

INTERVIEW XXXVI

DATE: September 21, 1988

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., with comments by Marcel Bryar

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Califano's office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1, Side 1

C: We'll just get in the record, then we can go on. On July 20 [1966], [George] Meany told [Willard] Wirtz that he would oppose any legislation to deal with the airline strike and he would support any agreement that the parties reached, that any legislation would be considered an anti-labor vote and move.

On an entirely different subject, I notice on July 22, 1966, in connection with the wage-price fighting we were doing, we made a decision to try and move on dairy products, for example to take butter out of the school lunch program because the price of butter was going up so high, and we also, it was the time when we moved to stop the Pentagon from buying large eggs and tell them to buy medium-sized eggs to bring down the price of eggs. It was somewhere in there or early the next year that we hunted for things to do about eggs, and upon discovering cholesterol, with the President's urging, got either Secretary [John] Gardner or this Surgeon General, or whoever to start talking about the danger of cholesterol in the American diet so we'd get people to eat--and how much cholesterol there was in eggs in order to slow the demand for eggs.

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G: Did you hear it from the industry, from the egg industry?

C: I'm sure we did. I'm sure we did, because it was brand new stuff at that point in time. And we told the Pentagon, and I'm sure other parts of the government, that all cost-plus contracts from there on out had to have a provision in it that any percentage of the wage or price increases above the guideposts for material for either the labor that the contractor was employing or materials they were buying would be a disallowed cost in contracting.

G: Was that strictly in Defense procurement or was there anything through GSA [General Services Administration] or--

C: I'm sure we used GSA, too, but my recollection is that we mostly were after GSA in terms of the stockpile, selling that stockpile which we ought to have a session on.

Here's the President talking to me about the airline strike and saying that we've got to get Wirtz to say to the labor unions that the right to bargain, quote, "the right to bargain collectively includes the duty to bargain constructively." Actually the President may have said that in a meeting. We had a meeting on the twenty. . . . Have you got the twenty-second of July? No, he must have told me on the phone.

God, there's a lot of stuff about Vietnam here. God, this is interesting. I don't understand it at all. "Ed Williams up here to represent unions." July 25, which began at six-thirty and ran until ten o'clock, I guess, with [Clark] Clifford and [Nicholas] Katzenbach and Wirtz, David Ginsburg, [John?] Douglas, and the President in and out. And it was here that we talked about the issue of supporting [Wayne] Morse's resolution to break the strike. Clifford saying that you need either national security, or health and welfare, or severe damage to the economy and that he doubted whether a case could be made here. And we talked about the people that ride the airlines, that it really didn't have

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much effect on the economy, and we needed a strong case to get Congress to break a strike or they won't vote for it. We talked about arbitration as an alternative. We talked about recommending the resolution that Morse was pushing. And then concluding that if we recommended today, that day, we would not be able to make the case for any of those things, all of us concluding that. That was terribly annoying but things had to get much more serious before we could take a man's right to strike away, and perhaps it was just a question of time. We could not make a Vietnam case. [Gardner] Ackley brought in all the economic material he could bring in, for example, half a million in balance of payments was lost every day. We looked to see whether we could make a case on safety. There was no case on safety. We were getting telegrams from governors and mayors from the harder-hit cities like New York and Miami, Chicago. Jack Connor wanted to move to support the legislation. Ginsburg wanted to move to support it and base it on stabilization. Larry O'Brien wanted to get the President in a position where he wasn't supporting it but he wasn't opposing it so he didn't appear to be negative and to try to get Wirtz postured to do that.

G: Which is essentially where he ended up, is that right?

C: That's right. That is essentially where he ended up.

