INTERVIEW I

DATE: April 30, 1971

INTERVIEWEE RAÚL H. CASTRO

INTERVIEWER JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Mr. Castro's office in Tucson, Arizona

Tape 1 of 2

F: Mr. Ambassador, tell us briefly about your background up to 1963 or 1964 when you first got into the ambassadorial business.

C: Well, as you know, I was born in Mexico; I came to this country--

F: Where in Mexico?

C: Cananea, Mexico.

F: Oh, yes.

C: That's about a hundred miles south of the Mexican border.

F: Mining country.

C: It's mining country, that's right. So I've been in the mining business for a good many years. From there my parents came over. They were actually political refugees. My family had to leave for political reasons and ended up in a town called Douglas, Arizona, also on the border, next to Agua Prieta, Sonora. It was there that I went to high school and graduated. Then I moved over to Northern Arizona University, where I received my Bachelor of Arts degree.

F: That's up in Flagstaff.

C: That's in Flagstaff, and after leaving Flagstaff, amazingly enough, I had a little difficulty getting a teaching job because of my ancestry. In those days it was not customary to hire people of Mexican background

F: Your timing was wrong, wasn't it?

C: That's right, the timing was wrong in those days. So what happened then, after that happened, I worked for the State Department in Mexico for a period of five years in the Consular Service. So that actually was my first fling with the Foreign Service.

F: Where were you stationed?

C: I was stationed at Agua Preita, but then I traveled extensively from there over to Nogales and Guadalajara and all over Mexico. And amazingly enough, at that time, one of the vice consulates in Nogales, Sonora, was a fellow by the name of Charles Adair. Charles Adair and I later met on in Central America; he was an American ambassador to Panama when I was in Salvador. Now he's in Uruguay. So after twenty-five years of absence from the Foreign Service, Ambassador Adair and I met again.

F: I see. Came right around.

C: Right.

F: So then you went back to school?

C: Yes. After that term, after the war, I came over to the University of Arizona primarily to go to law school. In order to go to law school, I had to teach--I needed some income--so I taught Spanish at the University of Arizona, and at the same time took a full-time law course. So in graduating from getting my law degree, I finished out my teaching

contract, and then started my own law practice, my own firm, the firm of Castro & Wolfe. I was the senior partner.

F: Somewhere in there you became known as Judge Castro.

C: Well, I was a deputy county attorney before that, then county attorney. That's comparable to district attorney in most states. So I served actually four years as district attorney. Then I was elected judge of the Superior Court, and then Juvenile Court. It was in 1964 when I received the appointment to go to El Salvador.

F: Had you ever met President Johnson?

C: Yes, yes, I had. I met President Johnson in Tucson, Arizona, in a park. It was right before the Democratic National Convention when President Johnson and President Kennedy, at that time, were in the midst of having selection made

F: This was 1960, you mean.

C: 1960. I remember giving a speech at this local park in Tucson and President Johnson, who was then vice president, gave his speech. We sat next to each other and conferred and talked about it, and that was my first relationship with the President.

F: You hadn't been a delegate to a national convention?

C: No, I'd never been a delegate. I just met him in Tucson.

F: Well, now, I'm not clear--he was already vice president then?

C: Yes, yes.

F: I see. Did you stay in touch with him, or did this appointment as ambassador sort of come out of the blue?

C: No, we didn't stay too much in touch with him. I think what happened there, was Senator

[Carl] Hayden, at this time, being from Arizona, of course, had an interest, had known me for quite some time, was interested in my future, *et cetera*. And the feeling was that they needed someone for Latin America that spoke the language, that knew the sensitivities and psychological aspect of the people of Latin America. So it was Senator Carl Hayden that made a recommendation to President Johnson, who in turn of course was very pleased to accept and receive it. And then we started conferring with each other.

F: Did the fact that Senator Goldwater was running against Johnson and came from Arizona, do you think, play any role in it, to be quite candid, or do you think that he just wanted a man with a good Latin American background to go to El Salvador?

C: No, I think what happens here is just the opposite way.

In fact when I was nominated--and mostly the strong pushing was being done by Senator Carl Hayden--Senator Johnson, or President Johnson at the time, was very apprehensive about appointing me before election because of my name, Raúl Castro. The general feeling at the time, the consensus was that my name might lose him some votes because of the Cuban [Fidel] Castro. And I took the other approach, that my name was well known in Arizona and deeply rooted, that it would be to his advantage to make the appointment immediately rather than wait. So he accepted my advice, my suggestion, and the appointment was made prior to the election.

F: Did you go to Washington to see him before you were named officially?

C: No, I went to the State Department. I didn't have to see the President. I just went to the State Department and made the initial contacts, and also to Senator Hayden. But you know, strangely enough, it was then that I remember seeing President Johnson and telling

him--he was giving me the business, sort of joshing me, about losing Arizona to Senator Goldwater--and I said, "Well, Mr. President, this might be the case except that in Pima County where I come from, you won by 10,000 votes; and therefore, considering that Senator Goldwater's from Arizona, he only took Arizona by 3,000 votes. It was a very small margin."

F: Right.

C: So I think that sort of . . .

F: Pima County nearly put it over, didn't it?

C: That's right--almost.

F: Did you have any trouble in confirmation?

C: No trouble in confirmation. I went before the Foreign Relations Committee, of course. Senator [J. William] Fulbright was presiding. I think it all went rather smoothly. I made some good friends. I think there was one objection in the Senate as a whole by Senator [William] Proxmire at the time. I think the objection came because he was having difficulty getting an appointment for a judge in Wisconsin, and he felt that my appointment was too smooth.

F: He wanted to kind of use you as leverage, didn't he?

C: That's right, some leverage for him. I think his classic remark was, "A fellow with this name requires a second look: Raúl Castro." (Laughter) Strangely enough, later on I communicated with Senator Proxmire and told him that he must remember, should know, that my wife was his constituent. My wife happens to be from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. My wife was from a very large and prominent family in Wisconsin, and [I said] that I was

going to sic all of my wife's relatives on him. Needless to say, the aspect changed.

F: Incidentally, have you ever had any contact with Fidel?

C: Yes, a contact with Fidel was [just after] our marriage. We were in Mexico City, my wife and I, and Fidel and Raúl were staying at the hotel--I forget the name of the hotel--in Mexico City.

F: This was about when?

C: This was about twenty-two years ago, or twenty-three, something like that. They were students at the university at the time.

F: When he was just--

C: They were just starting. So therefore the names Fidel Castro and Raúl meant very little to me at that time. And it was rather annoying to receive his phone calls and Raúl's phone calls. Of course, the switchboard would make the mistake, naturally. Raúl and Raúl are the same name. And people would rap at our doors. We were concerned; we just didn't know what was going on. So that fellow played a role in upsetting my honeymoon so therefore I have some vengeance on him.

F: I see. You haven't seen him since?

C: Haven't seen him since, no.

F: What kind of briefing did they give you on the Central American situation before you went down there?

C: Well, frankly, I want to tell you there's much to be desired as yet on the matter of briefing ambassadors coming in to the field to go into the respective host countries. I will not give an A for effort on that aspect.

I think perhaps in my case it was different. I think there were too many assumptions made. The assumption was that I had been with the State Department five years in Mexico; therefore I knew the ropes. And therefore very little time was spent in trying to acclimate me to my new assignment. So most of it had to be by digging on my own, and that's about the extent of it.

F: They just really turned you loose down there?

C: Turned me loose. "Here you are. You're on your own, and make the best of it."

F: Did the name Castro bother you at all, or help you, in Central America?

C: No. Strangely enough, the name Castro is much more of a conversational piece in the United States than in Latin America. The name Castro in Latin America is very common.

F: Yes.

C: And the names Raúl and Fidel Castro are rather common throughout Latin America, so really it didn't make much of a--

F: No one confused you with Fidel's brother?

C: Nobody ever did. Except they did confuse me in Miami, Florida, or New Orleans, or Houston. You see, coming in from Latin America the first person I made contact [with] was with our own Immigration.

F: And they would always do a double-take on you?

C: That's right. They had a little red book there of the people who were undesirable. They'd always find the name, Raúl Castro, and they'd come in with, you know, a little shock, a shocked look about them. Then they'd see my diplomatic passport, and this was enough

to sort of begin to ask a lot of questions.

F: What sort of situation did you find when you got to El Salvador?

C: I think in El Salvador when I arrived, it was rather [peaceful]. I think the transitional stage was a peaceful one.

My predecessor had been Murat Williams from Virginia. Murat is now retired from the Foreign Service. There had been, as in most of Latin America, some disagreements on the matter of our policy. The feeling in Salvador was at the time that we Americans were trying to impose upon their country our own tax structure, and the families from the obligarchy, or the fortuned families, so as to speak, were rather, at this point, a little chagrined. They felt that they could not accept our embassy being used as a sounding board to propagating some type of weird tax structure for their country. So there was a little resistance and a little animosity toward the embassy at the time.

F: Did you get down there before Lima was expelled from power?

C: Oh, yes, I was there with Lima. In fact, I met Francisco Lima in Washington when he was the ambassador from Salvador to this county and also Canada. On my arrival, I think a month or two afterward, he was expelled.

F: Did that affect your operation at all, or was this just strictly an internal matter?

C: No, that was an internal matter. Of course, I knew the President of Salvador quite well. [The President] then was Julio Rivera, who is now the Salvador ambassador to our country. And he was succeeded by Fidel Sanchez, who is now president. Both of them are rather close personal friends. I still see Ambassador Rivera in Washington when I go down there, and have lunch with him, and chat.

F: They had held national elections in the spring of 1964. You came in in the autumn of 1964, I believe.

C: That's right.

F: So you didn't go through that, but you had a strong opposition party.

C: No, it was the other way around. The elections were held after I was there.

F: It was after you got there.

C: That's right. I arrived there in 1964. The elections were held in 1965. When I arrived in El Salvador, Julio Rivera was the president. And then we went through the agonizing periods his last four months in office because the feeling was at the time that the President, Rivera at the time, was making every effort possible to create a crisis in the country so that he could say that there could not be any change of government, and not have an election and continue in government. It was then that the difficulty arose with Honduras. The Honduran-Salvadorian situation arose at the very moment. The election was held, though, and then President Sanchez came in.

