INTERVIEW XXVII

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INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Califano's office, Washington, D.C.

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C: --I don't really know, unless you've got specific stuff. I think that's inaccurate.

G: Okay. On the legislative battle, your initial problem was in the House Subcommittee chaired by William Barrett of Philadelphia.

C: Yes. Let me just say so we get it on the record. I mean I do think that the *Times* story--

G: This is the [Robert] Semple article--

C: --[the] Semple article of November 4, 1966, is an accurate portrayal of the battle. Maybe what I can do is just to add a, just adopting that by and large, add a little of this sort of, you know, with some reflection of the problem. It reflected in part in the *Washington Post* editorial, which said in view of the monumental problem, we weren't asking for enough money. And that was also the editorial position of the *New York Times* and many liberals. Secondly, the feeling that the bill was an instrument a) to help blacks and big city blacks, which was the perception, and secondly, it was also to force segregation, because one of the requirements of a Model Cities was that they'd attack segregation head on. Those varying interests put us in a position. While I was going on in the press, what

we were faced with was liberals and liberal editorial writers saying, "Not enough," the Congress saying, "Too much, 2.3 billion is too much," and the southern Democrats also saying, "We're not going to give another tool to desegregate," or, "We're not going to keep giving money to blacks." And the other thing which was in the *Times* story and I'd forgotten, in the back of our minds, we always thought that urban renewal had been a questionable value. Therefore we didn't ask for much money in urban renewal funds in 1966. But some of the same people who were bitching that the Model Cities bill of 2.3 billion was too much, also wanted urban renewal money. I mean it's the complicated problem of putting all those votes together and legislating. So one of the things we ultimately agreed to, as we trimmed back the years of authorization for the Model Cities bill, was to put more money in urban renewal, to get some of the Housing Subcommittee votes.

Now, the things, the little things that I remember, not in this piece, one, the President got very annoyed about laying out the five-year 2.3 billion dollar program. Even though, incidentally, that 2.3 billion dollar [amount] was really a very low number. The reality was we'd spent twice as much on the program. It wouldn't average four hundred million a year; it would average eight or nine hundred million a year, once it got going. And in effect, at one point he was so annoyed that he ordered me not to ever let anyone make up estimates three or four years out. He didn't want them. He didn't want them available. We never should have given them.

G: He was annoyed because of the political consequences?

C: It scared people, just political consequences. It scared people. And one of our great allies, [Abraham] Ribicoff, was constantly pressing to get costs out into the later years so

they knew what they were voting for. And then the President said if we were just asking for ten million, we'd have it right away and we wouldn't have all these problems.

The other thing that I remember was the day when the President sent [Lawrence] O'Brien and me out to see [Edmund] Muskie, and then we couldn't get Muskie to really agree and we came back and the President said, you know, go after him again and I got him to--

G: Go through the whole background of that. I realize it's in the story but I think you'll flush it out some if you'd describe--did you first try to get [John] Sparkman to carry--

C: We had no advocate in the Senate for the bill. Sure, if Sparkman was the chairman he would have [been] ideal. We couldn't get him. He had other fish to fry. He didn't want to take it. He didn't see anything in it for him. He saw another monumental civil rights battle.

G: Yes. How about [Paul] Douglas?

C: Douglas was a wonderful man, but, in the President's mind and in reality, he was [a] senator who, Johnson used to say, you know, "couldn't pass the Lord's Prayer." He just was not a legislator who knew how to legislate. Johnson used to tell a wonderful story about Douglas and the Fair Employment Practices bill. You must have this already.

G: (Indicates no.)

C: Well, as the President told it, he had the Fair Employment Practices that--they'd been trying to pass the Fair Employment Practices Bill in the Senate for years--Johnson was the majority leader--with no success. It was Douglas' bill. And finally one evening, the President saw an opportunity to just roll it right through. And he did, in about three minutes, rolled it through the Senate. Douglas came onto the floor, shouting, red-faced,

angry at the President saying, "You passed this bill." We didn't have any debate; we didn't have anything, whereupon the President said, "I turned to Douglas, I said, 'Look, give me your goddamned speech. I'll stick it in the [*Congressional*] *Record*. Advance of passing the bill. If you'd made that speech we'd never pass the bill.'"

