there was less difficulty getting the wheat through in 1967. But I don't think LBJ ever quite believed the Indians were doing as well as we knew they were doing, or trying as hard.

The last year I was there is particularly interesting. India had had a very big crop in '67--and '68, too, a hugh crop;--following these two disastrous droughts. When I went back to Washington on consultation I was asked how much wheat India would want from us next year; (they had been taking about ten million tons a year) I said about two million tons. The officials I talked with said, "We've got a hugh wheat surplus building up, the election is coming along--can't we persuade them to take more than that?" I replied, "India doesn't need it." But they said, "Well, can't you get them to take another three million tons?"

So I went back--this was all reversed from the earlier period--and I told the Indian Government, "You can put the additional wheat in storage, you can use it to hold your prices down in the future, you can use it against future emergencies." And finally, after a lot of talk, they agreed, but not at all enthusiastically. I reported this back to the Department of Agriculture and the State Department in July, 1968. Of course, they were very pleased.

Based on the proposed new shipments, the whole rationing system in India was altered. But came October, no wheat! We got more and more panicky. I wrote to Dean Rusk, cabled Orville Freeman and others, pleading with them to realize what we had gotten ourselves into. "We've urged

this wheat on the Indians," I pointed out, "they didn't want it in the first place; but in agreeing to take it from us, they built their rationing system around a certain rate of flow, which is now in jeopardy." They went to the President several times and pleaded with him, I'm sure very hard. They, too, were very upset about it. The Friday before the U.S. election, a group of people, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, went to see LBJ for one last effort. Without explaining why at all he simply said, "No. This is up to whoever wins the election--Humphrey or Nixon. I'm not going to act."

They wrote me disheartened cablegrams that night and we were deeply distressed. Then on Monday came a cablegram from the President saying, "Here's your wheat." Now, why, I don't know. Was LBJ playing games with these people? I don't suppose he changes his mind all that fast. Moreover at the last moment we were so desparate we had said, "well, give us at least a million tons of wheat;" but he came through with the full 2.9 million. Also, at that time he had been holding up the AID money for non-project loans, used to pay for fertilizer, copper, zinc, lead and so on. We said, "At least give us a hundred million dollars to start the fertilizer purchase," all authorized by Congress.

He said no on Friday; but on Monday he said, "here's the whole $225,000,000."

Now, these things leave me completely puzzled. I don't think Dean Rusk understood it either, although I've never talked to Dean about it since. There's a curious combination of idealism and right motivations in LBJ which I've heard him express in brilliant terms, side by side with his unpredictable, difficult attitudes.

F: Did he ever project a trip himself to India after you were there?

B: No, he had been there for one day about in '61 or '62--before I got there.

F: It was in his vice presidential days?

B: Very briefly. I tried to get him to come. At least before the wheat hold up, which created much bitterness among the Indians, he would have had a warm reception. As a matter of fact, I pleaded with him to come.

India was never very sure about our role in Southeast Asia; they were torn badly between two impressions; one a big white nation clobbering little villages and killing brown people which produced a visceral reaction. On the other hand, the possibility that the Chinese would move into Southeast Asia--and where would India be then? These two ideas were both in their minds at the same time. As

a result, while I was in New Delhi there was almost no public reaction to Vietnam in India at all. Mrs. Gandhi said things that nobody in our government liked very much, but they were about the same things the Pope, U Thant and other respected people said. However, Mrs. Gandhi was bitterly blamed by LBJ and also by Rusk. But the Indian people rarely protested about Vietnam. The biggest demonstration they ever put on against me, my associates and the U.S. embassy consisted of only about 150 people. You could hear that thousands and tens of thousands were comong to storm the embassy, and only a handful would show up.

F: They get much more intense about what went on in Karachi.

B: Yes, but now even that doesn't upset them very much. But most of our visitors expected to run into opposition to our role in Southeast Asia. I remember Richard Nixon visited India as a private citizen and said, "How do I answer questions about Vietnam?" I said, "You won't get any." He said, "What do you mean I won't get any? This is the big subject wherever I go." And I said, "Well, it isn't in India," because the Indians, as I say, were sorely torn. They were frightened about our walking away from it, yet they wished we weren't there.

I had regular off-the-record press conferences every couple of weeks. I rarely got a question about Vietnam. I had to bring the subject up myself. There's a latent and very powerful warm feeling in India for the U. S. that we shouldn't forget. A lot of Asians, including Indians, don't like the country "the United States," which they believe is powerful and arrogant, but they like Americans very much. Americans are easy and informal, by and large, and most of them pretty dedicated to what they're doing. And this produces a curious ambivalence.

F: And they have a kind of kinship in experience in breaking off from Mother England.

B: Yes. And this is one of the things that hurts them a good deal. They say, "Of all the people that should understand us, it's you. You were a colonial country, and you took a long time to get over your suspicions of the British." I would tell them the story of Mayor Thompson of Chicago who in the twenties said that he would keep the British out of Lake Michigan if he were elected, and everybody applauded greatly over that. The night before election he went further and said that, "If King George tries to get into Chicago, I'll personally throw him out." And somebody said, "King George III or King George V?" He said, "Good heavens, don't tell me there are two of them!"

This story meant a great deal to the Indians. I said, "This demonstrates that we too took a long time to get accustomed to the British being what they are. We suspected them for generations, much as you Indians are going to suspect the West for generations."

The Indians, I think, were hurt that we didn't understand them better. They said, "We admit that we have a chip on our shoulders and certainly we moralize too much. We're not being logical in all of our reactions, but neither were you." They felt very deeply about this. For two hundred years there were signs that hung on the benches saying "For Europeans Only," and signs outside of restaurants, "No Dogs or Indians Allowed." And there were still clubs when I went to India for the first time that were exclusively white men's clubs. They're all gone now, thank Heaven! But these things hurt them and affected them.

The British loaned us money to build the Erie Canal. Now, if they had insisted on showing us how to build the canal, we'd have thrown them out. The Indians are in that same mood, in fact so is the whole underdeveloped world. You can't go out and buy nations as we've tried to do. Nor can you go out and push people around with armies and tanks. We have to do more to understand what the world is all about and fit into it.

I remember talking to U Nu one time in Rangoon. I told this story to LBJ--he was very interested in it. We were talking about Russia and China, when he said, "Don't worry so much about Communism; that's not your problem." He said, "Your problem is, are you Americans still relevant, and are the Russians relevant? I'm beginning to think neither of you is relevant to the future. You may be like two dinosaurs that are doomed by history, but who look very powerful at the moment. You've gotten too ingrown with all your tortuous problems and antagonisms to each other; your greatest danger will be that you will be so divorced from what's really going on in the world that you won't understand it."

I think this is true to a great extent. We are very well off, very affluent, and as a result, it's impossible for us to understand developing nations and how they feel and how sensitive they are. We find it very difficult to understand the problems of the lower income groups in our own country.

