

The restriction on the Clifton Carter oral history was removed on October 15, 1991.

INTERVIEW WITH CLIFTON C. CARTER
(LBJ-Texas Aide, VP Staff Officer & DNC Liaison & Treas.)
Interviewer: Dorothy L. Pierce

October 1, 1968, 3:15 p.m.
Mr. Carter's office, 1120 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C., Suite 1242
Approximately 1½ hours-incomplete

P: Mr. Carter, how did you first come in contact with Lyndon Baines Johnson?
About what date?

C: Miss Pierce, back in 1937 I was a student at the Schreiner Institute up at Kerrville. However, my home was in Smithville, Bastrop County, which was a part of the 10th Congressional District of Texas. Our Congressman, Buchanan, had dropped dead, and they were having a special election to select his successor. And at various weekends when I was home in Smithville, from Schreiner, I had the opportunity to hear and see what was going on in this election campaign. To the best of my recollection, there were five candidates in this race, and the one that I was most impressed with was a young man by the name of Lyndon B. Johnson.

At that time, I was 18 years old and wasn't able or permitted to do much but pass out cards and tack up placards and do a little car-driving, which I did in the Bastrop County area around Smithville on weekends when I could get over there from Kerrville.

Now, on February 20, 1937, Mr. Johnson was elected as Congressman. In the election statute in Texas at that time, a person didn't have to have a majority; they just had to have a plurality. With five strong candidates, Mr. Johnson ran strictly on the ticket of supporting President Franklin Roosevelt and was elected. This was my first encounter of being around him.

P: Did you meet him and talk with him at that time?

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C: No, I don't believe that I did. I think I just shook hands along with great numbers of other people, but while I felt like he knew me, I know now that you meet thousands of people like this; and I can't consciously say that we really knew each other. I think it was a case of having met but not really knowing.

P: Were you serving in a volunteer capacity?

C: Yes.

P: Mr. Carter, for purposes of touching base with your career as it comes in closer and closer with President Johnson, would you summarize your career associations in terms of when you assumed this position and when you moved on to another one, and the functions of the job, just briefly, because we will be touching on these as the interview develops.

C: Yes, Miss Pierce, just a general outline first, if I may.

We became friends through a mutual friend, Ed Clark, in Austin. As it turned out, I belonged (after I left Schriener Institute and came in to Austin to go to the University of Texas), to the Texas National Guard there, of which Ed Clark, the attorney in Austin, was a member. And we were taken into federal service in November 1940. I served right with Ed. Of course, he was a very staunch supporter of Mr. Johnson, always has been, and was constantly talking about Mr. Johnson. Through him I got to know Mr. Johnson.

In 1946 Mr. Johnson was of course running for reelection. This was after the War, and he had a man by the name of Hardy Hollers running against him, who was trying to stir up a lot of trouble. Coming from Smithville, my daddy worked on the railroad there and was a member of the Brotherhood.

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There were several Brotherhoods at Smithville that were a little bit taken by this fellow Hollers. So Ed Clark called me and got me to go back over to Smithville to my old home. I was living in Bryan, Texas, incidentally, at this time. I went back over to Smithville to visit with the fellows I had gone to school with, and the fathers of other boys that I had gone to school with who were the leaders of these Brotherhoods at this time, to get them to switch back to Johnson and get away from this business that they were all for Hollers. That was my participation in his campaign in 1946.

Coincidentally with this, I had handled Congressman ^{Olin} ~~Teague~~ Teague's campaign over in the 6th Congressional District in which he was first elected to Congress. Mr. Teague was a Colonel in the Army at this time, and had no knowledge whatsoever of Washington. Along in August of 1946, I set up a meeting in Austin between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Teague. And Mr. Teague came from San Antonio Army Hospital (Brooke Medical Hospital) and we met at the Stephen F. Austin Hotel and had lunch with Mr. Johnson and Mr. Teague, myself. Spent about three hours in which Mr. Johnson started off with the number one item that Mr. Teague ought to have, and that was how to get his name on the payroll, because he had been elected in a special election and immediately was eligible for membership in the House. Also, he started his seniority at that minute.

And now we skip from 1946 to 1948. Mr. Johnson called me about the 14th of May, 1948, saying that he was going to run for the United States Senate. This was a seat currently held at that time by Senator O'Daniel, and that he, Mr. Johnson, wanted me to handle the 6th Congressional District for him--to be the campaign manager in the 6th Congressional District--the one I had just handled two years before for Congressman Teague.

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I was operating my 7-Up plant in Bryan at that time, and I remember his saying he was sitting there drinking a 7-Up as he called me.

P: What did he say in the conversation? Do you remember?

C: You mean other than what I've said-- that he was going to run for the Senate--the Democratic nomination--and wanted me to handle the 6th Congressional District for him? He opened it by saying,

"I'm sitting here drinking a 7-Up, and I just wanted to call and visit with you a second, to tell you what my plans are; that these are not ready to be announced. We are going to have a big kick-off meeting over in Austin here and want you to plan on coming and bring some people over with you for this kick-off announcement."

I agreed to handle the 6th Congressional District. Of course, he was successful in his election.

P: This point was the first time you had become a part of the Johnson staff in Texas?

C: Well, I wasn't actually a part of the Johnson staff. I was still strictly on a volunteer basis; this was a part of the campaign organization.

Then he won the Democratic nomination and went on to win the election as United States Senator in November, 1948. And on June 8, 1949, he called me one morning--8 o'clock in the morning--and said he wanted to submit my name for nomination as United States Marshal for the Southern District of Texas. I don't think up to that minute I had thought more than 60 seconds in my entire life about a United States Marshal--what a Marshal did--and I thanked him and told him that I was grateful for his consideration, but I really couldn't undertake the job. That I had been working the last three

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years very hard on my own business, and I owed a good little bit of money, and had finally gotten it to where it was beginning to show the profit that it ought to and progress as it should. I just couldn't step out and do something that would divert my attention from that.

Mr. Johnson said, "Well, I'm not going to take an answer of no on that. I'll call you back this same time in the morning. But in the meantime you talk to that District Judge," he was talking about Judge Barron-- Judge Stewart Barron--there at Bryan, State Court District Judge. He said, "Talk to that District Judge down there and your father-in-law, Mr. W.G. ~~Garrett~~ at Kerrville, and to Law Henderson." Law Henderson was an attorney there at Bryan. "So, I'll call you back in the morning. I don't want to hear the word no."

The next morning John Connally called at the same time--it wasn't Mr. Johnson but John Connally that called. In the meantime I had talked to these three people Mr. Johnson had suggested, and without exception they all said I ought to go ahead and be nominated, and if it didn't work out I could always resign and get back to my business. So it ended up, I served nearly five years--I was nominated and confirmed by the Senate the 2nd of July, 1949--and served until April 14, 1954. In fact I got out just in time from that-- Mr. Johnson was running for reelection in 1954, and in this campaign, Jake Pickle, who is now the Congressman, was handling the overall campaign. And he got me to handle five Congressional Districts instead of one like I had handled in 1948. I now handled five Congressional Districts which turned out to be the Southeastern part of Texas and that part of the Gulf Coast.

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I remember back there Jake--(of course, all of this was strictly on a volunteer basis)--said, "Now, what I ought to do is get you on some company's payroll where you'll be doing this traveling for them and actually attending to this work. We'll handle your expenses."

I refused this. I told Jake back at that time that I was doing this because I believed in Mr. Johnson; that I was an amateur and that I wanted to retain my amateur status. I didn't want to be paid for any of it.

So then he won a whopping reelection victory in 1954, and in December of 1956 he asked me to stop by the Ranch when we went up to Kerrville for Christmas. We did and Mr. Johnson and I went walking out in the field, up and down the roads at the LBJ Ranch, and he told me at this time that he wanted me to start with him on a part-time basis to head up the Johnson political organization in Texas. That Jake Pickle had moved over with Governor Price Daniel and was going to handle his campaign.

Daniel was still United States Senator at this time, but he was going to run for Governor and Pickle had switched from Mr. Johnson over to Mr. Daniel to handle his campaign. I agreed to do that, and this was the 24th of December, 1956. And I actually started the 23rd of January, 1957, as his part-time assistant in Texas, heading up the Johnson political organization.

The Johnson organization was built on a Congressional District basis and at that time we had 21 Congressional Districts in Texas. What we had to do was go into each county, each District, and start a rebuilding process. We were actually, while nothing was ever said directly on this-- I had the feeling back at that time that we were actually building for 1960.

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Then we were starting ahead of time. And the big problem was to bring new blood into the Johnson organization.

P: When you say building for 1960, did you have in mind the Presidency?

C: I had in mind the Presidency, although nothing was ever said between us, or anything else. Of course, he had to stand for reelection in 1960. That was one item which we were very definitely interested in, but secondly, while nothing was ever spoken about this directly to me, this was the thing that I in addition was thinking about.

And the big job on a political organization is that you've got to constantly be bringing new, young, aggressive leadership and blood into these organizations. Many of the people that we had listed on our county and district list started out with Mr. Johnson in 1941 when he ran for the Senate. And we're talking about 15 years later. Now that some of these people were in the prime--almost in the twilight of their career in 1941 when he ran. Some of them were up to 70-80 years old by the time I started this work out over the State.

P: Can you think of various individuals that represented this new young blood that you were soliciting?

C: Well, what we did, Dorothy, we just completely over 1956-1957-- well, I'm skipping 1956 too quickly here, because we ended up having--and when I said "thinking about 1960," I was jumping too quickly ahead, because we actually had a National Convention that year, and we were to have the State Convention, the Precinct Convention selecting the delegates to the County Convention and to the State Convention. This was where the national delegates would be selected.

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In 1952, we had had Governor Shivers and Senator Daniel endorse President Eisenhower and the Republicans, and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rayburn were determined this would not happen again in 1956. While we were starting the rebuilding of the Johnson organization, we were not unmindful of precinct conventions and others to come up along in May and June of 1956, which incidentally the records show turned out very well. Mr. Johnson beat Mr. Shivers 6 to 1 in that, and he and Mr. Rayburn headed up the delegation that went to Chicago in 1956 with a loyal Democratic delegation. I was a member of that delegation from the 6th Congressional District.

But then we worked on in 1957, 1958, 1959 constantly rebuilding the Johnson organization. In the fall of 1959 Mr. Johnson made approximately 70 appearances in Texas. Over these years, we had charted this out--had little pins on the map as to where he had been when. We were trying to eliminate as much duplication as possible, but also to go as many times to a town or city where the population would justify it. I mean not to duplicate in a small town but to try to cover the complete State over a several-year period, which we had effectively done with his 70 appearances in 1959.

P: That's 70 appearances all in that one year: in 1959?

C: That's right. And I handled all those appearances on doing the advance work, making the arrangements--

P: This covered the whole State?

C: That's right. And I would go back and travel with Mr. and Mrs. Johnson. We were traveling in a little twin-engine Beech. And he gave me a little suitcase at that time that was just a little bit larger than an attache case. He said,

"We've all got to pack very lean for these trips, and that's the amount of baggage space you're going to have."

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And I still use that bag today and can be gone a week with just that bag.

P: I'm going to stop you before we get to this Convention, because I do want to go in depth on that, and I think we can pick up with your career which is in Washington from that point on, isn't it? From 1960?

C: Well, when he was elected Vice-President, he no longer had a need for an office in Texas, or someone to do the work there. And being Vice-President, he only was permitted, as I recall, 17 assistants, where we had had more than that with the different hats that he wore--as Majority Leader and the various committees he was chairman of.

And so he moved us to Washington. In the meantime I had merged my 7-Up Bottling Company with the ones in Waco and Temple, and had it under other management while I was now spending full-time on Mr. Johnson's behalf. And was a paid member of the staff.

P: You said, "He moved us." Was that your family?

C: My family. We moved up here the first of January of 1961 and served in the Vice-President's office there. As a matter of fact, he was so short on personnel that the Army recalled Juanita Roberts and me to active service. She was a major in the WACS, and I was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve. They recalled us to active duty and assigned us to the White House--reassigned to the Vice-President's office. Although we never left our desk. We just were on duty from the Pentagon. This lasted about 3 months or so and finally the staff situation shook out to where we could return to the Vice-President's payroll.

Then in August of 1963, Mr. Johnson had me move back to Texas to get in readiness for the 1964 campaign. The family and I moved to Austin on Labor

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Day of 1963, and I was with him in Dallas the day of the assassination, on the 22nd, and he had us move right back up here. We moved back over Thanksgiving. We moved to Austin on Labor Day of 1963 and back on Thanksgiving of 1963. And I served at the White House until February of 1964; then he had me go over to the Democratic National Committee and I stayed there until the 1st of September of 1966, at which time I resigned to open my own business in Washington.

P: That's very thorough. I'm going to ask you some specific questions now.

To start with, do you recall some of the early associates who were close with Johnson when you were just getting involved yourself? That would be back as you took over the Texas campaign.

C: Well, Dorothy, let's go back to 1948 for a second, and see if we can recall-- We used to have these meetings at the Ranch. I say we used to have meetings-- we had two or three meetings at the Ranch--of the Congressional District leaders. This was the way we usually met, and the leaders in turn went out and met with their county leaders.

P: May I stop you just a moment here? You were overseas from the period of about 1940 up to 1946-1947, somewhere in there?

C: I was out of Texas. I was overseas from April 1, 1943 to August 1, 1945. I was gone about 30 months there. But I was stationed at Camp Blanding, Florida and Camp Edwards, Massachusetts.

P: While you were on active duty, however, you were not involved in politics during that time?

C: That's right. I was out of Texas.

P: This would be in Johnson's Representative years?

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C: Right. In 1941 when he ran for the Senate. This was when O'Daniel beat him after about a week's counting.

P: You weren't involved in that at all?

C: No.

P: All right, now back to these early associates of the Congressional District Committees in 1948.

C: Right. I can't for the second remember who the 1st Congressional Chairman was, but Chilton O'Brien from Beaumont was the 2nd District Chairman; A. M.

"Monk" Willis from Longview was the 3rd Congressional Chairman; Ray Roberts, who currently is a Congressman, from McKinney and Roland Boyd handled the 4th Congressional District. Of course, this was Mr. Sam Rayburn's district. General Carl Phinney and Bob Clark--Bob is now deceased, an attorney in Dallas--handled the 5th Congressional District. I handled the 6th Congressional District. There was a Judge Chandler from Jacksonville who handled the 7th Congressional District. Houston had Sam D. W. Lovell; John Singleton who is now a federal judge in Houston; and Johnny Crooker, Jr. who is now Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board here in Washington; and Roy Hofheinz that runs the Astrodome. Those were our four people.

P: That's Hofheinz?

C: Roy Hofheinz, who owns the Houston Astro baseball team, and runs the Astrodome. Those were our 8th Congressional District leaders. The 9th Congressional District I can't remember. The 10th--Ed Clark mainly looked after that district. This was Austin and Ed Clark, Jake Pickle, a whole group of those looked after the 10th Congressional District. The 11th--I can't remember; 12th--Hunter McLean from Fort Worth handled that; 13th--Wichita Falls--Elmer Parrish handled that; 14th--Cecil Burney at Corpus Christi handled that;

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15th--Judge J. C. Looney at Edinburg handled the valley area; 16th--I don't remember. I think John Ben Shepherd probably was at Odessa--he was of considerable help in the 16th Congressional District.

The 17th District--Abilene--I don't remember; 18th District--Ed J. Taylor, Charlie Gibson, Lawrence Hagy, all from Amarillo that were of help. The 20th District, you had Adrian Spears who is now a federal judge, Chief Federal Judge of the Western District of Texas; 21st District--you had Earl Rudder, who was mayor of Brady, Texas, at that time and is now the President of Texas A&M University. He handled the 21st District.

This was the group. We all worked together in 1948.

P: You've got excellent recall. Were these people primarily in the same capacity you were--on a volunteer basis?

C: Yes, all were.

P: And they, one or all, would try to get together at these meetings that you had down at the Ranch?

C: Right. Mr. or Mrs. Johnson or Jake Pickle--one of them--would call these meetings. And of course John Conally was in this both at headquarters and working out of Fort Worth.

I believe John was still located at Austin at this time, so he would have been working at the main headquarters. I think he was running station KVET; he and Willard Deason and some of the others were running KVET in Austin.

P: Anybody else? I don't want to stop you.

This, of course, was the victory--the famous 87-vote victory--over Coke Stevenson?

C: Right.

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P: I think you've probably pretty much told me about the campaign. Were there any issues particularly that came up? I understood the Taft-Hartley support was a little bit of a problem for Johnson.

C: Yes, it was, Dorothy, and this was in a period of time of the Democratic nomination, in the first primary. And this is just a little side observation that I'll bore you with here a second.

I've mentioned a couple of times running my little 7-Up plant and of course the soft drink business is seasonal. We do a great deal of business during the summer, and do little during the winter. Whatever money we make we have to make it in the summer because we lose money all through the winter. And to do this, you have to run either three 8-hour shifts or two 12-hour shifts. At this particular time I was working most of the night at the 7-Up plant, running the machinery myself, and working during the day campaigning for Mr. Johnson, and he was coming into our district. We used to have an operating procedure on this. Whenever he came into your district, you met him at the first town and stayed with him through the district until he went into the next district, then you left him.

This particular occasion he was coming into the town of Mexia in Limestone County that was a part of the 6th Congressional District, and I was to meet him there at about 9 o'clock for a breakfast. I had run this bottling machinery all night; I finished up about 5 o'clock in the morning and went home and bathed and dressed and got in the car to drive up to Mexia to meet him. My machinery back at that time was not automated, and all this was constant moving back and forth, handling every bottle twice. And not having slept during the night, I nearly went to sleep three or four times driving the approximate 100 miles.

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I met the party and we had our breakfast meeting there. My recollection is that he was supposed to come in there by helicopter, and it had rained and was misting--overcast, and that part had to be cancelled. He had to come in by car. We had him scheduled to go on from Mexia to Fairfield, down to the little town of Buffalo, which is a crossroads on the highway. We were there at noon. Buffalo had gotten word that the AFL-CIO--I guess it was AFL back at that time--Labor had endorsed Coke Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson had never been any particular favorite of labor but because of Mr. Johnson's vote on the Taft-Hartley Bill, they had gone against him and had endorsed Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Johnson was notified of this as we were in Buffalo that day at noon.

I remember we were over at a home of a friend of ours. This was about a 4-room house, a little frame wooden house, and Mr. Johnson was preparing his response to this endorsement of Stevenson by Labor. There was a lot of scurrying around the little house. There was an old bed out in the back yard and I went out and slept for about 30 minutes with the sun coming right down in my face, while Mr. Johnson was preparing his statement.

But we went on from there and ended up completing that day.

P: Corret me if I'm wrong, but on the Texas political scene at this time, Shivers was Governor? In 1948?

C: No, Beauford Jester was still Governor, and Coke Stevenson had been Governor up until January of 1947, and Jester was elected in 1946.

P: Didn't the emergence of the Dixiecrats, the earliest emergence of them, come about in this period? Was Texas involved in that at all?

C: Yes. In 1944. Of course, Dorothy, all of this happened while I was overseas and I know nothing about this except what I've read and heard but-- there was a big question back at the 1944 Convention, as I'm told. The group-- well,

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they were going to support Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. Stevenson was a part of the very conservative element. He went out as Governor in January of 1947; then he got into the race in 1948 for this Democratic nomination to the U.S. Senate.

P: Was this Dixiecrat element in Texas much of a factor?

C: We didn't have the Dixiecrat factor the way South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi, and the others did, and on this we would relate to the 1948 Democratic National Convention, which was held in Philadelphia.

Many of those states I just mentioned got up and walked out when Mr. Humphrey made his speech on Civil Rights. But to the best of my recollection, the Texas delegation did not. I would say that in the Texas delegation, the Dixiecrat movement did not predominate. There was a great Dixiecrat feeling and all this group did embrace Coke Stevenson.

P: Any other thing during that political campaign--incidents that happened?

C: No, you had a case, Dorothy, where most of your major newspapers in Texas had endorsed Coke Stevenson.

P: Why?

C: Well, conceivably, a couple of reasons. Number one, I suppose, the fact that he was considered the conservative in the race. The most conservative.

P: No liberal press in Texas at this period?

C: Well, Mr. Johnson was supported by Frank Mayburn at Temple and his paper there; and the one [Mayburn's] at Sherman--the Sherman Democrat. And also to the best of my recollection by Mr. Houston Harte from San Angelo with his papers in Paris and Denison and around over the State. And Charlie Woodson at Brownwood. Charlie had the paper at Lamesa and Del Rio besides Brownwood. And he also owned the paper down at Port Arthur. And there were a few little

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independents around. We had a second newspaper at Bryan at that time--the Bryan Daily News--that supported Mr. Johnson editorially.

But that support was scattered and very thin.

P: From the papers you named, the big city papers in Texas were not endorsing or at least not for Johnson?

C: That is correct.

P: I started a minute ago to ask you if there were any other incidents that happened during the campaign. Or issues that arose that were controversial?

C: Well, Dorothy, we finished up the first primary which according to my recollection was about the first Tuesday in August, with the way it was set up at that time. Coke Stevenson led Mr. Johnson by 71,000 votes, and I'm not sure that I recall the third man in the race who did attract some votes, but I believe his name was [Dan] Peddy. Great numbers of folks over the State were saying that 71,000 votes were just too much to make up in a run-off. We were to have this run-off election, the second primary, four weeks from the day of the first primary.

Well, everybody worked extremely hard during the four weeks time, and I speak now only of the 6th Congressional District, because that's where I was working day and night with different county leaders, precinct leaders. We had a meeting once a week of our county leaders to try to shore everything up to make sure that we carried our load as far as the 6th Congressional District was concerned.

I remember on election night Stevenson quickly jumped out ahead because the Dallas votes were always the first in. Voting machines come in quickly. They were largely for Stevenson and he quickly built up a 20,000-vote lead, and it just looked like everything was over at that minute. In fact, I

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remember the story was told over the radio that Mr. Stevenson was at his ranch out from Junction, and had gone swimming listening to these election returns. Then the returns, as they continued to come in, started going back the other way. They dropped down to 19, 18, 17 right on down to where it was just nip and tuck. I remember them saying that Mr. Stevenson, when things started dropping, got out of swimming and started to Austin. The lead switched back and forth, and this went on for a day or so.

Then according to your election statute, something like three days later, you have the official canvass of the vote. These reports at this minute were the unofficial tallies. Nothing is official until you have the County Democratic Executive Committee come in and certify each precinct. This has to be done by checking the tally list from each precinct. In many instances, I served as a County Democratic Chairman, and have presided over a number of these official canvasses, and I know it is very easy to write down 257 when it's supposed to be 275 or vice versa.

These figures are transposed from a tally sheet onto an official sheet, and this is where these mistakes happen. And I remember Mr. Johnson's calling one time at this canvass period, going over the different counties--we had eight counties in the 6th Congressional District at that time--with me and of course they would ask each of us district leaders to know everything that was going on in the canvass and to have some of our people at these canvass meetings to supervise and look over and make sure that it was done correctly.

And I thought I knew everything that was going on in our eight counties of the 6th Congressional District, but Mr. Johnson told me about one in Leon County where it was 25 votes off--something that was in our favor--and this had been recorded wrong unofficially.

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P: How did he know that?

C: Well, he just goes into great detail on many of these things. He was telling me things about my county that I ought to know, that I didn't know. I think in Brazos County we ended up losing one vote on our official canvass off our regular initial report.

P: What county contained the questionable--

C: Jim Wells County.

P: That's not close to your area?

C: Duval, Jim Wells County, down-- way down. That was a part of the 14th Congressional District down in that area.

P: This of course proceeded into a court fight. There were many charges of stuffing the ballot box, resurrecting dead people, onto the ballots. Do you remember much or recall--

C: I do not. I mean, I remember generally, Dorothy, what was reported and what was said. And these things.

P: You didn't see any instances of this? On either side?

C: No. My recollection is that Mr. Stevenson took this into every court there was from the Justice of the Peace to the Supreme Court. He took it into Federal District Court, and every court ruled in Mr. Johnson's favor from that standpoint.

Now, one precinct that I read about, I suppose I can say I know about, was out in Brown County, in Brownwood, in which one box in a separate court action between two candidates there--two local candidates. One box was thrown out because of the manner in which the polling had been conducted. And that one particular box had a 200 or 300-vote majority for Mr. Stevenson.

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Well, with that being thrown out, Mr. Johnson gained this much. Now that was never taken into the official tally, and I have been told that there were other instances where there was no question but what Mr. Johnson would have picked up another 1,000 votes by different boxes being thrown out.

P: Does this mean contesting these boxes?

C: Yes. Now the one I was talking about--as I say, this contest. We had nothing to do with it. It was strictly among two local candidates and a court did throw out that particular box. It was voting in a country store and they didn't have marked off proper limites where people meandered in and out and watched the other people voting; along this line, that was the grounds in which that box was thrown out.

This was like a football game where you lead 7 to 6. We were always ahead, and there was never any point, I'm talking about when the final votes were in-- we were always ahead so the court action was always-- the attempted court action was Coke Stevenson toward Mr. Johnson. When you win a football game 7 to 6, you don't contest it. You don't go back and question because you are ahead. But I think that if it had ever gotten to the point where Stevenson was ahead, then I think, from what I'm told, we had sufficient evidence to contest it ourselves.

The main thing on all of this was that the State Democratic Executive Committee meeting in Fort Worth heard all these claims and charges. They heard, they questioned; the Credentials Committee had the-- the complete Committee--State Executive Committee--voted and seated, and they selected Mr. Johnson as the Democratic nominee. They went over everything that Stevenson and his attorneys and everybody claimed, and anything they tried

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to show. But he was officially selected by the State Democratic Executive Committee who at their Convention in September of 1948, in their official canvass of State office--this is what they were doing. And they certified Mr. Johnson as the winner and the Democratic nominee.

P: Do you believe that there is any truth to the statements that the Truman Administration may have brought any influence to bear on this decision, because they preferred the more moderate Johnson to the Tory Stevenson?

C: I don't think so. I mean I know nothing in that area, but I don't think Mr. Truman would have had very much influence with the State Democratic Executive Committee.

P: Did Johnson in his campaign take any stand on the Truman Administration?

C: As I recall, Mr. Truman came through Texas on the campaign train, and Mr. Johnson rode with him part or all the way through Texas. I've forgotten the exact distance, but he was with Mr. Truman when Mr. Truman was in Texas campaigning.

P: Wasn't this the first use of helicopters by a candidate in Texas?

C: I think that's right.

P: Do you want to talk about Mr. Johnson dropping out of the sky in these helicopters, really sort of aweing some of the country?

C: Really used to generate a lot of interest and stimulate crowds.

P: Mr. Stevenson didn't use them--

C: No, he traveled by car.

P: Anything else on that Senate campaign, or as it developed into the Democratic Convention?

C: No, I don't believe so.

P: Did you go to that Convention?

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C: No. I did not go. I was not a delegate and I didn't go.

P: Did Mr. Johnson?

C: Yes. He and Mrs. Johnson were there.

P: As delegates?

C: I don't remember. I just remember seeing their picture in the paper--being there.

P: As you have said, you were appointed U.S. Marshal in 1949, I believe, wasn't it?

C: Right.

P: Is your political activity curtailed as a U.S. Marshal?

C: Well, I had been elected to the City Council at Bryan. I was a member of the City Council at Bryan, I guess, had been elected in, I think, April of 1949. Resigned that in July and that was it.

P: You weren't participating in any of the national politics--

C: No.

P: Or on Lyndon Johnson's--

C: No, and the only other thing-- I was elected Brazos County Democratic Chairman and this was immediately when I came out as Marshal in 1954.

I was elected Brazos County Democratic Chairman and served that until 1959, when I moved to Austin.

P: And you didn't attend the 1952 Convention in Chicago?

C: No.

P: Or participate in any delegation activities toward the Convention on the issues regarding that Convention?

C: No. Being U.S. Marshal you're under the Hatch Act, and I wasn't permitted to participate in any political activities.

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P: You've already mentioned this in your earlier summary, in 1954, when Mr. Johnson appointed you campaign chairman and at this time it was for--

C: Five Congressional districts.

P: This was in 1954 and he was Minority Leader at this point?

C: That's right.

P: And was up for reelection, right?

C: That's right.

P: You have commented somewhat on your functions. Do you have anything to add on that or your work and duties? During the campaign?

C: You're talking about 1954?

P: The 1954 campaign.

C: Well, his opponent in this race was Dudley Dougherty from Beeville, Texas. Mr. Dougherty was a very wealthy young man. The irony of this-- he had been a very close friend and supporter of Mr. Johnson, but for some reason, he decided in January of 1954 to contest Mr. Johnson for this Democratic nomination. And while he caused some problems, as any opponent would, it wasn't really much of a contest. I've forgotten-- Mr. Johnson beat him 4 or 5 to 1 without really ever making a campaign. The main thing-- my work in mid-April on was to marshal our forces in these Congressional Districts. This was the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th and 6th Congressional Districts in which I was working with Jake Pickle. And Jake was the State coordinator on this.

P: What was the political situation in Texas during that time? Regarding conservative element and issues?

C: Well, Mr. Shivers was Governor and Mr. Daniel was Senator. And as you stated a minute ago, Mr. Johnson was Minority Leader of the Senate and had a relationship with Senator Taft who was the Majority Leader, as I recall, at

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that time, that was looked upon as a very gentlemanly thing. There was a feeling in Texas, also-- Shivers was still a very popular Governor in 1954. Of course, you constantly had what you might say the conservatives in Democrats, as I recall-- Ralph Yarborough ran against Shivers in 1954. In fact, forced him into a run-off, so there was that constant fighting between conservatives and liberals, but at this particular moment, the leaders of both factions were pretty well supporting Mr. Johnson.

P: Part of your work was funneling back to Johnson reports and memos of information as to what was going on in the county and the county problems, wasn't it?

C: Well, that was constant. Yes, all along. I mean, that's all the time.

P: And getting to know the newspaper people and their personalities.

C: Getting to know the newspaper people, radio. We had very few television stations at that time. Of course, you had them in Houston and a few metropolitan cities, but other areas I covered--the main thing was visiting with radio people and newspaper people. There used to be a routine of work that you do, both in checking on your county organization and your county leader. Visit with them, visit with the newspaper editor, and try to make sure that they had up-to-date pictures of Mr. Johnson and that they didn't have something in their morgue-- some old picture of him 20 years ago.

P: Was fund-raising part of this activity?

C: No. This was strictly political. Strictly making sure that you had some activity going in each county. Again, like I said a while ago, in 1956 when I took over as State Chairman, even back in 1954, we were trying to bring new leaders in to help shore up the organization.

P: You said that this election [1954] wasn't much of a challenge. Didn't you uncover any frictions or factional problems?

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C: No. Nothing of any consequence.

P: Let me go ahead then to the 1956 convention. The Democratic Convention was in Chicago, I believe.

C: Right.

P: Did you attend this?

C: Yes.

P: And would you discuss the issues that did come up and the Lyndon Johnson position? On candidates and issues?

C: Well, we had had, as I mentioned earlier, these real tough precinct fights in Texas, which led on to the county fights the next week and on to the State Convention. Then this was held in Dallas. In Dallas, I was selected by the Convention, I should say by the Johnson forces, to be Chairman of the Delegate Committee.

P: You did go to this one as a delegate, didn't you?

C: Right. And I served as Chairman of the Delegate Committee, the Committee that selected the delegates to go to Chicago. I had firm support on my Committee. You see, each Congressional district selects a person--a man or woman--to serve on each of these committees, so I had 21, one from each Congressional district, on this committee with me. And we had strong support there to where we could have pretty well selected whomever we wanted as delegates. I mean, we did select the delegates. And did report these to the Convention. We made the report to the Convention in Dallas, and they were accepted.

And I went to Chicago as a member of the delegation. Now, Mr. Johnson's name was placed in nomination there for the Presidency by John Connally. And at this time Mr. Johnson was not on the floor, because he was a candidate for the Presidency.

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Then when Adlai Stevenson was subsequently selected, Mr. Johnson did join the Texas delegation. He was Chairman and sitting at the main corner where the Texas standard was. I sat right back of him, and Judge A. W. Moursund from Johnson City sat to his right.

P: What was the reasoning behind this favorite son candidacy at this point?

C: I don't know. You mean when the thing was wide open--I say wide open; there was a good possibility that Stevenson was not going to permit his name to be placed again and like many of the others actually start off, one can mention ahead of time to get their name before the public in these things. You had this period of time after Mr. Stevenson's selection and before the Vice-Presidential nomination that Stevenson called on a number of different strong people and talked. This was the evening after Mr. Stevenson had been nominated. When he entered the convention hall, entered the platform to make his statement on the Vice-Presidential situation, Mr. Johnson was one of a group with him, right behind Mr. Stevenson.

P: Were you with him?

C: No. I was out with our Texas delegation--the seats were right close to the platform, and everyone at that moment thought that Mr. Johnson was going to be the Vice-Presidential nominee. It turned out that there were four or five others with Mr. Stevenson.

P: Did you think this was possible?

C: That thought ran quickly through my mind. When he followed right behind Mr. Stevenson. And then Mr. Stevenson spoke to the Convention and said that he had decided not to make a selection and just throw it open and let the Convention decide.

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It ended up that Kefauver's name was placed in nomination. Senator Gore from Tennessee, and Senator Jack Kennedy from Massachusetts, and I think, my recollection is, that the Texas delegation supported Senator Gore on the first ballot and supported Senator Kennedy on the second ballot.

One little thing that happened here. Mr. Johnson sent me to get Senator Smathers of Florida. Mr. Johnson was doing all he could to round up vote for Kennedy. And the aisles and everything were all so jammed that I couldn't get across to Florida, which wasn't actually too far away from us. I had to go outside of the amphitheater and go around the building and come in a different door. I found Smathers and told him Mr. Johnson wanted to see him, and to come on and go with me. And he'd walk along a couple of steps with me, and stop and start talking to somebody, and all the time the vote was going on. Voting was shifting. As a matter of fact, it was beginning to slip away from Kennedy at this minute and going to Kefauver. And I would pull Smathers along a little bit, beg him to come on, and I finally got him to within about 10 feet of Mr. Johnson. And just went to Mr. Johnson and said, "There he is. That's as far as I can get him. Without breaking his arm or something, I can't get him. He has just refused to hurry."

Well, by the time Mr. Johnson tried to talk to Smathers about switching to Kennedy, Kefauver had already sewed up the Vice-Presidential nomination. Now, Mr. Johnson made a seconding speech for Kennedy on the Vice-Presidential nomination.

P: What in your opinion was his reason for supporting Senator Kennedy?

C: I don't know. I just felt like he was the most capable, able, attractive--I suppose. We had had a delegation caucus, and this was what this group came

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up with. This was under the leadership of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rayburn.

P: Perhaps a regional balance?

C: I do not know.

P: Was Johnson ever in consideration for the Vice-Presidential candidacy? When you got back into the delegate caucuses? Did he indicate that to you?

C: No. He was not nominated. I don't know that I ever had any direct conversation on this. I think the general word was that Stevenson had talked to six or seven different ones, and just told them that he didn't want to make a choice, that he was going to throw the convention open. But Mr. Johnson was not nominated for Vice-Presidency like he had been nominated for the Presidency.

P: Did the Texas delegation switch on the second ballot from Johnson to Stevenson?

C: That's my recollection. Wait a minute. I'm sorry--I jumped too quickly. Did they switch on what?

P: In the Presidential balloting, after they had committed themselves on the first ballot to the favorite son candidate, Johnson, did they switch to Stevenson or did they hold-- ?

C: I'm not sure they ever got to. I think the thing got down so far and Stevenson had it before we ever had the opportunity to switch. I think it was declared unanimous or something on the thing to where-- I don't know that Texas was ever permitted to switch.

P: Was there any consideration that if it went past the first ballot, that they would go to Stevenson, or was this acceptable to the Texas delegation?

