INTERVIEWEE: GEORGE CHRISTIAN (Tape #2)

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

December 4, 1969

F: This is the second interview with George Christian, now in Austin, Texas in his office, and the interviewer is Joe B. Frantz, and the date must be December 4, 1969.

Okay, George. We were talking before we turned the tape on and we may as well continue it. Let's talk a little bit about your relationship with the distaff press corps, the East Wing press corps headed by Liz Carpenter, how you stayed out of her way, or she stayed out of your way, or how you got in each other's way.

C: We tried to have a division of authority which existed when I became Press Secretary. Sometimes this was difficult because Mrs. Johnson's activities were related so closely with the President's on some things.

F: Things don't always fit in a neat slot, do they?

C: That's right. Generally, the White House press office had nothing to do with Liz Carpenter's east side press office. Occasionally, there were potential conflicts, though, frankly because President Johnson sometimes expressed displeasure with something that was going on on Mrs. Johnson's side, and somehow wanted his Press Secretary--whether it was me or somebody else--to interfere in it and try to change it or something. This always caused a little bit of a problem. In the first place, we didn't like to do it.

F: I presume as a line of demarcation--leaving out the fact that anybody connected with the White House is political--but in general if it wasn't politics, it belonged on the East Wing if it was personal.

C: That's right. And yet, Liz, being a rather astute politician herself and having very definite views on some things that the President ought to be involved in, sometimes in connection with Mrs. Johnson such as-- I think the worst potential flap we ever had was over the entertainment of the Latin American Ambassadors in Texas.

F: Was that when you came down to the ranch?

C: Yes. Most of that Liz planned along with Bess Abell, and some of it she did over the President's resistance, frankly, because he was never convinced it was the right thing to do. As it turned out, I don't think anything could have been better than the program that was staged down there. He had some doubts that he ought to do it, though, because it made a sort-of Texas show out of it--an image. He thought it would raise some image problems of the President.

F: I got involved in that peripherally, and you can straighten me out. Liz called, I think, Cactus Pryor as well as me about some entertainment, and I think I may have been the one who suggested the Fandangle out at Albany. I think she may then have checked that out with Cactus to see what he thought, and he endorsed it. I've never tried to follow this through, but I would gather that might have been a point of some concern.

C: I really don't think it was so much the Fandangle as it was the concept of having all these people at the ranch--the basic concept of taking them into this ranch setting and exposing them to this Texas problem that he always faced anyway--this big Texan thing that distressed him many times. He was sensitive about the Texas [image].

F: Was this flap over the hats real, or was that something that just got dreamed up?

C: No, it was real. As I recall it, the idea of giving hats was completely--he vetoed it completely. If I'm not mistaken, I think he had a little flap with Liz, or maybe Bess--I've forgotten. At least, it was the distaff side over the hat thing. That's my recollection. Somebody else who was closer to it might remember it more clearly.

F: You didn't really get involved in it?

C: No, I didn't get involved in that. I tried. I did my best.

F: You missed something once in awhile, huh?

C: Well, this was one of those cases where I did my best to stay out of that planning portion of it, because I knew the conflict was there and I didn't want to get into a flap with Liz. Yet the President insisted that Tom Johnson and I enter into some of these things, and occasionally we did have head-on collisions over this type of thing with the distaff side--unavoidably. He said, "I want you to present my view on this thing. You're my press secretary and I'm not going to be intimidated into doing something I don't want to do." Well, sometimes I didn't necessarily agree with him that it was something he ought not do, but it put me in a position of having to.

F: For instance?

C: Well, I think this was an example. I thought that the ranch thing was good.

F: I thought it came off beautifully.

C: It came off beautifully, and I think he did [think so] after it was over. I think he was quite satisfied with it. I think he had serious doubts because he thought that the press would eat him up on it.

Then we had a flap. We had some disagreements over press coverage of the event. This caused some real problems. He and Liz didn't see eye-to-eye on this. She naturally wanted full press coverage, and he was concerned

about it because again of the Texas thing, and the fact that it looked like he was going down to put on some big show for the Latin American Ambassadors.

F: Was he sometimes pushed into the position of being, in a way, more Texan than he wanted to be?

C: Yes. He got burned a time or two.

F: I presume the whole group of you were at times.

C: Yes, we all were sensitive about it. He got burned a time or two on this Texas stuff. He never forgave Liz for stuff like "six-shooter coffee" and things like that early in his Administration. He thought that put a Texan stamp on him that he didn't necessarily want, and this was part of the problem with this particular ambassadors' function at the ranch. That is the only example, though, that I can recall offhand where we really had a little conflict between the West Wing and the East Wing on this sort of thing. We worked out our problems. We tried to. I tried on this and on one or two minor things. I tried to stay out of Liz's way on it because I sure didn't want to get into the business of running the East Wing. I had enough to do on my own.

F: Did the President ever sort-of go behind your back and give reporters stories which up till that time he hadn't permitted you to give out?

C: Not really. I was almost always with him when he talked with reporters. Occasionally he might say something on an off-the-record basis to a reporter that I would have been very hesitant to say. But after all, I usually said what I was told to say on these sensitive matters.

F: But you never did wake up and pick up the Des Moines Register and [were] surprised by--

C: No, I never was really surprised because I was usually there when he did it, but, occasionally, I was surprised at some of the things he told newsmen in my presence. I'll have to admit that sometimes he surprised me.

F: Again, in a peripheral sense I've seen him on occasion give out with some just amazing information that if you had known, you wouldn't have dared reveal.

C: Yes, because I figure that that was his prerogative. He was the President, and I worked for him, and I worked under more narrow boundaries than he did on divulging some information.

F: In one sense, was being the press officer at the White House basically different from having been associated with the same sort of operation back in Texas, except that you are, of course, dealing on a much magnified scale?

C: There was a great deal of difference. I think the fact that I was, in a sense, a professional press secretary--had been doing this sort of thing for some time--helped me immensely, particularly in terms of not being totally overwhelmed with the problems we faced up there. You know, you get burned enough over the years that things don't affect you quite the way they would somebody that might be shocked by something that happens, or trying to work out a relationship with a reporter, or something like that.

F: You've built up scar tissue.

C: Yes, you've got enough scar tissue built up to where you take things a little more calmly, maybe, and you don't get quite as excited about certain things if you've been beat over the head a few times in the past. But I think that helped.