G: Katzenbach would essentially take any settlement and scrap the guidelines. Ackley wanted to press to support the legislation on stabilization grants [grounds?] and national emergency grants [grounds?]. Wirtz was opposed to using stabilization policy as a reason because he thought it was a red flag for the unions. He thought we should support the legislation because he thought that would help--there'd be a settlement to buy a negotiation, and he didn't think under any circumstances there'd be speedy action on the

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bill. Clifford said he would not take away the right to strike unless there was a really serious national emergency, that Congress would cut up the President and that we should testify against the bill. Ginsburg wanted to support it with whatever facts we could muster, just make the best case, and Connor said there was an emergency and that we should support action now and not wait until everything collapsed. He was very worried about the price side. O'Brien said from what he was listening to he didn't think we could prove a national emergency. He would avoid supporting the bill; he would try to project the strong possibility that there would be a national emergency in the future. Katzenbach said that the facts just don't justify the Morse bill and that he didn't think the facts were going to change dramatically over time. He just again said that he'd work for the best settlement we could, and LBJ said, "What about a settlement?" What was the possibility of a settlement? Wirtz said nobody knew, but we ought to keep trying for it, that there was serious inconvenience, no emergency. He was opposed even to compulsory arbitration. [He] asked for forty-eight hours to go back and bargain.

Johnson then said, this is almost a quote, that if he goes up and says the administration supports the bill, they will rub strike-breaker all over him before the bill even gets out of the subcommittee. Clifford said, when he looked at the two issues, the right to strike and the stabilization policy, he would not put any time limit on the bargaining, and he'd let the settlement violate the guidelines before he'd go in and break the strike. Ginsburg disagreed. He said it was a big case. Johnson, the President said, "We're making it a bigger case than it deserves to be," both on the price side and on the profit side. He said--well, my notes here say Kansas City--this is him speaking, but I don't understand what it is. "Can't do it for labor and have the kind of country we want.

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We've got to get more tools. We've got to get law. We've got to get more tools. We've got to get a law to do something to one small group of labor." Maybe he should issue a statement now and say he'd like to see this strike end. He doesn't want to legislate an ending. He thinks the board's recommendation should be accepted. "I've got reports that have been submitted to the President on what was happening. I've got reports from Defense and Commerce and the Post Office because of the impact of the strike on the mails. I would not conclude that they established a national emergency or a security problem, that there was some inconvenience, some trouble, *et cetera*, but I still think this should be negotiated. Give me the instruments to get it worked out."

We talked about the possibility of a hundred million dollar settlement. He asked Ackley if we kicked back the cost of living could it come out right within the guidelines. "Let's not blow the whole country and the whole stabilization on this. Let's make it look as good as possible." It's all the President's speaking. Then he said, "Let's get David Ginsburg to testify about the board. Let's get Defense to testify." And he--Johnson--would say, "This is bad. This is too much that labor is asking. We're saddened, but we've got to let this process go forward." God, he really was incredible. He then talks to me. This is one of those rambling phone conversations about the Panamanians and the people in Panama taking to the streets. Get the aid bill changed. (Laughter)

G: What is bothering him, then?

C: I don't know. The twenty-sixth of July he says--this is not related to this; this is a phone call obviously--"We have real problems coming in Panama. Leadership is bad. The people will take to the streets. Get the aid bill back to the bare bones. Let's get some

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negotiations with the [Marco Aurelio] Robles government"--or some government--"and get them some help."

Then on the twenty-sixth we pick up with--this is yet another meeting. We talked about the safety problems, the perishable food problems, the adverse impact on the balance of payments, the increased complaints from the airlines, the concern about first-class mail and what that does to our commerce, about Vietnam mail. And this is a meeting--on the twenty-sixth--this is a meeting with Wirtz, Clifford, Ginsburg, Jim Reynolds, Ackley, Connor, [Cyrus] Vance, I guess, Katzenbach. (Inaudible) it goes on from two-thirty in the afternoon all through the day, on and off through the evening until eleven-thirty at night by my book. The President says, "Look, we can't swear that we're keeping milk from babies and bringing them down, and we really can't make the case." There's some serious delay in the mail and it will be worse in the future, but there's no safety issue, and he still doesn't think the case has been made. Why can't we move more effectively? Why is [P. L. "Roy"] Siemiller doing what he's doing? We had a board the [airline] carriers would accept. Should he say, "Give me a report in forty-eight hours," that enough is enough, and maybe we can force the union to do something then.

