INTERVIEW III

DATE: July 18, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

PLACE: Mr. Califano's office, Washington, D. C.

Tape 1 of 1

F: Let's talk about crises and the management of crises, your action in them, the degree of presidential involvement, the degree over which the President had some mastery of the crisis, and how much of it was just beyond anything he could do. I think a good starting place would be our crisis over water back in 1965. I'm going to let you sound off and then I'll bring in questions as it seems relevant.

C: Water was a crisis that was building slowly in the Northeast over several months preceding August or late July--I can't remember the exact dates--when it really reached the White House and the front pages of the newspapers in the Northeast.

F: I can remember, parenthetically, living in New England in the late forties in which one thing that struck me, coming from the Southwest, was the fact that nobody ever discussed the problem of rain or water except as it was a nuisance, and now then it seems that time has caught up.

C: Time has caught up. It wasn't that the problem with water that summer was unpredictable; it was just two things, I think. One, when you start to measure the

problems that were coming before the President, or even the White House staff, it wasn't on a level where you'd give it much attention, in the late spring. Number two, a week or so of good rain and it would all go away.

F: How much time do you have to anticipate these slow-building crises that are subsurface? It would seem to me that you spend so much time dealing with the fire that has to be put out now that you sometimes don't see the pot that hasn't begun to boil yet.

C: Well, at that point in time that was true for me. You've got to remember that I had just--I was only in the White House a month. Once I got a staff, that changed. When I got a staff, that changed quite a bit. And I just got more knowledgeable.

My recollection of water is that the President on a Friday--all these things seemed to happen on a Friday--but just before a weekend, [he] called me and told me to get Buford Ellington, who was then the director of the Office of Emergency Planning, [Stewart] Udall, and anybody else that was necessary, and put together a proposal for him to deal with the water crisis. Now, what kicked him off to call me, I don't know.

F: You didn't have any rising volume of mail or telephone or anything like that?

C: No, although it was clear in the papers. My hunch is that somebody called him. In any case, it was a complicated problem because there were five governors and two or three mayors involved. And we had things like--at that time [Nelson] Rockefeller was governor of New York and [Robert] Wagner was the Democratic mayor of New York [City]. In Pennsylvania, [William] Scranton was the governor of Pennsylvania, a Republican, and [James] Tate was the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia. We met--

F: What do you do in protocol on something like that? Do you try to work that, or do you just meet and handle it?

C: Well, first I got Ellington and Udall. Larry Levinson was working for me then at the White House and I got him--there were some other people there who I don't remember--over in my office. We sat down and looked at what we could do. One of the problems was that, for example, there was water, as I recall, in the Delaware River that Delaware didn't want to release to Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania didn't want to release to New Jersey. That kind of situation. To the extent that we could do something about it, it was clear that there were two areas in which we could act. One was, in general terms, to get the states and cities involved to have roughly the same water use regulations. The second thing was--actually there were three--where there was water in a state that could be used in another state, to get those agreements worked out. Thirdly--this didn't come out of the first meeting; this came later--we had a concept of water crisis teams. We'd send Udall and some other people into these cities that were affected and get them to make specific recommendations. You know, were there an inordinate number of leaky pipes? What were the kinds of things?

F: Would you send someone of cabinet rank in person or is he just designated to send someone else?

C: On this one we sent Udall in person.

F: You wanted that much thrust?

C: That's right. Off of that meeting, I sent a memo down to the Ranch--the President was at the Ranch, as I recall--recommending to him that we have Ellington, who at that point as well as being director of the Office of Emergency Planning was also the contact with the governors, get in touch quietly with the five governors, get a personal feel of their willingness and ability to work things out mutually, and if there was a reasonable chance,

bring them all to Washington, have the President meet with them, and solve the problem. This was the day of Lyndon Johnson's magic wand; I mean, almost anything we touched worked. We were still in the wake of that enormous victory.

F: Ellington is a sufficiently political animal that he could get on well on a bipartisan basis with both sets of governors?

C: No problems, first rate in that area.

Then the President okayed that; Ellington checked it out. It seemed like we had a very good shot at getting the states and cities to cooperate and work together, getting them to adopt some rules. Also, I guess it was out of the fact that either Ellington or I, or both of us, began to feel we had to do something that would show a presence of the federal government, a presence of Lyndon Johnson on this problem. And that doing something would be very helpful politically, as well as substantively, to the governors and mayors that had to deal with their own constituency in these states, that we came up with this idea of a water crisis team.