But on the other hand, the assignments were so different that it was just like going to school all over again in going to the White House. I

had naturally worked with reporters, had been a reporter, and had some understanding of developing relationships with reporters. On the other hand, the concept of working with a huge staff of experts in various fields, the concept of working with newsmen who really are--there's only one way to put it--they're the best in the business. They're far and away above the average newspaperman, including myself as a reporter.

F: By and large they are, by nature, extremely critical because they are analytical.

C: These guys are very analytical guys. They're at the top of the ladder as reporters--not as editors, or publishers, or anything else--but you can't find better reporters than those who work there and cover the White House. They're at the pinnacle, and because of this they're a different breed of people. I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of good newspaper people out around the country. There are, but you don't have the concentration of talent and power anywhere that you have in Washington, naturally, and in the White House, specifically. They're generalists. They're knowledgeable people. They're generally highly educated people. In a sense, they probably know more than the Press Secretary, regardless of who he is, simply because they've been there longer.

F: They bring more background to it.

C: They bring more background into it. When you're dealing with a man who was at the Potsdam Conference, or who was at Warm Springs when Roosevelt died, or who went on Roosevelt's trip to Casablanca--something like that--and these guys have been involved in summit meetings and Presidential decisions for years and years. You've got to face that they may have a slightly better grasp of some things than you do. So you'd better be careful in how you deal with them. You can't bluff this type of reporter at all. He'll eat you up.

F: You were known for having excellent press relations, and I've got lots of tributes to you on that, but you must have run into lots of White House reporters that were just plain antagonistic.

C: Sure.

F: Do you handle them any differently than you do the others, or does everyone get equal shrift in this?

C: Once you find out a little about each man whose regular beat is covering the White House, you have to treat each one of them differently really. You can talk to some reporters, or I could anyway--put it in that sense. I could talk to some reporters on almost anything I wanted to talk [about] and knew that I was protected, or that they understood, or they weren't out with an axe trying to hit the President in the head. On others, you couldn't say anything to them; you were running a risk every time they came to your office.

A few of the White House reporters plain didn't like the President. They were after him from the minute he came into office, practically. These were difficult guys to deal with. They might be perfectly decent people in some respects, but they had a real hang-up on Lyndon Johnson. As a result, they questioned everything he said. They questioned the credibility of the whole government and, particularly, him on almost every issue. They might be outspoken critics of the war, or of the Dominican intervention, or something else. They just generally, were antagonistic reporters. There weren't very many of these guys.

The Post Dispatch was highly critical of the President, and I never met a reporter from the Post Dispatch that didn't share his paper's editorial policy when it came to President Johnson. Well, this made them a little difficult to

deal with in the sense that you knew that for that paper it was open season on the President, and you had to be extremely careful how you dealt with them. It didn't mean that these guys couldn't write a fair story. They could. I've seen extremely fair stories written by some of the worst critics of the President, but if they had even the germ of something unfavorable, you could always count on it being built up pretty good in an unfriendly newspaper.

There were others. There were one or two who were excellent reporters but were unrealiable observers of the Lyndon Johnson Presidency because they despised the President. I don't know whether there's any other way to put it. They questioned everything he did, morally, legally, or otherwise.

F: He could have solved all the world's problems and there would have still been some flaw in it.

C: I remember a terrible cuss-fight between Stu Loory of the Los Angeles Times and Loyd Hackler, one of the Assistant Press Secretaries. Loory wrote a story that was totally unfair. It was wrong--just an incorrect sotry. I don't remember now what the subject was. It just infuriated Hackler. He showed it to me, and I got mad when I saw it. When I got mad, Hackler just blew his cool and just the thought that this fellow would do this to the President just overwhelmed him, and he went out and challenged Loory. I thought they were going to get into a fight--a fist-fight. As it was, he called him every name he could think of, and Loory said he was insulted, and he wasn't going to stand for that, and they were trying to intimidate the press, and all this sort of stuff. Well, it was one of these momentary things, and it was a rarity, but occasionally we did have that.

I got into a row with Jim Deakin of the Post-Dispatch one time along similar lines. I had to, occasionally, call a reporter into my office after a briefing and tell him face-to-face that I wasn't going to put up with the type of questioning that he had asked in the briefing--that if he wanted to come in and talk to me about it, I'd be glad to talk to him about the subject --but I wasn't going to be treated like some sort of prisoner in the dock at a news briefing. If he didn't like it, why he could face me out in the alley if that's what he wanted to do, but that I didn't think my job was to be insulted by reporters. I didn't insult them, and I didn't think they had the right to insult me.

Well, we usually worked out our problems that way. Most of the time --99 percent of the time--the day-to-day relationships were good, and part of this was simply because most of the White House correspondents were basically fair, objective men and women who were there to do a job. It was a job they were assigned to do, and they didn't have any vendetta going on, or they didn't have any particular side to play on a lot of questions. Or, at least, they masked their personal feelings.

Yet the entire White House press has to be thought of as a rather voracious group. They bite, they've got teeth. They're looking for flaws in the operation, which I guess is their job--their Constitutional role.

C: Who certifies them to the White House?

F: Their papers assign them. Their medium assigns them.

Does the White House ever make somebody persona-non-grata, or would that be suicide?

C: I don't know how you would ever do it. If you had a particularly friendly publisher, I guess you could say, "I wish you would assign someone else to the White House. That guy's just giving me fits. Because he's the way he

is, he's not doing a good job covering for you because my people can't even talk to him. You can't trust him."

F: Of course, that would dangerous if it ever leaked on you.

C: You can't do that. It's extremely difficult to do that sort of thing, and I never did it. You just endure the people that you don't like. How are you going to go to the Los Angeles Times and say, "Don't let such-and-such cover the White House. He's bad. He's mean to the President." They'd say, "Great, I'll give him a raise."

F: Do you have a certified list of papers that can be represented. In other words, to use a paper that we both know, the Denton Record Chronicle, would they send a White House correspondent?

C: Oh, sure, they could cover him every day if they wanted to. There's a distinction between a White House regular and a person who just casually covers the White House. The regulars generally have desk space in the White House press room. A good many other people come in periodically, but don't staff the White House all day long every day. But anyone can be accredited unless he's a subversive or security risk of some kind. We do run security checks on accredited White House reporters simply because they are people who get in to see the President. An unstable man with a press card and White House accreditation could walk into the White House with a gun and walk right into a news conference and shoot the President. That is probably the biggest security problem in the White House itself--is the press accreditation. Simply because these are people who have access to the President and really no particular check and balance on them.