At some point either Morse came in or I had a conversation with Morse. I guess he was here and we were talking with the board. Morse said there was no intention on the part of the union to accept a non-inflationary settlement. The most important issue is whether Congress should sit by while the carriers fold and create a terrible destabilization. That the lawyers for the companies were saying, "We'll make the best settlement we can and then go and get a rate increase." That's one of the things that prompted the President to have me call Charlie Murphy and say no rate increase. And we

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talked about other situations coming up: telephone companies, the Teamsters, General Electric, Westinghouse, that this was a better case than those cases. We talked about taxes, wage-and-price controls, the need to protect the presidency, that if Wirtz came out for the bill that they'd take him apart on the Hill.

(Long pause) At one point the President recalled--I don't know if this is true or not--a 1941 railroad case; there were six weeks of hearings whether to break the strike and it was settled early on the morning the day before Pearl Harbor. Morse kept saying that this union would settle only on its terms and that Congress had to do something about it. There was no way there'd be mediation or arbitration or what have you, and Johnson said, "Will Congress do it to this group? Does it have the balls to do it to this group?" Morse said, "Maybe they'll pass permanent legislation," and Johnson said, "Are we going to have another Taft-Hepper [Taft-Hartley] thing?" I don't know what that is. President said, "Maybe we should tell you to go for wage-and-price controls." Morse said, "We've got to go after inflation, either some stop-gap measure or price controls. The strike goes by for another week there will be legislation." Johnson said, "The facts shocked me. He's trying to build a case but he's not convinced the case is there." Katzenbach said, "In giving in to the unions maybe we're giving in for more legislation." David said, "Could we have a bill that would put in a different standard for them than we had for others? Can we legislate for them?" and Katzenbach said there was an equal protection problem, and Morse said he agreed with Katzenbach. Johnson said, "Why do we pick on these guys? There was a [Walter] Reuther settlement up at 4 or 5 per cent. That we're talking about twenty or thirty million dollars." Steel stayed within the guidelines. When we talk about a 4 per cent settlement we've got to recognize the CPI

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[consumer price index] is already at 3 per cent. [Joseph] Beirne, the telephone workers, denounced LBJ and the guideline. "What do I say? What do I, the President, say to General Electric?" Katzenbach said, "There will come a point on defense. And Johnson said, "There'll come a point here. Vance will prove it." If he could prove it, if it affected the war effort. Morse did not think we had a case on the war effort. Johnson said, "All I can do is hear them saying that, quote, 'damned Texan' is going to break a strike. That's not going to get many votes in this country."

He said that [Everett] Dirksen wanted to do this by compulsory arbitration to set out the facts and then say there had to be compulsory arbitration. Morse said they ought to shift in favor of some inflation control legislation. Johnson then said, "I cannot get anyone in the government to advocate controls. I have a split in the government on taxes. We've raised the budget from ninety-nine to 113 billion. We can't take another six billion in appropriation increases without the tax bill and Congress is increasing appropriations above what we're asking for. If we keep going in Vietnam we're going to need another five to ten billion dollar extra by the end of this year. Domestic could be five to seven billion dollars more. Cannot take this tax deficit without a tax increase." Somehow we got onto Vietnam. This is the President still speaking. He said he did not want to provoke China to get into the war, that we must get out of Vietnam as soon as possible. That he had got a good feeler today, the best he had heard yet. And that as far as a tax bill was concerned that he'd be better off having a tax bill January fifteenth. I have the name Anderson here. Does that--has to be Clinton Anderson?

G: Can't think of anyone else. Let's see.

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C: I must have moved this. This tax stuff must come at a . . . another meeting. See if around this time--let's not do it now but--we had a leadership meeting or Senator Clinton Anderson. We're in the area of--this has got to be late July or early August, these notes. Let's see what the next data--

G: Unless it was Bob Anderson.

