

INTERVIEW II

DATE: November 18, 1968

INTERVIEWEE: WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER

INTERVIEWER: THOMAS H. BAKER

PLACE: Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

B: Sir, there is one whole area here involving urban disorders, the major city riots, which I believe you've been involved in to a great extent beginning, I think you just told me, with the Newark riot which would have been right as you took this job.

C: Yes, I came on board at the Department of Justice on about the third of July 1967. My recollection is that the Newark riot took place on approximately the first weekend that I was in the Department. My nomination had not been confirmed, but nevertheless I was here working and trying to learn the job.

B: May I ask--had you previously been informed that urban disorders would be a part of your function?

C: No, I don't know that we discussed it in that detail. I assumed that I would be involved in that because it is so much a part of the Department's responsibility, and I would guess that perhaps one of the things in my background that was interesting to the Attorney General was my having participated in the McCone Commission report and having followed such matters in Los Angeles thereafter.

B: Then, what happened that weekend when the Newark riot broke out?

C: In the Newark situation, the state police and the state National Guard assisted the local police and were able to bring the matter under control without the need for calling upon federal troops. However, the riot was an extremely dangerous one, and the Attorney General and I talked about

the possible need for federal troops and tried to begin the customary analysis of that situation. After the state and local forces were able to contain the matter, the federal government came into the picture, as it regularly does on the matter of relief and rehabilitation, to provide the emergency services and supplies that can help bring a community back to normal.

B: Does this mean emergency housing and food?

C: Yes, the Office of Emergency Planning has within its statutory powers the authority to make available various supplies such as housing, food, and medical supplies. I recall that my public involvement with the matter began with a Sunday morning meeting which I chaired here in the Deputy Attorney General's office at which I tried to bring together the officials from Newark who were still very much in a state of shock and who had been up for several days running together with relevant federal officials of the Departments that might be concerned--the Office of Emergency Planning, the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, the poverty agencies which might have some emergency funds that could be made available to Newark to help them through the emergency situation. After having chaired that meeting at which I believe Paul Ylvisaker was the principal spokesman for the state of New Jersey at which there were also representatives from the city of Newark, I continued to play a coordinating role for the goods and services that were made available by the federal government. In this picture, we were always walking a difficult line of wanting to assist the cities in their relief and rehabilitation, but at the same time not wishing to have the occasion of a riot made the reason for a city to get preferential treatment on its normal programs.

B: Is there a statutory authority for special aid after riots?

C: Yes, there are a number of federal statutes that can be invoked in circumstances in a city where there has been disorder or where there is suffering. However, there was and perhaps continues to be a legal question as to whether a city can be declared a disaster area under the federal statutes because of the occurrence of a riot. The legal question is really whether or not that statute was intended to be limited to natural catastrophies such as fires and floods and earthquakes or whether it was intended to cover man-made catastrophies such as riots.

B: Doesn't that statute also require a positive declaration of the disaster area by the President?

C: Yes, it requires such a declaration by the President, but the issue that we faced as lawyers, the threshold issue, was whether or not the statute authorized the President to make such a finding in the case of a man-made catastrophe. The judgment that we reached here was that the legislative history was fairly narrowly limited to natural catastrophies, and, therefore, the Department suggested that if it were to be extended more broadly, Congress should take the oar in broadening it. That was partly a fiscal judgment. The amount of funds that were available for those disasters were very much circumscribed. It would not, by any means, have covered the relief of the man-made disasters.

B: What has been the outcome of that in the Newark case? Was it formally declared a disaster area?

C: There was no request in the Newark case to have it declared a disaster area. We were able to meet the needs for emergency supplies without such a declaration, and we also informally discouraged them along the lines that I have indicated--that there had been no precedent for the statute having

been used for a man-made disaster.

B: Has there been a legislative proposal to clear up this--

C: Yes, there has been a legislative proposal, but it is not acted upon favorably by the Congress.

B: This work, in the aftermath of the Newark riot, did it involve you in anything approaching preventive measures--work with community relations councils or anything like that?

