INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM J. CONNELL

INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger

PLACE: Mr. Connell's office, Bethesda, Maryland

Tape 1 of 2

G: Mr. Connell, were you able to follow the evolution of Mr. [Hubert] Humphrey's thinking on Vietnam as the years passed?

C: Yes, I worked with Senator Humphrey from 1955 through the time he went into the vice presidency and then went over with him as his chief of staff in the vice presidency and held a somewhat ambiguous subtitle of assistant for national security. I had worked with him in the field of foreign policy and national security, as one of my many duties for the last several years, certainly from 1961 on, although my chief duties were to run the staff. I was the chief of staff from 1961 on through for those eight years, and I had basic political responsibilities, that is, dealing with all of his politics, national and state. Because I wanted to, I involved myself in the field of national security and foreign policy. Although we did regularly have on staff a foreign policy person, from about 19--well, really from 1955 on there was a person who dealt with the State Department and who was his foreign policy assistant.

G: Who was that?

C: Well, the first one, who came aboard the same day I did, was Tom Hughes, Thomas L. Hughes, who became the director of intelligence and

research for the State Department. [He] left Humphrey in about 1958 to go with Chet Bowles over to India, came back and I think became director of intelligence and research under Kennedy. He's now the president of the Carnegie Foundation for Peace here in town. He was the first one, and then he periodically was an adviser and consultant and in fairly frequent touch with Humphrey over the years.

Then I guess the next one who was actually a foreign policy--I guess there wasn't a foreign policy specialist as such. We had an arms control person on board, Betty Goetz.

G: Is that G-O-E--?

C: G-O-E-T-Z, Betty Goetz, who became the staff director of the subcommittee on arms control [of the Foreign Relations Committee] which Humphrey chaired from about 1958, I believe, on until he left the Senate. So she was involved in foreign policy to that degree. She handled that subcommittee. She is now living in New York and keeps running for office up there for Congress and failing. She's involved in the whole arms control intellectual community.

There was a young fellow named Frederick T. Van Dyk, Ted Van Dyk, who came with us about 1963 or 1964, and who took on some of the aspects of foreign policy. He is now the head of the Democratic--whatever the hell that is--council he's established here in town. I'll have to look it up for you [Center for Democratic Policy]. He had some foreign policy responsibilities. He'd come out of the European Economic Community's staff.

Then a young fellow named John Rielly, R-I-E-L-L-Y, came on board I believe at the time Humphrey--let's see, it might have been 1964; I believe it was 1964, before Humphrey went into the vice presidency. He was an academic person in the foreign policy field, and he remained with Humphrey through the vice presidency. He is now the executive person for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. He may be one person that you'll want to talk to. I think you'll want to talk to Van Dyk and to John Rielly about this period in the vice presidency. They were, in this period, people who had--Rielly particularly--formal responsibilities in liaison with the State Department and so on during the period of the vice presidency. I was busy in lots of other things and just kept my hand in.

I guess I could probably try to give you an overview of how Humphrey's thinking on Vietnam perhaps developed, beginning in the early sixties. Of course, Vietnam did not even loom on the horizon, of any consequence, until Kennedy's administration. There was, of course, the involvement with Vietnam to a degree under the Eisenhower Administration. Humphrey's basic background in foreign policy was an interesting one. He was greatly interested in trying to relieve tension in the world. He was instrumental in the development of the idea of an arms control agency and probably has to be considered the father of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was the father of the Peace Corps. He was the guy who instigated the idea, gave it to Kennedy. And he was very, very instrumental in persuading Kennedy to move in the direction of the first basic arms control treaty on the

testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, where both sides agreed not to do so. He was very much oriented in the direction of arms control. He developed the idea of Food for Peace. Food for Peace was his idea for using the great surpluses of Middle America, agricultural surpluses, in a constructive way, to use them as direct--instead of just putting money in, put food in, which he felt was less inflationary, and for a lot of reasons. It was also very good for American farmers to develop foreign markets in the underdeveloped countries.

He was very much interested in the development of democratic institutions from all the democratic institutions around the world. He felt that the ultimate solution to world tension was in creating a whole series of dialogues, and things being done together. He was always trying to figure out how you get the Russians to work with you on anything. If you get the Russians to work with you on anything, then you're not just confrontational. It's better to talk and better to work--preferably to work together, find common efforts. At the same time, with all of these thrusts toward international cooperation, development of democratic institutions, the funding--he was a very strong supporter of funding of underdeveloped countries' development.

So it was not just Food for Peace, but he had a concept for Health for Peace. One of the things he went to Russia for, for example, in 1957, was to talk--he had a subcommittee on international organizations, another subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. And he had a fellow named Julius Cahn who was his staff director there, by the way, another foreign policy person in a sense,

[who] worked with him on that particular aspect, which centered on health. Humphrey was extremely interested in health research, public health, worked very hard with all the health groups in this country, and then he tried to extend that into the area of international cooperation. He went to Russia then to talk to the Russian leaders in the field of public health--medical research basically, that's what he was doing there--when he got his famous call to the Kremlin to talk to Khrushchev for eight hours or seven hours or whatever it was.

So his background then, he started working in this field about 1954. And another person [who is] interesting I should put [in here], he had a fellow on his staff named Herbert J. Waters. Herb Waters was a person who came out of the Department of Agriculture, and he was the staff person that worked with Humphrey on the development of the idea of Food for Peace. He started with an agricultural background and moved into this field. So here is Humphrey with a person staffing him on international health, another person staffing him on international food and development, then he had another staff person over here on arms control, and then he later, in the sixties, got interested in Latin America, Alliance for Progress. He was very much interested. I went down with him to Latin America I think in 1957, something like that. He was very much interested in foreign policy in general. He got involved in the Middle East, went to see Nasser in about 1956-57-58, but he had a staff person--John Rielly was the staff person sort of on the Latin American thing. Rielly almost had a fixation on Latin America, that was his specialty, and he worked with Humphrey on Latin

America. So we had all these actual people in place on the staff, either directly personal staff or on the subcommittees, who were working with him and backing him up professionally, so that he kept au courant with all these fields.

So here you have a picture of a man whose professional career certainly from 1954 on, for six, seven years [included] very heavy, intensive involvement in international cooperation, international development, efforts to find peaceful solutions to conflict, a very strong effort to try to find an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, to make a serious effort. That's the picture of a man who spent the period certainly between 1954 and the time he went into the vice presidency, a full ten years of very intensive effort. The only other thing that perhaps involved more or as much of his energy as that general field was his commitment to civil rights, and he was, of course, instrumental in the development of the great civil rights legislation of the middle sixties.

Now at the same time, Humphrey was a very strong believer in the thesis that you had to stand up to the Soviet Union militarily. He was a very strong supporter of NATO, for example, one of the earliest supporters of NATO. I should again, parenthetically, go back and say he was one of the very early supporters of the United Nations. The United Nations effort goes back to the time he was a mayor of Minneapolis in 1947 and 1948, and he was then involved with Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt and other people who were very instrumental in establishing the active American participation in the United Nations.

So in the UN, UNESCO, all of the sort of multilateral operations of the United Nations, he really became involved with that before he became involved in the other activities I've just described.

At the same time, getting back to his position on military strength, he was always a very strong supporter of a strong United States Armed Forces and of strong military alliances, and in fact was one of the chief persons in the Senate at the time there was serious effort led by Senator [Mike] Mansfield--I forget what year this was, in the sixties, I guess, early sixties--to withdraw troops from Europe. He felt that you simply could not do that. So he was a very firm supporter of NATO.

His attitude toward the Soviet Union had been strongly colored by his experience from 1946 to 1948 in Minnesota, when there was a tremendous convulsion in the liberal--on the left side of the spectrum in Minnesota. There had been a rupture of the Democratic Party in the thirties, which had resulted in the Democratic Party becoming a splinter group and the majority had gone over to what was known as the Farmer-Labor Party. The Farmer-Labor Party was led by Governor [Floyd] Olson, a very charismatic, early, middle-thirties leader who died and his place was taken by Senator [Elmer] Benson, who just died last week in his nineties. The Farmer-Labor Party was a party very much in the populist, progressive mold, basically farm supported, a true populist, northern central plains populist party, very close ties to the socialists, although they didn't call themselves socialists.

In the period post-war, 1946-47, the Farmer-Labor Party became perhaps dominated by the communists. Its leadership was essentially taken over by the communists, and in the great Progressive Party effort of 1948 when Henry Wallace became the candidate, the Farmer-Labor Party was very much a supporter of Henry Wallace, and Humphrey and his group believed that the liberal community in the United States was in fact under danger of being taken over by the Communist Party. He was one of the founders of ADA. Americans for Democratic Action basically was a group of people in the United States who felt that the communists were trying to take over the liberal movement, and they fought them. They fought for the soul of the liberal movement, in effect. ADA is such a nothing now that we forget that it was a fairly powerful force, certainly among intellectuals back in the forties. So he was one of the founders. In fact, I believe he was one of the first presidents of ADA. And one has to remember, ADA is thought of now as a very left-oriented organization. In that day it was the anticommunist left, and that was its raison d'etre, was to have a liberal movement independent of the Communist Party.

At the same time he was doing this, developing ADA, becoming part of the anticommunist movement within the liberal movement, he was the driving force, really, behind the merger of the Democratic Party, the old-line, Irish-based, at that point really rural, Democratic Party and the Farmer-Labor Party. And they merged, I believe, in 1947. I believe they merged in 1947. And he was instrumental, he was the driving force behind the merger of the Democratic Party and the

Farmer-Labor Party to form the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party, which it's still known as, or in shorthand in Minnesota, the DFL.

