INTERVIEWEE: ALAN S. BOYD (Tape 2)

INTERVIEWER: DAVID G. McCOMB

December 18, 1968

M: To identify this particular tape, this is the second session with Secretary Boyd of the Department of Transportation. The date is December 18, and the time is 11:15.

To take up where we left off before, I would like to ask you about the completion of the legislation which set up the Department of Transportation. You mentioned the difficulties of the legislative struggle, the trouble with the Maritime Administration in particular. One other point about this. Where did the idea of the National Transportation Safety Board come in?

B: The NTSB was a development in the course of the legislative process; I'm not sure who came up with that particular name, but it became apparent that the aviation people, I think primarily airline, and aviation-oriented people in the Congress, and primarily Senator Monroney, would not accept a structure which permitted the Secretary to have control over accident investigations, even though this is certainly true with other modes. But due to a lot of history, they wouldn't permit it. So, we were on some pretty shakey ground there and we backed off, and I guess the strategy group which essentially had been the original people working on the development of legislation together came up with this idea. We kicked around a number of ideas, the details of which I've forgotten. Anyway, we came up with this, and it was provided that the board would be attached to the department, but not under the policy control of the Secretary.

And I think John Burzio worked with us on this. John was one of Senator Monroney's assistants, very helpful.

M: Are you satisfied with the idea of the board?

B: Oh, sure I think it's all right. I don't think it's ideal, but it seems to be functioning all right. And we had some last minute problems over the wording of Section 2 of the bill and Section 4, dealing again with the Secretary's general powers, and we had a number of last minute meetings on that in the Senate.

M: What was the problem involved there?

B: A concern about whether or not indirectly the Secretary would have the power to exercise safety jurisdiction in the FAA. Also, unspoken concern on both sides, the Executive and the Congressional, about the powers in Section 2 having to do with investment--evaluation and analysis of investment, and we came out of it fairly well satisfied; I guess maybe the Congress did, too.

M: Congress retained that power?

B: Yes.

M: And you were willing to accept this?

B: We had no choice.

M: Either that or no department?

B: Yes. So when I say fairly well satisfied, it was merely because we were able to get the thing through, not that it was the kind of language we would have developed on our own. But, I must say I look on this whole organization and authority as being in a dynamic state. You get reorganization plans and new authorities, you go along, and as the need is manifested, you are able to educate people to the importance of the changes.

So that was wrapped up. We did a pretty good job, I think, of coordinating our efforts where we were dealing with the Senate and with the House Government Operations Committee. We kept everybody pretty well informed at the staff level and particularly on the House side. Congressman Holifield was a great champion. And we finally got it all wrapped up, and passed, and then we drafted some language for the President in his signing message. Of course, there's a copy of that around somewhere. And set up an invitation list for the signing ceremony, trying to bring in everybody we could think of in the various transportation interests including all of the modes, some of the suppliers, and such organizations as the Transportation Association of America and the National Freight Traffic Association, people like that, trying to make it a truly catholic affair.

M: There was a statement that the President made after signing this, about tacking another coonskin to the wall, but you don't remember him saying that, is that right?

B: No, I don't recall that. I'm not sure he didn't say it, but I just don't recall it. At that stage, when the President signed the bill into law, there was a period of, I've forgotten what the period was when the department went into operation, there were two alternatives.

M: Let me give you a couple of dates. Maybe this will jar your memory. Was it signed in October of '66?

B: Yes.

M: --and effective in April of '67?

B: Well, the law provided when the Secretary first takes office, or on such prior date after enactment as the President shall subscribe and publish in the register.

M: Ninety days after October then?

B: No, after the Secretary.

M: After the Secretary. Now, had you been selected as Secretary by this point in time?

B: No. And there was quite a bit of speculation that the President would name the Secretary when he signed the bill, but he didn't.

M: Had he said anything to you at this point?

B: Not a word.

M: This must have worried you some?

B: Yes, it sure did. I didn't feel that I had any right to the position, but obviously I wanted to take a whack at it. So at that stage of the game, it seemed to me that whoever was appointed Secretary needed to have some groundwork laid, and that was when I got into working up the organization through the task force headed up by Paul Trimble. Then, in November, the President invited my wife and me to the ranch for the weekend. And we went down there--

M: Any idea why you were called down there?