C: It was apparent to us that the situation in the Newark area and the entire northern New Jersey area was a dangerous one from the standpoint of the possibility of civil disorders. Following the Newark riot we tended to put more emphasis to the extent that our resources made possible, on community relations and on civil rights in that area. We also offered the assistance of our police specialists in that area also.

B: Excuse me--what exactly does this mean? What kind of resources did you have to put in?

C: Well, take the community relations area. Nationally there are less than a hundred professional people in the Department's community relations service to span the entire country. That means that we don't even have one in each major city, so they tend to have to be moved around on a highly mobil basis. What we did was to send some of our community relations people into that area to see if they could reopen lines of communications between the Negro community and other communities there. You recall the Plainfield riot, or problem, occurred shortly after the Newark problem, in a sense, perhaps an outgrowth or a spreading of the Newark problem. We tried to offer similar assistance there.

B: What about the Detroit riot, to move forward a little in time, and what I suppose was a much bigger one?

C: Well, the federal involvement was bigger, and the riot unfortunately was somewhat bigger. My family had moved to Washington, D.C., arriving, I believe, on about Sunday, the twenty-third of July 1967. So I was involved with them on Sunday and on Sunday night, trying in that personal way that we all have of getting settled and getting reunited with my family--they had been in California. I came to the office on Monday morning, and we began to have then the reports of the rioting that had taken place the preceding day in Detroit and the problems that were continuing.

B: Excuse me--is this an unusual time lag? From Sunday to Monday morning?

C: In terms of getting the reports?

B: Yes.

C: Well, I meant to indicate that I think on any other situation I would have known about the trouble on Sunday, but because my family had just arrived that day and we were in the process of unpacking, the Attorney General, with his customary thoughtfulness, had not bothered me with the problem on Sunday.

B: I see. The point is that the President and the Attorney General were getting reports simultaneously, and they were just kind enough not to call you away from your family?

C: Right.

B: All right, sir, then on Monday morning you got involved in it?

C: Yes, as you recall, this riot had started very early on Sunday morning, late Saturday night, as most of us would think of it early Sunday morning, and it continued through the day on Sunday. By early Monday morning it had reached proportions that the Governor of Michigan and the Mayor of Detroit had begun to feel that they would need outside assistance. So,

as I say, the problem was there when I came into the office early Monday morning. The Attorney General and I talked about it briefly and then almost immediately thereafter we went to the White House to discuss it at the White House. As it turned out, the Attorney General had been talking with the Governor of Michigan and the Mayor of Detroit starting at about two or three o'clock on Monday morning. Those precise details are, of course, in the report on the Detroit situation. This was to be my first major involvement with the President in matters of high national policy. I had had my hearing and actually my nomination was confirmed on that very Monday by the Senate. When I arrived at the White House with the Attorney General, the President and others were already convening in the Cabinet Room.

B: Who would the others have been, sir?

C: I remember quite vividly that Secretary McNamara was present, and there were some of the White House assistants--I believe I recall Larry Levinson having been present and soon thereafter Mr. Vance joined the group. But before he joined the group, I recall that the President raised the question as to whether or not his participation would be valuable. And generally it was thought that it certainly would. As you recall, he just recently left the government on his way back, he thought, to private practice. So he soon thereafter joined the group. I remember also that John Doar, the head of the Civil Rights Division, was in the meeting at that time.

B: Now, was the issue of that meeting the issue of whether or not to commit troops? Or, perhaps I should phrase that, I realize the request would have to come from Governor Romney. Was the question of whether or not Romney was going to ask for troops the point of contention there?

C: By that time a request had come from Governor Romney for the troops although

it was worded in a rather inexact and somewhat contingent manner. As we sat there, a telegram was drafted in response to Governor Romney, and it was immediately dispatched--I think at about eleven o'clock that morning, and the telegram indicated that the President was ordering troops to the airbase which was near Detroit so that they would be available there for commitment should the decision be taken to commit the troops.