Inside the DFL then there was this great struggle for power between the communists or communist supporters, open, unsubmerged, and underground, in the Farmer-Labor Party, and the left, represented by Humphrey. They succeeded in driving--essentially taking over, that is, [the DFL]. Humphrey's group, ADA-oriented, liberal noncommunists, anticommunists really, took over the DFL and threw the communists out, essentially. There were terrific fights. Humphrey found himself in confrontation with very hard-line, committed ideologists of the left, and it stamped him permanently. He was stamped irrevocably at this period with a very strong anticommunist bias or anticommunist philosophy. This is curious; it's a dichotomy. Here's a guy who you see working to try to get something done, to get some kind of community of interests with the communists, the Soviet Union, at the same time very, very skeptical of the international aims of communism, very skeptical that any communist party in any country could be independent of the Moscow line, because he saw it in the United States. He saw it in the United States; he saw the communists following the Soviet line. So that he had therefore, on the one hand, this strong internationalist, almost pacifist urge to find nonmilitary solutions, conflicting with this very strong deep-dyed distrust of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and of the role of communist parties in carrying out the Soviet line.

At the same time, one must remember in the period during the fifties when the communists took over China, I believe about--what, 1950?--well, it was really 1949, it happened right after this. A mind set developed in the United States that the communists in China and the communists in the Soviet Union were inextricably bound together in common foreign policy goals, and even the left in the United States began to think of the Soviet Union and China as working together. The phrase was Sino-Soviet--oh, it's curious, Sino-Soviet, not Soviet-Sino. But it was Sino-Soviet ambition, Sino-Soviet policy, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and I guess the key is the Sino-Soviet bloc. People thought of the Sino-Soviet bloc as a bloc, and in their mind it was a permanent anti-U.S., anti-West, military, militarily-oriented, intransigent, unsplittable bloc of power. And the basic American mind set was, "Here we see the Russians pushing out into Europe, the Russians pushing in the Middle East, the Russians pushing in Africa, the Chinese pushing into Southeast Asia, Chinese pushing into Korea." In 1950 we literally committed several hundred thousand troops and navy and marine corps people and air force up in Korea. The perception was that all of this was sort of orchestrated by some superintelligent brain. Of course, the Chinese assisted in this by sending troops, sending their people into Africa and into Latin America. There were Chinese all over the place. So there was a basis, it wasn't just a. . . . But I think the mind set of even the liberals in the United States was that they couldn't conceive of any split between the Chinese and the Soviet

Union. It was just there. You'll deal with that the rest of your life.

Now we come into the commitment of the United States in Southeast Asia and what was Humphrey's role and what were his attitudes and his views about it. My memory goes back to the period when Humphrey was the assistant majority leader or Democratic whip. He had a little office in the Capitol. He had very good relationships with Kennedy after he had been defeated by Kennedy in the primaries in 1960.

I should also say that in the sixties, the 1956-1960 period when Eisenhower was in, when we were having confrontations with the Chinese over Quemoy and Matsu, he was very skeptical about the [policy], and open. This was the [John Foster] Dulles foreign policy, basically, which was confrontational with the Chinese, and very pro-Taiwan China, and made a commitment to Quemoy and Matsu, indeed, sent part of the Fifth or Seventh Fleet down there to patrol the straits, keep the Chinese from coming across the straits to take the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Humphrey was very skeptical about the commitment of American forces in that area and raised questions about the corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan.

He also was a very outspoken opponent of the Dulles--what do you call it?--brinkmanship. This is just I think some more background in terms of Humphrey's basic mind set on foreign policy. He was an outspoken opponent of Dulles' conception of foreign policy, that is that you push the other side to the brink and that they would back down. You would use basically the American nuclear superiority as an

ace card and you threaten massive retaliation. The two phrases were--the Democrats call it brinkmanship and the phrase that the Republicans used was massive retaliation. That if there was any attack anywhere against our allies, there would be massive nuclear retaliation. Humphrey believed that that route led to madness and that it was too dangerous; you just didn't do that. He was opposed to taking that kind of risk with the American people.

And that goes back quite far. This again was the period when the United States was becoming involved with supporting the French in Indochina, when we were opposing the Chinese in Quemoy and Matsu, and when we had just finished, of course, having stopped the Chinese-supported invasion of South Korea. Humphrey, by the way, supported that; he supported the commitment by Truman in 1950 of troops and forces to the defense of South Korea. Again, that was a direct, over-the-border aggression. There was never any problem with Humphrey on direct aggression as to the need to move in and oppose it. So that when the troops came over the border, Humphrey didn't hesitate at all on that one, but he was opposed to all of the blustering and the threats and the taking of the country to the brink that Dulles was very fond of doing in the middle fifties. So I think that sort of completes most of sort of the evolution of his thinking and what he felt was important in foreign policy.

So we come back to 1961 and you find Humphrey as the assistant majority leader again. He's in the little office in the Capitol and he is very close to Kennedy and is invited to participate with Kennedy

in the regular weekly meetings of the leadership. So he would go up with Mansfield and Johnson. Johnson at the time was a very subdued vice president, very careful not to intrude, very much in the background, and very skeptically viewed by the people around Kennedy. So that Johnson in this period of 1961, 1962 and most of 1963 was very much a minor player. Humphrey really had much more influence on Kennedy than Johnson did, at least that was my feeling about it. He certainly had great access to Kennedy and talked to him a great deal and, as I said, really got him involved in the arms control thing and he got him involved in the Peace Corps and in Food for Peace, a great supporter of his on the Alliance for Progress and all these things. He was very much behind him.

G: Let me ask you something.

C: Sure.

G: What did he think about the Bay of Pigs operation?

C: Well, he thought that was really--I'll have to think back now. At that time, the Bay of Pigs operation he thought was a disaster, that is it was a totally un-thought-out, reckless kind of thing that had been developed under the last administration that Kennedy probably should have aborted. I mean, it happened; they were in there and out of there in a hurry. I don't recall. Humphrey obviously didn't say very much about it; it was a disaster.

G: Were his feelings primarily that it was something that should have worked or was it something that shouldn't have been tried on principle?

C: I can't really remember now how he viewed that. Of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis came on the next year, and of course he was very much kept advised on that. I guess I can't really make a statement about what his attitude was as to whether or not we should have gone and even supported the thing in Cuba. I just don't have the direct recollection of that except that it was a real botched job. Certainly he had no illusions that Castro was independent of the Soviet Union, but I just don't think I can really answer that question accurately. I don't think I have enough recollection of that period.

G: What was his relationship to Ed Lansdale during this time? Can you comment on that?

C: Yes. It could have been in 1961 and certainly by 1962, as I recollect how this happened, a young fellow named Rufus Phillips, who is living in Virginia now and constructs airports around the world, came to Humphrey's staff and wanted to see Humphrey. In the usual course of things, he got shunted to me, and we talked about Southeast Asia and he talked to me about the ideas, objectives, of a--I believe he was at that time, he may have been still a colonel--either Colonel or Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. The basic thesis was that the United States had an opportunity to help a nation build itself into a nation and stand on its own feet to resist communism in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people, with the proper training and indoctrination and inspiration and development of certain institutions, could be brought to support their government and to fight. And on the other side, if it did not happen, that it was going to be down the tube and

the Americans ought to stay the hell out of there. Either you did this right or you should get out. And that the worst thing that could happen would be to fly in the face of Eisenhower's advice, which was not to commit American ground forces in Asia. And remember, that was something from Eisenhower that carried great weight with everybody. I mean, you could threaten air wars, you could do everything, but don't put any ground forces in there because you'd never get out. That was Eisenhower's thesis, which was very prophetic.

So I think I introduced Humphrey to Phillips first, and he talked to him and was very struck with this thesis, the Lansdale thesis. And at some point in that period--I just can't remember, I'll have to refer to my own memoranda--Humphrey met with Lansdale. Lansdale I think was in perhaps--he may have been out in Southeast Asia at that time. At any rate, Lansdale and he got together sometime in this period, the early part of the Kennedy Administration, and Humphrey was very much taken with his ideas and his character and thought that he was on the right track and thought that this would serve Humphrey's feeling you had to oppose the communists, but that you simply could not make a go of it unless you develop the will of the people to defend themselves.

So at this point I'm not sure whether he introduced Lansdale to Kennedy or whether there had been, and I suspect there may have been, some independent contacts to Kennedy through the apparatus of the National Security Council, McGeorge Bundy, and of course Kennedy's intimate, Maxwell Taylor. I suspect there may have been efforts by

Lansdale to push in that way, so that perhaps the approach to Humphrey was an end run. His not being able to push in this way, he came around this side. Well, Humphrey ran it into the White House, for sure, and gave his imprimatur to the idea that this is what we should be doing and not just throwing troops in there. At this time we had Green Berets, as I recall, is all we had. Kennedy had committed, I don't know, ten thousand troops maybe we're talking about. It was a very small presence as trainers. They were people like the effort in El Salvador, to train the army. But they were basically oriented toward training the South Vietnamese army to be an efficient fighting unit, and that's quite different from the development of institutions among the people so that you could dry up the sources of the Viet Cong recruiting and develop a cadre of people to support the government.

At any rate, among many things that Humphrey was working on, this was certainly not the dominant thing. Southeast Asia wasn't just that big a cloud on the horizon at that time. There were lots of other things that involved Humphrey: civil rights, Latin America, the Middle East, the Cuban Missile Crisis, all these things. But he did push the Lansdale thesis and tried to get it into the mix of the thinking of Kennedy and his foreign policy advisers.