B: Well, I sort of figured that at that stage of the game that the President was being very nice to us and was going to say, "Alan, you've done a great job. You've worked hard, and I appreciate it, and I just want to thank you. Goodbye." How much of that thinking was defensive, I don't know. But, anyway, that's what I figured would probably happen.

We got down there Saturday right after lunch, went on the usual tour--

M: He got in a car and drove around, and you looked at the deer and the cattle and--?

B: Yes.

M: And he was talking about this all the time, is that right?

B: Talking about what?

M: The cattle and the ranch and--

B: Oh, yes.

M: While you have in your mind, what's he want me down here for?

B: Yes. And so I just figured that I might as well relax and enjoy it. What the hell, it was pleasant to be a weekend guest of the President. And I should say parenthetically that I think Mrs. Johnson is one of the finest women I ever knew in my life. And I just think she's one of the most gracious ladies I've ever known, really a wonderful person!

But, anyway, we rode around and we looked at the deer and the cattle and the various houses and what not, and we had dinner, and we walked down to one of the other houses and talked for awhile. Nothing was said about Transportation at all. Went to bed about midnight and got up the next morning and ate breakfast. The President invited us all to go to church. And after breakfast, I was sitting in the living room reading the paper, and the President said, "Alan, come in here. I want to show you something!" He handed me a piece of paper, which was essentially a biography of me, with the statement that he was today announcing his intention to nominate me to be Secretary of Transportation. And I read it over, and he said, when he gave it to me, he said, "Look at this and see if it looks all right to you." So I looked at it, and said, "Yes, sir, it looks good to me!" I said, "I'm extremely grateful to you, Mr. President, and the only thing I can tell you is that I'll work hard as hell, and I'll never do anything to embarrass you."

And he said, "Oh, I know that. If I had any concern, I wouldn't have done this."

And John Gardner was there. Aida and John Gardner were also there.

We flew down together. Right after that, the President and I walked out to the carport, it looked like we were going to need two cars, so Mrs. Johnson said, "Lyndon, why don't you and the Secretary ride in one car," and the President said, "Which Secretary do you mean?" And so everybody congratulated me. And we went on to church. It was very nice. Then a press conference after church in Fredericksburg.

And with that, when I got back here the next day, it was easier to get things done on organization. So, we worked on that through Christmas and he sent my name up--I've forgotten the date he sent it up, but anyway it was early January. As I recall, I testified on my confirmation for nearly four hours. I nearly died. My bladder was about to kill me, but the Commerce Committee was a very good, very responsible group of men, and they were very much interested in just what I thought about the department and various modes of transportation and so forth. And we had an excellent discussion, but I made the mistake of drinking a whole pitcher full of water, and, boy, I'm telling you, I didn't think I was going to be able to hold it.

Anyway, I was sworn in on the sixteenth of January.

M: Did the committee really challenge your appointment at all, or were they just interested in your ideas?

B: There was no challenge.

M: This might be a good point in the discussion to get some of your reflections on Lyndon Johnson as President, rather than go directly into the organization of the department, since he has come up at this point.

B: First and foremost, I think Lyndon Johnson is a great President. I think he represents the end of an era, the era begun essentially by Franklin Roosevelt. I think that he has suffered terribly both personally and in

his public image as a result of the Viet Nam war, and this has made it impossible to accomplish a lot of the things that he wanted to do. I don't think he has the kind of charisma--I don't think he projects. Now, this is an interesting thing to me. Lyndon Johnson, to me, is a number of different men, all of whom are very real. I don't think he plays a role. I shouldn't say, "I don't think he plays a role," because I think he does. I think he does, in two ways. One is this God-awful Baptist preacher-approach which he has on press conferences and speeches, which I think chilled more people in terms of personality projection than anything he could have done. And another one I'm convinced, due to the man and also due to the circumstances under which he took office, caused him to believe that the President ought to be a very serious individual. And this, I think, ties into the sort of Baptist preacher thing. I think this has cost him terribly in public support. And, in passing, I think it's going to be the same with Nixon, although I don't think those two men--I don't think there's any comparison. I think Lyndon Johnson is head and shoulders above Nixon, in intellectual capacity and feeling. And yet, you know, in personal conversation, Lyndon Johnson is a very warm man, and he's funny as all hell! He's one of the greatest mimics I ever heard. He can have you just rolling on the floor with his ability to mimic various public figures. And I'm just awfully sorry he never did anything like that publicly, because I think it would have made people see him as a much different sort of individual. He has got a lot of failings, and these have cost him.