C: Well, the understanding we had was we would have a caucus of the delegation after each vote, and just go one vote at a time. You see, the 1956 Texas

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Convention instructed this delegation to place Mr. Johnson's name in nomination as the favorite son. And actually we were committed to him by the unit rule.

P: Right, but the favorite son candidate can then release the delegation--

C: That's right.

P: Had this been discussed at all? To your knowledge?

C: No.

P: Do you remember any other anecdotes of the 1956 Convention? Or at the State Convention earlier?

C: No. The Convention had gone very well in Dallas. The State Convention, of course, and then it ended in almost a big hassle over-- We had wanted Byron Skelton who had been a leader of the loyalist liberals as national committeeman and wanted Mrs. Lloyd Bentsen [Jr.] to be the committeewoman. And the liberals who had joined with Mr. Johnson's group in carrying the precinct conventions accepted Skelton but would not accept Mrs. Bentsen.

P: Why?

C: They wanted Mrs. Randolph from Houston. It ended up that they insisted so strongly on this that it was never put to a vote, but was finally decided to withdraw the thought on Mrs. Bentsen, and go ahead with Mrs. Randolph, which was done. And Byron Skelton and Mrs. Randolph were elected Committee members--National Committee members.

P: Why was Mrs. Randolph wanted?

C: Well, she was the leader of the liberals in Houston. And was a symbol to liberals all over the State of Texas.

P: Anything else you remember on this Convention? Any area I'm not pursuing? Any issues that came up?

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C: No, at Chicago we had a Johnson hospitality suite there that served coffee and cookies and practically all the Congressional district men that I mentioned while ago where delegates and were in Chicago.

P: These were the same Congressional district people in the 1948 election?

C: Right. And each of us served tours of duty, you might say, there in running this hospitality suite. Mr. Johnson's sisters were there, and each of us had so many states that we were trying to make contact with people. And we'd get them to come by and have coffee and talk, but frankly, much of this was very new to all of us. We did make some acquaintances in some of these states. I think some of them operating at the top level like John Connally did make some contacts that proved valuable later on. I mean, I was not at that level.

P: Do you know of any of these?

C: No. I had certain states there, but I don't remember any contacts right at this minute.

P: I was just looking at the Texas support for Lyndon Johnson in 1957 in which you were named clerk, or assistant clerk, or Texas administrative assistant. I was confused on the title. I think you were operating out of both Bryan and Austin. This was a more permanent position than your previous campaigns?

C: Yes, and I think I misstated a date while ago.

P: Did you say 1954?

C: Let me correct myself on the dates. I think I said earlier that it was Christmas of 1956. It was Christmas of 1956 when I stopped at the Ranch and talked with Mr. Johnson. And when he had asked me to stop by there. And I actually went on his payroll as his assistant in Texas January 23, 1957, I think I said 1956 while ago. I'm wrong on that. It was 1957, and this

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was when I was doing this-- handling his affairs in Texas.

P: This was really more on a full-time basis, too, wasn't it?

C: Yes, when it started off it was supposed to be half-time. But every day that went by, it became more and more full-time.

P: Where was the Texas support for Lyndon Johnson during these years?

This is prior to 1960.

C: Dorothy, it was scattered throughout.

P: Did it reflect-- Like labor or--

C: We had friends in labor and various ethnic groups, and conservative business men. It was pretty broad across the board.

P: I'm not sure if we went over your duties at this point when you changed?

C: Well, yes, I mentioned while ago just quickly in passing, this was in rebuilding the organization. And the second part of this-- Mr. Johnson by this time had become Majority Leader of the Senate. And the two previous Majority Leaders--Democratic Majority Leaders--had been defeated their next time up for reelection, and he was determined this was not going to happen to him. You had Scott Lucas from Illinois defeated, and Ernest McFarland, the next Majority Leader, was defeated when he was up for reelection.

P: Do you think Lyndon Johnson was sort of affected in his approach to things by what had historically happened or previously happened? Did he use that as a gauge or judge?

C: Well, he was determined not to let that happen, and he was prepared to resign as Majority Leader if necessary to keep this contact with the people back home. And a part of my job as I envisioned it and saw it and attempted to do it was to try to keep his thumb on the pulse of the people back home and what

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they were thinking. In my travels in a period of time 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, I averaged about three days a week traveling and spent the night in the home of all of our leaders in all 254 counties in Texas. I stayed in every little town over the period of time, and visited every radio, every television, every station, everything newspaper.

P: And you think Lyndon Johnson felt that previous Majority Leaders in fulfilling those duties had lost their constituency?

C: Neglected the folks back home. The people in a little county down in your home state are proud on the one hand that you have been recognized as the Majority Leader, but they get real upset if you are not looking after their little dam project or something down the road. This is what a person has to do as Majority Leader. He can't ever afford to get away from the folks back home.

P: He was instrumental during a part of this time--during his Majority years--in passing some legislation that did affect some of the conditions, particularly in the Hill Country?

C: Well, I'm sure he was. I don't recall--

P: Does this concern some of the dam projects that you mentioned?

C: Well, no, I believe, Dorothy-- he got most of this going and accomplished when he was still a Congressman. Actually, back when he was in the Congress, he was always considered the third Senator from the State because he helped people in many other districts beside his own. While I don't necessarily know that he had any designs on one of the jobs as Senator, I'd say that he was not unmindful that he was operating all over the State of Texas.

P: How was Mr. Johnson thought of within the Texas delegation to Congress?

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C: Extremely well thought of. Well, certainly as a Congressman. And then when he became Senator, he had a very close working relationship with every Congressman. As a matter of fact, this was one of the reasons that I always felt that our political organization was on a Congressional district basis, because he worked so closely with all 21 Congressmen. In anything that they were interested in or would introduce in the House, he would take and get it through the Senate for them. Any time there was an announcement to be made about a federal project or appointment, there was always a joint announcement between Mr. Johnson and the Congressman involved.

P: Can you think of anything specific?

C: Well, this was just every postmaster appointment, every federal project approved. I mean I know this because I worked in the office up here. He used to have me-- we're talking again about 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960-- He used to have me come up here for two 2-weeks' periods each year to work in the office here to get the feel of what was going on so it would be helpful to me while I was working back in Texas. And I just know the operating procedure on this. Any notification that the office got of a postmaster being confirmed or just anything approved, it was automatic standing procedure that he would not try to steal the glory of notifying first on this. It was always a joint telegram that went out.

P: This must have been one of the ways in which he did retain the name of at least caring for his constituency?

C: That's right.

P: Now I would like to proceed into the 1959-1960 Presidential, or Vice-Presidential as it ended up, nomination at the 1960 Convention. You stated awhile back that your organizational groundwork beginning with your 1957 appointment,

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in your own opinion, was the beginning of the foundation for the possibility of a Presidential nomination in the 1960 election. When did Lyndon Johnson begin to consider running for President? Whether actively agreeing to it or announcing it, but starting to move and lay the necessary groundwork for rounding up support?

C: Dorothy, this I don't know. I was working on the Johnson organization, and we primarily were working for his reelection in 1960, but I say that I was not unmindful of his prospects as a Presidential candidate--nominee. However, I never, to the best of my recollection and remembrance-- unless it was something that others of us talked about-- He did not talk to us about it; in fact the one or two times that I said something to him about it, he said,

'Well, let's just try to do our job as Senator on the thing. Let's don't worry about that. We're not going to be in it.'

And he told great numbers of his friends this, but no one ever believed it or paid any attention to it.

P: When you spoke of the 70 visits he made in 1959 aboard a twin-engine plane-- ?

C: Beech.

P: Beech plane that he made with his wife, these were towards election as Senator?

C: Yes. That's right.

P: There was no implication-- ?

C: This was an additional procedure that he used. He always campaigned about a year ahead of time--extremely hard. It has always been considered very good strategy to do most of your homework the year ahead of time. And this was what he was doing in 1959--in the fall of 1959.

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P: Was he ever in any problem with his campaign funding?

C: This I don't know. I had nothing to do with that.

P: Do you have any ideas why Mr. Johnson delayed in announcing his candidacy for President?

C: I don't know anything.

P: You were still in Texas at this point?

C: Yes. And of course some friends had started up a Johnson movement in Texas. I had moved to Austin from Bryan in July 1959. In October of 1959, about the 15th of October, a headquarters was set up in Austin to be the national headquarters of Johnson for President movement.

P: Under whose direction?

C: Larry Blackman from Mineral Wells moved down there and spent full time on this.

P: Mr. Johnson hadn't indicated that he wanted this?

C: No, and I'm trying to remember. Dorothy, I think this thing had reached a point to where Mr. Rayburn was pushing Mr. Johnson to make his name available. Mr. Johnson had kept saying, "No, they won't accept a Southerner."

Something on this. And my recollection is that Mr. Rayburn said,

"Well, we're going to move forward with or without your permission on the thing."

And Mr. Rayburn had a hand in this headquarters being set up down there. Along with Governor Price Daniel.

P: Governor Daniel was for placing Lyndon Johnson's name in-- ?

C: Yes. He was very much for it.

P: They talk about the "Johnson Network" coming into play in this sort of pre-announcing days, beginning to set up national headquarters around the

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country. Did you believe there was a Johnson Network?

C: No. I knew from the Blackman operation there that they were trying to make contact with people in different other states, but there was no Network as such. The only thing--

P: I think this Network they were referring to was more or less Congressional.

C: Well, I was going to say, the only thing that even came close in my mind would be people with whom Mr. Johnson had served in the House or the Senate. Mentioning names like Ernest McFarland from Arizona. McFarland had been in the Senate and had been defeated. Barry Goldwater defeated him. Then he was out two years and was elected Governor of Arizona. He had, I believe it was, J. Ed Johnson, maybe just Ed Johnson out in Colorado that had been in the Senate.

Then you had different other ones whom Mr. Johnson had befriended or had been close to in his service in the House. You see at this minute, we're talking about 1959-1960. He had been in the House for eleven years, I believe, just from off the top of my head. And he had great numbers of friends in these different states.

P: I knew they felt that he was the most powerful Leader to put forth this time, at least that was some of the Congressional and Senatorial support behind him.

There were reports that Lyndon Johnson was sending funds to various Senatorial campaigns as early as 1958, possibly to encourage support for his nomination should he decide. Do you think this was true?

C: I don't know. I knew he made speeches for Vance Hartke of Indiana; for Ted Moss in in Utah; for Gale McGee in Wyoming; Howard Kennon in Nevada.

P: Were you involved in any of these?

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C: Just in helping arrange his itinerary in this area.

P: In March of 1960, I believe you attended the Midwestern Democratic Conference in Detroit?

C: Yes.

P: This was more or less in place of Johnson, because he did not want to go?

C: Well, not in place of Johnson, because there were several of us out there. There was a delegation from Texas, you might say that was up there. Eugene Locke, who has been the Ambassador to Pakistan, Saigon, and ran for Governor this year back in Texas. My recollection is that he was the head of this delegation from Texas at this Convention.

P: Mr. Johnson was still unannounced?

C: Yes.

P: What was your purpose?

C: Well, to scout out delegates or feelings, or try to find some friends or something.

P: Did you all set up a hospitality areas at this conference?

C: Yes. We did.

P: Were there already campaign slogans and materials being passed out on Johnson?

C: Well, on Johnson, at that time-- we had little lapel buttons with a little Texas hat and LBJ on it. I believe they had the slogan, "All the Way with LBJ," back at that time.

P: But again in your opinion, Mr. Johnson had not pushed this furthering of his Presidential nomination?

C: No, he had not.

P: He had not indicated in any way that he wanted to have this organization to begin setting up? I have read that when the Johnson people began going out to the other states, they found that the John F. Kennedy people had

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gotten out earlier and in effect signed everyone up. Were you ever involved in any of these contacts with other states and was this true?

C: Dorothy, I remember Detroit there. I talked to different ones and did not get much encouragement. Practically all of them were for Mr. Kennedy at that time. Like Hobart Taylor that has served on Export-Import Bank and served as Associate General Counsel to the President over at the White House. He was a Negro from Houston originally. He had gotten his law degree from the University of Michigan and lived there in Detroit. He had a couple of us from Texas come out to his house one evening during this Midwestern Democratic Congress you're talking about. He had a group of top Negro leaders there and some one or two labor. This was not the top echelon of labor, but many of these were UAW people. And the main thing was he wanted us to have the opportunity to get to visit with these people, and we had a reasonably good meeting, but we did not make any-- This was in Detroit, during the Midwestern Conference. We did not make any converts. I think they did have the opportunity to see we didn't have horns, but there was little feeling among the Negroes at that time in that area for Mr. Johnson or anybody from Texas.

P: I believe one of the issues that was being talked about at this point was where Lyndon Johnson stood on the Medicare Program, and there had been conflicting letters to various people in Labor, whether it was in error or not, that he had been both at one time supporting and opposing the Bill?

C: This I don't know. I'm not familiar with it.

P: Do you know where he stood on this issue?

C: No.

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P: Did you turn in any reports at this point as to the advisability of Johnson pursuing the Presidential nomination?

C: No, I didn't direct. We did into the headquarters in Austin there. And we carried this information back with us. And I must say that I never dealt in issues. I usually try to deal with people.

P: Were you for his candidacy?

C: Oh, yes. I was from the time I saw him in 1937. Thinking about the President then.

P: Did you foresee in the year 1937 that a Southerner might conceivably have a shot for the Presidency? That's breaking a tradition of about 100 years.

C: Well, I wasn't thinking about a Southerner then. I was thinking about Lyndon Johnson's being President. And I had talked to him about that in the 1948 campaign when he was running for the Senate. Like they used to talk to county leaders that we weren't just electing a United States Senator--we were electing a future President.

P: Did they agree with you on that?

C: I think this was a general feeling.

P: In other words, they believed that strongly in the potential of Lyndon Johnson?

C: That's right.

P: It has been said that in the early part of 1960 that Lyndon Johnson counted on some of the wrong political figures that had already been committed to Kennedy. But that he had strong Congressional support from his various Representatives and Senators. And I believe that about this point you went to Des Moines to enlist Governor Lovelace's support. Is that true?

C: Well, I was in Des Moines.

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P: And what happened?

C: Well, let me go back to December of 1959 for a second. Governor Lovelace had requested that Mr. Johnson come out and speak.

INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON CARTER (Tape 2)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

Wednesday, October 9, 1963, at office on Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

P: Mr. Carter, when we left on the last tape, we were in the period of 1953 and '59 during the pre-campaign activities of the '60 election. And the tape ran out just as I had been asking you about, in fact, a later meeting in Des Moines, and it was in 1960. And at that point, you began to recall some activities of Johnson's speaking in '53 and in '59. You particularly told me of one regarding a Joe Barr in 1958. And I'd like to just turn this back over to you, and if you can remember some of those speeches and incidents that occurred around Kentucky--St. Louis--you mentioned Council Bluffs.

D: Well, Dorothy, let's go back to the Joe Barr incident I mentioned first because that was along in November of 1958. And I think this Barr incident **points** up some of the little humorous things that happened along the way, the campaign trail, if we may. At this particular time, Mr. Johnson was in Indiana speaking in behalf of Vance Hartke who was at that time mayor of Evansville, Indiana, and was the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate. This was a wind-up rally at Indianapolis that we're talking about and was on state-wide television in Indiana. As Mr. Johnson started out on the stage, some of the local helpers--supporters of Senator Hartke--said, "Senator, when you finish up your speech, mention a word for Joe Barr. He's running for Congress here. He's Phi Beta Kappa, a graduate of Yale; he's a wonderful party worker--been great. He is our Democratic nominee from this district--Marion County. We don't think he has got much

of a chance, but if you will, just because of the work he has done for the party over the years, please mention his name."

Mr. Johnson said, "Well, sure," and went on out to make his speech, and as he was getting on down towards the end, some of them started hollering out from the wings of the stage, "Don't forget old Joe; don't forget old Joe!"

Well, Mr. Johnson heard Barr's name only one time, and that was when he was walking out to make his speech to be introduced, and Joe's last name didn't quickly come to Mr. Johnson. So, he thought he would come to the end of his speech and the name would come to him. Well, it didn't, and he started closing his speech again--as a matter of fact, he did it three times, hoping that the last name would come to him. And it didn't. All the time these supporters were continuing to holler, "Don't forget old Joe!" So, as it finally ended up, Mr. Johnson just closed his speech out with, "When you go to the polls, don't forget old Joe's running for Congress from here!"

About a week later on election day, we were in Houston. Mr. Johnson was speaking to the Texas League of Municipalities at the Shamrock Hilton Hotel. And as quickly as he spoke, we went right upstairs to the suite to start watching the election returns. We had hardly gotten settled in our chairs when a phone call came in from Joe Barr from Indianapolis, telling Mr. Johnson that he thought he had made it, that he was 151 votes ahead at that time, and he thought it was all over. And he had won it because of Mr. Johnson's statement the last night he was in Indianapolis on that state-wide telecast to remember old Joe.

Dorothy, as I think back about these, there are some interesting ones along the line. Christmas in 1953, my family and I stopped by the LBJ Ranch

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on our way up to Kerrville to spend the holidays with my wife's folks. This was on December 24. Mr. Johnson had just gotten some new wrist watches with his initials on the back of them, and he was kind enough to give me one of those watches. We went on to Kerrville and has been custom over the period of time, I always called my mother on Christmas Day and wished her the best seasons greetings and thanked her for what she had sent the children for Christmas. And I wound up that conversation by saying, "And Senator Johnson gave me a watch with his initials on it." Well, my mother, mindful of the large family from which we came and the rather poor times we enjoyed and the hand-me-down custom of old clothes and everything, was thinking that Mr. Johnson had given me one of his old second-hand watches. My mother's response was, "Oh, son, that's too bad. Maybe you can have the initials filed off." And as I tried to quickly assure her that the most important thing about the watch were the initials on the back, the LBJ on the back, she still said, "Oh, son, that's too bad. Maybe you can have them filed off." I have told Mr. Johnson this story several times and told him that it was almost good enough, not quite, but almost good enough to be sent to Reader's Digest for "Life in These United States." I have not sent it in, but Mr. Johnson did get a kick out of it because all of us have gone through these periods of hand-me-down clothes.

And a situation happened out at the Midland-Odessa Airport one day, Dorothy, where we had about 30,000 people there for a big air show and Mr. Johnson was to speak to them. This was actually after he had become Vice President. I had been down there a day or two checking all the arrangements, and we'd had a trailer drawn up that we'd decorated and had a public address system all set--checked the public address system--everything was in perfect working order. The Vice President and Mrs.

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Johnson flew in and landed about two hundred yards from where the speaking trailer was. I went over to greet them and to accompany them back to the setup we had there, which took maybe ten minutes altogether. When we got back to the speaking platform, someone had taken our public address system we had. In the ten minutes I was gone, they had completely disassembled and stolen the public address system. And he had 30,000 people waiting to be addressed. Back in those days we always carried an emergency portable P. A. system along with us in the airplane, which we quickly got and assembled and he spoke to this great big mob with a little portable P. A. system.

But we've had these funny little--they're funny now; they weren't very funny then--happen along the way. Had the one that happened, Dorothy, where George Reedy in defending Mr. Johnson ended up having his ear nearly bitten off.

P: What year was this?

C: This was in December 1957. Mr. Johnson had spoken--I believe it was about the tenth of December, 1957--Mr. Johnson had spoken at a noon meeting in Waxahachie, Texas. And we had moved on into Dallas where Mr. Johnson was to speak that night to the Dallas Chamber of Commerce meeting in the Adolphus Hotel. We were staying at the Baker. Mr. Johnson always stayed at the Baker Hotel. Mr. Johnson spoke that night to the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, and the Dallas Chamber had invited all the Texas Congressional delegation to be there, which they were. That night after Senator and Mrs. Johnson had gone to bed, Walter Jenkins, George Reedy, and I went down to a restaurant about a block away from the Baker and had a midnight cup of coffee with a number of members of the Texas delegation. We left there and went back to our hotel rooms. George Reedy did not accompany us.

He and I were sharing a room together. I left the door unlocked, expecting him to come in just any time, and I woke up about six o'clock the next morning and Reedy still wasn't in. And so I got up and bolted the door at that time. About seven there was a big knock-knock on the door, and I got up and it was Reedy coming in. I laid back down and slept fifteen or twenty minutes and got up and happened to look at George. And I thought he was drowning in his own blood. I woke him up to make sure he was still alive and tried to figure out the mumblings I was getting from him as to what happened. It turned out that he had gotten into an argument with Judge Jim Sewell of Corsicana, State Court District Judge there, who incidentally is blind--got into an argument over Mr. Johnson's political philosophy, how liberal he was, and as a result of this argument Judge Sewell had jumped up and had bitten George Reedy's right ear and had nearly bitten it off. Dr. Silas Grant from Hillsboro was present at that time, and he put a band-aid on George's ear and sent him on home. Well, the ear was so badly mangled that it was pumping blood at this minute, and I knew I had to do something. At this time, the Dallas papers were not overly generous to us. All I could see was big headlines saying, "Johnson aide has ear bitten off in Dallas." And I decided not to even trust the hotel doctor, because I didn't want any of this to be leaked out, so I called a doctor friend of mine there in Dallas--Dr. A. C. Henry, that was from Smithville originally--and got him in turn to call a friend of his who would keep quiet, and send him to our hotel room. This doctor came on up within the hour and had to give George a tetanus shot since he had been bitten, and then he sewed George's ear back up. He had hardly finished this--let me say I did report this to Walter Jenkins, who was in a room around the corner from us. We were all on the same floor

with Mr. Johnson. The doctor had hardly finished sewing George's ear up, and Mr. Johnson started calling for all of us to quickly assemble in his suite. Walter Reuther that mornin' had taken exception with something Mr. Johnson had said the day before in Waxahachie--

P: Do you remember what it was?

C: I do not remember. The UAW was having their national convention in Atlantic City at that time, and on the basis of a wire report that Mr. Reuther had seen he had taken great exception with Mr. Johnson's remarks. And this had just come back over the wire service, and I think Mr. Johnson had gotten a telephone call or two about it. He was in the process of-- this was the reason he wanted Walter and Reedy there; he was dictating a statement to George Reedy and although George's ear had been sewed up and bandaged, he had had a couple of drops--some viscous matter had dropped on the collar of his shirt which Mr. Johnson, never interrupting his dictation to George, said, "George, I told you to put on a clean shirt each day. You've got on that same old shirt you've been wearing." Well, it was a clean shirt; it just had had this dripping on it. Well, we went through the day, everybody wanting to know what had happened to George's ear, and he told everybody he just hit a door.

And we wound up that night, which was a Friday night, in Fort Worth where Mr. Johnson spoke to the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce dinner. They had a little over 500 present that night, which is the most they'd had ever up to that moment. And about ten or ten-thirty that night, after we had all retired back to Mr. Johnson's suite, Walter Jenkins handed Mr. Johnson a memorandum setting forth what had happened to George and Judge Sewell. This was a perfect example of Walter Jenkins' knowledge of Mr. Johnson's temperaments and what have you--the correct timing, I

should say, of when to present something and when not, because while he was concerned he was not overly upset about the little altercation that had taken place. Mr. Johnson did tell me later to drop by and visit with Judge Sewell and try to see that matters were squared away because on the one hand, while he didn't want his aides antagonizing State Court District Judges, he didn't want his assistants to be having their ears chewed on by District Judges.

But there are great numbers of these things that happen, Dorothy, as you go along the way. You always sleep when you can and eat when you can because you never know when it's going to be the last you get for some time. You end up with a lot of work, a lot of detail, but it's always refreshing and interesting after you've finished to sit back and look at the various things, the events as they've unfolded.

P: You mentioned earlier on the previous tape that you had gone on a pretty extensive speaking tour as early as 1953 for upcoming elections of Senators; you mentioned Kentucky and St. Louis--

I: Well, Dorothy, on this, let me go back a second to clarify or where I don't misstate this. In '58, Mr. Johnson was Majority Leader of the Senate and was chairman of several other committees, and was extremely interested in the Democrats. Naturally, he was interested in the Democrats retaining control in the Senate. And at the request of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, he did speak in about eight different areas. Now, when I mentioned Kentucky, Des Moines, this trip, that was in December of '59, which I'll get back to in just a second. But in '53, he was accompanied by Warren Woodward on most of those trips. I did not make these trips with him; Warren Woodward did. And he spoke for Robert Eyrd in West Virginia, for Vance Hartke in Indiana, for Gale McGee in Wyoming,

Howard Cannon in Nevada. It seems to me there were a couple more; I can't recall them just off-hand, but these were the notable ones. Ted Moss in Utah.

P: Was Mr. Woodward on the Johnson staff?

C: No. He was just working as a volunteer at that time.

P: From Washington?

C: No, he was in Houston. He was working for a savings and loan association in Houston, I believe, and just was helping out as a volunteer--as a former staff member.

P: Is he presently back in Houston?

C: No, he's in Dallas. He's a vice president of American Airlines in Dallas. He was here in Washington as Vice President of American Airlines, but he's--then Los Angeles, but now he's in Dallas.

And back to this trip of December '59, Dorothy. This was a combined trip where we went to Kentucky, to Missouri, to Iowa, to Arizona. And this was a trip that had been put together at the request of the Democratic National Committee asking Mr. Johnson to speak at certain fund-raising dinners and to visit people in different areas. And we left from the LBJ Ranch, Judge A. W. Morrison^{? Morrison} and his wife were along with us, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, Mary Margaret and myself. I believe maybe George Reedy was along-- I'm not sure, but we were going to--

P: That's Mary Margaret Valenti now?

C: Yes. We went to Kentucky first; actually, we had to land at Evansville, Indiana, and go by car because I believe it was Hendersonville, Kentucky, where we went to the home of former Senator Earl Clements. Senator Clements had asked Mr. Johnson to come by to have lunch with the newly elected governor of Kentucky, Ned Breathitt--not Ned, but he's in the immediate

past--but the new governor of Kentucky, and other key Democratic wheels of Kentucky. We had a very enjoyable lunch session with these people, and we flew on to a place about seventy miles south of St. Louis that I believe was in the area of Bismarck, Missouri. We were met there by Tony Buford, who's a long time friend of Mr. Johnson's; he was legal counsel at that time to Gussie Bush. Tony had a big Black Angus farm down in this location where we spent the night. He and Mr. Johnson had bought cattle back and forth with each other. We spent the night with Tony Buford, and then flew on into St. Louis the next morning where Mr. Johnson spoke to a group at St. Louis University.

That afternoon we flew over to Hutchinson, Kansas, and Mr. Johnson spoke to a fund-raising dinner there. This had been requested by a Congressman Floyd Breeding who was running for reelection and it was a fund-raising dinner for him and for the Democrats of that Congressional district.

P: Mr. Carter, what were the topics of these in general--of these speeches across the country?

C: Basically, it was about the nation's welfare domestically, and to a degree, the foreign affairs. I remember Mr. Johnson used to tell a story on foreign affairs. He didn't deal at great length on this. And I've thought about this a number of times. In these days it would have been no nice if some responsible Senator would have said the things these days that Mr. Johnson said back in that time period. Of course, we had problems with Laos and some of the others going on in 1959, even Viet Nam to a minor degree. But Mr. Johnson, as I said, didn't deal at great length on foreign policy. He said that the way the Constitution of this country is written, we have but one Commander-in-Chief, and that's the President of the United States.

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He's the only person that is responsible for dealing with other nations on foreign affairs, and he likened the situation to all of us being in an airplane and flying through some very turbulent weather, with the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief as the pilot of this plane trying to bring it in for a safe landing. And he used to say that, "It would ill-behoove me as Majority Leader of the Senate and as leader of the opposition party to go in and be hitting this pilot over the head with a stick all the time he's trying his dead level best to land this plane." And I think that Mr. Johnson has encountered some of that these days when he has been trying to navigate this country through to a safe landing; that he has been hit on the head by friend and foe alike in many--I say friend and foe, I retract that--from Democrats as well as Republicans.

But the major part of his speeches were about our domestic economy; what he felt needed to be done; what had been done; what was being done; the things that were accomplished in the Congress where Mr. Rayburn was Speaker of the House and he was Majority Leader of the Senate.

But we went on then from Hutchinson, Kansas, to--we landed in Omaha, which is just across the river from Council Bluffs, Iowa. And Mr. Johnson spoke that night at a fund-raising dinner at Council Bluffs; this was at the request of Governor Herschel Lovelace of Iowa. Governor Lovelace was there and introduced Mr. Johnson. After speaking that night, we flew on in to Des Moines where Mr. and Mrs. Johnson spent the night with Governor and Mrs. Lovelace at the Governor's Mansion.

The next day Mr. Johnson spoke to some service club at noon--I don't know whether it was the Lions' Club, but he spoke to some group there. That afternoon he spoke out at Drake University to a group of students.

P: Mr. Carter, was Governor Lovelace already committed to John Kennedy at this point?

C: No, he wasn't committed to anyone. Apparently, what he was doing at that time was inviting the different ones--different possible Democratic Presidential nominees--to come by and visit in Iowa and spend some time with him. I remember Governor Lovelace at that time telling me that he had had Senator John Kennedy--had him come out for the Iowa-Notre Dame football game, in which Notre Dame had decisively defeated Iowa which the governor and Senator Kennedy had needled each other about. My recollection is that he had all--Senator Symington, Senator Humphrey, and all--come by.

That night after Mr. Johnson had spoken to the Drake group, he went over to Marshalltown, Iowa, and spoke to the Hotel Tall Corn there at their fund-raising dinner. Governor Lovelace was with him at all of these appearances. We went back into Des Moines that night and again spent the night at the Governor's Mansion.

We left at ten o'clock the next morning; we were flying in this twin Beech--^{? Missouri}. Now, Judge Morrison and his wife started out with us, but they left us in St. Louis. They were not along with us on the rest of this trip. We left Des Moines at ten o'clock that morning to fly to Phoenix, Arizona. And on this part of the trip it was Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, George Reedy, Mary Margaret Wylie and myself. We flew first from Des Moines to Amarillo, stopped and regassed and ate a sandwich, took on off for Phoenix. We were due there at eight o'clock their time that night for a dinner--fund-raising dinner that Governor McFarland was sponsoring. We ran into considerable turbulence over New Mexico and Arizona. There were several electrical storms we ran in and out of; at one point, we had to have the oxygen on. And it seemed like that we flew and flew and flew for just hours and hours. We had been given an estimated arrival time and when that time came and we had been flying an extra hour-and-a-half beyond that,

everyone was a little apprehensive as to really where we were and what was going on and concerned about the high mountain ranges out there. But we finally did get to Phoenix and rushed in to the hotel where the dinner was being held, and Mr. Johnson got there just barely in time to be introduced and speak.

We left there the next morning and came on back to the LBJ Ranch, but that was one week of speech-making in December 1959.

P: Did you, as assistants--the group of you that was a part of the Johnson staff--sort of feel any of the people out as to their consideration of Johnson for the nomination of the Presidency?

C: I don't think, Dorothy, we made any concerted effort or campaign, but I would say that we were--and I'll speak only for myself, I was not unmindful of any nice words that anyone had to say about Mr. Johnson and hoped to develop friendships that could be followed up on and checked back with.

P: You didn't seek any commitments at this time?

C: No.

P: To come forward in this time span a little further, Mr. Carter, in early 1960 there was a charge that Lyndon Johnson was using political blackmail to recess the Senate until after the convention, and then bring it back, using his powers over the passages of the issues on hand which were Medicare and Minimum Wage. Do you believe there's any validity in this charge? This was in order to cement possible backing for his nomination for the Presidency.

C: Dorothy, of course, I was in Texas, and I have no immediate knowledge of that. I remember some of his critics back at that time saying something along this line, but I don't believe any such thing was done. It would just be my evaluation that there's nothing to it.

P: Did you attend the 1960 convention?

C: Yes. I attended in two capacities--one, as an assistant to Mr. Johnson, and, two, I was an elected delegate--part of the Texas delegation.

P: Did this lend any conflict--

C: No.

P: --with his nomination?

C: No, because the Texas delegation had been instructed to unanimously support, to place his name in nomination for the Presidency and to support his candidacy until it was released.

P: Did this receive Lyndon Johnson's blessing, that the Texas delegation was going to nominate him as "Favorite Son" and back him?

C: Well, it depends on how you mean "his approval." I mean, he did not condemn it. Let's go back--I have forgotten the exact date that he announced his candidacy, but this action was taken without his being present. This was in Austin in 1960 at the State Democratic Convention. It would have been in June 1960. This action was taken with or without his knowledge, I don't know.

P: Was there any resistance to this--to placing his name in nomination by the Texas delegation among the members?

C: No.

P: What about other Texas political factions at the state convention?

C: As I recall, Dorothy, the 1960 convention was not unlike most other Texas conventions, and I think other state conventions. You had certain rump delegations there that were outside the auditorium, who had had appearances before the Credentials Committee. I know a group from Harris County and from one or two other counties where they had claimed that they actually had won their county convention, but the Credentials Committee, in going

over these, had decided in favor of certain delegations which does not include the one or two hundred, whatever number it was, that took up a stand across the street from the Civic Auditorium in Austin. But I think, as I recall, the vote was about 95 percent for the endorsement of Mr. Johnson in the state convention.

P: How many delegations were thrown out on credentials?

C: Well, Dorothy, I wouldn't put it in that wording. As I recall, there were about six or eight contesting delegations. I don't think anyone was thrown out. Those who had been certified as the winners, I believe in most instances, were the ones that were eventually certified by the convention as a whole. I don't believe that any of the rump--to the best of my recollection, none of the rump delegations were seated.

P: Were they favoring another candidate? And, also, what other candidates were mentioned at the Texas State Convention?

C: I can't specifically remember whether they favored another candidate; I think that if they did, it probably would have been Senator Kennedy.

P: This would probably be the liberals?

C: Yes. And, basically, at the convention no other candidate was mentioned but Mr. Johnson.

P: At the 1960 convention which was in Los Angeles, it was said that Kennedy really controlled--John Kennedy really controlled the convention and that Kennedy money had flowed and obtained a sizeable, or had reached a sizeable influence. Do you think that this was so?

C: Well, you always hear those charges. I never saw any of it change hands, and I don't know. I certainly couldn't state it as a matter of fact. I would say that there was an abundance of Kennedy banners and hats and balloons and everything else; I'd say that they were not lacking in anything.

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It seemed to me the biggest tactic that was used there was the bandwagon theory. It seemed to me also that Mr. Kennedy was aided and assisted by the press to a degree on this. We used to have our staff meetings in the evening to try to take a hard count of how many delegates were for whom, and the best we'd been able to ascertain was always 150 to 200 votes under what the press was reporting at that minute that Kennedy already had. This was always hard to understand because we had people swearing to us on the one hand that they were not supporting him, and yet the press was carrying that certain states were. In the several intervening days after the opening of the convention, it seemed that some of the states were hustling to try to hurry and get on the bandwagon that they thought they were going to miss if they didn't jump on quickly.

P: Do you remember which particular papers that these were?

C: No. I think this was a thing just generally--what I'm doing here is making a personal observation. I remember talking to my friend Art Edson who was a feature writer for the Associated Press at that time; Sander Vanocur of NBC, I mentioned this to; and they said, "Well, this is what it's going to be." That's the way it did end up.

P: They were stating projections as the way it was.

C: Well, that's what I gathered.

P: Why do you think this was so?

C: I don't have any idea.

P: Would you say that Kennedy--

C: I don't impute any motive; I don't anything. I think this is these people trying to be ahead of the news--I mean, to try to foretell what is fixing to happen.

P: Would you say that Kennedy did control this convention, not only in terms of nomination, but the platform and credentials?

C: It's hard to say that he totally controlled it. He did have a close ally and friend in Paul Butler who at that time was chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Knowing the way these things operate, I wouldn't be surprised but what the Kennedy camp wasn't consulted about various speakers and different ones.

P: At the convention, do you recall the events of the nomination and the consideration of Lyndon Johnson for the Vice Presidency?

