

INTERVIEW XIII

DATE: November 17, 1987

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Califano's office, Washington, D.C.

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C: Before the aluminum price increase in September [1965] as part of the annual budget process, I was pressing to increase the amount of materiel sold from the stockpile. It was one of several things we were doing. One of the key components of that materiel, and one that produced a lot of dollars for us, was aluminum. So I had some familiarity and so did the President with how much aluminum was in the stockpile and how much we could dispose of and how much money we could get for it.

G: Was this something that came from your experience in the Defense Department or was it something motivated by Treasury or--?

C: My recollection is that the President just told me that we should sell more of the stockpile, get more dollars in income in fiscal 1966. So I was just moving off of that, talking to Lawson Knott who was running GSA [General Services Administration] and [Elmer] Staats who was still in the Bureau of the Budget, I guess, as Charlie Schultze's deputy, to see how much we could sell, and to set a target and get them selling it.

There had also been, over the course of the year, meetings between GSA and the aluminum industry at a low working level, and other industries, to try and get the industry

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to agree to some program of reducing the stockpile, without any success. So that when the industry moved to raise in price, in October, they may not have done it with the knowledge that GSA's meetings with them were prompted by me and the President, by the White House, but they certainly did it with the knowledge that at least GSA was interested in disposing of more of the stockpile. And to give you a sense of how before October 29 we were involved, I look at this memo . . .

G: It's from you to the President dated September 8.

C: September 8, 1965, talking about raising our proposed four-hundred-million-dollar program to five hundred to five hundred fifty million in 1966, and six hundred fifty to seven hundred million in 1967. I got a note back from the President saying, "Joe, shouldn't we set goals, call in the congressional leaders, including the chairmen of committees, and sell one million if possible?" I then write a note on this, saying to my secretary to put it on a file behind my desk, which means that it's going to be a day-to-day, red hot operation. Even with respect to aluminum, just aluminum alone, he [Johnson] circles one sentence in a memorandum from Lawson Knott at the General Services Administration which says, "We're still hopeful that [inaudible] arrangements finally worked out. We'll permit an annual disposal rate of at least four hundred thousand short tons. Johnson says this is a must." So that was going on.

Even before that, that's in September, in a memo of August 28 to the President where I just send him a memo on stockpiling sales and Staats suggests that we have a meeting on September 7. I must have realized that the President was hot to do this because I suggest we move the meeting up even a week or two earlier. And he writes, "I

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agree." So we were moving to get rid of the stockpile as a matter of easing the budget pressure and we didn't think we needed it.

We got essentially talk and no action from the aluminum industry, and then on October 29 a small aluminum company, Ormet, raises the price. [Otto] Eckstein--[Gardner] Ackley must have been away--who signing it as acting chairman of the council, sends a memo to the President at the Ranch, noting that there's been an increase of a half of cent from 24 ½ to 25 cents, and two of the big three companies, Reynolds and Kaiser, followed immediately. Alcoa hadn't yet moved.

The memo that Eckstein sent showed the high profits for the aluminum industry and the fifth increase in price in about twenty-five months, high returns on equity. It was the kind of memo that, if you knew the President, was almost designed to send him through the Ranch roof.

When he received that, he called me. I guess the memo went to him on--well, it's received at 4:52 a.m. on Saturday so he really--he receives the memo when he wakes up on Saturday morning and calls me. I don't know if it was the first call of the day for him but it was an early, it was 8:50 his time, 9:50 Washington time. And he was outraged at the increase. He said we couldn't let it stand; it would kick off inflation; it would violate the wage-price guidelines and we had to roll it back. [He] told me to talk to people in the government--[Robert] McNamara, [Henry] Fowler, what have you, and the council--about how to roll it back. He was clearly prepared to do whatever was necessary, dump as much aluminum as possible.

G: Did he mention the stockpile or--?

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C: I'm sure he did.

G: Why do you think they raised the prices? Did they do it to gain a better bargaining position in this--?

C: I think they just wanted to make more money.

G: You don't tie it to their anticipation of the stockpile sales.

C: No. I'm sure, knowing that businessmen usually try and think various things through, that they may have thought about the impact, they factored that in, but I think they did it to make money. They thought they could get away with it.