G: There was some talk of appointing Lansdale as ambassador.

C: I think there was, yes. I think there was at that point, that he would be sort of an ideal person. That he had been there--see, Lansdale had been in Vietnam at the time the French were driven out, as I recall. He had somehow been involved there. I don't know

whether he was CIA or whether he was on--I don't know what his connection was, but he had been involved in the effort. He was an old Vietnamese hand, and he had this group of young men. I met several of them, but the only one I remember well is Rufus Phillips, who is the person who came to see me. They had all been out there together in the fifties. I would guess--I don't know when the fall of Dien Bien Phu took place. Seems to me it was 1956, 1957--

G: 1954.

C: 1954. It was that early. They had been out there that early then, so they had been out there a number of years. Knew the Vietnamese. Lansdale was very persuasive to Humphrey about his conception of what could be done. He was very fond of the Vietnamese people. He admired the Vietnamese. He thought they were bright, they were hard workers, that they had the capability of developing a structure that could overcome corruption and make the government more responsive, and therefore develop a population that would fight. And this intrigued Humphrey. It intrigued him for a lot of reasons. First of all, it conformed to his basic thrust that you had to oppose the communists intelligently. Secondly, that you didn't want to get involved with sending American troops in in masses. And third, it was part of the development idea; economic and political development was his basic thrust in underdeveloped countries. It was good in itself and it was also the way you kept the communists from taking over--economic and political development of the underdeveloped countries. That's why [in] Latin America economic and political development was important.

That's why he thought we ought to be doing the same thing in Southeast Asia. As one of many, many things he was involved in in that period, he pushed Lansdale and his group toward Kennedy. I don't think he traveled out there until he was vice president, though. I never thought he ever went to Southeast Asia. He went to Europe a lot, went to Middle East, went to Latin America. Never went to Southeast Asia.

Comes the Kennedy assassination and Johnson becomes president in 1963. Humphrey is still up on the Hill working as the assistant majority leader. He has never lost his relationship with Johnson. They were good close friends. They had been working partners, essentially, in the Senate from about 19--well, from the time that Johnson became majority leader, which I believe was 1958 perhaps.

G: I thought it was earlier than that.

C: Earlier? 1956.

G: I think it was even earlier than that.

C: Earlier than that? I guess he was the majority leader in 195--I came down in 1955. Middle fifties. It could have even been as early as 1954, under Eisenhower. But they had become good friends and partners, really, in the political process in the Senate. Humphrey took care of what Johnson called the wild men. Humphrey made deals with Johnson that he would bring his wild men into a coalition and Johnson would take care of the wild men on the right, and they brokered out this business of how you ran the Senate. At that time the wild men were a clear minority; by 1958, after the 1958 election, the Senate became a liberal institution. Certainly the Democratic Party in the Senate

became a liberal institution. Humphrey therefore became the guy that had more votes in a sense, you could almost say, than Johnson. If not equal partners, Humphrey became more important to Johnson after the 1958 election. So they had this good relationship. I think it was maintained during the subdued period of Johnson's eclipse, the period from 1961 to 1963, those two years when Johnson was in purgatory. Humphrey still was deferential to him, talked to him, didn't try to bypass him or anything. He dealt with him very well, and my recollection is they had a very good relationship.

So Johnson assumes the presidency in 1963 and the first thing on his plate, other than his great programs of economic development in this country and the attack on poverty, the War on Poverty, and the civil rights efforts, was what to do about Southeast Asia. At that time Johnson had brought in [Dean] Rusk--or was Rusk the secretary of state? Rusk was the secretary of state under Kennedy, right? He inherited Rusk. McGeorge Bundy had also been Kennedy. McGeorge Bundy and Rusk had been involved in Vietnam policy for the period from 1961 on, and then Maxwell Taylor was very much involved. Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk.

Humphrey continued, in his role as the assistant majority leader, to go to these regular meetings with Johnson in the White House every week. They were typically weekly meetings. And he talked to Johnson a great deal about foreign policy. However, my impression is that Johnson became quickly caught up in the Vietnamese problem and essentially closeted himself with the people who had been responsible. He

had been kept advised. I don't think he had a great deal of input, my impression is. You would know better than I. I don't think that he had a great deal of input in Vietnamese policy during the period of his vice presidency. I think he was essentially shunted aside, previewing a little bit what happened to Humphrey. While I think Kennedy was always deferential to him and polite and listened to him, I suspect that what happened was that he probably put in a strong recommendation one time and got shunted aside and his pride was hurt, and he shut up, probably.

G: Let me ask you: was Humphrey at all involved in the debate over what to do about [Ngo Dinh] Diem in the summer and fall of 1963?

C: Yes. I personally was not involved in any meetings about that, although I did talk to some of the White House staff about that. I talked to Kenny O'Donnell I remember one time about it. I believe that he was involved. When it came to such things as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Diem incident and so on, Humphrey was very close-mouthed about what he heard. If he was in a meeting with Kennedy, he wasn't going to come back and talk to the staff about it, if it was very sensitive stuff. He was very security conscious, interesting enough, somebody who was given to talking so freely. But f there was something that was really a security problem, really something that didn't want to get out, he wouldn't leak it to anybody, contrary to what Johnson later, who became quite paranoid about leaks, felt that Humphrey [did]. He couldn't believe that Humphrey, [who] was so talkative, was a talkative man, very talkative--very garrulous,

is the right word--that he would hold secret those really innermost secrets of the administration, which he did, in fact, do, but which Johnson couldn't bring himself to believe that he would do.

So that's a little parenthesis around--I believe that he was involved only because I know he was in meetings regularly with Kennedy, that he was briefed, very much up to date on what was happening in South Vietnam, and that he was pushing for his--it would fit in terms of what he believed you had. Diem was intransigent, that you couldn't do anything with him, that [because of] the old Confucian idea of power from the top, that he would never accede to anything in terms of really developing of democratic institutions, that he was a roadblock to the creation of what Humphrey would liked to have seen. So I can only extrapolate. I can only say I would have been very surprised if he had not acceded in some effort to move Diem aside and put in somebody that would be more cooperative in terms of trying to develop a nation state there that would work. I can't believe that he would have supported an assassination effort.

G: Do you remember his reaction to the assassination?

C: No. I don't. Humphrey would have been morally repelled. I doubt that they would have told him. If indeed it was supported by the United States government, and I don't know that, I doubt that they would have told Humphrey that they were going to do it or that they were going to permit it to be done, because I think he would have been so shocked and repelled by it that it might have caused a rupture. So just knowing the man--and again, I have no documentation for that,

it's just a feeling about the man. I don't recall any conversations with him about it, so my impression was that it was not anything that he expected or that he regretted. That it was one of those things. They had a coup and they knocked a guy off and "what do we do now?" kind of thing. I can't imagine that he thought that it was instigated by or supported by the United States government. Nevertheless, clearly there was a feeling in the Kennedy Administration that you had to do something about him. Something had to be done about him. I remember my conversations about that. They couldn't work with the guy; they had to find some other way to do it.

So in the early period, when Johnson found himself with Vietnam on his hands and not much really good happening, Humphrey [was] in at Johnson from the beginning with this sort of the Lansdale thesis that "now is our chance, let's move in and really do this thing right; let's put a really strong effort into nation-building and institution-building and cadre-building, and let's not get sucked in any deeper." Johnson, selecting the option that was proposed to him by--I don't know the inner workings of how this happened, how he was drawn into the idea that you couldn't work with [the South Vietnamese]. Essentially the bottom line was you couldn't really get the South Vietnamese to fight so you had to go in and do it yourself. Somehow you had to do it without causing enough impact back home so that you had to raise taxes and you had to get the Congress involved in a declaration of war and all this kind of thing. So that we got committed to the big

battalions and the big bombers and a lot of air power, a lot of ground support from the air.

Humphrey really basically felt that this was not the way we were going to win the war. He was not against the commitment in South Vietnam; he was very much for it. He felt that this was part of this [conspiracy]. He believed this, that the Chinese and the Soviet Union were together on this. They were pushing down, that it was a part of the worldwide conspiracy, and indeed they were supporting the insurgency. But he felt that essentially you couldn't stop it without drying up the sea in which the Viet Cong swam. That's the Lansdale phrase. That the guerrillas are fish that swim in the sea, and if your sea is favorable to them, you can't beat them, and if you dry up the sea, if you make the sea intolerable, they can't live there. He felt that the commitment of vast resources, money and men and weapons, would inevitably transform the war into an American war and would leave the idea of building a South Vietnamese society able to defend itself stranded. That once you got into the bombing of the North and once you got into really heavy-duty military operations, that you would be sucked down and down and down and deeper and deeper.

He was loyal. You know, once it was done, he supported Johnson. But he was really opposed to the Americanization of the war in the early period there, and riding his hobby horse with Johnson apparently aggravated Johnson greatly. Essentially Johnson--my recollection is that this was fairly early on, like by early 1964--in order to exclude Humphrey from the discussions, instead of having National Security

Council meetings where Humphrey had to be, as the Vice President, essentially Johnson began to have rump meetings where he would meet with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA Director, and so on, but in a non-National Security Council environment. Humphrey just wasn't invited.