In any case, within two or three days, we brought the five governors down; we brought the mayors down. I sat down with them, with Udall and Ellington, I don't know [for] how long, maybe half an hour, to make sure we were all in the same ballpark. Then the President came in, really very effectively got them together after a meeting of something less than an hour, as I recall. Took them all out to the press and announced that we were off to the races, and we were moving on the water problem.

F: You didn't have any fundamental disagreements there?

C: Sure, we had some problems, particularly as I recall in terms of the use of this water in the Delaware River basin. But it was ultimately resolved. That one was not resolved at the first meeting.

There was the second meeting when we brought them down, which really did nail it down. I can't remember whether that meeting was off the record or on the record. The papers will show that. Udall went through the Northeast. I don't want to say that we solved the water crisis. We did things that ameliorated it and made damn sure that even if we did have a bad autumn those cities would be okay. As it turned out, as you know, we had a pretty good autumn, lots of rain and lots of snow that winter.

F: What was the general procedure, to try to work out some sort of compact, cooperation?

C: Yes. We worked out compacts and cooperation. We got them to adopt relatively common rules. Then when the water crisis teams went into a city--I can't remember what they found in what cities, but I remember in some cities they found out that there were enormous leakage problems on big water mains, and those were fixed. Campaigns were started to--you'd be amazed in a city like New York how much water is wasted by just dripping faucets, leaking toilets, leaking showers, and bathtubs.

F: Part of it's just a matter of thrift.

C: We got the cities to start a campaign, get your water taps fixed, and that kind of thing. We had our experts help city experts. By nature of the pay scales and everything else, the federal government has better people in a lot of these areas. And that was resolved.

F: Did the President keep in touch with this all the way or--?

C: He kept in touch with it to the point--I'd say I probably sent him two or three memos. The way this was handled, as far as the President was concerned, was quite different than

something like either the steel strike or the aluminum price increase. He wasn't into this every minute. Now, if you went through the files, my hunch is you'd see, say, two or three memos from me to him on water in the Northeast--

F: You more or less set it up and let it resolve itself?

C: --and if you looked at the steel or aluminum, you'd probably see fifty memos, to say nothing of telephone conversations.

F: Did you personally go in the cities?

C: No.

F: Did they have some regular reportage to you?

C: They'd report to me. That's right.

F: Who reported?

C: Udall.

F: Everything fed then through Udall?

C: Everything fed through Udall. Buford Ellington made the political contacts and greased the way for Udall before he went in. Now I might say, Udall did this with great enthusiasm, not so much because he wanted to bounce around the cities, but because we had an important factor playing for us with Interior, which was that Udall never wanted Interior to be a western department. And this put him in the East and he just loved that. So he did it with real gusto. It was something you need. It goes back to a point we've talked about before, which is cabinet officers don't just do what you tell them to do. There's a great deal of self-interest here on his part.

F: Right. I've been very aware through working with him of Udall's eastern orientation, you might say, in what has been traditionally--

C: And we knew that and the President knew that, and we played on that, I think quite legitimately, to get him to deliver.

F: Did you have anyone in a major role who was noncooperative? Or did they all fall in line?

C: No, they all fell in line. There was no problem there in terms of cooperation.

F: Really, you had a one-way political street on this, didn't you? That is, you couldn't very well be against it.

C: No, that's right. You couldn't be against it. And it didn't hurt anybody. Everybody looked good. Nobody was having a battle with their constituency.

F: Where do you get the money for this sort of crisis? You don't plan for it in a budget.

C: You just force the department to reprogram money as best you can. Thinking back, we may have put some money in the fiscal 1967 budget, which went up in January 1966, to take care of some of the things we did, thinking back on it. But you'd have to go to the budget book to check that out.

F: Let's move on to the steel strike, or the threatened steel strike, and talk about your role there.

C: In personal terms I always looked upon steel--water was good. You know, water worked and it was one of the first things I did for President Johnson, whom I didn't know, you've got to remember, when I went to work for him. Steel in my judgment was the thing that I did for him that really made our relationship, because it worked. The President, quite naturally, up until steel, I felt, was very careful about checking what I did. During Watts, for example, I had less authority to move National Guardspeople, and other things, [as a staff member] in the White House than I would have had if I were in the Pentagon.