M: Let me ask you this. The press and writers and what not have, especially those who don't like Lyndon Johnson, have made a great thing out of the apparent crudity of his talk.

B: Oh, hell, I don't--

M: Has this ever offended you?

B: No.

M: It is, in some sense, a subjective evaluation?

B: Sure it is. It doesn't bother me at all. I never have thought of him as being crude or vulgar. Now, he has got what I would call sort of a frontier-type sense of humor, which can be fairly raw. His description of things sometimes are of the type that you would hear more on a farm than in a drawing room. But, hell, I grew up in that sort of atmosphere, and it just--I think it's unfair.

M: You've also characterized him as being a great man, one who is head and shoulders above Nixon. Now, what's your basis for judging him as a great person?

B: I think, in a phrase, a concern for people. And the distinction I would make between him and Nixon in this regard is a feeling. I don't question Nixon's intellectual concern, but Lyndon Johnson grew up in an area that had to be described as poverty stricken. And one of the things that I'm sure made great impressions on him was the time he taught in the school. I've forgotten the name of the school, a lot of Mexican-Americans there; and I'm sure that made a very deep impression on this man, because of conversations I've listened to, and he talks about the school and the kids there; how so many of them never had a chance. And this is the thing that, to me, really marks the greatness of this man and his desire to see the people in this country have a chance. You can provide much more sophisticated wording, but I think it's the thing that impresses me most about him.

Another thing, which has nothing to do with philosophy, is that even

though he, I think, probably justifies the reputation he has for a violent temper, is a man who in a crisis situation never gets in a flap. He's just as calm as he can be, and this, I think, is a real mark of greatness.

M: Can you give me an example of that?

B: Yes. I think the decision he had to make about sending troops into the Dominican Republic is a very good example. He had to react very quickly, and he got the best information he could; he talked to the people he trusted; and he talked with people who had a role. I don't know how he judges people, but he sifted it through and he came to a conclusion about what was in the best interest of the United States, and he went ahead and did it. He wasn't nervous; he wasn't scared; he wasn't mad. He was just doing a very workman-like job with constant concern of what's best for America!

Another thing about him that I have noticed is that he is very good on touching base. Nothing has ever happened involving Transportation or even where Transportation was on the periphery that I haven't been contacted for my views. And I'm confident that he works this way with everything. He wants to be sure that everybody who has any role or any interest has an opportunity to make his views known.

He doesn't want yes men around.

M: He will take argumentation on a particular case?

B: Oh, yes. I went in and talked to him one time on maritime policy. I almost got to the stage of saying, "You can't do this, Mr. President," but I decided I'd better not get too wrapped up in what he could or could not do. But I told him the approach he was taking was just 100 percent dead wrong, and I felt very strongly about it. He listened very carefully, very courteously, and then he said, "Alan, you may be right, but you know

I've given you a year to try to work this thing out the way you think it's right, and you haven't done it."

M: So what could you say to that?

B: Well, I certainly had to agree with that, but my point was, even though I hadn't succeeded, what I was trying to do was right, and I felt it was better to do nothing, although it's never that simple. But he really does want to know what people think! And he will listen. I think one of his failings has been his penchant for secrecy and for the dramatic.

M: Such as in your own appointment?

B: No, no, not that. I don't think there's anything dramatic about that particularly, but on the secrecy sort of thing, it's not the secrecy as such. Now, I have believed on what I thought was reliable information that a fellow for whom I had considerable respect was slated to be nominated to an office in the government, and it got out in the newspaper and that was the end of it. Well, now, I think that's wrong. I think that's a failing on the President's part. Just because the name got out before he had announced it, and I'm assuming that's what happened--I certainly haven't talked to the President about it and don't intend to, it's really none of my business, but I just think he lost a hell of a good man by his own action. And I think that was one of his failings.

Now, on the dramatic impulse. I don't think of a good example at the moment, but let me roll this around, and I'll try to come up with one.

M: Is his reputation for a hot temper well founded?

