

## INTERVIEW I

DATE: November 14, 1968  
INTERVIEWEE: MATTHEW COFFEY  
INTERVIEWER: David McComb  
PLACE: Mr. Coffey's office, Executive Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

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M: Mr. Coffey, I would like to know something about your background, where you were born and when.

C: I was born in Cumberland, Maryland, which is about a hundred and fifty miles west of Washington, on January 20, 1941. I am the second son in a family of four. I was educated through the Catholic school system in Cumberland through twelve years, and then went to junior college at Potomac State College in Keyser, West Virginia.

I completed junior college in 1960 and went on to the University of West Virginia. At the University of West Virginia, I was in the school of business administration. I studied principally in management, economics, systems analysis. I completed my work at West Virginia in February of 1962, and immediately entered the graduate school for a Master of Science degree in business administration. Following a semester and summer in the graduate school, in which I completed the bulk of my work, I entered the law school at the University of West Virginia and spent a semester there studying contracts and property.

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In October 1964 Ralph Dungan, President Johnson's special assistant for personnel, found out that the President was going to give him the ambassadorship to Chile and that the President intended to make John Macy the new personnel man in the White House. Ralph asked John Macy to provide him with the names of seven, eight, or ten people whom he would pick from his own organization to come over here, look over some of the problems, and principally to design an automated system to control personnel files.

I remember quite well the day that I found out that I'd been picked, because I was home in Cumberland, Maryland, visiting my parents for the weekend. I got a phone call. My boss at that time was a guy named Frederick Stalfort, and he called me up and he said, "Coffey, where in the hell are you?" And I said, "I'm home." "Well," he said, "You're going to the White House on Monday," and I figured, well, it must be part of my investigations. We got around every government agency, including the Executive Office Building. I'd been in there many times before to interview people in the Budget Bureau and things like that. So I figured another. . . . And I said, "What for?" He said, "I don't know what for. Somebody over there named John Clinton wants to talk to you." And I said, "What about?" And he said, "I don't know what about." Well, John Clinton is a career civil servant who worked during the Kennedy Administration for Ralph Dungan. He's now the director of housing of the new Communities Program for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

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So I had to come to Washington early on Sunday in order to get with my boss to be briefed on what I was going to do. We had to go see the supervisor, the Director of the Bureau of Investigations and he says to me, "Matt"--he never called me by my first name in my life--"Matt, you're going over to the White House to be interviewed, and I think it's for a job." I said, "What are you talking about? You know nobody over there knows me. Why am I being interviewed for a job?" And he said, "Well, we don't know. All we know is that they called up and they asked us to send ten guys. We have now sent nine. You're the tenth, and if you don't make it, we don't know what we're going to do." So that's the way it all started.

I came over just as nervous as any twenty-three-year-old kid can be when he walks into the White House compound and knows it's work they're talking about. Just walking in the White House is enough to scare you when you're twenty-three and relatively new to Washington and not very sophisticated emotionally. So I walked in and I sat down in an office around the corner here in Room 227, which John Clinton was occupying.

This guy with his jacket off, sleeves rolled up, comes walking out of his office, and I didn't pay any attention to him. He walks up to me and says, "Hi, I'm John Clinton." I figured I was going to be ushered into some great inner sanctum, but, no, John is just that way. He just walked out, says, "Hi, I'm John Clinton." So he sat down and much like you he said one thing to me, "Tell me about yourself."

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Well, for the next forty-five minutes he didn't get a word in edgewise, as you can see. And I said, "What can I tell my boss when I go back?" He said, "Oh, just tell him you talked to me." I said, "Okay, is there anything else I can do for you?" And he said, "No, no. Fine. It was really enjoyable meeting you and talking to you, and I'll be talking to you again."

So that was fine. I go home, or I go back to the street because as an investigator we worked on the street all the time. I went back to the street and was working and cruising around in the car, working late hours, because I'd missed so many hours interviewing that day. I get home that night around nine o'clock, and the phone is ringing off the hook. It's Stalfort again and he says, "All right, what the hell did you tell them at the White House?" I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "You're going to work there tomorrow at ten o'clock in the morning." So I said, "Do you have any idea what I'm going to do there?" And he said, "No, nobody's told me what you're going to do there." I said, "Well, I don't even know who John Clinton is, or what he does." And Stalfort said, "Well, neither do I. All I know is you're going to work there tomorrow morning at ten o'clock. So come on back to the office and clean up all your case work and get everything in shape and get it dictated so that you can transfer it to another investigator."

M: You had no idea what you're going to do, what you're going to get paid, where you're going to work?

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C: No idea. It gets more grotesque. I walk in the office at seven-fifteen. I'm over at the Civil Service Commission, which is just two blocks from here, and I'm dictating cases like mad to try to turn them over to another investigator. We get through with that exercise about a quarter of ten. I get up and walk out of the office. And my boss and his boss are saying, "Now when you find out what it's all about, call us up and let us know!" You know, it's like something written by a comedian, the way all these things were going on. Because here are all these guys very nervous about the fact that I'm going to work at the White House and they don't know what I'm going to do or what I'm going to be. But it was their recommendation and they'd sort of like to know why their recommendation was accepted. And I couldn't really tell them because when I told them the questions I was asked they really didn't understand what was going on.

I walk into John Clinton's office at ten o'clock. And she [the secretary] said, "John will be with you in a minute." So I sit there in the outer office and John came out, again in shirt sleeves, saying, "Matt, welcome aboard." And I said, "Fine." He said, "Come on in the office, and let's talk." So I went in the office, and he said, "I guess you're a little bit confused." I said, "As a matter of fact, I'm very much confused, but that's not unusual for me. What do you have in mind?" He said, "Well, I really want you to talk to Ralph Dungan later on about that." And I said, "Okay," thinking that later on was like an hour or so. I said, "Okay, what do you want me to do right now?" He said, "Well, just go find yourself a desk and

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some place to sit, and go look through those file cabinets out there." Well, there were two file cabinets, five-drawer type file cabinets.

So here I am, working at the White House. I have no idea what I'm doing. I know that I am detailed from the Civil Service Commission. Now this is an arrangement whereby the Office of the President can call up an agency and say, "All right. We need this specific employee. Appoint him to us and you pay him." I am still on that status after four years and a month here. So, October 17, 1964, just prior to the election, I came to the White House, unbeknownst to me that John Macy was even involved in any of this transaction.