F: What do you do about foreign press?

C: They go through the same procedure. Of course, the Eastern Europeans cover the White House just as easily as anybody else. They're restricted in their

travel away from Washington, as any national from a Communist country is. But other than that, they come in and cover the briefings and cover the news conferences.

One time, when we got special permission for one of the TASS correspondents to go to Texas with us, the President took him along with a group of three or four other reporters on a tour of the ranch in his station wagon, and showed him his house, and everything else--treated him just like one of the American correspondents. I think that's the first time any TASS man ever got on the ranch, and the Secret Service was always quite skeptical having these folks too close to the President. Not because of security problems particularly, but just because they represented the enemy, you know.

F: Allowing for the fact that they do have a party line and therefore are going to slant their stories according to the line, did you get the feeling with the Communist press representatives that maybe you blunted their antagonism just a little?

C: I never had any illusions about who they were or what they were. Every Soviet correspondent in Washington is also an agent. It's just a fact of life you live with. They're there for a double purpose, as journalists and as people who report to their government on activities. They report on a variety of things--economic, political, all sorts of things--but they are an arm of the Soviet government, and they have to be considered as such. Many of them are army-trained people. They're agents--Communist agents--and therefore their activities outside of Washington are a little bit restricted.

Also, if you talk to them privately, you have to understand that everything you say is potentially information [intelligence] for them that

they may make some use of. You also have to take with a grain of salt a lot of what they say, because they use an identical line. They did when we were there, anyway. The individual Russian correspondents, in particular, always were talking about "Why can't we have better understanding? Why can't we have peace? Why can't we get Viet Nam solved so everything will be fine?" The general line was pretty much the same, you know. It was a soft-sell type of thing that "Our country is a good place, and we're good people, and we ought not be enemies" type of approach. Well, this was fine. I sold the same line, and I didn't object to that.

I remember one time, though, I created a small problem. I ran into a new TASS correspondent--an Armenian, I've forgotten his name--at a State Department reception, and he asked me why he hadn't yet been accredited to the White House. He had sent his letter in several weeks before, and he hadn't received his White House accreditation.

I said, "Oh, you've got a particular problem."

He was sort of a little bit stunned and said, "What is it?"

I said, "You haven't signed the non-Communist oath."

He didn't laugh at all. It wasn't a bit funny to him. And I thought, "Oh, my word, I've really big-mouthed it too much!" But I think he finally understood that it was a joke.

F: Did you make any personal friendships, or were you in a position to make any personal friendships?

C: Not with Soviet correspondents. There was one that I liked. He was this fellow that went to the ranch with us. I liked him personally, but I never had any social relationship with him. Didn't want that type of relationship. Thought it was bad business, and didn't seek it.

F: Did you somewhat, like an umpire, stay away from the ball players so that

you wouldn't get sort-of non-objective in your relationships with them, or did you go ahead? Your natural friends would be newspaper people--would have been able to talk the same language.

C: I guess some of my closest friends--social friends, personal friends--in Washington were naturally newspaper people.

F: Of course, some of them you would have known back in Texas before they moved East.

C: Well, a few, but my wife and I developed very close personal relationships with a number of them. We were generally able to keep our business and our friendships apart. There are several there now that I still consider good friends, and we still have a relationship. I'm going to try to go to England next summer and going to stay with Ray Shearer, who's now with NBC in London. Pat Heffernan, the Reuters bureau chief in Washington, is a particularly good friend of ours, and a number of others that we are still close to and I still see every time I go to Washington. It's possible to have that type of social relationship without compromising yourself.

Naturally my friends in the press corps were generally people who were not supercritical of the President. I would have had extreme difficulty in being too close to a guy who just sat around all the time bad-mouthing the President. You don't have any relationship. You're just sitting there arguing all the time.

F: It's not exactly an evening of fun, is it?

C: So generally it was with people who were either pretty objective or who were actually fairly friendly to the President. Merriman Smith of UPI was a very objective sort-of pro-President reporter. He's an old-timer. He just believed that the President was the President and you ought to give him the

benefit of the doubt. He was a particularly good friend, and a number of others.

F: Was there an easing of any tensions between the White House and the reporters after the President removed himself as a candidate on March 31, 1968? Or did this seem to matter?

C: I guess it mattered some because it sort-of, in general, directed press criticism and press attention away from him some, particularly after the campaign--after the primaries were in full-swing, and the conventions, and then the campaign. The press attention was diffused over a number of people, and I think that, in itself, helped the President's press relations a little.

I always thought sometimes our relationships with the press were a little too close and a little too familiar. There was no great mystique about President Johnson as far as the press was concerned. They knew him too well. He had been in the Senate. A lot of them knew him there. He was a personal friend of a good many newspaper people.

F: Too many of them knew him when he needed publicity.

C: Well, he wasn't distant from them. In a way public officials are better off when they're a bit removed from the herd, you know. If you can develop a mystique that you're a little bit removed from the ordinary person and that you're a little insulated, and a little distant, and unfamiliar, and maybe treat them at arms length, sometimes I think your press relations are better. I think that the President in some ways was too close to the press room as such. He devoted a great deal of his personal attention and his energy to the news media. Now part of this was defensive because he was always having problems with the news media, and they were doing something that would get him in trouble. But still he had a very difficult time in lifting himself

sort-of above the debate of the press, and he was too often down there jostling around with them.

F: He had trouble staying out of the market arena, didn't he?

C: That's right. He was in the arena a little too much, I think, with the reporters. The familiarity itself became somewhat of a problem. There was very darned little that Lyndon Johnson said, did, thought, that the press wasn't aware of. He talked with them a good deal privately or publicly. He made a lot of appearances where they could see him a great deal. He just generally became such a familiar President to them that they may have treated him a little too familiarly. He wasn't the king.

F: Kind of like being married without any of the romance.

C: He was Lyndon Johnson from Texas who just happened to be in the White House. I think that's the way a lot of them tended to look at him, and I don't know what you do about this really. Part of it was just the circumstances. He had been in the Senate and exposed for a long, long time. A great deal had been written about him long before he ever became President. There was very little about his past history that wasn't known, very little about his personal life, his background, very little about his family that wasn't a well-known fact. Maybe he was just too much of a commoner in the sense that--I think Truman probably had the same problem.