At some point--I don't know what incident there was; I think it was related to the bombing of the North--Humphrey spoke out. Johnson had a very strong sense that Humphrey could tell him anything he wanted to in private, but that if Humphrey opposed a position that he wanted in the group there, that that was beyond the pale. And I suspect that what happened is Humphrey tried to talk to Johnson privately. At that time he was seeing Johnson privately on numerous occasions. Frequently he was down there. He moved down, his offices were down in the White House; he didn't stay up in the Senate very much. In the beginning he moved right down there, set up offices right in the Executive Office Building, right opposite, where he could walk across the street to see Johnson, and [he] established contact with McGeorge Bundy.

At this point, I should say, Humphrey effectively was put in purgatory by Johnson. Whether it was conscious effort on Johnson's part or not I don't know, but effectively Humphrey was shut off from anything but the most formal relationship on Vietnam, and Johnson gave all kinds of evidences that he was--

(Interruption)

C: --period there. So we were talking about Humphrey being put into purdah.

G: Let me ask you a couple of specific things. What was his reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin business in August of 1964? That was the first time airplanes were sent to bomb.

C: I think his reaction was that it was an attack; he was convinced it was an attack on the destroyers and that you did need to retaliate in some fashion. You couldn't tolerate that kind of thing.

G: Was there some doubt in his circles about the validity of the attack?

C: No, I don't believe so. In hindsight there were a hell of a lot of questions raised about the validity of the attack, and as a destroyer officer myself I have strong feelings that you may have had an impetuous junior officer indicating an attack that wasn't there. You can pick up all kinds of things on your radar. But at that time I don't recall that he was--I can't say with any finality or accuracy that he didn't oppose it. I don't recollect that he raised any questions about it. I think he accepted that it was an attack and you go ahead. It's the kind of thing that he would have said, "Yes, they hit us, so we [retaliated]." He couldn't conceive that they would have conjured up something and faked it.

But then when you got into sustained bombing, heavy, heavy B-29--or whatever the hell we were using then--bombing the North, he could see the weight shifting almost inexorably over where we were headed into a big confrontation involving American forces and that his thesis was just going to get discarded, shunted aside. Apparently at one

National Security Council meeting--I did not attend National Security Council meetings--he was very vigorous about this and Johnson got pretty pissed off.

G: Did Humphrey tell you about this when he came back?

C: No, he didn't. I also should say one thing about Humphrey: his attitude toward the presidency. Humphrey had an almost exaggerated respect for the office of the presidency and for whoever was president. He felt that that person had great responsibilities and that he ought not to in any sense--certainly a Democratic president--undercut him in what he had to do. He felt that he had to work on the inside--this was related with Kennedy and with Johnson--and he wanted to be free to say whatever he felt very strongly, but that once there was a public commitment, that he would support it. He also permitted himself in this period I think to be shunted aside and to be essentially handled by staff in a way that I found very disconcerting, and I expressed myself to him about it. He would go over and talk to McGeorge Bundy, he would talk to Jack Valenti, he would talk to--who was the fellow that was the domestic adviser to Johnson, Italian--?

G: [Joseph] Califano?

C: Califano. And I felt that when Johnson put him into purdah, these people, the Califanos of the world, behaved rather arrogantly to him. It was like sharks, you know, they can smell the blood in the water. And I did not think that they treated him very well. Some of them were very good, very accommodating. He always got along fine I think

on Johnson's staff with George Christian, before he got in trouble with the chief of staff over there, Walter--

G: Walter Jenkins, yes. [Marvin Watson?]

C: --Jenkins. And he had a Jewish attorney over there that was left over from Kennedy's period that he was--Mike. . . . What the hell was his name? [Myer Feldman] At any rate, there were some staff people that were very good, respectful, forthcoming, really carried messages and so on, and there were others I thought that just treated him like a nuisance. And Humphrey is a proud man. He sort of backed off so that there was really--he went back up to the Senate is essentially what happened. He became much more involved in the Senate activities and went off on his own. He decided just to do what he could do, which was to work in the Senate and to work on legislation, maintain his contacts in the Senate. And then he got involved in some little piddly things like the Council on Oceanographic Research and this kind of little crappy stuff that didn't make any difference, but it at least gave him something to do. But he did turn. . . .

As I used the term his exaggerated respect for the presidency, I felt that he should have broken past the barrier and gone back to Johnson and had a man-to-man with him and just said, "Look, I'm sorry I pissed you off on this. Can't we just talk?" But he knew his man, he knew Johnson a lot better than I did. Whether it was for fear that he would be further put out to pasture or whether he just felt that it was not his prerogative to do it, he did not press the issue of closing the gap between himself and Johnson. Johnson was a tough

fellow and very ruthless with people, very overbearing. He could be very charming, but he was also--I would never have worked for Johnson; I couldn't have stood to work for Johnson. People who worked for Johnson took an awful lot that I wouldn't have stood for, and Humphrey took a lot from Johnson that I wouldn't have stood for. It was a very, very difficult period for Humphrey.

At some point, nevertheless, Johnson I guess decided, by God, that he was going to bring him back in for some reason or other. I don't know what was the occasion, but it was--this was I guess in 1966. When was this that we went out to Vietnam?

G: That was in 1966.

C: 1966. In 1966 Johnson began to get in trouble politically on Vietnam. I mean, hell, they were all kinds [of problems], but in 1966 the student rioting was beginning and there were all kinds of problems. There were serious defections up in the Senate. And in hindsight perhaps Johnson decided that he needed Humphrey. That Humphrey had been the guy that put the liberals together before for him in the Senate, maybe Humphrey could do the same thing for him now, because he had real serious problems of keeping the country united behind him. So I don't know what the mechanism was, but at any rate, Humphrey was invited back in, briefed, and asked to go out to Southeast Asia. I believe this was the one. He went out a couple of times, but I think this was--is this the one where Johnson had gone out ahead of him?

G: If I'm right, in January of 1966 there was a conference in Honolulu.

C: Yes. Right. Johnson had gone out ahead and in fact Johnson flew back from that conference and met Humphrey in Los Angeles on the way out, and they had a meeting there at the airport in Los Angeles, on the plane, on Air Force One. Johnson went back to Washington, Humphrey went out to Southeast Asia. I went with him. And Humphrey was very excited about this and felt or thought that this indicated not only that he was back in the foreign policy business again and back in at least [as] a consultant to Johnson, but that Johnson was taking seriously his thesis; that is, you had to do something with the folks out there. I believe it was this trip, certainly it was--I think by this time Lansdale had been sent out there. I've forgotten when he went out there, but he had gone out there and he worked with the Boston Brahmin Ambassador, Elliot--not Richardson--the fellow who was down in Santo Domingo. Ellsworth Bunker. I believe it was with Ellsworth Bunker he went out. He went out there--

G: Well, now, Bunker didn't go until 1967.

C: Is that right?

G: He went out under [Henry Cabot] Lodge I believe.

C: Under Lodge. He went out under Lodge. That's right. Lodge had been kept over, that's right. That was one of Johnson's master strokes: keep the Republican out there so you could have a bipartisan thing. That's right, he went out with Lodge, and then he worked with Bunker later. Anyway, I believe it was his first trip where we went out and actually went and saw Lansdale in situ and went out and saw the cadre-training camps and all that kind of thing.

G: What did Mr. Humphrey think of the Lansdale operation?

C: Well, he was very excited about it. He met with the cadre, talked to them, he saw them in training. He said this looked like something functioning that was really going to happen. He believed that they were armed cadre but they were basically politically--they were small "d" democratically-oriented. He got very excited about this nation-building. I don't know when it was he made his famous speech about nation-building that got all of his liberal friends very angry. There were two trips and they blur in my mind now after all this time.

G: Well now, there was one I think in October or November also of 1966, when [Nguyen Cao] Ky was inaugurated.

C: Yes, that was the inauguration of Ky, yes. And it was that one I guess when he made his nation-building statement. But at any rate, it was very exciting to him. The cadre-training camps were there, they were sending people out in the countryside. He saw something that maybe was going to not only carry out his thesis that actually a country could be defended against communism from within, but that maybe we weren't going to get drawn in any further into the commitment of American forces. I think it was that period when he saw the Koreans. The Koreans were up in the northern part of the country, and he was impressed that we were not just committing American forces, we had some other forces in there fighting with us.

At any rate, Humphrey was a person given to passionate enthusiasms and wanted very much to believe that Johnson had now turned onto the right path, and this was something that the American people ought

to support, that there was a chance of a success in Southeast Asia. He became a very outspoken supporter of the program, which caused a terrific row in the liberal community, which was becoming increasingly skeptical about Vietnam and didn't want any part of it, and [neither did] the kids, the youth movement, the militants, activists in the youth movement in the colleges.

So in his enthusiasm for what he believed was a turning point, that is that there was really now a chance that we're going to really bring this off down there, he became an outspoken advocate, and Johnson rewarded him with another trip to South Vietnam, a trip to talk to the New Zealand and Australian people, and he went to Thailand. He spoke all around. He became involved. He went to India; he was sent out to India at Nehru's death. I forget what year that was, 1966 or 1967. And he talked to Southeast Asian leaders. He talked to Southeast Asian leaders who said to him, "You're doing the right things in coming there; we have to stand and fight there." And he came back and told that to the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, he told that to his liberal friends. He said, "They want us there. Singapore wants us there. The Indians want us there. They don't want to say it in public, but they do. They have their own political problems, but they say, 'Goddamn it, you can't leave.'" Singapore, the Indians, the Thais, the Australians, the New Zealanders, they all wanted us to stay there. They all wanted us to stay there, but they didn't want to say anything because of their own political problems at home. So he came back with this message. He said, "We're

doing the right thing. If we can just bring the South Vietnamese in, pull back American [forces], gradually this thing will stand. We'll steal out of the situation like Korea. We'll have a demarcation line, and that will be it. We'll have a North and a South Vietnam, as we have with Korea."