But in any case, so Douglas was going to be. Muskie had a subcommittee, which was the right subcommittee. Because we had no advocate in the Senate, most of the action was in the House and also, for some reason, the House was in those years--you know, House and Senate sort of take the lead on different kinds of things, just the way today, for example, with a strong, you know, with a guy like [Congressman] Billy Ford and the Education Subcommittee in the House or what have you. The House is much, is the leader in education legislation. The House was more involved in the housing arena and in this arena. So we were focused on the House. When [it] appeared we could get it out of the subcommittee, the President said, "You've to strike right away in the Senate. Now, go after Muskie." I mean that day. And I called Muskie and we went up to see him, Larry O'Brien and myself. We argued with him about the bill. He had a lot of reservations about it.

G: What were his reservations?

C: Oh, he thought it was too complex. He thought it wouldn't be politically viable because it was too oriented towards big cities. He thought we were trying to do too many things at the same time. So it was kind of a--you know, if it were going to do such great things to big cities, why couldn't we get somebody in a big city that had some interest in it or a stake. It was not a good, I mean, we came out of that meeting. I mean Muskie was a smart enough politician. He never said no, and he never said yes at that stage. But he had

clearly tilting very strongly no. We came back, reported to the President, just found it totally unacceptable.

G: What did he say? What was the President's [reaction]?

C: Oh, I can't remember the words. But he just said, you know, "You've got to get with him again, see him again, talk to him again." By this time, I worked for Johnson long enough to know that, you know, you kept beating and beating and beating and hopefully you found a crack.

G: Was there any *quid pro quo*? Was there anything that Muskie wanted that you could--?

C: He was not bargaining for anything. I mean he obviously wanted to make sure some cities and names were covered, would be ultimately. It was not a situation which we were dealing with a guy that wanted something. It wasn't even like whacking some more urban renewal money. So I, Muskie, came back to my office, called Muskie. He said he was going to Maine the next day. I said, "Stop here on the way to Maine." I mean, I remember--I don't know why I remember--I remember having steak for lunch in my office. The President told me to get [Hubert] Humphrey, and get him there, at the luncheon. So Larry O'Brien and Humphrey and I had lunch with Muskie and his aide, Don Nicoll. We talked about it. The lunch was really in the context of, "What kinds of changes would you like to see that would get you to carry this bill?" We weren't just asking him to vote for it, remember. We were asking him to take it on. And that also meant putting himself on the line.

G: Had he studied the bill very carefully?

C: Muskie knew the bill. Yes, he did know the bill. He was a thoughtful young legislator. And you know, in those days, many senators were more with the details than they are now.

That lunch ended with a sort of, you know, a vague agreement that we would come up to see him in Maine and put something together. I reported that to the President. He said, "You're going up tomorrow." And so I, well, I called Muskie. He agreed. We worked through the night, putting together--I don't even know if they exist anymore--we put together a loose leaf book. And I think I took Schultze--I think O'Brien, maybe Charlie Schultze came up with us, I don't know. To Maine. And Don Nicoll. Maybe it was just Larry and me.

G: The Semple article said that Hanna, yourself--

C: Phil Hanna?

G: Yes.

C: Yes. Hanna was from the Bureau of the Budget. I took somebody from the Bureau of the Budget with [me] because I didn't want to make a mistake. It was likely to be a nuts-and-bolts meeting and I didn't want to agree to something that I'd then have to call Muskie and back off of. So we went up, Hanna--

G: Did you take an air force plane?

C: We took a plane and the thing that I remember so vividly, the weather was terrible in Kennebunkport. It was terrible. And the pilot didn't want to land. You know, we said we had to land. He didn't want to land. They checked back with the White House and either Marvin Watson or whoever was running, I mean the President said, "Land the goddamned airplane." So we landed. We had fire trucks. We had these air force

colonels and generals, whatever, out there. I mean it was really incredible. And then we went and we did; we sat around. I know it's in the article; we had this fantastic lobster stew that Jane Muskie cooked and we there agreed to a bill, and basically with few, with very few exceptions that was the bill that passed, and mainly having the authorization only for two years after the first year, instead of the full five, that was the only difference. And that was the bill that passed the Senate and there weren't many differences between that bill and what we got out of the House.