F: I thought I detected right at the end almost a little sentimentality among a hard-boiled group.

C: Yes, I think this is probably the other side of the coin of just what I've been talking about. The affection that a lot of the reporters felt for him resulted from the very thing that got him in trouble sometimes, and that's the familiarity and the fact that he was not a regal man as President.

F: He was not so much a symbol to them as he was just a man?

C: As a man, as a human being with lots of attributes and lots of faults through their eyes. I think as his end neared it began to dawn on a lot of them that, one, he had done an awful lot as President. He had done a lot that he said he was going to do. And, secondly, that as an individual and as a politician and a public figure, there just wasn't going to be another one like him; that they were seeing the end of something that a lot of them didn't like to see; that they knew that it was going to be different from then on. It was just like losing Roosevelt, I guess. You know, the next guy along is a different individual, and you're going to be thinking back and wishing you had this--

F: You've gone through another gate, and you've kind of closed it forever.

C: Yes, you've closed it forever. I think this began to sink in on some of them. I remember a column Art Buchwald wrote. Lord, his barbs at the President and everybody else have been pretty severe. But he wrote a column of purported conversation between several people talking about how, thank goodness, they wouldn't have to put up with Lyndon Johnson any more--all his hollering about civil rights and all these things. Then he got down to the end of the column and the fellow said, "You know, the more I talk and think about it, Lord, how are we going to live without him? How are you going to do without this voice that has been beating us in the ears all this time?"

I saw another piece in the University of Maryland college newspaper. The headline was: "Goodbye to The Ugly Old Man," and it was a great satire on how we no longer were going to have this old bird from Texas. We didn't want to listen to him when he told us we ought not hate each other because, by golly, we wanted to hate each other. And he didn't solve the war, and he

didn't solve poverty, and he didn't solve the race question, and he was no good because he didn't solve all of these things; and he was just some ugly old man from Texas. Of course, the net of it was that if we had been listening to him, maybe we would have done a little bit more than we did and that, in the final analysis, maybe it wasn't that he didn't deserve the country, but that the country didn't deserve him--something to that effect. Well, this type of thing began to come out.

I remember another one in the Baltimore Sun about the Texans, how God, wasn't it great to get rid of all these Texans who had been ruining everything in Washington all this time. And, of course, he was the lead Texan of all. And then it sort of went down the list of the Texans like Ramsey Clark and the others, and Lyndon Johnson, and pointed out that these guys might take another look at these birds down in history; that these Texans weren't all that bad; that they were going to be missed in Washington.

That is probably a typical reaction to a man at the end of his term. A guy always looks a little better when he's not going to be there any more, and I think some of it is that--is purely that--but some of it also was sort of a nostalgia that here this boisterous, active, newsworthy Administration was going to come to a close, and that it wasn't going to be replaced; that there was no prospect that the incoming Administration was going to be anything like this thing, which had been kind of fun. You know from a newspaper man's standpoint, despite all the hardships and the bitterness--

F: There was hardly a dull day.

C: There was hardly a dull day in the Johnson Administration. For the average Washington newspaperman, it was a pretty good period.

F: Kind-of as if the President had gotten up each morning and said, "All right now, what hornet's nest shall we turn loose today?"

C: It would have seemed like that to a lot of them. There certainly never was any dullness about the thing. They might have harped at a lot of the stuff he did, and criticized his speeches, and his speaking style, and things like that, but at least the things he was constantly stirring up were newsworthy from their standpoint.

F: You've got reporters antagonistic to the President and then you've got your own role as the middle-man in this--funnel for the President to his relationship with the press. Were you ever caught in the position of the people, in a sense, taking things out on you personally? Did they get personal against you simply because of their dislike for Johnson--the fact that they couldn't get at the President they went after you instead?

C: No, very, very rarely. I'd have to say that essentially I had a pretty good press. Now this doesn't necessarily mean that's good. I mean that this is the way it ought to be. I tried to take as much flak as I could if the choice were there between getting him blamed for something or getting me blamed maybe for accidentally misleading somebody or something like that. I figured that was part of the job and I had learned a long time ago in the governor's office down here--when I didn't do it one time--I learned that you were a whole lot better off trying to absorb as much of that as you could and not blame him for it.

A lot of times when a wire service made a glaring mistake, which I happened to see on the ticker, I would try to get it corrected, or even sometimes have to raise a little hell about it if it was just a gross lie that was going to show up in print. I'm sure that the President got blamed

for a lot of that simply because they thought he was telling me to do it. Mostly he got blamed for it because he did a lot of it himself. I mean, if he saw something he didn't like he usually told somebody about it, particularly if it was just some glaring mistake that he wanted corrected before it was carried all over the country. So he had a reputation for correcting the newspapers all the time--the wire services, TV, and everybody else. The fact that I did it too--I did it partly to protect him because I knew he would see it too, and partly for the same reason he did it. I just didn't want to get a big error out in the press. I think he caught a lot of the flak caused by his Press Secretaries, including me, trying to correct what we thought were grievous problems with the press.

F: Isn't a good bit of that though transferrable to any President and any Administration? Isn't this just going to happen because of exposure?

C: It's going to happen, sure. It's going to happen, but it was particularly a certainty in his Administration because of his closeness to the press and his--I guess there is no other word--this obsession with the news that he had. He read the newspapers and listened to the radio better than anybody else at the White House, or anybody else in Washington. He knew more what was going on than anybody else, and he got a lot of his information by just being well informed through the papers and everything. Well, exposure to that much news copy became sort of an albatross, in a way, because the press knew it. The press knew it could antagonize him if they wanted to. A guy knew how he could twit him. All he would have to do was just write a little line--

F: Stick in a little sentence in there--

C: --in a story, and he'd get a reaction out of the President. Reporters aren't above doing that sort of thing. So his sensitivity to press coverage made

him more vulnerable to catching all the blame for everything that anybody did in regard to press relations. If Orville Freeman or somebody else had a row, the temptation on the press's part was to think that it was really the President and somebody having a row, that it was all his doing.

F: Everything got personalized?

C: Everything got kind-of personalized back to Lyndon Johnson's war with the press.

F: Did you have some sort of regular regimen for--or someone in your office who actually read papers and made a conscious effort for saturation reading, or did you just read the best you could and when you had time?