But he caused a tremendous uproar back home with his--and very troubling to him. And he got combative about it. He was really even more outspoken. Now I'm trying to remember the trip. He came back from one of these trips--we had half the White House along with us; we had Valenti with us and [Lloyd] Hand and Jim Thomson and a whole bunch of folks were on the plane. We came back and he was writing a report for Johnson. That report was argued over bitterly all the way back across the Pacific as to what was the situation. Humphrey came back essentially optimistic that it was going to work, and there were staffers on board that said, "No, it ain't, it's just flim-flam. It's one of these Russian-type things where it's all facade and there's nothing there." Humphrey got very angry. Jim Thomson particularly, he got very angry with Jim Thomson. At any rate, he wrote the thing, which apparently didn't satisfy Johnson, and it got rewritten a lot of times. It wasn't effusive enough for Johnson and it was too effusive for some of his staff and his friends. I don't know how it finally came down. It came down essentially optimistic that we were turning the corner.

G: What was your own feeling?

C: I shared that. I was caught up in the enthusiasm of the nation-building aspect. I don't know which trip it was when Bobby Kennedy made the statement that he wanted a coalition government with the Viet Cong, and Humphrey made the famous statement about "you don't put the fox in charge of the chicken coop." I gave him that phrase. I just said, "That's what you ought to say." We were talking about it and he popped right off with it, he didn't even wait a second, and he was on the air with it, and it caused a great uproar. Because it fitted with his thesis, you know. You can't deal with these guys; you can't put them into the government because if you put them in the government, they'll take you over. You're going to have to throw them out of the government. That's what he had to do with them back in Minnesota. So he really believed that coalition government was not going to work. This time he believed that you could go the way that he had outlined we could go and that we could pull back our troops, pull back our bombing, and that eventually we could get out of there with some honor and that South Vietnam would stand.

And I thought that, too, at that time. I'm not sure now, looking back, whether that was accurate, whether if we had really moved in that direction with much more vigor and effort and money, massive effort, whether we could maybe have made it work. The corruption out there, in retrospect, was so great that I'm not sure that it was going to be possible. Lansdale would say that it was possible, if you talked to him now. I think that the idea that we should have given support to South Vietnam, I think Humphrey never wavered from that

idea to the end of his life. He felt that we should have made the commitment, we didn't do it right, we got sucked in, Johnson's advisers talked him into much too heavy a commitment, that something could have been worked out. I also think that everybody misunderstood what was happening in the Sino-Soviet bloc. That there was a chance to play off the Chinese against the Russians, and that if you could just stabilize the situation, eventually probably you could have worked something out by playing them off one against the other. That's all retrospect. At that time, however, Humphrey was convinced that it was a just war and that it was a just commitment and he became an outspoken supporter in 1967 and 1968.

G: Did this clash with any of his staff's views on the war?

C: Oh, yes, sure. Oh, yes. It did. But he still was obviously uneasy about the continued pulling in of more and more troops, more and more troops. The Tet offensive in January I believe of 1968, he knew that that was a successful defense on the part of the South Vietnamese and American troops, that it was a military defeat for the Vietnamese in the North. But he also understood that it was a great political defeat for the United States, that it was a destructive event, and he became very pessimistic about the possibilities of a happy outcome after that. Nevertheless, he continued to support it. It probably as much as anything else destroyed his chances to be president, because the faction that was created in the Democratic Party was so great that when he did come to run in 1968, sufficient numbers of the Democratic left left him that it cost him the presidency. Other things were

going, too, that's not the only thing, but certainly if they had not left him, he would have been president.

G: Did LBJ consult Humphrey at all during the great A-to-Z examination of Vietnam policy that went on in February and March, leading up to the March 31 speech?

C: Yes, I believe he did. He was in pretty frequent consultation with Johnson during that period. He was absolutely convinced that Johnson was going to run again. He was in fact on a mission to Mexico when Johnson quit, on March 31 I guess. Yes, they were in close contact and I think he was very much involved in those discussions. I was not. At this time I was very much involved in a lot of other things other than foreign policy. But I believe he was probably involved in many, many discussions at that time. Johnson told him before he went down to Mexico that he was going to make a decision and that he had two speeches; he showed him both speeches.

G: Did he show him the ending of both?

C: Yes. Yes. He showed him both endings.

G: Then that was the first time Humphrey realized that there was a possibility of this?

C: Yes, just the day before he went to Mexico. He didn't even tell his wife. Didn't find out about it until after he came back. He did not signal anything to me. I was totally taken by surprise when that happened. I called up Marvin Watson when I heard it on the television and said, "Is that for real? Did I hear what I just heard?" He said, "Yes, that's right. He's not going to run." And I got quickly on the

phone and spent the rest of the day trying to reach people, tell them to hold up. I couldn't reach Humphrey. I tried to reach Humphrey; he was in a banquet.

G: So Humphrey didn't hear the speech live?

C: No. He was in a banquet with the Mexican President. It was really something. But I think he suspected, seeing this, that Johnson was seriously considering it. Johnson could. So he wasn't surprised; he was not surprised the next day.

G: If I read you correctly, then your first concern would have been, "Well, if he's not going to run, my man probably will," and so you've got to get hold of all of the points of power.

C: Everybody. I called, I don't know, maybe a hundred calls, and people would tell me on the phone, many of them, that they'd just had a call from Bobby Kennedy or from Teddy Kennedy. By and large, most of our people were standing firm; they were not going to jump. So I said, "You'll just have to wait. Humphrey's there. I can't reach him. I cannot tell you that he's going to run. I believe he will run. As soon as he gets back, he'll be in touch with you." So several days later he came back and then he went into a period of consultation for a couple of weeks.

But that period when Humphrey was sort of brought back into the Johnson embrace and brought back into the councils was really a gut-wrenching kind of business, because it did set up all the great dichotomy in the Democratic Party. People thought Humphrey had betrayed the cause, Humphrey had sold out, Humphrey was currying favor, when in

fact you can ascribe a certain amount of overenthusiasm to him, maybe he should have been a little cooler, but he believed it. I mean, it was no lying. Humphrey was not a man who would dissemble. He was a very much out-front fellow, up front. He believed that the turning point had come and that there was going to be a sea change in the American position and in the Vietnam position, that a new day was dawning and, by God, he was going to be part of it, and that there could be a happy outcome. He was a very great optimist. That's another thing. He was a very optimistic man. He always believed that if you really put your mind to it and energy and brought a lot of bright people in, that you could solve anything, that there were no intractable problems. When in retrospect it may be that South Vietnam, the whole of South Vietnam, is an intractable problem, just as Lebanon is an intractable problem. There ain't any way to solve it. Northern Ireland is an intractable problem. The historic divisions are so deeply ingrained in the minds and the hearts of the people there, you can't do anything about it with our logical, rational, western, American approach.

But Humphrey wanted to believe that you could, and had he become president, it's conceivable that he might have brought it off, with the power of the presidency. With his infectious enthusiasm and his gift for rallying people, he might just have brought the American support level up to permit him to pursue that route in South Vietnam. Maybe it could have stabilized the situation and troops could have been withdrawn. Instead of pulling out ignominiously--when, [in] 1976?--

whenever it was Nixon finally pulled them out, that he could have had them out of there in two or three years and had a reasonably stabilized situation. Because he would have put tremendous energy and conviction into it.

G: Well, now, did he follow what Johnson used to call the other war, the progress of pacification, Lansdale's program, revolutionary development and so on? Did he follow that pretty closely?

C: Yes. I guess as closely as he could. They were giving him reports that this was working. The pacification program, revolutionary development, yes. I'm trying to remember how--I think Lansdale sort of stayed in touch with him, either through his people or directly, so that he was in communication with him and kept encouraging him. Lansdale believed it was working, that this could be done. I think Humphrey felt that it was always underfunded and underemphasized and that it could have been much better had it been given more weight. Whether it was, in fact, just a--I guess it was, in fact, turned out to be a side show. The main event was the great big battalion battles.

G: Well, now, after Humphrey announced, you've alluded to the problems that he had with his old constituency. I suppose people in the ADA were not pleased, people like Joe Rauh and so on.

C: Yes, but of course, that was relatively--yes, Gene McCarthy, who had become a guru for the left and the students, was particularly bad about swinging to his support. Never really did. George McGovern, on the other hand--Humphrey always remembered that--did swing early to support him.

But the problem was not just the political problem of a schism, that is within the leadership of the Democratic left, but it was that the kids, the activists in the colleges, were so caught up in this thing that they felt that Humphrey was their bete noire. Humphrey was the enemy. He was it and they were out to get him, and they were skillful in manipulating the television media, very skillful, and the television media are easily manipulatable, as we can all see from what Reagan has been able to do with them. Beginning with the 196--well, before, all during the period between March and the convention, which was in August, so that period of about four or five months there, there was tremendous--everywhere Humphrey went he was demonstrated against. He would speak and they would howl at him and they would throw placards up. You're talking about a leadership of relatively few people, but they were highly visible people.