The story about him being "sputtering mad" is on Monday the first and this was Saturday. I don't know; to this day I don't know how that story got out. Let me just go back. On Saturday I talked to McNamara and all the people listed in my memo of October 30, and we came up with a plan. Basically, the proposal was to try and get Alcoa to hold, not raise the price. If Alcoa would hold, we would agree to a relatively gentle disposal, seventy thousand tons a year for seven years which would get rid of the 1.4 million tons we had in the stockpile. That was essentially the deal the companies wanted. If Alcoa wouldn't agree to hold, we intended to move it out as fast as possible; basically to move it out fast enough to break the price increase, force the companies to roll back because there was so much aluminum on the market.

G: You had described the phone call.

C: Yes, the first phone call. I talked to these people and I sent to the President a memo proposing a course of action. My recollection is that he essentially agreed with that.

G: Was he upset about the "sputtering mad" leak?

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- C: What I'm struggling with is I have a recollection of two things when I go through this. One is that there was a point at which we did indicate--and I don't know whether from Austin or from Washington--to the press that we were concerned about the price increase. We were sensitive as to whether or not to get the President engaged directly because I believed, and others too, that once the President became engaged directly, we had to win. There was no choice. We had to roll it back, whatever it took to roll it back. Secondly, we wanted to try not to get into the sort of "they're all sons of bitches" businessmen problem that President Kennedy had; we were sensitive about that. Nevertheless, we wanted to get some public signal out there because the press was saying, "Was there any response from the administration?" and what have you. One way or another we got a public signal out that there was concern.
- G: Was this sensitivity expressed on the part of LBJ or was this just a general White House attitude that you didn't want to--?
- C: I can't remember. All I know is I knew that once it became LBJ and the aluminum companies, we had to win. It didn't make any difference what we had to do to win, we had to win. We couldn't let him get beaten because then we'd have other price increases. On Sunday, I guess--what day was it? On the first of November, on Monday morning, the *New York Times* ran this story about LBJ is "sputtering mad," and he called me. Even at the time it was amusing; I had a hard time keeping a straight face. He was chewing my ass out, furious about this story. He was "sputtering mad" on the phone to me as he was telling me that he wasn't "sputtering mad" and [asking] who the hell would put a story like that out and who did it. I never knew. I thought maybe Otto Eckstein. You have to

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remember this story appears on the Monday morning after a weekend in which I've got a third of the cabinet, the whole council, working like crazy in terms of what are we going to do, how are we going to roll this price back. I can't remember at this point whether--I guess at some point, Alcoa joined the price increase. Is that right?

G: Yes.

C: Also at some point, maybe it began with that story, it was clear to me that we were going to roll them back. The other recollection I have, and you just have to check the newspaper clips, we leaked a story about putting out maybe a hundred thousand tons of aluminum--I can't remember--some amount of aluminum. There was then concern that that amount wasn't enough to break the price, whatever the companies did, because I remember having to call some reporter from the *Post* or the *Times*, get them over in my office--I have a dim recollection that it was Ed Dale--and tell them we were going to put out even more aluminum. And that clearly was enough to break the price.

(Long pause)

There is one other thing I should mention, which is Fowler was very worried about balance of payments and the fact that we were buying any aluminum from overseas. He normally didn't like these confrontations that we had with business over price increases, but with respect to this one, this was one of the few in which he was enthusiastically aboard, and he was aboard for that reason. That's why that kept appearing in all of our press releases.

G: Was there consensus within the government, White House and the cabinet departments and the agencies involved, GSA, Defense, Commerce?

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C: I guess there was consensus of everybody. I'd have to say Jack Connor, the secretary of commerce, was always a reluctant dragon on this and I think he did not like the aggressive way in which we were doing it. I think he was all for meetings and negotiation on the first round of meetings the GSA and the Defense Department had with the aluminum industry representatives. But when those meetings started to produce nothing and we started playing much harder, I don't think he liked that.

G: How about McNamara?

C: McNamara was with it all the way. He thought the price increase was an outrage; it was inexcusable. He agreed with the council's analysis, and he thought unless we rolled it back we'd face terrible problems. I'll tell you, from a mode of general discussion, once that story appeared about the President being "sputtering mad" and once it became clear to the press that the President was engaged--although he kept trying to keep in the background publicly and I don't think they ever really knew how engaged--from our point of view, at least from my point of view, there was no question but that we had to roll this price back, whatever it took to roll it back.