B: There was a good deal of controversy in the newspapers about the political implications here. Governor Romney was at that time a Republican contender for the nomination. Did you see any sign of politics being involved in either side of this?

C: I didn't see any sign of that from the standpoint of the considerations that the President seemed to be taking into account unless you would consider the general thesis that local and state resources should be used and committed to their maximum before federal troops are employed. The President had a very clear concept that the federal government ought to be involved here only if the matter was out of the control of the local and state officials and if there was a definite request from the Governor to that effect. It was in that area that Governor Romney's initial request presented some problem. The matter was discussed back and forth in the Cabinet Room and there seemed to be a fairly wide range of feeling that the federal government had a responsibility to make its own estimate of whether or not federal troops were needed and they had also responsibility to make sure that they were not committed capriciously or were not committed before the local resources had been exhausted.

B: Was this group in the Cabinet Room getting information directly from Detroit from someone other than the Governor or Mayor's staff?

C: I believe that at that point our information was largely based upon what

we were hearing from the Michigan officials although there was some additional input. That's one of the areas where we think we have somewhat improved the situation. Our reporting from the U.S. attorneys is a good deal more rapid and better now than it was in those early days. The Army Intelligence group would probably have been on the scene at a much earlier time and could have been giving us some firsthand reports. I would say we were pretty much relying upon Michigan information and that which we could get from the wire services which are always pretty near the first to report this kind of event around the country.

B: What was the President's reaction to the general situation--the fact that another major riot had broken out? Was he sad, angry?

C: Well, in my general experience with him, when he is dealing with a situation, he's not moody, or he's not given to philosophical reflections until it's over with. He was just operating at that point, making sure that the troops were coming from the place where they would get there the fastest, putting together the team that he thought would be the one that he wanted to have on the scene and making sure that Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanaugh were informed exactly what the federal government was going to do. In other words he was being an executive, not a philosopher.

B: Did he diverge into personalities, any comments on Governor Romney or Mayor Cavanaugh or anyone else in Detroit?

C: I don't recall that he did. I recall somewhat dimly that he made some reference to Mayor Cavanaugh as being a man who had been firmly in the Democratic camp but on this kind of a situation would be watching out for the local implications, giving those a high priority. But by and large there was very little, as I recall, of divergence into personality in that meeting. We were just trying to get organized and underway as fast



as we could. I remember his instructions to Mr. Vance and in a sense to the others who were going to be a part of that team was that he should take a very hard look at the situation out there and he should not be stampeded into committing federal troops until he was satisfied that the situation was beyond the control of local resources.

B: Was there any hesitancy about sending Mr. Vance and his on-the-spot team? Was that just an automatic routine procedure?

C: The President seemed to have decided that that was necessary and it was taken for granted, at least by the time the Attorney General and I got to the meeting. I'd been through a somewhat comparable thing in California at the next level down--that is, the question as to whether or not the acting governor of the state should have committed the National Guard to Los Angeles upon request of the Mayor.

B: This was at the time of Watts?

C: At the time of the Watts riots and as you may remember Governor Brown was then out of the state and Lt. Governor Anderson was considerably criticized for having postponed that decision for a number of hours.

B: As I recall that episode, there was again a similar problem there in that the information Lt. Governor Anderson was able to get from Los Angeles was not perhaps as clear as it could have been.

C: Yes, I think that's right. There is always a serious information problem in riot situations. There's a tendency on the part of all human beings to think that they had some insight into the situation and I'm probably going to fall prey to that right now. I can remember sitting there in the Cabinet Room and remembering the Los Angeles situation and feeling that the President might be criticized as Anderson was if he didn't respond immediately and admiring him for hewing to what he regarded and

and all of us regarded as an important Constitutional principle of using federal troops only if there was a situation of disorder out of control of the local authorities. I ventured only one comment, as I recall, in that meeting, and it was a point that he had considered substantially before I had raised it. That's not an unfamiliar experience.

B: What point did you mention?