B: I've seen very little evidence of it. Now, I do know that some of the White House staff have been subjected to considerable violent temper. I know this to the extent that I've been told by them, and I've seen some of them come out of his office sort of white and shaken.

M: But you have never been on the receiving end of such temper?

B: Never. And I've never been present when he really blew up that I can recall.

M: Have you been impressed with his domestic legislation achievement?

B: Oh, absolutely. I think it's superb achievement, just an unbelievable series of things he has done, all of which I think are good, to the extent I understand them. And I think that his efforts in conservation, in education, in health, and trying to deal with what is called the poverty problem, are going to stand as monumental records of achievement. I'm not at all sure that a lot of these poverty programs are worth a damn, but that has nothing to do with the efforts to try to solve the problem. And the fact of the matter is that there are no recipes for dealing with poverty the way you can pull down a cookbook and find a recipe for an apple pie or cake. There's really little agreement on what is the problem, and even less agreement on what are the solutions, and instead of fooling around and saying, "Well, we'll study this for a few more years," he has tried to do something about it.

I think his record on civil rights as President is outstanding. I think he was far better equipped to deal with the domestic scene than with the international. Although it's hard to say because the Viet Nam war just sort of clouds everything. I think his efforts on the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty both are going to have to be considered as high marks in the international sphere; and I think his efforts to try to develop some sort of an intelligent rational relationship with Russia fall in the same category. And I think that he has been very intelligent in his dealings with France. You know, he could have gotten a lot of public support if he had just taken a bottle of French wine out on the White House grounds and poured it out on the grass. It would have been a great symbolic

thing for a lot of Americans, but he didn't do it. And this is another reason why I say this man uses his head.

I don't think he was any great student of foreign affairs, and I have a feeling that he may have been overly impressed with the military because of his armed services activities. You know, the whole South and Southwest, I think, have been generally much more of a military caste of mind, a greater supporter of the military establishment on an individual basis--I'm not talking now about any military industrial complex, but individual. You get a lot more recruits, for example, from the South and the West. It's not just because it looks like a better living; it's a way of life, sort of a value system. And he's part of that.

M: Has the Viet Nam war hampered your activities in Transportation?

B: Oh, yes, sure it has.

M: Has there ever been an incident when the President has said, "Secretary Boyd, I'd like to do this, but the war--the cost of it prevents me," or anything like that?

B: No. But your whole budget process is geared to the Viet Nam war.

M: Well, do you have the feeling that you could have done more if the war had not been part of your history?

B: I could have started more, maybe couldn't have done more. I could have started more in the way of research. Well, we could have done more in such areas as highway safety and highway beautification; air traffic control, and things of that nature. But the main impact, I would say, has been our inability to develop comprehensive research programs.

M: Maybe I ought to, since I'm getting into that area, push on into the formation of the department and the problems you had in that; certainly the setting up of a new department is a somewhat unique, not completely

so, but an event that doesn't take place very often. What were your problems? How did you start out in this?

B: Well, you start off with a structure, the outlines of which are in the legislation. The role of the administrators. Also you have the role of the Assistant Secretaries without any definition, except that they're to be staffed and not operating assistants. So the first thing we had to do was try to see how we could devise and define the functions for the four assistant secretaries.

M: This is before you even picked your personnel?

B: Yes. Two of them fell out very rapidly. Public Affairs and Research and Technology. And then we got into the whole issue, and I knew we wanted an assistant secretary to be responsible for what ultimately became policy development, but for the whole approach to the transportation system from primarily an economic point of view. But it was very difficult to figure out exactly what his functions would be, and I was fearful that the assistant would wind up with most of the effective power in the office of Secretary except for the Under Secretary and the Secretary. In fact, that's what happened. Cecil Mackey has been first among peers; there's no question about it. And one of the developments as a result of that was that I took the Office of Program Review away from him the first of December, which I think will make it easier for the next Secretary.

We had very long discussions, for example, about whether or not we should have a comptroller. One of my idiosyncrasies was that we ought to have an inspector-general. I was very much concerned about all of the money that we spent, and of getting my fingers in the crack with somebody in one of the operating administrations sticking his finger in the till or something like that. And I was talked out of that, because a lot of the people on

the task force--in fact, all of them except me--felt that there were better ways to handle it. And I think they're probably right, plus which I didn't have any great concern about it, because the big money operations were Bureau of Public Roads, FAA and Coast Guard. And they've all got pretty good, clean records. The employees in these agencies are, I think, by and large very honorable people.