I remember one time when our government was holding up wheat shipments to India--there are a lot of these times that I suffered through--and finally the 2,000,000 tons came through just in time. The Communists took

advantage of this shipment to attack Mrs. Gandhi, saying that she had sold out to the American imperialists, the Wall Street warmongers, and she had been purchased with these 2,000,000 tons of wheat. The next day Mrs. Gandhi sent birthday greeting to Ho Chi Minh. The two incidents were connected. LBJ, of course, went right through the roof and so did Rusk. I received a bunch of cablegrams in the middle of the night saying, "What in the world has gone wrong with your 'clients' out there?" I understood what it was. It was Mrs. Gandhi's effort to illustrate that India was sovereign, that India could not be "bought." She had to do this. Now, until we are sophisticated enough to understand that sort of thing, we're going to be in trouble. The main thing is to get the job done, not try to shape people to our way of thinking but to help them stand on their own feet. As a matter of fact, I think the Indians are closer to us philosophically in matters of ideology than they are to the Russians--far closer.

F: Did you find a tendency in the State Department, except at the Indian desk and so on but over all levels of the State Department, to generalize about Asia rather than break it down into individual countries?

B: Oh, very much. For one thing, take as an example the way the whole bureaucratic structure there is divided. The Asia Bureau does not include India. It starts with the western borders of Burma and goes all the way up through Japan. Bureaucratically, India is in the Near East/S-outh Asia Bureau--along with the Middle East. Well, it really isn't in the Middle East at all, and everything we do should be to help India build a closer relationship to Japan and the nations to the east of her. The British always pushed India west towards the Middle East. The stabilizing force there was the Indian Army, the British Navy and the British diplomacy. Also, all the invasions of India had come from the west through the Khyber Pass. To help turn them around and get them pointed towards Japan, toward such responsibility for the future of Asia and the stability of Asia, had a very high priority with me. But the State Department didn't understand this. Right now, for instance, Joe Sisco, the Assistant Secretary, he's a good person, but I think he has spent only one day in India in his life--is devoting all his time naturally to the Arab-Israeli struggle. India's getting very little attention. Unless India really hits the skids, nobody will pay much attention to it.

F: Here's a big segment of the world's population among other things--

B: When a country as big as that starts to go, it's too late to stop it. It was too late to stop the disintegration of China, for instance, in the '40s. If we'd been able to act in the '30s, it might have been different. But it was impossible for political reasons to act when our help was needed and when it might have been effective. By the time a critical situation hits the front page, it's usually too late to do much.

One test of a nation is whether it can look ahead and plan thoughtfully. It's very difficult to do in a democracy because long range plans often require short term actions which are not understandable to the public and often are unpopular. So the tendency is to put them off, and therefore you fail to develop a long range program. One day Dean Rusk spoke to me of "shaping" our Asian policy. And I said, "We're not shaping our Asian policy; it's accumulating." He asked, "What do you mean?" And I answered, "Well, for example, we have a crisis. Everybody stays up all night and cables are flying in all directions and everybody is exhausted and a few changes made. And then a month later, or a few months later, comes another crisis; again we stay up all night and again a few things are done. And after we've had five crises, we have a policy." But we're kidding ourselves if we think we

shaped it that way. Events, and our reactions to them shape our policies. This is one way the totalitarian nations have some edge on us, because they can ignore public opinion of the moment and act in long terms, and we find it more difficult.

However, there is much we can do to cast our actions in longer-range terms. Woodrow Wilson has been ridiculed for many things--a do-gooder and so on, but Wilson's fourteen points spelled out the objectives of World War I; and they were instrumental in building among the American people a tremendous morale; it also gave the Germans the feeling that their defeat would not mean oblivion. Although we couldn't carry it all out, it fulfilled a very big function. The Germans could have fought for perhaps two more years if it hadn't been for that.

During World War II, outside of the vague "four freedoms" we offered nothing. If we had offered to Europe in those years, to or Germany, a United States of Europe with fifty billion dollars of money contributed to rebuild those cities--something we did anyway- the chance for the Germans to become a free people, and respected, once they got rid of the Nazis, the war might have ended a year or two sooner. But we said, "unconditional surrender," which to the Germans meant oblivion, and they fought all the harder.

I talked to LBJ a lot about this and particularly in reference to Southeast Asia. I said, "In Southeast Asia we need a policy as to where we're going. What are we there for? What are the conditions for us to leave?" I tried to get Kennedy to see this. I pointed out that in Korea we never knew what we wanted there. After Inchon we had no policy. Should we stop at the 38th parallel with our military positions secure; should we go to the narrow "waist" between Wonsan and Pyongyang and dig in there, which we could have done; should we push to the Chinese border or the Yalu River? Or should we attack China? We could have stopped at the thirtieth parallel; our casualties were then about seven thousand dead. Instead we went to Yalu with no thought of where we were going, left the whole thing up to MacArthur--and MacArthur's judgement wasn't very good politically--and we ended up with more than 30 thousand dead. More than twenty thousand of them were killed after we made the decision after Inchon. What I wanted to get across to LBJ and also to Kennedy, was the need to think out immediately in long terms what we wanted in Southeast Asia. Would we settle for a neutralized Southeast Asia? Would we put in money to build up the Red River Valley, as well as the Mekong? What role did we want to play there, and for how long? What would be left behind after our departure?

I never could get this done; and one reason I couldn't get it done was because in a democracy it's damned hard to do those things. We'll probably survive anyway, but it will not be because of this.

I probably wrote LBJ a dozen letters when I was in India, suggesting alternatives in Southeast Asia. I remember one series of letters particularly in which I said that if the government of Vietnam would offer every peasant family fifteen acres of land--this was done in Taiwan, where the offer was ten acres and Japan where it was seven--with simple tools and two bullocks, it could have an enormous effect on the people, who would feel that at last they had a part in the future.

The word came back--I'm sure these weren't LBJ's words, somebody probably did it for him--"The trouble with this is that we don't control much of the countryside. So therefore it's meaningless, and it won't have any effect on anything." In reply I said, "Think of the Emancipation Proclamation. In 1863 it had no effect in Mississippi or Alabama either." It was largely a moral statement or purpose, not carefully worked out, but successful in arousing people both at home and abroad as to what we were fighting for. Now here was the same thing. We could have said, 'This is what you people are fighting for. If we succeed in what we are trying to do, you're going to have fifteen acres of land and a chance to live decently.'"

If Eisenhower had said this in '55 or '56 after the Geneva Conference, in my opinion, there never would have been a war in Vietnam after the French left; its people would have had no need for a war. I tried terribly hard to get these things across; I always felt strongly that we were wrong in being in Vietnam. In 1963 I felt hesitant about going to India because I felt so strongly about this. And once there, I felt that I didn't really have to debate the question because my views were well known. So I simply said, "Don't let's argue about how we got into this mess, let's worry about how to get out of it."

The whole South Vietnam question was a tragedy for President Johnson because, as I said to you earlier before we started this recording, I feel he had a chance to become one of our very great Presidents. I think he wanted more than anything else, based on my visits with him, was to negotiate some kind of way of living together with the Russians, which is a primary problem we all face.

F: If he could have pulled it off, it would have done a lot for the world.