Part of the reason why we went through the meetings was so that our public posture wouldn't be so arbitrary, and so that none of the cabinet members, even a Connor or a Fowler, could say that we were just throwing this stuff out. We would be in a position to say, "Look, we met with them. We tried to work out a reasonable deal. They won't work out any deal. They're a bunch of greedy guys; therefore, we've got no choice. We've got to dump this stuff." We also had to keep Congress aboard because we only had authority to sell half the stockpile without Congress. We wanted a situation in which

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we didn't have to deal with aluminum price increases not just this month, but for a few years. We also wanted to meet with them and try and work it out because, again, we didn't want to seem to be like Kennedy. Johnson had pretty good relations with the business community.

G: I notice, too, that you had a conversation with Don Cook with regard to this.

C: You know he was a friend of the President's. I just can't remember what we talked about. I'm sure it was aluminum.

(Interruption)

Oh, yes. Okay. I did talk to Cook, I guess at the President's suggestion. This was October 30, so it's Saturday. We'd gotten word that Alcoa had decided to raise the price. I think at the time the President first talked to me, Alcoa may or may not have decided to raise the price. There was a point at which we got that word over the wire. That, coupled with how fast two of the other big three, Reynolds and Kaiser, had moved in response to this little company, the President thought it was just a setup, and that's part of what made him mad as hell. I talked to Cook on that Saturday, the thirtieth, because we were still trying to formulate strategy. Since the President was a good friend of John Harper--I think he was the chairman of Alcoa or chairman of Reynolds [Alcoa]--he [Cook] thought that a quiet conversation with Harper was the way to go, that we should not get into a direct confrontation. Cook also thought that we couldn't make an overwhelming case, and he was also sensitive to the Kennedy stuff.

The President also mentioned two people to me. One was a fellow named Charles Lipsett, who published newspapers in the magazine field. The other was a guy named Joe

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Zimmerman, who we ultimately brought in in copper, and we'll talk about him in connection with copper. Both of whom the President had met when he was chairing the Preparedness Subcommittee in the Senate.

One of the things I also should note, part of the reason was I felt inadequate. I didn't know enough about how the aluminum market worked. We got a lot of stuff out of the CEA [Council of Economic Advisers] but a real sense of how, why guys raised prices, what are the levers you push to get them to roll back. We wanted somebody that really understood the aluminum industry. McNamara did too, because he was really the lead horse in the cabinet. That's what led us to Lipsett. He was an expert in the metals industry.

G: How helpful was Lipsett? What did he do?

C: Well, I didn't meet with him directly. Certainly he was some help to McNamara. Zimmerman, on copper, was invaluable.

G: Really?

C: On Monday, the first of November, we had a cabinet level meeting with McNamara and Fowler, Connor, Knott, others, and issued a statement which expressed our concerns about imports adversely affecting the balance of payments, expanded defense needs for aluminum--do we have that statement here? I can't remember whether that's the first time we put out the two-hundred-thousand-dollar [ton] figure. (Long pause) I think we did not mention any amount of aluminum. There were meetings held during the week with the aluminum industry. They basically did not bear fruit.

Our concern started to increase, however, because there was a point at which

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Clark Clifford called me and told me that he was worried that the aluminum people were close to the steel people and that we were dealing not only with an aluminum price increase but that the steel industry was going to follow with their own price increase. I know I reported that to the President. That only increased our determination.

We then finally, on the fifth of November, Friday, said that we were going to sell two hundred thousand tons in the next twelve months, in 1966. The industry stuck with their hundred thousand tons as all they could take. When that story broke, for some reason, we got concerned that even two hundred thousand tons might not be enough to break the price under any circumstances. I notice that by November 8, that Monday . . . What happened was, after the two hundred thousand figure went out, at some point, for whatever reason, there was some concern. I then leaked to the press--I think it was to Dale, I'll have to just check the stories; I'm not sure he understood the importance, significance of it--that we were prepared to put three hundred thousand tons on the market in 1966. That was followed by--I notice that in a meeting on November 8 that McNamara and [Cyrus] Vance had with Harper and [Leon] Hickman, McNamara tells them that actions were underway for GSA to make available three hundred thousand tons from the stockpile. Hickman asked whether the government contemplated selling three hundred or only two hundred thousand, and McNamara indicated at the present time two hundred thousand was a matter of immediate concern. The future would determine what would happen with respect to the balance. It was basically a tactic to let them know that we would dump whatever amount of aluminum it was necessary to dump in order to break the price just in sheer market terms. We would sell it not to the aluminum industry

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but we'd sell it direct to people that needed it.