C: Oh, I read the available papers that were timely. Of course, that was just the Washington papers and the New York Times and the Sun and the Wall Street Journal. They were the only ones that you could really get access to when you needed them.

Willie Day Taylor read all of the papers that came in to the White House, and clipped stuff she thought the President was interested in, or that I would be interested in. So we kept up with the papers around the country fairly well, but it's extremely difficult to sit there and read a stack of clippings when you don't have time to do it. You know, if you're at home, you get our papers delivered to you at home. You can generally read them in the car going to work or something, but it's hard just to sit there and read the paper in the White House. I think one of my failings was, sometimes I didn't read the papers carefully enough or listen to the radio carefully enough or watch the "Today Show" carefully enough, or something like that. But I'll swear, when I got to work I didn't have time to do anything else except work.

F: Did the President ever catch you on some news development that you hadn't read and he had?

C: Sure, frequently, because he was lying up in his bed over there at the Mansion in the morning going over the newspapers very thoroughly, and going over a lot of other stuff thoroughly. That was his way of operating to spend most of the morning doing the reading of things that he had to do, and that included the newspapers. The Press Secretary had to get up at home, get the kids to school, eat breakfast--probably fix his own breakfast--and fight the traffic getting to work over a thirty-minute haul, or something like that, and come into an office completely unprotected from the phone or anything else. It was a slightly different environment so a lot of times I missed some things that I hadn't had time to look at.

F: How did you handle the problem? Each one of the Cabinet, each one of the Departments, each one of the agencies, has its own press office. I'm sure that occasionally things came out of there that you would rather had been funneled through the White House. Was there any coordination, or did you just trust to luck on this?

C: No, there was a good bit of coordination. We generally knew what the agencies were going to do, and it was reasonably well-coordinated with the White House. A lot of times I was given the option by an agency as to whether we wanted to release something at the White House or in the agency. I adopted a policy, and in a way changed the policy, that put more of that load back on the agencies.

I always thought it was sort of bad business for the White House to be releasing a lot of stuff that was obviously agency material, and we tried to guard against it. We didn't always succeed because sometimes

we were so desperate we had to have something from an agency to put out. I consciously tried to help the agency people--public information people--with their own problems as well as want them to help me with mine. I figured that if we just treated them like dogs out there in the Departments we weren't going to get any help when we really needed it. I didn't try to rule them with an iron hand, or anything like that. I didn't think it was wise, and it's not any way to do business.

They generally kept us advised on what their Cabinet Secretary or their Department head was going to do. They usually, at our request, sent us sort of a Futures Book every week on what they had in the mill. We would look at that and see if there was something there, you know, that looked like potentially Presidential activity. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred it wasn't, and they went on about their business and never even heard from us.

We checked with them every morning, with the key departments--particularly with the ones involved in foreign policy. I had a coordination system with the Pentagon, State Department, White House, CIA--the agencies primarily involved with international relations on problems of the day--on what was to be said in briefings. The State Department and White House had a particular problem in trying to be consistent on what they told the press because we both had briefings. I had one at 11 in the morning, and the State Department press officer had one at noon, and it was awfully easy to get caught in a conflict without very close coordination.

F: You didn't have time to get a transcript over to him.

C: Well, as soon as my briefing was over, one of my people called him and went over with him the questions and answers so he could anticipate what he might get and, also, just find out what I had referred over to the State Department,

that's what they were for. I mean, I didn't think that the White House ought to be sitting there answering a lot of questions on military matters. They had no business doing it, and as a result I kicked a lot of things to the Pentagon. But I always told them what I was going to kick over there to them, and we usually worked it out in advance if there was something in particular that Secretary Rusk felt the White House ought to say for some particular reason. We would find out ahead of time and say it.

Ordinarily we referred most of that stuff over to the appropriate departments. One, it lowers the level of comment on very ticklish things sometimes which we always felt might be better in terms of dealing with other countries. It kept you from getting into potential day-after-day harassments and harangues over some particular issue like the Pueblo, for example. There wasn't much we could say about the Pueblo. I spent a whole year referring questions on the Pueblo to the State Department, because it was a matter of negotiation with another country on the release of the thing. Well, it began to look like we just weren't interested in the Pueblo. And occasionally the President would make some statement about the Pueblo just to keep it--

F: Just to keep a hand in.

C: Just to keep a hand in it. But it was on a day-to-day basis. We didn't want to get into that every day-of having to make some statements--because sooner or later we'd slip up and say something that would jeopardize the negotiations on the release of the men, or it would cause some international problem. We just tried not to say much about it. Well, this doesn't give the public much information, but you stand a better chance of getting the crew back if you don't just have a running commentary in the papers every day on an issue like that.

A lot of that was a matter of judgment between my office and the Departments. I usually talked to Secretary Rusk, or Nick Katzenbach, every morning on something of particular importance. If there was something that I thought, maybe, the White House ought to discuss with the press, I usually cleared it with Secretary Rusk before we did it and we would be in a position to tell the President, "Secretary Rusk thinks we ought to do this." And he almost always went along with whatever we decided to do.

F: Now when you get something like the Pueblo incident which, of course, is highly inflammatory, when it first breaks do you spend a great deal of time trying to figure what you're going to say, or does the President pretty well just stick you out there and say, "Let's give it to them as straightforwardly as we can, and just field the questions?"

C: It depends. If it's a matter of relating facts, such as: when did we hear about this? how did the President react? what's he doing? how's he handling it? has he set up any committees or something to work on it? what's happening as a matter of fact? Well, I could tell them everything I knew about something like that. If it was "What is the government's position on this subject?" that became either a Presidential pronouncement, or a statement by the Secretary of State, or something like that.

F: A statement like that would be made directly by the man?

C: Well, maybe, or I might, or might not, release it. Sometimes before the briefing we worked up a statement, generally by Walt Rostow and Secretary Rusk, if it was something of this nature. They would work up a statement for the President to make. He would approve it, or change it, or do what he wanted to with it, and we generally worked back and forth on it. I might raise some question about it simply because it left a gap or something

that I knew they were going to ask a lot of questions about. I didn't try to butt in and say, "Well, you ought not say this," I mean, if it was something that Secretary Rusk knew a whole lot more about than I did, I didn't feel like I ought to be telling him what he ought to say.

On the other hand, sometimes I did anticipate we might get into a few problems on something if we didn't tell the complete story or didn't make it abundantly clear what we were talking about. That might be released by me in a briefing as a Presidential statement, or we might decide to let the State Department put it out as a statement by the Secretary of State or the State Department. Generally these questions were just resolved in conversation in the White House.