So, anyway, they knocked that off, and then we got into the question on a fourth assistant secretary--what should his functions be, and we were quite enamored of the idea that we ought to have an Assistant Secretary for Urban Affairs, feeling quite rightly that this was going to be the area of greatest concern and greatest impact. And also realizing that there was no good coordinating mechanism short of the Secretary for relationships between Highways, Mass Transit, and Airports, and Airport Access, and things of that nature. And after we kicked that around for quite awhile, we decided we couldn't afford to do that because it would be presumptuous as all hell in view of the fact that the Urban Mass Transit was over in HUD, and we were gearing up to try to take it away from them. The law establishing the department required the Secretaries of Transportation and HUD to make a study of where the mass transit function should be lodged and report back within a year. I came to the conclusion, supported by the task force advisers, that it just would be very poor taste to try to do that at that stage of the game.

And then we got into a discussion of whether or not this fourth assistant secretary should be responsible for safety. And that seemed to make a fair amount of sense, but part of the problem there was that by law the safety functions of the FAA were redelegated, or were delegated, from me--from the Secretary--to the Federal Aviation Administrator. Also by

law, the rail safety functions were transferred directly to the rail administrator. And we could see nothing but trouble coming out of that if we tried to set up an Assistant Secretary for Safety, particularly with the concern on the part of the Congress and the aviation community about the Secretary trying to get his hands in this, although none of these critics ever really were able to set forth what horrible thing would happen. But, anyway, they had the fear, and you know what I think is a fact--it's just that simple.

So, I had been very much interested in international transportation. It seemed to me that most of the developed countries, particularly Japan and those in Western Europe, had to have somewhat similar transportation problems to those of the United States. And it seemed to me that, with limited resources which every country has and every department has, it would make a great deal of sense if we put a lot of effort into joint research and development activities, because there's nothing political about a traffic jam. I figured we could overall help to improve U. S. international relations, we could do it in a non-political way, and we could spread our money further and get some very good assistance and save the necessity of us going through research efforts, the British going through research efforts, and the Germans all spending money for the same damned thing.

M: Did you also have the idea here that there might be an exchange of ideas that would be profitable?

B: Yes. And I was also interested in having some place in the department to tie in our technical assistance efforts. Both the FAA and the Bureau of Public Roads, particularly, and some lesser participation by the Coast Guard, have people and have had people scattered all over the world on

AID projects. And it just seemed to me that a common administration could be beneficial and efficient.

Also, I had been for some time concerned about the way we developed positions on international transportation matters, particularly with regard to multilateral activities, such as ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the maritime area with regard to IMCO, the International Maritime Consultative Organization. I had a feeling that there was too much policy being made by technical people, and that the considerations often were not broad enough. So, I thought that we needed somebody to deal with that. And it seemed a fairly innocuous sort of thing to set up an Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, innocuous in the sense that--

M: Let me get something straight. Did you come to a point of defining these positions after the act was passed?

B: Oh, yes.

M: Why did you decide that you have to have four of them? Why not five, or three? It would seem that you were told you had to have four assistants, and then you had to sit down and try to think what they're going to do.

B: In the testimony, I outlined various things, including safety, as possibilities and the four was an arbitrary sort of thing. We looked around at the other departments to see how many assistant secretaries they had, and we just said this is what we want to try.

M: Could you have changed this, and, say, had five or three?

B: Oh, yes. Yes, this is the sort of thing which goes by with very little attention being given to it. The Bureau of the Budget is interested, and, of course, the people who think that they may be involved are interested, but it's not the sort of thing that's an issue with the Congress, within

reason. If I'd asked for a dozen, that would have been something else. Three, four, five, or six--

M: Well, now, you had to define their functions? How further down the organizational structure did you go in definition of jobs?

B: The development of offices.

M: You personally had to see to the definition of their tasks, is that right?

B: In general terms.

M: Now, the details of that you would leave to personnel appointed to that position, or what?