The file cabinets that I was supposed to review were personnel folders, and so all of a sudden it dawns on me that this is a personnel function, which is okay. That is within my grasp. I don't finally find out what is the job I'm going to have to do until a week after I had been there, because that's how long it took for me to get to meet Ralph Dungan. So I met Ralph eventually, and met other guys on the staff and eventually found out that this is a recruiting office, that it recruited executives for the federal government. I really wasn't sure at what level, but I thought it was the presidential level and maybe super-grade level of the Civil Service. We went from there. Ralph finally found time in his very busy life to sit down and go over what he thought this office needed. Now, I have to get into some of the problems that were existing at that time in order to really explain the context of the conversation with Ralph.

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M: Right. Did you go into this job with any thought of saying no? Did this ever occur to you?

C: No.

M: You, you were just sort of caught up in the stream of this and you went along with it?

C: I was at the point of not being in a position to say no.

M: If the White House called you, you went. Is that it?

C: If the White House called you, you went. And number two and maybe the more practical reason being that if the White House said yes, my bosses weren't going to allow me to say no! That's the Civil Service Commission say-so, and you're caught in those two.

I remember it was a period of very high emotion for me because this was just the most exciting thing! I knew that no matter what it was that I was here to do that being this close and having the insight that this place gets you would be an advantage no matter how long it lasted. Well, the initial arrangement was that I would be here for six months. And then that was extended for two years. And as you can see, I'm still here. The transition people for Mr. Nixon called me up the other day and asked me if I planned to stay around. So, I may be, but I doubt it.

M: You have some choice in the transition, I would assume.

C: I have a great deal of choice.

M: Is this essentially the same position you've been in all this time-- 1964 to the present?

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C: No. It's grown through the years. The situation that existed at the White House when I came here was [this]: there was President Johnson, there were three or four of his close special assistants, but the majority of the Kennedy people were still here. Kenny O'Donnell was just getting ready to leave. Larry O'Brien was still here, Dick Goodwin was still here.

M: You're still in the transition period.

C: No, I'm talking about October of 1964. This is a year after the assassination.

M: But some of the Kennedy people were still [here].

C: Yes. A majority of the staff, in fact, is still Kennedy people. Ralph Dungan [who] was one of Kennedy's close associates was my boss. Ralph had somewhere between twenty-three and thirty-five people working for him. They were divided up into two groups. One--the group headed by John Clinton and composed of Edward Sherman and on a part-time basis, Dan Fenn--was concerned principally with presidential executive recruitment without regard to politics. Then, operating almost independent of that, or as a matter of fact independent of that, was a group headed by a lady by the name of Dorothy Davies. Dorothy Davies was supposedly a patronage giver and grantor for the Kennedy Administration. And she stayed on and was doing the same sort of low-level part-time patronage activity as a completely separate operation from the professional recruiting activity. In fact, they were in such conflict that Dorothy Davies had all the files. Those



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guys set up those two files I mentioned earlier--these were the only files they had--and they would request files and then--

(Interruption)

--Dorothy Davies was dispensing this low-level patronage and making the various government agencies report to her personally on all of the trips they were sending public members on and things like this. She was making an awful lot of contacts with Capitol Hill and, as a result, building up a big power base of her own.

So, essentially, I walked into a divided kingdom. The first job that I was told was my responsibility by Ralph Dungan was developing some form of, hopefully, computerized system, but initially a punch-card system, which would allow the retrieval of biographic information on candidates to be considered for presidential appointees and on people who had already been appointed. Because there was no complete record in the White House, in any shape or fashion, of who the current incumbents were in all of the jobs which the President had responsibility for. It was next to impossible working with the clerical people in the White House--this is Bill Hopkins' operation--to pull the information out. They had control over it. They were happy to respond to questions, but they weren't about to relinquish the kingdom.

The idea being that we had two thousand names at that time of people who we could consider executive talent, and I figured it was pretty wasteful to use a computer just to control two thousand people because they couldn't have that many variable factors in their

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background. You could probably do it with a punch card system, so I designed a punch card system with the help of an IBM representative who was given to us by IBM to help out.

M: Now this file you set up, this automated file, included not only personnel already here but potential?

C: It was an impartial file of people who were already here and it was people from outside as well.

M: And the purpose being that if the President said, "I want--

C: "I want an economist," you know, you go see if there are any economists in your file.

M: You punch a button and here come the cards.

C: See, the prior system of the White House in doing this was a cross-index card system, which means that for every file you have five cards. Well, the only problem with that is that most places you can't keep the files filed, much less keep the cards filed. So when I came in here there were all kinds of cards piled up on file cabinets. It was completely out of control. Nobody could control the file room. So we designed this little punch card system.

M: Is this a key to the quickness of presidential appointments? You read all these stories about the President calls up a man and talks to him and two hours later sends his name to the Senate. Does this key to that operation?

C: It's all part of that, yes. This is the first time in the history of the presidency that a computer has been used as a management tool. We started out humble with a punch card system. As the machinery comes

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along to do a better job, fine, we'll add some more elements. But, at least, the analytical base was laid with that punch card system.

M: Did you eventually move into magnetic tapes?

C: Within six months. We had reshaped the staff, really reshaped it. We'd set up the staff as it appears on the chart up here--only with one other addition, Chairman Macy and his secretary. We had a domestic desk officer, we called him. The domestic desk officer was the man who handled all the domestic agencies, so all the departments which dealt with domestic affairs were his responsibility including all their inventory commissions. They had an international desk officer who dealt with the ambassadors and with the State Department and the Defense Department--everybody who had international operations to be dealt with in appointments. Then you had my job which was the Management Services System Analysis job.

M: Three main people under him.

C: Right. Then we had a fourth person who took care of advisory commissions.

M: What's his name?

C: Terry Scanlon.

So, you take that organization and you put two people on each desk, a senior man about a Grade 15-16 and a junior man, Grade 9, just beginning in the career service like I am, lots of energy and vigor, and let them do all the work. Then let them make recommendations to the Chairman, let the Chairman do the liaison to the President, and

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these guys stay out of it with the President. That's always been our philosophy.

Our other philosophy was that you had to keep this place alive and fresh. Therefore, you've got to turn people over every two years. That's our base. Turn them over. Get them out of the recruitment business every two years. We follow that policy.

M: Why the turnover? Why is this necessary?