F: On this border problem that you had with Honduras, were you pretty much directed from Washington, or were you given a free hand to follow your own instincts on this?

C: Fortunately I had a free hand in the situation of the border concern. I kept my hands away from their--my view was that it was an internal problem between Salvador and Honduras, and I believed that both sovereign countries could make their own determinations, that they could solve their own problems. I played it cool and unencumbered for about maybe three months. I was trying to get away from the feeling that "the Americans are always intervening in the affairs of another country, and trying to

tell them what to do." But strangely enough, it went the other way around. The Salvadorians got rather annoyed that I was not participating in trying to resolve their problem. So actually they made a straight request of me to see what I could do to resolve the problem. It was then that, of course, through other circumstances, Ambassador [Joseph] Jova, who was then American ambassador in Honduras, and I decided that, instead of taking potshots at each other and taking sides on the matter and confusing the issue, that we should meet in some neutral territory and discuss the matter, to arrive at a *modus operandi*. So Ambassador Jova and I met in Guatemala with Ambassador [John Gordon] Mein--who was later assassinated--in his residence. No one knew about it; we just met in Guatemala and decided that we should take an active part in trying to resolve the problem between both counties, and we did.

F: There wasn't any conflict between the two or three of you?

C: No. I think what happened there wasn't a matter of conflict; it was a matter again, I feel, of identifying too strongly with our own respective host countries. Ambassador Jova, being our ambassador in Honduras, more or less just took the posture that there was a great deal of merit to the Honduran side; and I, being the American ambassador to Salvador, was taking the Salvadorian side. So we agreed that this was not any posture to take by an ambassador; we ought to be objective and impartial about this thing. It was then that we decided to meet and try to form our strategy. But the crowning situation then, I think, to me the matter that resolved this situation, unquestionably, was the visit of President Johnson to El Salvador. I think you will recall [it], because I think Bill Bowdler, Ambassador Bowdler, who was then the liaison man in Washington for Latin

America, set up the trip. And the crowning blow was this: that Bill Bowdler told me at the time that President Johnson was coming in to visit El Salvador. We had five days to prepare for the visit, and I as American ambassador, and senior ambassador in Central America--I was then senior ambassador

F: You had a whole new team by now, didn't you?

C: That's right--had to make preparations. Senior, and all over Central America with the other ambassadors, you know we met every six months.

F: Yes.

C: It was up to me to get all the ambassadors there, and get the respective presidents in Salvador within five days, and be there to meet President Johnson.

F: Was five days long enough?

C: Five days was no easy feat, I'll tell you. You can see that the problem I had was to get the President of Guatemala coming in to Salvador. It was difficult because of the guerrilla problems he was having--internal problems and security problems in Guatemala. I had to reassure him we would get a jet, and he could leave Guatemala after breakfast and spend all morning conferring with the other presidents, and then go back in the jet and have his lunch in Guatemala. It's only a twenty-minute flight.

F: Yes.

C: And I think that was agreeable and amenable to him, and the President of Guatemala accepted the offer to visit El Salvador.

F: How did that trip go--from a Johnsonian standpoint?

C: You mean to El Salvador--Central America?

F: Yes.

C: At the time, you will remember, Vietnam was coining into the fore and President Johnson was not getting too good a receptivity in the United States. Neither is President [Richard] Nixon at this moment--a very similar situation at this very moment. The feeling was that something was needed to give President Johnson a good boost, and make the people recognize his leadership qualities. The trip to Central America was the most successful trip President Johnson ever made, I think, in his whole career, keeping in mind that Latin America has been sort of forgotten territory in most instances, as far as our foreign policy is concerned. Secondly, I think no president had ever been to El Salvador; it's a very small, insignificant country so as to speak. And thirdly, there was quite a bit of animosity towards our embassy and our country in Salvador because of the promulgation of the tax structure. Amazingly enough, President Johnson arrived; the receptivity was tremendous; [he was] well received, much more than we anticipated. I think there was a certain amount that the ambassador does in getting crowds, *et cetera*, but let me assure you that my efforts in that area were minimal, because most of these crowds were rather spontaneous crowds, and I think sincerity was there. He struck it well. Mrs. Johnson made a tremendous hit with the people of Salvador. And let me tell you, Luci--as we are talking now, both my wife and I--they stayed at our residence in El Salvador--and [we were] discussing the fact that perhaps we felt Luci was a little young, perhaps a little impulsive, and we doubted very much if she could make any point, make any impact in El Salvador and the rest of Central America. And amazingly enough, that little girl was a darling girl. She wore a little miniskirt, or it wasn't quite a miniskirt, but she was young,

a young-looking girl, a little short girl. And then she had a little baby; the baby did come with her. Her personality was absolutely fantastic. She charmed the Salvadorians, old ones and young ones. The crowds around the residence there, our residences, in the morning and in the evening were tremendously large, people of all walks of life: the fortuned families, the oligarchy, and the common herd, the ordinary man in the street. They would wait all day just to be able to get a glimpse of the President and Mrs. Johnson and Luci coming in in the morning and the evening, going to and from the residence.

F: Did the Salvadorians provide the security, or did you pretty well handle all your own security?

C: No, I think we handled our own security problems. I think the usual Secret Service contingent came down with him, but I think the brunt was carried by the local people, and they did a tremendous job. There wasn't anything out of hand. I was very pleased. I think not only did he help our posture in Central America, but I think it helped our posture *vis-à-vis* all of Latin America, and world-wide, the world-wide basis.

F: So it spilled over the borders?

C: Spilled over completely. Because then I think the feeling was that he was a man of the people; he was a man who was down to earth. And he was. So I think this helped tremendously on this big trip.

F: And did they get a sort of a raise to their ego by the fact that he picked the smallest Central American country to come to?

C: Unquestionably. I think unquestionably that even every Central American country was

thrilled, as was--later on, I went to Bolivia and all of Latin America. They felt that it was a wonderful gesture of the President of the United States of America, unquestionably the number one power in the world, to come in to a country as small as Salvador, which is 50 miles wide and 165 miles long. And yet, this, his visit to El Salvador, was a visit that solidified and harmonized the Central American Common Market and also resolved the Honduran-Salvadoran problem at that time.

F: I wanted to ask you about that. I wanted to ask you about the Alliance for Progress funds in that area and just how much impact you thought the United States had on getting that Common Market under way.

C: Yes. Well, you know, I was there at the very inception or origin of the Common Market. I think that without the guidance of the United States, the Common Market would not have gotten a foothold. On the other hand, unquestionably, the intelligence--the intelligentsia, the technicians, the people of ability to operate the Common Market--are there. We didn't make them; they were already established: very commendable people, very capable, did a tremendous job. All they needed was guidance on our part, and some financing. The Common Market's an expensive proposition--they need some support--and we could furnish that support. They furnished the brain power; we furnished the financial support and the catalytic agents, really, to keep it going, to spur it on.

F: I was in San Salvador in 1969--I hadn't been to Central America in five years--and I was amazed at the amount of goods that were available.

C: Oh, yes.

F: Non-Salvadorian goods, either.

C: El Salvador, you know, is the most highly industrialized country in Central America. Also, I found in Salvador more graduates of Harvard, Yale and Princeton than anywhere else in Latin America. They're well trained; they're well versed; they're very bilingual.

F: Probably more per capita than you'd get in the United States.

C: You're right, and very pro-American. They're very pro-American, very favorable to our country. I believe that they feel the sphere of influence for Central America and El Salvador is definitely the United States of America.

F: Did you have any difficulty getting AID [Agency for International Development] funds for El Salvador?

C: No, I think El Salvador spoke for itself. The people are rather energetic. I think the presentation was well done; the government was sharp. They were opportunistic. They know of the proper opportunity at the time. I believe that--you asked me a minute ago about the Alliance for Progress. When you talk about the Alliance for Progress you must take it down country by country. In El Salvador, the Alliance for Progress was extremely successful. For instance, in a period of three and a half years that I was in Salvador, almost four, I personally dedicated about three hundred and fifty schools. Roads, bridges, everything in the world. A most successful--

F: It must have kept you on the move.

C: It sure did.

F: You didn't spend all your time in San Salvador?

C: No, no, no. I was a man that spent most of my time in the country reading, very little in

the capital city. But then I moved over to Bolivia and I found that the Alliance for Progress was a complete failure in Bolivia. Somehow or another it never took hold, it never went to the grassroots, the ordinary people never received any--

F: Was that a leadership problem?

C: I think it was a leadership problem and the political instability in the country. You know, Bolivia has been an independent country 145 years, and it has had about 185 revolutions. So it's very unstable, so therefore it's extremely difficult.

F: And nothing ever really gets any long-range planning?

C: Planning was very poor, I think. And on the other hand, Bolivia is the country in Latin America [where] we have spent more per capita [than on] any other Latin American country in foreign aid. And yet [there is] very little to show for it. So again, leadership is very poor, and it hasn't trickled down, and whatever projects have been undertaken have failed as a rule, so I'm afraid the Alliance for Progress is a dismal failure in Bolivia, highly successful in Central America.

F: Did you think that's rooted in the leadership or rooted in the people? The difference, say, between your experience in El Salvador--

C: Well, of course, you must consider that El Salvador has no Indian population *per se*. It has mostly mestizo type. On the other hand, Bolivia is seventy per cent Indian population.

F: Tremendously non-Spanish-speaking.

C: Non-Spanish-speaking and also illiterate. So therefore it's hard to work with those. But on the other hand, with good leadership I think even an illiterate person will react and be

motivated in something constructive. So I felt the leadership wasn't there. I also wasn't completely happy with the operation of AID program. I think the AID program had much to be desired. I think the funding, the structure--I think the bureaucracy was too heavy, too heavily loaded. I think the countries were objecting to the overabundance of American presence. So that is in for reformation. Of course, now it's been scuttled.

F: Yes. Back to El Salvador, and these three hundred and fifty or so dedications that you made which works out to better than several a week really--

C: That's right.