B: Well, it was pretty much what Alan Dean calls a collegial approach. We'd sit down. We'd have a meeting set, say, for tomorrow afternoon at four o'clock, and I'd say we want to talk about the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Let's have your thoughts then on what should his functions be, what offices should he have, how many people, and what should their grades be, and so forth? And each one of the fellows would give however much thought they wanted to to it, and that depended on their own areas of interest. And we'd sit down and meet and that'd be an office of this and an office of that, an office of so forth. Then somebody would say, "Well, Christ, you can't have ten offices! You'd never get it by the Bureau of the Budget." And so then, we'd start refining; then there'd be arguments as to whether or not--.

Well, in legislation, for example. We've got a screwy setup here, with three different officials having responsibilities for the development and promotion of legislation. Public Affairs, General Counsel, and Policy Development. And we had a big argument over how that should be handled, and whether or not the Office of Public Affairs--the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs should have a role and if so, what it should be. And

the question of who coordinated with the Bureau of the Budget. Would it be the General Counsel, would it be Public Affairs, should it be Policy Development? And we set tentative grade structures, once we got the offices lined out, with no idea who the people were. Nobody really had much thought about who the people would be except for Policy Development, where I had put together a pretty good little group over in Commerce.

M: This is the group that you were working with in your organizational development?

B: No, this had FAA representation, Coast Guard, and so forth. They were in on all of it.

M: Now, at what point did you coordinate in your definition of jobs with the Bureau of the Budget?

B: As I recall, the Bureau of the Budget sat in on this--somebody from the Bureau, and we felt that there our bigger problem was really what sort of hope could we get for acceptance from Civil Service Commission, once we got below the Presidential Secretarial appointees.

M: Since this has come up, I might ask you--how important is the Bureau of the Budget in your dealings with the White House? Are they in on just about everything that comes up?

B: Just about. Under the 1946 or 1947 act, the Bureau of the Budget became the coordinating mechanism for the Executive Branch, so the Bureau is in on everything.

M: Once you got your organization defined, then I assume you had to start looking for personnel. Was that any great difficulty, or is it always hard to find good people?

B: Well, we had in the administrations--the administrators were there except for Highway and Rail, which were two new administrations. And I knew who

I wanted to be Highway Administrator--I wanted Lowell Bridwell, because Lowell was my deputy over at Commerce. He had been the Scrips-Howard specialist on highways, and he knew the people who knew where the bodies were buried. He wasn't an engineer. He had the same kind of concern which I tried to describe my belief that President Johnson has about people, and I knew they couldn't pull the wool over his eyes--the engineers. So Lowell was a natural there. In the Rail Administration I had gotten Shef Lang from the New York Central where he had been the head of their department on cybernetics, and he had taught transportation or some aspects of transportation at M.I.T. He had been all over Europe, quite a student of rail operations in Europe. He had worked on several railroads in the United States and a very bright, thoughtful man. Shef wanted to be Assistant Secretary for Research, but--and he was my Deputy for Research at Commerce, but he just couldn't cut the mustard, not for lack of qualification, but for lack of drive. He's not a manager. And I had some qualms about him as Rail Administrator for that reason, but having gotten him down here at considerable sacrifice on his own part (he had to give up a bunch of stock options and what not), and since I felt and still feel that he probably knows more about the gut issues in railroading than anybody else I'll ever run into, I decided that he ought to be in that job.

We screwed up--going back for a minute--on the Assistant Secretary for R&T, because we didn't begin to provide that office with the number of jobs it should have had. Just really didn't have any concept of the magnitude of the effort that was going to have to be undertaken in research. So we really skimped there, and part of that, I'm sure, was due to the fact that we didn't have anybody who was sitting in on the meeting, thinking "Well, now, I'm going to be the Assistant Secretary," whereas, we had these

other people, all of whom had reason to hope that they might be Assistant Secretaries, with the exception of International and Public Affairs. And so Policy Development and Administration were well taken care of because they had their own--. Cecil Mackey and Allen Dean were there in all the meetings, and they were able to think through pretty well what they wanted, or what they thought a man in their position would want.

For Public Affairs I talked to a number of people. I asked Lowell for recommendations, I asked all the fellows around for recommendations, I talked to John Macy and tried to get names from him. I solicited names from places like the Air Transport Association and others like that. And John Macy came up with John Sweeney.