C: Well, Dorothy, as I recall, the Presidential nomination was on a Wednesday night. Of course, the different candidates had been placed in nomination; they had Senator Kennedy, Senator Johnson, Senator Symington, Adlai Stevenson, and there were a few other favorite sons placed in nomination. But as they got down to the balloting, the serious part of it was between Kennedy and Johnson. And also, as I recall, I think it was down to Wyoming when Mr. Kennedy got enough votes to put him over the needed requirement.

One little sidelight on this. One of the states I was doing a little coordinating with at this time was the State of Kansas, and the State of Kansas was under the unit rule in voting their delegation. And I had been able to work out an understanding with the Symington delegates in the Kansas delegation that their delegation would either vote for Johnson or Symington, although the governor of Kansas--Docking--was all for Senator Kennedy. In fact, his son was working for Senator Kennedy on the Kennedy staff. But we had caused them to go into caucus at the time this balloting was going on for the Presidential nomination. It ended up Kansas never did get to vote as Kennedy got the nomination, because they were held out in caucus by the Symington-Johnson delegates trying to get the matter resolved. At the same time, the governor was trying to get it resolved in favor of Senator Kennedy. And I frankly was off the floor back keeping an eye on

this Kansas caucus as the balloting was getting along, and I ended up seeing the final Wyoming votes--saw this on a television set inside the hall. That was on Wednesday night.

P: Did the Johnson staff have any of this elaborate communication network set up?

C: We had a telephone system, Dorothy, and we had some walkie-talkie radios, but we didn't meet with a great deal of success with the walkie-talkie radios. I don't believe the equipment in 1960 was as sophisticated as today, and as a result we had considerable interference from metal girders in this colosseum. We never knew when we'd be able to hear or read someone with a radio even just a few hundred feet away.

P: The floor of that convention was pretty mobbed, wasn't it?

C: Yes. Then on Thursday, according to what I've read in the papers and books, there were some discussions that transpired between Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rayburn and others, at which I was not a party to any of this. I had no knowledge of any of this. I got word at about 3:30 that afternoon--this was Thursday afternoon--that Mr. Kennedy was going to go on television at four o'clock and announce that he had asked Mr. Johnson to run with him as the Vice Presidential candidate, and Mr. Johnson had agreed to this.

P: You were not present late that Wednesday night during the period when supposedly Mr. Johnson was approached by Robert Kennedy?

C: No, I was not. And I don't know when. In fact, I was under the impression that it happened Thursday morning. I mean, I was not present period at any of that. But Mr. Kennedy did have his four o'clock press announcement, and did announce that Mr. Johnson was going to be his running-mate. Mr. Johnson made his acceptance speech that night--well, I'm mistaken here.

He was nominated that night, and the next night he made his acceptance speech and Mr. Kennedy made his acceptance speech in the Los Angeles Colosseum, and then everybody moved off to get down to the campaign.

P: Was the 1960 convention one of the first that started late in the evening to accommodate television?

C: Dorothy, I'm trying to think. I don't think so. I did not attend the 1952 convention, but I remember watching it on television and it was in the evening. Of course, it was from Chicago. What they always try to do, and I say "they", I'm talking about television advisers on conventions, try to suggest that you have the best part of your programming around nine or ten o'clock Eastern Standard Time. You have to work your time out accordingly. Like when we were in Los Angeles for the '60 convention, we had to be three hours earlier than we normally would have been to start a convention. We were starting at five and six o'clock in the afternoon out there, mainly coming back to the Midwest and the East on television.

P: Do you recall any other events surrounding that ticket? The Lyndon Johnson-John Kennedy ticket during that convention?

C: No. As has been written in a book on this thing, these events transpired so quickly that it even caught Lynda Bird off balance. She was out at Disneyland when they were finally able to locate her to tell her to get back, that her father was accepting the Vice Presidency. But we had some of our friends that were upset because he had accepted this nomination, while most of his friends understood that it was a thing that he ought to do; that he would add strength to the ticket. As I recall, Mr. Kennedy had gotten around 300 votes for the nomination, and Mr. Johnson had gotten over 400. And this was indicative of the strength that they had across the country.

P: Do you think John Kennedy needed him to win the election?

C: Well, as it turned out, I think it was proven by the election results.

I think it was just a matter of Texas as one, and then there were several other states there--a number of the border states--that were carried that I would rather doubt that Mr. Kennedy could have carried with any other prospective candidate, or any other candidate that was on the scene at that minute that was well known.

P: Why do you think Lyndon Johnson accepted the Vice Presidency?

C: Well, Dorothy, of course that's a hard question, something that only he could answer. But I would presume it was one of several--I mean, not one of several, but several contributory factors were involved there. One, he felt like he could be of further service to his country. Two, he could be of further service to his party. And three, he had achieved a magnificent record as Majority Leader of the Senate--his record was unsurpassed, I think, in the history of the United States Senate. And in this job of being Majority Leader--it's a real tough job. Every day it's a different ball game. You have to put together a different combination of votes of Democrats and Republicans to try to get needed legislation passed, and you have to treat each of the other Senators like they're all prima donnas. It's a very tough, nerve-wracking job that Mr. Johnson had carried on for some six years or so at that time. In my own opinion, the law of averages would have dictated a move, if nothing else. And I think for these different reasons--I think these were probably the major considerations, although as I say this is just my personal evaluation. Mr. Johnson has never addressed himself to me on this subject.

P: Do you think it might have been possible that Mr. Johnson could have run as President following an eight-year Administration by John Kennedy? Was this a possible consideration?

- C: Oh, I'm sure that he was not unmindful of that, although I don't know that that was a major consideration, because so many things can happen in an eight-year span.
- P: What was the situation in Texas regarding Lyndon Johnson keeping his name in the Senatorial election and as the Vice Presidential nominee?
- C: Well, most of his friends were delighted about this, because he was either going to be Majority Leader or Vice President, one or the other, in all likelihood. John Tower was running against him at that time and was the Republican nominee for the Senate, and Mr. Johnson did not make a speech in that Senatorial contest. Came back to Texas the last couple of days of the '60 campaign. I've forgotten the margin by which he defeated John Tower, 500,000 or 600,000 votes, something like that as I recall; so the Senate seat never really was in jeopardy.
- P: The press was pretty hot on this issue, weren't they?
- C: Dorothy, I don't remember them being hostile about this point. Of course, this was an issue that the Republicans tried to raise and tried to stir up trouble about, but I consciously don't remember it having ever gotten off the ground.
- P: The liberal factions didn't raise any question on this at all?
- C: No, the liberal factions were working right with us on the campaign, because they wanted to see the Democrats win; they wanted to see John Kennedy President. And I remember them working right hand-in-glove with us on the campaign.
- P: As soon as the convention was over and the ticket was established as Kennedy and Johnson, what were your functions assigned to be for this campaign?
- C: Mr. Johnson got Gerald Mann from Dallas, former Attorney General of Texas, to serve as campaign manager for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, and I served

as his chief of staff, served in an office right next to him, looking after the day-to-day operations of the campaign through the state.

P: Primarily in the state of Texas?

G: Yes, my activities were confined totally to the state of Texas. We put together--

P: Let me stop you here. During this campaign, Lyndon Johnson visited every state, I believe, in the Union. It was quite extensive campaigning, but there have been three highlights mentioned, and I wonder if you were involved in any of these, regarding the whistlestop tour of the South, the meeting in New York City of the American Liberal Party, or the Adolphus Hotel incident?

G: No, I wasn't involved in any of those directly. Nothing in the New York meeting at all either directly or indirectly. I was involved in the Dallas affair, the Adolphus affair, only slightly in that I had helped work out the arrangements for that meeting. I was not there; I was in Austin. So my connections with that were very slight as was my connection with the Southern train trip. But I want to tell you one of the little funny things that happened along the way, and this relates to the Southern train trip.

I got a call from Ed Shelton, who was in Washington working out the details of the train trip, and wanted me to get a real live donkey lined up to be taken along on this train trip. Wanted one from South Texas. I had gotten hold of Judge Bibb down at Eagle Pass, Texas, and had gotten the Judge to get us a donkey lined up which he sent up to Austin, and we were going to some way try to get it on up to Washington to put it on this train. The plan was that at each whistlestop they would unload this donkey and have pictures made of people and children with a big Kennedy-Johnson sign as a background. Well, the donkey was delivered--. Let me

back up a second. I'm getting ahead of myself. I got a call subsequently from Shelton saying that as this train was being made up, there wasn't going to be a place for the donkey; that the railroad officials would not permit that to go along, so cancel that. So I called Judge Bibb and thanked him and told him to just cancel it. He said, "Well, it's too late for that; there had already been a big writeup in the local paper about this with my picture and the donkey on the front page; you're going to get the donkey whether you want it or not." So he sent the donkey to us in Austin. It ended up we had the truck go back by the LBJ Ranch and leave the donkey there; I had no place in Austin to keep him.

And a month or so after the election, I think, folks from Eagle Pass did come back and pick up the donkey. I mean, they did get it finally. But the Judge was very adamant about this. He sent me clippings; there had been a big writeup with his picture and all--that this donkey was going to be flown to Washington and was going to accompany Mr. Johnson on this Southern train trip, and that their city and county were going to be represented. So the donkey got only as far as Austin.

But back to your original question. I had nothing more than these little side actions on any of it. I had nothing to do with any of it.

P: Would you talk about your activities in Texas during this campaign, and regarding Gerald Mann, the campaign chairman?

C: Well, Dorothy, I think we previously mentioned we had the Johnson political organization by Congressional districts, and the main thing we did here was to get all of these folks into high gear on the campaign. And also to feed into this group, by setting up different departments, different areas of the campaign headquarters, those from Labor, those from the various ethnic groups. At the same time, we worked hand-in-glove with a citizens' group

for Kennedy-Johnson, which was made up of those people who could not work within the normal framework of the campaign. We were coordinated, although we were two separate organizations.

P: Who headed this other organization?

C: A gentleman by the name of Williams from Dallas, and a lady by the name of Jean Akin. She's now wife of Congressman Richard Bolling. But those two headed up this organization.

P: Is that the cigar-smoking Jean Akin?

C: Yes.

P: Was Mr. Mann very active in the campaign?

C: Jerry was very active in traveling around. Of course, he had a very large business of his own that he had to look after. And he usually came to Austin where our campaign headquarters were located each Monday, and he'd stay there a day or so and then have to be gone. This was the main reason that I had to stay primarily in Austin to look after the nuts and bolts of a campaign, the day-to-day operating details.

We mentioned a citizens' committee a second ago, and we did try to carry on a coordinated campaign. We did go astray on this at one--I say astray--they did go off on a tangent at one point, which is one of the things that helped precipitate the Adolphus confrontation. You may recall, the books show that a citizens' committee ran a full-page ad in behalf of Kennedy-Johnson. It was a signatory-type ad. And what they had done was take a long list of names--a big card file that I believe Bob Clark had accumulated over the years of people that at one time or another had indicated their support for Mr. Johnson. And the citizens' group sent out telegrams to these people, saying something to the effect that, "Unless we hear from you by five o'clock tomorrow afternoon, we're going to use your

signature in a full-page ad in the Dallas News and Dallas Times-Herald, supporting the Kennedy-Johnson ticket." Well, it turned out that a number of these people were dead, or out of town, and didn't get these telegrams until after the names had already been used. While many of them were for Mr. Johnson, they resented the fact that their name was used without them having really given formal approval. But the Republicans seized on this quickly, and the thing fomented into the--I mean, as a result of that, it fomented into this confrontation at the Adolphus Hotel.

P: You were not present there?

C: No.

P: Were you involved in any fund-raising activities in Texas?

C: No. Mine was out of the fund-raising area. Mine was strictly political, strictly trying to get campaign headquarters set up, and the counties broken down into precincts, and the precincts down into blocs, and where we had people canvassed, and planning for election day activities of getting out the vote.

P: If I remember correctly, there was some speculation that Nixon might carry the state of Texas.

C: Yes. In fact, as you recall in the book he wrote on his six disappointments, one of them was the fact that he didn't carry Texas in 1960. All of your national publications had already written Texas off as being solidly in the Nixon column, and he had even learned to believe it himself. But--

P: You never thought so? You weren't worried?

C: Well, I'd worried. I'd always worried, but I never thought that he was going to win it. In fact, in September of 1960 Mr. Johnson talked to me one day by telephone. This was about the twenty-fifth of September. And he asked me how much I thought the Kennedy-Johnson ticket was going to win

by, and I said around 50,000 votes. Well, he and I talked a number of times between then and November, and he was always saying, "We've got to work harder and do more and win by a bigger margin than that." As a consequence, we were doing more; we were trying to do more, and I think each time I talked to him thereafter, I raised the estimate a little more as to how much I thought we were going to win by. I ended up telling him I thought we were going to win by 150,000 votes. I should have stuck to my original 50,000, because we won by 46,000.

The Republicans did a lot of hollering about voter irregularity in Texas. I don't think any of this was ever half-way well founded. I think we lost a number of votes. I think the Kennedy-Johnson ticket could have well have lost 100,000 votes in that November election of 1960. The Texas ballot that year had a Constitution Party candidate listed, and it was off the far-right side. Unless a voter marked every column out, then that invalidated his ballot, and great numbers of them marked the Republicans and most of those off, but did not mark this particular one off. As a result, many ballots were not counted; they were invalidated because they failed to mark out this one column.

P: What was the party running for--what office?

C: I believe--

P: Did they have a full slate?

C: I'm not sure. No, they didn't have a full slate. As I recall, they only had one or two candidates on the complete ticket. I believe maybe that it was just a candidate for governor which, as you would look across the top of the ballot, there would be no candidate for President beyond Democrats, Republicans, and I expect the Prohibition Party was on there. I don't remember. But the Constitution Party had no candidate, and all was blank

there, and it was a very easy mistake to make unless you checked very much in detail as you cast your ballot.

P: Do you think that this resulted in Johnson losing more, or--

C: Yes, I think the Kennedy-Johnson ticket could well have lost up to 100,000 votes on this by ballots that were invalidated. As I recall, Senator Yarborough made several speeches about this at that time on some spot-checking that he and some of his friends had done across the state. In fact, I believe it was his estimate that he felt like the Kennedy-Johnson ticket had lost as much as 100,000 votes by those that had been invalidated for not having marked out the Constitution Party.

P: Did Roman Catholicism become much of an issue in Texas--John Kennedy's religion--faith?

C: I think it was a factor, Dorothy, up until the confrontation he had with the Protestant ministers in Houston. I think that was--

P: Was this a trip that you arranged?

C: I was on that trip, Dorothy, and I had a little hand in this. This offer first came to our attention at State Headquarters. We had Johnny Crooker, Jr., now the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and another gentleman-- his name has slipped my mind right this second, but he's a federal judge down at Houston now, who represented the liberals, and Johnny represented the moderate conservatives. They were the co-chairmen of Harris County for the Kennedy-Johnson campaign. And they called me one day and said they had been approached by a Protestant minister group that wanted to offer a forum to Mr. Nixon and to Mr. Kennedy to come speak on religious freedom and government operations. And I passed this on to Jerry Mann who in turn passed it on to Mr. Johnson's and Mr. Kennedy's headquarters. Then it was reported back favorably that they'd like to follow up on this.

We were naturally in hopes that we'd have some friendly ministers on this panel, and it turned out they didn't permit any of our Harris County people or anyone else to have any hand in any part of this thing after Mr. Kennedy accepted their invitation. The ministers' association took this thing over and ran it lock, stock, and barrel as to what format would be used; how questions would be asked; and the different other things.

Now, Mr. Nixon rejected their invitation, but we from the campaign headquarters' standpoint had felt like that this would be a good meeting. And although we were very short of money, we arranged for a pretty good network throughout the state of Texas to carry thirty minutes of this. We also had a tape made of it that we used at other stations where we were not able to get it live that night. And as I recall the national campaign headquarters in Washington took our film and had it shown in various other places where it's generally termed "The Bible-carrying Baptists" were upset over the Catholicism. I have been told that this film did a great deal to turn the tide as far as any religious aspect was concerned.

I recall one thing. Let me tell you this. Woodrow Seale was the fellow's name in Houston that was the co-chairman with Johnny Crooker.

P: That was the liberal?

C: Yes. He was a friend of Mrs. Randolph's there, and represented the liberal faction.

P: I was going to say--do you recall any other instance surrounding this? It was considered a great kind of victory over this particular issue, as I remember. Is there any other elaboration on that meeting?

C: No.

P: Was Kennedy alone in this? Mr. Johnson didn't have--

C: No, he was in the hotel; he was there. In fact, as I recall, the ministers had asked that no Johnson people be around; they wanted this strictly with the Catholic Kennedy himself. I did ease in--I did sit in on it.

P: Did you feel that they were really kind of trying to get him off balance on this issue; I mean, as opposed to being a favorable group, were they really putting him through the fire on this?

C: Well, I think they were totally nonpartisan, if we can use that wording. They were neither for nor against. They certainly couldn't have been labeled a favorable group. Now, they were not totally unfavorable either. I think they were a very objective group, and I think Mr. Kennedy acquitted himself extremely well because when he finished, they, as I recall, they gave him a standing ovation which made it even more outstanding.

Again, this little detail. I recall this confrontation lasted around forty-five minutes. And the unfortunate part, as far as the campaign was concerned, we'd only purchased thirty minutes of live time and missed some of the little details of it as far as the Texas network was concerned. All this was caught on the tape though, but the people in Texas got the main message on what Mr. Kennedy had to say.

P: Did Mr. Kennedy make other stops in Texas? You said Johnson only came in toward the very end.

C: Yes, Mr. Kennedy made--he came into Texas on the evening of September 10th at El Paso, Dorothy, and spoke there. Spoke again the next morning, and left and went to Lubbock. And I believe it was San Antonio, Houston--and this was when he had this session--and went from Houston to Austin and spent the night. The next morning left and went to Fort Worth, to Dallas and had a tremendous crowd. I remember the police estimated at least 150,000 people there.

P: In Dallas?

C: Dallas, which I was greatly surprised myself. I wasn't sure how we were going to draw in Dallas. And Mr. Johnson was with him through this. Then when we left Dallas, Mr. Johnson, I recall, had a speech commitment somewhere else. He had to leave by separate plane and go in another direction. Mr. Kennedy went on to Texarkana, where they had a fantastic crowd. I remember it was estimated at around 200,000 people in the Texarkana, Texas-Arkansas area there. And I was along for all this part of the trip. But when Mr. Kennedy flew out of Texarkana to go on some place else, we had--I say "we", I'm talking about the campaign staff--we had a plane there that we flew on back to Austin on. But that was his main trip, campaigning in Texas.

P: Did you have Kennedy staff people in Austin?

C: No. The only thing close to this that we had was we had some advance men down a couple weeks ahead of time to work out the details of his visits in San Antonio, Houston, Austin, Fort Worth, Dallas, and all of these.

P: Who was this?

C: Marty Friedman, who today is an attorney here in Washington, was the head of this group. He stationed himself in Austin. He had five or six other men with him--I don't remember all of these people. But I worked with Marty Friedman at that time in telling him who his men should contact in the different cities, who would be able to be of help to them.

P: Wasn't this your area, too?

C: Yes. But even so, you have to have advance men come in and work details out on the exact arrangements, and these were people who had been trained in how Senator Kennedy wanted certain things done. Each candidate has his own method of operation, and an advance man who knows his business knows much more than any local leader does on how to achieve maximum results.

Speaking of advance men, one phase of this we left out was the Kennedy women and Mrs. Johnson made a quick trip over Texas in late August--early September. The last week in August I believe it was.

P: Which one of the Kennedy women?

C: Well, we had Mrs. Robert Kennedy along, and we had Mrs. Shriver. Those two and Mrs. Johnson and some of our women campaign people from Texas.

P: Jacqueline Kennedy was not--

C: No. She was not. If you recall, she was still expecting a baby at that time. But what these women got into the--actually started the campaign in Texas, you might say, by being thrown right into the breach while other main elements of the campaign, as far as Senator Kennedy and Senator Johnson were concerned, while those things were being perfected and worked out, these women were able to move quickly and have rallies at the various towns. I remember we had a big rally in Houston and Dallas and Amarillo and El Paso, Odessa-Midland area. These were all extremely successful events, got considerable publicity. Mrs. Johnson did her usual great job on this part of it.

P: Was there any friction between the Austin and Boston approach at this time?

C: No. We were basically just given the job of running the campaign in Texas, and just try to make sure that Kennedy-Johnson carried Texas.

P: How was the draw compared with the Democratic candidates, or the Lyndon Johnson people--the Johnson-Kennedy people and the Nixon people?

C: How do you mean "the draw"? You mean--

P: Crowd-wise. You all must have compared them.

C: Well, it was, and I think the only main one I recall, Dorothy, was in Dallas where Nixon had been there ahead of time, had been there before Kennedy. And he had drawn something over a 100,000, and this was not very

happy news to those of us who study these details, because we couldn't help but wonder if this wasn't almost an insurmountable crowd to try to surpass. But like I mentioned a minute ago, we were all hugely delighted that things did work out so well when Mr. Kennedy was there.

P: Did Mr. Kennedy evidence any anxiety over the fact that they might not carry the state, or there was a question about them carrying the state?

C: He didn't to me. I wasn't that close to him. I saw him, shook hands with him, and talked a little bit to Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien at that time, but none of my conversations were anywhere close on this.

P: Did you have any conversations with Kenny O'Donnell or Mr. O'Brien--

C: Just quickly in passing. Just to the effect that I thought we were going to carry Texas.

P: Who were the members of the campaign staff, the top ones that you remember?

C: Are you talking about the Texas campaign staff?

P: Yes, sir.

C: Of course, Mr. Mann was the top man. And basically, I was considered the number two man in campaign headquarters. Will Wilson, who was Attorney General of Texas at that time, had a definite place in the campaign headquarters. Jerry Holleman that was then the state president of the AFL-CIO was an assistant campaign manager. His work was, of course, with all the labor unions, to get their help and support. And Lloyd Hand had an equally important office. I believe Lloyd's job--we had five field men working and traveling constantly at that time, going from county to county in their particular areas of Texas, and Lloyd's job as I recall at that moment was to keep track of these field managers, to feed information in that they were reporting to him. We had various Negro and Mexican-American leaders working with us. Dr. Garcia from Corpus Christi;

M. D. Anderson, outstanding Negro businessman in Austin, did a lot of work with us and helped us; there was a Reverend Black down in San Antonio; and, of course, Henry Gonzalez was helping us. Henry was still a State Senator at that time. But he was most helpful. In the Latin Americans, Albert Peña from San Antonio, Valmo Ballinger from San Antonio, Hobart Taylor Sr. in Houston. But we tried to have some elements of every factions, every group that we could, working on this.

P: Were there any groups or factions or organizations whose endorsement you sought that were lost?

C: No. I can't think of any.

P: Where did Mr. Nixon's support mainly come from?

C: These were just from the conservative element--that conservative element that exists in Texas.

P: And had they switched parties? Texas is predominantly registered Democratic.

C: No, this group, I would say, Dorothy, was a carry-over from the Eisenhower years. These people had voted for Eisenhower in '52 and '56, and it was just a follow-through on what they had previously been doing.

P: This would be some of the former Dixiecrats then?

C: Right.

P: Are there any other incidents during that campaign in Texas that you recall, or you would like to add?

C: No. The only thing, Dorothy, just to conclude this phase of it was that Mr. Johnson--well, let me digress a second. I believe that the Kennedy-Johnson strategy at the time was that this ticket would carry Texas, and it needed Mr. Johnson's time spent in North Carolina, Virginia, and other areas that better use of his time could be made. And it was planned that he would come back into Texas for a final wrapup on the last several days,

taking your major metropolitan areas, and this was done I believe on the Thursday, Friday, Saturday before the election on Tuesday--the following Tuesday. This was when Mr. Johnson spoke in Fort Worth on a Thursday night, and then I believe this Adolphus confrontation was the next day at noon on a Friday. And then Mr. Johnson made appearances in Houston and San Antonio. My recollection is he was in the valley on that Sunday before the election, and it could have been on Monday that he went to New York and was with Mr. Kennedy in a big joint final rally at Madison Square Garden, which was nationally televised. But those are the only appearances-- Now, he was with Mr. Kennedy back on the evening of September 10th, the day of September 11th, and most of the day on September 12th, when Mr. Kennedy visited those places we talked about earlier. But that was it.

I was over in campaign headquarters which was in a building right across the alley from the Driskill Hotel where Mr. Johnson was on election night, and I'd had a system set up there with various county leaders where that they would quickly get information in to us on how their counties had gone, and we had what I thought was a wonderful system set up, but they couldn't get the calls in quickly enough. After about an hour and a half or two hours of our vote counting, and I was calling Mr. Johnson about every fifteen minutes to give him our latest results, the Texas Election Bureau started out-stripping us on the thing, where we were running way behind their count. And I finally realized, after about another hour or so, that we weren't as effective or as efficient as we thought we were going to be. Finally, we pretty well stopped trying to keep our counts up to date, but we were checking--continuing to check with these county men to have our own estimate of how this thing was coming along.

P: Did you have people out in all of the counties?

- C: Well, we had the county campaign chairman who was to call in. He was to call in and report to his field representative and our group that we had set up. We had some additional phones and girls and field men and what have you to take these calls.
- P: Do you think this was a carry-over from Mr. Johnson's supposed "watching those ballot boxes" philosophy when the count came in?
- C: I think it could well be. I think that it also points up a part of his personality of being a perfectionist, looking after many little details. We finally reached that point on election night where we realized that we had won Texas, and--
- P: Were you worried during the course of the evening before you were certain because it wasn't--
- C: Well, you always are worried, Dorothy, to a degree. I felt very confident. At the same time, you always are afraid that maybe your information has been wrong, or you've misjudged something. But my wife and I went over and joined Mr. and Mrs. Johnson--
- P: How early was it ascertained that Texas carried Johnson?
- C: I don't believe this we're talking about was till about eleven o'clock, somewhere along in there. I haven't thought about that timing in some time, Dorothy, but reflecting back on it, I think maybe nine-thirty or ten I called Mr. Johnson and told him that in my opinion we had just won the state; that the Texas Election Bureau had just completed all--including all the Dallas County votes--and we had been able to sustain that shock, and still were ahead and that the counties that were still out would all be favorable to Kennedy-Johnson. We'd have a few exceptions here and there, but not enough to amount to anything. I believe, as I try to recall, that it was with the ten o'clock Texas Election Bureau--right after that

was when I called Mr. Johnson and told him that in my opinion we had won the state without question.

P: And then you and your wife--

C: Yes, we joined over at Suite 480 over at the Driskill Hotel, where as I recall there were about roughly a total of eight of us, altogether. And the networks were calling for Mr. Johnson to make a victory speech, which, of course, protocol-wise would have been incorrect in a couple of ways. One, Mr. Kennedy had not made a statement, and secondly, while they had had Henry Cabot Lodge on and he almost indicated that this was his defeat statement, he did not give up. Ended up we went across the street, left the Driskill Hotel and went across the street to a little cafe there, and all of us ate some eggs and bacon, and then went back to the suite.

P: Who were these eight people?

C: Dorothy, I can't recall. I would be sure that Walter Jenkins was there, and I'd be sure that Mary Margaret Wylie was there. And I would expect that George Reedy was there.

P: Was there a celebration?

C: Well, we had our own little celebration, just our private celebration. Everybody was tired and very pleased and happy. (end of tape)

INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON C. CARTER (Tape 3)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

Tuesday, October 15, 1968, 10:30 a.m., 1120 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

P: Mr. Carter, at the end of our last tape, we had proceeded through the Vice Presidential campaign of 1960, and I was about to begin to ask you what your position became after Mr. Johnson was inaugurated as Vice President in January of 1961, and what your functions were.

C: Dorothy, at the outset of this tape let me take just one second on my name. It's Clifton Crawford Carter. As I was telling you just a second ago, through Shriner Institute Junior College and through my time at The University of Texas I was known as Crawford Carter, because my daddy was still living at that time, and he went by Clif Carter. But November 1940 on, after I had gone in the Army, well, it was first name, middle initial, and last name, and I became known as Clif Carter. Since November 1940 I have been known as Clif Carter. Occasionally I still get a phone call from someone I went to grade school with in the little town of Smithville, and they still call me Crawford Carter. In fact, a couple of years ago when they had Clif Carter Day in Smithville, my wife and I were given a nice big tray saying, "To Crawford Carter on Clif Carter Day."

Now, to get back to your question, I'm sorry for taking that second. Actually, part of my activities started in December 1960. Many arrangements were having to be made for the Inauguration and besides this, Walter Jenkins, who was the top man in Mr. Johnson's office, had to go into the hospital about the fifteenth of December 1960 for a minor operation, but he would be tied up for about two weeks. So, Mr. Johnson had me come to Washington

to work out of this office. We had meetings after meetings after meetings with the Inaugural officials on compiling lists of people that should be extended this invitation or that invitation or to make sure that all those who had helped from Texas and other places were properly remembered. This is quite a time-consuming task. But we got that worked out, and I mainly worked with Mr. and Mrs. Dale Miller on this back at that time. They were helping coordinate from the Vice President's standpoint with the Kennedy group--

P: Do you recall some of the details of setting up the Inauguration?

C: Yes, I do, Dorothy. Well, you had your invitation list generally to the Inauguration. Now, this did not actually permit entry into anything. I mean, this same procedure is used in all inaugurations. But people back home and people across the country do seem to appreciate being remembered and to receive a nice big engraved invitation inviting them to the Inauguration of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. These were sent out to many thousands of our people in Texas. I keep repeating Texas because this was what I was primarily interested in. Now, there were tickets available for the Inaugural parade and also for the Inauguration itself. You had to have a ticket even for a standing room area, and we were limited on the numbers of tickets both to the Inauguration and to the Inaugural Parade; and we had to try to ascertain who was going to be coming to Washington so as not to waste tickets being sent to Texas or other places and not be used. They were to have a gala that year that was a hundred-dollar-a-ticket fund-raising event, and then they of course had the Inaugural Ball that were \$25 a ticket; and also tickets were sold for the Inaugural Parade. Dorothy, it cost \$200,000 or \$300,000 to put on an Inauguration, and a non-profit corporation has been set up to handle this.

It's a non-partisan, non-profit operation that was set up by the Congress. And what usually happens, they get--this committee gets local business firms to advance the money and then this money is returned after they have made their--they make money off of the Inaugural Balls, off of the seating for the Inaugural Parade. And not to get confused here, the \$100-a-ticket gala--that was sponsored by the Democratic National Committee, and they were the beneficiary of that money, not the Inaugural Committee.

But in '61 at Mr. Kennedy's Inauguration and Mr. Johnson's Inauguration in '65, the Inaugural Committee did a great job and people were refurnished their money on just about a 100 percent basis that they had loaned the money to the Committee.

P: Were you involved in any arrangements for the speakers, or for the ministers giving the prayers, or the design of the platform, or the seating arrangement?

C: No. On the platform of the Inauguration, this is handled by a committee of the Senate--the Rules Committee, I believe. I don't remember. Senator Jordan from North Carolina always has headed this up. And they build and handle the platform, and they handle the ceremony totally at the Capitol. And I would suppose that maybe Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson each were able to express their preferences--well, I'm sure they were. I remember Cardinal Cushing gave the invocation and the lectern caught on fire and a few other things.

P: Who worked on remarks that the Vice President gave?

C: I believe George Reedy worked with Mr. Johnson on this, as I recall; I had nothing to do with that. I'm going to digress just one second, to keep this right continuity, Dorothy.

Mr. Johnson had me move on up to Washington which I did with my family. We left Austin the thirtieth of December 1960 and started driving through

and arrived in Washington about the second of January. I worked out of the--it was still the Majority Leader's office at that time, but quickly became the Vice President's office.

But as history has shown, we had a terrific snow storm right in the middle of the Inauguration--the Inaugural events. And on January 19th about five o'clock in the afternoon, it had been snowing for a couple of hours at this time, I got a call from Mr. Johnson. He was out at his home. And he said that one of his old professors from San Marcos, Southwest Texas State Teachers College, had just called him and was down at Union Station. He said that he had told this man to stay where he was, that I'd be by to pick him up. And he went on to tell me that--and this is Mr. Johnson speaking--"that the phone rang out at his house," now this is the day before the Inauguration on the twentieth, and Mr. Johnson answered the phone himself and the voice at the other end said, "Lyndon, this is Prof Green from San Marcos. I've ridden a train all night to get up here, and I'm here. What are you going to do with me now?" And Mr. Johnson found out the number of the telephone where he was speaking, said, "You stand right there, and Clif Carter will be by to see you in just a little bit." So he got me on the phone and told me where Prof Green was and what he looked like, that he was standing by at Union Station. Mr. Johnson told me to go pick him up, find a hotel room for him, give him a ticket to the gala that night, and give him some spending money if he needed it.

Well, I called first and made contact with Prof Green and went down to Union Station and found him. It was snowing very large flakes at that time. And I went by the old Raleigh Hotel and was able to talk the manager of the hotel there into making a room available for Prof Green. I told the professor that I'd be back in about an hour to pick him up and take

him out to the gala. And he said, "You're not going to take me any place. I've been riding for thirty-six hours on that train, and I'm nearly frozen right now, and I'm going to take a hot bath and go to bed," and he did.

I saw the professor each of the next day or so--he was at the Inauguration with his boots on and heavy clothes and was extremely proud of his former pupil.

But we had such a tremendous amount of snow that evening that I finally got home at eleven o'clock that night. Ordinarily, it took me twenty to twenty-five minutes to drive from the Senate Office Building to where I lived at Arlington, Virginia, but this particular time it took me a little over six hours because of the various jams--traffic jams--and ended up--. Also, if you will recall, over 10,000 cars were abandoned on the streets that night that had to be hauled off--many of them on Pennsylvania Avenue and on the route that the Inaugural Parade would take the next day. Well, the Army--the Service had worked all night with big cranes and wreckers, moving these vehicles out of the way.

P: Mr. Carter, did you follow that operation to be sure it was all clear?

C: No, I did not. But they were giving us reports on radio-television off and on all night. I did have to abandon my car about three blocks from my home, and walked on in, and did spend a good part of that night putting chains on my other car to make sure that I would be able to get in the next morning regardless of what the situation was.

I was there on the morning of the twentieth, and it was extremely cold during the Inauguration. My two daughters were along--they came back in just crying. I was out and watched some of it and came back myself.

Just one little note. The first call that came into Mr. Johnson's office, and this was about two minutes after he had taken the Oath of Office--

P: In the Senate Building?

C: Yes, in the New Senate Office Building. That first call was answered by Dolores Hunter in which she changed from "Mr. Johnson's office" to the "Office of the Vice President"--was the way she answered the phone. And that call came in, as I said, just about two minutes after he had taken his oath.

P: Do you remember who was calling?

C: I do not remember. But, Dorothy, the next month or so, and I'm talking about late January, February, March, we were going through a reorganizational period in Mr. Johnson's office, because as I've mentioned before, being Majority Leader, being chairman of the Senate Space Committee and Senate Policy Committee and different others, he wore a number of hats and had to get these things coordinated and squared away. He had new chairmen taking over from him on the different committees. And it ended up I worked very closely in the main office with Walter Jenkins; my area, as it developed, turned out to be in the political area and patronage area. Any correspondence or visits or conversations along these two lines ended up being directed to my desk. It was my job to know what positions would be available for Presidential appointees, to try to develop a list of people who might be considered by Mr. Johnson to recommend to President Kennedy; to have a number of alternates and give sufficient reason why a person should be considered, or why they shouldn't--what all considerations were to be taken into account.

P: What were some of the more important appointments that Mr. Johnson recommended?

C: Well, we were relating ourselves mainly to the Texas situation, along with some national appointments. Now, the Vice President doesn't really have a big say-so in many instances in these Presidential appointments, because they are Presidential appointments.

But, let's take the Texas scene for instance. You had four U. S. Marshals to be appointed; you had four Collectors of Customs to be appointed; you had four U. S. Attorneys to be appointed. And these were matters that we involved ourselves quickly on, trying to figure out the people best suited, best qualified for these jobs. Then there were to be some federal judgeships down the line that Congress had approved and was approving. It ended up in an agreement with Senator Yarborough. Mr. Johnson made the recommendation on the U. S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas, which was Barefoot Sanders at that time, and on Ernest Morgan for the Western District of Texas. Mr. Yarborough nominated Wayne Justice for the Eastern District of Texas and Woodrow Seale for the Southern District of Texas.