Humphrey became associated in the American mind with unruliness, loud demonstrations, that kind of thing. Of course, it was a disaster at the convention. The confrontation with the demonstrators and the Chicago police over Vietnam, from the point of view--politically it was a terrible disaster. Humphrey was dogged from that day until his Salt Lake City speech with, daily, two things: demonstrations everywhere he went. When he spoke anywhere, there were always demonstrators out there, and they were always kids and they were very skillful, and the television cameras would go over and pick them up. So the gestalt that the American people had about Humphrey was Humphrey and those damn, loud kids and banners and so on, an inability to control,

inability to be in control. The feeling was that somehow or other they should have been able to do something about that. At this point, the very basic majority of the American people were not opposed to the commitment in Vietnam. All the public opinion polls were very strongly in support, very strongly in support of the Vietnamese commitment. So it wasn't that the American people were turned against Humphrey on Vietnam so much as it was that Humphrey was somehow associated with all this uproar and disorder. Also this was aggravated by the black riots after Martin Luther King's death. The Democratic Party, the Democratic standard-bearer, was all associated with this disorderliness and uproar and all kinds of trouble. Trouble, trouble.

The other thing was that the press, every single time that Humphrey would have a press conference, be it in Dubuque, Iowa or New York City, the first question was always Vietnam, and the second question was Vietnam, and the third question was Vietnam. He couldn't get on the attack. He could not get on the attack against Nixon.

G: Let me ask you about the Salt Lake City speech. Who wrote that speech? Whose product was that?

C: Really it was very much a composite project. Humphrey finally-- Humphrey was drawn into the drafting himself, very much so. I should precede that by saying that every stop from August through this period, I forget when, October, all the way through, that six or eight weeks there, every stop was just disaster. [It was] a rolling kind of a thing, a rolling story [?]. The press was just terrible; every night on television, the same thing. Humphrey kept trying to make a statement

that would be a definitive statement, that would reflect his position on where he would go, what he would do if he were president. He would just make one little change in what he had said the day before and it would be blown up into a huge story.

He kept doing things impromptu. He was a very impromptu fellow. He didn't like to sit down and plan anything. He was a very innovative, creative fellow, but he didn't like to plan. So I was driven almost to despair by his failure to come up with a definitive position, bang, lock it up, no matter what it was, whether it was all out for the Johnson program or all out against. Although I was opposed to that, even that would have been better than his movement and the impression that he was shilly-shallying, that he was back and forth on the issue. That was disastrous because, again, American people want firmness. They'd rather have a firm guy they don't like than somebody that is uncertain or appears to be uncertain. So I was pressing and his whole staff was pressing to have him commit to paper something that he could say, "Okay, I said that. That's my position. Pass on to the next question." Politically it was a disaster, disaster, not to have this.

So finally it came to a head. What was happening in the meantime, which was really causing him to do this, was that Johnson had sent over his negotiating team to Paris. George Ball was sort of liaisoning to them. This was Ambassador--what's the old guy's name, from New York?

G: [Averell] Harriman.

C: Harriman. Harriman had led a delegation to Paris. This must have been early summer, spring of 1968, during all of this period, and Johnson had really set up negotiations, trying to negotiate his way out of this thing, wanted very much to. In fact, [he] had said, "That's what I want to do now. I'm not going to run, I'm going to spend all of my time trying to get this thing done." And I think Johnson very much wanted to be able to do it, get the hell out of there, you know, declare victory and leave, whatever. So Humphrey was under very strong pressure not to say anything that would disturb the negotiating position in Paris. I was not fully aware during this period of how important that was in his mind. It became apparent as time went on. It was terribly exasperating and frustrating that he would not take a definitive position because things were--he kept--

Tape 2 of 2

C: --yes.

G: --and Mr. Humphrey's campaign.

C: Right. We had a guy on the staff at this time [who] had taken over administrative duties, Bill Welsh, and he stayed in the Senate staff up there and kind of ran the Senate staff. While the rest of us tended to travel with Humphrey in 1968, among the things he did, he stayed in touch with George Ball. The trip to I guess it was Seattle--Seattle or Spokane?--Washington State anyway, there was a big event out there. It came to a head that apparently the word had gotten back that Harriman said, "It ain't going to work. Go ahead and do what the

hell you got to do. Say what you want to say. We can't get any agreement with these bastards."

So I flew out to meet him out in Seattle and I think several other people; Ted Van Dyk flew out or was on the plane. I guess Ted was on the plane with him. Ted was one of those who wanted an out-and-out break with the administration on Vietnam, later became a key member in the McGovern campaign in 1972, which tells you a little bit where his mind and heart were. And John Rielly, who also wanted to break, [was there]. We went out there and started drafting a statement which would be a definitive statement which would indicate Humphrey's intention to do something drastic if he were president in terms of changing the direction of the war and finding a peaceful solution, negotiated position, but at the same time would not undermine the American troops committed in Vietnam.

There were really two considerations. One was the consideration of the situation in Vietnam itself; he did not want to do anything that would start a debacle. At the same time, he felt that we had to reverse direction and do something to bring the war to an end. The other was the political consideration back in the States, and the arguments were, on the one hand, the faction arguing that in order to get the kids back and to restore the Democratic left to unity that you had to make an open break with Johnson. You had to completely break with Johnson. The other argument, which was on my side, [was] that the American people politically, just aside from the merits of the question on Vietnam policy, were not going to stand for a guy who was

going to break with the President of the United States trying to get peace out there, and that they were still committed to the Vietnam War. They were not prepared to cut and run. They wanted negotiation, they wanted to get out of there, but they did not want to cut and run. And that it would be a disaster for Humphrey politically to have broken openly with Johnson, a disaster. That it would just simply not go down well with people. That for every one vote you pulled back from the left, you'd lose two in the right, in the middle. That was my thesis.

G: And this was an issue on the staff, is that right?

C: Yes. Oh, yes. We worked on this damn thing. We worked in Seattle; we worked on the plane over there. Then finally people came out to join us there; Larry O'Brien came out. Larry O'Brien wanted essentially to [break]; he bought the thesis that you had to completely break with Johnson. Jim Rowe came out; Jim Rowe supported my position. Humphrey's basic position was about where he came down, basically that you had to make a dramatic gesture, but at the same time you had to make sure that you were not undermining the forces on the ground. That you couldn't trust the North Vietnamese, you had to have some sanctions. You couldn't just say, "I'm going to cut and run." You had to [say], "We'll do this if you do that," and so on. He had to lay out some parameters to protect himself in case it didn't work. There was almost an all-night session there in Salt Lake City, and we rewrote, rewrote, argued and argued, and finally Humphrey just said, "To hell with it. Everybody go to bed." But by that time basically

we had thrashed out the basic line of the speech which, looking at it cold-bloodedly now, you'd say, "Well, how in the hell did that speech satisfy anybody?" The statement was so hedged around with all kinds of ifs and buts and so on, and it didn't really blackguard Johnson. Johnson got pissed off at it. Humphrey called him up and read it to him, he got pissed off, because Johnson, of course, didn't want any kind of criticism or any implied criticism of his policies. But he kind of grunted and growled and said, "I'm not going to denounce you," and that kind of thing.

(Interruption)

But it satisfied my basic requirements: a) that there be a definitive statement. And once you had it, that he was committed to stick to it. No matter what the hell anybody said, he was never going to waver from that. That was it, bang. That would stop the press harassment. I did not know whether it was going to stop the student harassment, but the press harassment, you'd say, "That was it, no more. Take the next question. What do you want to talk about? Let's talk about something else." [That] satisfied that, and I thought that the protections insured him plenty of wiggle room in case the North Vietnamese were not cooperative.

But the goddamn thing had a magical effect. In twenty-four hours it transformed [his campaign]. Instead of the students getting up and raising hell with him, people were cheering him. He got cheering crowds the next day. And the press accepted it, didn't ask any more

questions. Vietnam became a nonissue. The next time it came up was when Mrs. What's-her-name, the Chinese lobbyist--

G: Mrs. [Anna] Chennault?

C: --Mrs. Chennault subverted the process with the South Vietnamese government in the last days.

G: What do you know about that? That's an interesting story.

C: Humphrey got word that--and this was literally in the last days; this could have been, I don't know, three or four days before election. I remember that the polls had given us a tie; we had come up from twenty-two points down. All this happened from October 20--whenever the hell it was that we had the Salt Lake City speech. In three weeks Humphrey had come from twenty-two points behind to even, maybe even ahead. I always felt that we actually went ahead in the last couple of days before the election. And that the last notch that twisted it back down again was when Mrs. Chennault went to see the South Vietnamese government people and said, "Hold out. Nixon will give you a better deal."

G: Now, I want to know where you have this from.

C: Humphrey was given this information by somebody in the Johnson Administration. I don't know whether it came from CIA or whether it came from National Security Council staff or where, but he got the information directly from the government. It wasn't a press thing. That there had been an intercept, a telephone intercept I believe. Probably it was NSC, because they operate electronic surveillance stuff.

G: Do you mean NSA?

C: NSC. National Security Agency, yes, the electronic surveillance people. A very hush-hush group, you know. But at any rate, he was given this information. There was a very vigorous debate as to whether or not--he wanted to go public with it that day and denounce both Mrs. Chennault and the South Vietnamese government. But he was persuaded--I believe that I agreed to that--that it would be considered by the American people as a last minute, last ditch kind of thing and that it would be perhaps a lie, that actually if he said that, they would say, "Oh, shucks, he's just saying that because it's a close election and he's trying to go after Nixon and these people." So he swallowed it and did not go public. In retrospect maybe he should have. Maybe it was not the prudent thing to do--maybe it was too prudent.