B: If any may could have pulled it off, LBJ could have, because I believe he could have been most effective in negotiating with the Russians. The Glassboro meeting was an eye-opener to everybody. Here was this sudden burst of emotional fervor for a peaceful solution to things, both in Russia and here. I think LBJ sensed this and would

have been very good in moving with it. But he never had the chance. Prague, of course, was a tragedy. But before that, Vietnam. If you look back at his record in domestic affairs, it's quite remarkable. I think that he felt deeply about the racial question and frankly when he was elected, I hadn't thought he would. But I was wrong on that. I think he felt deeply about it and did an awful lot to bring about the improving conditions we have today.

F: Did you know him back in your OPA days?

B: Yes, as a Congressman in 1937.

F: He was the first Congressman to volunteer in World War II, and then was called back when the rest of them were called.

B: He supported the New Deal, and I remember that FDR was enormously pleased at his election. Was he elected to the Senate in '42 or '44?

F: '48. He'd run once in '41 and lost to a squeaker to old "Pappy" O'Daniel, who didn't exactly distinguish Texas.

B: Well, he won by a very narrow margin in '42-'44--I was in Washington--

F: No. In '48 he won by eighty-seven votes for the Senate.

B: Causing the "Landslide Lyndon." I knew him then casually. He was one of the two members of the House from the oil-producing areas that voted to support OPA. The other was Mike Monroney. I always felt indebted for that. In the late '50's when I was in Congress, I knew him but didn't have an awful lot to do with him--saw him from time to time and was always on good terms with him. He frankly surprised me as President. He was much more liberal than I anticipated.

F: As Vice President?

B: Yes, and as President too.

F: You were Under Secretary fo State there in the early days in the Kennedy Administration.

B: That's right.

F: You wouldn't have had much relationship with Mr. Johnson on that, would you?

B: No. I saw him from time to time and tried to get some good staff people assigned to him so that he would be able to depend on people, thoughtful people. I did get one or two people assigned to him. When he took his various trips, we sent people along with him also to help. But he didn't play much of a role then; he stayed in the background as the Vice President usually does, except for Mr. Agnew.

F: He inherited you as Ambassador to India, was there ever any consideration on his part to withdraw, or you to withdraw because you did have a new President, or did this continuity just---?

B: I asked him, naturally, if he wanted me to stay and he said to me very strongly that he did. I stayed there five years under Johnson. I made up my mind I would stay as long as I could be useful. I also had a lot of capital out there in the way of good-will I had built up over the years, which I was fully prepared to use. I think a person's

capital should be spend and not hoarded, and therefore I offered to take on very difficult tasks with the Indian Government.

Like most ambassadors to India, I probably ended up looking as though I was favoring India over every other country--you become sort of an Ambassador of India to the United States. The reason for this, I think, is because understanding of India is so very shallow in the U.S. that any Ambassador, no matter what he thinks, tries to explain it. The Indians are very sensitive, over sensitive. It's all the more pronounced if they feel you look down on them or don't understand them. So an Ambassador to India is constantly trying to convince the President and Congress back at home that it's different than they think it is. LBJ used to kid me about that once in awhile, and I'd say, "Well, you go out there and spend a month and you'll feel the same way I do."

F: You had two tours as Ambassador--once in the latter Truman days. Was there a visible change of policy; in other words, would you compare those two Indias that you saw? The first one was much shorter, of course.

B: Yes, two years only--less than two years. The changes physically were tremendous. Very few Americans today realize the change that has taken place in India economically. India is now a fairly industrialized nation for its people to still---

F: You have had a revolution in a sense.

B: In agriculture a very definite revolution. The changes are quite spectacular. India is very close to being self-sufficient in food, I think within two years, three years at most. It doesn't mean that they'll have all the protein they should have, but it means that they'll have the calories at least. Tea and jute used to be their big exports. Tea and jute have now declined, and yet the exports were up eleven percent last year. Earth-moving machinery, jeeps, generators, railroad cars, locomotives, steel towers, machine tools--things that you'd never associate with India--now this is moving along very rapidly.

F: These are export items.

B: Yes, their main export items. Sold in the Middle East and also in Southeast Asia. Another change, of course, is that people have a lot more confidence now. And--a very explosive matter--they feel much more sure of the promise of their future; therefore, they are going to be much more upset if this promise isn't realized. In 1951, when I first got there, I suppose no more than five percent of the Indian people dreamed that they could someday have a better life. Now ninety-five percent not only dream it, but they demand it and want it tomorrow. The fact that you can't get it tomorrow is one of the great causes of unrest all over the world, and particularly in India.

The biggest problem now is birth control, and the Indians know that. President Johnson understood this; he and I discussed it a good deal. To develop a birth control program is not an easy thing to do. With agriculture, if you get one farmer out of five to use modern methods of farming, you've got a terrific change in your rural area. But if your objective is population control, you've got to get at least eight out of every ten married couples of child-bearing age, or you don't get very far. It's a far bigger task, but they're attacking it with great energy and a lot of money. They have an unlimited budget for family planning and a lot of publicity. There are no significant religious or cultural barriers in the way.

F: There's no feeling that the United States is doing this as a sort of plot to deplete the population?

B: No, Occasionally you get somebody....

F: You get that charge some in Latin America...

B: .....but this is not a factor. I've never heard any political leader of any party oppose birth control in India, which is very unusual. But I don't think they're going to be able to do an adequate job until they get an up-to-date contraceptive. One thing that shocks me is we put ten-fifteen-twenty billion dollars into military research, and last year we put six million dollars only in contraceptive research, of which the government spent only two hundred thousand dollars. If you spent fifty

million to one hundred million dollars in contraceptive research, attracting top scientists, I think you'd solve the technical problems in three or four years. The answer might be an injection. Once you got an injection, there would be a real chance of stabilizing the population. Until then all you can do is keep population from growing quite as fast as it has been. President Johnson, I think, understood this very well and was in favor of what I was trying to do.

F: Did you have any great conflicts with LBJ?

B: Except for the wheat question, I had no real difficulties with him. But I'll tell you one thing that was very disappointing. The war of 1962 between India and China opened up a whole new situation in Asia. It shook up the whole set of relationships. India had kept their military budget low in spite of the fact that Pakistan had built up quite an army, on the assumption that the U.S. would never let Pakistan attack them. Since 1954 we had told them we never would allow them to. Every U.S. Ambassador--Allen, Cooper, Bunker, Galbraith and I--had assured them of this. I don't know why I was foolish enough to do so. And so when the attack came, they were spending a little less than one and one-half percent of their GNP on military. They were very poorly equipped--old World War II equipment. And, as a result, the Chinese Army ran rings around them. We had every reason to move in as we

did to help India against China, and in doing that we won an enormous lot of goodwill.

Then, however, India decided they had to modernize their military, and they came to us for help. The Pentagon and some people in the State Department were reluctant to give them anything because they felt that this would upset the Pakistani--we had a large military base at Peshawar and it was supposed to be terribly important to our future security, although I've always had my doubts about that. There are other places where we could have gotten the same formation. But anyway this was the gambit that was used when military aid to India was discussed.