P: These were U. S. Attorneys?

C: These were U. S. Attorneys. Mr. Johnson nominated the four Customs Collectors, while Mr. Yarborough nominated the four U. S. Marshals. I believe maybe Mr. Rayburn had intervened with President Kennedy in behalf of John Connally to be Secretary of the Navy; that had been done, I believe, in late November of '60. That one had been handled ahead of time.

But for the period of '61-'62, this was primarily what my work was in the office, visiting with people as they came in and answering mail. Mr. Johnson has always been quite strict on getting mail answered quickly and responsively. Certainly, this was followed-up there. He used to dictate from twenty-five to fifty letters a day, and we used to keep a work-chart on how many letters we had gotten out each day; how many letters were left over from the day before; how many came in that day; how many we had gotten dictated; how many were left. And he was not ever very happy if we had any letters left at the end of the day.

P: It sounds as though you were in the office management capacity then.

C: To a minor degree, yes, to a degree. Walter Jenkins was still the top man, and I did do some interviews of those seeking jobs as secretaries and what have you and would make my recommendations to Walter.

P: Did you prepare any recommendations on Cabinet members?

C: No. My work didn't go that far.

P: Were you in on the early decision on Mr. Connally?

C: No.

P: Were you aware of friction between the Johnson and Kennedy staffs?

C: No, not in particular, and certainly not at this time I wasn't aware. I later became somewhat aware of it because mainly you would always have difficulty in getting to talk to any of the Kennedy staff, or ever getting them to return your calls. You would always have to leave word. And the only exception that I learned then and over a period of time was that Dick Maguire, who later became treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, always bent over backwards to cooperate and work with the Vice President's staff. Now, it was my observation and it is my belief that Kenny O'Donnell and all them did cooperate totally with Walter Jenkins. I think it was a feeling that the rest of us were such underlings that our calls were not returned and, as I say, with the exception of Dick Maguire, we were given little consideration, even though we were trying to carry out business in behalf of Mr. Johnson.

P: At this point, had you moved over into the Executive Office Building?

C: No, I was still at the New Senate Office Building.

P: Were there any instances where these unreturned phone calls resulted in any problems developing?

C: No, nothing of any consequence, nothing that I can remember. Just a little

irritating at the time. But I certainly made a note in my mind that if the situation ever changed where Mr. Johnson was the President that we would be a little more considerate of the Vice President's staff, whoever that happened to be.

Let's talk about the year of '61, Dorothy, for a second here. You remember along in September-October of '61 that a Congressman from San Antonio, Paul Kilday, was appointed to the U. S. Military Court, and they had a special election to fill that vacancy. And State Senator Henry Gonzalez got into the race and was the main Democrat in the race. Mr. Johnson was backing him completely.

P: Was Maury Maverick in that race?

C: I don't believe so. I can't remember. It ended up in that race that--they may have had a runoff; I don't know. My recollection is only after there was a Republican and a Democrat in the race, and I can't think of the Republican's name at this second--I thought I could, but I can't.

P: Wasn't that the election where it seemed like just hundreds of people got in on that race, was that the later Senatorial--

C: That was the Senatorial race, Dorothy, and I skipped by that one and I didn't mean to. The one you're talking about took place in May of '61. This was to take Mr. Johnson's place in the Senate. A gentleman from Dallas, Bill Blakley, had been given an interim appointment by Governor Price Daniel to fill Mr. Johnson's vacancy in the Senate and had called a special election in May of 1961. That was when there were seventy-two candidates in the race--one Republican and seventy-one Democrats. As I recall, Maury Maverick Jr. was in that race, and Senator Gonzalez was in that race--

P: I was in error--he was in the Senatorial race.

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C: And it ended up that Blakley and John Tower were the two that were in the final runoff. In this final runoff, out of 880,000 votes cast, Senator Tower defeated Mr. Blakley by 10,000 votes.

P: Did Mr. Johnson endorse one of the Democratic candidates?

C: He did not endorse anyone for the runoff. He was interested in Blakley's election. In fact--

P: But not in the primary?

C: Not in the primary. And, Dorothy, this is a standard procedure that he always followed. He never endorsed anyone in a primary. I heard him make the statement that, "It's just like asking me to decide which of my two daughters I like the most." As long as there--any time there was one Democrat running against another Democrat, he would not endeavor to impose his thoughts upon the people. But if it was a Democrat versus a Republican, most generally he stepped out and endorsed the Democrat. And he did this for Blakley. In fact, he made me available--I spent the last couple of weeks of Blakley's campaign in Austin trying to help coordinate and trying to help bring in additional votes for Mr. Blakley, but this turned out to be a very difficult task. Mr. Blakley would not speak to the labor people; he would not speak with the various ethnic groups, where I had some contacts and was trying to be of help. And I remember the night in Waco on a statewide telecast, Congressman Poage gave Mr. Blakley a very glowing introduction and the first thing Mr. Blakley said when he was introduced was, "Thank you, Bob, but I disagree with all your farm policies and everything you stand for." This was the little problem we had in trying to help get Blakley elected.

P: That was in part for the great factional split in the Democrats at that point, wasn't it?

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C: Well, I would say that he helped continue any problem, and also a major factor in this thing, Dorothy, was that in November 1960 in the Presidential election you had two-and-a-half million people voting in Texas; whereas, just six or seven months later, you only had 330,000 people vote. You can see the great fall-off in votes. There were many of the liberal persuasion that just went fishing or did not vote--others that were just interested so little in the race that they just didn't bother to vote.

P: Do you think this was the beginning of the trouble that ultimately led to that fateful trip to Texas in order to sort of patch up political problems?

C: I don't know what fateful trip you're talking about.

P: In 1963 to Dallas.

C: Well, we'll touch on that in a minute. I mean, I don't agree, no--I don't agree with Mr. Manch--[Manchester]--I presume you're referring to his premise on this, and I don't agree with that at all, which we'll talk about in a few minutes.

Let me just skip from the Tower election in May of '61 to--maybe that runoff was in June of '61. I think it was, as a matter of fact. Talking about filling Kilday's place down in San Antonio, Mr. Johnson was quite interested in Henry Gonzalez's election and made me available--I spent about the last week with Henry Gonzalez on his campaign. And Mr. Johnson flew down and made some videotape recordings endorsing and speaking in behalf of Gonzalez's candidacy and spoke at a couple of different places for Henry. And he made several suggestions to Henry that Henry buy more time on radio or do additional things. Then I remember that was on a Thursday that he flew down, and the election was on Saturday. I remember on the Friday Mr. Johnson had to fly out to Lubbock and speak there on Friday night to a group at Texas Tech. He spoke for the student body first,

then spoke to some organization at a dinner meeting there. Between the period of time speaking to the student body and to the group Mr. Johnson placed a call to the President of Mexico. Mr. Johnson was real concerned about Henry's election, felt like that from his visit there that Henry was running behind, and something dramatic additionally had to be added to the campaign. Mr. Johnson talked to Adolphus López Mateas, the President of Mexico at that time, from our hotel in Lubbock, telling him about Henry's race and that what he needed was to get the movie actor Cantinflas to come to San Antonio to help rev this campaign up a little the last twenty-four hours. And Mr. Johnson asked the President of Mexico to reach Cantinflas and arrange for him to fly the next morning--Saturday morning--from Mexico City to San Antonio just to be with him as Mr. Johnson and Gonzalez made their rounds of San Antonio that day. This the President of Mexico agreed to do and he got Cantinflas lined up who did fly up on the Saturday morning. Also, from Lubbock, we had arranged with Henry Gonzalez to have mass rallies set up at about five different big shopping center areas around San Antonio.

We flew back from Lubbock on the Saturday morning and got there just about the same time Cantinflas had gotten in from Mexico City. And we started the rounds of the--of course, we had had spot announcements on radio and had had little handbills and leaflets passed out that Cantinflas was going to be at this shopping center or that one, and these were just fantastically large crowds that we encountered. They would start off by introducing Mr. Gonzalez who in turn introduced Mr. Johnson. And Mr. Johnson in the opening words of his speech would introduce Cantinflas, who would usually step up to the microphone and say he didn't know anything about politics, but he knew Mr. Johnson and he was for whatever Mr. Johnson

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was for, and he would sit down, and the crowd in San Antonio would go wild over this. Fortunately, we had the Secret Service and other security men along with us because we had almost an impossible task of getting out of a crowd once we had gotten into it. They had to rope themselves around by holding hands around Mr. Johnson and Gonzalez and Cantinflas to walk them out of a crowd to get them back to their cars where they could go on to the next shopping center.

As you know, Senator Gonzalez was elected Congressman from the 20th District of Texas by about 10,000 votes.

P: Why was Mr. Johnson so interested in the election of Henry Gonzalez?

C: Dorothy, I think several things. One, he always did this to be of help to any Congressman from Texas or other places. But second, he thought that we had reached certain milestones, a certain plateau that either we were going to be for racial justice, or we weren't. I mean, that we needed to eliminate this as a factor in a person being elected. With Bexar County, which was the 20th Congressional District being, I don't know, 80-90 percent Latin American, he was of the opinion that a Latin American should be elected from there if that's what the people wanted; that he should not be discriminated against; it should not be held against him because he was Latin American. This was a point that he made several times in his speeches in behalf of Henry Gonzalez.

Now, later in '61, he also was of help to Graham Purcell who was elected up in Wichita Falls to the 13th Congressional place, taking Frank Ikard's place in the Congress. And later in '61 or early '62 to Ray Roberts who was elected to take Mr. Rayburn's place in the 4th Congressional District. But back when Mr. Johnson was a Senator, he always worked with Texas Congressmen. This is nothing more or less than what he had always done;

it was a pattern he had followed right straight through.

P: Did you do any advance work on domestic or foreign trips for Mr. Johnson during the Vice Presidential years?

C: Dorothy, I did on some domestic trips. I did not on any of the foreign trips that he made. In '62, February 20 was when John Glenn made his trip around the world as the astronaut around the globe. And Mr. Johnson, as Vice President, was chairman of the President's Council on Space. During this period of time, he had a great deal to do with John Glenn and the other astronauts.

P: What do you mean by a great deal?

C: Associating with them in trying to help the overall program. I know this personally because John Glenn and I attended the same church over in Arlington, and I used to see him every Sunday morning; and our children attended the same schools. I know that at that time the original seven astronauts, I believe there were, were all very fond of Mr. Johnson, felt like he had had such a big hand in writing the Space Bill and in seeing that it was properly funded, and was now following through as Vice President. In fact, I remember one dinner that Mr. Johnson addressed over in Baltimore. This was a fund-raising dinner, and it was along in late September-early October, I believe maybe about the third of October, 1962. Actually, Mr. Johnson was over there speaking in behalf of Governor [J. Millard] Tawes who was seeking reelection and Danny Brewster who was running for the Senate. And on the trip over from Washington to Baltimore, Mr. Johnson spoke to Wally Schirra who today is in the Apollo up above, but at this time had just made his orbit and had landed. Mr. Johnson talked to Schirra from his car radio telephone direct to Schirra still in the space capsule. He had not yet been picked up by the destroyer. That was done

over on the way to Baltimore and was mentioned by Danny Brewster and Carlton Sickles who was running for Congressman-at-Large at that time. They both rode with Mr. Johnson over to Baltimore. I believe this was about the third of October, 1962.

P: Were you in the car?

C: No, I was not in the car. I had done the advance work on this and was there ahead of time waiting for the party to arrive. My recollection is that Danny Brewster, when he was speaking on statewide television that night at the dinner, did mention the fact that Mr. Johnson had called and that they had all talked to Schirra from the space capsule.

P: Was this the occasion that provided a few headaches for advance men when Governor Tawes was unable to make the rostrum?

C: Yes, it's one of those things, Dorothy. Two main things about this. One, we had the Pikesville Armory lined up for this--Pikesville is a section of Baltimore, a suburb of Baltimore; it's right there; ended up overselling the capacity of the Armory and we had to rent--I said "we" had to, it was the state committee of Maryland--I was just coordinating with them in advancing for Mr. Johnson and trying to help find solutions to problems. We had to lease three funeral tents and put them up outside, three big tents, and where these people wouldn't feel bad, we had Mr. Johnson eat his dinner at a head table out in the tents, and Mrs. Johnson ate her dinner in the Armory with the others--with Governor Tawes.

Just before we were to go on television, we moved Mr. Johnson from the tents inside, and had the people from the tents come in and stand around the wall in the armory so they could see the telecast and hear the speeches as they were made. We had had this arranged where it would go on statewide television at eight-thirty that night, and I had given Mr. Johnson a

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second-by-second schedule on who was to speak, at what time, and when he was to speak. The way it was to be was that Governor Tawes would open up at eight-thirty and speak for three-and-a-half minutes, introducing Mr. Johnson; and inasmuch as Mr. Tawes was eight to ten inches shorter--well, not that much, five or six inches shorter than Mr. Johnson, we had had a soft drink case behind the podium there for Governor Tawes to stand on. We had had this all scheduled that when Mr. Tawes finished his introduction of Mr. Johnson that the camera would swing to the left to pick up the Vice President, and while the camera was there Danny Brewster who was sitting on the right would remove the soft drink case, and the podium would be the correct height along with the microphones for Mr. Johnson. This had all been pretested. But at the appointed hour of eight-thirty, Governor Tawes was not present and the dinner chairman of the evening, Herbert O'Connor, took about ten seconds telling the television audience who he was and that he now gives you the Vice President of the United States. This was contrary to our schedule and did not make Mr. Johnson overly happy at that second of the thing. He did get up and speak; the soft drink case was removed; and everything was a proper height. He did make his speech; Governor Tawes did reappear towards the end of the thirty minutes and ended up speaking the last three-and-a-half minutes instead of the first three-and-a-half minutes. The Governor later, with Mr. Johnson, took all the blame for this, saying that it was not my fault on it.

But I want to digress another second here, and I'm sorry to ramble, Dorothy. Talking about '61, I remember at this time also they were having a gubernatorial election up in New Jersey. New Jersey and Virginia always have their election on an off-year, usually it's a year after the national election. And President Kennedy was real interested in Richard Hughes being

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elected governor there. You asked about Mr. Johnson's interest in Henry Gonzales--Mr. Johnson and President Kennedy had a little bet between themselves as to who would do the best in helping carry their particular candidate in. President Kennedy went up to campaign in New Jersey for Dick Hughes, and Mr. Johnson went to San Antonio campaigning for Henry Gonzales. And at one point, it was not thought that either would win, and it turned out they both succeeded.

But, Dorothy, in '62, the first of November of '62, I submitted my resignation to Mr. Johnson--I had a meeting with him over in the Executive Office Building--to be effective the first of February of 1963. I wanted to return to private business, and he accepted the resignation. Along in January, he asked me to add thirty days on to this, to make it the first of March, said he was going to have to make trips down to Texas and he wanted me to work with him on these trips, which I agreed to do--to make it the first of March. In February, he made--February of '63--he made trips to San Angelo, to Wichita Falls, and spoke at a space association group down at Dallas. But along in February, it was seen fit to have my salary raised where I ended up staying on and passed up the March 1st deadline on my resignation.

Now we did start talking about the '64 election.

- P: Can I stop you here a minute? Did you in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, did you see any activities of the Vice President surrounding this event?
- C: I saw part of it, and I'm glad you mentioned it, because it had slipped my mind. Mr. Johnson called a breakfast meeting of George Reedy, Walter Jenkins, and myself. We met Mr. Johnson for breakfast out at his home, The Elms, which he reviewed with us the situation in Cuba. All of us had

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Top Secret classifications. Mr. Johnson was going into a meeting at ten o'clock that morning, I believe; and he reviewed these matters with us, then went around the table asking each of us if we were the Vice President and sitting in this National Security Council meeting which was to be held at ten o'clock that morning, what would we say when President Kennedy called on the Vice President--"What would you say, what course of action would you suggest?" And I can't remember what the others suggested, what George and what Walter suggested, but I didn't think, Dorothy, the Russians would ever back down on direct confrontation. I thought we might sink one of their boats, and then it would be just an all-out scrap with the Russians. I was of the opinion and I go back to that particular day, that particular time, when they had these missiles in place already pointed towards Washington, all that had to happen was that some reckless irresponsible Cuban touch a button, and Washington, D. C. would be hit with a missile; and you start thinking about your family and children and others that are being looked at right down the barrel of a missile. This is the atmosphere-- this is the situation back at that time. And I expressed the thought which turned out would have been wrong and was not what President Kennedy decided, but I expressed the thought that what we ought to do is go ahead and drop paratroopers in there and take control of the island and straighten the matter out, and then let the Cubans end up having an election of their own, and set up a new democracy there. That was not the course followed, and as it turned out--

P: What was Mr. Johnson's frame of mind on this?

C: I don't recall him expressing it. I think he was listening to the different ones of us put up our thoughts. And, of course, I have no way of knowing what he did end up saying at the National Security Council meeting. But it

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did prove that--events proved the wisdom of the course that was chosen that day, because the Russians did back down and did get away from there without any real immediate big problem on it.

P: Did Mr. Johnson indicate any surprise at the development of the situation as it was, suddenly such a complete issue--the missiles being implaced and ready to go?

C: I don't remember him expressing surprise. I remember that we were all surprised. I was certainly surprised, just hadn't realized so much had been done. Apparently, our--at least as far as the public was concerned-- And I had not had any Top Secret briefings before that. Certainly, as far as the public knew, their aerial photos had been taken and Cuba had not necessarily shown these missile sites, everything being in place.

P: Did you conclude from that that Mr. Johnson may not have known ahead of time?

C: Well, I think, Dorothy, he knew whatever President Kennedy knew--or the CIA or others--and it could well be that they knew this was going on. Like I say, I had not been in on any other briefings, and had read about it only as the average citizen had.

P: Were there any arrangements being made to evacuate the President and the Vice Presidential staff that you were involved in?

C: Nothing that I had anything to do with, Dorothy. There is a place out here some place--I've never been there. I was supposed to have gone out one time. It turned out I didn't get to. There is supposed to be a place somewhere out here, and I've heard West Virginia, where there is an underground office set up to where they can evacuate the President, Vice President, and other key government officials. I have only heard about it; I've never been there. I did have one instance where there was a call

from this headquarters, saying that a Clif Carter was trying to be admitted there. Someone had used my name and, of course, I was sitting back in the office in the New Senate Office Building at this time, and couldn't have been there.

P: Did they ever find out who that was? Or how they got there?

C: I think they did. I don't know what--I think it ended up being a message that was garbled in transmission, as I recall, Dorothy. I think it turned out on checking the matter out that someone was clearing a list of names of people who had been cleared to go in there, and this is the way my name got brought up, as I recall. But the original call was that someone had presented himself, using my name and trying to be admitted.

P: Did you know of any members of the staff that sought to protect their families?

C: No. Because--

P: Either bringing them into town, or taking them out?

C: No.

P: Let's proceed to the point where you did return to Texas, I believe around Labor Day 1963 to begin setting up the Austin headquarters for the '64 campaign.

C: Well, in conversation with Mr. Johnson, we had talked about the '64 campaign and he had forewarned me that he probably would want me to move back to Texas around Christmas of 1963. I had reminded Mr. Johnson that I did have a wife and five children, five children that were in school and it was difficult to pick up and move them right in the middle of a school year, and what I would like to do, so as to keep the upset in my household at a minimum, would be to move ahead of the school year. He understood and agreed to this, and so we moved back to Texas in late August of '63

and moved into our new home in Austin on Labor Day of '63.

P: Were plans already afoot for the Texas trip at this point?

C: There had been preliminary trips on this. There was a trip that Walter Jenkins and Dick Maguire went down. And I believe, Dorothy, this was about March of '63. They went down for a conference with Governor Connally. So much of this related strictly for financial support and help from Texas to the Democratic National Committee and to the Kennedy Administration. Walter and Maguire went down for a talk with Governor Connally about having some sort of fund-raising event in Texas. As it turned out in '61 and '62, there had been only very nominal financial support from Texas, and most of the money that had come in had come in from New York State, Massachusetts, California, and other places. And they just felt that there were a lot of friends in Texas that would be pleased to help if they had the opportunity. This was the main reason--I mean, there were two main reasons, as I would recall, why a trip was planned to Texas by Mr. Kennedy. One was to try to encourage and receive more financial support. And secondly to try to build a better image for himself in Texas where he could probably carry the state in '64.

Now, skipping over '63 pretty quickly there a minute ago, there was a meeting June 6, 1963, in El Paso where Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kennedy, and Governor Connally met and agreed on a dinner, and agreed at that time to a tentative date which later had to be changed. They talked about a date late in September--

P: This is as opposed to the later November date?

C: Right. Mr. Johnson had spoken that morning to the graduating class at Annapolis, and Mr. Kennedy had given the commencement address out at the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. It was agreed that they would all

meet in El Paso. President Kennedy was going from Colorado Springs to go on and make an inspection tour of the White Sands Missile Base. Mr. Kennedy was on the tenth floor of the hotel--the Hotel Cortez; Mr. Johnson was on the ninth floor. Governor Connally was on the sixth floor, and it was decided that they would meet in Mr. Johnson's suite; that Mr. Kennedy would come down a floor and Governor Connally would go up to the ninth floor. We had one of those little funny things happen here, Dorothy. Mr. Johnson had told me that they were coming to his suite to meet and for me to quickly get some refreshments--soft drinks there, some ice, which I called downstairs and told them to send some coca-colas and 7-ups and send a tub of ice. Mr. Kennedy arrived--I remember him taking off his coat and throwing it over in a corner; then Governor Connally arrived. I was still standing in the room with them. About this time the Secret Service knocked on the door and said, "Did you order some ice?" I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "Well, you doggone sure got it. They brought a washtub of ice up. What do you want to do with it?" I said, "Well, wheel it on in here." So they wheeled in this big washtub of ice cubes, along with the coca cola and 7-up, and I left the room at this time.

The three of them met and I was told later it was decided that President Kennedy would come to Texas and there would be a fund-raising dinner. They tentatively agreed some time late in September; later than it was finally decided November 22.

P: There were reports in the newspapers and, of course, there were subsequent books written regarding political splits in Texas among the Democrats. I believe the figures involved were Senator Yarborough and Governor Connally, Yarborough representing the more liberal faction and Connally the more conservative, but there was quite a problem and part of this trip was an effort to cement relations.

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G: Dorothy, there were, of course, problems as you have mentioned. This is correct. To the best of my recollection, there was no concerted or great effort to try to cement these relations. It may have been hoped that this would be one of the fringe benefits. But it was primarily trying to get better financial support from Texas, the Southwest. Secondly, to create a better image for Mr. Kennedy in Texas. And a couple of little points on this. I did sit in on all of the meetings in Texas in preparation of Mr. Kennedy's arrival there. The Democratic National Committee had sent Jerry Bruno down to advance, to coordinate, to help, and had Jim Corcoran along, Jim Athai; these three were along for the Democratic National Committee. And I went with Jerry Bruno around--we went to San Antonio; went to Houston; we went to Fort Worth and we went to Dallas. And we had daily meetings in Austin with Governor Connally's people--Frank Erwin and the others that were working on the big dinner to eventually be held in Austin. And while Jerry Bruno generally would touch base with one of Senator Yarborough's friends in each of these cities, and usually I told him who Senator Yarborough's friends were, it was not done until the matter had already been decided. Bruno had already agreed to, in consultation with one of Governor Connally's top people in San Antonio, Houston, what have you. This was usually decided before Jerry--Jerry would usually call one of Senator Yarborough's people just before he was leaving town, and tell them that Kennedy was going to be there, and that this is what the schedule is going to be. This was done to get Connally's complete support and backing on the dinner. To be a success, it was going to have to have Connally's support and backing.

P: What was the base of this split?

G: Dorothy, I don't know this. I just read about it in the paper, and I just

know that there is a personality conflict between--apparently there's a personality conflict between Governor Connally and Senator Yarborough.

P: You don't believe that this is political--

C: I have supported both of them over the years. Senator Yarborough--I supported for many years. But they each had issued very strong statements against the other before Mr. Kennedy's trip down. I don't know what the base of their problem is; I just know that--as I say, there appears to be a personality conflict between the two.

P: You feel it's not political?

C: Well, certainly I would think it's political. I think that it probably, of course, is from the areas of support that each gets from the supporters.

But the only arrangements, as I recall, for the head table for the dinner that was to have been in Austin, and I'm talking about--my point on this, Dorothy, is that this was with the total approval--approbation--of the Kennedy staff working with Connally's staff. And the way the head table was arranged, it only included Mr. Johnson and Governor Connally, along with President Kennedy; it did not include Senator Yarborough. He was to sit at a second lower table. Mentioning this again, I'm disputing Manchester's theory on the thing, because if President Kennedy went there solely to try to heal the breach between these two, he would probably have had one sitting on each side of him. He would not have agreed to one being placed at a lower ranked table.

P: Did Senator Yarborough agree to this?

C: I don't know that he was ever offered the opportunity to either agree or not agree. I am told--well, I saw one time, I believe it was when he was in Houston while we were on that trip--this would have been November 21st, that Senator Yarborough did not ride in the car with Mr. Johnson where he

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was supposed to have. I recall he went back and got in the car with Henry Gonzalez and rode in that. I believe it was in Fort Worth the next morning when Larry O'Brien and Kenneth O'Donnell told Senator Yarborough to get in the car with Mr. Johnson and ride where he was supposed to. There was a little hassle over that, and I did see this in Houston. I have just been told about the other in Fort Worth.

P: And this was Senator Yarborough's doing on this?

C: Yes.

P: What was the situation in the Austin headquarters when you did return there?

C: What do you mean "headquarters," Dorothy?

P: When you were going to begin to set up one there. Was there a working base?

C: You see, Mr. Johnson had an office in Austin, and I just reopened the Austin office and was operating out of there. Now, we're talking about September of '63. I did do a good little bit of traveling out of there to advance trips for him to Cleveland, Toledo--he made one swing in late September to Lucas County, Toledo, Ohio, and over to Columbiana, Ohio. I remember we went into Pittsburgh and crossed over to East Liverpool, Ohio, and on over to Columbiana.

P: These were all a part of the strategy of beginning your campaign early and gathering your support?

C: A combination of several things there, of fund-raising events. The one in Cleveland was the big annual Cuyahoga County, what they call "Ox Roast," and it's the annual event that the Cuyahoga Democratic Central Committee gathers their money for the year's operation. And the same thing was true over at Toledo. This was the Lucas County Democratic Central Committee, and Mr. Johnson spoke at both of those events. Over in Columbiana, Congressman Wayne Hays, who had always been an outspoken Johnson friend, was being

honored for his twelfth year in the Congress, and Mr. Johnson went there and made the main speech in behalf of Congressman Hays.

P: Since most of these were fund raisings, were the Democratic coffers at this time, both nationally and statewide, were they at an unusually low point for the coming '64--

C: Well, the national committee, of course, still had a big debt from the '60 election, and they always needed money. This was true, I think, of the county and state committees. Now, I'm not sure that the national committee participated in any of the proceeds of these dinners. I think this was a case where these states had requested Mr. Johnson to come out and speak, and that's what it was.

P: Why was the Democratic Committee particularly low on funds, or how come the debt had been so large in the '60 campaign?

C: Well, one reason, Dorothy, a part of Adlai Stevenson's 1956 debt had been carried over to 1960. And then some of the early quick proceeds that came in during 1960 and early '61 actually went to pay off some of the debts that had been left over from the '56 campaign. In fact, this has been a traditional thing as far as the Democratic National Committee was concerned. They usually paid off the debts four years later from the previous campaign, and we encountered something like this after the '64 election. Mr. Johnson had to end up paying a lot of Kennedy's debts off. In fact, we were left with around \$4,000,000 in debts when Mr. Johnson became President.

P: You traveled through Texas, you said, in September of 1963. You must have been pretty attuned to the political climate of the state. Did you hear or feel or sense any of the rumors or warnings regarding the political climate in Dallas?

C: Well, I read it daily in the Dallas News, and had a general feeling that--

of course, Dallas before that had been probably the most conservative area in the state of Texas. Along in '56, I believe it was, they elected a Republican Congressman, and they had this reputation. But the main thing I sensed, Dorothy, was that there was beginning to be a change as far as Dallas was concerned. I mean, that it wasn't quite as conservative as it used to be; that there was going to be an acceptance of Mr. Kennedy. Of course, they had turned out in 1960 when we went through there that day-- September 13, 1960--150,000 people turned out. And there were responsible businessmen in Dallas who were beginning to realize that this ultraconservatism was hurting their city and their area. There were those that were willing to step up and speak for the Democrats. This was one reason that Mr. Kennedy was interested in going to Dallas, because the group that had been considered extremely conservative were going to put on this dinner for him and were going to let him know that they were pleased with what he was doing and going to support him. As you will recall, the editor of the Dallas News had been at the White House at Mr. Kennedy's invitation and had--this Mr. Daly that had spoken up and said that Mr. Kennedy acted like a boy on a tricycle in trying to work out the problems of the world. And people in Dallas resented this. They were trying to do a number of things to atone for previous mistakes.

P: Did you follow through on any reports that perhaps President Kennedy should not go to Dallas, or did you file any reports?

C: No, I didn't have any reports of anything like that. I never heard anything like that.

P: I believe that was mentioned in the book, The Death of a President, that there were several indications that they were considering bypassing the whole arrangement in Dallas.

C: Well, what they--and I say "they," I'm talking about the Kennedy staff--was interested in doing was taking him through the town where he would get maximum exposure. If you will recall, I mean the layout of Dallas, where the airport is, where the hall where he was to speak at this luncheon--where they're located, the simple thing to have done would have been to come from the airport direct to the hall. But this gives you little exposure, so it was a recommendation made by the Kennedy staff people there, Jerry Bruno and the others--incidentally, later they, about the last week of this, they sent Bill Moyers down to take over all charge, and they brought Jerry Bruno back to Washington; but Bill Moyers was in complete charge of Mr. Kennedy's visit to Texas. They worked out the route on this, and that was to go from the airport out around a big part of the residential area, and end up coming through downtown Dallas, then proceeding to the hall. At one point back in the early stages, to make sure that he got this maximum exposure through downtown Dallas, they had thought about having the luncheon out at the Texas Fair Park Auditorium. This would be an excuse for him coming through the town. They were trying to make sure he came through town, but they felt like there had to be a logical reason or people would figure that all he was doing was trying to be seen. So they worked out the route of his motorcade to take him around through north Dallas, around through the residential area, down through the middle of town, and on out to the hall.

P: This was done more at the insistence of the Kennedy staff people?

C: That's correct.

P: There were security reports from the Secret Service regarding radical elements in Dallas. Did you ever hear of any of those?

C: No, I didn't. I've read about that since and thinking back about it, this,

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of course, is always--you hear little rumors like this and because--just before this, if you recall, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been hit with a sign; and General Ted Walker had been shot at; and there had been other little disturbances in Dallas. And, of course, that morning--the morning of the twenty-second--there was this horrible full-page ad in the Dallas Morning News telling Mr. Kennedy to stay out of Dallas. But in your travels and in your movements around, you have different little rumors--you just have to--I say "you" have to, I'm talking about professional people like the Secret Service and the CIA and the FBI, who have made careers of this--have to know how to evaluate what information they get. I mean, a layman like me wouldn't have any idea what importance to attach to any such report.

P: You didn't see any apparent sensitivity to this situation as it was developing in Dallas?

A: No.

P: Or worry on the part of either the Johnson or Kennedy staff members?

A: No. Mr. Kennedy, when we arrived in Dallas that morning, having flown from Fort Worth over, there were a number of people at the fence line. I remember Mr. Kennedy getting off the airplane and going right over to the fence and walked the fence line, shaking hands with people. Anyone that had harm in mind could have fatally wounded him right there. The Secret Service were right along, but he was walking right next to the fence shaking hands.

P: Do you think perhaps there was a careless attitude that Mr. Kennedy's charisma would overcome this, and he would come out ahead in having succeeded in Dallas?

A: I hesitate to use the word "carelessness," but I am pretty much in agreement with you on the balance of your statement. And in objecting to the word

carelessness, I think that it needs to be put in a different perspective, and that is that all candidates have to get out and mix with the people. They can't hold themselves aloof, and they have to take calculated risks at times, getting in and pressing the flesh and making the people feel close to them.

P: All right, I retract the word "carelessness."

C: I didn't mean to make a point of it, but I--

P: In other words, you think perhaps Mr. Kennedy and his staff did count on John Kennedy's appeal?

C: Very definitely. And I might say that he was very successful, because they had--I have been to Dallas a number of times, and I've never seen crowds like were there for his visit that day.

P: Would you reconstruct the events that led up to the assassination: the prior arrangements; where you were in the motorcade; what you saw; any conversations; who you were with in the car; and did you see or speak to Mr. Johnson prior to the motorcade beginning--

C: Dorothy, we--let me back up just one second. We had awakened that morning in Fort Worth, and it was misting rain. And we were having our breakfast there in the Hotel Texas, at which Mr. Kennedy was to speak. And Raymond Buck from Fort Worth was to be the master of ceremonies. We were limited on the number that could be invited to this because of the size of the ballroom of the Texas Hotel. And great numbers of folks had gathered on the parking lot right across the street from the Hotel Texas. Mr. Kennedy had decided to step out and speak to these people. This was not on the schedule, but he had looked out his hotel window and had seen these folks there. He went out, and as he stepped out of the hotel, the rain stopped and the sun came out and it got to be a beautiful day. He spoke about ten

minutes to this big group that had gathered there, and then he went back into the hotel.

P: Were you witnessing this?

C: Yes. I saw all of this. I was there. Of course, Mr. Johnson was along, too; he ~~was~~ there--that's the reason I was there.

We went back in and went to the breakfast. Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson went up to the head table, and Raymond Buck gave Mr. Kennedy a very fine introduction. Mr. Johnson had been introduced and had spoken a few words, then Mr. Kennedy spoke. They presented Mr. Kennedy with a hat which he refused to put on. He put it up close to his head, but he wouldn't put it on. And about this time, Mrs. Kennedy came along. She had been late in getting there, and she came in and walked right past the area where I was. As a matter of fact, I think [she] came through the kitchen of the hotel dining room there and went up to the head table. Then quickly thereafter, we left and went to Carswell Air Force Base where we had landed the night before, and where the planes--Air Force One and Air Force Two--were located. And we flew from there over to Love Field and landed and Mr. Kennedy got out and shook hands like I mentioned a minute ago. And we got right in the motorcade. The way the motorcade was set up there was a Dallas police car that was the pilot car. I mean, it was in front, then President Kennedy's car. In that car you had, of course, Governor and Mrs. Connally along with President and Mrs. Kennedy; you had the driver and a Secret Service agent by the name of Roy Kellerman sitting there right in the front seat. Governor and Mrs. Connally were sitting in jump seats. And since it had turned out to be such a beautiful day, it was Mr. Kennedy's decision, his staff's decision, to take the bubble off the car. Previously they had thought it was going to be misting and raining.

But it was decided to take it off.

P: Do you know who made that decision?

C: I do not know. I just understood that this was what the Kennedy group had decided. When you say the "Kennedy group," it could be the President or Kenny O'Donnell--the Secret Service doesn't make a decision like this. They make recommendations.

P: Wasn't their recommendation through Dallas to--

C: I had read or heard that the Secret Service had made a recommendation that the bubble be retained. Someone higher up made a--overruled that, if that recommendation was made.

So they were in an open car. In back of that car was the President's security car. And in that car, you had six or seven Secret Service agents, and Kenny O'Donnell and Larry O'Brien were riding in that car. Then in the next car, you had--which is the third car--we had the President's car, his security car, and then Mr. Johnson's car. You had the driver of that car, this was an open convertible; you had Rufus Youngblood, Secret Service agent, sitting in the right front seat; and then you had Senator Yarborough--this is the back seat going from left to right from the back of the car--Senator Yarborough, Mrs. Johnson, and the Vice President. The Vice President was riding in the right rear of this car.