C: It's really not of enough substance. It simply was to try to reassure the people of Detroit as to how close the federal troops were to be. I was thinking of the political significance of this to the people of Michigan, and I suggested putting something in the telegram about how close the troops would be. His response to that was that they were "going to be at Selfridge Air Base and everybody in Detroit knows where that is and I think that covers the point."

B: Was there already in existence a contingency plan for the commitment of troops to Detroit and at the Newark riots?

C: No, certainly not to the extent that there now is. There is not any civil disturbance directorate at the Pentagon and they have had some contingency plans, but they have been much refined since that experience.

B: Did your discussions at the Cabinet meeting include not only the fact of committing troops itself but also exactly what the troops would do and how they would behave while they were there?

C: The units were referred to by Secretary McNamara, and I believe the identity of the Army commander was discussed. The President was extremely concerned that the Army commander be one who could have a high degree of respect for human life and he be a man who would instill great discipline in the troops. I remember the President being deeply concerned that no federal contingent be responsible for any loss of life if it possibly

could be avoided. He emphasized this point more than once in that relatively brief conference.

B: Did this get as specific as it later got, such as in the issue of whether or not to shoot looters?

C: No, the President seemed to me to be speaking in broader terms; he wanted an Army commander who would have a great reverence and respect for life and who would recognize that you weren't dealing with enemy troops but with American civilians and would use the least force necessary to accomplish the mission.

B: Was there anything discussed at the meeting about whether or not the troops would include Negro troops? Or was it just assumed that there probably would?

C: I don't recall any discussion of that, but I think that we all knew that an Army combat group of this character would have a fairly high proportion of Negro troops.

B: How long did that meeting last?

C: It probably lasted an hour, an hour and fifteen minutes.

B: It ended with the decision to send Mr. Vance?

C: Right. I recall that the President turned to the Attorney General and said, "Ramsey, do you want to send Warren along? I don't think you ought to go," or something in that vein. And the Attorney General indicated that he did think that was the right decision. And so Mr. Vance and I were on the airplane headed for Detroit shortly after noon.

B: Then what did you do in Detroit?

C: Well, we arrived there in the late afternoon and the first thing we did was to take a tour of the city with Mayor Cavanaugh.

B: Were you welcomed by Mayor Cavanaugh?

C: Yes, they were naturally delighted to see some indication of federal support. They were a very concerned and worried group. The tour of the city was made by Cy Vance, General Throckmorton, who had been designated the Army task force commander, and myself, together with some city and state officials. I remember being very much struck when I arrived there by the fact that the commander of the state National Guard indicated that he was waiting for us to tell them how they should deploy some 3,000 National Guard troops who had not yet been deployed into the effort to control the riots. That fact, I think, had a profound effect on me and perhaps the others. That is, there was still a substantial contingent of National Guard troops that had not been deployed and they were waiting for our advice about the deployment. That question took General Throckmorton about five seconds--he said, "Get them on the streets as fast as you can." Naturally we did not know at that point whether that very sizeable contingent of forces added to the already large number of police, National Guard, would be able to contain the matter.

B: Was there any implication in that question from the National Guard that they lacked riot training? Or did that thought cross the mind of your party?

C: Well, it seemed to me that was an indication of a failure to take responsibility and grasp it and move on it at that time. It also failed to appreciate a lesson which later became a matter of course, and that is that you ought to try to flood the riot-torn areas with as many law enforcement personnel as possible to bring the matter under control.

B: Then your group continued on the tour. Then what happened?

C: Well, we came back and our tour had indicated to us that although there were certainly problems, there was a possibility of control without the

commitment of the federal troops. Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton and I discussed the matter, and then Mr. Vance so informed the President.

B: Let me ask just a technical question. What are the mechanics of communications in a case like this? How does Mr. Vance talk to the President?

C: When we arrived at Detroit police headquarters, we were assigned two rooms there and the rooms had in them two or three telephones each. Mr. Vance simply reached the President by calling the White House and asking for him.