F: Could you get a sense of a real rise in the educational level and in the forward impetus in the country?

C: There's no question about it. I think, being of Latin background, having come from Mexico, it's been rather traditional--and Latin Americans are a traditional society--that education was not one of the priority items in any family. When a youngster reached the age of thirteen, fourteen or fifteen, papa and mama tapped them on the shoulder and said, "My good man, you're now old enough to go into the cotton fields and work, or mines or smelters, and come back and help us put the beans on the table."

F: They raise them to work and earn.

C: That's right, to work and not to be educated. I received a tremendous impact and impulse on this possibility in El Salvador. I remember one day going out to a village close to the Guatemalan border. We could not go by jeep or car because there were not any roads, and there were not any jeeps that could make that type of terrain, so we went on horseback, and then walked part of the way.

I'd say about ten miles before arriving at this village, five hundred people met us barefooted, on those sharp rocks. Their clothes were tattered and torn. I think economically speaking they were at the bottom of the totem pole. On the other hand, I was very much impressed when a man looked at me and said, "Mr. Ambassador, we're looking to you for help. All we want in this village is a school. We don't have a school. We also want a teacher. And we can't get teachers here. There's an old school that's abandoned because we can't keep teachers, to remain in this village. To me the answer was apparent, that no teacher could be living under those circumstances, the huts, the food and lack of water, *et cetera*. Yet those people there on the street who were illiterate were telling me, "The only thing we want is a school and a teacher. We want our children to be educated." They weren't saying anymore, "Let's get our kids out in the field to work." They were saying, "We want our children to be educated."

I became convinced then that Salvador was on the move, and so was Latin America, that they were no longer being concerned about getting on the cotton fields, and *et cetera*. They were concerned about getting an education. This I also found in Bolivia with the Indian people, too. So I believe that there is an innate desire now to get an education.

F: You must have gotten some emotional receptions in some of those sort of backwater places that had never seen an ambassador or really had never seen, probably, a first-class government official.

C: That's probably true. Number one, they were rather surprised to find an ambassador who spoke their language--as you know, I'm a native Spanish speaker--that could speak their

language without an interpreter, properly. Then they were also surprised to find me a Latin in every sense of the word, appearance and otherwise. They couldn't conceive how the United States of America could send a man with a name like Castro as an American ambassador. And I explained to those people--that was part of my mission--that this country is the melting pot of all peoples, and I happen to be a member of that melting pot, even though I was Latin, and my name was Castro, that I was an American. Yet we understood the problems of each other. So I think, to me, they were very thrilled to see me because I was one of them--I identified. I don't think you could distinguish a Salvadorian from me. I mean, complexion-wise or otherwise, in the language, I think we identified rather closely. So I think it helped a great deal.

F: They talked more freely to you.

C: Oh, yes, unquestionably. I think they weren't giving me amenities; they weren't bowing. We'd sit there and they'd be frank with me. They would tell me what they felt about Americans, and why they were unhappy about Americans, in many instances. By the same token, they would give me the pro side of it, too.

F: Did the Dominican invasion, or whatever you want to call it, give you much of a problem?

C: No, it didn't dampen my spirits any, not even in Salvador. I'll tell you why. I became convinced the Central Americans and most of Latin Americans feel strongly--they recognize that the United States is the strongest power in the world, and their feeling was that, "You people, you Americans have been playing patsy for too many years; you're compromising yourself too much." To them, this was a stroke of power and strength, and

saying, "This indicates to us that you are the power and the strength of the Western Hemisphere."

F: They respected that?

C: Therefore, they respected this type of strategy. So I was never criticized, publicly criticized. In fact, the commentaries were favorable to the Dominican Republic aspect.

F: I spent seven months in Chile in 1965, and I don't know how many Chilenos told me that, "Of course, we've got to speak out against you because that's the posture we have to take, but between you and me, we think you're doing the right thing."

C: Absolutely. I think this was the consensus I felt through all Latin America, really. So I think this should give us some feeling of our policy in Latin America. My view, as a man that's been in this field now, is that in the past we have adopted a policy of seeking people to love us--and this has not worked, and will not work ever in Latin America because of the machismo complex in Latin America. I think we ought to be seeking a matter of mutual respect. They like to feel that we respect their ways of life and their means of government, their ways of government, and by the same token, we are saying, "Respect us as Americans, what we stand for." I think once we work on that basis, that type of policy, I think we'll be a little more successful.

F: Stand up like the man you are.

C: That's right.

F: Did you have much evidence of a Cuban subversion while you were in San Salvador?

C: I think in San Salvador there was some Cuban subversion out of Guatemala mostly, not in San Salvador, or Salvador properly. Some of it was there. On the other hand, my view

in El Salvador was that we had a list of a hundred and fifty established and well known Cuban-framed guerrilla activists in El Salvador; we knew what they had for breakfast and what they had for lunch and what time they went to bed.

F: These are home country boys; these aren't imports.

C: No, they're home country boys. We fairly well knew what they were up to, and surveillance was good, so we weren't really concerned. I didn't consider it a problem. It was not a problem in Salvador.

F: You never really felt any personal danger?

C: Not in Salvador, never. Some in Bolivia but not in Salvador.

F: On that visit that you made over to Guatemala City to meet your other two ambassador colleagues, could you feel the tension there in Guatemala or were you there long enough?

C: Oh, I was there long enough. After all, Guatemala was only twenty minutes away from my home base. And I used to go to Guatemala often and confer and visit with Ambassador Mein, who was later killed in Guatemala. [For] both of us, Guatemala's problems were our problems because there was a sort of filtering over into Salvador from Guatemala. So we used to compare notes, and we were fully aware of the fact that Guatemala was explosive, that it was a dangerous situation, and that precautions had to be taken. So we were aware of it. And Guatemala was a hot and still is . . . I was in Guatemala, in fact, I'd say four weeks ago, and the situation still prevails. It's rather tense; it's rather difficult.

F: Now, am I right in assuming that because El Salvador has a fairly high standard of living that there is a bit of a spillover, particularly from Honduras into El Salvador, of people

coming into the frontier regions of El Salvador and that this creates a problem?

C: It's the other way around as a rule. Because, you know, Salvador being so small, and it's a country of almost four million population . . .

F: Well, they're trying really to escape the population pressure.

C: That's right. Actually what the Salvadorians are doing, they're sort of spilling over into Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua because the dense population of Salvador is so intense. So this is a source of problem to Honduras and Salvador: that at this very moment we have close to 350,000 Salvadorians living in Honduras. And most of these Salvadorians living in Honduras are, as a rule, better trained, better prepared, better equipped to make a living, so they are a little bit more successful than the Hondurans themselves. This creates a friction, it creates a problem, and this is the problem we have.

F: In your briefing before you went down, did you feel the State Department gave you a fairly good idea of whom you could work with and who was a somewhat delicate person to handle and so on, and what the various possible insurgencies were?

C: No, no. I think that this is the field that at its very inception, as I told you before I was a little bit unhappy with the type of briefing. I think it needs more to be desired on that one. And secondly--this sort of goes with what I'm saying at this very moment--I feel that the preparation on intelligence collection is not the best. I think we're a little bit weak in that field, in knowing personalities.

F: At that stage of the game did they consider the possibility of kidnappings? Or is this later on?

C: No, no. In that particular time, kidnappings were not in vogue in Salvador. Kidnappings

were very in vogue in Bolivia, as I went there later. But not in Salvador, no.

F: Well, while we're on that subject, before you went to Bolivia, were you prepared for any major security measure against your own person or your staff?

C: Oh, yes. In fact, the determinations of my going to Bolivia occurred and happened when President Johnson was visiting us in El Salvador--I said residence. I remember very well that afternoon, we were in the limousine--President Johnson, Mrs. Johnson, Luci, my wife and myself--I recall when the President looked at me he said, "Raúl , what's your next assignment?" I said, "Well, Mr. President, I've been here four years now. I'm waiting for you to make that decision." And he hesitated and thought, and I was hoping I'd get the Philippine Islands. And he said, "Well, you're supposed to be in Bolivia right now." His memory was [going] click. He said, "You're long overdue in Bolivia. We've got problems." You know Che Guevara was in Bolivia about that time and we were having serious problems. He felt we have some very serious problems.

F: You yourself hadn't made any pitch to go to Bolivia?

C: I did not know I was going to go to Bolivia. It was right then, when he said, "You're going to go to Bolivia."

F: Funny way to be told.

C: And he said, "Furthermore, I'm giving you five days. Can you get out of here in five days to Bolivia?" I said, "Hell, Mr. President, everything is possible, except that I do have the courtesy of saying goodbye to the President and to the Salvadorian government and I'd like to comply with the amenities as much as I possibly can." And we were able to work it out and this got the State Department in a stir because that meant the aqréments had to

be sent to Bolivia and Covey Oliver had to find replacements, *et cetera*, and the wheels had to start that very day.

F: Do you think discussion had been going on back in Washington about transferring you to La Paz, or did the President decide at this moment that you were the man that they needed?

C: No, I don't think that discussions had been going on, because I recall well that Covey Oliver, who was then the assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, was shocked as anybody else. He wasn't too aware of it. I'm sure, it probably had been discussed in the White House, but not in the State Department. You know, it was also then that President Johnson took away my cook and butler. And he's still with him at the LBJ Ranch in Texas, because the boy still writes to me.

F: Must have changed his life somewhat.

C: I'm sure it did.

F: Have you seen him since he left?

C: I have never seen him. In fact, the order from the President at the time was that also he was . . .

F: How did that happen?

C: The President--in fact we were in the limousine at the same time--looked at my wife, and said, "Mrs. Castro, do you have a good houseboy in the place?" She said, "Well, Mr. President, you saw him. He's a Chinese boy who doesn't speak English or Spanish." And he said, "Well, can he iron pants?" "Sure can, and he's a good bartender." It was then that he ordered me to take the boy with me. My ego was strongly deflated then because

the boy traveled with me. I arrived in Miami, Florida, and nobody met me. But there was Secret Service, there was Immigration Service, there was Customs Service, there was everybody else meeting the Chinese boy in Miami , Florida.