And I was riding in the fourth car with two of Mr. Johnson's Secret Service agents.

P: Weren't there four in the back seat with the Vice President?

C: No. Just three, because this was just a regular convertible. You see, it was Senator Yarborough and Mrs. Johnson and the Vice President.

P: Did you speak to Mr. Johnson before the motorcade got under way?

C: I would expect I did, Dorothy. I don't remember any particular conversation,

but I usually told him right where I was or where I was going to be. And I was the top Johnson aide along on this trip because Walter Jenkins was back in Washington.

P: How did Mr. Johnson assess the trip as it had gone so far at this point?

C: Everyone was very pleased with the turnout, the reaction. When we landed in San Antonio the afternoon before, the trip out to this new Space Medicine College; and as we had gotten to Houston, the turnout there--the reception that--the Albert Thomas dinner that was in process when Mr. Kennedy dropped in and spoke. Then we left there and went right on to Dallas. I remember Jack Valenti accompanying us--Mr. Johnson requested that Jack accompany us on to Fort Worth. Of course, Jack's wife, Mary Margaret, had just had their first baby just maybe a week-ten days before that. I remember Jack saying Mary Margaret had said that she wasn't very happy about him going. She said, "Is this trip really necessary?" It affected and changed their lives like it did many of the rest of us.

But back to this motorcade. Now, in this fourth car, I rode with Lem Johns and Jerry Kibbett, Secret Service agents that were attached to the Vice Presidential assignment. We had a Dallas policeman driving this car; this was a Dallas police car. And each of these four cars, I'm talking about President Kennedy's car, his security car, the Vice President's car, and this car, which was Mr. Johnson's security car, we had two different radio setups where we could talk back and forth to each other on, plus the fact that everybody had their regular commercial type radio--AM radio--on, listening to a broadcast of this motorcade through Dallas.

P: Were the Secret Service carrying weapons?

C: Yes.

P: Was this unusual?

C: No, they always have.

P: I mean rifles, not sidearms.

C: Well, in the President's security car, they've always got submachine guns and these, which I'll mention in just a second here. We went through downtown Dallas, Dorothy, and we made our right turn a block away from the Texas School Depository Building; then you go about a half a block and you make a left turn, which is right in front of the Depository. We've got ten or fifteen cars in the motorcade with three or four buses that the press is riding in. And as they negotiate these turns like this, by necessity, one to keep the motorcade intact, and two because of the crowd they have by necessity to go slow. And we weren't going more than five to ten miles an hour as we made these corners, and actually were fixing to head out on-- I believe it's the Harry Hines Expressway--out the expressway that's in front of the Texas School Depository. And this first shot that was fired came right over my right shoulder. My immediate reaction--I thought it was a cherry-bomb type firecracker; I thought somebody had popped a firecracker. But then quickly I saw Rufus Youngblood in the Vice President's car just immediately ahead reach over and shove Mr. Johnson down and jumped in the back seat himself and put himself over Mr. Johnson's body. And about this time I saw something also going on up in the first car--in the President's car. You see, these cars are right in front of me and bending just a little bit to the right, as the expressway does right there.

P: Almost bumper to bumper? How far away would you say you were?

C: They weren't bumper to bumper, but they weren't real spread out either. I'd guess fifteen to twenty feet apart, something like this. It was about three-quarters of a block before--maybe a block, I can't remember, from the corner of the Depository to the underpass that we were fixing to go under. And then I saw something happening up in the President's car also;

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about that time the second shot was fired. The next thing I noticed, Mrs. Kennedy was trying to get out of the President's car. She had jumped out of the seat and had jumped out on the back--the rear end of the car, and was trying to leave; it looked like she had been hit. By the time the second shot was fired, of course, I realized by this time that someone was firing at the cars, and she had made a movement that looked like she almost vaulted out of the back seat out on the back end of the car and was trying to get off the car. This is when the Secret Service agent Clint Hill jumped out of the President's security car and ran up ahead and climbed on the back of the car and helped get her back inside. And while this was going on, Roy Kellerman, the Secret Service agent up in the first car, who was connected to all of us by radio, said, "Let's get the heck out of here." Well, that came through to all four of these cars I have mentioned. And at this time--you asked about the submachine guns. Well, one of the Secret Service agents sitting in the back seat of this President's security car wheeled around with his submachine gun and pointed up at one of the windows of the Depository, knowing that the shots had come from up there, but you had people peering out of all the windows and didn't know where it was coming from--I mean, he couldn't shoot--one, I don't know that he knew from which window he came, and second, he couldn't indiscriminately fire into a building like that. But Kellerman said, and he was in command of the situation at that minute, said, "Let's get out of here."

P: Were there any other transmissions?

C: Yes. We started out as fast as we could get moving, and Kellerman said--

P: I mean, prior to this?

C: No.

P: That was the first, and at this point you realized that it was firing--that people were probably wounded?

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C: Yes. I had seen President Kennedy slump over, but we couldn't tell--at this minute, couldn't tell how bad anything was. But we started moving out of there--these first four cars, I'm talking about; and the police guide, when Kellerman said, "We're going to Parkland Hospital--we go across this expressway over to another one over here and go right on out," and we went right by the hall where Mr. Kennedy was to have spoken. We went by there about seventy miles an hour. We went on to Parkland, traveling at eighty to eighty-five miles an hour speed and shipped around to the back to the emergency entrance to Parkland.

P: What were you all talking about?

C: When these four cars--well, no one was talking. Just trying to figure out what all had gone on. And there were three shots fired, Dorothy, and there's no question. I heard three, and the timing is very clear in my mind even today. And I have fired--when I was in the Army, I fired rifles--there's no question that one man could easily do this. In my mind, there's no question but what one man did do it. I don't know whether it was Lee Harvey Oswald or who it was; but moving at the slow speed that our motorcade was, everybody in there was an easy target. Anybody that can half-way fire a rifle would have had no trouble picking off any target he wanted to. One, it was a very easy shot. And secondly, it was very easy to flip the emptied shell out and load a new one and fire again. It was done, I think, in six or seven seconds, they say, and it could be very easily done. And all the firing came right over my right shoulder. There was none in front or back or any place.

P: You were close to the building, weren't you?

C: Yes. In fact, I was closer to the building than--Our car was closer to the building. (End of tape)

INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON C. CARTER (Tape 4)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

(Continuation of Tape 3 and also fourth interview [October 15, 1968])

P: You said the car speeded up at this point seventy to eighty-five miles an hour to get to the hospital.

C: Yes, we pulled around to the rear of Parkland Hospital where the emergency entrance is. All four of our cars just jammed one right behind the other, everybody jumped out and ran up to the President's car to try to see what had happened, what had gone on, and by the time I got there they were wheeling Mr. Kennedy in on a cart, and Mrs. Kennedy was helping push the cart to try to hurry and get it inside. Now I did not see what had happened to Mr. Kennedy, he was on this cart feet first, and what I would have seen was the left side of his head. I did notice--Mrs. Kennedy had on a rose colored suit that day and there was blood all over the front of her suit that I noticed at this time. I went to the car and did help unload Governor Connally, put him on a cart to go in, and I thought he was dead. He was gray, one eye was focused off in one area, the other eye was pointed another way, and they rushed him right on in. I wouldn't have given you ten cents for his life at that moment.

P: You thought the President was still alive?

C: I didn't know; they just said that he had been badly hit. I did not know at that moment the extent of his injuries, but then I got with Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and we went along with Lem Johns, Rufus Youngblood and we went right in the hospital. I remember as we walked in Senator Yarborough, I saw him sitting off to the side, crying; he was all beside himself. We went into a little room around to the right and the Secret Service closed

this area off and I went out and got some coffee and brought it back for Mr. and Mrs. Johnson. Congressman Homer Thornberry was there with us and a Secret Service agent by the name of Henry Roberts that was with the Presidential detail had come in and he was talking to Washington from the little outer room of the area we occupied. We had pulled the shades down so no one would necessarily know where Mr. Johnson was. Roberts said, in talking to Washington, "We don't know what the full scope of this thing is, it could be a conspiracy to try to kill the President, Vice President, try to kill everybody." And I remember Roberts at that time saying, this was after he had talked to Washington, that the only safe place the Secret Service felt there was for Mr. Johnson was back in Washington, to get him back to Washington as quickly as possible. Now this was later; I believe this actually took place after we had been notified that Mr. Kennedy was dead. Now Mrs. Johnson--

P: At this point you were still awaiting the reports on the President.

C: We were back in this little extra room, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, Thornberry, Rufus Youngblood, Lem Johns and me. And Mrs. Johnson left to go up to be with Mrs. Kennedy and to be with Mrs. Connally, and to the best of my knowledge and recollection and belief, she was not present when Mr. Johnson was officially notified that Mr. Kennedy was dead. I've read various versions of this, but what I actually saw there, the agent I mentioned a minute ago, Emory Roberts, came in and told Mr. Johnson that Mr. Kennedy was dead. And Homer Thornberry, Lem Johns, Rufus Youngblood and I were present with Mr. Johnson at that time.

P: What was the emotional state of the people?

C: Well, everybody was just existing, Dorothy. What I felt my main job at that time was to look after Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson, make sure--he'd

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had that heart attack before--make sure there's no recurrence of this and to do everything I could to be of help and comfort there to him. And I got him a couple of cups of coffee over a period of time; he did tell me there in that room that he did want me to come back to Washington with him that evening.

P: What other things did Mr. Johnson say to you and people in the room?

C: I don't recall any specifics. I know he said something to Congressman Thornberry. I think he counseled back and forth with Johns and Youngblood and it was decided that they would leave quickly and come on back to Washington, but it was somewhere along in here, too, and I was in and out after this period of time.

P: It was about an hour altogether, wasn't it?

C: I don't believe it was quite that long, Dorothy. Two things happened. Mr. Johnson also told me to go get Jack Valenti and Liz Carpenter, and as I started out--well, somewhere just before this, a nurse had brought a sack in that had--Governor Connally's clothes were in the sack and she wanted me to sign for them, which I did, and then Congressman Gonzalez was out in the little outer room of this area that we had occupied, and Mr. Johnson was preparing to leave, and he told me to go get Jack Valenti and Liz Carpenter which I started out to do. I handed the sack of clothes to Henry Gonzalez and asked him to take them and keep them, that they were Governor Connally's clothes. I went up through the hospital looking around; they'd set up guards at every corridor, every stairway, everything, they had guards, Dallas police. I did have my identity card from the Vice President's office so I was able to get back and forth and around. I found Jack Valenti quickly and he had just left Liz Carpenter in the little chapel at Parkland. We went back there, Liz was gone. We announced

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over the P.A. system, asking her to report to a certain area, and we got no response. So I told Jack that President Kennedy was dead and we better go on, let me take him back to Mr. Johnson, and I'd go back and look for Liz. I did take Jack through and when we got down to where Mr. Johnson had been he was gone and Lem Johns was waiting there and said, "Mr. Johnson went ahead and left me to bring you on." So we went outside and got a Dallas policeman to drive us out to Love Field. This was a young rookie policeman and he was so excited, and we were driving seventy-five to eighty miles an hour out there that we ran right by the entrance of Love Field. We got him to turn around and went through the private side and he was fixing to go right across the main air strip landing, trying to hurry to get over to Air Force One. We got him stopped on that and got him to go around on the access road and when we got on the plane--see, on the commercial radio there had been a number of reports that several Secret Service agents had been killed also and I had never been on Air Force One--went on to the rear steps and saw a white telephone and I stopped and picked it up and asked the operator to get me my residential number in Austin, which the operator did, and I talked to my wife and told her that I was all right and I wanted her to call Rufus Youngblood's wife in Vienna, Virginia, and tell her that the agents were all right and for her to call the other wives up here. And while I was doing this, Dorothy, there was some hammering, knocking on some chairs to my left rear. And as it turned out this was the President's compartment of the airplane--President Kennedy's compartment where I sat down at his desk and made my phone call. They were knocking these seats out to put his casket in, which I didn't know at this time, but I later learned and saw that this is where his casket went.

Q: I have some specific questions. Could I ask them of you now?

A: Why don't we stop right now, and we'll resume from the airplane on.

Session Four

P: At the end of the previous session you were at the point of taking off in Air Force One on the day of Jack Kennedy's assassination, and I wanted to ask you some question, specific questions, before we discuss the actual return to Washington.

First, do you recall who first called Mr. Johnson "Mr. President"?

C: The first one that I heard call Mr. Johnson "Mr. President" was Emory Roberts, Secret Service agent. Now as I noted to you awhile ago, I was in and out of this room where Mr. Johnson was located, and I read and have been told that Kenny O'Donnell and Larry O'Brien had been back and forth a time or two, at least had one conference with Mr. Johnson. I did not see them there. I'm sure that they were, because I've heard it and read it. I've read that one of the other of them supposedly officially told Mr. Johnson that Mr. Kennedy was dead. Now I heard Emory Roberts do this, come in and address Mr. Johnson, "Mr. President, the President is dead." It also was Emory that had been talking back and forth to the Washington headquarters, to the Secret Service, and this is where it was determined that they should return to Washington immediately.

P: Was there any response to Mr. Roberts referring to Mr. Johnson as "Mr. President"?

C: No, not as I recall. There was just total silence at this time.

P: Did it strike you at this time that the change had been made?

C: Well, from reports that we had gotten, so much of Mr. Kennedy's head being blown away, it was almost a foregone conclusion that this is what the ultimate bad news was going to be, and while I said there was no reaction, there was no--when Emory Roberts addressed Mr. Johnson "Mr. President," there was none direct with Roberts. Again as I recall I think this was

the period when Mr. Johnson turned to Congressman Thornberry and had conversation with him.

P: Did you hear what was being discussed?

C: I don't recall. I think I heard, but I just don't recall. I think it had to do with probably the calls that should be made and discussed the advisability of when and where Mr. Johnson should take his oath of office and other little details like this.

P: You spoke of having heard that President Kennedy was so badly wounded. How had you heard about this? Had you been receiving reports?

C: No, this was Secret Service.

P: They had reported this to you shortly after arrival?

C: Yes, it wasn't so much of an official report as we knew all these agents personally as it was a case of one passing on information to the other.

P: What members of John Kennedy's staff did you talk with and what were their states of mind and emotional states?

C: Dorothy, I didn't actually see or talk to any of them until we were on the plane. By the time we got to the plane, as I described a few minutes ago-- when we got to the plane, Lem Johns, Jack Valenti, and I got to the plane, and incidentally Liz Carpenter was already sitting on the plane when I got there. I should have learned a long time ago about Liz. You don't have to really worry too much about her, she'll always be ahead of you. I had worried about us going off and leaving her in the hospital and she was sitting waiting on the plane when we got there. I talked to General Clifton, General Ted Clifton, the top military aide along that day, talked with him as quickly as we got on the plane and learned at this time that arrangement had been made for Mr. Johnson to be sworn in on Air Force One there at Love Field. That apparently there had been conversation maybe

between--I believe I was told between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Katzenbach who was the Deputy Attorney General at that time. It was decided among all of them that it would be much better psychologically for the country, the world, all, for Mr. Johnson to have taken his oath of office immediately-- I mean for him to have taken it before we left Dallas, although technically he immediately became President at Mr. Kennedy's death. But the oath of office is the symbol and it was decided by those working on this, and I had nothing to do with this. Further I was told that Judge Sara Hughes had been asked to come out to give the oath of office and was on her way. We assembled in the main meeting room of Air Force One and waited until Mrs. Kennedy and the casket arrived and Kenny O'Donnell as I recall went back into the Stateroom, the bedroom, and got Mrs. Kennedy to come out and be there for the swearing in. And basically it was Congressman Thornberry, Brooks, Albert Thomas, Jack Valenti, General Clifton, Mrs. Johnson, and they invited four newsmen from the news pool to come in and witness this. I was standing in front to start with and as we had more come in I moved to the back and moved the newsmen up.

Q: Do you recall who the newsmen were?

A: I do not. I believe that Smith was one of them, but I do not-- I have seen pictures that were taken during this period of time when we were awaiting Mrs. Kennedy's arrival and all that I have described were in--and I think Bill Moyers had just joined the group at this time, too. Bill had been down in Austin, like I said earlier, coordinating the dinner that President Kennedy was to speak in Austin that night, and when he heard of the assassination he chartered a plane and flew up to Dallas, and sent a note into Mr. Johnson that he was outside if he was wanted. And Mr. Johnson had brought him in and he then became a part of the party; he was

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not a part of the official party up until that moment. But this is a long way around to answer your question about the Kennedy staff. After the swearing in, and Mrs. Kennedy retired to the bedroom, and the other Kennedy staff people were up front in the airplane, and when the swearing in was all completed, Mr. Johnson told General Clifton we were ready to leave and to take off; he gave those orders and we did take off. Liz Carpenter, Marie ~~W. Fehmer~~ ^{W. Fehmer} and I were sitting up front with the Kennedy staff. Liz was sitting on my right, Marie was sitting in the row right behind our row and in the seat behind Liz, and immediately after we were airborne I got Liz and Marie to get out their pencils and paper and I dictated a second-by-second happening from the time the first shot was fired until we were in the air at that moment, to make sure the timing all got into Mr. Johnson's diary. Again, to your question on the Kennedy staff, Evelyn Lincoln was sitting right across the aisle from me, and other female secretaries were in a little group of four seats there with her. Kenny O'Donnell and Larry O'Brien were in seats just ahead of us. They all were just grief stricken, were in a state of shock it appeared, no one was saying anything to anyone. I've read about hard feelings that existed and all these things; I was there, I neither heard nor saw any of them. I got up after we were airborne, after I had dictated these notes to Liz and Marie and went up and squeezed the arm of Kenny O'Donnell, and went back and sat down; not a word passed between us. But that was it.

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- 2: Do you recall any discussion or information regarding the person referred to as the "bad man" who carries the defense information for the country and that he was lost for a period of time in the hospital?
- 3: No, I did not. Having been in the Vice President's office, I wasn't familiar with those things, and I didn't realize until I read about it later.

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Q: Were you in on any of the discussions or the decision to use Air Force One or Two or the confusion as to where they were, or who was to go aboard?

A: No, I was not. I have understood that this is conceivably a part of the discussion Mr. Johnson had with Kenny O'Donnell and Larry O'Brien and conceivably with General Clifton. The judgment seems to have been made largely on the fact that Air Force One had certain sophisticated communication equipment that Air Force Two did not have and that if a man is going to be President of the United States he's got to be in constant contact with all elements at his command. It was thought that that was not entirely possible on Air Force Two. This is what I've been told, and as I said, I had nothing to do--did not participate in any discussion.

Q: How was it conveyed to you to come to Air Force One as opposed to Air Force Two?

A: This is what Lem Johns told me when Jack Valenti and I met him in the hall of Parkland Hospital when we were fixing to leave.

Q: And he specifically said Air Force One?

A: Well, he just said, "The President left me to bring you on out." And we got out to Love Field and he directed the driver to go to Air Force One.

Q: During the first hour of flight in the book, Death of a President by Manchester, he described you as coming in and out and dictating, as you have already said, this diary of second-by-second events, to Marie Femen, and he uses the phrase "in a conspicuous drawl," indicating that this was of course part of the Boston-Austin polarization. Could you comment on that?

A: Dorothy, I would suppose that he was just trying to make his language a little more colorful or something because no one heard me on this, except Liz and Marie. Of course, Mr. Manchester talked to me on the telephone

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but other than that he would have no occasion to know whether I had a drawl or not. My recollection on another part of this, that first hour no one moved; everyone was just sitting there in a state of shock to a large extent and after about an hour, I did get up and go in the main cabin where President Johnson was, and spent the rest of the trip there. Liz Carpenter was in and out, Marie was in. Liz had started drafting a short statement to present to Mr. Johnson to think about making when he landed at Andrews Air Force Base. Bill Moyers likewise started drafting what he thought should be said. These statements were presented to Mr. Johnson and then Mr. Johnson dictated his own statement, changing the words around. Actually his statement was almost a composite of the two.

On that flight back, from the President's cabin Mr. Johnson did call the mother of President Kennedy, Mrs. Rose Kennedy, and talked to her.

P: Were you present?

C: I was present when he talked to Mrs. Rose Kennedy and told her how grief stricken he was this had all happened, that his thoughts and prayers were all with her and had a very good conversation with Mrs. Kennedy.

P: Did you see the President at all during the first hour of the flight?

C: No.

P: He was secluded in this cabin?

C: That's right. The Congressmen were there with him and Secret Service men, and Mrs. Johnson.

P: What Congressmen?

C: This was Homer Thornberry and Brooks, as I recall.

P: Do you have a taping made of conversations between Love Field and Andrews on Air Force One?

C: No, I do not.

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P: Would you continue with any developments that happened during the second hour, what went on.

C: As I recall, Dorothy, Mr. Johnson had spoken to Walter Jenkins in Washington, and as you remember about half the Cabinet was in another jet out in the Pacific; in fact they were just leaving Hawaii, I believe, when word of the assassination reached them. And Mr. Johnson was passing on instructions to Walter Jenkins to get the Cabinet members that were in Washington to have them assemble at the Executive Office Building and to pass word on to the plane out in the Pacific to return at their earliest moment, and--

P: Mr. Jenkins was still in Washington?

C: He was in Washington. And I believe that was mainly it. We landed at Andrews and it had been decided to let Mrs. Kennedy and the casket and the others go off first in the back of the plane. They had to use a hydraulic²⁴ lift to take the casket down, and I remember Bobby Kennedy, who was then Attorney General, came in through the front of the airplane, rushed right through the President's compartment; he did speak to President Johnson, but he didn't tarry. He moved right on quickly, went right to the casket, and after the casket was loaded in an ambulance, they drove away, then the President and Mrs. Johnson and the party went down the back steps over to the microphone and made a statement to the nation and the world, and we got in helicopters and went right over to the White House grounds and walked around to the Executive Office Building.

P: Was there a discussion on the flight, or did people still think in terms of there being a conspiracy? And did this influence the immediacy of the oath?

C: Well, there was talk about the possibility of conspiracy, but I don't believe that was the predominate factor in the decision to go ahead quickly.

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I think it was mainly the psychological factor that someone had picked up the torch, the country was not without its leader. And I know later on that evening ~~we~~ were out at Mr. Johnson's house and sat and talked, this was the main thing that he was determined in working out the details--the many details--of what he would be doing the next day. The guiding factor in all this was for the country to know the nation was in firm and resolute hands, this on the one hand, and not to be overdoing on the other. And it was a very tight rope that he had to walk, to make everyone realize that he was going to move in and take over and yet not to appear that he was rushing in just power-mad like a scavenger that just scoops everything out of the way.

P: There was some trouble upon landing at the White House regarding identifications, getting in and out. Do you recall events around that?

C: I do not. I don't know what kind of identification problems. It could have been with the pilot of the helicopter, I don't know.

P: I think this was among Mr. Johnson's staff and they didn't know where to report, to the White House or the Executive Office Building. Some of them didn't have identification with them.

C: It could have been. I had no problem.

P: When you did get to the office--the Vice President's office in EOB--what was done until you left to go to Mr. Johnson's home?

C: Dorothy, I was in and out of this main office, and as I recall, and I must say that Walter Jenkins was handling the scheduling and working of his time at that moment. Those members of the Cabinet who had remained in Washington were there to visit with him, and I was in an office down the hall but adjoining his office. The only little thing I did hear, he asked me to get a couple of sheets of White House stationery, which I did from

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one of the offices from down the hall and took it back to him. This woman secretary from that office came back to me later crying. She was a very faithful Kennedy staffer, and she was saying something to the effect to me that, "He can't even let the body get cold before he starts using his stationery." It turned out that what Mr. Johnson did was write a letter in his own handwriting to little Caroline and little John about a brave wonderful person and great man their daddy had been. He wanted to write it the day of the assassination, which these letters were later taken and handed to the Kennedy children.

P: Who was this staffer, do you remember?

C: I don't remember her name, I just popped in the first office I found open and got the stationery. Then I remember Mr. Johnson also talking to Jim Riley, the head of the Secret Service, bragging on what a great job Rufus Youngblood had done and telling him he wanted Rufus cited for exceptional bravery which was done ten days or two weeks later. From there we went on--I went with Mr. Johnson out to The Elms and we--

P: There was a dinner prepared. You were there with the Johnsons, Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Mr. and Mrs. Busby and Dr. Hearst, is that correct?

C: That is correct.

P: You started a minute ago a little bit on the conversation. Do you recall what was discussed in this early part of the evening?

C: We finished eating about eleven o'clock. This was the first food we'd had since breakfast; no one had been hungry, nor cared to eat anything anyway, but to that moment, and it was a very light dinner that we did eat, light purposely, but we retired about eleven o'clock. Valenti, Moyers and I were spending the night with the Johnsons, and we each had gone to our bedrooms and the Busbys and Dr. Hearst had left, and just as we had gotten

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to our bedrooms, Mr. Johnson called and had us come on down to his bedroom. And we pulled up chairs by the side of his bed and talked until about three o'clock in the morning about different things. This was mainly Mr. Johnson talking. We were just listening and counseling with him, and he did tell Valenti at that time that he wanted him to take two years' leave from his firm, public relations firm in Houston of Weekly and Valenti, and plan on serving at the White House with him, and he told Moyers that he wanted him back from the Peace Corps. And he told me at this time he wanted me to plan on moving over to the Democratic National Committee to represent his interests over there. And we talked that night about him talking--a visit he was to have with President Eisenhower the next day--and other meetings were scheduled, those who would be in to attend the funeral from foreign countries, the governors of all the states, and it's like I mentioned awhile ago, everything was weighed out--when I say "weighed," I mean to make sure that he was walking this chalk line not to overdo but yet where the people had confidence that he could do the job.

P: Were decisions made at this time regarding Lyndon Johnson's participation in the funeral and the Cabinet meeting and the speech to Congress also?

C: I don't think those decisions were made at that time; the only additional decision made was that he was going to loan me three pair of his underwear and three pairs of his socks. I had just packed for an overnight trip and was going to be here at least until Thanksgiving, for five days, and this decision was made about two-thirty in the morning. He said, "I'll just have the girl bring you in some of my shorts, undershirts, socks, and she can buy some new shirts," which I did the next morning, Saturday morning, went down and bought a couple of new suits and had to buy a black suit--I didn't have a black suit--and some new shirts. I wore his shorts and undershirts for several years after that.

P: Did you continue to stay at The Elms the following day?

C: Yes, I stayed there the first five days after the assassination, and rode in with Mr. Johnson each morning and rode back out with him in the evening. Usually we went home about nine-thirty at night, and--

P: Could you give me a kind of day-by-day rundown there of what happened those days immediately following--what Lyndon Johnson did?

C: I can't--Mr. Johnson was just in a series of meetings with President Eisenhower, with the former Texan Robert Anderson who was Secretary of the Treasury under Mr. Eisenhower. He was in contact with leaders all over the country by telephone and in person. What I was doing most of this time--we were flooded with telegrams and mail, telegrams, telephone calls at first, and then the mail started catching up. And one of my primary jobs here was to try to identify as many of the telegrams as possible. We had stacks of telegrams on every desk in each room, and I used to spend hours going through, looking--because this is one thing Mr. Johnson's always been insistent upon--knowing who had wired or who has written. And many times a person would just sign a telegram "Pete," and if you know the town you can almost figure it out. We were trying to figure out many telegrams and letters where people had sent them--the assassination had caught them off traveling and they'd sign a telegram by their nickname or something like that. But Mr. Johnson also--we knew that every one of these had to be answered, and I spent a good part of that five days trying to categorize and identify.

P: Did you take special care of the notices to the Kennedy family for condolences?

C: Those were not delivered to us. I did not see any of those. These were telegrams and letters directed to the President, Lyndon Johnson, that came into our category.

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P: Is that how they made the separation as to who they were addressed to?

C: I'm sure it was, Dorothy.

P: Do you know who was in on that?

C: Well, they've got a big White House mail detail, and those are professional career people. They've served a number of Presidents, and the only thing I ever saw was mail to Mr. Johnson, telegrams.

P: Could you give an estimate about how much mail did flow into the White House on those few days?

C: Dorothy, I knew those figures, I don't think I can even trust my memory on that. But over the period of several weeks, my recollection is that it ran several hundred thousand, and we had just great stacks of numbers.

P: Why had he gone to see former President Eisenhower so soon?

C: Well, he didn't go see President Eisenhower, he had President Eisenhower come visit with him. Mr. Eisenhower visited with him there in the Vice President's office in the Executive Office Building and the purpose of it, I would presume, was the bipartisan aspect to this change of Presidents and his great feeling that he needed the support and help of everybody on both sides of the aisle and both parties. And additionally Mr. Eisenhower had served eight years as President and I think he, Mr. Johnson, wanted benefit of his total advice and counsel.

P: You had spoken about Mr. Johnson trying to hold this fine line, not offend any of the Kennedy family. Did he indicate this to the staff members? Was this continuously on his mind--?

C: No, and I didn't say offend the Kennedy people, Kennedy staff, or Kennedy family. What I was saying and what I say, and this was my belief as far as the American people were concerned, the American people as you will recall were greatly shocked and in a great state of grief, and it would

have been entirely conceivable that a person taking over under conditions like this, if he moved too rapidly or anything, that the people generally would have been offended by it, like he was, like I said a minute ago, like a scavenger rushing in to just brush everything aside.

P: Were those his words?--

C: No, these are my words, my evaluation of--

P: Did he indicate this to you?

C: No, I think, Dorothy, this night, and this was the night of November 22, that we sat and talked so long, we were talking about the many, many details of things that needed to be done, the bases that needed to be touched with foreign governments, with governors, with Senators, Congressmen, mayors, certain things with the Cabinet members, and what I said to you is what my feeling was of the situation. And I don't recall it ever having been said there or since.

P: Did anything occur at this time that later was to cause some members of the Kennedy staff to be upset?

C: Not that I know of. You remember during this period of time the President, I think he did this mainly that Friday evening when he met with the Cabinet, asking all of them to stay on, that he needed them, and of course in the next days, as he had the opportunity to talk with Theodore Sorensen and Kenny O'Donnell and Larry O'Brien, he asked all of them to stay on, he needed them now as much or more than President Kennedy had needed them. And I say the liaison with the Kennedy family, and I don't know who that liaison was, whoever it was dealing with Walter Jenkins, was laying out the time schedule, when the funeral would be and when this, in order for Mr. Johnson to make his own plans, when he would speak to the joint session of Congress. And of course as it was laid out, the funeral was on Monday

after the Friday assassination and then Mr. Johnson spoke to the joint session on Wednesday, just the day before Thanksgiving. The funeral service was of course planned to the nth degree and this was done by the Kennedy family. You had to have credentials to be admitted into the Cathedral, and these were delivered from the printer at about five minutes until eleven and the funeral procession was to start at eleven. Walter Jenkins and I were there representing the Johnson staff, and I remember the envelope and the credentials with a black border. They were still, I say they just arrived from the printer, they were still hot from having just been printed. And on the procession from the White House over to the Cathedral, the heads of all the foreign countries were there, General deGaulle and the others were going to march, whereas our Secret Service had practically ordered Mr. Johnson to ride in his car over there, that they weren't sure that they could protect him at all, that he would be an open target for further assassination if he marched, and he overrode their recommendation saying that if deGaulle and the others could march, he certainly could take his chances and march also. Well, his car was scheduled to be in the procession behind those who were marching. As it turned out, Walter Jenkins, his wife, and I rode--we had planned on walking but this car was going along empty so we got in the car and rode over to the Cathedral from the White House, and we were there for the service. We left--Walter and I had to get back to work--we did not get to accompany the procession out to Arlington Cemetery.

P: What offices were you operating out of at this time?

C: These were the offices in the Executive Office Building. They were offices adjoining the Vice President's office in the Executive Office Building. As I recall it was on the second floor.

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P: How long did you stay there before you moved over to the White House?

C: I never did leave there--I mean move to the White House. I left there in February of '64 to move over to the Democratic National Committee, and I operated from this suite of offices until February.

P: And when did Mr. Johnson move into the White House?

C: My recollection is that Mrs. Kennedy took something like ten days or two weeks after the funeral to move from the White House, and I believe the Johnsons moved in two or three days after that. Back just a second--of course Walter, Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, George Reedy and I went up with the President when he spoke to the joint session of Congress on that Wednesday. And then Valenti and I left and flew back to Texas that evening and over that Thanksgiving packed up our respective families, Valenti in Houston and I was in Austin, and we flew back together on Sunday, meeting in Dallas and flew back with our families.

P: Were you involved in any of the arrangements for the Cabinet meeting that was held?

C: No, that would have been done by Walter Jenkins.

P: Do you recall if Lyndon Johnson evidenced any disturbance over Robert Kennedy's late arrival?

C: No, I'm not familiar with any of those details. I was not there.

P: Did you help on any arrangements for those attending the address to Congress?

C: No, I was just there.

P: Manchester credits you with having arranged to have the representational seating with Mrs. Johnson involving the liberal intellectuals Schlesinger with Mayor Wagner from the big cities and Governor Sanders from the South.

C: Well, that is correct. I don't think I understood your question as you originally placed it. When we say "arranged," it wasn't exactly arrangement

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we had discussed somewhere along the line, I think maybe on Tuesday, that there would be so many seats available in the balcony with Mrs. Johnson and that probably what we should try to do is invite key people, key representative people, to come and sit with her at this speech. I did talk to Mayor Wagner and Dr. Kenneth Galbraith and with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and I believe maybe Mrs. Johnson called Dr. Galbraith, I believe maybe I called Schlesinger. I'm not totally sure on this--

P: Was the purpose to show a representational gathering?

C: Yes, and to have a broad based representation there. I believe that would be what my recollection of the thinking was.

P: Did this meet with any resistance?

C: Not any that I knew about nor know about.

P: Did you encounter during this time any people not wishing to cooperate with the Johnson takeover?

C: No, I didn't.

P: That's about all my questions on this particularly concentrated period of about five days. Are there any other things that come to your mind that we have not covered?

C: No, not that I can think of, just quite a traumatic experience, as you would realize. During World War II, I had Sinclair Lewis' son shot down standing by my side. This was Wells Lewis that was raised by Dorothy Thompson, and I thought I'd never get over that, but this one of course surpassed that, and I think we've pretty well covered it here.

P: I'll just ask you one more question that I think of. Was there any time in here where Mr. Johnson--you felt was showing the stress and were worried about him regarding his heart condition?

C: No, I believe that I didn't say that he was showing stress, I think that

he was probably the strongest one of all of us concerned--I say "concerned"--I mean involved. I mentioned that I was concerned because he had had a heart attack. This was a horrible thing he was experiencing here and the way the world suddenly dropped on his shoulders this was what I was concerning myself with, but I do not recall him ever appearing to be worn out or anything else.

P: Did Mr. Johnson ever indicate to you that there were certain areas where he lacked information for such a quick succession to the Presidency?

C: No, not to me.

P: All right, I'd like to continue on now. You did say that you stayed on with Mr. Johnson until February when you went over to the Democratic National Committee. What were your--between the months of December, January and February, what were your functions at that time?

C: I mainly was answering mail, taking telephone calls; at that moment during this period you were talking about, I was averaging talking long-distance a little over 100 times a day and dictating 75-100 letters a day.

P: To whom and on what?

C: This is just any calls or mail that were coming in to Mr. Johnson, calls that were coming in for Walter Jenkins that Walter couldn't handle, that he was so far behind on, and it's just basic staff work, is what I'm saying, getting these letters prepared for Mr. Johnson's signature; many of them went out over my signature.

P: Were they still in the form of wishing Mr. Johnson success?

C: Basically that's correct and you have all forms of inquiries, all forms of letters; after a little time had lapsed you had people wanting this job and that job and wanting some veterans claim to be higher compensated, and the many problems that people have that they write the White House and

Congressmen and Senators about that basically was what it was.