C: Well, because after a while you get a vested interest. In other words, you always go to the same people. You know, you limit yourself as far as the number of people you call up and ask, "Who do you know that's qualified in this area?" The reason we have such an effective system of contacts around the country--in every city in the country--is because of the turnover we've encouraged throughout the whole thing.

Ed Sherman served as the international desk officer. James Marsh, who was a management intern from the Office of Emergency Planning, came to work as Mr. Clinton's junior, and Louis Schwartz, who now is at the National Security Council, came to work as Ed Sherman's junior. Lou was a foreign service officer, so he was conversant with the international side of the foreign service group. Then you had Terry Scanlon doing the advisory commission.

Then you had me, and I had all the clerical staff, the file room, the mail answering. I answer all the President's mail on appointments, still sign my name to about everything, the coding operations for the punch card systems, the key punching operations, and then the

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statistical operations. So the bulk of the staff actually worked for me, while we had those units who were doing recruiting. I was here as an organizer. I was here as the man to pull the staff together and get all this information resources organized. I mean the simple ones like a listing by name of every person who is a presidential appointee. That had never existed before in the White House. A listing of all the jobs, and what they pay and how they're appointed.

M: Does this tie in in any way with the trouble with Walter Jenkins?

C: No, no, I don't think.

M: Well, the point is after Walter Jenkins' problem, there's an FBI check run apparently on all White House personnel.

C: Yes, full field investigation. I heard about that.

M: But your program is not tied in with this Walter Jenkins trouble?

C: No, no, not at all. We had always insisted in designing a work flow chart for this organization that it was necessary that every person who you were placing the confidence and trust in of running a big operation, like all of the full-time jobs are--that it is necessary that every one of them have a full field investigation.

And, see, the Jenkins thing happened just about three months after we'd been here. So it was relatively unrelated to us and our function, although to this day I still stand in great admiration of Walter Jenkins, because I think he's one of the most effective public servants that the President's ever had around him. I think he and Horace Busby are probably two of his best men that I've seen around him. They were long-time associates of his.

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M: Where do you get the names to put on your records and your files?

C: They come from a series of places. I think the best thing to do is just run you through the process. Then after that we'll have a better description of what we're doing.

Our first and most important phase in this whole operation is to describe a vacancy. Now, what does that mean? Okay, we are concerned with all the cabinet jobs, the deputy and under secretaries for the departments, the assistant secretaries in the departments, the general counsels of the departments. There are a lot of bureau chiefs, like the Bureau of Census director, the Weather Bureau director, people like that, that we appoint by presidential appointment, or the president appoints I should say. Any time one of these is coming up vacant, we've got to know what the job is.

M: Is the dividing line here whether or not it is a presidential appointment?

C: Right.

M: Otherwise the regular Civil Service will handle this.

C: Right. Now, we also appoint all the heads of the independent agencies and all the commissioners of regulatory agencies. Then we have about twenty-five hundred advisory commission jobs. So every time we have one vacancy, we've got to go through the position description, we've got to have an historical analysis of the division, who's been in it, what they have done in it. We've got to look at the current and future program responsibilities, particularly the future program responsibilities. In other words, what does the President want to do

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with this job five years from now? Where does he want this guy to take this job?

M: You have to do this every time?

C: Every time.

M: And the reason for this being?

C: The reason for this being that these jobs are so important that you can't miss. You've got to find the right man. And you've got to be able to tell the President exactly what the job is and where you think he ought to be making it go.

M: Well, now, say you're going to replace a secretary of HEW. Each time you replace that secretary, even if it's six months, you have to analyze that job again?

C: You re-analyze that job and take the effective man upon the position, take all of his shortcomings, how he screws things up in his department, because everybody does. We lay all that out and say, "All right, what do we need to fill the gap? What kind of man? What kind of a background?" That's what we're doing here. We talk to the peers in the position. So if you take an under secretary you always talk to the secretary of the department about it and get the view of the present incumbent, the guy who's just leaving office. You say, "All right, what was your concept of this job? What do you think the job was?"

M: There are important changes then in the particular job every time a new man comes in.

C: That's right. And it's a change in direction.

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M: And you've got to fit the personality of the executive to the change.

C: Right.

M: It's not just a rigid organizational chart.

C: Not at all! This is the most fluid personnel outfit you've ever seen in your life, as far as being willing to change all the time. One of the important things we do is talk to the affected area people. Namely, if we're going to appoint a man to run the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we're going to talk to all the labor economists that we know. "What do you think this job ought to be? Who do you think in the field is the best man for it? Where do you think it ought to be five years from now? And who can take it there?" That kind of thing.

M: You interview the outgoing man?

C: Yes, we always try to. Sometimes they don't cooperate with us, but we always try to. So then we move into our search-and-evaluation phase, which gets almost cookbook. You go to your contacts and you say, "All right, who do you know? Who do you think would be qualified?"

M: Well, wouldn't you hit your own files first?

C: Well, we do, but I'm trying to look at it from the personal side, and then I'll go back to the committee side of it. But we get the contacts. You know, if we're starting out saying we don't have a file and how do we collect names! Okay, what we do is we call up people and we say, "Who do you know? Who are the best people who fit that job description that we've written on this job? Who, in your mind? And we want you to go away for a couple of days and think about it,



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and be sure about whom you are recommending because we don't want any duds.

M: And depending on the job is who you talk to. You may go to a government agency. You may go to a university.

C: We always go to the multiple sources, and most of them are outside the government. Because the affected area is really the important one. If you can get a cross section of opinion in the affected area you're going to do a much better job filling a presidential appointment.

M: Now, of course your contacts are important, too.

C: Oh, yes. Our contacts are mainly prominent educators, writers, lawyers, around in all the cities and states in the country. They're picked indiscriminately. We don't really pick them based upon any political affiliation, or anything else. We pick them just on the basis of trying them out. We'll call them and say, "What do you think about somebody we've already evaluated?" We'll ask them maybe three or four times.

M: How do you get knowledge of the contact, though?

C: Oh, it's not hard. It's a problem of remaining absolutely informed about all the people that are making news. I read approximately fifty magazines a month in addition to the three newspapers a day.

M: Do you pick up names that are prominent in a field?

C: I pick up names, people who are doing new things and all this business. And you say, "All right, I'm going to use him sometime so I'll jot him down on my contacts-to-be-used list."