But I did not see the document. I know Humphrey was absolutely furious. He stormed around. He was not someone who got angry easily. He was a very optimistic kind of a nice guy all the time. But he was furious, just furious. He could see his election going down the tubes. The peace process had begun, Johnson had really got the thing going there, and all of a sudden the goddamn corrupt right-wing government over there in South Vietnam was going to do him in. They were going to give it to Nixon because Nixon would give them a better deal. He was furious, and he was with great difficulty persuaded not to go public. He finally calmed down and said, "Okay, that's it," and he went out and campaigned. But Vietnam policy certainly was the determinate issue in that election.

G: Now, of course we did get a bombing halt right on the eve of the [election].

C: Yes. The bombing halt was there, it helped, and then after--it was the bombing halt first, and then I think it was the Chennault trip that scuttled the--you know, the bombing halt was supposed to get them to the bargaining table. It was a great ploy by Johnson. Johnson by this time, for whatever reasons, had finally decided he wanted Humphrey to win, had gone down to Houston to the Astrodome there and Johnson had come out there and, God, it was the biggest political event of the century. They had the people hanging from the rafters at the Houston Astrodome. Johnson had gone all out to carry Texas. You can say whatever you want about Johnson, but he wouldn't have done it unless he wanted Humphrey to win and he knew that he couldn't win without carrying Texas. So he was out there and he really went all out. Johnson--and the move on the eve of the election was a great political move and would have succeeded I think, it would have elected Humphrey, if it had not been for this event that just took the edge off it. It was such a close election. It just took the edge off of it. It destroyed Humphrey's momentum at the last minute, literally in the last two or three days. People had been lifted up; "ah, we're going to finally get out of that mess," and then "we're not going to get out of the mess. Goddamn it, we've got to change administrations."

G: Do you recall when Cy Vance came out and denounced the South Vietnamese publicly for--?

C: Yes. Yes. And Humphrey probably should have. His instincts were right and mine were wrong. That it just wouldn't have been credible.

G: What do you think he would have done about Vietnam had he been elected?

C: Well, I think he would have probably begun a policy of gradual, very gradual extrication of American forces. I don't think he would have in any sense moved precipitously. I think probably the first thing he would have done would have been to send a message to the North Vietnamese that he was not going to cut and run, that he was prepared to negotiate something, but the troops are going to stay there until they get a negotiation. And he would then have looked forward to a long and protracted period of negotiating and fighting for the next couple of years, putting enormous resources into the cadre development thing, trying to really work out some kind of a--forcing the South Vietnamese government to be responsive to the people, working hard on doing something about corruption, really putting pressure on them. Possibly, possibly--I don't say that it was probable--but possibly being able to bring something off where there would have been in place a native Vietnamese government with the reasonable support of its people and something that would have bumbled through until we had the big Chinese-Soviet apparent split in Southeast Asia. That's possible. I think that's what he would have done. It wouldn't have been a sudden move. He would have moved to supplant American forces with a much more vigorous native-born Vietnamese effort, maybe made Lansdale ambassador or something. And he would have been involved personally.

He'd have gone to Hanoi to see Ho Chi Minh or whatever. Knowing the man and knowing his great persuasiveness and vigor, he might just have brought it off. But it may, on the other hand, have been something that was not doable. I don't know. But that's what I think he would have done.

G: What do you make of the stories of LBJ deliberately humiliating Hubert Humphrey at various times, not necessarily in connection with Vietnam but for instance the incident at the Ranch where he had him dress up in western gear and so forth?

C: Well, he didn't do that to humiliate him. He thought that was cute. That was the kind of thing to do: get him in that goddamn gray Stetson and put him up on the horse. This was fun. This was all the good times. No, I don't think Johnson consciously ever tried to humiliate Humphrey. He was an overbearing fellow, a bully, and overstepped himself occasionally, but I don't think he ever deliberately set out to humiliate him. Humphrey was always diminished by Johnson because the pictures they always took of Johnson--Humphrey was five foot eleven; he was my height, almost six feet. But next to Johnson he looked like a little guy, and the people were always saying to Humphrey, "My God, you're tall! I thought you were a midget." Just the fact that he stood next to Johnson, his head was always down here by Johnson's shoulders. Johnson was, I don't know, five inches taller than he was or something like that. So it was Big Johnson and Little Humphrey, is what it looked like, like an extra basketball player.

Johnson had a mean streak, no question about it. I think he was in many respects a great fellow, a great president, a powerful political figure, in many respects a great leader, but his personal relationships were pretty difficult, overbearing. And there are little things like he would not let Humphrey take press with him on a plane, and he required that Humphrey submit to Marvin Watson the manifest on the goddamn plane. Whenever Humphrey took off with one of those little Air Force One planes that could carry maybe three or four passengers, Johnson insisted on approving who the hell went on the plane.

G: Who would submit these manifests? Was that part of your job?

C: Yes. You'd have to send the manifest over to Marvin Watson, and Marvin Watson would walk in and show the President. The President would say--of course, anybody that showed up there that was a press person, Johnson by this time had become perfectly paranoid about the press. This was not publicly known, so it wasn't a public humiliation, it's just Johnson just--it was not proper to do that. It was infuriating. It infuriated Humphrey, it infuriated me, and there was not a damn thing you could do about it short of not taking the plane at all.

It was possibly part of a conscious effort by Johnson to keep Humphrey from running free and feeling that he could set up lines of communication. He never trusted Humphrey's ebullience and garrulousness. He did not understand Humphrey's strong sense of security, and that if he gave his word, he wouldn't break it. He'd tell Johnson, "I'm not going to do it," and Johnson should have believed him.

Johnson was paranoid. I believe he was honestly a paranoid character in many respects, and the pressures of the presidency made him even more so. I don't think he set out to deliberately humiliate him, and certainly not in public. In fact, with Johnson it was either a bear hug or a kick in the ass. He was much more calculating than Humphrey, much more calculating, but equally effusive--he could be effusive--and affectionate. It sort of varied. One day he would have his arm around Humphrey, and the next day he would be cold to him, Johnson. Humphrey would say, "He just fixes you with those eyes, those cold eyes, and that's the end of it."

So during the election, in the beginning, [he was] very cold to Humphrey. At the end, I remember in the Astrodome his arms were around him and he was just like a big bear, you know, grrrrr, and roaring out to the crowd. He was going all out, all out, totally shrugged aside any reticence at all and just went all out. So it was just one of these things. It was kind of a roller coaster ride between the two men.

I'm sure that back in the fifties and sixties there was that sort of pattern and relationship, love-hate kind of thing, Johnson liking--loving Humphrey really, because of the person he was. Humphrey was a very affectionate, delightful person. Honest, happy, wonderful fellow to be around. The life of the party for everybody, every time he was there. The room lit up whenever he went into the room, everybody just up. He was great for Johnson, because Johnson is kind of dour and cynical and here is this happy guy--it was wonderful to have him

around. At the same time, Humphrey mixed with all this very suspect crowd, all these people like Wayne Morse and Mansfield and [J. William] Fulbright, all these guys out there that Johnson really just didn't trust at all, and Humphrey was his liaison.

So Humphrey was his friend and his political ally. At the same time, Humphrey was out there talking to all of these guys, and Humphrey had a great relationship with the press. He did have; he had a wonderful relationship with the press before the Vietnam thing. Johnson never had. Johnson had two or three key guys that liked him, guys like a fellow from Baltimore, Phil Potter, two or three guys that liked him, AP guys, top A[P]. The rest of them hated him and they were always trying to gut him and he knew it. So his paranoia was fed by--there was a lot to it, a lot to his fears and worries about the press.

So it was a love-hate relationship in a sense, not hate but it was intermittent love, and then "get away" and "I don't trust you, you talk too goddamn much." He'd tell people, "That goddamn Humphrey, he'll just say anything to anybody," and all that stuff gets fed back to you. Humphrey couldn't keep his mouth shut, he would say. "Humphrey can't keep his mouth shut." That was the thing that bothered him, because Humphrey would talk. Humphrey was in a constant state of communication with everyone. People were talking to him, and he was talking to them, back and forth, back and forth. All day long he was talking to people, just a man who was in a state of instant and total communication with hundreds of people. Johnson was a very

secretive fellow. He controlled it all. He'd call somebody up. He'd see somebody. He was always in control and he knew exactly what he was doing all the time. Johnson's methods were just very different from Humphrey's, and he never really understood, again, Humphrey's total commitment to security. Once you told Humphrey, "That's it, you don't say a thing," he wouldn't. He would talk around things but he never would say anything, he wouldn't tell me, he wouldn't tell his wife, he wouldn't tell anybody. It happened over and over again.

And Johnson--this was typical--in the vice presidential festivities in Atlantic City, 1964, he flew Humphrey down, he flew [Thomas] Dodd down, he flew--he even had McCarthy thinking, for God's sake, that he was going to be the nominee. McCarthy firmly believed that Humphrey aced him out of the vice presidency, which is why he became the great attacker of Johnson on Vietnam. It was nothing but injured pride, in my opinion. But Humphrey was told to come down. Jim Rowe went to see him, and Jim Rowe told Humphrey that Johnson had said that the first thing, it's absolute law, you can't talk to anybody. When you're told something--he was really very--sent an ambassador to see him, "This is the conditions for the vice presidency." Then he sent Rowe to tell Humphrey that he was going to be the vice president, but not to say a word to anybody, not to his wife or anybody. Nobody. Not to his wife, nothing. Just come on down to Washington. Just that little kind of a--all the thread of the relationship was that he didn't trust Humphrey not to talk too much.

G: When did you find out that Humphrey was going to be the vice presidential nominee?