P: Did you see anything that would indicate the slightest harshness in the transferral of power here?

C: I did not observe it. I know nothing about this except what I've read in the Manchester book and some other books. We had--I attended--at the President's request I attended a meeting one day over in the swimming pool, the President's swimming pool; he had Ted Sorensen there with him and Secretary Celebrezze was there with him, and we actually conducted a conference in the swimming pool. My job was mainly just sitting in listening--or swimming and listening, and there were one or two little occasions like this that always congeniality prevailed that I saw.

P: What was the swimming pool meeting about?

C: I don't recall the subject. I'm trying to think--I think it had to do with the timing on an education bill. This would have had to been in early January I suppose, the priority of actually setting, attempting to set priorities or think out priorities on the timing of different bills that were going to be before the Senate. If one was going to be filibustered or this or that, how quickly needed to get the different bills out. As I recall, the conversation that day had to do with how quickly the education bill had to be moved.

P: What were you in attendance? Do you swim well?

C: No, and I don't know why I was invited to come over that day. I did have some knowledge of some of the congressmen and some of the senators, conceivably a little bit of judgment on political thoughts, but other than that I don't know.

P: During this couple of months do you remember any anecdotes or events that particularly come forward in your mind, stand out in your mind?

C: No, during this period of time, it was a rather grim--I won't say grim, I don't mean that, but it was strictly business. Everybody was trying to get moving, trying to get the many things done that needed to be done as far as legislation was concerned. This is what was going on at the White House. I was over at the Committee, working--let me say this, at the Democratic National Committee when I arrived there, see John Bailey was chairman and Dick McGuire, both of these were Kennedy appointees. Mr. Bailey is a very capable, knowledgeable political chairman; however, he spent most of his time in Connecticut and was down here maybe one or two days a week and was not interested in the day-to-day details of the operation of the Committee. This chore was handled by Dick McGuire, who as Treasurer, in controlling the money, he controlled the Committee, and it was my job to coordinate with him to start thinking about the convention that would be coming up and the campaign later. The first item that we had to settle, which came up about March or April, was on the allocation of delegates to the convention. This had never been finally agreed to. A plan had been drawn up that would have penalized some of the Southern states, would have given extra bonuses to other larger industrial states; that seemed to me to be out of balance. As a result of this I spent some time on drawing up a new suggestion on the way the votes would be allocated. When I say "votes," I'm talking about the Democratic National Convention and the nominating procedure. And we had a session on this and presented my plan. At this meeting Walter Jenkins was present presiding over the meeting; Ted Sorensen, Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien, Dick McGuire were there; I was there. We thrashed out different points and waved back and forth on the proposals. The recommendation that I had made was adopted, but in the pride of authorship on the part of the others--when I say "others,"

this was mainly Ted Sorensen, as I recall; it injured him a little bit to the point that he was not happy about his plan having been passed up.

P: Would you explain the two plans? May I just ask before you do that, had the allocation been established by the former election in '60 where a number of the Southern states had gone Republican?

C: Well, as I recall, Dorothy, we didn't have too many of the Southern states go Republican in '60. Of course we did in '64. But unfortunately I've gotten off on something here that I can't remember the exact details. Those allocations are very complicated, where so many bonus votes are given if the state went Democratic the last time, if they have a Democratic governor, and several other factors, but the general feeling was that the plan that had been advocated was not fair and equitable to the South, Southwest and what we were trying to do--what I tried to do in my plan--was to have fairness and equity for all fifty states, and that just about boils it down.

P: What was Sorensen's plan?

C: Again, I don't remember the exact details, but some of the larger industrial states were given additional bonuses and weighted more heavily than other states. As I recall some of the Southern and Southwestern states had been left just exactly as they had been, while others were given additional bonuses that would tend to have given them more advantage.

P: These are the ones that had been Democratic, and would be eligible for these bonuses according to the Democratic elective officers in the state?

C: Well, the ones that were going to be eligible for these bonuses, I don't know that they all went Democratic, or had Democratic governors; like the State of New York did not have a Democratic governor and they were going to get substantially more delegates.

P: In your opinion had this been established where John Kennedy had the most influence?

C: I would think that's a fair appraisal.

P: And of course the basis of the strength would not be the same with Mr. Johnson, and so this realignment would have to take that into consideration.

C: That's right. I think it could be said, and this is my evaluation, it could be a realignment according to the two individuals--just what the two plans were--realignments according to those two individual personalities.

P: Did you get objections from the former Kennedy staff members?

C: Objections to the point that they were trying to stress why they had drawn the system up that they had.

And, Dorothy, on a political convention of course it all happens in a week's time, but there are many months of planning that go into this and this was the thing that Dick McGuire and I began to concern ourselves about. We started about late April or early May going to Atlantic City every Thursday. We'd go up and spend the day there, check the many thousands of details, the progress being made. Leonard Reinsch from Atlanta, I think since 1940, has been the executive director of every Democratic National Convention. He's the President of Cox Broadcasting Company; he has a very large business in Atlanta, and does this more as a hobby than anything else. He took off, I believe from the first of March in 1964, and just moved to Atlantic City and stayed there until the Convention was over on August 28, 1964. And he was the one that Dick McGuire and I checked with each week that we went up there, on the arrangements for housing, and how the meals were going to be accommodated, seating arrangements, the credentials. And so we were working on this and this same time we were beginning to concern ourselves with the campaign--it was just around the corner.

P: Did Mr. Johnson give you any specific directions regarding the arrangements at Atlantic City?

C: No, the only thing--I remember we were flying back from Atlantic City one night; the New Jersey democrats had had a fund-raising dinner in Atlantic City about May and Mr. Johnson was principal speaker and we were flying back that night on Air Force One and Chairman [John] Bailey was sitting next to the President and Mr. Johnson said, "John, my goodness, how in the world did you ever select Atlantic City? It's the most unavailable, out-of-the-way place." And Chairman Bailey said, "Just one reason. I was told to." President Kennedy had told Chairman Bailey where he wanted the '64 convention and that's the reason it was there. The dates and site had already been selected before the assassination--this was selected in August of '63.

Did you have another question on the convention?

P: I was going to ask if you were involved in fund raising?

C: No. No, this was Dick McGuire's job. He had the President's Club and this was an idea of his that had come into fruition back in 1962 under President Kennedy and continued on very successfully. This was handling the financing of the Democratic National Committee operation. Of course, a convention is very costly and McGuire had come up with the convention book. I was told that something like a million and a half dollars was netted from the ads sold in this book, and then the City of Atlantic City and the State of New Jersey had given the Democratic National Committee six hundred and fifty thousand dollars and on our final accounting we still had to pay about--we were still about one hundred thousand dollars short paying for the convention that we had to take out of Democratic National Committee funds.

P: Was there anywhere near that much in the treasury at that point?

C: Well, at that particular point, and we're talking about September--this final accounting came after the convention, September-October--that was during the campaign, and of course money was ebbing and flowing at that time and I don't remember when they got that bill paid. I believe I was told that it was paid along about October.

P: Did you go with Mr. Johnson or help in the arrangements in these campaign swings?

C: No, I didn't, I don't believe I accompanied him on any of the trips. Let me take a few seconds to tell you here about the campaign because at this time the campaign and convention are interspersed; we're talking about May, June, July of '64 and we had to be working on both of them at the same time. I started worrying, just wanted to get a job done, I say "worry" because the polls were showing Mr. Johnson with a very high rating and we felt very confident. I felt very confident, but I always like to see a campaign organized correctly, executed correctly, and it did not seem to me at the Democratic National Committee we were getting these things done. I had asked for a meeting with Dick McGuire and Kenny O'Donnell--it was generally conceded that Kenny O'Donnell was the top political man around to handle the campaign--and we would have a date set and O'Donnell didn't show up, then we would talk a couple days later and he's day, "Well, everything's coming along fine, we'll get around to it one of these days." It finally got to a point, where I told McGuire, I felt like we just had to go ahead and move forward and that when O'Donnell was ready I suppose he'd come on, but that we couldn't wait in my opinion. So in July of '64 McGuire and I selected seven men to work with us on a regional, organizational basis, and we got these gentlemen in and assigned certain geographical

areas. Well, the fifty states were broken down into seven regions.

P: Do you recall these people?

C: Yes. I'm going to start up on the east coast because that was our first region. Bill [William Leo] Dunfey and Blair Lee--

P: What were these men's background or qualifications? Did they have to be from the area?

C: Well, they were from the area, and most of them had good, strong, political backgrounds also. Dunfey was from New Hampshire. He handled the New England states, down to and including New York State. Blair Lee is from Maryland, State Senator here now, lives out in Bethesda, and he handled Pennsylvania and down; Bill [Hiram Wilks] Brawley handled a good portion of the Southern states. Bill was from South Carolina originally; and Ivan [Arnold] Nestingen who was the Under Secretary of HEW at that time. He took leave from his work and handled the Midwest. We had John Singleton from Houston. Back on Nestingen, he was from Wisconsin originally, had been very active in Mr. Kennedy's primary out there, and had been brought in by the Kennedy people and appointed Under Secretary of HEW.

John Singleton from Houston handled the Southwestern region and then Culp Krueger from El Campo, Texas, who was State Senator at that time, handled what we called the Rocky Mountain region. Irvin Hoff, formerly of Washington State, handled the Pacific Coast region for us. Hoff used to be Senator Warren Magnuson's administrative assistant; he's located here in Washington now.

But those were our seven regional administrators and we had Johnny Crooker, Jr., present chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, who served as my assistant on this. I headed up this regional organization, and, Dorothy, what I did, I advised the state chairmen in all the fifty states

who their regional coordinator was, and this man would be working with them at the convention. We had gotten these regional coordinators to come in nearly a month ahead of the convention, and they stayed right here in Washington and they started working then by telephone with each of the states that they later would be coordinating with. Arrangements at Atlantic City, their hotel rooms, worked it out to where when the convention came along they were daily in contact with the people from their states. Also we were able to make plans and get a lot accomplished at the convention by virtue of the fact that we knew who our nominee was going to be and we'd get so much organizational work done ahead of time that we could hit the road running immediately after the convention and not have to spend the next month organizing. McGuire and I set up workshops that started every morning at eight o'clock at the convention and we usually had nine or ten states in. We had nine or ten special subjects to be covered, on how to handle public relations, how to register, how to do the most effective work.

P: Before the convention?

C: No, at the convention. But I led into this by these regional coordinators. [They] were there and would attend with each of their states as they were scheduled to go through these workshops. In most instances through these workshops is where a state coordinator was picked; wasn't necessarily the state chairman. If you had two United States Democratic Senators and a Democratic governor, those three, plus a state chairman, would end up picking someone to handle the campaign in their particular state. The main point and purpose of all this was for the people from these states to know what we had available and were going to have available, what the campaign materials were, what we were going to have, and at the same time for the regional coordinators to get on a very close first-name basis with

the state coordinators, with the governor, with the senators, to know all the key political people who would be working in the campaign in each of their respective states.

P: And the strengths of the Democratic candidates within the state?

C: Yes. This makes it so much easier. Later when one of these regional coordinators would call out to the State of Iowa, he would know who he was talking to and they'd know who they were talking to. But it helped mesh our organization, actually firmed it up; from these workshops, we were able to move right out, and the regional coordinators during the convention were backstage. We had a little booth for each one of them that had telephones out to talk to the people from his states, talk to them out on the floor, talk to the chairman of each state delegation in his region. And we also had a telephone set up where I could punch a button and talk to all fifty state chairmen at one time. We had red and white lights on a telephone by the chairman's seat of each delegation.

P: This would be the state chairman who could be the state coordinator, but not necessarily.

C: That's right. And it wasn't necessarily the state coordinator, it was whoever was the chairman of the delegation. It might be a state chairman, might be a national committeeman, might be a governor, but we had gone over these instructions with them ahead of time. In fact, we had one dry run to practice how to use the telephone before the convention actually opened.

P: Did you have any problems with it?

C: No, no. If the red light flashed that meant that the regional coordinator wanted to talk to them backstage; or they in turn could talk to him, they could buzz him. When they picked up their telephone his light buzzed

backstage, if they had a question they wanted to ask a regional coordinator. They could talk to him or he could talk out to them. Then I had a console I could punch by button and the white light would come on and all fifty of the delegations, where I could talk to all of them at one time.

P: Did you have occasion to use this?

C: No, it didn't come up. I've been through conventions before and the main problem that you always have is lack of communication or breakdown in communication; as I mentioned in one of our earlier sessions when we were trying to use little walkie-talkie radios, we failed miserably. But we had communications throughout on this.

P: Was this necessary in order to inform delegates of positions on various issues?

C: No, it turned out it wasn't necessary at all. There were a lot of things we didn't know and this is a case where it's much better to be prepared than to get caught short.

P: You've been described as the communications man at the convention. You also had control of four TV networks--the monitors--another line to the Democratic National Committee, one to the White House, plus the one to all your regional coordinators which also could reach all the state chairmen. Why all this, and how was this used?

C: Well, let's go back and look at them as you've enumerated them.

(End of tape)

INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON C. CARTER (Tape 5)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

(End of Fourth Interview and also the Fifth Interview [October 30, 1968])

C: On the TV monitors the place that I occupied was right next to Leonard Reinsch, who I mentioned earlier was Executive Director. Leonard is a professional TV man, and these were monitors that were actually in front of him; I was seated at the same desk, so to speak, and this was a case, I think, of where he was trying to make sure he knew what was going on and how it was coming out, how it was going out to the nation. He had gone to great pains to eliminate a walkway and area back of the Speaker where so many times as you're watching a convention--I cite this as one quick example of what Reinsch's executive ability and knowledge in his field--he eliminated any area where people could gather and be back of whomever was being focused on at that time and speaking. This was his command post where he sat to watch to see that things were going like they were supposed to be. Now I did not have a telephone to the White House. I had telephones to regional coordinators, as you said, and backstage we did have television sets going on in each room.

You mentioned something else there.

P: A line to the DNC, Democratic National Committee.

C: Well, we conceivably did have, but all the Democratic National Committee staff were in Atlantic City and we would have had no one to talk to back here. We did have a line where some of our staff members in advance up there used to call and talk, but this was before the convention started. We did have a switchboard, a Democratic National Committee switchboard, but I'm sure it was still in existence at that time.

P: Did you have any way of cutting off the delegates or the chairman's microphone?

C: I did not.

P: Did anybody?

C: There's bound to have been some control, Dorothy, on that. I can only think that this was part of Leonard Reinsch's operation.

P: How were the TV monitors used?

C: They were just used to watch to see what was going on.

P: From the standpoint of what television viewers were viewing or--

C: That's right, what the networks, how the different ones were covering the speakers or whoever else they might be talking to.

P: Why was this done?

C: This wasn't done from my standpoint, as I said a minute ago. I can only think that Mr. Reinsch is the one who had them installed, and I can only think that he wanted to make sure that he knew what was going out by the three networks so he could make his own evaluation. How good a coverage the convention was getting, or other details along this line.

P: Did you have occasion to talk to Mr. Johnson while you were in this position of communications man?

C: No. No, I didn't talk to the White House at any time when I was in Atlantic City.

P: Did you talk to some of the immediate staff members of Mr. Johnson?

C: Not at the White House. Walter Jenkins was in Atlantic City, and from time to time--I say "time to time"--daily I was in contact with Walter Jenkins.

P: Did you have occasion to speak to some of the--well, let's begin with the regional coordinators backstage, and what were your conversations about?

- C: Dorothy, I don't remember talking to them anymore than just trying out the equipment to make sure that it worked; and frankly after the opening session I spent practically no time out at this particular location; usually I had Johnny Crooker sit there. There was another fellow that worked with us who worked with Crooker and shared some of this time, Dave Clark, and I don't think I spent more than maybe five minutes a night out there after the opening night.
- P: And this very complex communications arrangement was not even used very much?
- C: It was used very little, practically not at all.
- P: Would you say, in the most recent convention in '68 where there was much more of a fight for the nomination that this would have come into more play?
- C: I think it would have. Of course from what I read in the paper and have heard about the '68 convention, I think they probably limited it to the different candidates to how much telephonic equipment they could put in and these things.
- P: In other words, it's much more simplified when the nominee is the incumbent President?
- C: It sure is. It sure is, and since you asked the original question on this, I've been running through my mind trying to think. I believe the only call I got was from a member of the South Dakota delegation that was disturbed over the seating of the Mississippi delegation or wanted to express his opinion on how the Mississippi delegation seating should be arranged. And I believe that that's the only call that I got.
- P: And what was the decision on that?
- C: Well, you recall the credentials committee were seating two members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, Dr. Aaron Henry and some other gentleman I don't remember, but they were seated along with the regular

Mississippi delegation. The regular delegation was required to take a loyalty oath--or an oath of affirmation, I believe they changed it to. Many of them went home refusing to do that, but these two members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party were seated. But that was done by the Credentials Committee, approved by the full convention.

P: It has been said that one of the reasons for this communications network was to hold the Southern delegates in line and not reject the first Southern president in over a hundred years. Could you comment on that?

C: Well, I know nothing about that, Dorothy. We had Governor Carl Sanders of Georgia and Governor [John] Connally of Texas working--were very close friends--and were working with all these states.

P: Was there much worry about this prior to the convention?

C: No.

P: Do you know if Mr. Johnson arranged for Alabama to yield to Texas for the nomination?

C: No, I sure don't.

P: Did you help in the arrangements for Smathers, Governor Smathers, Senator [George] Smathers to second Hubert Humphrey?

C: No, I did not.

P: Were you appraised of either one of these situations regarding the nomination of Mr. Johnson and the seconding of Mr. Humphrey?

C: No, I don't recall, Dorothy, Alabama doing it. I suppose since you said it here that's correct, but I don't recall. There was such total unanimity as far as all the delegations and states were concerned in regard to the presidential nomination there was no problem along this line. If Alabama had been asked it would only have been, I suppose, because they are first on the list. I would feel sure that the President--I don't know in fact.

Session Five

P: Mr. Carter, this is our fifth session. I would like to pick up here and briefly go back to some of the strategy prior to the convention and in particular go into what has been called the Bobby Kennedy problem as the vice presidential candidate. Was Robert Kennedy in the running for Vice President, in your opinion?

C: Dorothy, I don't know that you'd call it "the Bobby problem." I think it'd have to be considered an attempt to select the strongest possible running mate as vice presidential nominee, and it goes back. It doesn't start in July or August, the period of time we've just been talking about, but this goes back to the spring, early spring of '64. Remember at this time I'm over at the National Committee talking sixty to seventy-five times a day long distance on the phone, either calls that I initiated or came in to me. Most of them were calls coming in, from state chairmen, national committeemen, committeewomen, governors, senators and congressmen. And along the line there, the general gist of most of these conversations were that Bobby Kennedy should not be the running mate with Mr. Johnson in 1964 as the vice presidential nominee.

Well, it was part of my job, I felt, to transmit what you might call political intelligence or grass roots feeling, a feeling from out across the country. This I did transmit to Walter Jenkins, and all of my conversations with the White House when I transmitted information were always with Walter. Along in the spring, like I just said, I told him two or three times the expressions that had been sent forth to me, or had been given to me, and had suggested that someone ought to talk to Attorney General Kennedy and let him know that he was probably not going to fit into the picture. And I understood, I'd say late spring, I understood

this had been done. But there continued to be what, in my opinion, were self-starting movements in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California.

On the twenty-second of July, 1964, Dick McGuire and I presented a memorandum to Walter Jenkins suggesting that the time had come that the President was going to have to personally talk to Attorney General Robert Kennedy and tell him he was not going to be the nominee and let it be known publicly that he had told him. It was our opinion, unless it was made public, you would continue to have self-starting movements trying to ride in on the sympathy, the Kennedy sympathy for J. F. Kennedy at that time.

On the twenty-ninth of July the President announced that he had told the Cabinet and Ambassador [Adlai] Stevenson that men he daily worked with would not be considered for the vice presidential nominee.

- P: You call these speculations on Robert Kennedy self-starting. There was a charge that the New Hampshire primary was staged by Kennedy people, and that the Democratic chairman there, Hugh Bounds, tried to stop it on orders from the DNC, Democratic National Committee.
- C: Well, Dorothy, you don't order a state chairman to do anything. Bounds called a number of times upset on the situation and was reporting, telling me more of what was going on out there. He wasn't asking for instructions. Initiative or action taken out there was mainly on their part, but he did call me a number of times quite upset over the situation. He felt like his authority was being usurped to a degree by outsiders and was quite distressed about it, but remember all these people are volunteers and you don't order anybody to do anything.
- P: Did you think that Kennedy supporters were attempting to stage a draft call for Kennedy as Vice President?

C: Yes, I did. Some of his supporters, of course, a man--I must say this in fairness--any candidate or potential candidate does not have total control of his supporters; he's always got some supporters that want him to do a lot more than he's willing to do or beyond.

P: Do you think Robert Kennedy wanted it?

C: I don't know, Dorothy. I don't know what went through his mind. I never had any conversations with him on it. I would just presume, or I'll say it was my feeling, that he was not unhappy about some of the publicity he got out of some of these movements.

P: Did you feel any pressure from former members of the John Kennedy staff--Salinger, Bundy, O'Brien, O'Donnell--for placing Robert Kennedy on the ticket?

C: No, no, there was none. I would think that most of them were pretty much in accord with the thought that he should not be the nominee. I think if he had personally gotten out on a stump and had tried to make a move, I don't think they would have opposed it. But I'm not of the opinion that the ones you name, I'm not of the opinion they were trying to push him for it or really felt like he ought to be there.

P: Do you think Mr. Johnson was in the least bit fearful or concerned of being forced to select Robert Kennedy as his running mate?

C: Well, I don't know what went through his mind, but I don't know that he was any more concerned about Bobby Kennedy than anybody else, but this is an area where a President needs to have an open, full, loose hand in the selection of a running mate because they have to work together. They have to be very compatible pair and have to have the same views along many lines, and I think at this particular juncture this would not have been true between Mr. Johnson and Bobby Kennedy.

- P: Did you arrange with former Illinois Senator Lucas to persuade nine county Democratic chairmen in Southern Illinois to sign a pledge that the President would have a free choice of picking his running mate?
- C: No. Senator Lucas, Senator Scott Lucas did this and showed me after it was all over, came by and showed me the resolution that he'd written and gotten this group of people to adopt, which incidentally was a very good resolution.
- P: It didn't receive any prior judgment by the National Democratic Committee?
- C: No. This was something Senator Lucas did strictly on his own.
- P: Did you then take this resolution and send it around the country to key politicians in order to get it passed in May at the Midwest Democratic Conference in Des Moines?
- C: I didn't send it around; I was there, I took it with me and showed it to Governor Harold Hughes of Iowa and others who were running that conference. They asked--let me back up and say that I had it in my pocket and they told me unofficially, I say "unofficially," out of session, that they wanted the conference to adopt something along this line. I said, "Well, I've got a copy of the Lucas memorandum in my pocket," which they took and adopted pretty much verbatim.
- P: Was there much resistance to this at the conference?
- C: I don't believe that there was any resistance. I don't recall any.
- P: You spoke also of showing it to Governor Hughes of New Jersey?
- C: Yes. I said Governor Harold Hughes of Iowa and that's correct on that one, but I did show it also to Governor Dick Hughes of New Jersey.
- P: In a later Atlantic City trip prior to the convention?
- C: No, Governor Hughes was in my office visiting; I was not in Atlantic City at the time.

P: What was his reaction to this resolution?

C: He thought it was excellent.

P: And did his delegation subscribe to it, and Rhode Island, I believe--

C: I don't know about Rhode Island, and I don't remember what New Jersey did. I believe that they did adopt that resolution or one very similar to it.

P: Was there to your knowledge any other members of the Cabinet considered?

C: I don't know any that were considered.

P: Was [Eugene] McCarthy misled on his vice presidential possibilities, to create a contest with Hubert Humphrey?

C: Of course I don't know all the things that were said or conversations, but I would not be of the opinion that he was misled. I think, and this is my personal feeling, I think that there were possibly three people that were at one time or another considered, at least different ones of us talked about, and Senator McCarthy was in that three.

P: Who were the three?

C: Senator [Thomas] Dodd and Senator Humphrey.

P: You were described as being on Team E of the Democratic National Committee. It was in Theodore White's Making of the President, 1964--with Bailey, O'Donnell, O'Brien--

C: Dorothy, I don't know what Team E is; I've never heard of that. You mentioned that the other day quickly in passing; I've never heard of that. Let me tell you a group we did have meet every morning; if I may, let me digress a second and go back. As we mentioned before, the longest period of time we're talking about is July-August of '64. We had simultaneous events of planning going on and simultaneous events at the convention and in the campaign to follow.

I mentioned the other day to you about setting up the regional

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coordinator setup and all of this. This was both to do with the convention and mainly with the campaign organization so we could get to running immediately after the convention.

Now at the convention, I'm talking about, about the fifteenth of July, we began to encounter difficulties on our housing requirements and great numbers of these things. And it happened that Marvin Watson and Blake Gillen of Austin were up here attending a White House luncheon just at that time, and at the luncheon I asked them to come over and visit with me at the National Committee that afternoon and they did. I asked them to take a couple of days off and go up to Atlantic City and try to give us a hand in getting the housing situation straightened out. Mrs. Betty Harris had been put in charge of it and the thing had gotten out of hand; something, some way things were not working out as they should. Marvin and Blake agreed to do this, and it ended up they never did go home until after the convention was over with. They both did a magnificent job on the housing and other details that we subsequently assigned to them to help get worked out, working with Leonard Reinsch there.

P: This caused quite a furor, the housing shortage. How did that happen? How did it come about?

C: Well, Dorothy, it gets to be a very complex situation when you get into housing. In a city like Atlantic City which will list 14,000 available rooms, to use as an example, maybe 5,000 of those rooms have no bath, have no air conditioning, have no lavatory, everything is down the hall, and it would have to be listed as substandard living accommodations. You have that from one standpoint. From the other standpoint you have, of course, in Atlantic City the big auditorium that could seat over 26,000 people for the convention, which is much larger than any space the Democratic National

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Committee ever attended before. That ran up a greater requirement for housing and a lot of people, of course, as we've become a more affluent society, so many more people now want one or two or three bedroom suites, they're not satisfied with just having a good room anymore. You're always limited on that. Your additional factors are that you have your media networks there, whose employees are union people, and under their union contracts they can refuse to work unless they're furnished first-class rooms with air conditioning; this is all in their contract. We had to set aside literally thousands of rooms for TV-radio technicians that probably should have been used by the various state delegations. What I'm saying, as you can tell from this, it gets to be a very complex situation, and in addition to all of this as we talked about the other day, we had more delegates and more alternates to the '64 convention that previously attended.

Let me just say one thought on that, that I'm not sure I made totally clear the other day, that I hope as you type this up, this some way can be put back in and amended. I want to speak just for a quick second on the allocation of delegates. It was my evaluation, back at the time I looked over the proposed change in allocations, that the press and the public would picture this, would print it as being punitive to the South. This was a way that Sorensen and the others proposed to change the delegate allocations. And what we changed, what we ended up changing it to, was fair and equitable in our minds, a fair and equitable situation to all fifty states. That was the only reason though for the change.

But these were the problems, Dorothy, that we had on the housing, items I mentioned, plus the fact that Dick McGuire who handled the President's Club was inviting in all the members of the President's Club for various functions there, a clam bake and various things to help make

all of them feel closer to the Democratic party. So we had to have rooms for them in addition to all the delegates, TV-radio technicians and newspaper people and all.

P: What group complained most vigorously of all?

C: I don't know who complained the most. Many of the problems got straightened out. There were some of the different state delegations that sent their housing chairman up maybe in late July or early August to see what had been set aside for them well ahead of time, and there were complaints then that ended up getting straightened out. I'm sure there were still some complaints but I don't remember what they were. I believe, my recollection is that Marvin Watson did a very fine job of getting all this worked out almost totally to everyone's satisfaction.

P: Since Mr. Watson stayed on, what did his capacity become?

C: Well, he stayed on through the convention. You remember back at this time he was the State Democratic Chairman of Texas, and he went back to Texas right after the convention was over.

P: What was his capacity during the convention? I mean, he had only come to briefly aid you and then he did stay on. Was he assigned responsibilities?

C: Of course, he had the Texas delegation there; he took over his duties when they arrived at the convention of handling the Texas delegation as state chairman, and I don't remember anything in particular except being available to help see that the convention went off like it was supposed to.

P: Was much time given prior to the convention to the question of the need of a Roman Catholic on the ticket to balance it?

C: Well, I don't know how much time was given. Of course that's one of the factors that you always put in the hopper to weigh out. You start off first with ability, and then geographical location, probably religion comes in

there, but I think it basically is--

P: This was to appeal to Kennedy supporters?

C: Well, not thinking about Kennedy supporters, but what you always try to do on a ticket is try to make it well balanced with ability, with views, with geographical location, the candidate's home state, religion and anything else you can think of; nationality.

P: After the President's July announcement regarding that no Cabinet member would be under consideration for Vice President, did the Kennedy "Irish mafia" then support Hubert Humphrey?

C: Well, no, I don't believe they supported anyone at this time, because everyone recognized, everyone working on this, recognized that it had to end up being the President's selection. I don't recall any of them speaking out in behalf of anybody. I suppose they each had their own personal choice, but what I'm saying is there was no concerted effort to attempt to push someone off on the President. The President did talk to me about this, and knowing the way he operates, I'm sure before he arrives at a judgment he talks to a great number of people, and I just would know--I should say I feel, I don't know--that he talked to Kenny O'Donnell, I feel he talked to Walter Jenkins, I feel he talked to Dick McGuire, I feel he talked to all these people to get their judgment, their thoughts on who would be a strong running mate.

P: Did you hear of any response from Robert Kennedy or his staff after this announcement was made?

C: No, I didn't, except what I read in the paper, and that was just where he said he apologized to all the other cabinet members for taking them over the side of the boat with him, but that's all I know.

P: When did you become aware that Hubert Humphrey had been decided on as the running mate?

Q: Dorothy, I didn't know it until he flew into Atlantic City, which I believe was on Wednesday evening.

P: And until that time the possibilities of McCarthy and Dodd were still very valid?

Q: In my opinion they were probably still being considered.

Let me comment one bit further on the convention, to pretty well close this up; it's just a little item. For all the years that I've been associated with Mr. Johnson we have been trying to have some dinner, some big event, honoring his birthday which is August 27, and each year--and I'm talking about through the fifties and early part of the sixties, we would--when I say "we" I'm talking about staff and friends--try to think up some event, try to do something. We'd always be told by the President or by someone else that this is the last week before Labor Day and all our friends are off taking their last little bit of vacation before getting their children back in school and not the appropriate time; and of course we didn't set the time for this convention, this was set a year ahead of time, in August of '63. But as it turned out the Thursday night, the final night of that convention was the President's birthday, August 27, so we were able at long last to stage a big celebration honoring his birthday, something we'd thought about and tried to do for nearly fifteen or so years before that.

P: Could you tell me a little bit about the occasion?

Q: Well, of course he made his acceptance speech that night along with the Vice President and we had a gala celebration, members of the President's Club and delegates, and they had a tremendous fireworks display out in the ocean. This was staged off a barge well out from the beach; it went on for twenty to thirty minutes, something like this. It had the American

flag and LBJ and a picture of Mr. Johnson and Happy Birthday and these things. It was a very grand affair. I stood there and watched it out the window and would turn and watch it on television that I had going also, and it came across very good.

But finishing up the convention, the next morning Mr. Johnson spoke to a meeting of the Democratic National Committee and urged them all to get back home and get to work, and he left and went to Texas. And when the convention was over we had our campaign organization completely fitted out and organized and had these training schools I mentioned the last session, and by Labor Day we were already rolling pretty good.

Trying to anticipate campaign material is always a problem; I've gone through it many times before. You never have them where you need them, when you need them. So we'd put together a catalogue and had these materials displayed in the catalogues, trying to encourage the states to go ahead and place their orders and buy their materials. These materials were complete with everything except who the vice presidential nominee was going to be. We had so much of it already fixed for Mr. Johnson--All the way with LBJ, and these things--we had the molds at the different factories set up where they quickly could place Mr. Humphrey's picture in there. We had held it open, we didn't know who it was going to be. But this was done within a week's time. We had bumper stickers and everything out available.

P: Did you already have casts or molds of the three potential people available?

C: No, I don't think they'd gone that far. It doesn't take them very long to get this done, so I don't believe anything was done along that line.

But to speak of campaign material just a second further, a number of the states did buy supplies. They were timid about supplies; states are

always short of money. After three or four weeks, of course, people out in the states were complaining they didn't have any supplies, and even though we reminded them that they had a chance to order and buy; they're so used to a national headquarters sending them supplies free they were reluctant to buy, so we put on a special if they would buy so many we'd give them so many free. Still each time that Mr. Johnson or Mr. Humphrey or some of the others would make appearances across the country, they'd always come back saying these people are out of bumper stickers or they don't have-- . So toward the end of the campaign, say during the month of October, we finally got to the point where we were issuing these supplies free, just send them out as much as we could get credit from printers and what have you to let us send out. We would hit that point every now and then where we'd have to stop and get some money to get some of these bills paid before they'd let us have any more.

P: Mr. Carter, was this a new approach to sell campaign material instead of parceling it out among the states?

C: It wasn't anything particularly new, Dorothy. They've tried it over the years, at least I've always been on the other end of the thing. Down at a state or county headquarters basis, we've always had to buy our material. We did in '60. We had to send money to Washington then to buy the Kennedy-Johnson campaign material, and this runs into a sizeable item; we're talking about three to five or six million dollars, and there are many economies that can be effected by having them mass produced in one place, or by buying in quantity. The quantity discount is what I'm trying to say. This is what we were trying to do; effect these economies. If you have ten million bumper stickers printed at one place you get a much better price than if you have 75,000 printed in one city and 100,000 in another

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city, and like this. But we needed this additional financial help from the states; let them try to pay their own way.

P: What problems came up during the '64 campaign and what was the strategy?

O: Let me mention a couple of things here. As I said a minute ago before I digressed a bit, we were completely organized, we did move right out from Labor Day on. We had Jim Rowe who was in charge of our Citizen's Committee groups, which is a necessary adjunct to any campaign, and yet is one that causes many headaches. Jim Rowe and his staff did a great job on this. [Buell] Craig Raupe handled our ethnic groups and did a great job, with Louis Martin coordinating all the various groups, and we get down to this Group E that you were talking about on these morning sessions. We used to have this meeting at nine o'clock every morning in Chairman Bailey's office. These meetings were presided over by Kenny O'Donnell, the official campaign chairman.

I want to tell you about a service we had developed, because it relates to a degree to these meetings that we had. We set up an all night news service where men worked through the night collecting information on everything that Mr. [Barry] Goldwater and Congressman Bill Miller, the Republican vice presidential nominee at that time, things that they had said, their night speeches, that other Republicans had said that should be called to the President's attention. Also news items, how Mr. Johnson's speeches, utterances or releases were carried across the country. Not only did we have this on radio-television, but we had reporters in about fifty major cities that would call in during the night and report what placement in the paper Mr. Johnson's speech got. It gave us an immediate picture of what was going on across the country. This service was worked out to where mimeographed sheets would be finished and delivered to the White House

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at seven-thirty, where this was immediately available to the President each morning as he awakened. This was the latest political intelligence, news coverage that was being given. Also we had where Mr. Goldwater, Mr. Miller were going to speak that day, what advance. We had a distribution on this to the White House and the White House staff, Cabinet members, and of course Vice President Humphrey and his staff, and maybe about ten members of the Democratic National Committee. As we sat down each morning at nine o'clock, this was the first thing we did. Most of us would try to read it before we got in there at nine o'clock. We would discuss the situation, what had transpired in the past twenty-four hours, where Mr. Goldwater was going to be that day and the next twenty-four hours, and of course we had friends traveling with Mr. Goldwater in his traveling camp, his entourage there, that also would daily let us know what Mr. Goldwater's thoughts were, what he was upset about when he was confronted with such and such a sign or such and such an ad in the paper, what upset him.