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- M: Do you ever contact anybody just cold that you've never had any dealings with?
- C: Yes, I do it all the time.
- M: I mean, you might call a professor at the University of California and say, "Who do you recommend for this job?"
- C: When we were doing the director for the Johnson Library, I called down to North Texas State [University], not knowing anyone and said, "All right, tell me about this guy." And at the same time I was talking to a couple of people we really knew who had known him and getting evaluations, so I could judge the objectivity of these people against other evaluations.
- M: So you use your contacts then not only to initially give you names but also to evaluate them.
- C: Evaluate them, right. So the contacts, of which there are about four or five hundred, form the basis of this information network that we've designed. If you really want to think about [what] this whole procedure is, what we've done is we've organized a network to collect and then use, in the most effective manner that we know how, to solve the problem, namely, the President's problems of filling executive jobs.
- M: This sort of rationalization of this problem has not occurred until you set up this system?
- C: That's right.
- M: I would assume there were contact people. Kennedy--
- C: Absolutely. The idea of the contact and of the contact book comes from the Kennedy recruiters. They thought it up. They started to

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develop it. They really didn't know what to do with it after they had it. Sure, they were getting a lot of information in, but they forgot it the next day. It sat in the file room and nobody knew where it was unless they remembered the guy's name. And as fantastic as some of the memories those guys, they still couldn't remember all the best candidates. It was still the BOGSAT method: a bunch of guys sitting around the table saying, "Who do you think?" So we poured system into this, and John Golden was very helpful in this area, finding what the problems were and helping us pour the system into it.

Okay, we've got a file. We've got a file room and we've got a computer system. First thing we're going to do then is not walk over to the computer, because the way I designed the computer system is not--while it can respond. . . . But it's a waste of money, a waste of a lot of things. The way I designed it is on mag tape, and all I had to do is every six months I add in a batch of new names to it. Then I had them print me a catalog. A catalog is a cross-index listing by skill of everybody in the file, with their backgrounds displayed. So that you wind up looking for whatever kind of background.

Let's use educators. Let's say we're looking for university presidents who are basically administrators rather than intellectual leaders of the university area, the guys who do the nuts and bolts of the university administration. Somebody like Harold Howe. Okay, we go to this printout which you can see here on my desk. We go to this catalog and we say, "All right, let's look down our educators list and

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and see who we've got. And just by skimming down the page I can tell if they're within the age range we're thinking about, if they have the background we're thinking about, just brief little one-line descriptions of what they've done, if they're from the right area of the country if that's critical. You know, any of the many factors that go into this. You go to the skills catalog and review your standing file.

Well, the difference between the computer operation for what we call our executive biographic index, which is really the synonym for the computer operation, the difference between the executive biographic index and placement is that it's just an index to a file room. Computers do not pick people. They index file rooms. So, then the desk officer has to do the very hard work of sitting down with maybe three or four hundred names that might come up under one category. But he has the confidence of knowing that after he's reviewed those three or four hundred names and hasn't found what he's looking for, he doesn't have to look in his file room anymore. He doesn't have to wrack his brain for a name anymore. He's got to pick up his contact book and start making phone calls.

So what you've done is you have shortened that period of doubt that he has, because every man I've ever seen as a recruiter always says, "I know somebody, if I could only think of his name." You can always get somebody, but you've eliminated that for them. They don't have to do that anymore because you know everybody they know and you can give it back to them. You say, "All right, here's your brain

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back. Here's everybody you've collected for the last four years. Now, if he's not in there, you don't have him, so you've got to go find him someplace else."

You might even go out and do your professional training work, where before they might sit around for three days talking about this around a conference table at various times, trying to come up with a name. Now you eliminate that BOGSAT business. Now the guy sits quietly with his books, goes through the files, picks out names, comes over, or calls up the file room here and asks the clerk to deliver him a group of files. He looks through the files. In the files you have a lot more than you have in the printout. The printout is just a key to the file room, so it just has biographic information. In the files you have all the evaluations that have been done on him, and everybody you've collected and evaluated. So you get all these comments from people who were on the contact list about the person.

M: How far do you evaluate a man whom you're just putting in your files for future use? You're not looking for a specific job--

C: If we're not looking at him very seriously, we'll probably just take an evaluation from the person who recommended him and leave it go at that.

M: Until you're more serious.

C: And probably in talking to the man who recommended him, we'll say, "I've heard some people who had known him."

M: For future use.

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C: So he gets that and now he has something to work with. Now he's going to sit down maybe another twenty minutes and go through the files. But once he's finished that, he knows he has searched his entire file and found everybody in it who came within the range of his descriptors. A lot of times they change the descriptors at that point. It's interesting to watch how it happens.

If we do find several who have the qualifications, then we do what we like to call, for Ivory Tower reasons, cross-sectional personality analysis. What that really means is that we're not so concerned about what a man has been in the past as much as we are of what he is going to be in the future. His "Past is Prologue" as the Archives Building has stamped on it. You look at his personality and try to determine what he is now and what he's going to be in five years. You're just taking a cross-section of his personality, or a cross-section of years of a person's personality, and trying to project based upon the data you have. And this is where the decision-making and the creativity comes to play. This is where you create a Betty Furness for consumer adviser, which we've done right in this shop. This is where you pick a vice president of Esso in Puerto Rico to come be assistant secretary of commerce for international business to eventually become secretary of commerce in two years time.

M: So this kind of speculation is rather valuable.

C: Right, very valuable.

M: Now I would assume you've made mistakes.

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C: We have made big mistakes. There's no question about it. We've made big mistakes. And we're now going through the process of evaluating our successes and failures, hopefully for our own improvement and for help to the incoming administration.

M: Well, on this point, to take Betty Furness for example. She was a big surprise when the appointment came through and people, you know, the public--

C: Extremely critical. The press was very critical.

M: Why do you want a TV actress, ad woman, doing something like that?

C: All right. Let's go to the job description where we start out with everything. We had in that job Esther Peterson who was doing it as a part-time job from the assistant secretary of labor. Esther had lost touch. The President had just stopped communicating with her.

We talked about it, and one day we all got together and we talked about the job of consumer adviser and what we thought it ought to be. We came up with the reasoning that what it ought to be is a person who can articulate ideas, can sell ideas, if you will, to the American public for their own good.

M: And Esther Peterson couldn't do that?