C: Well, I believed that he was going to be the nominee for some weeks. My main job was to organize efforts to put pressure on Johnson to go with that route. I believed that, knowing how Johnson worked and the people talking to Johnson--every time he asked somebody it was always Humphrey, Humphrey, Humphrey--that he wasn't going the Kennedy route and he wasn't going to go with somebody like McCarthy. It had to be Humphrey. The knowledge that he actually had made the decision, an irrevocable decision, [I did] not [have] until he came back and they called--who was it?--Bill Moyers came in and said, "The President sent me over to work with you on the acceptance speech."

(Laughter)

That was the famous speech that we cooked up about ". . .but not Barry Goldwater," the attack on Barry Goldwater.

But it was a very curious relationship. Humphrey always admired Johnson and never downgraded him, never attacked him for his--oh, he would get pissed off at the things that were happening to him, but he never attacked Johnson, never ran him down, in my presence. He admired him greatly. He said he was a man who had great liberal instincts, and he would frequently talk about Johnson's tremendous effort in the field of education. He said basically his whole program for the poor and underprivileged, "Johnson is a nut on education," is the phrase he used. He said, "Yes, he's an absolute nut on education. He's right, he's a nut, and he's going to do something about it." And health, and

housing for the poor. In that respect, he greatly admired him, thought that he would emerge as a great president.

G: Let me take us back a minute and ask you something in this relation about Johnson not necessarily trusting Humphrey to keep his mouth shut or say the right thing or whatever. On the trip to Vietnam, were there any special efforts by Johnson to tell Humphrey what he could say or what he couldn't say or to report on what he had said?

C: Well, he sent along Jack Valenti and Lloyd Hand. Now, Lloyd Hand I think was sent along mainly as a protocol person, but Jack Valenti clearly was sent along to make sure that he was there in all the meetings and that Humphrey didn't depart from the Johnson line to any degree, and that he would participate in any kind of statement, that he would have a chance to be in on the drafting of any documents that Humphrey would come up with. There's no reason for Jack Valenti to have gone along. Jack Valenti basically was a speech writer. Clearly Valenti was sent along to make sure Humphrey didn't blurt out something that would screw up Johnson's plans or that he would come out, that he would tell the press anything. Clearly he was along to monitor.

I'm trying to remember who else--McGeorge Bundy was along I think on one occasion, you know, as basic staff.

G: Well, let's see. On the first trip, the early 1966 trip, there was Valenti, Lansdale--I guess maybe Lansdale went out with you.

C: Yes, I guess that's right, yes.

G: Lloyd Hand, Mac Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Harriman, [Chester] Cooper, Jim Thomson, and Bill Jorden.

C: Yes. Jorden and Cooper--Cooper was very good, by the way, with Humphrey. Cooper kept him advised about matters in Vietnam and also he was close to Harriman, for some reason or other. I'm trying to remember that. There was a relationship with Harriman somehow. Cooper had a long relationship with Harriman. When Bundy would be reticent to talk to Humphrey, Cooper, Chet Cooper, was always available to tell him what information he needed. Cooper went along as a professional staff person. Valenti was the person sent along to make damn sure Humphrey didn't say anything foolish or blurt something out, something of that kind.

Valenti also had cultivated a relationship with Humphrey from the beginning. Humphrey liked him. I don't know why, but he liked Valenti very much. Because Valenti was a bullshitter and kind of a glad-hander and a happy guy, and Humphrey sort of just liked him. So Johnson sent along somebody that Humphrey liked. But nevertheless, he was there to make sure, I think--there was no real reason he should have gone along unless he was to do what he in fact did, was monitor and then participate in the discussions, and he did.

G: You'll forgive me for saying that I can see where you might have kind of resented this from a personal viewpoint.

C: Well, the President had a right to send anybody he wanted to send out there, as far as that goes. I was aware of this distrust of Humphrey and also knew that Humphrey was not going to do anything untoward. So

yes, I resented it, not from the point of view of overriding me, I was not in any real sense an expert on Vietnam. I had a position but I was not really an expert. I didn't work full time in it; that occupied maybe 10 per cent of my energies. But it was not something that Johnson should have done. It was perfectly acceptable to send along Chet Cooper and McGeorge Bundy and all those folks. That's proper. But it was not really the thing to do to send Valenti out there.

G: You went on that trip, though? Well, you went on both trips, I suppose.

C: Yes. Yes.

G: That second trip, the inaugural of Ky, newspapers made a big splash out of a mortar shell that went off someplace in the vicinity. Do you remember that incident?

C: Oh, yes. They were lobbing shells. It was not close; it was, I don't know, a block away or something like that. It was typical newspaper exaggeration. There was a mortar shell that hit. We heard a puff, you know, but it was nothing like a car bomb going off in the Embassy or something like that. It was not a big thing.

G: What are your recollections of that particular trip? What impressions did you get of key Vietnamese people?

C: I did not go in. They did not let me into the meetings, so I was not there. This was Ky, a meeting with Ky, and let's see, who else did he meet with? [Nguyen Van] Thieu, I think. Thieu and Ky. So I only got from Humphrey his impressions. I'm trying to remember what his reactions were to meeting with them himself. Ambiguous, I think.

G: Not convinced that these were the guys that were going to do it?

C: Well, maybe not. Maybe not. He was hopeful, but maybe not. I don't think he was really convinced, but I think he was hopeful. He didn't come out of there wildly enthusiastic, but he didn't come out and say, "Goddamn, these guys are really terrific, they're really going to do it." I didn't hear any of that, which would have been--and since I wasn't really in the meeting there, physically in the room with them, I can't really kind of--

G: What were your duties on that trip? What did you do?

C: Well, basically, just traveling with him to kind of back him up on everything. I was liaison to the Lansdale group essentially; over the years that had developed, and I think that was part of it, was to make sure that we got involved and made sure he saw that aspect of it out here, aside from the State Department.

G: You said that Lansdale was basically, at this time, feeling that things were going to get better and so forth?

C: I think that's right. I believe yes. Lansdale was optimistic that things were going to be--you know, he was fretting that there wasn't enough commitment of resources and all, but that things could be turned around, yes.

G: Did you see anything of a feud between Lansdale and Phil Habib at this time?

C: No. No. Don't recollect anything about it. I know there was a lot of infighting out there. Looking over some of those notes there that you sent along, which I had not seen before, interesting. This is an

old history of Lansdale rubbing up against people in the--you know, Lansdale is probably a little nutty. Most people that get things done and shake things up have to be a little nutty. I've learned in my life that you have to accept that. But the guy who is perfectly rational never gets anything done. The guy who's not willing to take chances and really make a pest of himself, be obnoxious, isn't going to get anything done. I mean, he's just going to go along. He'll just flow. He'll go with the tide.

My feeling about Lansdale, my recollection of Lansdale is that he was essentially--when I say he's nutty, he was obsessed with an idea. A very decent person, very intelligent, knew what he was doing, had great difficulty, because it was a revolutionary idea, in persuading the bureaucracy of the Defense Department particularly that the idea was worth a damn and only succeeded in getting anything done by making a nuisance of himself. Probably sacrificed a career in order to try to get something done, which was contrary to the normal, bureaucratic method of proceeding in the army. And he impressed Humphrey the same way. He's the kind of person you hoped you'd have everywhere around the world working with indigenous groups. If you had had somebody like that in El Salvador, Humphrey would have felt, we would never have gotten into the fix in El Salvador.

G: Did you know any of Lansdale's crew outside of Rufe Phillips?

C: I met a couple of them; I remember a couple of guys, nice fellows, interesting guys, but I don't remember their names even.

G: One of them was Dan Ellsberg, I think.

C: I don't remember--yes, Ellsberg. (Laughter) I didn't remember meeting Ellsberg. That's right, Ellsberg was part of that. He was a loose cannon.

(Interruption)

One looks at the conversion of some of the liberals, very big liberals of the past, who now are leading the so-called neo--what do they call them?--neoliberals, like our recent Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, is a perfect example, who have become Reaganites. There's nothing like a person who has been a true believer on one side and then--it's a classic progression from left to right, moving from extreme left to extreme right. There's lots more movement there than going through the center.

So, no, I did not meet this gentleman, or if I met him, I don't remember having met him.

G: What were your personal impressions? Did you share Humphrey's convictions that perhaps things are getting better and so on, or have you already addressed that?

C: I think I've addressed it pretty well. I thought that there was a chance that it could go, and I thought there had been a turn in policy. But I'm an optimist, too, and maybe I was seeing things I wanted to see.

G: Yes. How long did you stay with Mr. Humphrey then after 1968?

C: Well, I left in January of 1969, decided I did not want to stay in the government and decided I wanted to go into business on my own. However, I stayed in close touch with him up through the years, very

close touch with him. I worked in his campaign in 1970 when he ran for the Senate again. I handled his media campaign for him. Worked with him in 1972, handled his media for his presidential effort in the primaries, and would have worked with him again in 1976 had he decided to go for the presidency. I consider myself one of his closest friends during those last years, and confidants, but I did not stay with him on staff, for a lot of reasons. I just had been burned out, I guess, after fifteen years.

G: Is there anything else about Vietnam that we want to get on the record here that we have not touched on?

C: No, I guess not. I think we've exhausted it as far as my memory is concerned. But again, you may want to consult or have one of your research people go up and take a look at the memoranda, which would be interesting probably in the period 19--well, go back to the end of the pre-vice presidential period, maybe in the period with Lansdale when Lansdale's people first made contact. It would be interesting to see what I had to say that I've forgotten, in 1961 and 1962.

G: Okay. We'll do that.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I

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