G: Was the integration requirement removed at this point?

C: I can't remember. But at some point, it was taken out. Our view was that we didn't lose a lot by that because we had every federal dollar so tied up with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that we had it anyway. But it's interesting, in the real world, the bill was not passable without the mandate in there.

G: Did you stay over or did you fly back the same day?

C: We flew back the same day. [The] weather was a little better later in the day, I remember. But we flew back the same day. And we had it. I mean, I think we even--I probably called the President from the airplane, and he was very much, this was, you know, [his] consuming determination to get this bill.

Then rolling it through the House, I mean my memories of the House--I do remember that phone call; I mean I remember saying that we can't possibly pass it. I remember two meetings. One, a meeting with the subcommittee, in which it was so hot. Actually no, it was the meeting on the floor vote. It was a very tense meeting. Speaker [John] McCormack didn't want to put it on the floor. He didn't think we had the votes unless we had another major presidential statement. Everybody agreed that was

necessary. We were arguing with Bill Barrett, who was the chairman of the subcommittee. Barrett had a toupee. It was so hot--we were all dripping with sweat, whatever little room we were in--that his toupee started to peel back.

G: Curl up?

C: Curl up. And I had great difficulty not laughing--(laughter)--because I was head-to-head with him, arguing about it. And then I went over to the phone, and the President had just had a press conference in response to a question, come out very strongly for the bill.

G: That had not been coordinated with you though? I mean he didn't do it--?

C: That was just a good fortune. I mean, he knew we needed everything we could get to get that bill passed. And once given the opportunity, he was going to, you know, he was smart enough to say all the right things.

G: Initially, getting it out of the subcommittee--I have a note that you mobilized Hubert Humphrey, that Barrett refused to advance the bill unless some[one], either the President or someone who spoke for him, would issue a strong statement in behalf of the Administration's bill and it was arranged for Humphrey to give a statement. Do you recall that? Were you involved in that aspect?

C: I was but I just don't have the present recollection. I mean, I was as much involved in this bill as any bill. But, you know, Humphrey was a great asset in a bill like this.

G: What would he do?

C: Well, I mean he was an asset in talking to guys like Barrett and issuing a statement, doing whatever anybody asked him to do. I mean, it's an impossible job being vice president.

G: Would you describe the [Robert] Hardesty speechwriting operation and how it was plugged into this particular legislative battle.

C: Well, I can't. I mean, I don't really have a present recollection of it. I mean, we wrote many speeches for members of Congress. And we had an on-going daily operation, in which we would write speeches in support of our legislation. And then have--which Hardesty's operation would produce for the various congressmen and senators. And then Larry O'Brien's people would go up and get them placed. On something like this, where we had a major bill--I mean we'd really rev that up and we'd try and get guys to say things we really needed to be said so that we could then later quote them and sign them. I mean, that was called the Hardesty speech operation. That was pure Lyndon Johnson; I mean, that was, who, as you know, read the *Record* every day.

G: What other forms of lobbying were employed?

C: Oh I'm sure we, well, we went after the interest groups, get the housing people and others to support us. You know what happens, it's more commonly known now, but it wasn't really, people didn't appreciate it. You know, if the president was from Texas, as Johnson was, the homebuilders would kind of elect a president of the homebuilders from Texas, or the housing groups would elect people that were wise or knew him or we'd suggest people we'd hope they'd look at. Johnson was very effective, both in knowing where all those groups stood, knowing who they could really put pressure on, and knowing how we could put pressure on them. And you know, it was always carrots and sticks, a little urban renewal money and on the one hand, on the other hand you won't, you know, you won't get this if you don't help us with the Model Cities bill. And we went after those groups.