When I left Washington for New Delhi under Kennedy's instructions in the spring of '63, he said, "Find out how serious the Indians are about this. I'm inclined to agree with you that we should go ahead with one hundred million dollars of some of our military equipment, but find out and make it top priority." Once in India, I explored, discussed and negotiated. By early November the Indians were prepared to say that they would buy no further equipment from the Communist nations, meaning the Soviets and the eastern bloc, and that they would try to negotiate

a ceiling with the Pakistani that neither side would spend above a certain amount, and they would otherwise cooperate with us if the Chinese ever attacked Southeast Asia. Although they said they couldn't participate directly, they'd help wherever they could.

I went back and almost triumphantly reported this to Kennedy, and he was very pleased. I think our assistance program would have gone through in about two or three days. But just before a meeting on it was to be held, Kennedy was assassinated. I hoped LBJ would go right along with the whole thing; it was all set up; McGeorge Bundy knew all about it, so did Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk. Instead, Johnson insisted that he must personally review the situation.

I then asked General Maxwell Taylor out to India, whom I knew President knew well, to make his own study. He came in early December and made a report similar to mine--that by putting in one hundred million dollars or less a year for five years the U.S. could help build up an Indian army perfectly capable of keeping China out of India, and also bring India closer to us. By April 1964, I had the whole proposal almost back on the tracks again. In May we had the key negotiations between the Pentagon and State Department and the Indians, and by mid-May our government decided to go ahead again. I felt satisfied

that I'd won a victory. The meeting to approve the program was set for President Johnson's office on a Thursday. But Nehru died on Wednesday, the second death of a key man in six months--and again the decision was postponed.

I returned to India for the funeral accompanied by Dean Rusk and a few others. Before we left, Mac Bundy and others told me that they felt the program was ready to go through, and if I would persuade Rusk, and if they could persuade McNamara, who was remaining in Washington, they could have the cable in my hands when I arrived in India so I could give to the new government the assurance we were solidly behind them. Dean wouldn't even talk about it; he knew what I wanted and he ducked it. And apparently they couldn't get Bob McNamara to go along without Rusk. So the White House said, "We'll wait until the dust settles. Let's see what this new government is like." I replied, "when the dust settles, you'll find India in Moscow buying everything there."

By August this was just what had happened. I don't think it was really Johnson's fault; he was ill-advised. Today, of course, the Soviets are providing India with whatever military equipment it has. Actually India is producing fifty-five percent of its own equipment now, which is a good thing. That's the best answer. What

we ought to do is not to give the Indians or Pakistan arms, but help them to build factories to take care of their own needs with no obligations to or dependence on a foreign power.

F: When the Soviets give military aid like that, do they send along technicians? Is this just part of the package?

B: Yes, they have sent a great number of technicians--I imagine there are two thousand of them in India now. India has missile defenses around its cities, which, originally I am sure, the Soviets had a lot to do with. The Indians have a small group of submarines, four, five, or six, which the Russians work on. And complicated machinery such as the Mig-21s. They're actually building the Migs now in India. They would have preferred to build F-5's with our help. And Canada had a surplus F-5 plant that we could have turned to use for India, the Indians would have leaped at it. They didn't want to deal with Russia. But when the U.S. failed to come through, the Russians offered them the Mig plants on a favorable basis and they had no alternative.

F: At a sensitive diplomatic post like New Delhi, do vou and the Russians get together?

B: You can't, really. I tried very hard and there were two Russian Ambassadors there during my last assignment who were perfectly congenial people. When I first went to India in 1952, the Soviet Ambassadors wouldn't even speak to me. On one occasion I told a reporter that I was going over to speak to the Russian Ambassador and

to see if he couldn't get a good picture of us together. I walked over to the Ambassador with outstretched hand, and as I anticipated he turned his back on me in '52. When I came back in '63, it was different. They were friendly on the surface, but you couldn't talk about any substantive matter. They were nervous, fearful and inhibited. I remember one time, about four or five years ago--in '64, I guess--I was having lunch with the Soviet Ambassador alone in my garden, and I said off the top of my head, "China will fall apart someday. It may not be able to solve its food problems; or its fertilizer problems; it's trying to do too many things at once. Even the Chinese, who are tough people, can't carry the load indefinitely. When this occurs, are you Russians going to move into Manchuria? If so, Chiang Kai-shek will try to move into the coastal areas opposite Formosa. Would it be wise for us to agree to some program in advance, some plan to prevent chaos in China and hopefully end up with a benevolent China we can all live with? Could we start cooperating with you on this?"

He looked absolutely aghast. I'm sure he reported to his government that afternoon that a trial balloon was shot up by the American Ambassador to New Delhi. They wouldn't believe an Ambassador would talk about such things without specific instructions from his government.

F: There's no such thing as a casual conversation?

B: Oh, no. I tried to encourage our young people to see their young people, and we made some progress on that. But they play a tough game out there--although friendly on the surface. I have a feeling that they have two policies operating in opposite directions at the same time, one an old cold war policy which calls on them to do all kinds of mean things--they forged my name to letters fourteen times in one year--

F: Oh, really?

B: Yes, At the same time, they move in the opposite direction, "Let's get along with the Americans and if possible, find some means to work with them." There are probably different groups within the Soviet government that operate on these different tangents. Just as often, I must admit, do ourselves.

F: Well, I would gather also they've got the same bureaucratic problems we have, sometimes of one group not knowing what the other one is doing.

B: Absolutely. For instance, they used to put out some awful stuff on the radio about American "evil intentions" in India, spreading disease and so on--incredible stuff! I used to complain to the Russian Ambassador--I would give him transcripts of the broadcasts--and he would look quite embarassed. He practically told me one day, "This is the KGB, not me...you know, we can't control all of these things." I think this probably was true.

Once the Soviet Ambassador told me, "That's a private radio station anyway; we have nothing to do with it." I said, "Really?" And he said, "Oh, yes, it's private." So I wrote a letter to the manager of this radio station saying, "I understand you're a private corporation operating in India. Your Ambassador here assures me that the Soviet government doesn't have anything to do with this; therefore, I appeal to you personally to stop all of this anti-U.S. nonsense over your station." I mailed the letter, and when the Ambassador saw me at a party a little bit later, he said, "That was a good letter you wrote." He laughed about it. He knew perfectly well that it was a game.

F: Did they try to make propaganda value out of the Vietnam situation in India, or did they pretty well recognize what you've said earlier that the Indians didn't look on that as a matter of crucial concern?

B: They tried to some degree, but it wasn't a high priority for them.

F: It wasn't any serious irritant in your life?

B: No, the Communists in India--speaking of the "Communists" and "Russians" as being synonymous actually is wrong, because there are all kinds of Communists today, and to use the word too generally I think is dangerous--but there was a parade on May Day, 1966, and a very good friend of mine watched on the street corner. He took count of all the banners that went by and all the placards, and ninety-four percent of the placards had nothing to do with India at all. "Get the Americans out of the South Indian Ocean," "Down with Imperialism," "Down with Wall Street," "Throw the Yankees and other Barbarians out of Southeast Asia," all issues that mean nothing to the average Indian. The average Indian citizen or farmer wouldn't know what they were talking about. Only six percent of the signs had any relevance to India.