B: Was there any provision made to keep the lines open in case later troubles caused a breakdown in general telephone communications?

C: We had a line open most of that evening to the White House and of course as soon as the Army troops were committed the Army Signal Corps phones came in which would enable us to patch through the Pentagon to the White House. In my experience, the best way to get the President, though, when you need to call him, is to go to a phone booth and dial 456-1414 and ask for him.

B: Then what did Mr. Vance report to the President after that first preliminary tour?

C: Mr. Vance had along with him an Army colonel who worked with him for a long time. This Army colonel began to plot the rate of incidents of a riot character. Unfortunately, we didn't have any base period to work from, but he plotted the number of incidents that were reported to the police every half hour, and these incidents rose very rapidly as the evening wore on. All of these Detroit events have been rather fully chronicled in Mr. Vance's Detroit report which is public and although I could talk about it in great length, you'd get more precision, one would

get more precision by looking there.

B: Yes, we don't want to duplicate what is on the written record. Was there any difficulty among your group, the Washington group, in Detroit? Was there any difficulty in dealing with state and municipal officials? Any failure of cooperation?

C: No, I wouldn't say there was any failure of cooperation. I did observe about the then-Governor of Michigan, that he seemed to have a tendency to make a decision and then unmake it a half-hour later or an hour later which has, perhaps contributed to some public reputation for a lack of decisiveness. I also, in my conversations with him, was struck by his unwillingness to indicate that there was a state of insurrection in Michigan, which was thought to be one of the statutory prerequisites for the calling of federal troops. He indicated that he had been informed that insurance policies in Michigan might be voided if he found there to be a state of insurrection. This problem with the insurance policies seemed to give him a good deal more pause than I thought it should under the circumstances. I did what I could to alleviate that problem by telling him that if he would spell out the facts which would justify a court or other reviewing body in concluding that there was a state of insurrection, that could be the basis for a request for the federal troops if he had some problem about using the talismanic word "insurrection." Actually, so far as I know, no court has ever voided insurance policies on the ground that federal troops or National Guard troops had been asked for. But this was a sticking point with Governor Romney. It never grew to the level of unpleasantness between us, but it was something that I didn't understand at the time and thought somewhat shortsighted and I still don't understand it.

B: Did you get the impression Governor Romney was--had the feeling he was being put in an untenable political position? I realize such a thing, if it existed, must have been very intangible.

C: I didn't put it down so much to politics so much although maybe that was what was motivating him at the time. I rather put it down more to uncertainty in a very, very difficult situation.

B: Then, to skip on to the aftermath, was it after the Detroit riot that full-scale contingency plans were thought about and put into effect? You mentioned earlier that contingency provisions did not exist before then as they exist now.

C: Before we leave the Detroit riot, I might make a comment about something which is relevant to history focused on President Johnson. That night at about twelve-thirty when I was in the police station and I believe Mr. Vance was out making one of his periodic inspections of the situation--

B: To clarify that, that would be Monday night?

C: Yes, it would be twelve-thirty Monday night, or accurately, early Tuesday morning. At that time, federal troops had been committed based upon the rising incident rate, and the President called. This, I think, was the first time he had called me, certainly since my nomination had been confirmed, and perhaps the first official dealing I had had with the President over the telephone. It was characteristic of the conversations that we would have later. He began by asking me whether this was worse than Watts, and I told him that I thought it was probably going to be at least as bad as Watts, that the property damage seemed to me to be quite widespread and that I would expect it to stand with Watts as one of the major riots in U.S. history. And then he began this barrage of questions which is so characteristic of him and so indicative of the precision and

clarity of his mind. He always wants to know how many troops had been committed, how many policemen are on the streets, how many people have been injured, how many people have been injured by Army troops, how many people are arrested, where are they in the process of booking. He asked all the questions and I came to know that he wasn't very satisfied unless the man on the other end of the line had a great many answers. I've often thought in that rather self-satisfied way that lawyers have that the President would have been a magnificent lawyer if he had chosen to go that route because he has such a comprehensive and precise mind and I always remember that evening, that first call, as being such a good indicator of the character of our subsequent conversations.