F: You rated somewhere below the cook.

C: That's right. They carried his bags, and all kinds of attentions. Anybody cared less about the American Ambassador. So that put me in place fast.

F: Had you kept up with the Bolivian situation in more than just a perfunctory way?

C: No, I keep up very well with all of Latin America rather strongly. I subscribe to everything about Latin America. So I am abreast with it on a day to day basis.

F: No, I mean before you went, though. You hadn't developed any particular expertise in the . . . ?

C: No, no particular expertise on Bolivia, except that I am a student of Latin American affairs--have been all my life. I was aware.

F: It could just as well have been any other South American country.

C: Oh, yes. It could have been Argentina; it could have been Chile, I'm sure, because I keep up with them. That's right.

F: Was there much concern throughout Central America, as far as you could tell, about the possibility of a Castro takeover in one or more of the Central American countries?

C: No, as far as Central America, I'm afraid, unfortunately, the Castro name--I'm talking about the Cuban Castro--is being used as a little gimmick in many instances. Whenever a Central American republic wanted some help from us, they would dress four or five men in GI suits and long hair and caps, throw them out in the woods and say the Castro

guerrillas are taking over. Then, I could guarantee you, within twenty-four hours or less, there would be somebody in my embassy saying, "Look, we're faced with a serious internal security problem. We need more armaments. We need more materiel. We need some more money. We need some help to improve our situation in Central America."

F: Made a really good stalking horse, didn't he?

C: That's right. I think they're using that, as well as the communistic situations were, for the purpose of getting help. I'm convinced of that. It's overplayed.

F: You were there during some elections and I presume they were completely free.

C: What completely free? On the other band, I'd say that I had several elections in Salvador. In fact, both for Congress and presidential, and I felt that the elections in Salvador, being for Latin America, were just--

F: Reasonably well run.

C: Reasonably well run and possibly as democratic as one could conceive of Latin America having. I'd say the elections in El Salvador had less stigma than some elections I've read about in Chicago, and sometimes even New Mexico, and other eastern states.

F: You can count Texas if you want to, in certain precincts that I won't get into. Had you ever met President [René] Barrientos [Otuño] before you went to Bolivia?

C: I had never met President Barrientos before I went to Bolivia. Let me assure you that man and I hit it right the very moment. He was a young man, I'd say about forty-seven at the time.

F: He must have been an enormously attractive person.

C: . . . a graduate of Randolph [Air Force Base?] in San Antonio, Texas, spoke good

English, believed in his people, had a grassroots approach, very pro-American. I found him an outstanding man. I always considered him an outstanding Latin American, really.

F: Do you get the feeling--we're still in Central America--that the improvement in the Common Market situation guaranteed, or at least presaged, an improvement in political stability?

C: Yes, unquestionably. I believe that it did so for this reason: that, as we had interchanges of meetings of ministers of the economy and different technicians in the Common Market, this brought about a better understanding and a better view of each others' problems in their respective country and did promote political stability, I think.

F: Did you go down to Punta del Este?

C: No, I stayed in Salvador at the time. I did not go.

F: Did you get any feedback in El Salvador from the conference?

C: I did, but it was very favorable, because, after all, you know, we go alphabetically and President Sanchez sat next to President Johnson. They shared the table; and there was El Salvador and Estados Unidos.

F: Were they *simpático*?

C: Oh, yes. I think President Sanchez came back and he was rather pleased with President Johnson, and he spoke very highly and in high terms of him. He felt the man was a very good president and had a feel for the Latin people.

F: When you got down to Bolivia, what did you find in the way of the situation insofar as the Communist apparatus was concerned?

C: Of course, Bolivia has been a hotbed for that type of operation. What I found: the Che

Guevara incident . . . he was made a martyr, so that made every student pro-Che Guevara, made every young man sort of performing some act of idolatry towards Che Guevara. And this solidified all the left wing forces whether they be communist or nationalistic Bolivians. So that there was a strong force, no question. There still is.

F: From your assay of the situation, would it have been possible for Che not to have been made something of a symbol or was this just inherent in the situation? In other words, was he bound to lose and therefore, in a sense, be immortalized?

C: I think Che Guevara was bound to lose from the very inception. I had strong feelings that Che Guevara had gotten in Fidel Castro's hair, and also Raúl Castro's hair. They were trying to unload him; they wanted to get rid of him because he was becoming a problem in Cuba. They chose Bolivia because they knew very little about Bolivia. Their only point of reference was that Bolivia was underdeveloped, one of the poorest countries economically in Latin America next to Haiti. And because poverty prevailed [they felt] that this would be fertile territory for people being dissatisfied and would join their ranks and he'd be out.

F: It's a basically unhappy country.

C: That's right. But they made a mistake, because [in] Bolivia, as I know it, the people are very suspicious. The Bolivian accent is rather Bolivian. And even though I am Spanish in my native language, they were a little suspicious of me at the very inception because they detected an accent that was different from theirs. They knew I wasn't Bolivian and if you're not Bolivian, you have a real problem in Bolivia. Historically, those people have been suspicious of everybody else because they've been kicked around in their teeth

for so many years. So that being the point, we must remember that Che Guevara had maybe about thirty-five Cubans, about eight Peruvians, and maybe four or five Bolivians. So, the terrain was not known to them; their accent, their attire, their whole structure was wrong. They did not identify with the Bolivian structure. He was bound to fail.

F: I gather, putting this in academic terms, that Fidel and Che really were guilty of poor researching as far as Bolivia was concerned. They weren't prepared for what they got into.

C: No. I think Fidel had a better research problem; Fidel knew the research problem fairly well. I strongly feel that Fidel was trying to get rid of Che, and he did; I think it was his way of unloading him. I'd say even at this very moment Fidel Castro does not run Cuba; it's Raúl Castro that's the power behind the throne. Raúl Castro is the power and, of course, the shots are being called by the Russians. But Fidel Castro is ready to fade out.

F: Did you get the feeling that in Bolivia Fidel was a legitimate hero to the disenchanted people or that Che was the real hero?

C: No, I got the feeling in many instances that Fidel was the hero at the time. He was the hero because he was the man that was tweaking Uncle Sam's nose. In other words, they felt that Fidel Castro had enough audacity, or guts if you want to call it, to be able to defy--

F: The old David and Goliath story.

C: That's right--defy the greatest power in the world, and therefore he did have the admiration of most Bolivians--I'd say, 99.9--even the intellectual ones, *et cetera*. Even our friends admired him because they felt he was quite a man to be able to stand up to us.

So really he was the hero, I think, Fidel Castro, not Che Guevara.

F: Did the fact that he'd come off rather poorly in that Cuban Missile Crisis tend to lower his esteem?

C: You mean Fidel Castro?

F: Yes.

C: I don't know. He came rather poorly in the Missile Crisis but he didn't come too poorly in the Bay of Pigs Crisis.

F: No.

C: So therefore, that off-balanced the other one. I think what happened here, too, was that Che Guevara did not become a hero until he was killed. If Che Guevara had not been killed, had not died in Bolivia, I don't think . . .

F: If they had kept him alive . . .

C: If they had kept him alive he would not have been the martyr. That's right. It's killing him that made him a martyr.

F: Now you got in after Che's death--

C: Shortly after his death, right.

F: --but you did have the [Jules Régis] Debray problem.

C: I had more than that. I had all the consequences of the Che Guevara death. When I was assigned to Bolivia, a cable came from the embassy to the extent that my life would be in danger if I went to Bolivia and for me not to go to Bolivia because they would meet me at the airport and there might be some problems. My only reaction was that if it's Latin America, I can go to any country in Latin America on a Sunday afternoon, and nobody

will be there to meet me. I said, "I will ignore your cable. I will go to Bolivia--make it on a Sunday afternoon--I'll be there."

F: Did you come in by commercial plane?

C: I went by commercial plane. I arrived on a Sunday. There wasn't a soul in sight. You must remember that in Latin America, very few coups ever take place on a weekend. They like to do it on their own time. They like to have their Saturday and Sunday activity at the beach, *et cetera*, or in the *fincas*. And do all their activating during the weekdays. And students always this is traditional. Why, you couldn't get ten students on a Sunday to perform any type of an act.

F: So you just came in and went to the residence--

C: Came on a Sunday and there was no problem.

F: --and that was it. Did you meet any open hostility then when you began to move around?

C: No, once I got into Bolivia there was no open hostility. I think my first defiant act occurred when I presented credentials to President Barrientos. I had a press conference immediately after presentation of credentials. This is traditional in Bolivia. You presented your credentials and afterwards you have a press conference. And a press conference was held and the question was rather pointed, the number one question: "Do you object to Bolivia recognizing Russia?" My answer was negative. I said, "Bolivia is a sovereign country and what Bolivia does with other countries in recognition is no concern of the United States. So I cannot answer that one and it's your internal problem." And then they brought in the same question about my feelings on Cuba. What was my reaction about Cuba? I said, "I think the Cuban problem is a Cuban problem and I have

not come to Bolivia to discuss the Cuban situation. That's another problem. I'm here to discuss a matter with Bolivia." So, I think some of these questions were rather pointed. I think they felt they might make me squirm. All my answers were in Spanish and when they finished I think they were with me.

F: Did the fact that Debray was a Frenchman give any problem to the French representation in La Paz?

C: Yes, it gave some. I think the fact that Debray was French also added to the charm of Debray being also another martyr.

F: It made him a little more romantic.

C: Oh, yes. I discussed it many a time with President Barrientos on what should be done with Debray. I think the fact that he was French made him a little more attractive. President Barrientos approached me one day and said, "Look, I have a little problem with Debray. What will your view be if I turn him loose and let him go to Cuba?" I said, "Mr. President, again, I don't think I as an ambassador could come here and tell you what to do with Mr. Debray. I think it's your internal problem and I think you better do what you think is to the best interest of your country." I think he was looking for a cop-out, and then if the American ambassador approved it, why, then he would say, "Why the Americans favor it." He at the time felt that Debray should be released because he had so much charm that all the prisoners and all the guards and all the village of Camiri where he was imprisoned were coming to him and looking to him for guidance, and he was brainwashing all of his army staff there. He felt he was creating a problem and should be released. And it's true; I think Debray had quite a bit of charm. Everybody in Bolivia

thought the man was attractive. I think the fact that he was French made him a little more attractive. He had this girl coming in from Venezuela, his wife, to visit him from time to time. So he was a real problem, I think there's no question. He was a security problem for Bolivia.