To expand a little on my remark about there being all kinds of Communists in India, there was a wing of the Communist Party that was an instrument of the Soviet Union; that is, the Soviet wing. There's another wing now that's called the China wing, which is closer to Mao. The third group is the so-called Naxabaria, who are even to the left of Mao. They are named after a town up in the Bengal where the peasants took over the land, goaded on by a group of people who were obviously educated in China to Mao Tse-tung's methods. Thus, the Communist party in India is split three ways, with the Soviet branchs relatively stable, much more so than the others. They, I think, would like to work with Mrs. Gandhi if they can; I hope she's not foolish enough to try. She may think she can handle them, and they'll think they can handle her. I don't know who will turn out to be right, but it wouldn't be good for India.

F: Did you have to shift policy during that period following Nehru's death? There was a lot of confusion before India finally settled back down.

B: Well, I knew Nehru very well in the early 1950's and saw a great deal of him. He was a remarkable human being who was much misunderstood and unappreciated in the West. He was right, very right, on many things to do with Asia.

For instance, he would not sign the Japanese Treaty in 1951 or '52, because, as he said, "You've made the mistake of making as part of the treaty an arms agreement with the Japanese government, and you'll live to regret that. What you should do is sign a treaty with Japan, setting it up as an independent power, and next day negotiate with that soviereign power a military agreement so they can never say that you forced this down their throat." Well, he was right, we're facing the problem now.

He saw the whole crisis coming in South Vietnam. He knew the French couldn't win; he prophesized Dien Bien Phu; he feared that the Chinese would come into the war. He also saw that Stalin would have to choose between educating his people to become a technologically advanced nation, recognizing that educated people may ask unpleasant and difficult questions, or controlling them tightly, in which case he would not have a modern nation but a very backward one. And he said in '52, "I think that Stalin has undoubtedly decided to opt for an educated nation," and he was right. It took us some years to see this.

Shastri was also an extraordinary man. He was a little like Harry Truman. I divide Indian leaders into two groups: One group I call the Adamses and the other is the

Jacksonians. The Adamses are people educated in the U. K. or the U. S., therefore very anxious to prove to the Indians that they're not pro-American or pro-West and they go overboard the other way to prove they're not. They have one foot in Asia and one foot in Europe; charming, attractive and bright people, but they're not thoroughly Indian or deeply Indian. Now Shastri was a Jacksonian; his roots were in India. He'd never been out of India until after he became Prime Minister. And there are a lot of those. I have much more faith in that type person for the future.

One incident involving LBJ caused us to lose a lot of ground. Again, I don't know how it happened. I was anxious to get Shastri to come to the United States for a visit, and everybody finally agreed it was a good idea. He wanted to come in October, 1965, and LBJ wanted him to come in May. I tried to get him to shift and he said it would be inconvenient because the Parliament would be in session, but he finally agreed after a lot of talk to come in May. Meanwhile, Ayub Khan of Pakistan had been invited for about the same time--out of our mistaken notion that India and Pakistan must always be bracketed.

I was sitting in my office one day, and a person came in and handed me a bulletin from the radio station in Pakistan, announcing that the Ayub Khan visit was to be postponed, and Shastri's as well. I thought it was a mistake, so I called home saying, "What in the world is this?" --This was about six days before Shastri's visit--The answer came

back, "this means what it says; that the President is very tired and is overladen and feels he has too many obligations and can't carry them out; and we're sorry to impose his problem on you; we know it's very great, but nevertheless that's all we can do."

That night I had a perfectly horrible talk with Shastri, who was deeply hurt; he was a sensitive man; he felt he had been insulted. My wife had worked very hard to get Shastri's wife to go with him, and she had agreed to go. Shastri was hurt and very bitter, and I had to work awfully hard to restore his confidence.

What I hear happened, although I can't vouch for this, is that LBJ in April sometime said, "I've got too many things on my plate, and we've gotta chop a few things off," and told the State Department to cancel these two visits or postpone them. They were as startled as I was and wanted to talk him out of it. Rusk was away at the time and he cabled back, "Wait until I get back to Washington; I want to talk to the President." When he got back, he was unable to get the President to change his mind. But by this time it was so late that when the President remained adamant, I was given no time at all to make adjustments. Now, if I had had a week I could have gone to Shastri

and said, "You remember you wanted to come in October, and we wanted you to come in May. We've now had second thoughts, and I've advised the President that we should agree to October because you'll have more leisure." And Shastri would have been greatly relieved and pleased. But, as it was, the announcement came from the Pakistan radio, and it couldn't have been worse.

One of the things that troubled me about President Johnson was that these things didn't seem to trouble him at all. He would just say, "Well, we're giving them all of this money, why should they get so angry at us?" Which again is an attitude that is so deep in our country; and it's very wrong.

F: No real feeling for the sensitivity of a leader like that.

B: No. It goes back, as I said and you mentioned before, that this is all charity being handed out to these people from the goodness of our hearts. I think all of you can get out of aid is an independent nation ready to stand on its own feet and defend its own interests, not tied to anybody probably. You take France. In 1946 France was a shambles, chaotic--I visited France then. The Communist Party was very strong, and the government looked as though it was going to come apart. The Marshall Plan aid saved the day and put the country on its feet. Later we ended up with deGaulle, who intensely disliked America.

Does this mean we were wrong in helping to build up France? Of course it doesn't. I'd far rather build up France and end up with deGaulle, but with a solid France. DeGaulles aren't immortal.

F: You forget what the alternatives might have been.

B: Just give me an independent India, with one-seventh of mankind, reasonably democratic, reasonably open minded---

F: Ornery....

B: Yes, they can be just as ornery as they want to be; that's unimportant. But we're not that sophisticated yet, and maybe it's too late now.

F: Did the assassination of Kennedy give you any great problem in India, or was this just accepted....

B: Oh, everybody was terribly shocked. I wasn't there at the time; I was back home on consultation. My deputy, Jerry Greene, who is a very able man, in my absence arranged the ceremonies. There was a huge turnout in front of the Embassy--thousands and thousands of people. The whole Indian Parliament turned out--everybody--the whole Cabinet.

You go into the most remote villages of India and you'll still find pictures of Kennedy; it's just unbelievable--way, way in the back woods--pictures of Gandhi and Kennedy. Now, the only explanation I have of this tremendous hold Kennedy had was that he was young, and it looked to be the young generation taking over, and people identified themselves with this breakthrough of a new generation. I think

Kennedy had a little more understanding of India, but not an awful lot more. But he was certainly revered all throughout that part of the world, as he was in Europe too.

F: When you went back you had no great problem though, as I've had in Latin America, of explaining that Johnson didn't plot the assassination? There's no great conspiracy feeling?

B: No. Oh, crackpots, the extreme left, an article or two in the press, but no general belief in it...

F: Of course, India had gone through this same thing.

B: Yes, this is true. But when Martin Luther King died, this had a horrible effect; and when Bob Kennedy died...we had so damned many of these ceremonies in commemorating the loss of these men--

F: You weren't running an embassy; you were running a memorial service over there.