The press officer really is nothing more than a funnel, whether he's a State Department press officer or a White House press officer. He's a funnel for information that the Administration wants to get out, or he is in a position to field a lot of questions and take the brunt of a lot of inquiries. On something sensitive like Pueblo, Viet Nam, something else, neither the White House press officer, nor the State Department man, nor the Pentagon man ever says anything that isn't cleared ahead of time, and is [not] completely Administration policy. I mean, if he does, he just made a colossal blunder that you can't live with. And a press officer is restricted, consequently, in what he can say. I was told several times by Rusk, or by McNamara, or by the President, "If you get questions on this subject, Stonewall it. You cannot say one thing about it. You can't even indicate that you might have something later to say about it. Just Stonewall it." And that meant to me sometimes going in and facing thirty minutes of bombardment and refusing to say anything about it.

F: While they come at you from every side--

C: With all different ways of asking the question. But when I got that kind of instruction I was quite willing to go on in and do it because I knew that was the policy. That was what we had to do, and somebody had to take the brunt of fending off the questions and leaving them with no story, or with very little story simply because it was something so sensitive that they didn't want any public information getting out on it--particularly any information out of the White House itself.

F: You must occasionally have felt very strongly the temptation when someone was questioning you on a certain line, and you knew that you could lay to rest what was becoming a wrong conclusion on their part, to lay it to rest and yet just have to sit tight and let them go ahead.

C: What you faced a lot of times was [that] you would refuse to comment on something and they'd come at you with a series of questions about, "Well, does your refusal to comment indicate that such-and-such?" They would very rarely want to leave you alone just because you wouldn't comment on something. And about the only way you could head it off is just say, "When I say 'no comment on that,' I mean no comment on any questions related to it, clarification questions or any other kind. I'm just not going to comment on it." They still wouldn't give up a lot of times.

But I never had any great problem with that sort of thing. I mean, I'm completely willing and thick-skinned and dumb enough to stand up there and let somebody beat me if they want to, but it never did bother me. I never got concerned about that particular thing.

F: Were you involved in that last weekend misunderstanding, confusion--whatever it was--in which Udall named D.C. Stadium "RFK Stadium" and the pronouncements

out of the Interior Department on the land that was going to be set aside, and the President's counter-announcements that it wasn't going to be as great as Mr. Udall envisioned?

C: Yes, I was involved in it.

F: What went wrong?

C: To the best of my knowledge, the President had never really decided in his own mind that taking in 7,000,000 acres of land--whatever it was--that were already public lands [and] putting them under the Parks program was a wise thing to do right at the end of his Administration. Secretary Udall had presented it to him earlier, and I remember a conversation with the President far back in the fall--maybe even in the summer.

F: This had started the summer before, I think.

C: Yes. About the subject, and he had showed me the memos and said, "What would you do if a Cabinet officer recommended you do this?" My initial reaction was, "Well, Good Lord, we've gone around telling everybody that we're not going to take any precipitate actions like this right at the end of the Administration. It's just bad press to do some of these things and I think whatever you do, you're going to have to remember that, on instructions, I've been telling reporters and everybody else that would listen to me that it was not going to be your policy to do this kind of thing before you left office as a lameduck President, particularly something that was mammoth--some major reorganization or some huge step that looked like you were bypassing the Congress or something like this." That was a problem that he was going to have to face in doing any of these things, no matter how meritorious they were.

His attitude then was, "I agree. I don't want to do this. I'd love to do it. I'd love to protect the land, but we should have done it a long

time ago. Wayne Aspinall up here in the House Interior Committee thinks it's just crazy for a President to do all of this by executive order or proclamation, and I'm just not going to do it right now." He [President Johnson] just put it aside after several months.

Apparently Secretary Udall came at him again in October. Incidentally there were several members of the White House staff that I knew did not want him to do this either. Not because we didn't like the idea of conserving the land, but simply because we thought that the reaction would be pretty severe, particularly since there was apparently a good bit of opposition to some of the Alaskan projects.

But apparently Secretary Udall came back at him in about October and urged that it be done. Apparently the President looked at it with some more favor anyway. He was, at least, taking another look at the thing and then in January--I don't know why it came right up to the last the way it did. It was my understanding that he had agreed to see Udall that weekend before we left office to work out the final proposal on what they were going to do.

F: He made some intimation in his State of the Union address--kind of farewell address--you know, [he] departed from your script on that and [said] in an aside, "We've done X, Y, and Z"--and when he came to this matter of what they'd done in Parks and so on--"and we're not through yet," or something like that that was just thrown in out of script.

C: Yes, he threw it in. And I recall this RFK Stadium naming just caught the President completely offguard. Naturally, he didn't like it and reacted accordingly. Udall told his press office over there to be ready for the announcement on Saturday on the lands. They had already alerted the press

the Thursday or Friday before. The press was completely aware of the project by then and had been given some background on it.

On that Saturday before we left office the President did not see Udall, I guess Udall thought he was going to see him. Udall apparently cooled his heels most of Saturday waiting to see the President, and along in the afternoon a story moved on the wire that the President had taken this action.

When I read it, I was really caught offguard. I thought, "Boy, they sure didn't coordinate this with us. Here it is a Presidential decision that they've just announced over in Interior--and I didn't know anything about it." They didn't even call me and alert me that it was coming out, but, you know, it wasn't unusual for a Department to announce something that the President had done if the President thought that's the way it ought to be handled.

F: I presume this came through Charlie Boatner's office?

C: Yes.

F: And you would have known Charlie real well.

C: Yes.

F: And probably quite congenially.

C: I talked to Charlie after the thing was over and he said Udall had told him to put it out.

F: So he didn't bother to touch base in this case. He thought he was free to go ahead.

C: Yes. When the President talked to Udall, Udall, according to the President anyway, blamed part of the problem on his press office over in the Interior Department--that they'd been a little premature on it. I don't think that's the fact. Udall got tired of waiting, and he just went ahead and did it. He was committed to the reporters to have the briefing, and he, without

seeing the President that day, told Charlie Boatner to go ahead and release the stuff. There isn't any doubt in my mind about that, because I checked into it enough to know.

I don't think he did it maliciously. I think he did it thinking that he was just going to be delayed in getting the thing done, and he was tired of piddling around with it. I think he misjudged the President's attitude on the thing some.