B: Did you have the answers?

C: I had some of them and by the next time he called--he would call quite frequently--in Detroit--I got myself somewhat better armed. It's another indication here, Dr. Baker, of something that may be worth noting. When there is a major national problem of any kind, you find the President working on it almost constantly--it must be the exclusion of many other things--he called with great regularity and great frequency, and he always seemed to be fully up on matters. If you had one answer, he would be able to cross-examine you based upon on what he had seen on the ticker on that matter. When there is some trouble in the nation, he gives himself totally to that and he will not stand for anything short of rather firsthand information.

B: Does this mean that you had to be pretty regularly available at the telephone? Were these calls, say, one an hour--that predictable?

C: Well, they weren't--you could be sure he would call first thing in the morning and usually after his nap in the afternoon, and then you could



always be quite sure that he would call before he turned in at night, some place between midnight and two a.m. Those weren't the only times, but you--I can see the pattern now, looking back on it, better than I could see it at the time. He has a habit of calling after he reads the early editions, I think they are called the Bulldog editions, of the morning papers. Quite often, something in there isn't the way he wishes it was and he will call you at home at midnight or twelve-thirty and he started that pattern out in Detroit. I remember his calling me one night out there when the Washington Post had severely criticized his decision to have a personal inspection made by Mr. Vance before committing troops as being a predominantly political decision. He was naturally disappointed that the paper took that slant at it and called and read me the editorial from that paper and also some other newspaper comment that was not too flattering to our efforts.

B: Did he expect you to do anything about that?

C: The President always expects people to solve all kinds of problems. Yes, I think he wasn't just complaining, and it caused us to do our best to try to talk to reporters on the scene when we could get time from acting to explain the philosophy and the strategy of the matter and that there were Constitutional principles involved. I don't think we ever succeeded in getting that story told. You usually never catch up with the initial impact. Also, reporters have a way of preferring a political explanation to any other one. Maybe they are right.

B: Did the President specifically ask that you talk to reporters?

C: No, I don't believe he did, although it may simply have been because I volunteered that we ought to talk to the people who were reporting from out there and that I would try to explain as best I could as a lawyer

the Constitutional principles that he was following in his decision and the historical precedent existing for it.

B: You know, the future historians are going to read the same newspaper reports. You are clear in your mind, I gather, that the President was not playing politics with the Detroit riots.

C: One can never be sure what some other human being--what motivates him--and men may do things for mixed purposes. If you look back through our nation's history, you find that Presidents, and especially the best of them, have been very, very reluctant to commit federal troops into situations of civil disturbance. It's been done only very rarely in our history and only by most Presidents after great thought, great reflection, and great exploration of the alternatives available. I think the President was acting in that historical setting and against the Constitutional background that only if there is domestic disorder which is out of the control of local officials is there justification for federal troops. I don't want to expand on the rationale of that point of view. Of course, we are a nation in which there is no federal police and a nation in which there is a strong belief that law enforcement should be conducted at a local level barring some major overriding catastrophe or calamity.

B: How long did you stay in Detroit?

C: I believe I returned the following Friday evening, so I would have been there four or five days.

B: Did you report to the President when you came back?

C: Not in the sense of going over to the White House to make a report to him. We would have been talking on the telephone on a fairly regular basis. I returned somewhat before Mr. Vance did because of some pressures here

at the Department of Justice that seemed to make it desirable that I return. So I didn't make any formal report, but I soon assisted Cy Vance in the preparation of his report to the President, which, as I say, is a comprehensive statement of the chronology and background of the Detroit situation.

B: By pressures at the Department of Justice, do you mean pressures of other duties that required your presence here?

C: Yes, I'm sorry if I was elliptical about that. I simply meant that there were matters of legislative concern, because of my duties in that area, and matters involving judicial appointments and particularly because the Attorney General has to worry about not just one city, but all the cities of the country. If you can think back to that time, it was a very bad summer and he was concerned that there might be problems elsewhere and wanted to have me back as soon as it was compatible.