C: Could have been Bob Anderson. No, this was still with Morse. Whoever it is, Anderson says, "We need a tax increase today, even if you never got it."

Oh, I go back. When the President was speaking, he also said he was trying to save the pound for the British. Anderson said, "You ought to ask for the tax increase even if you never get it," and then Johnson said, "Look what Congress is doing to my bills. They've added 10 per cent on everything. If I fail to get a tax increase, the people have no confidence in me. I can't try and do it until I have a chance." We talked a little bit about doing something about the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. Maybe sending something up September 1. Morse said that if Wirtz testified in this kind of fuzzy way--now Wirtz is not at this meeting now. Whatever this meeting is, Wirtz is not there--the union will not settle for less than 5 per cent. Johnson says, "Give Wirtz a good working over when he comes up there. (Laughter) Tell him you want him down there every morning. Monday morning. That it's a bad situation. We've ought to make sure the carriers hold out for a few more days. Maybe Siemiller will end up looking like hell." Ginsburg said--this must be a meeting with this board, Ginsburg and Wirtz and myself and the President. I just don't know. Ginsburg and Morse and myself and the President.

B: This took place on the twenty-seventh of July.

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C: Is that the twenty-seventh? No it's sometime after the twenty-sixth of July. Could be the twenty-seventh. Could be the--

G: Here's the twenty-eighth.

B: There's a meeting (inaudible).

C: Where?

B: Joe Califano's office. It's during the airline strike.

C: Maybe this was earlier. Wirtz is clearly not at this meeting. Okay. Let me just go through it and while you can figure out the meetings.

Morse said well the President called on the parties. "If I could do it, I would," the President said, "but I see no sign of give." "Who is close to Siemiller besides Meany," Morse asked. Johnson said, "I've got to hold back my going in until we get a better, a little more public sentiment. If the board and the President recommended it, why not agreement?" Morse said, "We can't wait to vote on this until that happens, until we have more facts." Johnson said something about Joe Beirne and the Communication Workers, and Morse said, "Let's forget about the guidelines." Johnson said, "We've moved back and forth, but not too many"--I can't read it. Morse said, "The other airlines should put"--no, "other" something--"should put pressure on us."

(Long pause) There was a lot of exchange back and forth between the President and Katzenbach and Morse and I can't read all of it, but it ends up with the President telling Morse, "You've got to put some more pressure on the unions. Show the committee's clout here. The committee should show why these folks, mainly the Machinists, are better off than anyone else." Also talked about talking to other union leaders like Meany and [Joseph D.] Keenan and Joe Beirne. This is an earlier version.

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These were not, I guess. . . . Incredible. I wonder why I kept so many notes on this.

Must have just been all-consuming in this thing. Now here, I can't . . . the eleventh of July. When did the board report?

G: The initial report was the sixth of June.

C: All right. This is the eleventh of July. This is the President talking to me. I don't know what happened but he's talking about how outrageous it is for the union to reject the board. That we should brag on [Richard] Neustadt and Ginsburg and what an able board it was, and here's what they did, that they'd get seventy dollars per month more. That labor couldn't have a better, closer friend than Morse and he came in with this kind of a judgment.

I should get this stuff out in the press. It's really indefatigable. I still do the same kinds of doodles. That must say something.

(Laughter) This is the President, [commenting on] AP [Associated Press] 1962. There was some item on the wire related to Luci and Pat Nugent, and Johnson didn't want them to have to go down and get all kinds of publicity as they went to get their marriage license from the D.C. government, because Luci just couldn't handle all that stuff. So he tells me, he's telling me they have [Charles] Horsky. There's an item in the wire that says they don't have a marriage license yet. They have to get their marriage license. Johnson calls me and tells me that Charlie Horsky, who is the special assistant for D.C., to get them their marriage license. (Laughter) [LBJ didn't want] the press crawling all over his daughter. I don't know whether he did or not.

God, I want you to Xerox this and give it to my father-in-law. Okay? This page. "LBJ might want to announce a further [William] Paley committee, would help him with

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the whole mining industry." My father-in-law [William Paley] did a big Paley study for [Franklin] Roosevelt or [Harry] Truman. Was it Truman?