And then, on the International, I had known Don Agger for a number of years, and I knew that Don had an international law practice, that he'd lived in Europe for awhile. I was impressed with him, his sense of humor, for one thing, and with his ability to get along with people, and obvious drive, and I thought a very good intellect. So I called him in and asked him if he's be interested. He said, "Sure."

M: In hiring people like this, is the salary level a problem?

B: I don't think so. John Sweeney had a job offer--considerably more money than he was getting here; and Don was making a hell of a lot more money. Cecil wasn't, because he was an office director over at Commerce. Lowell wasn't; he was my deputy over there. Shef had been making a lot more money before he came down. It's no great problem. Frank Lehan, I'm sure, was--well, Frank's a different situation. He and another fellow set up a little company which they built into a big company, and then sold, and I don't know how much money Frank has, but he wouldn't have to hit another lick to live well the rest of his life. So really the salary sort of thing

is insignificant. The problem on salary is simply this: if a man has two, three, or four kids and he's making a good living, but it's salary or something like that, or he hasn't been able to bank much, then you've got an awful problem. You take a fellow who's making $45- $50- $55,000 in fees as a lawyer or economist, or on salary--this is particularly true of lawyers. Hell, lawyers make a lot of money, but it's awfully hard to squirrel any of it away. Then you do have a problem, because these fellows have got a standard of living, they've got kids to educate, and it's difficult to get some. I've lost a couple who would have come in except for that very problem.

M: Well, what do you appeal to, then?

B: First of all, the challenge.

M: This, of course, is what attracted you?

B: Yes. And second, the ability to do something for your fellow man. In a somewhat mundane fashion--we don't have any moon shots here, but still and all, if you can do something to cut down on commuter time by ten minutes a day, you've really accomplished a great deal. If you can help make the system safer--you can reduce fatalities on the highways from 53,000 a year to 45,000 a year, you can feel that this is really worthwhile.

Another thing is that you can point all over the country at people who have been in government and have gone out and by virtue of being in the government, have increased their earning powers very substantially. So there is a matter of a man having enough confidence that his health will hold up and an ability to take a loss for a period of time. And a lot of people do come in and live off their capital, if they've got any. If they don't have any, you can't get them in. But there are a lot of people who are willing to do it.

M: In your hiring of personnel, did you have to take anybody for political reasons?

B: I don't know the answer to that. Everett Hutchinson was not my choice to be Under Secretary. I got a call from the White House, not from the President, saying to me, "Everett is a real good man. He's a friend of yours. You like him. Don't you think he'd make a good Under Secretary?" This was at the same time when a number of the appointments I had suggested had gone through, but two of them were lodged somewhere--Cecil Mackey and Lowell Bridwell, both of whom I very much wanted to see appointed. Nothing was said, and I'm not sure that my suspicions were accurate, but I made a quick judgment, and I said, "I think he'd make a pretty good partner with the trio of Hutchinson, Bridwell, and Mackey." The response was, "Yes, I believe he would."

M: In your hiring, was there any raiding of other departments other than what you've mentioned? You took people from Commerce, for example.

B: Oh, yes. Our personnel man, direcotr of personnel, George Meharry, we got from the Treasury, and one other fellow, Nat Cutler.

M: Does this cause any ill feeling in the other departments?

B: Nat Cutler came from OEO, and Sargent Shriver called me up and just raised hell! He said, "What do you mean, stealing my people? Here I am with my back against the wall," and so forth and so on. And I had told our people in their recruiting not to hire anybody without me having a chance to talk to the head of the agency. In the case of Nat Cutler, Allen Dean told me that Nat did not want me to talk to Sargent Shriver--that he wanted to do it himself. And I was told that he had talked to Sargent Shriver. So, at that stage of the game, I said, "Go ahead and hire him." I think, in fact, that he had talked to Sarge, but he was a hell of a good man and Sarge just didn't want to lose him.

M: Was there any problem--let me ask you this--it's twenty-five after twelve. Do you want to break at this point?

B: Yes, I expect we'd better.

M: Okay.

(End of tape)

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Alan S. Boyd

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, ALAN S. Boyd, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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Signed Alan S. Boyd

Date 5 January 1970

Accepted [signature]
Archivist of the United States

Date November 1, 1974