I think the President made a mistake in waiting to the last minute to make the decision on the thing. I think it could have been done earlier. It made him look bad, particularly when he carved it down to 300,000 acres--whatever it was.

On the Sunday after this, the day before we left office, I think he tried to reach Udall or, at least, DeVier Pierson did, and Udall was gone. He was out hiking or something. And DeVier Pierson and the President went over some of this material and again on Monday morning went over it. Finally the President signed some of the proclamations, or took part of the action. But if I'm not mistaken, he made an effort on Sunday to talk to Udall about the case.

F: This may be outside your purview--do you think Udall would have gotten more if he'd been a little more patient?

C: I don't know, because the President was highly doubtful--in my presence anyway. I mean, in talking to me about it--about the advisability of doing anything on 7,000,000 acres of land. It was just too much. It was too big. He, at least, indicated to me that a lot of it, or maybe all of it, was justified; but that he ought not be in the position of having to do it all, that the thing really should be done. He was interested in trying to

figure out some way to do it, but 7,000,000 acres was just a little bit too much for Congress to swallow.

Also he had told Udall to check with the Congressmen--the appropriate people--and get this worked out, to get their assent on anything he was going to do. I know for a fact that Wayne Aspinall still opposed it right up to the last, and that it was my impression that Udall had not really done his homework with the Congress on this matter. And I think this had an effect on the President's action too.

In fairness to everybody, I think it was just one big unfortunate incident the way the thing developed. It was not all the President's fault and it was not all just anger over naming a stadium after Robert Kennedy and stuff like that, although he considered that to be precipitous as all get-out--two days before he went out of office--to have one of his Cabinet officers just rename a major facility in Washington, D.C., two days before the Republicans come in, you know. Some of the Republicans promptly said they were going to change the name to Eisenhower Stadium, you know, and just created a little political issue.

F: Strong movement to get Cape Kennedy back to Cape Canaveral.

C: That's about all I know about that particular thing. That same Saturday by sheer coincidence I goofed up the release of a Presidential statement on the Big Thicket. Tom Johnson gave it to me. He had been with the President. He gave me the statement and indicated to me that the President had agreed to issue this statement so I just went ahead and put it out. I think it was a lack of communication between Tom and me, because Tom, I think, really intended for me to run it back by the President before I finally put it out. But I had understood him to say, "The President okayed this--

it's ready to go." When I put the statement out right on top of all this other stuff with Udall, it made the President pretty mad.

F: You couldn't have picked a topic--

C: I couldn't have picked a topic that would have upset him any more, and he worked me over pretty good for releasing the statement without clearing it with him. He was for saving the Big Thicket, but the way it was handled he just didn't like it at all.

Well, I tried kind of half-heartedly to retrieve the statement, but it was too late. I mean, the thing had already been moved on the wires and everything else. It's in the Presidential papers--I mean, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. It's in there, so it became an official statement by the President even though he didn't really approve its release.

F: You were always a little bit like a football coach, weren't you? That is, your mistakes were always made right out in public?

C: Yes, there wasn't much way you could retrieve them. That's why you had to be super-cautious, in my opinion, and careful, because you couldn't pull something back usually. I just regret that right there at the end of the Administration--

F: Instead of going out into the peaceful--

C: We had two or three just real goof-ups on that Saturday. We were all harrassed including the President; and this Udall-Johnson controversy was one of the worst.

F: I was busy interviewing at that time. [I] had been going at it all fall and everyone had said to me originally, "Wait until after the conventions," then, "wait until after the election in November," and then, "wait until after Christmas--things are going to slow down at the end of the Administration."

It seemed to me that things never slowed down, but if anything, either maintained or accelerated their tempo right up until the very end.

C: He never quit working.

F: He remained President until 11:59.

C: It's not in his nature to slow down. A lot of things slowed down around him. A lot of the Administration sort-of packed its bags early. But he tried to prevent it from happening, and he sure stayed there until the end.

F: On something like McNamara's resignation--That was a great sentimental occasion in a way. It must have been a little bit of a press trial for you because there was this feeling that, in a sense, McNamara was being booted upstairs to get him out, and that he and the President had gotten at cross-purposes. How did you handle that?

C: I tried to handle it just on the facts as I knew them. I'm not sure we were ever believed completely.

F: Did you ever have a clearcut impression of what was going on?

C: Yes, I knew what was going on all along. I knew, for example, that McNamara had been the first one to talk about the World Bank. It wasn't the President suggesting it to him, it was him suggesting it to the President. I think McNamara had reached a point where he wanted relief from what he was doing, and he had talked to the President a time or two about it. I think when it got down to the point where the need for the change became evident, I think the President picked up the option to go on through with what McNamara really wanted to do, or what he had said he wanted to do. McNamara had talked to Mr. Wood over at the World Bank, and there was a lot of by-play in here of McNamara wanting this spot. The question was when.

F: This isn't a deterioration of relations between the two men?

C: I never considered it as such. I had a definite impression toward the end of McNamara's reign that he was emotionally very tired.

F: Lord, he had taken a lot.

C: He had taken a lot of punishment. He was a pretty strained man in a lot of ways. Not that any dire consequences were going to come from it, but I just remember too many times the President talking about Forrestal killing himself and that sort of thing, you know. The job was a killer, and he didn't want to hold a man in the fire, you know, to where he just burned up. A President has to look at these things a lot on when and at what point does a very effective man become less effective, not because necessarily of something he has done but just because of the wear and tear. He has to look at it pretty coldly.

I don't dispute that the President concluded, in the latter part of '67--I think in the latter part of '67 he reached the conclusion that it was time to have another Secretary of Defense. McNamara had been there six years--seven years, almost--and that he had expressed a desire to shake loose from the bonds, and that he had been cut up pretty badly, and it was just time to do what had to be done. I don't think it was done in any sense of having lost confidence in McNamara, or anything like that, as much as it was a timely thing to do, and a President has to act with a certain amount of timeliness. He hoped it would work out to everybody's satisfaction, and I think it really probably did.

Whenever you make any kind of change like that, it's going to cause a lot of public comment about why. Was McNamara a dove, being eased out because he had gotten too dovish on the war, or just what were the facts, you know? But I never detected McNamara getting very dovish on the war myself.

He remained fairly consistent. He had doubts about some of our military activities. He had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the bombing and things like that, you know, but as far as the commitment of being there and that type of thing, he never raised any doubts about that to us.