G: That's great. Do you think he can read that?

C: I put the year on this. Well, I'll just read it to him. This is July 13, 1966. I'll put the year here, so when it comes through Xerox . . .

(Long pause) God. We have to--I'm not going to go to all this stuff here--we have to get into these Johnson talking about meat and bread and cattle prices. Milk.

G: Let me ask you while you're on that subject, did he have a particular problem with cattle prices since he, himself, was a rancher and had close rancher friends like A.W. Moursund?

C: He didn't seem to. See if we had July 18. Do we have a meeting in the Cabinet Room? Four o'clock or something? Is this 1965? Is it six--

(End of Side 1, Tape 1)

C:--[Carl] Albert, Dirksen, [Leslie] Arends.

B: They went to the Cabinet Room at three o'clock. Meeting with Robert Komer.

C: This is [Gerald] Ford, Albert. I wonder if this is the right year?

B: To the Cabinet Room for the congressional bipartisan leadership meeting.

C: Yes.

B: . . . with you for a review. Ford was there. Tom Johnson made notes of the meeting and included a memo--

C: Do you have it?

B: No, but it says right there--

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C: Let's try to get those. I think this was the tax meeting [on July 18, 1966] and I have notes on this. We ought to get Tom Johnson's memo. This is a big meeting. I mean, I rarely did this unless he told me to--

G: Why would you do that, diagram who's seated where around the table?

C: I don't know. He must have told me to really get very good notes about it. But I think this was the meeting where Ford said--either Ford or Albert said, "I don't think you could get twenty-five votes" or something like, "There aren't even that many votes," or something. But let's get Tom Johnson's notes and let's make a note to have a session on that meeting. That was the key. I believe that was the key tax meeting.

(Reading from his notes) This is [fire] hydrants, to cool off the kids in the ghetto. One hour in the morning, two hours in the afternoon, two hours in the evening. Seven days a week. Pools, how many pools we had. We ought to talk about the hot summer of 1986 [1966]. God, I'd forgotten. Seventeen pools, OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity]. (Long pause) Labor Management Advisory Committee. This is all tax increase stuff. We ought to Labor Management Advisory Committee. This is all--this is July 1986 [1966]. We ought to gather what we could. The eighteenth is another big day here. Who got--did they piece all these notes together? I mean, they got them in the--

G: I guess so if they were loose. Or they may have been attached to the book.

C: God, here's Johnson honesty. Wirtz and Reynolds trying to bust the guidelines.

G: What steno pad number is that?

C: Twenty-two.

G: Twenty-two.

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C: In any case there's a lot of stuff in there that we want to deal with, and I was worried if there'd be anything in 1966 for the book. Let's get Judy right now to do that. Poor Judy was in here.

(Interruption)

Well that was much longer. God, [Peter] Rodino calling me to get Italian-American judges.

5 per cent, here's more on the strike. I really was immersed in that goddamned strike. Airlines up to eighty-five million, Siemiller at 115 to 117 million. Morse resolution. Unfortunately I can't tell what--now this is July 22 [1966]. This is a meeting on July 22 with Wirtz. Wirtz must have come by to talk to me. He did come by at six o'clock on July 22. And, what's the next meeting after that? This is probably the meeting on July 23 with Wirtz and [Charles] Schultze and Katzenbach, what have you.

On Saturday afternoon, July 23, what we talked about [was] the situation [with] the airlines at eighty-five million, Siemiller and the union at 115 million. That we have the Morse resolution and [Mike] Mansfield says the Morse bill is going to pass. And we talk about the strategy on the Morse bill and I explain that we've got to get the President out of the bill. Not make him the guy that breaks the strike. This must reflect things he's told me, that the bill in any way can't appear to bless higher wages, and what about having the court appoint a board, not the President appoint a board? Did we end up having the court appoint the board? I don't know. So that it's the Congress that stops the strike and then if it's not over at the end of thirty days, it's a court that appoints the board and that continues a no-strike situation for the next whatever number of days it was. That would mean that the President wanted to make sure that we didn't end up with a bill that went to

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the House in which we had to have seventy freshmen Democrats who would be up for re-election have to vote on the issue of compulsory arbitration or have to vote on the issue of breaking a strike which he thought would hurt--these are the Great Society Democrats--hurt them get reelected. I had a meeting with Clifford and [Abe] Fortas and Wirtz and we talked about we've got to get these guys back to work if this was some sense of stability without getting the President in the middle of it.