The other thing about this bill was this was also--part of what, and I think if you total up just the numbers, we'd probably passed more legislation in 1966 than we did in 1965, in terms of bills. And part of getting something like this passed was making it a

presidential bill and making it a presidential priority. And part of that, when you look at the Semple story and think about it, it's the President saying things. But it's also these congressmen and senators on the Hill seeing the kind of commitment he's making by using his own staff resources, by, you know, sending us up there, time and time again to meet with member after member.

G: Was he more involved in this bill than the other legislation?

C: No. I think he became involved--I mean he was involved in legislation as it became necessary. And in some cases, it was, you know, more necessary than in others. I mean if you'll look at, you know, auto safety at the right times he said the right things. Now, that didn't present the kind of battle this did. I mean, that was on a fly through. But you know, he was deeply involved in the Transportation Department legislation. He got as involved as he had to.

G: Yes. Were there specific instances where you had to assure a member that there would be a model city in his district? For example, Joe Evins getting one in Summerville, Tennessee.

C: I don't think we would have ever made. I mean I just--the answer is I don't remember. Larry might remember. But I don't think we would have ever made an absolute hard commitment, for fear that a member would tell somebody else and we'd end up having to commit fifty cities. I think we were wise enough to know that if Bill Barrett was from Philadelphia, and he was the chairman of the subcommittee, and he was willing to come with us and drive this bill, which was, you know, we were talking about a bill that moved out of the subcommittee by one vote, I think. I think Bill Barrett would have considered us, let's say, ungrateful if Philadelphia didn't qualify or some neighborhood in

Philadelphia didn't qualify for a Model Cities grant. So in that sense, I'm sure, you know, in the real world you take care of people. But it was the situation--it was not a situation which we'd do something that didn't make any sense. The reality was that, you know, we had whatever the combination was: six, ten, and fifty, or six, fifteen, and fifty, in different sizes of cities. There were thousands of cities that could qualify for a Model Cities grant. So it wasn't a situation in which we were just giving you something you absolutely didn't need. We weren't sinking a (inaudible). It's like placing a military installation. It's no accident that South Carolina, you know, almost, as they said, almost sunk into the ocean from the weight of the military installations when they had both the chairman of the House and the chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee from that state. But we needed the military installations. Where they happened to be placed . . . .

G: Okay. The floor votes were very close. Were you involved in rounding up members of Congress or senators for those?

C: I'm sure. I have no recollection of it but I'm sure I was on the phone. There, it would really be under the direction of O'Brien or somebody, with Henry Wilson on the House side and Mike Manatos on the Senate side, who would say, "You better call X, Y, or Z." Sometimes, I don't think in either body we had any floor amendments, but on some legislation it would be, "Can we put an amendment together that could just shave this a little bit" or . . . . So we have it in case we need it.

G: What was [Robert] Weaver's role in pressing for the legislation?

C: Well, Weaver was not good on the Hill in the sense that--he wasn't bad on the Hill; he just wasn't strong. Nobody in the department was really strong on the Hill. [Robert] Wood was a professor; [Charles] Haar was a professor; and Weaver in his own funny way

was a combination government bureaucrat/professor. They were not strong lobbyists, and they would never have been capable of moving this legislation. Now, I'm not sure anybody that was secretary of HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] would have been capable of moving this legislation. I mean it was such a dramatically different kind of thing. It upset so many existing relationships that I'm not sure anybody short of the President [could have passed the legislation]. You know, we had an urban renewal program and we had some housing programs. And that's sort of how we dealt with cities, and they were just barrels of money. And they just got rolled out and you'd just line up for grants. The issue wasn't whether you'd get a grant; the issue was when. You just got in line; you file for your urban renewal grant; you got a number; you ultimately came up.

We were coming in with a bill that said no longer is the issue when; the issue was whether. We're going to rebuild six major city ghettos; we're going to rebuild fifty other cities or fifteen middle-sized. And, you know, out of twenty-five thousand cities in the United States, if it was fifty, fifteen, and six, we were going to provide seventy-one; seventy-one are going to get into this program. I mean when you start with three hundred and sixty-four members of Congress saying, "I'm going to get screwed." You start there, and you need more than half of four hundred and thirty-five to get it through. So it was just a dramatically different kind of thing.