P: Were these in effect your spies?

C: They weren't our spies, but they were our friends traveling with the news media group. They were people that apparently a number of these evenings, traveling by plane or train or what have you, at the end of the day Mr. Goldwater would sit down and relax with or talk with. And these reports would come in as to what he was disturbed with--

P: For capitalization the next day.

C: We would manage to, if he were going to be in Cheyenne, Wyoming, the next day or two days from now, we would see that an ad was placed in the paper along the lines which upset him.

P: Who was this?

C: What do you mean, who was this?

P: The traveling news people that passed on the information.

C: These were different individuals, Dorothy. I'd rather--I think I'd better protect their identity.

P: You could place a restriction on it.

C: Well, the main one was Everett Collier, editor of the Houston Chronicle today, and we had others that were long-time friends that traveled with the Republican nominee and kept us pretty well posted as to what was going on.

P: Was this a new approach, this political intelligence?

C: I'm inclined to think this overnight political intelligence report was. It carried coverage--usually it was one-two-three sentence synopsis--of what, say the cabinet members, if they'd been out making speeches, what they had said or done. If the speeches were carried in the paper, what emphasis was given to what they had said, as well as reporting editorial comments from papers all across the country.

P: Were there any other techniques involved that sort of kept the opposition off balance?

C: I don't think of it offhand. We were coordinating the schedules of all the cabinet members and the presidential appointees, who are permitted to make political speeches, those who can speak without violating the Hatch Act. This is the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the four or five Assistant Secretaries. Actually, it doesn't boil down to a whole lot who can get out and speak; approximately fifty at that time that we were using. And we did through the use of IBM computers try to keep track of where everybody was going and try to help them schedule their appearances and help coordinate speeches. The main purpose of this, of course, was to make sure that we didn't have nine cabinet members all appear in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at the same

time, and we were trying to make sure that the country as a whole was well covered. Just naturally there were some areas that some cabinet members were more popular than other members, and we tried to schedule these people to the points of their strength.

P: Which cabinet member was most effective?

C: I don't know. It'd be hard to say. They were all very good. This did not include Secretary McNamara. The four that were precluded were Secretary [Robert] McNamara; Secretary [Douglas] Dillon, Treasury Secretary; Nick Katzenbach, the Attorney General; Secretary [Dean] Rusk.

P: These were not included?

C: Those gentlemen did not make what you would call campaign speeches; they were not scheduled.

P: Why?

C: Well, they were in sensitive areas--the Defense Department, State Department, Treasury, Justice Department--they just should not be asked to get out and make partisan political speeches. At that moment we only had ten cabinet offices, so we used eight others. Since that time, of course, two cabinet positions have been added, Transportation and HUD.

We had this operation of the Democratic National Committee, these morning sessions, and you asked at one time who attended these meetings--Kenry O'Donnell, Chairman Bailey, Margaret Price, the vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and Louis Martin, who was in charge of our ethnic division. Mike Feldman attended most of them, Dick McGuire, me, and I believe that's about it. Oh, Bill Connell or Bob Short, usually Bob Short from the Vice President's office. Our work was on that particular phase of the campaign. Operating simultaneously with that you had the White House scheduling Mr. Johnson. They handle their own speechwriting

and all this, of course; they handled all their own. Now we, through the help of Bob Short and Gene Foley working for Mr. Humphrey, did coordinate his schedule with Mr. Johnson's schedule, and we had Mrs. Johnson's and Mrs. Humphrey's schedules to coordinate. Again, as we were talking about on cabinet members awhile ago, we got maximum benefit of their travels and eliminated as much duplication as possible.

P: Any other techniques or strategies?

C: No, to get on down to October. I'll just mention a couple of things in October. We were rolling along according to all indications in excellent shape, and we had cut back on some of our expenditures, our recommended expenditures I should say. We had the firm of Doyle, Dane and Bernbach, and I remember one particular item. They had literally thousands of billboards across the country scheduled and we were having--Dick McGuire was having a tough time paying bills as it was, and this time was deleted from their suggestion and the thinking here was we were having such a tough time with money--

P: Why?

C: These things just cost so much money, just costs so much money to pay for everything.

P: You weren't being able to, with an incumbent President running, collect substantial funds?

C: Well, they collected pretty good money, but it still was costing a considerable amount. I don't know what kind of figures we're talking about. I just know we were always short. What we were trying to weigh out at one time--and I say "we," this now boils down to Kenny O'Donnell, Dick McGuire, Bill Moyers, this group--and we were thinking about the overall campaign progress. We were all quite confident of victory and

the question was how much overkill would be involved. We had a meeting one day with the President in which Moyers advocated about a million ninety or approximately two million dollars expenditure on television spots. This was to be spent the last two or three weeks of the campaign. All of us spoke against this; however, Moyers' view prevailed with the President, and it was agreed to go ahead and do this. Of course, these TV spots, additional programs, did do a magnificent job. We did have one session on that.

P: Was this in order to build the Johnson mandate? You spoke of the overkill-- it was.

C: Well, that was our opinion, but of course when you're a candidate running for election or reelection, second place doesn't count, and it's always better in your figuring to overdo than to slightly underdo. I just think that probably the prevailing thinking there was not to take any chance of anything going awry; we had it within our grasp, if we didn't let it slip away, not to underdo everything. Now along in October also Larry O'Brien joined with us. Of course he had been busy with the Congress and various legislative matters, and at this time we assigned Larry to go out and hold regional meetings across the country to see how things were going and send back his evaluation of what the various state leaders, campaign coordinators and what have you, told him. He did a very good job in letting us know how things were going.

Dorothy, that's all I have on the campaign to the minute unless you've got some questions there.

P: I do. You indicated that there wasn't any doubt of Lyndon Johnson winning the election; was there anticipation of how large he would win it as he did?

C: The predictions that came in from our state coordinators were pretty close to what the eventual results were. Going back to my regional coordinator

system that I'd mentioned to you, down to the state coordinator system, I put up a prize of a suit of clothes to the state coordinator who could best guess, or would come the closest to the percentage that his state would end up, and this little contest generated much interest and enthusiasm. We had wonderful participation on it. The state coordinator from Minnesota picked the figure of 64 percent, and I think Minnesota was 63.9 or 64.1; he missed it one tenth of a point.

P: Who was that?

C: State senator out there, Nick something. Of course, Senator Fritz (Walter F.) Mondale--Senator now, he was the Attorney General then--was working very closely with Nick, his last name slips my mind at this second. But we had five state coordinators who were within one percentage point from what their state came out. A couple of the Southern states thought they possibly were going to win, a couple of them we lost, but other than that all the states came out very close to the percentage point that their state coordinators had guessed.

P: Were you under any pressure to "win it big" and carry a lot of Democratic candidates with you with the idea of passing a lot of the legislation that Johnson wanted to--

C: No, I never did feel any pressure along this line. I'd say we were not unmindful that if Mr. Johnson won big and large it would be a good, clear mandate on the one hand and additionally bring in marginal senators and congressmen with us, which as you recall it did bring in forty-six congressmen--forty-six freshman congressmen elected.

P: Were there any problems along the lines of these Democratic marginal candidates that come to mind?

C: No, we set out the next year to work with them, which I'm going to tell you about in just a minute.

P: What do you consider was the key factor or major undoing of Goldwater?

C: I think it was a combination of factors; I think the American people were very pleased with the way Mr. Johnson had taken hold and was running the country, and he was enjoying a very fine image and reputation and feeling among the people, that he was a strong man doing a very good job. Conversely you had Senator Goldwater saying that he wanted to do away with the TVA and Social Security and you might as well take the New England states and saw them off and shove them out in the Atlantic Ocean and spending the next three days explaining what he really said, and his talk of the atomic bomb, and just a combination of these things as I recall. In fact it got to a point where nearly anything he said he was sticking his foot in his mouth, just all these factors.

P: What were your views of Chairman Bailey?

C: Well, Dorothy, I set forth part of that the other day. The chairman is a very able, astute politician. He's been state chairman in Connecticut for something in excess of twenty years. Over that period of time he had come to know all the top politicians across the country, had been to many conventions, many conferences with him, very able man like I mentioned the other day. He has a very lucrative law practice in Hartford, and he had been left considerable monies. At his age I don't think he was particularly interested in worrying about day-to-day details of operation. He was--I'll say this--he was very loyal to Mr. Johnson; he was put there by President Kennedy, but never to this day see or hear or heard of anything that he had ever done that was contrary to total loyalty to Mr. Johnson.

P: Were there any pockets of resistance in the Democratic Party? Not necessarily only to the candidate but his position, platform on the major issues of the day?

C: No, not that I can recall. I think everybody just joined in. I don't recall any serious problems--any problems that we had.

P: If you have no other comments on the actual election, I would like to continue on to your activities and responsibilities in the Democratic National Committee from '64 to '66.

C: Let me just say this. On election night, of course Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Johnson and the group were down in Austin, and we--Dick McGuire and I--had sat up at the Democratic National Headquarters and we'd get reports in. We had our regional coordinators there and the reports would come from all the fifty states. We had--this is very similar to the '60 election I was telling you about--we had a very elaborate setup--arrangements--on getting reports in, but it turned out television was getting it in much faster than we were, finally just abandoned our efforts at being futile. We were in contact, but I did not talk to Mr. Johnson this time, we were in contact with the suite down in Austin; I believe the Jim Hogg suite was used for this celebration and awaiting the returns and we were in constant contact there, but by nine or ten o'clock that night it was all over and we ceased our state-by-state operation.

P: Was there any extra effort exerted in Texas for fear that Mr. Johnson might lose his own state?

C: Well, I don't think any extra effort, over and above the fact just intense pride and the desire to see he did carry Texas.

P: There was speculation that he might not.

C: Dorothy, I didn't read that--I wasn't aware of it. I never did worry about it. On that election, I say about ten o'clock Dick McGuire and I signed off with the Austin group and were going over to the Mayflower Hotel to join a celebration there, and we first went by George Washington Hospital

and visited Walter Jenkins and spent about thirty minutes with him, then on to the Mayflower. But we felt Walter had had so much in helping everybody get organized and doing everything we wanted to visit with him first.

P: Mr. Carter, how long have you known Walter Jenkins?

C: I first met Walter when we were both attending The University of Texas, 1938--and I've known him ever since then, worked with him over a period of years when I worked as a volunteer; I worked immediately under him when I was on Mr. Johnson's staff.

P: Did the unfortunate incident in connection with Mr. Jenkins have any reaction during the campaign in regard to a compromise of security?

C: Well, this was a point Mr. Goldwater tried to make, but the American people didn't buy that, and I don't think it influenced a half-dozen votes, because everyone had read or knew of Walter's great loyalty to Mr. Johnson, and he's such a great citizen that I think people realized this. They knew--I mean they felt that there was no breach of security, and of course as you recall Mr. Johnson had the FBI check this and report back to him and check everybody else in the campaign, on the staff, everybody connected.

P: Was there any effort to keep this from being reported in the newspapers?

C: I don't know, Dorothy. I have read some speculation in the papers, but I know nothing about that.

P: To what did you attribute this happening to Mr. Jenkins?

C: Dorothy, I don't know. Of course I don't know what happened. I know what I read in the papers, but I know that the man was working from eighteen to twenty hours a day and carrying more burdens than any five or six of the rest of us were doing. I just know that he must have been a very tired--had to have been tired--very tired man.

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P: Do you think what you read in the papers describing the event was true?

C: I don't know. He's been my friend, and I certainly give him the benefit of any doubt on anything.

P: To continue with election night, do you recall any other events that happened or what had taken place?

C: Well, just one other thing. I joined my wife and we stayed a short time at the Mayflower and then went on home and continued to watch election results. About two o'clock in the morning, Mr. Johnson called and thanked me for my part in helping on the convention--I mean the campaign--and this points up another one of his outstanding traits, Dorothy, of never forgetting little details like this. With all the things he had on his mind he could have better spent his time, no doubt, calling somebody else or doing something else, but he was thoughtful enough to call and thank me and he and Mrs. Johnson are both most thoughtful.

We had a situation happen the next year where my wife's father died and Mrs. Johnson--this was October 3, 1965, the day Mrs. Johnson had been to New York to meet the Pope, and as quickly as they got back from New York Mrs. Johnson called Mary Jane in Kerrville, Texas, and talked to her twenty minutes expressing her sympathy over the death of Mary Jane's daddy. What I'm saying is it epitomizes very great feelings for those who work with them.

And I'll go back to the campaign for just a second--along in October, I had a terrible back problem. I got to where I could hardly walk, and Mrs. Johnson learned of this--this was the fifteenth or sixteenth of October. She called me from Texas and said she was sending Dr. Janet Travell to check me over, and Dr. Travell had me come to the White House every morning for the rest of the campaign where she worked on my back

and got me back to walking without a limp and got me where I could work. At the hospital they wanted to put me in traction, and I told them I wouldn't do that. I mention these little instances just to show--and there are many more I could tell you--and I know they've done this for all their staff members. This is one of the additional reasons that none of the staff members have been concerned about working extra hours, rather just try to get a good job done for those that care about you.

P: Do you remember any anecdotes of something that struck you funny or unusual during the campaign or election night?

C: No, not really, not anything that relates to these items.

P: Then I'd like to go on to your activities in the Democratic National Committee from '64 to '66 when you did leave the Committee. Could you tell me briefly what your responsibilities were.

C: Several factors here, several items. One, we had to go through a cutting down of the Committee; during the campaign we built up to where we had over four hundred people working there, and we had--well, I had the personnel director draw up a readjustment plan to take effect immediately after the election, had him draw that up in September by October what we would be cutting back to. So during the months of November and December, we did have those readjustments to make at the Committee. Now working with these forty-six new congressmen, I believe there were five or six new senators; December 9, 1964, we had a special conference back in Washington and we sent round-trip airplane tickets to all these people--congressmen, senators--asking them to come in and we had a day-long session orientating them to Washington, many things to do with the Congress. We ended up meeting with Vice President-elect Humphrey that evening, but we had books prepared for them--back up a second--we had spent the last three weeks of October, our

staff had, of visiting with the top people on the Hill--Speaker McCormack, Congressman Boggs, different ones--this loose-leaf book that we presented each newly-elected member with, had the equivalent of about ten to twelve years experience in that book if they would just follow suggestions made. What we were trying to do is help them to hit the road running on--they started right off. A number of these men had never been to Washington; this was their first trip to Washington.

P: Was this a new approach. I don't recall hearing any other Presidential--

C: I don't recall it ever having been done by the Democrats before, but--

P: In your opinion has it proved to be effective?

C: Well, that and then our follow-up. we had--this was the first step in a series of programs that we developed for these congressmen and senators. We had in this book--well, it was very much detailed--any kind of problem that they had come up we had listed the person and the telephone number to call, sample letters on how to respond to constituents and in case all else failed, call the Committee and we'd advise with them; and also in January, mid-January, we had a session set up for the wives of the new congressmen. We had Mrs. Johnson, Mrs. Humphrey, Margaret Price, the wives of Carl Albert and others passing on little helpful hints to the wives of these freshman congressmen; what events to expect and ways they could be of help to their husband in getting reelected. As a matter of fact, go back to the December 9 meeting, I opened that session with about a thirty-second talk saying, "This is December 9, 1964, but what we're talking about right now is 1966; you've got to start thinking about 1966 right now. That's the whole purpose and point of this meeting."

During the spring of '65 we used to have meetings every Thursday morning starting at eight o'clock and would spend twenty minutes individually

with each of these Congressmen. We scheduled and would have them come in and would review the progress they were making, the projects in their districts, find out what they were interested in, and we had speechwriters who would help them write speeches if necessary, would help them write their weekly newsletter back home, would help them with film clips for television. We installed another new service there where anytime a Congressman or Senator were to make a release to his home town radio, he'd pick up the phone and call the Democratic National Committee where it was recorded and then we in turn would call all the radio stations in his district and give them this recording. We did the same thing for the press releases. We had telegraphic connections with newspapers across the country where Senators or Congressmen would send a press release, and we'd put it on telegraph and send it direct into the newspaper office. We also developed our computer system more than we previously used. At no charge to these congressmen we fixed tapes for their mailing lists; many of them had 100,000 to 150,000 names on their mailing list. They would write their newsletter, send their envelopes down to the National Committee, and we'd run it through the computer and have all these addressed for them. And we were processing many thousands of pieces of mail for these Congressmen. This was during the year of '65, trying to get them off strong with their constituents back home to where they could be reelected.

P: Who is considered the shining light, or the most potential Congressman that came in with this group of forty-six?

C: That's hard to say. I suppose that Lee Hamilton from Indiana was probably one of the guiding lights--very tops--but there were a number of other good ones. Lee was reelected quite easily in '66; many of these others failed in reelection in '66.

P: Were you still with the Committee for that '66 election?

C: No. In '65--just following up '65, we had felt like this was the main effort that the Committee ought to make, and I say "we"--I'm speaking of Dick McGuire and myself--and through the year of '65 Dick continued as Treasurer and I was serving as his Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee, and we felt like we had a successful year. Dick resigned in December of '65, and Arthur Krimm took over as Financial Director of the Democratic Committee. I had the title of Acting Treasurer only because someone had to sign checks.

P: Were you involved in fund raising at this time, or is there much done between elections?

C: Oh, there's always fund raising, but Arthur Krimm actually took over the supervision of fund raising, but McGuire served through December 31, 1965, and starting '66 Arthur Krimm was the financial--he didn't want to be elected Treasurer--he took the title of Financial Chairman. Of course during '66 we continued to work with these congressmen. You could detect some of them were beginning to show a little independence or not necessarily wanting to cooperate with the Committee. In '65 they were all for it with anything which they could learn or get, but after they'd been here a little bit they weren't quite as cooperative. You'd just feel this in the different conferences. Then came July; I had asked--see, I had a resignation pending at all times--I had asked several times, I mentioned before, to be relieved and late July of '66 I had a conference one day with the President and Marvin Watson, and it was agreed that my resignation would be accepted as quickly as we could find someone to recommend to take my place, or to work over at the Committee. And so my resignation was accepted as of the thirty-first of August of 1966, and I left to go back into private business and open my own business.

P: Did you want to resign?

C: Dorothy, I've got a wife and five children. I'm not exactly a youngster anymore, and if I was ever going to be able to possess any worldly goods, it was time for me to move. Additionally, a person should not try to make a career out of serving any national political party. Service there I'm convinced needs to be on a transitory basis. I'd spent two and a half years there, and although it had been most enjoyable, it was time for me to move on.

P: Why do you think it should be on a transitory basis?

C: Well, you need constantly new blood, new ideas; you get in a rut, and you just--it's just not a place for a person to make a career, but out of the approximate thirty years--nearly thirty years--since I first met Mr. Johnson, and I say to you, it's been a great source of pleasure to me having had the opportunity to work with him and around him and to have been associated with him. I'm very pleased over it, proud of the fact that I got the opportunity, and through political work like this you learn a lot you wouldn't have learned otherwise, but you also have the opportunity to meet some of the greatest people that you'll ever know in your life and affords you many opportunities that otherwise would have been missed.

P: Do any events strongly stand out in your mind during your tenure with the Democratic National Committee?

C: No. I just think that I suppose the greatest enjoyment was getting the '64 campaign organized and see everything work so well and for Mr. Johnson to be elected as well as he was by the greatest figure any President has ever been elected, and a thing like this, if you could have had just a little hand in some part of it, you can't help but feel a little bit good about it.

P: Mr. Carter, have you seen the President recently?

C: Yes, Dorothy, I saw him last month, September.

P: What was the occasion?

C: Just purely a personal visit. My youngest daughter about the last two years has been giving me a fit to get to see the President personally. She said, "I've seen him on television, seen his pictures," and she's eight years old now and she wanted to go to his office, so we went over and had a visit with the President. We spent approximately forty minutes together just visiting.

P: Did you have any suspicion that Lyndon Johnson would decline a second term as he did on March 31 of this year?

C: Dorothy, I wouldn't say I had a suspicion, and I must add quickly that I didn't know anything that this was going to be in his speech, but I guess it's one of those things you feel after a long-time association. At five o'clock on the afternoon of the March 31 speech, I was sitting with my wife and we were speculating on what might be covered in his speech that night, and I wrote three topics down, the third of which was announcing that he was not going to be a candidate for reelection. My wife didn't believe me then, and she sat crying in total disbelief when he stated it that night.

P: Why did you think that he might not run?

C: I don't know that I can really tell you why, Dorothy. I just--through the early months of this year I catch myself like you with a friend, you put yourself in his position, you get a terrible war to try to settle and win, and you get peaceniks giving you a fit on the other hand, and people that had been beneficiaries of many of the things that you, as President, had done for them that were now raising cane about this or that and putting

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myself in his position I used to meet myself just coming back where a number of times I thought there's no way out except just not run for reelection.

(End of Tape 5)

INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON C. CARTER (Tape #6)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

Wednesday, October 30, 1968, 3:15 P.M.

P: Mr. Carter, there have been several things written regarding the Johnson treatment of his staff men. Is Mr. Johnson a hard man to work for?

C: Dorothy, a part of it goes back to, in my mind, what we--I think I mentioned the first day we talked that I classify him as a perfectionist. He wants the very best done by himself and all those associated with him, and he does get the very best out of you--the very best you can do, whatever your individual limited capacity may be. He does inspire and expect the best from you. It used to be my feeling that none of us were ever as good or as bad as he told us we were at times. It's something you learn over a period of time in working with him.

P: Did you ever incur his wrath when you failed to meet his standards?

C: There were times when he wasn't happy over something that I did. Particularly when you're in the learning stage, you make a number of mistakes. But also he was very tolerant at other times when things went awry or didn't work out just exactly as they should have.

P: Did these occasions occur in a public dressing down?

C: No, I don't recall having ever received any such public dressing down. In fact, any time things didn't go exactly right it was more a case of constructive criticism, and this would be stated to you in front of other staff members or what have you, or it would be stated to other staff members in front of you. But actually each of these times you learned something so as not to do it again, not to have that same thing happen again.

P: There has been a considerably large turnover in Mr. Johnson's staff men.
To what would you attribute this?

C: Where do you mean--a large turnover?

P: In his close staff.

C: You're talking about at the White House. Let's go back a second to the twenty-four years before that. You have people still there now that were with him for that twenty-four years. With the exception of Walter Jenkins. You've got Mildred Stegall and Juanita Roberts. But these that you're talking about, I presume, left during the days of the White House. Dorothy, you work under a tremendous amount of pressure just by virtue of the job, and what people need to do is--they just need to move on because the very nature of the job, even when you've worked eighteen-twenty hours a day, six-seven days a week, you still go home worried that you've left things undone that will affect the lives of many people, or the welfare, or well-being, and all of these people have families. You get to a point where you worry about have you ignored your children in growing up; have you not done many of the things that you should have done as a father or husband; and you spend many hours wondering where the balance is between public service and your obligations as a parent-father-husband.

P: Would you comment on Mr. Johnson's relations with his staff and their service to him, such as in the case of Reedy and Valenti and Moyers?

C: Well, all of them--those that you mentioned and others that have served there with him--have been very capable, very qualified people and have rendered outstanding services to Mr. Johnson. He has always had his own way of compensating and thanking and showing his areas of appreciation. I doubt that anyone alive has more compassion and more appreciation and more gratefulness than Mr. Johnson does, and I include Mrs. Johnson with that, for services rendered.

P: Have any frictions developed between his staff over a close work relationship with him?

G: Not that I know of, Dorothy.

P: It's said at this point in time that Mr. Johnson is an unpopular President, and there's a great furor over the credibility gap. How has this happened?

G: Dorothy, I don't know that I'm qualified or capable to answer the questions on the credibility gap. I read this, and I'm not sure frankly that I know what they're talking about part of the time. But just an observation here that'll be a partial response to your question. I think the advent of more television news coverage has changed politics as we have known it. I think it has changed our every day life as we've known it. I read the other day in a column, I think Marquis Childs' column, and I'm inclined to agree with this, that many of your TV producers are people who've been trained in the entertainment business and not necessarily in the news business, and as they flip from one camera to the other, they're looking more for something that's going to be spicy and try to make news rather than objectively report the news, as one who has been thoroughly trained in journalism and as newspapers normally do. I think that, again, as we--this is an overall observation--again as we have become a more affluent society, and each day we are doing better, everybody's doing better and of course this is what we want. People are making more money, working less hours, having more disposable cash to buy the third automobile and the boat and the trailer and extra television set, and these things, to where there is more leisure time, more time spent at the beaches or at the lake. As a result of this, I don't believe that people are reading books, magazines, and newspapers as much as conceivably they used to, and they're

relying more on television as their quick capsule information. When you end up having views, as you and I have seen, that have been staged for a television film, and when you have these shots from the war as almost you were sitting right there, I think all of this has tended to make this a very unpopular war. And I think all of this--I think Mr. Johnson has been the unfortunate victim of this.

P: Would you attribute this unpopularity to the issues, to his personality, or to the fact of his being a President from the South?

C: I wouldn't attribute it to any one of the three. I think it's strictly that he's President at the time a very unpopular war is being conducted. I have traveled around the country and in my talks with governors and senators and local political leaders over the last year-and-a-half or so, this is the first thing that comes up every time.

P: Looking back now, how would you characterize the early Johnson of the Senate days?

C: Well, I don't think really the Senate days were any different than his days in Congress. That twenty-four year period he was a very hard-working man who worked; he helped many people over that period of time, other Congressmen, Senators; he had a very able, hard-working, capable staff that supported him and backed him up. The big thing--he did his homework well. He burned a lot of midnight oil. A lot of times when others were sleeping, he was working trying to anticipate what the problems of tomorrow would be, where he could take action rather than react after something was already done. It was just a case of a natural born leader bouncing to the top like the cork does.

P: Over his career, do you think he sacrificed any of his own principles for the consensus opinion, say, going from liberal to conservative or

to liberal, or middle-of-the road?

C: No. Dorothy, those terms--that categorization is largely done by writers and it depends on what particular item you're talking about. And I'm talking about politics generally now. You can have a man that's quite liberal on civil rights that would be considered conservative on fiscal matters or others. And it just depends on how someone wants to write them up, or how it's depicted. I think that the environment, the background from which Mr. Johnson came, predicted--could have been predicted thirty or forty years ago exactly what course he would take when doing the greatest amount for the greatest number of people. He has tried to be a Congressman, a Senator, a Vice President, President, for all the people, and you have to take into account that there are plant owners as well as the laboring people and vice versa, that there are those of the various ethnic and minority groups and that their rights have to be looked after, at the same time not taking away rights of others. I think that when the history of his Administration is written that his many great accomplishments will point out just what I'm saying.

P: Do you see any similarities between the earliest Johnson that you knew and President Johnson? This making a break in between all of your long association with him--thinking back to your earliest recollection and as you see him today.

C: Yes, I do. I think there has been pretty much a heavy thread of continuity right straight through from the opening day you talk about to today. Of course, President Roosevelt was one of his great idols. As you recall, in 1937 he ran on a Roosevelt platform; he was the only one that was all for Roosevelt. And many of the programs that he has supported and many of the programs that he sponsored as President have been populace programs. I

believe in his first session of Congress he and only one other Texan voted for the first minimum pay scale; it was 25¢ an hour at that time. I think he was the only one that survived it, as I recall. But none of the other Texans even voted for 25¢ an hour minimum pay wage.

P: Mr. Carter, do you have any further comments on Lyndon Johnson and his career, or any events that we have covered over these numerous tapes?

C: No, I think we've about covered it, Dorothy. Let me compliment you on the very fine job you've done, and your patience. I know that I've rambled a good little bit here and have gone the field conceivably in trying to get to part of this, but it has been a pleasure getting to work with you, and I think I've said about everything I can. I live in the firm belief that the historians will greatly record and well accord much to Mr. Johnson and this Administration.

P: Thank you, Mr. Carter.

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INTERVIEWEE: CLIFTON C. CARTER (Tape #7)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE MC SWEENY

Tuesday, March 25, 1969, 3:15 P.M.

M: This is a continuation of the interview with Clifton Carter. We are in his offices on Connecticut Avenue. Today is Tuesday, March 25, 1969.

Mr. Carter, we've had a gap of several months between our last interview and this one. I know that after we had concluded the last one, you mentioned that you had forgotten about telling about the Australian trip in 1966. This was in October of '66, and it was one of the first Presidential trips that Mr. Johnson made; it was an extensive trip, some seventeen days and many, many thousands of miles. I'd like to just sort of ask you generally what your capacity was and what the problems were of a Presidential trip, and what events happened and what significant highlights of events come to mind.

C: Thank you, Dorothy, it's good to get to visit with you again. Before I get off into the Australian trip--I, of course, have thought about our previous recording sessions. One of the things that I think that my wife and I get a big kick out of over the period of time that the Johnsons were in the White House--we were fortunate enough several different times that Mrs. Johnson would call on Sunday and say, "Won't you-all come over this evening and take potluck with us to have dinner?" I always got a chuckle out of having potluck dinner at the White House. Of course, it was always a very delicious bill of fare that we had, and usually these were small groups of three or four couples that the President and Mrs. Johnson apparently just wanted to visit with on a personal basis. They were most

enjoyable evenings. There were times on these that we would break up into groups and do some swimming, and others would go bowling over at the Executive Office Building. But these were always very delightful occasions.

When you and I last talked, I had just left the Democratic National Committee. This was September of '66. Spent about a month trying to get started in my own business, trying to chart my own course. And I get the call along in early October from Marvin Watson at about six o'clock one evening, telling me that this trip was forthcoming and they wanted me to go along. I had just made a couple of contingent business deals that I had sizeable fees riding on, and I told Marvin that I just would love to go, but that I just couldn't go because of personal hardship involved. I could well lose both of these contracts. Marvin said, "Well, I understand that."

So, I went on home and about three hours later, about nine o'clock, I get a call from the White House--Mr. Johnson. He said, "I understand you told Marvin you couldn't go on this trip." At this time we were talking about a Southeast Asia trip; we weren't talking specifics. And I enumerated the things to the President just as I had to Marvin. And he said, "Well, all that's fine; you just be over at the Health Department at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon to get shots and be prepared to leave at six." So it ended up I worked out my schedule accordingly. Did get the shots and did leave at six o'clock that afternoon. This was on what could be termed an advance plane, Dorothy; it was actually what also is known as Air Force Two or a backup plane to the President. It was a 707 jet that had four sleeping bunks in it that made down. It was very similar to Air Force One; it did not have all the electronic radio equipment--not as complete as Air Force One, but it was a very close duplicate. And Bill Moyers was the one in charge of this overall plane.

We flew from Washington to Los Angeles, stopped there to refuel and pick up Lloyd Hand and Warren Woodward; then flew on to Honolulu where about half of our group were unloaded and they caught a plane going on direct to Manila. We talked about the Southeast Asia trip; as you will recall, this was to be finalized at Manila in a meeting of the SEATO countries--the Presidents of all the SEATO countries--to be hosted by President Marcos of the Philippines. So a number of our people went on direct to Manila and went on to the other countries, whereas the main plane went on to New Zealand, stopping at Pago-Pago overnight--not overnight, for a refueling. We stopped in Pago-Pago for refueling and left two men there, went on to New Zealand, and this is where we had our first rest on this trip. We had been flying continuously since we left Washington. We stayed about twenty hours in New Zealand. By this time, everyone's metabolism was getting well mixed up because of the time factors. We had gone through a night and day, and did sleep--I slept very well. We landed at a New Zealand air force base, and stayed there. While we were there, Moyers and Warren Woodward--Woodward was assigned to New Zealand to handle the visit to New Zealand; and Marta Ross handled Mrs. Johnson's affairs--handled the scheduling for Mrs. Johnson.

They flew on into Auckland while we stayed at the base. Actually, there's no airport in New Zealand to handle a 707 except where we had landed, I said Auckland, I believe it was Wellington, I'm sorry. Then we flew from there on to Australia, and I was placed in charge of the visit to Australia by Mr. Johnson.

On this thirteen-stop Southeastern Asia tour, five of those stops were in Australia--five of the thirteen were in Australia. Our American Ambassador to Australia was Ed Clark from Austin who I had served a year

in the Army with. I stayed at the American Embassy the first night we were there and ended up moving on to--this was at Canberra--ended up moving on to a downtown hotel because I was working daily with people out of the Prime Minister's office, working out all the arrangements for the visit, very detailed plan.

You asked in your opening question about some of the preparations and details. Well, it becomes a very complicated massive operation as you go to move a President around the country, or the world like we were in this particular instance. We had people from the Air Force; we had people from the Secret Service; we had people from the FBI; we had people from Central Intelligence; we had every communication--the Signal Corps; just all these groups. Basically, with my job as being in charge of the Australian visit, theoretically I was in charge of all these people on coordinating their activities as to who did what and where. Of course, they all knew their own business; I don't mean I was telling them their business. But we had an Air Force Colonel and his main job was to check the fuel that would eventually go into the President's plane, and make all security preparations, things like this. And, again, I'm saying that my job was more of a coordinator than supervisor, because the Signal Corps knows where they need to hook up their switchboards, and all these things, which they did. Within twenty-four hours after we got there, I had a telephone in my hotel room that I could pick up and immediately get the White House switchboard; I was back in touch within twenty-four hours. And the only problem we had was keeping the time straight. We were fourteen hours ahead of Washington on time, and just had to keep this business straight.

But what we did, Dorothy, the Prime Minister assigned his top protocol

man to work with me. We used to have about four meetings a day. And we got to Australia about two weeks in advance of Mr. Johnson's visit, so for two weeks I was in constant contact with the Chief of Protocol and his staff.

M: What was his name?

[J. H. (Jim) SCHOLTENS]

C: His first name was Jim. I know it well, and I'll think of it in a second.

But from Washington I had George Gallagher, who is an attorney in Washington, with me that I assigned to handle the visit to Melbourne. I had Gene Foley that was a former Assistant Secretary of Commerce who I assigned to Sydney, Australia. I kept Joe Bailey Swanner in Canberra to work with me. I had John Gonella at Brisbane, and I ended up with Chuck Lipson in Townsville. I say, ended up with Chuck--Chuck could handle the visit at Pago-Pago and as he arrived with the President, on the day they arrived in Canberra, I immediately dispatched him to the other side of the field to catch a commercial flight to get right on up to Townsville. Townsville is about 1500 miles north of Canberra.

Going back on this, Melbourne and Sydney are both towns of a little over 2,000,000. They are very competitive; they are very much like Fort Worth and Dallas have always been, Dorothy, in Texas. In working out the schedules, we had to make sure that what we did in one area we spent a like amount of time in the other area. We had worked this schedule out at one point that got corrected right quickly, because they said the people in Sydney would resent this. But with the gentleman from the Prime Minister's office, I went to Melbourne, and we went over everything--every detail of where it would be best for the President to go; what route to take into town; and where to visit; what to do; where to go.

And as you'll recall, back during World War II, Mr. Johnson served down

in Australia. There was a lady that was very generous to many of the soldiers, quite wealthy lady, that made her home available almost like she was running her own U.S.O. And one of them that she was kind to was Mr. Johnson back at that time. This was Dame Mabel Brooks. Of course, Dame Brooks and her husband were up into their eighties when we were down there, but I went out and visited with Dame Brooks and we set up a personal visit to where Mr. Johnson could go by and visit with the Brooks. I used this as a chance for him to change clothes and freshen up before he went on to the governor's house. We had an excellent visit there--everything went fine.

I'm getting out of order on my conversation here. Let me say this. I did go to Sydney; I did go to Brisbane; I did go to Townsville, and check all these out. And I want to stop and talk about Townsville for a second. Townsville was to be the last stop, to refuel, and this was on a Sunday morning. Anyway, it's a two-hour time operation in refueling these planes, getting everything, because you had the press planes, you had these two big 707 press planes, and you had a backup plane. There were four planes in this group. So what we did--we decided that Mr. Johnson ought to go to church that morning, it being Sunday morning. So, the Prime Minister's assistant--we went in and we picked out the church that we decided it would be best for him to go to. And we went in and talked to this minister and told him the time factors and just wondered if he would like to have the Prime Minister of Australia and the President of the United States in his congregation that morning. And he said he would be delighted. And we said, "Well, you have exactly eight minutes to greet them at the steps of your church, preach a sermon, sing a song, and tell them goodbye at the door as they're leaving." And he said, "Well, I can do this; this is no problem."