C: She could not do it. Esther Peterson is a grandmother type, you know. She is not a saleswoman. She is not the kind of a person who is an advocate, who can stand in front of the TV camera and look real charming and say to people--you know, here's the charming thing saying to you, "For your own good you ought to ask the local health department

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what they have done about inspecting meat plants around your town," and things like that.

Now it's much better to have that kind of message delivered by somebody who is basically attractive, who is very familiar with the media, who has worked in it, and who has sold things in the media. So we started thinking. Also, we wanted somebody who was close to the President. We didn't want our Peterson experience to happen again. It couldn't be a professional consumer type because he doesn't know those kind of people. So maybe somebody new.

So I brought in all my list of the committees that were formed in 1964 for the campaign, artists and entertainers for Johnson. We went down the list, and we looked at people like Bess Myerson and we said, oh, maybe she was too stiff, and things like that, back and forth, just responding back and forth. We checked our skills catalog and everything. And up comes the name of Betty Furness.

M: Did it come from several directions, more than one?

C: No, no. It came as a part of a list of names which we were discussing after a couple of us had worked on the search, on putting names together. I was doing part of the searching and Jim Marsh was doing the other part, and every time the name Betty Furness came up, we kept saying, "You know, wouldn't that be an interesting idea, Betty Furness selling consumer protection to the consumer!" Because she sold refrigerators to them for so many years that she's a household word, and she's identified with a consumer product. "So if she has intelligence, and if she has individualism, you know, a personality and an



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ability to manage, why don't we try it on the President?" So, sure enough, John Macy, being the gullible soul he is, signed the memorandum recommending the President consider Betty Furness for this.

The President wrote on the note saying, "I'm interested. Why don't you bring her down? Have her come down." So she came down, and John and I interviewed her together, and the two of us were just absolutely stunned by this personality. Because rather than getting somebody who only read her lines, we found somebody who thought, you know, who was creative in her own right.

M: So she had the intelligence for it.

C: She had the intelligence to do the job. Now she wasn't convinced she could carry this off, but we became convinced she could carry it off. So then we sold her to the President and then the President sold her on taking the job, and whammo, we announced it!

M: Well, in the recent reviews of her work in the press she's been highly praised.

C: Absolutely. You ought to see her mail now. She gets more letters of apology from people who wrote in a couple of years ago saying, "You know you have no right being in that job." Gets more letters of apology than you can--

M: So this is a prime example of how you--

C: Of where the job description completely stunned the people outside, because for years they were used to having a special consultant that nobody paid any attention to. So we changed the whole image of that job and got an awful lot of consumer legislation through the United

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States Congress. And the fact that she could go up on that Hill and testify to those old men, and they paid attention because she was attractive. Her physical features were a big part of this thing because it gave her an ability to sell Congress a package of consumer legislation we would never have gotten through. We would have gotten one or two of them but we wouldn't have gotten the seven new bills we got in one session of the 91st Congress, which has been the most ungiving Congress of them all.

M: Well, physical appearance was one of your points of job description.

C: Absolutely, it's one of the criteria of the job description. So we put it all together and lightning struck and whammo! And all the time she was going through hell and I was answering all these letters that were being sent to the President, we knew this phenomenon was going to occur. We had the confidence that it was going to occur, and, boy, when the press started backing up, all of us felt good. Every one of us felt good about that appointment. So, that's an example of using the system as I have described it to come up with a totally new solution to a problem that nobody really thought about until they were startled into thinking about it by the new solution. That's just one example of how the system can operate at its best.

Just to finish off the chart there, after we complete the search and evaluation and narrow things down to a few candidates, we'll send them along to the President, listing all the names and just a brief paragraph on the personality, never more than eight or ten lines, and we'll send the comments that his friends have used.

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One of the interesting things that we discovered about the President about a year ago. One of the big jobs here has been a study of Lyndon Johnson, the decision-maker as a decision-maker, not as a man. Because I can honestly tell you he does not know me except by reputation. I am not an intimate of the Johnson Administration. I am an intimate of John Macy, period. I had management responsibility and my management responsibility is to study Lyndon Johnson as a decision-maker. Well, about a year after we'd been here, we ran into a period of inaction. Every memorandum we sent over, no results, no results, for a long period of time, two months.

M: For appointments?

C: Yes, memos recommending people for appointments.

M: Did you just get them back?

C: Yes, no mark on them or no action. We weren't getting any results.

So I went into an analysis of the President and it dawned on me with the help of certain people that I talked to that here's a man who for, at that time, six years had not made any new friends. He had been protected by the Secret Service to the point where it was very difficult for him to become acquainted with new people as friends. He could become acquainted with them as vice president [or president] but he could not be Lyndon Johnson, the man, to people--new people.

M: Now, you're talking about social contacts?

C: Social contacts, not professional, social contacts. Now what does this have a tendency to do after six years? Okay. I'm completely winging this. This is just a theory that I was operating on at the

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time, the theory I had about him was that here he was sitting in the White House in mid-term, feeling like he didn't know a single person we were recommending.

M: This was 1966?

C: Yes. He was making the appointments, but he didn't know the people. Everybody we sent in to him looked the same. They were all very well-qualified for the job as we had described it, and he stopped responding. He just absolutely stopped responding.

So my theory was, "Okay, where have we gone awry?" Where had we gone awry. Well, we had sent him professional papers, and we had not included in our papers any of either his friends as candidates or as evaluators saying things about the man we were recommending. So I launched a project which proved to be quite valuable. That project was to analyze all his mail, all the mail that he had sent out to every person that he wrote to by their first name, as an indication that there may possibly be a friendship there. I mean a lot of times he sent it out mainly because he's known them casually for a long time and it's nice to call people by their first name. So, at least we thought there was a basis, or I thought there was a basis.

So I spent, I guess, five Sundays going through the central file downstairs and spending twelve hours a day just reading his correspondence from the time he was president up to that date--his personal correspondence. Not personal in a sense because it's handwritten, but personal in the sense of things he dictated, "Dear John: Thank you." I came up with a list of about forty pages of people that he called by

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their first name, and if he used any endearing terms in the letter, I just made a note of it under the name of the guy and the address. We immediately poured these people into our contact list with a special notation that "there is a possibility that the President knows them and knows them well, or considers them friends."

M: And so you would contact these people for recommendations?

C: Every time we had a candidate we found someone that he knew, and usually two or three people he knew, to evaluate him.

M: So what happened?