B: When Bob Kennedy died I felt we -- Indians and Americans alike--had had all the emotion we could absorb. We simply placed a book there in the embassy for people to sign. These deaths hurt America greatly. We appeared violent; Indians see our movies and our television sometimes; and this makes them feel we're violent people. But I think generally Americans are well liked in India and individually popular, I would say more so than the Russians; the Russians, contrary to all the theories, do not speak ten

languages each and prefer sleeping on the ground. On the contrary, they think India is full of hardships, which never particularly troubled me. Very few of them speak English or Hindi, and most of them don't like it there. It's hot and dusty, and they don't bring their families because they believe there are health dangers--which they grossly exaggerate. America had every advantage in the world in India, and we probably still have, if we'll only grasp them. I'm somewhat discouraged at the moment about our ability to do this.

F: Were you pretty free to go wherever you wanted to, to--?

B: Absolutely. Nor was I ever threatened at the time I was in India, I wasn't mistreated, I wouldn't hesitate to go anywhere at night. I felt that I could walk through the slums of Delhi in the middle of the night without the slightest fear; I wouldn't do that in New York or Washington. During my first tour one of my daughters, who was sixteen years old, worked in a hospital every day after school on the other side of Delhi. She had to bicycle back at nine o'clock at night through the whole city of old Delhi; it never occurred to me that this was dangerous for her. I was threatened once by some college students in Calcutta in a mild sort of way, but I opened up a dialogue with them and ended up debating with them; and before we got through, they were laughing and relaxed.

F: Is Communism to a great extent sort of an intellectual Marxism, or is it pretty pragmatic now?

B: Well, I think the Soviet wing is just whatever the Soviet Union wants it to be. But they've got their problems, because if they campaign as Communists, bringing fire and destruction and revolution, they don't get elected; the people don't want that. They're mild and moderate, most of them, and they don't like that. There are some riots, but the people generally dislike violence. And so in order to get elected, the Communists have to appear as very moderate and say, "We're living under the Constitution, we'll serve the people and serve them better, but there'll be no more graft, there'll be no more corruption." But once they get in, the hard core which has worked to put them in, says, "Now comes the time for Lenin and the terror." And of course the people who got elected are by that time very sobered by the process. They say, "Well now wait a minute: we'll lose everythingwe've gained," whereupon the hard core go off the handle; you've got this built-in difference between those who believe at least in the first stages they must work within the democratic system and those that don't.

You see, Marxism doesn't fit Asia. I never get tired of saying this to the Indians, indeed all the Asians that I talk to. In his Manifesto, Marx devoted one sentence to

agriculture; and it just made no sense. He saw the urban slums; he did not see the rural slums. Yet, agriculture is the base of every economy. This is becoming apparent to people, and it makes Marx a little out of date. I wrote a column in India for an Embassy publication, which has 400,000 circulation, and which was then syndicated to every paper in India--we got a big circulation on it. I would say Marx and Jefferson are both out of date, and this was the sort of thing that would make them listen to you, by coupling America with the problem. Marx could only see the cities, and Jefferson could only see the country. Things turned out to be very different than either of these views. Blindly following Marxism must be a silly as blindly following Jefferson, much as we may revere him as a person.

F: A necessary part of our lives at one time maybe. Were you involved in the rerouting of Stalin's daughter?

B: Oh, very much involved.

F: Do you want to tell me about that?

B: Yes. It's quite a story. In the first place, we didn't know she was in India. This idea of this great intelligence network of ours, this idea that we knew what was going on, was nonsense; we didn't even know she was there. The only

Americans who had any contact with her were two young Peace Corps volunteers who lived in the same village with her. They mentioned this "very attractive European lady", as they called her.

F: They didn't know who she was?

B: They had no idea who she was. The first thing I knew was--when I was in bed with a brief case of flu--my assistant called and said he and two or three of my associates wanted to come to see me about something. They came at seven o'clock p.m. and said that a person describing herself as Stalin's daughter had just arrived at the Embassy, with a Russian passport in good order, and "what should we do about it?" The first thing I said was, "I don't think Stalin has a daughter." And one who was a specialist on the U.S.S.R. said, "Oh, yes he has."

I then said, "Let's take some time to think this through." I suggested they put her in my office with a yellow pad on the desk and have her write down for us who she is, and what she wants to do, which would give us time to consider the alternatives. In the next hours she put together a very eloquent sixteen-to eighteen page statement in excellent English, a dramatic story of her life and who her father was and her mother, and why she wanted to leave Russia and come to America.

We then tried to figure out what to do. I put down three possibilities on a yellow pad: One, send her home; we're trying to get along better with Russia; this is a delicate period; this will upset the Russians; tell her just to go away. I didn't see how we could do that.

Two, give her asylum officially which will mean she stays in the American Embassy, which will be surrounded by policy and reporters and television cameras=-with a great public uproar, while the case is taken to the Indian courts. The Indian courts are as basically independent as our courts. Regardless of what the Indian government wanted them to do, they would, I believe, insure her right to leave the country and go where she wished. But this would upset the Russians even more against us, because it would be so well publicized and we , or rather she, would win the case.

Third, get her out of the country as fast and quietly as possible and then figure out what to do later. I asked, "When does the next plane leave India?" My aides said, "for where?" And I said, "Tehran, Bangkok, Juala, Lumpur, Singapore, Paris, London, anywhere but Moscow." And they said, "Well, there's a Quantas plane at one a.m." It was by then about nine p.m. I said, "Get a couple of tickets on it," so they did. I assigned a young officer, a Russian speaking officer, to her, although she really didn't need an interpreter because she spoke such good

English. I then sent a cable to the State Department and the White House--

F: This was their first knowledge?

B: Yes. At about nine o'clock p.m. in India, eleven in the morning Washington time. I said, "I have a person here who states she's Stalin's daughter, and we believe she's genuine; unless you instruct me to the contrary, I'm putting her on the one a.m. plane for Rome where we can stop and think the thing through. I'm not giving her any commitment that she can come to the States. I'm only enabling her to leave India, and we will see her to some part of the world--the U.S. or somewhere else--where she can settle in peace. If you disagree with this, let me know before midnight." No comment ever came from Washington. This is one advantage that non-career Ambassadors have; they can go ahead and do unorthodox things without anybody objecting, where a foreign service officer might not dare do it.

We talked to her and said, "Point number one--are you really sure that you want to leave home? You've got a daughter and a son there, and this is a big step to take. Have you really thought it through? You could go back to the Russian Embassy right now, (she was staying there in their dormitory) "and simply go to sleep and forget it,

and get up Wednesday morning and on to Moscow, as your schedule calls for."

She immediately said, "If this is your decision, I shall go to the press tonight; and announce that (a) democratic India will not take me (they had turned her down prior to her coming) and (b), now democratic America refuses to take me."

F: That was pretty good blackmail.

B: Well, she didn't need to do it; I was just trying it on for size to be sure she had thought it through. But she was very quick on this. In reply to the second possibility--asylum in our embassy--the publicity would have been great, the Russians would have blamed the Indians, and the Indians would have blamed us, and we'd have all been at swords' points; I think the Russians would have been much more badly hurt. So we gave her fifteen hundred dollars so she'd have money, which by the way, she returned to me within three weeks.

F: You had no problem getting her to agree to go?

B: No, oh no, she was eager. I told her, "I can't imagine that you're going to America; we can only guarantee that we will see you out of India to some place where you can live. It may be America, and if not, Denmark, Australia or Sweden or some other place where you will be welcome,

we'll see you to a safe place and see you established there."