One of the newspaper people along said, "You may have revolutionized complete church-going by having a eight-minute service here." It all went just exactly like that.

Dorothy, let me go back to some of the little problems that we encountered. One of them is on the protocol of who's going to ride in what car, and where. How many cars there are going to be in the caravan. I said awhile ago that we met four times a day; these were the little sticky problems that we were working on.

They've got very stringent health laws in Australia on any flora or fauna, the various things--perishable foods coming into the country. They've never had any kind of epidemic or anything in Australia of flora or fauna, and they enforce these rules very strictly. One day we were sitting there talking at lunch on the proposed trip; on how the planes would arrive, and the unloading and the different things; and one of them suddenly reminded us of the Australian health laws, that these planes would have to be sealed and boarded and held on the ground for forty-five minutes to an hour after they landed. Well, there were a couple of things wrong with this. One, they were going to get in just about dark, and we wanted some of the daylight for Mr. Johnson to make his appearance--this is at Canberra I'm talking about. Secondly, I knew that neither Mr. Johnson nor the newspaper people in the other two airplanes were going to be content to sit on the ground for forty-five minutes while health inspectors sprayed the plane and took all the perishable food into tow. So, we spent about two days worrying over this and finally worked out a compromise where they would send health inspectors to New Zealand, which was the stop just before Australia, and they would fly back with--they exempted Air Force One. But they went on the two press planes and the backup Presidential plane. And

they sprayed the plane en route and confiscated all the perishable foods and checked everybody's immunization record. All this was done in flight from New Zealand back to Australia.

Making preparations at the hotel for the Presidential party, we got all that well under control. We had to have one room, Dorothy, for Presidential gifts that had to go along on this trip, because he has to be prepared at all times. He never knows when a governor, or a prime minister, or someone is going to surprise him with a gift, and he has always got to be able to reciprocate quickly. On a trip this long and with as many people as he would be seeing, we had one complete room full of gifts.

But he landed in Canberra there. We had a very good turnout. They first had been on the radio that morning, and television, saying that the public would not be allowed on this air force base; then it rained that afternoon, and then the Royal Australian Air Force changed their minds and came back and said the public would be invited. And I would guess we had maybe 10,000 out there. Canberra is a town of 90,000. And then people had lined the roads as he was going on into town. And we went to the Prime Minister's home, and ended up getting on to the hotel. The next day he spoke to the Australian Congress; they had a special luncheon for him, and he spoke to a joint session. Prior to the luncheon, he met with the Australian Cabinet--the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

We left and went down to Melbourne and had just a fantastic reception there. The papers estimated over 2,000,000 people turned out. The airport where we landed, I would guess it was fifteen to twenty miles out from town, and people were lined all along the way. When we got in what you'd call downtown Melbourne, it was almost impossible to take the cars down

the middle of the street; the streets were lined out in the middle of the streets back to the stores, with confetti and all. They had many little miniature American flags along with signs that had been printed. Some of this was developed in cooperation with the Australian American Society, which is very active in each of these major cities.

Now, back visiting with the Chief of Protocol, the Prime Minister's man, I had asked a question about how he thought the people would respond, what kind of reception Mr. Johnson could expect. And he said, "Well, you know, we're very reserved, and there will be very little applauding, be very little acts of spontaneity and welcome, these things. When the Queen was here a couple of years ago, there was no applauding. In fact, according to the custom, many people turned their heads away, so as not to embarrass the Queen by looking at her." But this was all out the window, because they gave him a tumultuous welcome. A number of our cars had to be abandoned for overheating. We had to go so slowly that the car just overheated.

But Mr. Johnson went to Dame Mabel Brooks and had a very nice relaxing session there; and it was when we were leaving there, Dorothy, that two little boys about sixteen years old jumped out of the crowd and threw a couple of plastic bags of paint at the car. They partially hit the car; the main thing they did was splash and hit two of these Secret Service agents that were riding in the back of the car. They each got just covered with the paint.

We went on from there to the castle which was not far away, Government House I think they call it. There were a group of about twelve hundred of the top people in Melbourne that were there for a reception and visit.

Then we left there to fly back to Canberra that evening. This is

getting along seven or eight o'clock at night now. And all the way to the airport at various intersections, there were big crowds waiting to greet Mr. Johnson. And he stopped nine times on the way to the airport to speak to these groups, to tell them of the American friendship for the Australians, and what a great feeling he personally held for Australia because he had served there.

And we got on back into Canberra that night, and flew up to Sydney the next day. Along with this, Mrs. Johnson--A lot of the time when Mr. Johnson was speaking or visiting with the Cabinet, Mrs. Johnson was on a little tree-planting trip of her own. Canberra is a very beautiful city. It was laid out by an American--a fellow from Chicago designed Canberra at the end of World War II. I believe it was 5,000 population, and it has grown now to 90,000, as I mentioned while ago. They've got man-made lakes there. It's a very beautiful city. And Mrs. Johnson planted a tree as a gift from the American government in one of the real prominent places.

But we went up to Melbourne, and Mr. Johnson, the Prime Minister, and the Governor of New South Wales went on a launch--they had lunch out in the Bay of Sydney. Sydney's a beautiful city; it reminds you very much of San Francisco. And they spent a couple of hours out chatting and touring the bay. They've got a big new opera house that's just--many people have laughed at it and bragged on it and done everything. It's the butt of many jokes, but it appears to be a very beautiful place.

They say that the Governor of New South Wales had issued a statement a week before Mr. Johnson got there that the government would pay for the rail fare of every child in New South Wales to come into Sydney on this day to see the President of the United States, and he had been criticized by some of the members of the legislature about wasting the State's money.

But he said, "It's not very often that you have the President of the United States come to New South Wales, and it's a very historic occasion, and I'd like for them all to see it." So he provided this rail transportation and bus transportation for all the school children in New South Wales that wanted to come in.

We left the dockside right after the luncheon and went over to a big art museum, where they had about twelve hundred of the top people in Sydney assembled for the President to be presented by the Prime Minister. Of course, Ambassador Edward Clark and his wife were right along with Mr. and Mrs. Johnson. And as we went back into a little rest area at the art museum, Ambassador Clark suddenly realized he had split the seat out of his pants, and his wife was all upset about this. And she asked me to see if I could find a needle and some thread. I went outside of the museum, and I was able to find a needle and thread. But the Ambassador refused to let her repair his pants at this time. About this time, it was time for us to go out and the President to be presented and to speak, and the Ambassador was to take his place. The speech all went well and was well received, and Mr. Johnson mixed around and mingled with some, shook hands when it was over. And Ambassador Clark was holding his hat behind him to cover up the rip in his pants, usually with his right hand, and people would come up and shake hands with him, and he'd have to switch hands in which he was holding his hat. It ended up he flew back to Canberra; he had radioed ahead of time and had one of his people bring him a new pair of pants out before we went on. He changed on the plane.

But we had a near bad incident when we were at this art museum. It turned that maybe our planning wasn't as good as it should have been. The art museum had been selected because it was the only place that had adequate

room of the type that we needed. The fact that we didn't take into account was it was located in a cul-de-sac to where you were just--could be bottled off down there very easily and quickly. And there were the antiwar demonstrators who moved in--several hundred of them moved in while Mr. Johnson was in speaking. And it looked like they could well have had us pinned off down there to where we couldn't get out. But the police did move ahead and clear this area out and get us out of there, but there was a lot of hollering and ended up near civil war between the loyalist Australians and these antiwar people. As a matter of fact, after we got away from there, we had some people who tried to get out in front of the cars. I had one elderly lady that ran right in front of my car and begged the fellow to run over her, while we waited just a minute and a policeman grabbed her and jerked her out of the way. But we did encounter that little bit of that in Sydney.

M: Had you had much of a report on demonstrations?

C: Yes, we knew--the CIA, Secret Service, we had reports. In fact, at one point we changed--and this was back at Melbourne--we changed our route because of reports that we had. They were at a corner where they could cause trouble, and we ended up just bypassing that corner.

Dorothy, that night we flew back to Canberra, then went out to a place--they called it a cattle station, but it's a place very similar in looks and operation to the LBJ Ranch. And the gentleman there--actually, Ambassador Clark had arranged this. He knew these people well. We had the equivalent of a big Texas barbecue; they had a great number of the people from the Canberra area out and had a very delightful evening. In fact, Mr. Johnson switched to his ranch clothes that he wears at the LBJ Ranch, and wore this while we were attending the barbecue.

In moving on up, we went on up to Brisbane. And he stayed at the hotel where General MacArthur had--in fact, he occupied the suite that General MacArthur had occupied in his later days of commanding from Australia there. Brisbane is a town of 600,000, and it was estimated that we had over 700,000 people out to see Mr. Johnson. They had come from all areas. Liz Carpenter and I were riding in a car together going in, and the cars had been stopped so many times that we--And this was at night. We encountered the same thing on this that I told you earlier about Melbourne and Sydney, that the car in which we were riding just stopped; it overheated. We were about two blocks from the hotel fortunately. And it ended up Liz and I got separated. I had been there; she had not, and I lost her in this big crowd. Of course, I should have remembered back in Dallas the day of the assassination when I told you I was worried about Liz, and she was already on a plane waiting when I got there. By the time I finally made my way to the hotel, and I had to go in through the back door, Liz was already in Mrs. Johnson's suite with her. I don't know how she found the hotel or got there, but she was there.

M: Who was providing the cars, Mr. Carter?

C: The different state governments. I say, the different state governments. Australia is a country the size of the United States, and where we have forty-eight states on the mainland, they have only six states. The state governments of each of these places provided drivers and automobiles.

We had a good visit with the Governor of Brisbane there the night we arrived, and the next morning he had a good visit with Mr. Johnson and presented Mrs. Johnson with one of the Koala bears. And this is when we flew--I believe we had to get up at 5:30 that morning, Dorothy, 4:30 or 5:30. But we had to be airborne at 7:15, I believe it was, flying to Townsville.

The big problem that had to be reckoned with was the fact that you had the Presidents of all these different SEATO countries coming into Manila, and they had to work out a schedule of arrival for all the different ones to where they wouldn't all arrive at the same time. And the arrival time for Mr. Johnson had been given, and we had to work backwards from that as to how long it would take to fly from Townsville to Manila, and from Brisbane to Townsville.

So we did fly to Townsville and quickly transferred to cars and went right into town. Townsville is a town of about 60,000, and it was estimated by the papers that we had a little over 100,000 people out to see Mr. Johnson. We went in, he stopped a couple of times and shook hands with people, but we got to church right on time. The minister greeted them just like I'd mentioned earlier. We had a nice song and a nice sermon and a nice prayer, and another song, and a goodbye. By the time we got back to the airport, they were just finishing the refueling on the planes. This is where Prime Minister Holt left President Johnson. The Prime Minister of New Zealand was arriving, and he was scheduled to arrive at Townsville about ten minutes after Mr. Johnson left to pick up Prime Minister Holt. They were going together to Manila. And this was where I left Mr. Johnson also. I actually caught the Prime Minister's plane back to Sydney, and caught a commercial flight from there back to the United States.

M: Mr. Carter, did you have many conversations with Mr. Moyers both pre-Mr. Johnson's arrival in Australia and during it? This would be in coordinating things.

C: Dorothy, the first day we got there was on a Sunday. We had a meeting Sunday afternoon with different members of Prime Minister Holt's staff to talk about the overall purpose of the visit, and the places to go. Then

Mr. Moyers left after that, and it was left up to me to develop the details of the generalization of what we'd talked about and agreed to. There were times that I did call him, though, when he was back in the United States and then even as late as when Mr. Johnson was in Hawaii or in New Zealand, I think. We talked--getting him to clear certain details of Mr. Johnson doing this or doing that.

M: What were some of these?

C: Well, take a thing like the church matter. I mean, this was my idea--that it was Sunday morning, that he ought to go to church. But I wanted this cleared before I made arrangements on it.

M: Did you talk directly with Mr. Johnson before his arrival?

C: No, I didn't.

M: What about conversations during the trip through Australia?

C: Well, I was usually just a car or so behind him because I had come to know all these people down there and know who was going to do what next on the thing. No, we did--I say, we--actually the gentleman from the Prime Minister's office and I compiled information, and the Australian government printed a book on Mr. Johnson's trip that detailed every second of the time from the time he first set foot on the ground at Canberra until he left at Townsville, even showing diagrams of the way he was expected to turn--the right or left, if he was reviewing a group; or what song would be played; or the different things. But nonetheless you needed to know the personalities involved, and this was one of my jobs--to make sure that he was told ahead of time who was going to be waiting for him, who would be the first person to shake hands with him. But I was usually very close by to make sure that everything went just like it was scheduled.

M: Were there any occasions where they didn't?

- C: No, we did have the one situation at Canberra there that a bunch of the antiwar students were out in front of this Rex Hotel, and we ended up coming in the rear entrance of the hotel. He was already in bed asleep before they ever realized that he was in the hotel.
- M: What was Mr. Johnson's reaction to the paint throwing in Melbourne?
- C: Well, he was just a little disgusted that they had had this wonderful, big, warm reception there from the people in the street, and to have two little youngsters--two juveniles--nearly ruin the complete visit. And he said--I remember we were talking in a private room just before we went into this big reception, and he said, "That's what'll be on the front page of the New York Times and all of them tomorrow; that we've had paint thrown at us down here. They don't necessarily take into account the fact that we had over 2,000,000 people turn out to greet us, but two little sixteen year old boys--that'll be the front page story." I told him at that time that I didn't agree with him. I thought they'd write up the wonderful turnout, but it turned out he was correct.
- M: Did he have occasion to ask you before you landed in each of these places what the size of the crowd would be?
- C: I had made my guess to him; it was just a standard procedure, Dorothy, in talking to him ahead of time as to what to expect at the different localities and events. They'd turned out better than I had anticipated.
- M: Did he make any sort of just general response to you, remarks to you regarding his reaction to the receptions in Australia?
- C: Yes, Dorothy. This was on the final leg of the flight from Brisbane to Townsville. He and Prime Minister Holt called the Prime Minister's man, Jim, and me into the President's cabin and presented us each with a medal--a medallion that was commemorative of that trip, one; and then

second, they took one of these books that I was telling you about--each one autographed and wrote a personal inscription in the book. Mr. Johnson and Prime Minister Holt each wrote one to me and did the same with Jim, and thanked us for everything having gone as well as it had.

M: Did he talk about any surprise at the reception that he received in Australia?

C: No, he was very delighted with the way everything had gone. You had these three little occasions that we've mentioned, but it was so miniscule actually, when you stopped and considered all the other things, the people that you had gotten to visit with and their size. I know a number of times I had the different Australians say to me, "Don't you think we're much more like you than we are like the British?" Well, I always considered this a very high compliment, and I think this is the way they feel in Australia. I think there was a very warm feeling there, and I think they felt very warm toward Mr. Johnson.

M: There is some speculation that the Australian trip was somewhat of a boost with Prime Minister Holt and his reelection; I believe also the Prime Minister of New Zealand was running for election. Did you get into many political discussions with Australians regarding this?

C: No, Dorothy, the system down there is different from our system. The people that serve the Prime Minister, and I'm talking about even his personal secretary, they're all under Civil Service. They stay regardless of what party is in power. They talk no politics whatsoever. They take much pride in their job, and they don't recognize politics. What I'm trying to say, they just take much pride in trying to do the best job humanly possible to serve their Prime Minister. That complete staff stays regardless of who the Prime Minister is. And this was the group that I was dealing with.

M: Did Mr. Johnson make any other remarks to you in between, on rest stops, or in flight, or were there any changes that he asked for?

C: Dorothy, I don't remember any. It was a very hectic schedule. He did see--you asked about the opposition--I mean, about politics. He did have a conference with the leader of the opposition when we were in Australia. This gentleman came and spent forty minutes or an hour at the hotel with Mr. Johnson.

But while it was a hectic schedule, everything went pretty much according to schedule. And the men that were down there with me that I named while ago all did just real outstanding jobs; we had wonderful cooperation from the Australian American Society.

M: What did you consider were the high points, the most significant events, of this Australian trip?

C: Well, it's hard to really sum it up, Dorothy, because his arrival in Canberra was outstanding; the reception he received in Melbourne was outstanding; it was great in Sydney; and quite outstanding in Brisbane; and very good in Townsville. But these were five of the thirteen stops that he made on this Southeastern trip--Southeastern Asia trip.

M: Do you recall any sort of anecdotal stories that happened during this trip?

C: Dorothy, I don't just offhand. We did a lot of working on these things, and I'm sure we had some happen. It just doesn't come to my mind quickly.

M: I don't have any other questions regarding the Southeast Asia trip. We can go on to some of the other areas that you mentioned that we've not covered.

C: All right. Well, that was in October of '66, of course, and--

M: You had mentioned the AFL meeting in Miami.

C: Right. Now, that was December 11, 1967 that Mr. Johnson was speaking to the National Commission of the AFL-CIO, and he had asked me to fly down to Miami Beach and coordinate that part of his visit which I did. I went down a day ahead of time. Just many little details that you need to check out to make sure that they have it where he can do a maximum amount of work with minimum effort, which I always tried to do on advance trips, try to have things so arranged--and this is every detail--to where he could accomplish the equivalent of about three days work in one. This is what you try to do, and that's what I did at the AFL-CIO to make sure that all the top labor leaders were there to visit with him, and that they each got their proper accord, and to make sure that everything was right for his speaking, and it all went off extremely well.

M: How did he happen, in 1967, to call you in on this one?

C: I come from a laboring background. I've always maintained a very close relationship with--my daddy was Brotherhood of Railroad trainman, and I've always been very closely associated with the labor people. Of course, I know Mr. Meany, and I know his top people over there. It has made it very easy for me to handle.

M: Let me just ask you quickly--were there any difficulties to sort of surmount in this particular visit?

C: No, it was a very--

M: Everything went smoothly?

C: It was a very easy assignment, because everybody was very happy and very willing to get everything squared away and straightened out. It all went very well.

Do you have any other question on--?

M: No, not unless there's anything you recall specifically of significance

about that particular meeting that you were involved with.

C: No. He spoke, made quite a strong labor speech, was well applauded and well recorded. All the major networks--as a matter of fact, it was shown live that evening by all the major networks. I flew back with him that night to Washington.

M: Did you know why he had happened to accept this invitation to speak there?

C: Oh, I just think that President George Meany asked him to speak there, and, of course, I'm sure that they weren't unmindful of the Presidential campaign the next year.

M: Did you talk any politics with any labor people?

C: Did I? Yes, I was talking politics all the time with labor people. Of course, as I recall back there, they were not permitted to make any endorsement and of course this would have been premature anyway in December of '67; but as I recall, Mr. Meany, in his introduction of Mr. Johnson, gave his endorsement and did everything but issue the AFL-CIO endorsement right there, which he didn't have the authority to do. I mean, it hadn't been voted on. When he left, there was no mistake in anybody's mind--there was no question in one's mind as to how the AFL-CIO stood and what they were going to do.

M: Did you feel any reluctance among other people in the top echelons of labor for supporting Mr. Johnson?

C: No, not any that I talked to. I talked to many of the national and international presidents while I was down there, but I'm sure I didn't talk to all of them.

M: Did you have any prearrangements you had to make after you were in Miami with the people back in the White House? Phone calls or conversations?

C: No. Mr. Johnson was at the ranch and was coming to Miami from the ranch.

And he stopped in New Orleans, I believe, stopped at Michoud Air Force Base out of New Orleans and spoke. And as I recall, his arrival in Miami was delayed about two hours, and we had to do some rearranging of the convention program to keep everybody in tow where the meeting would not have adjourned before he got there. And my main job here was being able to stay in communication with Larry Temple, who was traveling right with the President at that time, to try to coordinate to the point of knowing exactly when he was going to arrive, and that we had the cars at the right place, because he landed one place at some military base--I don't remember where, but he took a helicopter from there over to a public park area and then came by car from there on to the hotel. And we just had to make sure that we had the cars at the right place.

M: Did you get out the crowds, so to speak, for these?

C: Of course, you've got a locked-in audience on a thing like this. I mean, he was arriving in Miami Beach after dark, and it was only six or seven blocks from the hotel, something like that. There was a crowd around the entrance of the hotel when he came in, and all friendly. But then the rest of it, you've got a locked-in crowd because all of these labor people there are attending the convention. And what we did there, we drove into the basement of the hotel where he was able to go right to a room to freshen up, and they had President Meany there to greet him and then they had to walk only about a hundred feet to the main stage. We had carefully measured all this off and worked it out. And I believe that just about covers that, Dorothy.

The next time I handled a trip for him was this past August--August 19th of '68, when he was speaking to the VFW convention in Detroit at Cobo Hall. This was on a Monday. I got a call a little after midnight on

Sunday night from Larry Temple at the LBJ Ranch saying that the President would like for me to catch a plane the first thing the next morning to get up to Detroit and handle this visit. I remember Larry saying, "What were you doing?" And I said, "Well, I was sleeping until you called me." He said, "I can't understand anybody going to sleep this early."

But I did get up and caught an eight o'clock plane and got on out to Detroit and got right with the top VFW people there to check out all the details, every little statistic on what was involved and made sure they had some signs to welcome Mr. Johnson, and suggested that inasmuch as Luci was going to be along with little Lyn, the grandson, it might be well if they presented him with a VFW cap, or have one fixed quickly that would fit little Lyn, and present an honorary membership to his daddy who was over in Viet Nam at that time.

I also got a call from Air Force One after they were airborne from Texas to Detroit, asking me to please pick up a couple of boxes of Pampers Diapers for little Lyn, which I picked up at the drug store. Making my way to this little room, the VIP room, off of the head table at Cobo Hall, there was a Secret Service agent on the door there that I didn't know and I didn't have any identification pinned on my coat lapel. He wasn't about to let me go through with these two boxes. Of course, they were in sacks under my arm. Finally, I located a Secret Service agent that I did know, and he let me go on in. I was telling the President about that as we flew back that night, his having a grandson had added an extra dimension to the advance work, where you have to pick up the Pampers.

But he had a very fine speech, very well received.

M: Mr. Carter, who creates or thinks up some of the ideas, such as you mentioned about the cap for the grandson?

C: Dorothy, this is a part of the job of an advance man, to go into an area, go to a place, and try to do some thinking of what can be done; to try to figure out what would be a nice thing to have been said, or to do to attract attention, or to try to use your imagination on some of these things. It's actually very easy; each one of them is nearly a custom-made, tailor-made situation; you have to get into a community or get with a group and just kind of get the feel of what's going on, and what the feeling generally is. Then you can start brainstorming and try to figure what can be done on these things. But your big thing, the thing that I said awhile ago, is to have his schedule so arranged where you take all the fat out of it--you don't duplicate things--and where he can get the maximum accomplished in a minimum period of time.

One little coincidence on his trip into Detroit. Mr. Nixon was there to speak, was the speaker just before Mr. Johnson. Of course, at this time a Secret Service man had been supplied to all the Presidential candidates, and their two motorcades passed--Mr. Nixon going back to the airport and Mr. Johnson was coming in. And the Secret Service agents talked back and forth between the two motorcades. Mr. Nixon sent word to Mr. Johnson that he had warmed the audience up good for him, and knew that he would be well received.

M: When you are advancing these trips, you know arrival time and departure time, and who's in the party, and that's about the extent of it?

C: You know that generally. Your arrival and departure time many times varies right up to the last minute. And what you always have to do is do the best you can with what you've got to work with. The most important things are developing your lines of communication and to make friends with local people who can get things done quickly and immediately because in an operation

like this, it is so prone to have many little last minute changes that you've got to completely change everything. You've got to have people that you can work with who can do these things. And the biggest thing--you've got to be able to be in constant contact with Air Force One or the White House or somebody to make sure that they know what changes you've made, or you know what changes they desire.

M: How do you determine who you're going to contact locally in the town?

C: Well, of course, that's changed, Dorothy. That's changed over the period of time. And we're talking about the general subject of advancing now. It was a great deal different when Mr. Johnson was President as compared with when he was a Senator. I used to do the advancing work for him when he was Senator, and I did it all by myself. But as President, he has got the Secret Service--they do certain things, they make contact with the local police and make many arrangements. You've got the White House press section--they make contact with local newspapers and news media. And you've got the Air Force that handles the transportation and all these things. The Secret Service also checks out in great detail every movement that he may make, where he might go. You've got the Signal Corps that moves in and sets up the White House switchboard; they set up the podium and make sure his P.A. system is correct. I used to have to do all this; I used to carry his--we developed, you know, a portable podium that we'd quickly put into a little canvas bag and go toting this thing off. But it was the exact, correct height that he wanted the podium. But the Signal Corps handled all this, and the Secret Service usually handled the Presidential Seal to make sure it was hung correctly.

But back to answer another part of your question. It depends on what the event is, who the host group is, and exactly what you hope to accomplish

by the visit. Of course, you always want crowds, and an advance man usually does anything that comes to his mind to help draw crowds. A lot of times, for security reasons, the Secret Service would not permit us to announce that the President was even going to come into a town. You've got the dilemma of having to try to develop big enthusiastic crowds, and at the same time you're not even permitted to announce he's going to be there. A lot of time you get notice at the last minute that, "Okay, now it's all right to say he's going to be there."

And again, on some of these that I handled because of my work at the Democratic National Committee and at the White House, I had gotten to know some of the national reporters, some of the national people at different places. And even though it had not been announced that Mr. Johnson was going to be at a certain place, some of them had learned that if I showed up about a day or two ahead of time, they knew he wasn't too far behind or something to the effect. This, of course, added to the toughness of my job. I needed to get work done, and yet I almost had to hide out to keep from being seen, to keep from tipping off the fact that he probably was going to be there.

But it's very interesting work. It's not totally dissimilar to being a producer of a Broadway play or something. You work out all the details and hope that everything is going to fall into place. You've got to stand back to a degree and watch the show go on.

The last time I visited Mr. Johnson before he left Washington on January 20th of this year was September 6th last year. It was on a Saturday, and he called that morning and asked me to drop by the White House that afternoon at two o'clock, that he wanted to visit with me. And I did. I took my little daughter Laurie along, who is eight years old,

and she had been complaining about the last three years that she always saw Mr. Johnson on television but she had never seen him in person. She had seen him when she was a little baby, but she didn't remember. And I took her along with me that afternoon, and she had a real nice visit with the President. He gave her a pen and candy and some other things, and had four or five pictures made with her, which later he sent her an autographed picture of one of the real good pictures.

But then I had her wait outside, and he and I sat in the Oval Office and talked for about forty minutes, mainly just talking about families. I think the main reason he had called me over was to get my appraisal of how the Humphrey campaign was going, what it looked like, what I heard, what I was hearing. And I've thought about that visit a number of times. It was a very delightful forty minutes, but the main reason, I think, that I was called over there was wondering what I was hearing. He told me at that time that he certainly wanted Mr. Humphrey to win, and he was going to do everything he could to be of help. And he was in hopes that I would do everything that I was called upon to do. I did tell him that I was not getting very good reports from across the country, that things just had not clicked very well at that moment, that there was a lot of work that needed to be done if he was going to make any showing at all. But, as I said, I've become convinced this was the main reason he had asked me over there, just to see if I knew anything or had heard anything or what my evaluation was.

M: Did you participate in the Humphrey campaign at all, Mr. Carter?

C: I did to a degree, Dorothy, mainly showing them where--and I say "them," I'm talking about Bob Short who was treasurer--showing him where he could raise some additional money. I did get the feeling at times that maybe the

Humphrey people, and I was very close to all of them and I think a whole lot of all of them, but I did get the feeling that they felt it was just as well not to have any Johnson intimates or associates too closely by. While I was extremely interested in Mr. Humphrey being elected, I didn't want to presume to force myself upon them. And I'm certainly not any prima donna on any of this stuff, but I helped where I could without presuming to force myself.

M: Did Mr. Johnson ask you at the meeting you had with him if you thought campaign speeches by him would be of any help?

C: No, he didn't ask me that. He just told me that he stood ready to speak at any place or do anything that they wanted him to do. I don't think it helped anything. I mean, no comment was made on this, but this is my personal evaluation--but you may recall that one of the Humphrey staff people out at Chicago during the Democratic National Convention was asked what Lyndon Johnson was going to do in Humphrey's behalf or something. And this aide replied, "Lyndon who?" on the thing. Well, this was printed in most of the papers. And it would just be my guess, knowing the situation, that this didn't rest very well with Mr. Johnson, even though it came from just a staff member.

M: What was your assessment of the errors of the Humphrey campaign, or the fact that they did not, of course, win?

C: Oh, Dorothy, I don't really feel that I'm qualified to answer that. I think that probably a lot of things should have been done quicker. The only major criticism I would make, and I don't feel that I'm qualified to go beyond that because there are a lot of details of it I don't know, but it was known by May that Mr. Humphrey was going to get the Democratic nomination. I mean, there wasn't any question in anybody's mind. He had

the delegate count that far back. And what I think should have been done was not wait until August 27 or 28 or Labor Day to start trying to get some plans together. I think a complete campaign organization should have been put together, all plans finalized because the convention was held several weeks after the Republicans--it was late--and they should have hit the road running the day after the convention. It actually took them thirty days to get--it was up in late September before they ever really got started.

M: Did you attend the '68 convention?

C: Yes. I was not a delegate. I was invited as a guest of the convention, having served as acting treasurer of the Democratic National Committee and my previous assignments in the Democratic National Convention. I was a guest of the convention.

M: Did you help out in any areas connected with running the convention?

C: No. I didn't help anything. All that I did was try to help people get tickets and had a very difficult time on this. I'm talking about spectator tickets. It was just where I would have bumped into somebody that had been very helpful to us in the past, and usually they had their wife or son along or something, and they needed another ticket. And that's not very much. In the '64 convention, like I previously recited to you, I was tied up every second; but this one I got to just view.

M: What was your assessment of the running of this convention?

C: Well, basically, I don't think anything, Dorothy, too wrong with the running of the convention. This is the way these conventions have been run. I've been at a number of them. I've started at precinct conventions, county conventions, state conventions, national conventions, where sometimes we've been victorious and sometimes we've been run over, just like some of the

people thought they were out there. The whole name of the game is to have the votes, and Mr. Humphrey had the votes. I just think that some of the factionalizing of the Democratic Party just made anything that was done out there impossible almost.

M: There were rumors developing, of course, that Ted Kennedy was going to make a move. Did you place much credence in these?

C: Dorothy, I heard some of this, of course, fifth or sixth-handed. And I thought that he might do it. I was told that he was Mr. Humphrey's first choice for Vice President and was told that Mr. Humphrey had talked to him. I thought he might do it, and I thought if he did, that that could very well be a winning combination. But of course he didn't.

I believe that's about it unless you've got some questions.

M: I have just one more. Occasionally during Mr. Johnson's Administration, there were speculations that he was going some place and then he did or he did not. Did you ever have occasion to advance something and then have the things changed so that he did not come?

C: Well, I had that happen right after--and I should have mentioned this while ago when we were talking about the Australian trip, because this happened very quickly after the Australian trip. You know, it had been tentatively planned, and, of course, in business or politics or anything else, there's a big difference between a tentative plan and a confirmed plan; and the press a lot of time would make a great to-do out of--I mean, maybe he was thinking about a schedule, or working on a tentative schedule, and then it didn't work out or something, well, then the press would have a big to-do that he had gotten mad at somebody and changed his mind and didn't do--or they would try to find some ulterior motive involved. And nothing was ever finalized until it was totally confirmed with him on the thing. We did

have this. As I say, he had planned--tentatively planned--speeches around the country about the last four days of the election in '66. And I was out in Chicago. I was to handle his visit to Chicago. We did have people at other places across the country. But as you may recall, when he got back off this Southeastern Asia trip, he went into the hospital here; and the doctor ordered him to cancel any plans that he had to go right into some little operation. I've forgotten what, but he was forbidden to do any more traveling at that time. It ended up that I had to come on back in without executing the plans that we had tentatively developed out there. I was the one that had to call Mayor Daly and tell that Mr. Johnson was not coming. And we had already developed all the plans of how his time would be utilized.

M: How did Mayor Daly receive that?

C: He wasn't very happy when I first told him; then when he listened a little second further and realized it was on doctor's orders, well, he was a little more understanding. However, they went ahead and had the celebration in Chicago just like Mr. Johnson was there. Of course, I was back in Washington and just read about it in the newspaper.

M: Did this happen any other times?

C: I don't believe it happened to me any other time. I'm sure it happened some other times, but I don't believe it happened to me any other time,

M: Did you ever have occasion where, as you mentioned, your arrival some place set off the speculation of the President's arrival that you couldn't help?

C: Dorothy, I didn't understand the first part of your question, I'm sorry.

M: Was there any occasion during your advancing of any of the Presidential trips where your arrival did set off the speculation that it was imminent, and it was, you know, had not been officially announced?

C: I don't think it ever got as far as being an AP release or anything like this. But I had these people walk up to me and make the statement, "Well, with you here, Mr. Johnson must be planning on coming on in," and I had this happen at the AFL-CIO convention in Miami. I was talking to one of my good friends, one of the international presidents I was standing in the lobby talking to; about this time a fellow from Newsweek passed by. He grabbed this fellow and said, "I want you to meet Clif Carter; he works for Mr. Johnson." This fellow wanted to know what I was doing there, why I was attending an AFL-CIO labor meeting. I changed the subject right quickly and left. But you have good friends unintentionally get you with the press just like this.

But back to answer your question. No. There were instances where they start whispering--I'm talking about people attending a convention or a meeting. There have been times when some of them would see me there that they'd turn and start whispering among themselves that he was going to be there, and at this time it hadn't even been announced that Mr. Johnson was going to make an appearance.

I was telling you awhile ago I had a very good trip down to Texas A&M three weeks ago. It was Wednesday, March 5, I spoke to a group down there--about 300 students, Dorothy; and I told them that there were four things I wanted to mention to them, for them to keep in mind, to evaluate my answers to questions that they might propose. One was I was prejudiced and very partisan; that I'd had a hand in some of the accomplishments of the Johnson Administration; and that time was too quick to really evaluate what had been done. And I thought as college students they ought to keep those four points in mind in evaluating everything that I said about the Johnson Administration. This was a delightful experience meeting with those

students, and they were very generous. They had said that what they'd like to do was prepare questions and have them written and let me take them and study over them to see how I was going to answer them. This was the only part of their format that I changed. I told them I didn't want to do that; I wasn't sure that I could answer all their questions, but I thought it ruined the spontaneity of the thing--it appeared too canned to have written questions; that I would be glad to attempt to answer any question anybody had on their mind, but I wanted them to stand up and ask their question and I would try to answer it. And it was done this way.

M: I have no further questions, Mr. Carter. I know that there's always a chance that we can have missed some subject or area, but if you have no further comments, we will close.

C: Fine. I failed to emit while ago--after the Detroit VFW speech, I flew back with Mr. Johnson that night to Washington, and General Westmoreland had spoken earlier in the evening, and he flew back with us. Of course, it was a very fine experience for me to visit with General Westmoreland and the President on the flight back to Washington. I meant to include that in my remarks about Detroit.

I just want to thank you again. It has been a real pleasure to get to work with you. I hope this can be of some little help.

M: It's fine, and I thank you very much, sir.

* * * * *

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
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Gift of Personal Statement

By Clifton C. Carter

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Clifton C. Carter, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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- 2 -

Sec. 507 (f) (3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) this material shall not for a period of 20 years after the death of the donor be available for examination by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it. This restriction shall apply to and include employees and officers of the General Services Administration (including the National Archives and Records Service and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) engaged in performing normal archival work processes.

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Signed

Mary Jane Carter

Date

Dec 9, 1969

Accepted

Harry A. Hinton - for
Archivist of the United States

Date

February 28, 1975