F: Let's intrude on that just a moment. When he first brought you in, did he sort of lay down a set of ground rules you should follow, or did you just one day get installed in office and then you played it by ear from that time forward?

C: Aside from the legislative program, which he told me he wanted developed--

F: Did he go over with you piece by piece future legislation or did he--?

C: No, what he said to me was, "You've got to prepare my program for next year. I want to review it at the end of this year. I want major programs in civil rights, transportation, and for the cities." That was it; that was the only guidance he ever gave me. The rest were things he handed me to do, either himself or other people would tell me he wanted me to do.

The way I got into steel, one night, literally, the President called me down to his office and I. W. Abel was there. Abel was giving to the President a copy of his original demands to the steel companies. The President called me in, introduced me to Abel, and handed me these demands. He said, "You go over them and tell me what you think about them." Abel left the office. The President called me back in and told me, "This is going to be a major problem and you start learning everything you can about steel, because this one is going to end up here." As a result of that--

F: How much time lapse did you figure you had in there?

C: There wasn't much. This was, you know, a week before steel was really blowing hot, if not less. Either that night or the next day, he called me and said that he thought steel was important enough that I should meet with [Willard] Wirtz and Jack Connor, who was then the secretary of commerce, and [Gardner] Ackley, every day to follow the steel

negotiations and send him a report every night. And we began meeting just about every day.

F: What did you do when you met?

C: Well, we started with Gardner laying out the economic situation of the country and the steel industry, Wirtz laying out the current status of the negotiations, and Connor just giving his experienced judgment. As time went on, we got much more detailed and much more specific about the negotiations themselves. To put steel in context, earlier that year we'd come out again for the 3.2 per cent guidelines, which represented the growth and productivity in macroeconomic terms. And we didn't want any labor settlements to exceed 3.2 per cent in cost. Steel, as it turned out after the fact, was the last major labor contract to settle at 3.2 per cent. We didn't know that was going to be the case.

The personalities were very difficult, but the President knew them all. Abel had just been elected as president on a platform of, "I'm going to get tremendous benefits for you." Conrad Cooper, who was the main negotiator for the steel industry, was a tough guy, very hard-nosed negotiator who was of the old school of business, old hard-line Duquesne Club steel industry, and he was determined to teach Abel a lesson.

Traditionally in the steel industry, settlements were reached in the back room. The deal between [David John] McDonald, who had been the prior president of the [United] Steelworkers, and Cooper, Abel had run on a platform attacking that, among other things, and saying there would be no back room deal. There'd be full clearance of the committees of the various local chapters. Wirtz, I discovered in this experience, was an enormously sensitive, status-conscious individual, more than any other member of the Johnson Administration, cabinet or otherwise. [He was] very sensitive about Connor's

involvement in a labor negotiation--he thought that was the function of the secretary of labor--about Gardner Ackley's involvement, to say nothing of my involvement.

Steel negotiations, as time went on, were clearly on the rocks. Abel was asking for way more than 3.2 per cent; the industry was nowhere near 3.2 per cent. We decided, for a couple of reasons, that Wayne Morse and LeRoy Collins, who was then the undersecretary of commerce, should be sent to Pittsburgh in one last-ditch attempt to get the parties to settle before we brought them to Washington. Traditionally, big steel likes to settle in the White House.

F: Why did you go outside [the Department of] Labor and get these two men?

C: For two reasons: one, the President wanted to put some real focus on it; two, the President had great faith in Wayne Morse's ability in labor, I guess from his experience in the Senate. And at that point in time he had a lot of confidence in Collins who, you've got to remember, as part of his job as undersecretary of labor [commerce] ran something called the Community Relations Service and proved to be a phenomenally effective arbitrator and negotiator in some of these difficult black-white problems in the South. Collins had done a good job in Watts--in connection with Watts; he didn't actually go to Watts, as I recall.

F: He had a good national image left over from the 1950s.

C: That's right. So the President at this point was still at the Ranch. I keep saying he was at the Ranch. It was 1965 when he had that operation. I guess he hadn't been operated on at the time of steel; it was post-steel that the gall bladder was taken out. But he was at the Ranch at the time the decision was made to send Collins and Morse to Pittsburgh. That was his decision, and to the best of my recollection, that was his idea.