F: This was where she wanted to come?

B: Yes, she wanted to come to America. So when she got to Rome, the government blew up immediately, and said they didn't want to have war with Russia over Svetlana Alliluyeva; and they wouldn't let her stay. We had an awful time getting a delay for even three or four days. We tried to get her into Switzerland, but the Swiss at first refused for the same reason. Finally, at the very last minute we decided she had to go on to Washington at once. There was no alternative. The Washington plane had actually been called for boarding when the word came through that the Swiss would take her temporarily. So my young man took her to France, chartered a plane and took her to Geneva and she stayed there three months. And I suggested to George Kennan by mail that he go over there and see her and talk with her. I knew she had this book she had written--she had showed it to us. And I said, "She must not be allowed to fall into bad hands among people who will take advantage of her; she's a charming person."

F: Kennan didn't know her?

B: Knew of her. I don't think he'd ever actually met her. And Kennan did this and introduced her to the peace and quiet of Princeton, New Jersey. I ate lunch with her there a week ago yesterday. She came up here about three weeks ago; I see her about three or four times a year. She's a good friend of ours now.

F: She's reasonably satisfied with her choice?

B: Oh, yes, she's very happy with it. She feels badly about her children, but--. May be it's a rationalization, but this is what she says: "I knew you had a freedom of speech in the United States, but when I see it in India--a poor country where they debate subjects and I can pick up any newspaper and read all kinds of different viewpoints and listen to debates in Parliament--you can't believe what a shock this is to a person like myself. To find democracy even in India which has so many problems, is deeply heartening. I can't go back because if I should go back, I'm already a member of a group of literary people who are criticized by the government anyway, I would write things, then I'd violate the rules, I will write things that will circulate throughout Russia and it will be known and I will be in great difficulties. How will my children be any happier or secure? If I'm there constantly reminding

them of my presence and trouble with the government, or if I'm far away somewhere else?" This may to some degree be a rationalization, but she felt that in America she could say what she wished and her children would not be responsible for it.

Of course, the Soviets tried very hard to get the children to turn on her. KGB put together a half hour television show with her children denouncing their mother for being mentally ill and all kinds of nonsense. One network, which should perhaps be left unmentioned, was about to put this on the air when one or two of us heard about it. We called them and said, "For God's sake, this is a pure KGB film, drop it quickly." And they cancelled it.

Svetlana is quite a person. I tried to get her to act as more of a bridge between Russia and America; I said, "We've got plenty of people trying to burn bridges, let's get a few trying to build them. If you could describe in another book what Russian youth have in common with American youth, and the common desires and hopes for the future--what you hope for your children in the future--you could play a brilliant role here. It could have a terrific impact." But she's in no mood to write that book now. She's very bitter about the Soviets.

And if you try to say, "They're trying to modernize, they're trying to ease things a little bit, trying to let some of the steam out of the boiler," she'll just say, "Nonsense!"

F: She hadn't come to India expecting to stay though?

B: No, she expected to return to Russia in two weeks, but she went to this little village in the United Provinces where her husband had lived, and this family was very warm-hearted and took her in immediately; and she lived there in completely new surroundings. She told me that she read a book of mine there that was in the library about Gandhi and this had a deep effect on her. So she told me, perhaps just to flatter me, that it was the first time she had thought about a whole lot of things. We like her very much, and I think she's quite happy here.

F: Princeton accepts her--no problems there?

B: Oh, yes. She's still sensitive to the fact that she's Stalin's daughter, and she's constantly imagining rebuffs. She says, "People think that because my father was a monster, I must be a little monster myself." But I have told her, "This isn't true; these people are thoughtfully trying to avoid embarrassing you and taking your time. They think you want to be alone and this is a tribute to you and you should see it that way." Actually, she already has many friends.

F: You never had any real problem in India then once you got her on the plane?

B: Yes, I did. The Indian Government--. Well, in the first place, the Russian government hit the Indian government very hard and said if we'd---

F: They undoubtedly suspected collusion?

B: Oh, yes -- because in their country you couldn't possibly get out of the airport without the government knowing it. And they assumed that the Indian government must have been in cahoots with us or she never could have gotten through the airport. Actually, she sat in the airport for two hours; the plane was late starting. But the Soviets were completely convinced the Indians were in this with us. It was, of course, said to be a CIA gesture and effort. The Indians wrote me a very sharp aide-memoir (memorandum), using some pretty strong language, under pressure from the Russians. And I said, "Please don't hand me this because if you do, I will have to write a sharp reply saying that democratic India wouldn't take her and wouldn't give her freedom and opportunity and so we had no choice but to help her ourselves. I can write just as sharp an aide-memoir as you can, and I promise you I'll do it. Why don't you just withdraw this official statement which will help no one?" So after bickering about it for a day, they withdrew it.

Later I kidded the Soviet Ambassador, saying, "You should thank me from the bottom of your heart; I saved you from an awful mess, because you would have forced this into an Indian court, where you would have lost. It would all have been well-publicized, the whole world would be watching this court case, and you would then be in real trouble." He smiled, and didn't exactly thank me, but I think he got the point.

We had occasional defectors coming through. There's evidence of a new spirit among the people in Russia. Svetlana Alliluyeva thinks change will come from the younger members of the Communist Party who are growing up in a different world. She thinks it'll take alot of time but eventually it will happen. I hope she's right.

F: Did the Kashmir problem give you a good bit of concern?

B: Well, it did, yes. In the first place, the problem was never understood. As you know, when the British left India broke into two parts, and the princely states were allowed to go as they wished, provided they joined a country with a continuous border. In an analogy to the U.S., Kansas couldn't decide to go with Mexico, for instance. Kashmir had a border on both nations; it had a Hindu maharajah, and the Muslim leader, Sheik Abdullah, who had been very friendly to Nehru. The maharajah wanted most of

all to win some kind of automony like Nepal, Sikhin or Bhutan. And so he stalled when the closing day came by which time he was supposed to have made up his mind. The Pakistani in an effort to force his hand sent in Pakistan guerrillas who had no trouble pushing aside the maharajah's police force, and almost reaching Shrinigar, the capital.

At that point the maharajah lost his nerve totally and cabled Lord Mountbatten, then governor general, that he had decided to go with India. The Indians troops immediately and just barely saved the airport and held on. They then took the case to the U.N. People always think Pakistan put it before the U.N. but India brought it there. The Indian army probably in a week's time could have driven Pakistan out.

The difficulty is that the Pakistani always presented the case as a Muslim versus Hindu situation. "The people of Kashmir", they say, "are largely Muslim, therefore, they belong with Pakistan." The Indians looked at it as a test of their secular state. There are sixty million Muslims in India, and if the two million Kashmir Muslims belong to Pakistan because they're Muslims, where do the other sixty million Muslims go?

Also, after Pakistan attacked twice, which created deep feelings in India, President Johnson one time asked me, "Why in the world don't they have a plebiscite, just decide

it that way?" I replied, "Let me ask you a question. Suppose an American President about 1875 recieved a letter from the President of Mexico saying, 'We'd like to have a plebicite in Texas, to see whether it wants to come back to Mexico or remain as part of the United States.' If you were President of the United States, what would you do?" "I would think he was out of his mind," LBJ replied.