G: Was there a--

C: And Weaver also was not capable of dealing with the conservatives, partly because he was black and they, well, they acceded because Johnson very shrewdly did Weaver's appointment and what have you. Well, they acceded to the appointment and confirmed

him and everything, didn't make a big hullabaloo or blew over it. We were still in the world in which blacks didn't have many votes in the South. In terms of local politics, you know that Weaver was not an asset. He was a burden to them. Remember, it's a world, and maybe it's still that world, in which I can--Carl Vinson, as Johnson used to say, used to hold up editorials from the *Washington Post* back home in Georgia or South Carolina or wherever and say, "By God, look at what they say, these awful bastards up there in Washington."

G: At one point, Weaver made a speech in Dallas to, I believe it was to homebuilders or the mayors, to the effect that urban renewal money would be increased, that this would not--

C: Right. That was all orchestrated by that time, some way to send the signal out. The reason we used Weaver, rather than doing it directly from the White House, was that we didn't want to get in the--we were ready to do that, but we didn't want the President who was, you know, the tight-fisted budgeteer. We didn't want that coming from the White House.

G: Yes. But it was not in opposition to--

C: I think he did it at our direction.

G: Okay. Was there some kind of rural balance for model cities that would simultaneously offer something to the members from rural districts?

C: Well, that was the fifty small cities. We, you know, did we have a farm program or something like that? The answer is no. But in a perfect world, where there were no politics and we didn't have to get votes--I'm not saying that's a perfect world--but if we were living in that kind of a world, we would have gone with six cities, the kind of thing that [Walter] Reuther and I talked about that first afternoon. And we would have taken a

piece of Detroit or a piece of New York or a piece of Philadelphia or Los Angeles, whatever, and done it. And my hunch is if even after it passed in terms of the body politic, most people thought that that's what this bill was about.

G: How did the status of OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] impact on the development of Model Cities?

C: The part of the original Model Cities legislation that called for putting together, in effect, a community board was, in our view, really a reflection of everything from, you know, Edgar Kaiser's sense that you get business and labor in to getting the blacks and the poor in and getting the whole community involved. The way that was read by the mayors of the country was more of the problems that the community action boards were creating all over the country in OEO, creating a set of political machinery that was totally independent of them. Didn't depend on them for money. Didn't depend on them for anything. And we ultimately had to back down and put clearly in the hands of the mayors the power to approve those boards, set them up, in effect pick them. The mayors ended up with enough power in the bill as it was passed to totally control those boards. We never would have been able to pass the bill without them. OEO was doing something very important but we were paying the inevitable price for that, which was that it, the concept of community action boards, was going to have a limited life in terms of federal funding.

G: Did OEO see Model Cities as a competitor or a threat to its own existence or funding?

C: I don't have a recollection of that. I don't have a recollection that they might have but I don't have a recollection of Shriver bitching or complaining about it. From where my recollection is that from where I was sitting, the experience of local politicians with

community action boards created a problem for taking an analogous concept and putting it in the Model Cities program. And we weren't able to do it.

G: Yes. But did you, yourself, see this as ultimately a substitute for community action?

C: No.

G: The *New York Times* article describes two meetings in which the--it was at the White House--where it was almost assumed that the bill was dead. And you and O'Brien took the position that its death is premature.

C: Well, you'll have to remember a couple of things. That's right. I mean Larry was very good--I think I mentioned yesterday--Weaver and Wood didn't want this legislation to go forward at this time. They considered themselves overwhelmed with trying to build a department. And they were, to the point where, as I think I mentioned, my recollection is that Larry Levinson indeed literally wrote Weaver's testimony. So we didn't have any sense that they were pushing that hard. Secondly, I think both Larry and I were, you know, highly skeptical of their skills and experience in terms of the Hill. Wood, as I said, was a professor, an academic. Haar was an academic. And Weaver, in his own way, was sort of academic and a bureaucrat. So we didn't have sense that they were fighting the way they should fight or even that they knew how they should fight.