Morse and Collins went to Pittsburgh from the White House. As part of the publicity, for example, even though the President was at the Ranch, they came to the White House. I briefed them. We then took off in a presidential helicopter and we let the press take pictures of Morse and Collins and me saying goodbye to them as they got on the helicopter to go to Pittsburgh to settle the steel thing.

When they first arrived they thought they had a shot at it; after ten or eleven hours they didn't think they could do it. This was on a weekend, I might say. We then set up a meeting, as I recall, on a Monday morning--a breakfast meeting--at which we had present the President, Wirtz, Connor, Morse, Collins, a fellow named Bill Simkin, who was the Federal Mediation [and Conciliation Service] chairman--and you might make a note, at some point ask me about Simkin, not in this connection, but just *vis-à-vis* his relationship with the President--and myself, and there were other people there. I think Jack Valenti was there.

F: You haven't mentioned any either on Cooper's side or on Abel's.

C: No, this was just the government. The meeting was in the context of a report to the President by Morse and Collins of their work in Pittsburgh. However, the President always keeps his options open, and in hindsight I would say, as a result of my conversations with him on the phone that Sunday night and Sunday afternoon, he had pretty much decided that we'd bring the parties to Washington, and this was in part to lay the groundwork a) with the public; and b) with Wirtz and Connor. Particularly Wirtz, as I recall, was opposed to bringing the parties to Washington. He later modified that and was opposed to bringing the parties to the White House. He was willing to bring them to the Labor Department.

F: Did he feel that this sort of superseded his department?

C: I think it was a combination of feelings. I think that was part of it, and I think part of it was a feeling on his part that the President just shouldn't get into labor disputes. I subsequently found that in earlier labor disputes, which I guess George Reedy was at the White House then and worked on, whoever worked on the first railroad dispute, which was in 1964, and the maritime dispute, had [had] similar problems with Wirtz.

The upshoot of that breakfast was the decision to get the parties to Washington that day. Jack Connor called the management people and Wirtz called the labor people right from the White House, right from the Mansion. We got them to agree to come down at one o'clock or something. We offered to send planes, but they wanted to come on their own planes. They arrive. I went back to my office and wrote a statement for the President. They arrived at the White House. We hauled them into the Cabinet Room and started to turn, full blast, national press coverage and the resulting pressure on them. The President went through a statement; there was TV coverage, reporters covering it. Then we cleared out the press after he went through the statement. Then he talked very persuasively privately and said he wanted to go across the street to the Executive Office Building and get this thing settled, and get this thing settled in a way that would help, not hurt, the steel companies, the Steelworkers, and the national economy.

And that Wirtz and Connor and I were available to be of whatever help we could.

F: You weren't to be in on the negotiations unless needed? I mean, they were to settle it between themselves?

C: That's right. Now, the facts are that he knew and we knew that Wirtz and Connor started immediately meeting with the parties. We gave them each a room. We put them kind of

dramatically in the room that Lyndon Johnson had occupied in the Executive Office Building when he was vice president, which was not being used then. [Hubert] Humphrey was in another office. There wasn't a hell of a lot of progress made; later that afternoon the President announced, or had me or [Bill] Moyers or somebody announce, that he was sending dinner over to them. They weren't going to leave the building until they settled. And we sent dinner over. We kept at it. They were there a day or so, and the President himself went over on the second or third day, gave them both a lecture, told them to get back, get to work. They were still quite far apart.

F: Does the President, in a situation like that, take a hand in the issuance of press releases, which I'm sure must come out rather frequently, on where we are, what they're doing now?

C: On something like this, yes, yes, definitely, something that was this important. You've got to remember, steel works its way into every aspect of the economy. A steel price increase which could have resulted from this settlement can be an enormously difficult thing to handle and very damaging in terms of inflation. That's number one. Number two, this was the first big labor dispute in the last half of 1965 when the economy was really taking off. We had the growth rate [where] we wanted it, and it was terribly important to us that this set the right example. Number three, we hadn't lost--he hadn't lost; I wasn't there, but he hadn't lost any of these labor problems yet, so we didn't have the caution that comes from stinging defeat. At some point in time now, after this night--I might say every night, and they were there for about a week. We're talking about the last week of August, just before Labor Day 1965.