B: To get back to what I asked awhile ago, was it at this time that there began to be made contingency plans for the use of troops and so on for all major cities?

C: Yes, we got a good deal better geared up in a number of respects. You will recall that Detroit was the first time that federal troops had been used in an American city or any situation of civil disorder in twenty years. It had been more than twenty years earlier that they were used, also by coincidence, in Detroit. Among the things that were done--

B: Excuse me, this may be a technical question. Is there some legal difference between the commitment of troops in Detroit than say in Oxford, Mississippi, or Little Rock, Arkansas?

C: Yes, they were used there to enforce the federal court order rather than based upon the finding of the President that the situation was a civil

disorder out of the control of the local officials.

B: I see. I didn't understand that distinction. Excuse me, would you go ahead with what you were saying?

C: The Pentagon soon thereafter formed a civil disturbance directorate. I have to correct myself here. The directorate was not formed until the spring of 1968, but the Pentagon under the direction of General Harold Johnson began laying more concrete contingency plans. I don't want to imply that there were none for Detroit, but there is no doubt that we were all stimulated by that experience to try to improve our techniques. Here at the Department of Justice, we soon thereafter began to arrange for the Airlie House conferences in the winter and spring in which twenty-five chiefs of police and mayors were brought in for each of four weeks to talk about prevention, control, planning for civil disorders. In addition, here at the Department of Justice, we began to work out teams which would be available for going in with troops if necessary with the feeling that it might be necessary to have more than one such team available in any given time.

B: Were these teams in the nature of community relations units?

C: No, they would be representative of the various parts of the Department which would have a particular involvement. There would be a team leader who might be the senior civilian representative and there would be a representative of the Bureau of Prisons who would be the detention specialist. There would be somebody from community relations. There would be a man from the Civil Rights Division to do what we could to assure that court processes were being followed properly and to commence investigations if there were civil rights violations. There would customarily be an assistant team leader and perhaps two young attorneys

who would be of general assistance in whatever problems that might come up. In short, it was sort of an emergency team which was put together based upon those parts of the Department which had had experience in these matters. I should have mentioned that there is usually someone from the Criminal Division on those teams, also.

B: These contingency plans, particularly the military ones, are they quite specific as to what troops shall go where?

C: Well, now they have formed a Civil Disturbance Directorate under General Mather and they have elaborate contingency plans about the availability of troops all over the United States and where they would be, if you had problems in City A, where the troops would come from, and the like.

B: Has anything been done to further clarify this question of when troops are to be committed in the absence of the passage of the legislation we mentioned earlier? Is it still kind of up in the air?

C: Well, the legislation would relate only to relief and rehabilitation. As to the commitment of troops, we are following the same doctrine now as was employed at the time of Detroit and which is necessary under the federal Constitution and our federal statutes.

B: Has the educational process gone on to explain to mayors and governors?

C: Shortly after the Detroit situation, the Attorney General wrote each of the fifty governors indicating the bases for the request for federal troops and the procedure that would be used in requesting them. We hope that this has had some educational value. Generally speaking, I think that there's come some recognition on the part of state and local officials that it takes some time for the federal troops to come there and that the federal government is going to make a determination of an independent character as to whether or not they are needed.

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By Warren Christopher

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In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Warren Christopher, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of the instrument available for research in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. At the same time, it is his wish to guard against the possibility of its contents being used to embarrass, damage, injure, or harass anyone. Therefore, in pursuance of this objective, and in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 507 (f) (3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) this material shall not, for a period of ten (10) years be available for examination by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it. This restriction shall not apply to employees and officers of the General Services Administration (including the National Archives and Records Service and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) engaged in performing normal archival work processes.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed Warren Christopher  
Warren Christopher

Date 3-24-71

Accepted Harry J. Anscombe for  
Archivist of the United States

Date March 10, 1975