C: Immediately he started responding again. It was just like that! Wham! The next day when he got the memo, bang, bang, bang, he started approving things again, or denying things, but he started reacting again. Now, I may have misread the whole situation. That may not have been what was going through his mind at all, but that's the way I reasoned it out and those were the steps I took to solve the problem. And it worked. Now, somebody else's interpretation, including his interpretation of that period of time about us, may be just completely different. But that's the way it worked for us, and we saw results.

M: Can you be more precise on the time span here when this occurred?

C: I would have to dig back and look it up.

M: Would it, say, be mid-1966?

C: I would say it would be early 1966.

M: Early? Spring?

C: Probably spring and summer that these two phenomena were going on, because shortly after that time I took over the advisory commission

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duties. Yes, it was just before I took over the advisory commission duties.

So we used that technique and that technique worked. And he has never stopped responding since that time to the technique.

M: Now that means that he personally as an individual has to have some personal interest from the contact in order to make a decision like that.

C: No, it means "It's much more comforting to me as a decision-maker to hear what my friends say about somebody, on top of the recommendation of my best man in personnel. Now John Macy is an awfully good recommendation, but if a friend of mine happens to know this guy, too, then I just might want to pick up the phone and say, 'Hey, I see where Macy talked to you about this, that, or the other thing.'"

M: It's a type of catalyst in decision-making.

C: It's a real catalyst and it's worked very well.

M: Do you suppose it has any broader applications beyond the President? It might be just his personality, but it might work in other--

C: I think it's the office. I really think it's the office because it's so circumscribed in their activities and in their meeting of new people that they get lonely as hell. You know, they call that the loneliest job because of the decisions you have to make. Well, that's not the reason it's a lonely job. It's a lonely job because you don't have the opportunity to be honest and truthful and open with friends anymore, and you don't get to see your friends as often as you'd like to, and that kind of thing.

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M: In your work, did you have to do any of the work with the potential appointee himself? That is, after you recommended him, did it go out of your hands then or would you have to take some action?

C: No, we did it all. If the President approved him, we were usually the people who called him up.

M: Like in the case of Betty Furness, you made the initial contact.

C: We made the initial contact, we brought them down and we said, "Joe, we were sitting around here thinking the other day and thought you just might be the right person for this."

M: So you may have a problem of selling them the job, too, a job they might not want to take.

C: Oh, yes, right, right. We had a problem with Betty, on selling her to take that job. It's a real selling job we did on her, and we needed the President to do it.

M: Is there any general hang-up that you get in selling a person a job? A salary problem, for example?

C: I'm sure that Chairman Macy will consent to this. I have found that when you're asking someone to do something for the President that they respond. The only time they don't respond is when they have serious family problems, where they can't move because of special schooling needed for a child, or their wife is sick, or something like that. Or where they are so committed to an industrial retirement program and so near to completion of the number of years they have to have that they're a little bit hesitant to back away from all that, and it's a vested interest. You know, they have to give up all their stock

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when they come here. Well, when you take a vice president of IBM, this guy has over the years through the stock-option plan and the bonus plan been picking up so much IBM stock that he's probably got close to a million dollars. And we're going to say to him, "You've got to sell your stock!" And he's going to think an awfully long time before he does that, because he's jeopardizing his family's security.

M: But you outline to these people the various problems, the conflict of interests.

C: Exactly, exactly, we have to do that. That's the way we play the game. We lay it right out to them, say, "This is the situation. The President is interested in your doing this job for him."

M: If you really have a hard time selling the person--

C: We call in the reserves.

M: And the reserves are what?

C: The President.

M: The President.

C: Because he's the best salesman there is. If we think he's on the brink of making a decision and it may not go our way because we just weren't convincing enough, then Macy will call up and say to the President, "You've got to talk to him about this." We usually find that succeeds. But normally we don't need the President, don't need him at all. The first time he meets the man is when he's swearing him in.

M: There are some appointments that are, at least on the outside,



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somewhat famous for problems, such as the appointment of Robert Weaver to HUD. Can you tell me what was the problem there?

C: You mean as far as the delay was concerned?

M: Yes. There was a delay.

C: It was a simple one, mainly that we felt absolutely it had to be a black man in the job, without any question.

M: Because housing, low cost housing, is mainly a Negro problem?

C: Part of it was that housing is a serious Negro problem in the cities, but more importantly we needed that Negro cabinet officer, and this was the first opportunity to appoint one.

M: So there's a political tangent to it.

C: Absolutely. See, the thing that had been so good about President Johnson is he has allowed John Macy to take over all of the political dealings, to talk to all the party officials about people. We talked to party officials all over the country as part of our contact list, and we never miss checking with them when we have an appointment from their state.

M: Incidentally, do you also contact the senators in the state?

C: It depends. Seldom do we contact the senators unless we expect a tough confirmation.

M: You mean this business of senatorial courtesy is not a real problem then.

C: Oh, no, no. In fact, we run into problems on senatorial courtesy like that--the problem we had with George Murphy over confirmation of Cecil Polk [?]. George Murphy doesn't want a Negro on the bench and that's

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all there is to it, so he will not return his blue slip. You see, the way this procedure operates is that we nominate to the Senate; the Senate passes it down to the committee; the committee hands a little blue slip of paper to the senior and junior senator from the state saying, "We have this name before us. Do you have any objection?" Normally they just sign their names and return the slip--no objection. Murphy never returns his blue slip, so the committee refuses to take action, so the guy doesn't get appointed.

M: It's blocked.

C: Right. So there's a case of racial bigotry where an appointment was stopped.

M: But you would not normally check with a senator.

C: No, not unless we were expecting a tough confirmation. Then we call them up and say, "We're going to do this."

M: If you have another Negro to appoint, you might contact Murphy beforehand.

C: Yes, you might, and then again you might not. You might just jam the medicine down his throat.

M: It depends on the situation.

C: And say, "Okay, the last time we were just wondering about your bigotry. Now we've got it pinned down."

M: The President supposedly is credited with encouraging more Negroes and women in executive branch jobs, is this true? Has this affected you at all?

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C: Statistically, it is accurate. Now I make that distinction because I really want to deal with the question in two parts--one, the statistical part, and then, two, the inspirational part of it. The President has always tried to appoint women. We have had a difficult time finding them. He's all the time trying to appoint Negroes. We've had better luck there, because there's a lot of quality around. And our success is reflected in the statistics, as comparing it with Eisenhower, with Kennedy, and so on. But I think the more important thing that the President has done--and not only for women and Negroes but for another minority group, the civil servant--is the inspirational part of it. Namely, he's lifted the hopes. He has lifted the expectations of these people by saying, "I think they're good, and I want to see them respected and used on an equal basis, or on the basis of their ability. I want to get sex and race and prejudice against bureaucracy out of the minds of the American people."