G: Was that an issue, the public sale issue rather?

C: Yes. The public sale was an issue. Aluminum wanted to buy it all and we said [not] under any circumstance would we let it. When we ultimately put the GSA announcement out, the GSA announcement, if my recollection is correct, indicated that we would take all bids on the first hundred thousand tons. McNamara and Vance had this meeting on the night of the eighth. On the morning of the ninth we put out the GSA release on the first hundred thousand tons. We sent bids to three hundred firms, and we basically were turning the screw up.

I remember, then, on the tenth of November the president of Kaiser Aluminum and Lloyd Cutler, who was his Washington lawyer, came in to see McNamara and ask what action would be required in terms of prices. McNamara said, "A rollback." Cutler argued that this wasn't fair, that there had to be some compromise, and they said maybe they'd roll back only part way the way Olin Mathieson had done. After that meeting, McNamara said there was no give; they had to roll all the way back. Bob called me and they tried to come and see me at the White House. We decided that I wouldn't see them and we wouldn't let them in the gate, that there was no point in seeing them. There was no give. We had to be very tough.

G: Who made that decision?

C: Bob and I. I just can't remember, but we were tough. At this point, as I said, we really were in a mode of we were going to roll them back whatever it took.

G: Was there any question of the legality here or was it simply a question of posturing the

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administration?

C: No, the only issues we were worried about on legality were whether the companies would say, "We can't make a deal; it violates the antitrust laws if we all agree to buy this aluminum." We talked to [Nicholas] Katzenbach about that--or had not talked to him. There was no problem. With no movement from the companies on the ninth, going a week into this fight or nine days, we also started to look at other areas. I talked to [Joseph] Swidler about the charges that the Tennessee Valley Authority made to the aluminum industry and whatever public power we controlled through the Federal Power Commission or the TVA or what have you. He was chairman of the Federal Power Commission. Talked to him about what we could do in terms of what we were charging the aluminum companies. It was really a two-edged conversation. We could either threaten them by increasing the rates we were charging them, and in effect say, "We're going to get this money back in the government. You raise the prices; we'll just raise the rates." Or, if we wanted to have a carrot instead of a stick, we could have used holding rates, saying we'll hold them for a while. But we were much more in the stick mode at this point in time.

G: How did the industry react to this element?

C: I don't know if the industry knew--well, I just don't know, I can't remember. I'm sure nobody directly told the industry this. Okay? Whether we leaked that Swidler was looking at this or whether I may have told Swidler to do some things so the industry would know he was looking at it, I don't know.

I'm reminded of something else. We also wanted to talk to Katzenbach about

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whether or not we could bring antitrust actions against them for raising the price, for price conspiracy. We undoubtedly made the industry aware of that. We may have done some of that through Clark Clifford and we may have done some of that in the course of meetings with the industry saying, "There is concern about why all the prices were raised at the same time and whether there is price fixing here or conspiracy to fix prices." We tried to do that in a gingerly way because, again, we were conscious of the Kennedy thing. We were also conscious of the fact that we wanted to keep business aboard. But they knew, and that made them very angry.

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C: I can't remember. I just remember McNamara talking to me. I remember Connor and others saying this is really--I know Connor and Fowler didn't like that at all.

G: Really?

C: But we kept turning the screw up because we weren't getting any response. On November 9 I also got a memo from Katzenbach in which he let me know that the Justice Department had four suits and seven investigations but that they were mostly related to acquisitions. There was some concern *vis-à-vis* the stockpile but, by and large, the industry was an oligopoly and they were acting like an oligopoly. We then talked about price control legislation. We also talked about the fact that one of the reasons McNamara was so deeply involved was that the government had the power to compel defense contractors to use aluminum out of the stockpile and to process aluminum. We also had the power to--if the aluminum companies refused to process the stockpile of aluminum, we could sue them under the antitrust laws and make life miserable for them. They must

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have been getting the same kind of information from their own lawyers as they started to look at this.

(Long pause)

Some point on the tenth of November, Harper and Hickman indicated to McNamara that they would rescind the price increase and we'd indicated that we were trying to reach an agreement for orderly disposal of the million, four hundred thousand tons of aluminum. (Long pause) I notice that in the recap there's an indication of a story in the *Wall Street Journal* that in the aluminum industry there were hints of antitrust action, review of rates charged for federally produced electricity, IRS [Internal Revenue Service] audits of tax returns and studies to substitute other materials for aluminum defense and AID [Agency for International Development] projects. There were studies to substitute other materials for aluminum. On the IRS audits I don't remember whether we used that with aluminum but either with aluminum or steel I think through Clifford and maybe through [Abe] Fortas--I just can't remember--we sent out the word that we would certainly audit the hell out of the expense accounts of the executives of these companies.