F: Was that a fairly cynical approach on the part of some Bolivians that he was not really a guerrilla but was, say, an intellectual or a journalist?

C: I think the intellectuals used that approach, that this is the person they placed in the government, that Debray was an intellectual, was not actually a warfaring man, and that he was only expressing certain ideologies and certain views and as an intellectual, as a man of the news media or the press or a literary man, he had to be able to express himself and not be curtailed. So I think this added to his charisma.

F: Did you get a feeling that the original thirty-year sentence that he received was maybe, to use a current example, a little bit like the [William] Calley sentence, that the people really felt it had been overdone, or that this again was just a chance to make a hero out of a man?

C: At the time the sentence was imposed, I don't believe that the feeling was that the sentence was overdone. I think that the sentence met the approval of most Bolivians and was well received. It was as the time began to change, as time wore on, when they began to really make a war hero or a martyr out of the Che Guevara episode that he became a hero. Upon my arrival in Bolivia, at the very inception, nobody cared or discussed Reggie Debray, really. He was nothing. It was afterwards that this thing came in.

F: Let's go back a moment to that afternoon in the automobile in Salvador. Did the

President give you any particular instructions? What did he say about the Bolivian situation? He told you that it was bad and that you were needed.

C: No, I think that on Bolivia, of course, he felt, I think in considering this thing, "I feel that you can do a good job for us in Bolivia because number one, you're Spanish speaking, number two, you know Latin America, and three, I believe with the political background you have, you may be able to get down there and resolve some of the problems and help us out." I think this was his feeling, that with my background I would be able to step in there and try to keep the lid down a little bit to some extent.

F: Did you come from El Salvador to Washington for a briefing or did you go right straight?

C: If I remember--no, I came down to Washington for a few days because I had to bring the Chinese cook with me, and he accompanied me down to Miami.

F: That was the occasion when the cook came.

C: I went to Washington for a few days. That's right.

F: Did the people at the State Department, as you recall, feel pretty alarmed over the Bolivian situation?

C: Oh, they were very much concerned, absolutely. I think at that time Bolivia was the hot spot of Latin America and everyone was concerned about Latin America. I think that the briefing in Bolivia was much better than my briefing for Salvador or Central America.

F: There was no real concern, though, that Bolivia would export revolution? The fear was that Bolivia, having that unstable history, might just go under itself.

C: No, and I think there was concern about the welfare of the Americans in Bolivia. There was very much a concern about the welfare of every embassy staff member and the other

American families in that country. The entire American feeling was at a high level at that particular point.

F: Are the Americans pretty well scattered over Bolivia, or do they tend to center in La Paz?

C: No, they're pretty well scattered over Bolivia because of the mining operations.

F: Incidentally, I've got a nephew-in-law who's in the mining business down there.

C: Is he?

F: Louis Astudillo. [First name pronounced Luís but spelled Louis]

C: Oh, I know him quite well. Louis and I are very good friends.

F: Mary Ellen, his wife, is my niece.

C: He's from Texas originally.

F: Right, San Antonio.

C: San Antonio, and he graduated from the University of Texas, and he used to live in Prescott, Arizona.

F: That's right.

C: I know his wife well, sure.

F: That's my niece.

C: Sure, sure, know them very well; in fact, he and I were very close friends. You know, when I talk about Bolivia, when I arrived there things were at a very high pitch. I think you have forgotten the incident of the diary of [Che] that was sold.

F: Yes. I was going to come to that.

C: The Minister of Interior sold the diary to Fidel Castro and this made notice--it was all over the newspapers--that our government had been using this Minister of Interior

supposedly as an agent, one of our CIA agents. And then secondly they published every name of the possible CIA employees. So the students were on the street, the teachers were on the street, the Bolivians were mad at us because we were supposedly using intelligence methods in their country that were not acceptable to them.

F: Did the Bolivians have any strong feeling that the CIA might have been active in disposing of Che?

C: Oh, of course, naturally. It was published and I think it was in everybody's lips and mind, oh yes.

F: Did you have any feeling that the CIA had been active in this?

C: I think this is a little bit too much of a classified section. I wouldn't care to go into that detail there, but I think we were involved in a number of facets. I think we were involved in most every facet in most every country really, as you pretty well suspect, one way or the other.

F: Yes, I have interviewed both [former CIA Director Richard] Helms and [former CIA Director John] McCone along various lines. What happened to Che's guerrillas while you were there? Did they just become rag-tag and peter out or did they continue to do a certain amount of . . .

C: Oh no, no. Most of them were killed. Five escaped back into Chile and then from Chile into Cuba, and then one of them remained. Inti Peredo, who was Che Guevara's number one lieutenant, was a Bolivian; he came back in to Bolivia. One day I was at the airport ready to go to Buenos Aires and also to Rio, when I saw my picture on the headlines in one of the local papers. It was that day that Inti Peredo was shot on the street in La Paz,

Bolivia, and they found in his pocket a map and instructions indicating that at five o'clock that day my wife would be kidnapped and at seven o'clock I would be kidnapped, and that both my wife and I would be taken to Camiri and we would be exchanged for Regis Debray. That the ransom would be to let Debray go loose and we'll turn the American ambassador and his wife loose too. He was killed so the plot did not come to [pass].

F: Do you think it was a real plot and not just somebody's dream?

C: No, Inti Peredo I think was close to Che Guevara. I think it was in the wind. I think all intelligence sources indicated that this was very much in the wind. It's a question of timing; how long would I be [there] before being kidnapped. To me, the humorous aspect of it was that the papers had to make a distinction between Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro. The headlines said "Yankee Castro to be Kidnapped this Evening." So the distinction was "Yankee Castro." I was "Yankee Castro."

F: They actually came out with the story in anticipation.

C: Oh yes. Not in anticipation; they killed the man. They found this map in his pocket with the instructions of what would happen to my wife and myself. So the headline was "Yankee Castro to be Kidnapped."

F: Did you take more than the usual security precautions?

C: Oh, unquestionably. I think we were concerned. From that moment on I had to travel with bodyguards. I had to travel with a car in front with machine guns, one in the back and two bodyguards in my car. And my wife traveled when she went shopping also with two bodyguards and machine guns. It was a rather close security at the time.

F: Now, Barrientos had visited the LBJ Ranch just before you were moved down there.

C: That's right. The Ambassador was there too.

F: Yes. Do you think the fact that he did visit the President at the Ranch was instrumental in your being moved?

C: I think in fairness to the former Ambassador, the Ambassador had a very sick wife; in fact she died shortly after that one. Also it was public at the time that President Barrientos and my predecessor had a little falling out. It was a little disagreement between themselves. Things weren't going too well between them at that very moment.

F: What was the problem?

C: I think the problem was that Barrientos felt that probably our ambassador at the time was trying to call the shots and tell him what to do, how he should run his country, and I think this of course was disagreeable to him. Whether or not this matter was discussed at the LBJ Ranch meeting, I really don't know. I have no conception. Now President Johnson never told me he was unhappy with our ambassador or anything else.

F: Did Barrientos ask for a new . . .?

C: No, never indicated that to me at all. He just indicated that they needed some help in Bolivia and that he felt with my background I could do some good.

F: I don't recall--Barrientos didn't go on to Central America. He went right on back to Bolivia after he went to the Ranch.

C: No, he went to Colombia. Made a two day stop in Colombia, and [from] Colombia over to Bolivia.

F: Was there any liaison between the Colombian guerrilla situation and the Bolivian, or were they pretty much isolated?

C: I think they were isolated cases, although I think the ideology and the moving factors that there's a common cause are there. I think there is some relationship. There's a tie-in, unfortunately.

F: Let's go back to Che's diary. What do you know about it?

C: Well, I read the diary and I found it rather innocuous. I wasn't too excited about it. I think the diary was overplayed.

F: But how did it get out?

C: There are so many versions of that one: how it got out.

F: You don't have any insight on which might be the correct one?

C: No, not any insight. I've talked to the man, I've talked with the individuals themselves, and their feeling was that the Minister of Interior got hold of a copy of the diary and just shipped it out.

F: Did you know [Antonio] Arguedas [Mendieta]?

C: Yes, I did. After all, he was my next door neighbor. When Arguedas took exile, sought asylum, he went into the Mexican Embassy and the Mexican Embassy was next to our embassy. So we used to wave each other from the porch.

F: What kind of a man was he?

C: I think Arguedas, as a young man, was rather bright, sharp. I think he was rather frustrated and distorted. There was no question in my mind that the man was accepting subsidy; he was a double agent, I think. Also I feel that he had a strong feeling for Fidel Castro. He felt that the Cuban way of life and the Cuban government . . .

F: Now by double agent: whose double agent?

C: Cuba and Bolivia and I think we had some fling with it. I think we misjudged him completely. We misjudged the man.

F: But he couldn't be characterized as a real Barrientos man?

C: Oh, no. In fact, I discussed this man with Barrientos very strongly and I said, "Mr. President," and Barrientos upheld him. He said, "Look, I must confess to you that I was fooled, because I knew this man as a boy in school. I knew him as a brother; I loved him as a brother and I was sold on him. I was convinced that this man was solid. I was convinced that he was with me. But he failed me, he double-crossed me and therefore I have no use for him." I think he actually hoodwinked Barrientos, no question about it.

F: What became of Arguedas?

C: What became of Arguedas? He's now in Cuba. He took refuge in the Mexican Embassy and for six or seven months the Bolivian government would not turn him loose. Finally they gave him a letter of amnesty of some kind and he came into Mexico and from Mexico I believe he went to Cuba.

F: In a case like that, you're pledged to give sanctuary and it's generally observed. Is it an embarrassment to the host embassy or is that kind of understood in the rules of the game?