Then there was a meeting. I must have been talking to people or calling people or recording a report from Larry O'Brien. I can't tell which. It may have been that I was just calling to see. Morse said that the Dirksen resolution was for compulsory arbitration and he didn't want that. He wanted his resolution, which would have stopped the strike. He said that [Jacob] Javits and Dirksen were determined to force the President to take a stand. [George] Smathers was for compulsory arbitration. [Ralph] Yarborough would speak against the Morse resolution. [Claiborne] Pell was not convinced we had an emergency. Senator Edward Kennedy was arguing for full hearings to delay things. [Joseph] Clark backed Morse as he thought Javits would, but Bobby Kennedy and Clark and Pell were joining the Republicans and demanding to know where does LBJ stand on this thing. This must be Morse reporting what was happening in the committee. Javits went after LBJ, and Bobby Kennedy kept saying, "Where does LBJ stand? The President has to tell us. He's got the responsibility here." And Morse is saying we've got a motion for 9:00 a.m. tomorrow morning, that he expected Pell and Kennedy, looks like [Harrison?] Williams, I can't tell, and Yarborough to fight this. Morse said--and this is confusing--that Clark, [Lister] Hill and Javits he thought would want to be co-sponsors of

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the Morse resolution. That's not consistent with the stuff he said earlier. All the senators keep telling him that the President has not made a recommendation.

Then on the twenty-fifth for some reason I'm talking to Dante Fascell who has introduced a bill on the airline strike. I guess he has; he's from the Miami area and he must be calling me. He says we got no position from the President yet. I don't know if this is helpful at all.

G: It gives a lot of the flavor.

C: Jeez, I can't believe I kept so many notes on this subject. This is a meeting on the first of August with O'Brien, Ginsburg, Wirtz, Reynolds, Ackley, Katzenbach, Douglas, [Walt?] Rostow, Clifford, and [Bill] Moyers. In and out. I guess O'Brien's reporting on where the legislation stands, and he says that Yarborough will support it according to Mansfield, and that [Jennings] Randolph is for some kind of congressional action. Gaylord Nelson will support it. Williams wants to change the approach. Clark has a slightly different version of the bill. They can't get any reading on Teddy Kennedy. They can't get a reading on Pell. If there's no further mediation all the carriers and all the Republicans will vote for it. Moyers says the President ought to call the leadership in and tell them what he wants. Then Wirtz says that's what we ought to do. And then Clifford again saying, "No, slow down. If there's something we want out of this, we ought to make it known informally," and somebody like me or Larry O'Brien ought to let the committee know what's going on. Katzenbach says, "Why can't LBJ say that he's done everything he can do and he reluctantly supports the legislation? He prefers the 180-day version of the bill."