G: Was that easy to do? Was that something that IRS would be responsive to, a request from the White House?

C: Well, Johnson used to say that there are two jobs that he would want his mother to hold, and only his mother. One was the attorney general's job and the other was the commissioner of the IRS. Yes, I think they would have been responsive. It was unnecessary. I think there is no business executive that would want a meticulous scrubbing of his personal expense account. Just think of all the use of company aircraft

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and that whole arena. I guess the indication that was made with what the CIA would call deniability was done through somebody like Clark Clifford and it was done so that he could, in effect, just warn people that this is something that might happen, not that anyone threatened to do it.

The bottom point of aluminum was that from our point of view looking ahead to the price pressures, there was no question that that price had to be rolled back. Aside from that one day in which the President really didn't talk to me, the "sputtering mad" day, he was intimately involved in this. I mean minute by minute, hour by hour in what we were doing.

G: Did he relate it to his experiences on the Preparedness Subcommittee?

C: Whether he believed it or not, I don't know. But he certainly talked about, "I know how these stockpiles were built up. These stockpiles were built up because these companies put pressure on. They wanted their prices supported." They sort of ripped the government off in the first place, and they had no clean hands, if you will, when they came to the table. He certainly felt that and talked about that. I think all of us viewed it--and he did--as a test from business on prices, especially once Clifford said that he thought steel was watching this very carefully and that there were some hints that steel might raise the price which, of course, they tried to do on New Year's Eve. There was no question that we felt we had to roll this price back. And the council was really stoking the fires. I don't mean that they were being inflammatory in an irresponsible way but I mean they were really banging in there saying, "This is unjustified; this is wrong. This will really open the floodgates. We're going to have a hell of a mess on our hands. And

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we've got to roll the price back."

G: Were there appeals to patriotism, too, in the Vietnam--?

C: Sure. There were appeals, not as strong as the appeals that were later made to the steel industry. Absolutely, Vietnam was part of it. Balance of payments, as I said, was part of it. But I think it was the right thing to do. You should do this. This is what you should do for your country. But there was also the constant pressure. There was no question that we were prepared to turn the screw as hard as we had to turn it to get the price rollback. I think that's why they did it, and McNamara announced it in the context of the public interest. I give them credit for that but they also had to realize that there was no way that we were going to sit still and not turn the screws as far as we had to turn them to get it rolled back.

G: There was one suggestion that this was a classic case of using all the levers in government that were available to accomplish an objective.

C: Yes, I guess we were using all the levers that were available to accomplish an objective. There is no question about that. We used every one we could find. It also is a reflection of how much Johnson knew about government. When I stop and think about, you know, when he talked to me about the Federal Power Commission and how much the federal government was charging for electricity to the aluminum companies and what we could do to their rates, and I just think about something like that, remembering this guy in the Preparedness Subcommittee. Of course, he knew Harper well. Harper was a friend. I don't know whether their friendship was torn over this or not. Did Harper have a ranch in Texas? He may have--

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G: Yes. Were there any long-range consequences of this?

C: Oh, I think this and then copper and then steel all in 1965 made it clear that we would not tolerate price increases, and, yes, I think economists would have to do the calculations: what is it worth, how many points on the consumer price index? But it was certainly worth something. He got emotional and he ultimately held a press conference. I think we all regarded Hickman as not very smart and really playing into our hands. He didn't have Harper's breadth. He wasn't as shrewd as Cutler, for example. They were mad as hell if they couldn't get to see me, which was a decision we had made, partly because I didn't want to put the President out too far in front. I notice that somebody in the White House even indicated to Evans and Novak that it wasn't all directed by him, but it was. Partly because if we kept it focused on defense and forced them to meet with McNamara, forced them to meet with Vance, we constantly had the flag, we felt, at least up there. It was the Defense Department, our boys, what's going on in Vietnam and talking to them all the time.