F: I rather gathered that the Preident had an almost inordinate admiration for McNamara, probably more than any other Cabinet member.

C: He always thought that as an efficient administrator and operator, McNamara had no peer. He had, I don't know how else to put it except, just very great confidence in both Rusk and McNamara. At the same time I think if either Rusk or McNamara had slipped or become less effective in critical decision-making assignments--if their effectiveness had been dulled by something--I don't question that he would have asked either one of them to leave in the interest of the country. In the case of McNamara finally leaving. I think there was a little element of that in this. Sure--bound to have been.

If he had stayed forever--I mean, stayed another term as President, I don't doubt for a minute that Dean Rusk probably have gone by the wayside too, simply because of circumstances. Rusk had had a lot of wear and tear too. I'm not sure he could have stood four more years of that. I think he would have asked the President to be relieved. It's a miracle that Dean Rusk survived as Secretary of State for eight years with what he had to put up with.

F: You had the problem, of course, of two major assassinations in Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy. Did they give you any particular problems?

C: Yes, [a] very grave one was King.

F: Obviously, I'm not going to get off on these other subjects we talked about earlier; we'll save them.

C: King was assassinated on the night the President was due to leave for Honolulu for a conference.

F: And Mrs. Johnson was coming to Texas shortly with a bunch of foreign editors.

C: I think we may have misjudged a little the impact of this. It sort of stunned us. You know, well, he was killed and it was a terrible thing, but I'm not sure--

F: Along about 7 o'clock in the evening.

C: Yes. I'm not sure we immediately grasped the impact of his assassination.

F: Instant beatification.

C: Yes, it was another one of those dire events, you know, that had happened. The President was certainly going to be involved in it in some way, but we delayed canceling the Honolulu meeting for a period of time, not really being certain about what would happen. After a few hours, it became quite evident that this was a traumatic event in the country. It was going to be one of the big ones. So he canceled his trip to Hawaii, and then we, over the next several days, faced this horrendous problem of riots and disorders. Of course, the President had to be very delicate in his handling of the funeral and the memorial services and this sort of thing.

F: Did he talk with you? Was there indecision on whether he should go to the funeral?

C: A little. He thought about going to the funeral in Atlanta, but decided against it--decided that he would attend the services in Washington and that that would probably be all he should do. I think that was probably a wise decision. I think his presence in Atlanta might have made it more of an emotional problem there in the sense that there were a whole bunch of the people who went into Atlanta to that funeral who had zeroed in pretty

heavily on him--some sort of symbol of a lot of things they didn't like--and that it might have changed the complexion of the day--of the service--if he had been a central part of it down there. Humphrey went and a number of other people went to the funeral. He [President Johnson] went to the services there in Washington.

F: How did you handle Robert Kennedy's assassination which from a work standpoint was most inopportune, quite apart from the fact it was inopportune for him too? I mean, everybody is scattered and your offices are closed down and facilities are closed down and so forth. At least they're on a minimum work schedule, plus the time lag.

C: As I recall, when the situation room called me and said he had been shot--

F: The President didn't call you? The situation room called you?

C: No, the situation room called. I turned on the television there at home and began getting the news. Finally after I had gotten as many facts as I could on the thing, I went on down to the office early that morning, 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning; and a lot of us began to assemble down there because we knew there would be a lot of things we were going to be called on to do.

F: I presume the newsmen were already there.

C: They began to drift in, yes. The President had to make a statement. We had to make decisions on how you handle that, whether he went on television. Of course, Kennedy was still alive. We had to get set up a system for getting medical reports. We faced the question of what type of assassination this was--whether it was a one-man deal or another conspiracy. I say, another conspiracy, I think because we probably suspected that the King thing was more than just one man although we never saw any evidence to the contrary. It was just one of those things, you know, coming right on top of this

King assassination. These raised questions in your mind as to what was involved in it.

The President was extremely concerned about other candidates. His immediate reaction was that this was the type thing that could just darned near tear the country up. If a man can't get out and campaign for President, you know, without getting shot, what does this mean? Does it mean that somebody is going to bag Humphrey next, and Wallace next, and Nixon, or what's it going to be--just a shoot-out? So his initial reaction was concern that the thing would spread, and the determination that everybody was going to get maximum security--whatever it took.

He was quite concerned about others in the Kennedy family, particularly Ted Kennedy, whether he might be a target for some nut because these things feed on themselves. I know back after President Kennedy was killed here in Texas and after Governor Connally was recovering from his wounds, very tight security had to be imposed on the governor for the first time in the history of the State. We had to protect the governor because he became a potential target simply because Kennedy had been killed. He had been in the car. There were a whole lot of threats around-about, you know, "we'll get you next time," and stuff like that, and it became quite a little problem. Nobody knew whether it was a plot or what was going on on the thing.

Well, the same thing on Bobby Kennedy's death as far as the President's reaction. He immediately wanted to establish contact with the Kennedy family. He did this through Ted. Really, it was sort of assistant to assistant procedure through Ted Kennedy's office. Tom Johnson did a lot of the liaison on it. He wanted to gear up the Secret Service and find out what the law was on the subject and whether he had the authority to

assign the Secret Service to these people without some kind of authority. He had to talk to find out he didn't, and he went ahead and did it anyway. He had to get Congressional sanction for it so he had to talk to the proper people there and get authority to do it. He just, generally, had again become sort of a stabilizing influence in the country-at-large because of the situation.

F: Did you have the same fear of an outbreak of riots that--?

C: Yes. We didn't know what would happen. I sometimes wonder what would have happened had Senator Kennedy died there on the floor in the kitchen there--if there hadn't been a period where he was hospitalized.

F: That always takes a little bit of the flame off.

C: That took some of the flame off, took some of the sting out of it. It let people get their emotions worked over, you know, without having just a big explosion. It didn't matter whether you liked Bobby Kennedy or not. It was a traumatic experience to have a candidate for President just shot down, and the effect of it is just the type of thing that you don't know what's going to happen.

F: Were your White House reporters antagonistic during this, or did--?

C: No, they were quite cooperative, and I think they saw quite plainly that President Johnson was sincerely trying to rally the country.

End of tape.

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By George Christian

to the

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2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed ______________________

Date ______________________

Accepted Harry J. Middleton - for
Archivist of the United States

Date March 13, 1975