F: Did the President more or less set hours for them to work, or did they get to a stopping point some evening and decide let's quit and go home?

C: They kept going until ten at least every night. Every night I would go over to the White House and sit down with the President for hours and go through what had happened during the day. It became clear after two or three days--I might say, I really mean hours. My recollection of those nights is that I would eat dinner with the President at midnight, 1:00 a.m., and not leave there until two or three in the morning.

F: How did you know what was happening?

C: Initially, I was kept informed by Connor and Wirtz. Then at some points the President sent me over to deliver messages to these people. I can remember, for example, at one stage going over there and telling them that they had to recognize they were in a situation where the President would literally not permit them to leave without a settlement and not permit them to go on strike.

F: When the President went to see them, were you along?

C: Yes. He only went to see them once during that week, until we were sure we had it.

F: Right. Well, at that time did he lay it on the line? Was he sweet reasonableness? Was he making a plea for national unity?

C: He was sweet reasonableness, national unity, our boys are in Vietnam. Remember, we had sent the first big batch in early August or late July of 1965. But the harder stuff came from me, I'm sure by his design. I'm sure by his design.

F: He was really kind of a welcome antidote to you?

C: Yes, except that it was abundantly clear--he made it abundantly clear that I was not dancing around the halls on my own hook. He made it abundantly clear that underlying

his desire for a settlement was all the power he could muster, both in terms of public statements and--you'd have to go back to that week, but I'm sure you'd find he held a couple of press conferences, one formal, one I remember just walking along with the press between the White House West Wing and the Executive Office Building.

At some point in time, I don't know whether it was Tuesday or Wednesday night or whatever it was, it was clear to me that we were down to an argument and Wirtz and Connor couldn't agree. They couldn't agree on what the numbers meant, how much of a percentage of increase was involved in wages, how much pension plans were worth, how much holidays were worth. I told that to the President and he said, "Well, get Gardner Ackley to get up a set of figures and get Wirtz and Connor to agree on the figures. If you get Wirtz and Connor to agree on the numbers, I'm sure we can get a settlement." And we did. We got Gardner and we finally got [it], I remember. I don't know if I have them here, but I have pictures of Wirtz and Connor and I at 2:00 a.m. one morning finally getting our own people to agree on what the numbers meant.

F: Now, this is very intricate. How does Ackley go after something like this?

C: We knew what the steel contract was. We knew, in great detail at this point, exactly what Abel was asking for. We knew what the companies were proposing. Both of them had changed. Ackley could take, knowing the number of steelworkers, for example, and their ages, which we had roughly, the computations the steel people had made on what the percentage of increase was, the computation the companies had made on what the percentage of increase was, and Ackley was able, with his staff, to make an analysis and give a judgment. It was a lot of work but we were able to do it. We finally got agreement between our own secretary of commerce and our own secretary of labor.

Also, at some point at this time along here--and I think it was Monday night, but I can't remember--unknown to Connor and Wirtz--I'm not sure to this day they know; we'll have to put a long lid on this--we brought Arthur Goldberg and Clark Clifford into this. Goldberg, I guess by this time, was U.N. ambassador, I'm not sure. If he wasn't U.N. ambassador it's even more sensitive. Clifford was a privately practicing lawyer. But they both had experience in this area; Goldberg had represented the steel unions at one point and Clark Clifford had represented some of the steel companies. Moreover, he had been Kennedy's emissary in the steel price fight in 1962.

Working through them and with their contacts, one of whom was a lawyer named Elliot Bredhoff--he's a lawyer here in Washington for the Steelworkers, with a law firm here--and on Clifford's side, Roger Blough and some of the others, we had another set of negotiations going, independent of what was going on in the Executive Office Building. It was this set of negotiations, coupled with the guidance we were getting from Ackley's numbers, that actually stopped the [steel] strike and settled the dispute.

I would meet with Goldberg and Clifford over in the military aide's office in the East Wing of the White House because we wanted to be sure not only that the press never saw them but that Connor and Wirtz never saw them. This wasn't so much a matter of concern with Connor, although he would not have been happy knowing another set of negotiations was going on in the background, but of Wirtz, who would have walked out on the negotiations because of the earlier sensitivity I mentioned. The President, with one exception of a phone call and one personal meeting, also kept himself in a position where, while he was fully familiar and brought Goldberg and Clifford into this, he was not dealing with them if that became necessary.