C: You mean to take somebody in?

F: For the Mexicans to have a man in their embassy that the government wants?

C: No, the Mexican government has a policy that they will accept anyone that's a political refugee if he meets the criterion, that he must really be a true political refugee. And as you know, most Mexican embassies all over the world are just full of political refugees. As you know, in Santo Domingo the Mexican embassy was just loaded with refugees as

it was in Cuba and elsewhere. So they will always accept some people. We don't, of course. Our policy is not to accept anybody.

F: Yes. One question you can answer yes or no or dodge altogether. The claim was made--Arguedas made it among others--that President Barrientos, Ambassador Henderson did not know who the American CIA agents were. Is this a legitimate charge? Did you know who the CIA agents were?

C: Well, of course we're not playing any games. I think there's a difference. An ambassador knows his operation. If he's an American ambassador, he knows all the operation--

F: Well, that's what I was getting at. Is it possible in a sense to have two sets of representatives in one country?

C: No, I think an ambassador is responsible. I think I could never shirk my responsibility, and I think an American ambassador knows and has known and must know what goes on.

F: Did the Arguedas situation and the fact that the CIA, whether involved or not, was believed to be deeply implicated present any great problem in the U.S-Bolivian relations?

C: Yes, it sure did. It presented a tremendous problem to me as an ambassador. I think the average Bolivian felt that it was wrong for our country to absolutely infiltrate and have the whole area covered by CIA agents or spies or whatever it might have been. So this created a lot of explanation on my part. It took a lot of tact to be able to work it out and I think it was finally acceptable.

F: Do you think you finally convinced them?

C: I finally convinced them because I cleaned out house. That's what I did. My first move in Bolivia was to change staffs. I completely sent everybody home. I had a new staff.

That satisfied most people that I had--

F: That was reassuring?

C: Oh absolutely.

F: Did you feel that Bolivia moved toward some stability while you were there?

C: I frankly don't think that Bolivia has . . . If we're talking about stability in Bolivia, we're talking in terms of one year at a time. I was there almost two years and we had stability for almost two years, and then it hit. So I don't know, really. I'm not that optimistic about Bolivia at this point. I think they will have another change of government.

F: When the bomb exploded at your residence . . .

C: Yes. I had several.

F: Yes. Did the Bolivian government take any extra security precautions? Did they offer apologies? In other words, are they in the same position we're in right now of trying to keep the militant Jews from blowing up Russian . . .

C: No, no. I tell you, on these bombing episodes--and there were several bombing episodes that I went through in Bolivia--to me they weren't that critical because I had a strong feeling, frankly, that many of those bombs were not coming from the enemy, were not coming from any guerrillas. I think some of those bombs were coming from the government itself. As you know, after all, if you want to create a scenario of help and need, drop a bomb in the American ambassador's backyard. Then we'll get panicky, we'll push the panic button and we'll get all the help in the country we can conceivably think--

F: We can rush in and--

C: That's right. My feeling was that this type of activity was going on and I did not get too

excited about it.

F: So that really didn't concern you?

C: No. I took it as a matter of course.

F: Now then, you're dealing with a much bigger country than you did in Salvador. Did you still try to get around over Bolivia?

C: Oh absolutely. I think I knew most of the area better than most Bolivians as a rule.

F: I'm sure of that.

C: I felt the American ambassador has a responsibility to get away from the office and get to know the people, get to know the language, their problems, their sensitivities and what's bugging then.

Tape 2 of 2

F: Were there ever any indications that the government was trying to find out who did explode the bombs, or were these just looked upon like kids throwing gravel?

C: I think in most instances [in] the bomb throwing episodes, within one second--and they're not efficient--the troops would be there and the Minister of Defense, expressing apologies, *et cetera*, and a perfunctory search would be made. But I knew that that was the end of it, really. I understood the message. On the other hand, this is bad because it has a tendency to drop your security guards and the tendency to become overconfident, and you never know when the real one is coming in. They're all real; they broke the windows and made damage, but nobody was ever killed, fortunately.

F: Is there any basic difference in the feeling towards the United States in various parts of Bolivia? Does the lowland, for instance, have a kinder feeling or less kindly?

C: Oh, I think so. I think the mores vary from area to area. For instance, in the Santa Cruz area, which is lowland and highly progressive, the most progressive city in Bolivia, I think the feeling there toward the United States is a favorable one and I think a much better approach than would be in the highland. The highland is very anti-American; for some reason or other it's a hostile attitude. The weather is difficult. It's physically difficult.

F: It's just not a pleasant land.

C: Not at all. It's very difficult. The lack of oxygen. Living conditions are difficult.

F: In the matter of aid to Bolivia, you've already stated that you had the problem that aid didn't filter down the way it should have and the way it did, for instance, in Salvador. Did it give you particular problems because of that additionality clause?

C: Oh yes. Of course I went through the stage of the additionality clause considerably, and we strongly recommended to the country that this ought to be dropped and this should not be utilized. Finally we were able to convince [them] that at this particular point it was the Bureau of Budget that was calling the shots and not the White House. Bureau of Budget was very insistent that this ought to remain, and finally the White House came to its senses and recognized that this was a factor that was disturbing relations between both countries. Bolivia was the first country, by the way, that dropped the additionality clause.

F: Did you keep a kind of pressure on yourself to get rid of the clause?

C: Oh yes. No question about it. Oh yes, there are cables and cables.

F: Now did these go to Dean Rusk or to Covey Oliver or to the White House or to the Bureau of the Budget? Who did you contact?

C: Most telegrams from an embassy are third-party telegrams prepared by a political officer or somebody else, and then they go: "The Embassy says . . . *et cetera*," or "The country team feels and recommends . . ." In this case of the additionality clause, most of the messages were first-person messages: "I, the Ambassador, I, Raúl Castro, very strongly urge that this clause be deleted." So I think that it was on this basis that many were directed to Covey Oliver and directed to the White House as well as to the secretary of state. So the pressure was rather strong--and personal visits: I personally made several visits urging the deletion of this particular clause.

F: On the matter of visits home: do you request permission to come home? Do you come when you think it's worthwhile? In other words, do they have some kind of formula on this?

C: There's no formula on it, unfortunately. I think that you can only come by asking permission. If they agree, you come down. If they don't, you never come down. I think I spent almost a year and a half before they allowed me to leave Salvador and come back to the States. Even though I had requested it several times it was not granted.

F: When you came home from Bolivia, which is a much hotter spot than Salvador, did you ever see the President?

C: I saw the President once. I think in my whole tour of duty in the Foreign Service, I think I only came into contact with the President twice on visits. I recognize the tight schedule of the president. Of course he cannot be seeing ambassadors every day of the week. On the other hand, I think it's also a failure of our foreign policy that in many instances when the ambassador has information that is not being properly interpreted by the State

Department or anybody else, the president should be able to say on his own, "I want to see this ambassador, and let's discuss it." I think many pitfalls could be avoided, and the ambassadors don't see the president often enough.

F: You do subscribe to the feeling that most ambassadors have to filter their information through a sort of bureaucratic screen before it gets to the president.

C: That's right. By the time it gets to the president, it's third-rate; it's been edified, edited and that type of thing and it's not the true message, really. I'm afraid I . . . this is my fault; I criticize it severely.

F: What can be done about it?

C: I think my recommendation would be that instead of--I recognize again the tight schedule of the president--the ambassador coming in and recognizing that he [the president] cannot see the ambassador every time, that instead of going and checking with the State Department, the ambassador ought to be able to go to the White House and talk to Bill Bowdler, for instance, who was then Latin American chief, or someone who's next to the president in the White House so he can convey the message firsthand.

F: Someone who's going to be seeing the president that day.

C: That's right. Who will be with the president.

F: Did you notice any difference after Johnson went out in the way that your operation proceeded?

C: I certainly did. I can tell you that I served under President Nixon for a period of almost ten months; I was there until November in Bolivia. During that period of time under the new administration, I don't believe I received two cables from the White House, if any. I

don't think I ever received any from the White House and very few from the State Department. There was no guidance or leadership, really, and there was no policy whatsoever. So in my view I was the king, and it was up to me to make the determinations and call the shots.

F: Nobody ever told you what U.S. policy was?

C: No.

F: Nobody ever second-guessed you?

C: The only policy we were concerned about was that Nelson Rockefeller was going to visit Latin America and let's wait and see what happens. That was the foreign policy in Latin America at the time.

F: You left. No, I'm trying to get my times straight. You were there when Rockefeller came.

C: Yes, sir. I sure was. In fact I sent a strong cable urging him not to come to Bolivia, that I as an American ambassador felt that his mission to Bolivia would be disastrous and would not be in the best interests of our country if he appeared.

F: Tell me about the visit.

C: He was rather insistent in demanding that he could not afford not to visit Bolivia. He already had been rebuffed in Peru and I forget what other country, two of them.

F: I went, incidentally, to Ecuador to do a month of lecturing at several universities in June after he had been there in May, I believe it was, and you might say that he just killed my trip. No one would have an American professor at that time.

C: Of course not.

F: I had a month as a tourist, but no lectures.

C: So the answer in my case with him was that I compromised. He was so insistent, and apparently he was the man that was setting his own schedule--I don't think our own President, the White House, had determined what Nelson Rockefeller did, because he was very insistent.

F: They just left it up to him.

C: Left it up to him and he insisted, and I said, "Well, if you have to come to Bolivia, we'll send you over to Santa Cruz, which is close to the Paraguayan border and the Argentine border. That will take the sting of any possibility of bloodshed." He wanted no part of that. He said, "No, I will not accept it. I want to go to Bolivia, to La Paz." The most we could give him was two hours at the airport. And that's what he got, two hours at the airport.

F: How did that go?

C: There was no violence, weren't any demonstrations, but nobody was allowed to go to the airport. The airport was secluded from the populace, and the only people present were people who had special tags, government officials, embassy staff members, and that's all.

F: Really didn't get anything done.

C: Nothing was done. No, quite a few pages were written about Bolivia, but to me it was inconceivable how that could be done when he only spent two hours in an airport.

F: You might just as well have read it?