In addition, we were fortunate because we had our strongest cabinet officer in the Defense Department and we had somebody that was with us. It's very unlikely, if not inconceivable, that Joe Fowler or Jack Connor would have ever been able to conduct these negotiations. The thought of Fowler, for example, or Connor dropping on Hickman the fact that we might go to three hundred thousand tons is just not in the cards. But McNamara, once it became clear that two hundred thousand alone might not be enough to break the price and we had to have enough out there. As I said, I know I told it to Dale; [I don't know] whether he understood it. But we ultimately got it out and then Bob putting

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it out to these guys, you know that kind of thing was very important.

I also doubt very much that I would have talked to Connor or Fowler about my conversations with Swidler or my conversations with Katzenbach on using the antitrust laws or any conversations I had with Clifford, for example, about the possible IRS [audits]. The IRS thing was something Kennedy had used and that was kind of like an atomic bomb for these guys, or a red flag for a bull, however you want to put it. I remember we did use it once; I can't remember with respect to which industry. We really didn't want to use that.

G: Johnson, I gather, had some sensitivity to that aspect.

C: Yes, he was sensitive because it was sort of like wiretapping. He was dead against wiretapping on the one hand. On the other hand, he didn't mind reading or hearing whatever they got from [Martin Luther] King. And I think part of it also was not unrelated to Bobby Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy's total ruthlessness in the context of something like this and all the wiretapping he did, whatever IRS threats he used, there was some of that.

G: You mentioned the "sputtering mad." Was there a period in here when you couldn't communicate with the President when he was out of [reach]?

C: It wasn't as bad as Watts. Okay? I guess it seemed longer to me, but I tried to call him on the day of that "sputtering mad" story and he just never returned the call. It was the one day that he was out of pocket.

G: You had read it before he did or at least--

C: Well, I knew from somebody--I don't know from whom--that he was really pissed about

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it. As I said, I never knew who did it. If it was somebody like Otto Eckstein, inadvertently, he's gone to his grave so we'll never know.

G: Did the Peter Hurd painting come up during any of these discussions?

C: I have no recollection of it. I see that now when I look at the diaries and obviously that was part of why he was really so angry. He was angry. He was really mad at these guys. He felt betrayed, double-crossed, and he felt that they were not patriotic. We didn't do it here, but I remember with the steel increase on New Year's Eve, he had me brief the press that these guys were doing this at a time when our boys were dying in Vietnam. Talk about making people mad. That made the steel executives mad, but they were dumb to move on New Year's Eve.

(Interruption)

G: You said you called Edgar Kaiser.

C: I called Edgar Kaiser. At first I couldn't get him; he was in Israel. I finally ran him down in Israel, and I talked to him on the fifth of November and asked him to get his company to roll back the price. That was what precipitated the visit of Cutler and the president of Kaiser Aluminum to see Secretary McNamara and ask what could be done.

(Long pause)

G: You needed congressional approval to sell the balance of that 1.4 million.

C: We needed congressional approval and there was an effort, and [Lawrence] O'Brien did most of that effort. My calls in my telephone book here to [Senator Everett] Dirksen and [Senator Mike] Mansfield and others were more related to [Robert] Weaver in the Department of Housing and Urban Development than to this. I don't think I spent much

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time--I'm sure I took any call that came on it but I don't think I spent much time. I think I told Larry O'Brien what we were doing and had him keep them informed.

G: Did the aluminum industry attempt to exert any influence through the Congress?

C: None that I felt or remember.

G: They didn't have any senators or congressmen call you?

C: No, I think we probably pre-empted all that. Once we started on our strategy I'd tell O'Brien and he'd have his people start calling all the key people. [Stuart] Symington is one senator that I did talk to about this and I guess--whether he was with Johnson on the Preparedness Subcommittee or for whatever reason, I did tell Symington what we were about. We weren't asking for agreement or disagreement or support or anything in a public sense. What I'm struggling with, is it would not have been unusual in cases like this for us to call some key congressmen, senators and members of the House, and ask them to make a public statement supporting the President or calling on the industry to roll the price back. If statements like that appeared in the press, I'm sure we inspired them.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XIII


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
Joseph A. Califano

Interviewed by: Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz and Michael L. Gillette

I, Joseph A. Califano, hereby remove the restrictions on the use of the transcripts and recordings that states, "During my lifetime I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. During my lifetime researchers may publish 'fair use' quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without my express consent in each case." of the sixty-three personal interviews conducted with me by Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz, and Michael L. Gillette, currently at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. (see attachment for interview details)


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July 17, 2019
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