F; He could have denied you if . . .

C: That's right. I was the link between them. Ultimately, we then got a feel for how far the steel company presidents were willing to go. You've got to remember, it's just human nature, you know. If you deal with the boss, you can probably work something out a little better than with his aide who feels a little more constricted. My recollection is by Friday morning, after a lot of work, both in the Executive Office Building with the publicized negotiations and the sort of underground negotiations, we were within a hair of a settlement. By late Friday afternoon, we just about had it. At that point in time, the President went over and gave it that last push. You know, it was one of those wonderful things where it was the right time for the President to be in. He was probably the only person in the country that could have given it that last push. They were a penny apart I think at this point, but we just couldn't--the penny wasn't much, but the problem was that we had gotten compromises on everything except the matters of principle, and we had to crack one of those. And it was the President's visit, I think, that did that.

They then agreed. We then took them into the President's office and then over to the theater in the White House. They went on nationwide television, announced the steel strike was settled, and the President went off to the Ranch for Labor Day, which he had been telling these guys he wanted to do, go down and see Lady Bird for Labor Day. He left and we had to do some work over that weekend with Abel's executive board. He had a batch of negotiators down there but we had to make damn sure that everybody would stand behind him. There was some work done then; most of that work was done by Wirtz and Jim Reynolds.

F: Now, who is Jim Reynolds?

C: Jim Reynolds is the undersecretary of labor.

Now, just a human interest sidelight. I'll never forget it. This is why I say [the steel settlement was important] in terms of my own personal relationship with the President. We came back to the President's office after he went on television and announced this, and he started to walk out the door to get on the helicopter, out those French doors. He walked back to his desk and said to somebody, "Where are those pictures?" [Yoichi] Okamoto had taken a lot of pictures of all these negotiations and everything. He pulled out a picture of me, autographed it, "To Joe, with thanks, LBJ," and handed it to me. He said to me something like, "You did a hell of a job," or something, and left.

As soon as that was over in terms of the press and everything else, I wrote a long cable. While they were flying to Texas I wrote a cable about how the negotiations had been settled, what had happened. That was the basis of a backgrounder that the President or Moyers had down at the Ranch to show what the President had done to stave this off. As I said, it was the last 3.2 settlement that we were able to get.

F: Before we talk about that 3.2, in something like this closeting in the EOB, do you put in special electronic and telephonic facilities so that, for instance, Cooper can talk direct line to Roger Blough back and forth?

C: No, no, no. We put phones, just regular telephones, in their meeting rooms. We had basically four rooms over there: we had one room where the parties met together; we had one room where the steel company people were; we had one room where the steel union people were, and they all had phones in them. Then we had a room for Wirtz and Connor.

F: This is the suite of rooms that eventually became Hubert Humphrey's?

C: No, no. They were never used while Johnson was president except for things like this. They had been Johnson's offices. Humphrey went to another floor.

F: Which floor is that on?

C: I can't remember.

F: Well, it doesn't matter.

One other question. Did Wirtz and Connor ever find out that there had been a distinct set of negotiations?

C: No. They knew, or strongly suspected, that we were talking to Goldberg and Clifford, but to my knowledge they never found out that there was a totally independent set of negotiations. There were times at which they would tell me that they had a feeling that there was something else going on and wanted to make sure that they were the negotiators, and I'd reassure them. Let me make it clear, I don't mean to imply that Arthur and Clark Clifford just sat off somewhere and waved the wand and settled it. The whole apparatus was necessary to get this done. Goldberg and Clifford could no more have settled that alone than Wirtz and Connor. What went on at both levels was necessary to go on to bring it in.

F: Did Goldberg boggle at this sort of a division of duties, or did he feel that it was necessary?

C: No, he fully felt it was necessary, fully understood the sensitivities involved in terms of Wirtz, for example, and fully understood--you know, this is not unusual in a labor negotiation. It may not usually be written about in the papers, but it's not unusual in a big labor negotiation.

F: Should we take time to talk about the breakdown of 3.2, or shall we leave it for another time?

C: No, let's pick it up--

F: All right. And one other question. That is, where is Simkin in all of this? Is he feeling hurt?

C: Yes, he is, but let's make that a larger question when we get through all the labor disputes.

F: All right. Thank you.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview III

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