C: That's right.

F: You were there when the Gulf Oil got in its little situation.

C: Oh, yes.

F: Tell me about that.

C: I was in Argentina when Gulf Oil was expropriated. I'm sorry. When the coup occurred--there was a coup that occurred in Bolivia--I was in Argentina at the time. We had an idea that the coup was coming, it was imminent, and I so reported to our government. And it was then that I received my notice of termination saying that "we accept your resignation." So when that happened, I said, "I recognize that Bolivia at this point is ready to explode; we do have a problem. The fact that I'm receiving a cable saying, 'We accept your resignation at this time,' indicates to me that you are not concerned about the problems of Bolivia, that you feel you don't need an ambassador. So therefore, I am taking a leave. I'm going to go to Buenos Aires; I'm going to Argentina on a frolic of my own. You worry about Bolivia, then, if you're not concerned about it." So the answer then came back, "We are concerned about Bolivia," and that I should use my own judgment whether or not to go to Argentina. My answer was that, "You already have accepted my resignation; I don't believe you can have any continuity." So I took off to Rio and then also to Argentina. By the time I got to Argentina, of course, the coup occurred.

I had seen General [Alfredo] Ovando at the airport before I left for Argentina and had discussed it with him. I said, "General, there is a coup in the air, and let me tell you one thing. If you do something foolish, don't do it, wait until I come back. I'll be gone for five days, but don't do anything foolish because I might be able to assist you in the recognition of government." He said, "Don't worry, you go ahead to Argentina. I know

that we have problems. Nothing will happen. When you come back, we'll discuss it again." This was at the airport in La Paz, Bolivia.

Well, this happened on Friday, and I came back on Saturday, and when I came back, I discussed it with him. He said, "Well, I couldn't help it. The pressure was so strong that I had to take over the government."

F: Do you think he was sincere in that?

C: No, I don't think so, because I saw him--he is now in Spain as an ambassador, and I was in Spain three months ago. He's been involved in this type of conspiracy most of his life, so I don't think he was very sincere.

F: Barrientos, I judge, was pretty solid, as solid as any Bolivian can be.

C: Barrientos was a very good man; yes he was. He liked his people and believed in improving his country.

F: Did you go around with him at all?

C: Oh, considerably. He used to call me at midnight about every other day to fly with him. Whenever he'd go down to dedicate a bank, a school or a road, he'd invite me to travel with him, and fly. I did. I flew with him several times.

F: Did you have the feeling that his crash was just one of those things, or that there was some sabotage?

C: Oh, his life was in danger, and so was mine, because I think he was using me as a hostage to some extent. We were good friends, and I finally told him, "Mr. President, you're the one that's politically involved in this country, and I'm not; I'm an ambassador here. I wish you wouldn't invite me to fly with you. It's hard to tell a president of a country that

you don't want to join him, but we are both in jeopardy here, I think you'll recognize." I said that. I told him [that] the last time that I flew with him, and four days later he was killed. We almost got killed. In fact, I had information that he was about ready to be killed by Ovando and his people, supposedly, four days before he and I flew. They had machine guns geared on him to kill him over some army episode. It didn't go through; he convinced them it shouldn't happen. So he prevailed. Two or three days later he asked me to fly with him to dedicate a bank close to the Brazilian border. He had bought a new airplane, called the King Air, and he said, "I want you to try the King Air with me, Mr. Ambassador. Go with me." I said, "Well, the bank you're dedicating tomorrow is not our money; we have no interest in it. It's just strictly one of your banks; it's your internal matter." He said, "I know it. You're not involved in this, but I like your company. Travel with me."

We got to the airport and got in the airplane and I said, "Mr. President, this is La Paz, Bolivia. You're a pilot; the capacity is ten, and you know you can never leave an airport in Bolivia with a capacity load. You've got to reduce it at least by half." So he got rid of three or four people of his people in the plane; they weighed about sixty-five pounds [kilograms?] apiece. Then I said, "Have you checked your airplane? I'm a little concerned because after what happened three days ago. Your life might be in danger and that means my life is in danger." "Oh," he said, "there's no problem. We've checked the plane; there's nothing wrong with it." We flew at 26,000 feet that day. There were six of us in the plane. Out of the six, four passed out; they blacked out because there was no oxygen. He and I were the only ones who survived. Our tongues were hanging in our

teeth, *et cetera*.

F: Was he just sort of cavalier toward danger?

C: I felt very strongly at the time that somebody might have dickered with the airplane, took care of the pressure business. [There was] no oxygen coming in, and anoxia set in to everybody with the exception of me and he. We were strong enough to survive it--I was a big husky guy, and my lungs were . . . I adapted quite well to Bolivia. So did he, it being his own country. So we survived that one.

And then it was four days later when he expired in this helicopter accident. So I felt that his life was a question of when will it happen, and I knew it was coming. And I felt that as long as I was traveling with him that they would be a little hesitant killing the American ambassador and the President. If he was alone, they'd kill the President, but not the two of us.

F: That's a little too obvious, isn't it?

C: A little too obvious.

F: Did his death give you any problems at that moment?

C: Problems in what sense?

F: Well, you've got a change of government and I wondered whether . . .

C: Of course there were problems. Some of my problems got worse. When the man was killed, when Barrientos died, of course, it was a shock to me, because he was a good personal friend and I knew it was a question of time when it would happen. Although General Ovando was then in Washington; he was being wined and decorated by our government. And the Vice President, a fellow named [Luís A.] Siles Salinas, was a

civilian, a professor at the University of Salvador, took over as president within a matter of fifteen minutes. This, of course, did not sit well with General Ovando who was then in Washington, and he was flown in one of our planes back to Bolivia. I met him at the airport; I was one of the people to meet him.

F: According to the script, Siles was not supposed to move in on him.

C: That's right. He was not supposed to become president. He moved in too fast. So then arose the funeral of General Barrientos. We had the procession in La Paz, Bolivia. I participated; I walked the ten or fifteen miles on the entourage that very morning.

F: Where did you walk from and to?

C: From the airport clear down to the church, and on to the palace.

F: That is quite a mountain climbing.

C: You bet! So then, the ceremony continued up into Cochabamba, which is a forty-five minute flight. It was then that I got concerned because I was going to the funeral of course, as the ambassador, because our American delegation had already returned home. And about three hours before departure for Cochabamba I received a phone call from the President, Siles Salinas, asking me if I would join him and be his guest to go to Cochabamba.

F: You can't stay out of the presidential plane, can you?

C: So again I felt I was a hostage again, and I couldn't say no. So we got to the airport to go to Cochabamba for the ceremony. I approached the presidential plane, and he said, "No, we won't go in that one." So then we approached the second plane, and "No, we're not going to go on that one." So then we ended up in a little six-passenger deal of a charter

plane in the airport. As the President started to get into the plane, somebody gave him a .45 and some ammunition. His hand was shaking; I don't think he knew how to handle a .45.

But then he also had one of General Ovando's good strong men, General [?] de Lafuentes, as another hostage. I would call him a hostage. So the General de Lafuentes was there, the President, and myself.

F: That neutralized Ovando.

C: That's right. So I figured the plane would end up in Chile by that time, instead of going to the funeral. The schedule was that the President--Salinas--would make a speech at the park that day. There would be the ceremony at the church, and from the church the body would be taken to the park across the street. It was at that park that the President would make a speech, and it was at that park that the President would be abducted or killed, one of the two--Siles Salinas. And the script was changed because the President knew about this, and instead of giving his little speech at the park, he gave it at the church and oozed out with General [Juan Carlos] Onganía from Argentina. Onganía left first and then Siles Salinas went next, got in the plane, and off he went back to La Paz.

F: You got back another way?

C: I came back my own way, by commercial. But in the meantime, of course, the scheduled death of the Vice President didn't occur. The *campesinos* were there with rifles loaded and set up, but it didn't happen that day.

F: How was Salinas to work with?

C: He didn't stay in office too long.

F: I know!

C: Oh, he was a very nice man; I knew him perfectly well. You know, it's a small country and you know him well and he's a personal friend. He knew I was an attorney. He was also a lawyer. He was a professor, and he was an academic man and was a constitutional president, very professorial in his approach. A little weak. He did not have the military behind him, so let's face it.

F: He realized that he was just biding his time until Ovando made his move.

C: Yes, he did. He recognized it very thoroughly.

F: In a situation like that, how do you get on with anything when you feel that about half the people are plotting to remove you?

C: It's one big plot. I think all of us understood it and worked on that basis, that it's one big plot. And we don't work on the basis of bringing any other capital into the country. We sort of keep foreign aid at a minimum and do the best we can, because we know that anything coming in, any program is going to be a failure. Because the stability isn't there. So it pretty well crippled the country. We would just work on a day-to-day basis and that's all.

F: About all you do, really, is represent.

C: Represent, and that's all. And then plan the game of cops and robbers, gather information and talk to people. And you go to bed saying, "Will this be the night?"

F: What did you have in the way of children down there?

C: Two girls.

F: What ages?

C: They're now twenty-three and twenty-one.

F: Did they go to school there?

C: One of them did. The younger one graduated from high school in San Salvador, then went to Bolivia, did some work in Bolivia, and then went to The University of Dallas for two years--in Texas--then transferred to Arizona.

The other one is in Philadelphia.

F: Were you fearful for their safety, particularly the girl that was going to school there?

C: Yes, I think I was much more fearful for my wife and the two children than myself. I sort of enjoyed playing this type of thing and I enjoyed the action. I enjoyed the people that I was dealing with.

F: There is a kind of exhilaration in it--

C: There's no question about it.

F: --particularly when you get home.

C: That's right. You never know what's going on from day to day. You expect the bomb to come in or you expect the coup to happen, or expropriations, or students marching, demonstrating. I enjoyed that tour as exciting. I'm afraid that my family was a concern. The family didn't belong there.

F: They don't want to go back?

C: I'm sure not to Bolivia.

F: Did it affect your relations with the other nations represented there? Do they encounter the same problems or is this primarily a U.S. [problem]?

F: No, no, strictly American, strictly a U.S. problem. No, this is U.S. The other countries

are well accepted, received. They offer very little, but really, we are the problem.