G: Yes. The Ribicoff hearings on the urban situation, very dramatic, highly publicized hearings--

(Interruption)

I'd asked you about the Ribicoff's hearings.

C: Well, Ribicoff held hearings on the cities and on the government's, what he considered to be our lack of responsiveness in terms of coordinating the cities' programs and not putting

enough into the cities. The President regarded those hearings as adversarial as far as the administration was concerned. Ribicoff considered them, in my conversations with him, to be--I mean he agreed that they were critical of the administration but he thought they would help get more funds into the cities. I think it's fair to say we thought they were something of the circus. I mean I'm sure there are several issues we had with them. The major issue I remember was, and it got to this question of--he wanted five-year projections on all kinds of cities programs and the President was adamant in not letting any numbers like that out of the government to the point where as I said, I mean it was in this connection that I think he said, you know, "You ought to have Charlie Schultze just destroy all those numbers. Let's not keep those numbers. Let's not have them around. They're only trouble because we won't be able to get our programs funded." I think we also thought that Ribicoff's hearings would hurt us in terms of the Model Cities bill, that they would start off all the old fears that people had. And lastly, I think the President thought that the hearings would be inflammatory and would keep fanning the flames--we had some disturbances in the cities that summer. And would keep fanning the flames of racial strife in the cities. But there was no turning Ribicoff off.

G: Was there a Kennedy versus Johnson element to those hearings because Robert Kennedy was very prominent and it seems that the witnesses associated with the Kennedys received a much lighter treatment than those who were not, or had not been.

C: I mean I can't, you know, do I have evidence? No. But I'm sure there was a Kennedy-Johnson--you know, and to the extent that Ribicoff tilted, he would tilt towards Kennedy, not towards Johnson.

G: But did LBJ feel that this was a Bobby Kennedy operation?

C: I just don't remember. If Kennedy was prominently involved in those hearings, the answer would be I'm sure he did. (Laughter) Or it would be unusual for him not to. But I know that he was very annoyed with Ribicoff. I mean, I think it's interesting to note *vis á vis* Johnson that that doesn't . . . . After the hearings were over, or even during the hearings, you know, after the first round but before they were over on September 15, I write to the President and I say, as you know, "Putting together next year's legislative programs, I think I should see Ribicoff and Kennedy and ask them for their ideas." He said, "Go and see them and approve that." I think Johnson always realized you had to work with everybody in the future and you know, some would be with you on one thing and be against you on another or you just had to use whatever you had. But it did not make him any less unhappy about those hearings.

G: There was a lot of dramatic testimony.

C: And Ribicoff, I think, if I'm correct, I don't know what (inaudible) he had no legislative authority. I may be wrong, but I think it was very much no legislation came out of those hearings.

G: There was a lot of dramatic testimony on the plight of the cities and the slums. Did this have an impact, do you think, on the passage of Model Cities ultimately?

C: I think if anything you'd really have to talk to O'Brien. My hunch would be that if it had any impact, it was adverse. It would scare people. It gave more in continuing attention to the disturbances we'd had that summer.

C: In this connection, the Rat Extermination bill came up and was defeated. If you'll recall, it was made light of and H. R. Gross had a cat bill substitute, proposing that cats be brought in to take care of the rats.

C: Was it the Rat Extermination Act of 1966?

G: Yes.

C: Do we have the stuff on it? I'd like you to--

G: Okay.

C: I'd like you to get that. Let me tell you that bill--I don't know when we sent it up. Was it part of the cities program? Was it a separate bill?

G: I think it was separate, yes. But it came up during this time.

C: Yes. Well, when we were sending the bill up, Weaver was worried about the bill. He was worried [about] ridicule, or what we were doing, or what have you. I told that to the President. The President said to me, "Has Bob Weaver ever been bitten by a rat? Does he know what it's like to live in a ghetto and in a bed where rats come and eat children?" Then Gross took to the floor. I saw that and I think the President did almost simultaneously as a marvelous opportunity to really let him have it in the chops. They voted the bill down, as I recall, on one day. I got some pictures from an OEO report. I called Shriver and I said, "You must have something about rats." [He said], "Yes, we have some pictures of children who have been bitten by rats or had pieces of their limbs eaten by rats." The President issued a statement, if my recollection is right, blasting the House for not passing the bill. And I went out to the press briefing room with these pictures.