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And the President must've joined the meeting, because he says the sixty-day deadline will be a problem for Congress, will bring the whole thing to a head just before the election. And he doesn't think when Congress focuses on that they'll want to have any periods of time to do something like that to them. That the President is very reluctant to say to a man that you have to go back to work when he doesn't want to go back to work. He doesn't want a bill where we have to have a finding every sixty days. He talked about the option of a court being involved in doing this and let Congress deal with it, where it's less than a national emergency; let Congress make the decision. Let the Republican votes drive this. . . . President says, "As I said the other day, we favor collective bargaining." Leadership thought they should have a solution; that's for the leadership and the Congress to do. He again repeated that he couldn't prove a national emergency, couldn't prove that the health and welfare were at stake. If Congress feels they have to do something in a compulsory way, then let them do it. [He] said, "It looks as though there is a consensus of Everett Dirksen, Bob Griffin, and Wayne Morse; [if] those three have a consensus, then they ought to act." And if he's asked about it at a press conference or in some other [event], "Do you favor?" he said he'd just say, "I really don't favor it, but maybe it's the least objectionable alternative." Johnson said that he had told Mansfield that we've done everything we can under the law and we can't bring it off; we can't get them back together again. And that he told Mansfield that of all the unsatisfactory alternatives that the Hill had, the Morse resolution was the better, for the following reasons. (Reading notes) I don't understand. One says, "sixty days"; two says, "the House does not want to act on this"; three [says], "legally, Congress is better to order the people back to work than

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anyone else," and Morse knows more about it than Wirtz does. Clifford says, "Let the Congress make the findings of interference with economic stabilization or an emergency."

Then on the second of August, Johnson is calling me, obviously, and he is saying Dirksen is saying that LBJ favors the legislation, that Mansfield and Morse are doing all this at the request of the President. He wants me to get that all straightened out in the press and with Dirksen. That's not so. [There is] something about a steel increase [in the notes] which we'll get to. He says, "Call Dirksen." He says, "Dirksen is telling the press that the President wants to approve a compromise. Call Dirksen and tell him that I don't think you understand the President's position. The President's position is that this is a matter for the Congress. If the Congress wants to do it then the President will take it; then I'll take it."

Then on the third of August Johnson is calling me and he's telling me to get Meany, "off his ass and back from vacation. Get Siemiller to call in the local unions. Get some arguments." This is, I guess, right after we've lost the vote, isn't it? "If Meany doesn't do this he's not being responsible. Siemiller's basic error is not knowing the heads of the unions. We've got to find some line which will get the men to go back to work."

B: The bill was passed, right?

C: Has the bill passed by now?

G: No. Well I--

B: It was four, right? To fifty-six?

C: This is the third of August.

B: There were two votes on it?

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C: Then I had a meeting with the President, Wirtz, and Reynolds on the third of August, and maybe he talked to C.R. Smith, but we talked about various options for settlement. We could not or did not embrace the settlement. There must be a Katzenbach letter here of some kind. It's referred to several times. Maybe there's something in the [LBJ] Library, to Congress or--I don't have it; it's not in the papers you gave me. The President's griping that the press is saying, it's unfair to say, we're doing nothing. We're doing everything we can and we get into a . . .

This stuff deals with the whole wage-price guideline stuff. (Long pause) This is stuff--Johnson talking about Bobby. Lot of good stuff here. (Long pause) Here's another joint leadership meeting on prices with Ford and Arends (inaudible) on August 8. We ought to make sure we cover that too in the future. (Long pause) Get a black clip to hold these together. We must have been in very deep budget trouble. Wonderful Johnson--we really do this separately--"This is one country; I want to keep it that way."

(Laughter)

G: What is that with reference to?

C: Obviously arguing with these guys. We really ought to just go through that meeting with--

G: Is that wage-price related?

C: And budget and tax. This is all--

G: What number is that [steno] pad?

C: Well this is--maybe these are separate but--these are separate. I can't tell. 1967? You got a black clip? Maybe I have one in here. I may have one right in here. I've got them right in my drawer. I think we're done for today. You know, it's a quarter to ten. (Inaudible)

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End of interview XXXVI


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Addendum to the Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of


Joseph A. Califano

Interviewed by: Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz and Michael L. Gillette

I, Joseph A. Califano, hereby remove the restrictions on the use of the transcripts and recordings that states, "During my lifetime I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. During my lifetime researchers may publish 'fair use' quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without my express consent in each case." of the sixty-three personal interviews conducted with me by Paige Mulhollan, Joe B. Frantz, and Michael L. Gillette, currently at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. (see attachment for interview details)


Donor

5-28-19
Dated


Susan K. Donius

July 17, 2019
Dated

Director for Presidential Libraries