F: Did you have a situation at all like, say, you had in World War II in Lisbon, in which this is a breeding ground for all international groups to get together, all complexions to spy, and everybody is observing everybody else?

C: Yes.

F: It's a good listening post, in other words?

C: Yes, a very good listening post, except Bolivia is very unsophisticated. That's a difficulty. There's a tendency in the unsophistication, for the people involved in the plots to call the shots. Not only do they tell in a whisper, but you can't confide in anybody. So whatever plot exists is known to the community within two or three hours notice really.

F: If I've got something going, I've got to brag about it.

C: That's right, so it's a funny situation. Rather strange. But that's the way it works. Everyone knows the plot. It's there. People would come into the embassy and plot with me and say--not plot with me, but offer their plotting to me: "I intend to knock over the President; how much time will you give me to get recognition?" Then the other group would come in. This goes on.

F: And all you do is listen?

C: Just listen to them. Of course, report it. Listen and report and discourage. I think that's something we all do is discourage the fact--our posture was: we feel that no government is worth having if it comes in by violence. If you come in by violence, then recognition is going to be very difficult, and therefore I would not encourage them. And secondly, you won't get any foreign aid, any assistance. So therefore I would say do it by

constitutional means. It's sort of a cliché. Nobody listens to it, but we feel obligated to do it.

F: Do you report to the government in power, or do you keep that to your own intelligence?

C: Oh, no. Oh, no. We just keep it--it's our own information. That would be jeopardizing our own posture, because then if you report to the government in power, then they know what's going on and the tendency is to expose everything. Within two minutes the opposition will know and that will give them the information.

F: And there would be stories, huh?

C: Yes. And my life would be limited then.

F: Your usefulness would be gone.

C: That's right.

F: Back to Gulf for a moment. Once the expropriation is announced, is there anything you can do about it? What did you do?

C: No, we did, once the expropriation was announced. In fact, it was very sloppily done. The troops came in in Santa Cruz at two o'clock in the afternoon and took over Gulf--the compound. And then later on--I was at home at lunch, in fact, when this happened--then we received a notice that they were coming into the office of Gulf in La Paz, taking over the records, impounding everything. We filed a formal protest but . . .

F: That's just paperwork.

C: It's paperwork, because after all it is a sovereign country and under international law they have a perfect right to expropriate. That's condition number one. Number two is adequate compensation, which hasn't happened yet.

F: Is there kind of an innocence on the part of the Bolivians in this sort of expropriation that they can then make things work? Because I know in Gulf they ran into a real problem of not being able to export their own oil.

C: I think what happened there actually: General Ovando had the pressure. He'd seen the Peruvian situation work--the IPC [International Petroleum Company] in Peru--and he misread the facts, didn't know what was happening. He felt it was the same type of structure, and he never realized that there is more to expropriation than just taking over. There is a matter of compensation, which he never gave a second thought. And then, the worst part, the worst blunder, was they never realized that there's marketing to begin. So, they took over Gulf and they didn't have any place to market their product, and to this very day, they can't market their product.

F: Peru is enormously sophisticated alongside Bolivia.

C: There's no question about it; that's right.

F: How did you get along with Ovando?

C: Oh, very well. Very well. You know, I didn't seek him out in Spain; he was there in Spain. But I think everybody thought well of Ovando; he's a quiet little fellow.

F: I presume among the Bolivians that this is an accepted way of life. In other words, a man doesn't come in with the kind of stigma of having removed somebody.

C: That's the way of live. General Ovando's been through four of five of these changes of governments. So therefore . . .

F: He comes; he goes.

C: He comes and goes. And that's the way of life; people know him. Since I left Bolivia,

four of my good friends have been killed . . . murder really. A man by the name of [?] Alexander: he was in bed with his wife and somebody sent him a cake or a little package. He opened the package and it exploded and killed him and his wife.

F: I thought they cut that out in 1919.

C: And the fellow was then the minister of government. The minister of interior was killed in Germany. A woman out there killed him. And also the minister at the time when I was there who was then minister of economy. Larrea [?], was also killed. He was Barrientos' man. He was killed.

F: So what did the insurance companies do?

C: There are no insurance companies. They don't insure lives there.

F: How did you come to leave?

C: Leave where?

F: Bolivia.

C: (Laughs) What a question.

F: Well, it's obvious, though.

C: For the record, yes. As you know, the Nixon Administration came in, and I submitted my resignation, which was accepted eleven months later. I was the last Democratic ambassador to leave Latin America; the last in the world was Sargent Shriver. And the reason I remained as long as I did was because Gulf Oil Company and all the other mining concerns--all the business people in Bolivia--made strong representations to the President that I should remain in Bolivia because they needed my help, and as an attorney I could be of great help to them. They all put a bit of pressure in saying that I should

remain, that I should not be fired. So, at long last, patronage came in and I had to leave.

C: Well, now there's the other question I was going to ask you. How did you stay so long?

F: Well, that's the reason. I know for a fact that Barry Goldwater from Arizona, Senator [Strom] Thurmond intervened and [Senator John] Tower from Texas, and, believe you me, they were not even close on ideology with those people. And also Gulf Oil Company and Mills and some contributors of the Republican Party of New York make some personal representations to the President.

C: Did Thurmond get in because of petroleum or because of textiles?

F: No, the textile industry. You know, there's a fellow that has a textile industry, the owner of . . . I forgot the name of it in North Carolina, a tremendously large concern, contributor to the President. They also have a mining interest in Bolivia, Lepos [?] mining company. And they were about ready to lose their pants, and were having difficulty in Bolivia and I was doing a lot of work for their Lepos mining company. So they felt that keeping me there would be to safeguard their interests to some extent. So they had textiles and also mining.

F: How are you going to work out that situation down there?

C: In Bolivia?

F: Yes.

C: I don't think we'll be able to work it out. I think we'll just have token representation and do the best we can. I foresee great difficulty in Bolivia in years to come. I don't see stability at this moment.

F: Did the Alliance for Progress hold out any real hope, or was it just pouring it down a rat

hole there?

C: No, the Alliance for Progress was no hope at all.

F: That wasn't the answer.

C: No acceptability and very poorly handled, so it didn't work.

F: Do you really think during the time you were there there was no answer?

C: For Bolivia, no. I think the only answer is, of course, political stability. I think you've got to have political stability. The people will argue this: that the economists in Washington will take their stance; we feel that we can bring money into Bolivia and bring an economic development in Bolivia; then that in turn would bring political stability. And I take the other stance: they both go together; you can't have economic development unless you have political stability. So, you've got to work an approach both ways. You have to have the political know-how to have economic development. And my view is that in our foreign policy in Latin America, I think our political vintages and our political tenets are very poor. We don't have enough people with political know-how, political sagacity to be able to go into Latin America and help in political structures. We send people who are economists; we have economists coming out our ears in Latin America. We have every facet coming into Latin America except people with political knowledge. And to me this is the key to the whole thing. And they say, "Well, how can you bring in political knowledge to them?" Well, you can. You can bring in a man, an expert say in municipal government, who can work with the municipal governments. It's political; I don't care what you call it. The mayor's political and very much political. You start developing this political structure that goes in and then the schools and the

universities, *et cetera*, with people who are politically skilled in our country, that understand the political problems of Latin America and work on that basis. Like Mexico has. They've developed their own political skills with the PRI [Revolutionary Institutions Party].

F: Is the [Gen. Alfredo] Stroessner example viable?

C: Oh, yes. I think the Stroessner example is, of course, a military government. On the other hand, he has a lot of political--

F: Paraguay has moved forward.

C: There's no question about it. And he has a lot of political know-how. I think Stroessner has a lot of political ability. So did Barrientos have a lot of political ability. Had Barrientos remained, I think Bolivia would have been at high plane, would have continued. I think under Barrientos, Bolivia made a lot of progress. This is admitted by every Bolivian. Tremendous; he was well loved. The man had the political know-how.

F: Was there any serious interest in Bolivia toward furthering President Belúnde Terry's program for an interior trans-Andean road?

C: No.

F: They never really had any concern in connecting onto that?

C: Well, there is now. I think when I was there it was the biggest fiasco we ever [had]. I think we contributed fifty million dollars for that road from Cochabamba towards Lima, Peru. But it leads nowhere. Those points are dead end, you know. And we spend all that money and there it is. But the dream was eventually to get to Peru and be a way out of Peru.

F: Does the fact that Bolivia has this abiding hate for Chile because of its land-locked position give you any problem as an American ambassador?

C: Oh, not too much. I think we got involved and were trying to resolve it. Before President Barrientos died, he and I had several conferences, and were working on a possible formula for having Bolivia recognize Chile and resume relations with each other and then in turn get a seaport out of Chile. This was very much in the plan.

F: What would you do, head for Arica or get a fabricated . . .

C: Oh, no, get Arica . . . There's a little port about twenty miles north of Arica right on the border between Tacna [Peru] and Arica. [The idea was to] have that made a free port, make that a Bolivian port.

F: Give you a little corridor there.

C: That's right. Give Bolivia a sovereignty of that port, a Bolivian sovereignty. And that way, Bolivia would have a port out, and relations between Bolivia and Chile would be resolved and that's it. Frankly, I was rather encouraged. I felt this was very much a possibility at the time.

F: One final question, Mr. Ambassador. You have of course this strong Christian Democrat movement in Chile which moved out throughout South America.

C: You have it in Salvador.

F: Your big movements in politics don't really pertain in Bolivia. They're still personal, aren't they?

C: Very personal. The personal democracy is, of course, rather strong in Salvador. The mayor of San Salvador was a Christian Democrat. And there's a possibility that the next

president could be a Christian Democrat in Salvador. Very strong, of course, in Chile. There's some strength in Colombia, some in Peru; very little, none, whatsoever in Bolivia. So Bolivia has no outside forces coming into it really. Strictly a native, a local [inaudible].

F: You don't really have a theology?

C: No, none whatsoever. It's grab and take and that's about it.

F: Anything else you think we ought to talk about?

C: That's about all.

F: Thank you very much.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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