(Interruption)

And the House turned itself the next day, I think, and passed the bill.

(Interruption)

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G: Anything else on the legislative battle?

C: On Model Cities?

G: Yes.

C: Not that I can think of.

G: In retrospect, did the bill turn out as you hoped it would?

C: Yes, I think--my view, in retrospect, is that the bill we got passed was a fully workable bill. I think the tragedy was that the program was not far enough off the ground. [The] Nixon Administration took it as a symbol. And I think it's one of the first, you know, one of the few, of our programs that they were able to knock out. I mean had Model Cities had another two years under its belt by the time Richard Nixon became president with, you know, seventy cities participating, that program would exist today, in my judgment.

G: Was the strength of it the planning?

C: Well, the strength of it was that we would use federal funds to pull together all the possible programs, and private and local and state funds we could to redo a neighborhood. Now I think in this day and age you'd get an argument that well, you know, you let the private market do that. Look at what's happened on Capitol Hill in Washington where you put in private sector money and you start to rebuild housing. Look at what's happening in Manhattan, where you're pushing Harlem further and further north. The line was 86th Street. It's now 96th, clearly moving above 100th Street. And that's the way you do these things.

I thought it was a good program. I mean I still think it would be a workable program. I think unlike most of the other Great Society programs, it didn't get into the system before the administration changed and it was easy pickings. And it also needed

big bucks. It needed big bucks at the time when Nixon had the war. He really didn't want to continue the tax surcharge. The budget was beginning to feel the bite of the changes we'd made in the entitlement programs, creating Medicare, which was turning into very big dollars, the minimum payments in Social Security, getting more money out at the bottom there, getting more money out of the veteran disability programs. So it just got squeezed. It was an easy target. It hadn't built its own constituency yet. If it had had a constituency, if it had been going, I don't think it would have turned.

G: Okay.

C: The signing ceremony, by this time, we were calling it the Model Cities program; the name, the demonstration cities, had created its own set of problems. Just calling it demonstration cities was a liability. As this bill was working its way through, Stokely Carmichael is calling the cities for black power; [James] Meredith is shot; Puerto Ricans riot in Chicago. There are black riots in Chicago, Puerto Ricans riots in New York, blacks rioting in Jacksonville, Florida, and Cleveland, Ohio. Ribicoff's having his cities hearings. Here's where they began in August. And there are riots in Atlanta, Georgia; there were riots in Grenada, Mississippi, riots and violence in New York, riots in Cicero, Illinois. You have all that going on that summer and people are literally taking to [the] floor in the House saying, "This is a Demonstration Cities bill in response to the demonstrations." The President never let me forget the name of that bill. But in any case, we renamed it the Model Cities Bill and in his signing ceremony, the signing statement, he called it the Model Cities Bill.

(Interruption)

So that we got away from the word demonstration.

G: When you say he never let you forget the name of that bill--

C: Well, I mean about naming bills. First of all, I learned a hell of a lesson. I was very careful about how we named these bills. And he never let me forget the importance of naming bills.

G: How would he? Did he remind you of--

C: Oh, I can't remember. He'd tease me about it, sure. And that's why I'd come up with things like Safe Streets and Crime Control Act. And we were much more careful, Truth-in-Lending, Child Safety. You know, we got much better, much better titles for our bills.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XXVII

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Addendum to the Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of

Joseph A. Califano

Interviewed by: Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz and Michael L. Gillette

I, Joseph A. Califano, hereby remove the restrictions on the use of the transcripts and recordings that states, "During my lifetime I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. During my lifetime researchers may publish 'fair use' quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without my express consent in each case." of the sixty-three personal interviews conducted with me by Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz, and Michael L. Gillette, currently at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. (see attachment for interview details)

Joseph A. Califano Jr. — Donor

5-28-19 — Dated

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Director for Presidential Libraries

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