So as an inspiration thing, he really has been effective, but I couldn't speak one bit on what his personal feelings are about women, Negroes, or civil servants.

M: What's the trouble with recruiting women? What problems do you have there?

C: Most of them are married, and their husbands don't want to leave their jobs and become the husband of the assistant secretary. The emotional problem involved in the husband is much bigger than you even can reckon. You just can't cope with it. We've found lots of good women, we've got loads of good women around--

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M: You were talking about women and the difficulties in recruiting them. You had explained that.

C: That's right. Okay, I think that's the principal problem.

M: How about the hiring of minorities? Now, in the case of Robert Weaver, there's the political part of that, but also I suppose he was a qualified man.

C: Oh, he'd been head of the Housing and Home Financing Agency for many years and then director of housing for the city of New York, you know, so he has lots of qualifications. No trouble about that, but I think we were looking for somebody with a more hard-charging public image than Robert Weaver and we couldn't find him. And we turned this country upside down.

M: Is that the reason for the delay?

C: Yes. That's the reason. Every name we sent in to the President, you know, we went round and round and round. Then that was it. So the President settled on him as the compromise after about three months, I think it was, delay.

M: Did you ever have a situation where the President would say, "I want to hire this man," without ever contacting you. Does he ever short-circuit your office is what I'm driving at?

C: Well, yes, he can. I can't recall a specific instance where he's done it, but there's certainly nothing that's going to prevent him from doing it. We would not feel the least bit put out if he had somebody he particularly wanted to put in a job.

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As you see up here, under indications of intention, he can say he rejects all of our names. He wants to do further checks on so-and-so, or he just writes in, "Let's look at John Doe for this." Or he says, "I have other plans. Forget it. I don't want your recommendation. I've already picked my man." It's happened a couple of times. Fine.

M: Do you ever have to sell wives?

C: Never have. We leave that up to the husband. If he can't manage his own wife he can't manage an assistant secretaryship or he can't manage an independent agency. But I find most wives want to come to Washington, because Washington has such a glittering social life.

M: Are there any general qualifications or incidences in a man's past that would automatically disqualify him?

C: No.

M: Such as a poor credit risk. Say he has a history of bad credit.

C: Not so much credit risk as a guy who doesn't pay his taxes, because we do Internal Revenue checks on everybody. If a guy hasn't paid his taxes or is way behind or is being sued--you know, if he's in any form of litigation--we usually stay very cautious about him. We'll investigate the whole process of what went on.

M: And, of course, a criminal record.

C: Criminal records sometimes will defeat him, sometimes won't.

M: Communist affiliation.

C: Depending on how recent. The FBI hasn't found a communist since 1941, but they sure will tell you in long, long, long memos about anybody whose mother registered to vote for the American Labor Party.

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M: Okay, what do you do about a situation like that?

C: We make a professional judgment here. And there are circumstances where we will explain to the President exactly what the situation is and make a recommendation.

M: How about in a situation where the person was brought before the McCarthy hearings in 1952?

C: Never had that situation. Most of those people are over the hill.

M: Well, one person came to mind, and that was Mary Keyserling.

C: Oh, well, we didn't have any trouble with Mary Keyserling. She was a pro. She was very qualified for the job.

M: She'd been in those hearings, but cleared.

C: No, we don't run scared of the FBI's information. We consider the FBI's information right along with all our information, and I would say to you that things we find out knock people out much more often than things the FBI finds out, because the FBI's information many times is just plain worthless. They'll send you a ten-page memo on a guy's background and it will include about eight words about him saying, "He may be identical with so-and-so who appeared on this list." Then they go into a long explanation of what this list was, what the organization was, when it was cited, what the House Un-American Activities Committee said about it, you know. Then, at the end of the memo they say, "We have no further information on Mr. So-and-So."

M: For your purposes the FBI is not as useful as it might be.

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C: It's a source of information, it's helpful at times, but it causes us just as much trouble as it does help us. It causes us trouble by leaking appointments.

M: Okay, that brings up another point. What about leaks? How do you prevent this?

C: We prevent them as best we can by not talking to anybody but the President and ourselves about people under consideration until the last minute. Then we turn the FBI on. We try, always try, to avoid telling the FBI what the job is. A lot of times they find out, and there have been cases which we can document where a personal vendetta by the Director of the Bureau has killed a candidate because he went out and built a case against him. We have even gotten FBI letters from the Director of the FBI saying, "This man has been critical of me in newspaper comments and therefore should not be considered for a presidential appointment."

M: When you say the FBI leaks information, does this mean in the field checks? A man goes out and knocks on the door and says--

C: An agent goes to Capitol Hill to talk to the senators about a guy, okay? The greatest example being the D.C. city council. The D.C. city council, we have all nine names lined up. We gave the FBI the investigations and we read it out in the morning paper. All nine names, all lined up. We backed off. The President told us to get rid of the whole nine names, bring up a whole new slate of names. But we didn't do that, we went back and saved seven of the nine.

M: The President gets upset when this happens.

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C: Sure he does, I don't blame him. It prejudices his options because up until the moment he announces it, he can say no.

M: Okay, it's not just a personal quirk or idiosyncrasy that he would want to be the first to announce it.

C: No! It's management. See, it's giving the President his options right up until he has made his decision irrevocably, and the FBI has no right in taking that away from the President by putting something in the paper! Or by saying to one of the congressman's staff men, "He's being considered for this." Then right away, the congressman calls the local newspaper back home. Wham! The next thing it's on the AP wire and it's all over the papers.

M: The trouble is you may have a good man that you want, and he's just being considered and such a leak may knock him out. You've lost a good man.

C: We've lost a lot of them.

M: Are there cases where there were such leaks, and the President has taken the man anyway?

C: Yes. Joe Yeldell on the city council for one. When those things leaked, the day after there was a big headline in the news, the local Washington news, and it said, "Who is Yeldell?"