Well, Mrs. Gandhi is in exactly the same position. Any Indian government that gave Kashmir back to Pakistan would be out in two minutes. Now, there's comparatively little agitation about it. I think eventually there may be an agreement or kind of semi-autonomy for Kashmir like Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S. That's the best hope. But right now Pakistan needs the issue as a lever to hold the country together, and the Indians can't move because they're caught in kind of a political vise.

F: Because of the old camel driver incident, the Ayub Khan business to the ranch and so forth, did the Indians regard Johnson as more pro-Pakistani than---

B: They believe most Americans are. The Pakistani are very able people; they're good people. Most of their leaders act more like Westerners than almost anybody in Asia. Here's Ayub Khan with his British Army methods speaking excellent English, arguing with his western counterparts whether you ought to put an olive or an onion in a martini.

And our people say, "Well, there's one Asian I understand; he speaks my language."

F: He could have come off Madison Avenue nearly.

B: Well, sure. He's a brown Englishman. And Indians are not that way quite so much. though some are. Also they played the Peshawar base issue very hard. The base had a function a few years ago, though I doubt it has had much function the last two or three years, and we were prepared to do almost anything for Pakistan to maintain that base. I argued with President Johnson and others that we were paying a terrible price for these satellites of ours. They are in fact setting our policies. The more we gave, the more they demanded of us. After the war between Pakistan and India ended, we almost restored all the damaged U.S. tanks that the Indians blew up. We were on the verge several times of even replacing those tanks which had been destroyed. This, I thought, would be absolutely outrageous. Make one mistake, if you will, bud don't make it twice.

F: In August of '66 you made an offer to provide India with radios.

B: Oh, yes.

F: That fell through.

B: Yes, it did. And it was a good idea too. They were talking about television, and I said, "That will take many years and you've got to move faster than that; why not build a lot of small transistor sets and set up a radio station for each of your three hundred distrincts, a million and a half people each, and broadcast in the local dialect or language."

F: They don't have that?

B: They've got some big stations. You can get radio all over India, but you can't get much television. I suggested that an intense radio network of this kind would make the people of that area feel closer together. The stations could put on weddings, send people out with microphones and recording sets, talk about the crop conditions, broadcast debates about current events. There might be, in effect, three levers; one lever for local programs; secondly, the state lever, and third, the national lever . You could hear broadcasts on each basis. Well, Mrs. Gandhi thought it was a great idea. But at that point it got in the papers, and the Communist Party was operating with its usual skill in trying to take over the communication system of India. This was "an American plot." So it was put aside, I thought very wrongly. I think it may be revised in time. Of course, television is the ultimate answer, but television takes a long time and costs a lot more money. They should move on along in the meantime with this localized radio.

F: Did you get the feeling that the Johnson Administration didn't pay enough attention to India?

B: I did very definitely. Half the people of the Johnson Administration who were in a position to make policy had never been to India. Two or three of them came for furnerals while I was there but that's about all.

F: You don't learn much at a funeral.

B: Until I got to India, the average number of visiting Congressmen per year was seven. One year we got thirty-two. The average while I was there was probably twelve. Most of them stayed three days. And this was just enough to confuse them. They'd see things they didn't expect to see, changes they hadn't anticipated, and they felt unsettled about it. But it's the same way with this new Nixon Administration; very few people get out there. India is far away and strange, it's leaders are sometime difficult. Of course, the more difficult we think they are, the more difficult they'll be. In India we are dealing with a culture rather similar in its nationalism to Andrew Jackson's America in its early nationalistic days. If they think you like them and generally approve of them, you can argue with them, criticize the, question them, even abuse them, and they'll take it in their stride, because they know you're a friend. But they've got to first know you're a friend.

The Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration have ignored a major nation which I think is going to have in the future a very big impact on the world. I'm not at all sure what will happen to India politically; it is having political difficulties. But its

economy is gaining rapidly. But I was never able to persuade the White House and State Department of its key importance. I had a few friends who saw it, but not a lot of people.

F: Was Dean Rusk fairly approachable on the subject of India, or did he have these rigid ideas too?

B: No, he held rigid ideas. He was in Asia during the war and saw it then. I spent a month there with him in the '50's when he was president of the Rockefeller Foundation and for a while I thought he understood pretty well, but he didn't have the broad view. He didn't see the whole. He saw only the present problems, although he saw those very clearly--in an emergency or crisis, he was an extraordinarily able man. But for the long range--where is Europe going, where is Asia going, what's our relationship to them, how can we get India together with Japan more and bring the two together--these things he would appear not to be interested in.

F: Now, you had a relationship along two lines with John Kenneth Galbraith; one, as Under Secretary of State, he was in a sense a representative of yours and then you were his successor also. Did that pose any problem, did he leave you any problems other than---?

B: Well, Kenneth is quite an extraordinary person. I knew him first in OPA because he was the first Deputy Price Administrator, and he persuaded me against my judgement to go to Washington to work for OPA. He left shortly thereafter. So we had a long acquaintanceship, never intimately. But I was delighted when he went to India, because he's an economist and I thought he would help a lot on development; he's an agricultural economist basically. I think he spent less time on agricultural economics than he did on politics which he's very interested in. He got along well with Nehru and I think he did well. Ellsworth Bunker did a wonderful job out there, and Sherman Cooper also was a success. We're very lucky with the people we've had there, because it's a place where an individual can have quite a lot of impact personally. They'll listen to you if they like you and if they think you like them.

F: Does having a woman leader pose any particular problems?

B: I don't think so. I knew Indira Gandhi very well and saw a great deal of her as a friend. When she became Prime Minister she changed and everything became very formal overnight, suddenly she was very hard to talk to. When I went to see her and talk with her, there would often be silences. Once or twice I remember saying to myself, "Well, I'm not going to break this silence; she's going to have to break it." I'd sit there for three minutes and there would be stone silence, and I'd finally capitulate and ask her a question. But I'm sure I could go back now and see her on a

quite different basis, much more relaxed. She's very smart, knows very little about economics, but she's very shrewd politically.

F: Was there any foreshading of any essential changes in that brief period you served Nixon?

B: No, I don't think so. Nixon was out there twice and, curiously enough, he got along there quite well. I think he understands the AID program better than people think; but I doubt that he will do much about it, which is tragic. You see, if we stop now, and there's a damned good chance we will stop, the whole "Green Revolution," which is moving India rapidly towards self sufficiency in food and wheat, based to a large extent on American fertilizer provided by the AID program is going to slow down. It would be tragic if we pull out now. If we could maintain an adequate aid program there for five years, even four years, I think it would go far towards assuring India's success. But I just don't know if we are going to do it.

F: How would you sum up briefly President Johnson?

B: That's a big order; he is a complex man. But I would say that his record on domestic legislation was extraordinary; his handling of world affairs very limited; his involvement in Vietnam tragic and costly to him, to us, and to Asia and to the world. More precise analyses would be better left to the historians.

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By Ambassador Chester Bowles

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