That's a fascinating story. That's why I recommended that you talk to Joe, because he really has a fascinating story to tell about a boy who grew up in a ghetto, went through a master's degree in mathematics at the University of Pittsburgh and came to work in Washington for IBM, and all of a sudden got turned into a public servant like



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you've never seen. And he got turned into a public servant because of his contact here and because the President appointed him to the city council. Now he's one of the toughest-minded city councilmen we've got and probably one of the best, most intelligent Negroes for his age--about thirty-one--in this city. And he is going to be a power to deal with in the city the rest of his life. The President made a career, and he has that ability.

M: Is there any particular problem in getting loans of people from departments, as in your case?

C: No.

M: Is this fairly common?

C: Very common.

M: And why is this necessary? Why can't they just be added to the White House staff?

C: Well, because the President has a limited budget. You see, he only has the Emergency Fund of the President and the special projects money, and that runs out real quick. He only has appropriations for fourteen positions.

M: So this is forced on him really by the financial end of it?

C: Forced on him. Yes, and we're now in the process of returning people to the agencies. And I'm spending all afternoon interviewing people on the White House staff who are trying to make up their mind where they want to go.

M: One more question and this is generally your impressions of the

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President as an executive and in your contact with him. Is he effective? Has he been misjudged by the public?

C: Well, okay. Let me digress just a second and talk a little bit about perception. The President is a victim of two forces that are afoot in the country. One, negative perception. As the natural swing of the pendulum after World War II, when we had the most positive perception the country's ever had of itself, we have now swung to a country that has a negative perception of itself. [It's] questioning everything it's doing, saying, "This is phony." Okay? The other force is that now for the first time, because we have nationwide, instantaneous communication, we have for the first time the capacity to form a society in our country.

Now, what is that society going to be? It has shown an inclination since 1940 to be more honest, to be more straightforward, and to deal flat out with problems, to say, "All right, American public, here's my problem, and here's what I'm doing to solve it. If you have any questions about my judgement, let me know." Okay.

Well, I don't think the President grew up thinking that way or feeling that way about America. I think the President grew up with a very positive perception of America which he never lost. I don't think he understands--although he may very well, as I say I don't know him personally--I don't think he is aware of the managerial revolution that has overwhelmed it. In other words, the decade of the manager has all of a sudden come to a point in our society where the manager is taking over the politics of the country.

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Politics of personality, of promises, leave the American voter cold today. What the American people want out of their society, I think, is direction. They want to say, "All right, define the problem for me. Don't keep it secret from me. Don't say I've got to make my lonely decision all by myself. Stand up at the Bay of Pigs invasion and say, 'All right, here are the ships and here are the missiles carriers they have on those ships, American people, and here's what we plan to do with that.'" Now, if the President could have communicated that way, if the President would have opened himself up to a telethon once a year, where people could just call him up and say, "Mr. President, what are you going to do about this, that, or the other thing?"

M: Is this a contrast between Kennedy and Johnson?

C: No, because Kennedy is the old politics also. But Kennedy came closer to recognizing the fact that the manager in the society has arrived. You know that the society now expects management and demands management. It doesn't want promises unkept. It does not favorably think about a person just because it once thought favorably about a person. A person has to continually keep proving himself over a period of time, and I think he is a victim of that.

From my point of view, and I'm sure that from Macy's point of view sitting back there in the back room, dealing with him on a day-to-day management solving basis, I think he's a fine manager, a fine manager. I think he feels many times very frustrated about his abilities to manage some things, but you know, it's quite clear there have

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been lots of problems in our society. A lot of them are going to get worse in the next four years because the American voters made a bad choice.

M: To clear this up a little bit, are you saying there needs to be an closer definition of the problem and a solution by the chief executive and a communication of this to the public?

C: I think the chief executive has to communicate his problems to the public. I think he has to be a manager in the sense that, if the problem is not within his realm of control, he has to say so. You know? He has to tell the people what he's doing. At some point he has to stop being so overly cautious about the feelings of people in foreign countries. Because what he's doing is locking the American people out of the decision-making process, and they're going to grow more suspect of him all the time.

And if you think Lyndon Johnson had a problem, wait until you see the problem Richard Nixon's going to have! Because Richard Nixon isn't even going to have as many contacts as Lyndon Johnson had. He's not going to have a press secretary. He's announced he's not going to have an appointments secretary. That says two things. He's not going to tell the American people anything unless he wants to in his own special way. He's not going to have anybody speaking for him, where Lyndon Johnson has two press conferences a day! He doesn't do them personally, but George Christian does them. So there'll be less communication with the people.

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So here we are at this critical stage where we're running around the ridge of the abyss. We're either going to veer into a society which is the most exciting society this world's ever seen where our children know more because we teach them on computers all the classics by the time they are six, you know. We pump them in and develop their brains much better and we develop a more beautiful way of living. We're going right over the racial binge into the abyss. Or right over the cities problem into the abyss!

M: Now, what about the conception of the Great Society? Wasn't this an attempt to define what we might be and how we might get it?

C: The problem of the Great Society is that it became a catch phrase. And it became a deriding phrase upon the President, because it aggravated the negative perception which was afoot in the country. You see, the man who thought up Great Society didn't understand the negative perception that was about to occur when this man came into the White House. And the negative perception, you know--a lot of it happened because of Kennedy's death. The bright young men who sat over there in the White House and said, "The President's got to form a Great Society" just misread the United States 100 per cent or misread the mood of the country and got the President off on a bad foot.

Sure, he got a lot of legislation through but if he would have sold it in a completely different way, if he had sold it in a . . . . You know, of course, hindsight's better than foresight by a damn sight, but if he would have noticed the negative mood and said, "I know we've got problems, and we're going to look at our problems, and

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we're going to look at them straightforward." If he had given that speech that Senator [Daniel] Inouye gave at the Democratic Convention as his State of the Union Message the first time he went to the Hill, he'd be president after January 20. Because he would have led us through our negative perception rather than letting the negative perception become the thing that beat him into resigning.

M: Well, on that negative note, maybe we should end. I wish to thank you.

C: As you can tell, it was great fun for me.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I

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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Matthew B. Coffey

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Matthew B. Coffey of Washington, D.C. do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the ~~tape recording and transcript~~ <sup>THML</sup> of the personal interview conducted on November 14, 1968 at Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

*AS edited 8/23/84*

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

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~~(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.~~ <sup>THML</sup>

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript ~~and tape~~ <sup>AS edited</sup> <sup>THML</sup>

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*Matthew B. Coffey*

*8/23/84*

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