

INTERVIEW III

DATE: September 9, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: THOMAS CORCORAN

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Mr. Corcoran's office in Washington, D.C.

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F: Let's talk about the New Hampshire primary in 1968 and what happened to the President there.

C: There was a primary in Massachusetts or a convention in Massachusetts--I don't know which--to choose the delegates to the national convention. It was stacked for Lyndon. By that I mean all the delegates were for him anyway for a second-term try. The problem was--

F: Seriously, can you unseat a president if he has any aptitude at all?

C: No. Lyndon unseated himself. Lyndon wouldn't let his name be put up for the candidate in that convention or primary--I don't know what it was. It was a convention. He insisted that his votes be represented by someone else. I don't know whether he did this because he was afraid of protest on the floor by some outside Kennedy groups or not. But at any rate he decided that John McCormack should stand in for him. He sent Jim Rowe down to talk to John McCormack, and John McCormack demurred that he didn't want to be the front guy. Jim Rowe came back and told me about it.

Later he told me that he wanted, or the President wanted, me to go down and talk to McCormack because I was much closer to McCormack than Rowe was. So I went

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down to see McCormack in his office on the Hill. I said, "John, I understand you've said no to Jim Rowe. John, I'm down here to tell you that if you don't stand in we'll have a great deal of trouble. Because you are who you are and have a unique position in democratic politics in Massachusetts and because the Kennedys wouldn't dare to take you on, you've got to be the man to stand in and be the favorite son and take these delegates because Lyndon doesn't want to take them in his own name because of his trouble with the Kennedys."

And John said, "I don't want to do it. Jim Rowe has talked to me, and I don't want to do it because my wife doesn't want me to do it." "Now," he said, "You know my wife, who is older than I am, is a very difficult problem, and my wife has been listening to all these stories about the attempt to unseat me as speaker. She thinks that if I make a fool of myself by being an obvious stooge, because of course I'm not a real candidate for president at my age, that it will react in some way to hurt me. Besides, I have enough self-respect not to appear a complete stooge. I would have to pretend that I was a favorite son candidate. I would have to go on the television. I would have to make statements. Since everybody would know that at my age, of course I'm not. In the kind of acrimony that you get in the intellectual circles of Massachusetts and with the Kennedy organization behind it trying to make all the trouble it could possibly make and hoping that maybe Lyndon wouldn't run and Bobby could, I'd be subject to a great deal of criticism that wouldn't bother me but would bother my wife."

I said, "But, John, if Lyndon won't take it indirectly, there isn't anybody else that can obviate the criticism but you, and I'm awfully afraid we could lose the delegation."

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He said, "Well, now, I don't want you to put pressure on the President to put pressure on me." I said, "I'm going right back, I'm going to report to Rowe and I'm going to tell him just exactly what I said to you. I think if you don't take this, we'll have a donnybrook, and a donnybrook isn't going to help. You're the first big New England delegation in. Our vote has been the biggest from New England. To have anything go wrong in New England is disastrous, particularly in front of the New Hampshire primary. He said, "Well, I'll talk it over with the President myself."

That night later there was a judiciary reception. John McCormack was a little bit ahead of me in the line with his wife. As we lined up in the East Room, I said, "John, have you talked to the President? I still think what I think." He said, "I'm going to clear it with him right now. Of course if he insists, I'll go, but I hope he won't insist." John was around ten ahead of me in the line. I saw John talking to the President cheek-to-cheek. I walked through the line. I tried to ask Lyndon what he said, but Lyndon was passing me on. I went off to see John. John said, "He let me off the hook." I said, "John, I don't believe he let you off the hook. I think you wanted to hear him let you off the hook, but I don't believe he did." "Oh," he said, "yes, he did. He's going to get somebody else." I said, "John, there isn't anybody else." He said, "He said he's going to get somebody else."

I then learned later from Rowe that the President tried to get Larry O'Brien and Larry O'Brien said, no, he wasn't going to get in, although he had loyally come over to Lyndon, although he did like the Kennedys. He didn't want to get in the position where if he ever had a future in Massachusetts he'd be criticized. And it was let go. And when it

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was let go, the McCarthy people moved in, and McCarthy got the delegation. Now, that utterly surprise victory for McCarthy was what fueled the New Hampshire debacle.

F: It gave him momentum.

C: It gave him something. He started with delegates from Massachusetts and with this he moved into the New Hampshire primary. In the New Hampshire primary we had all kinds of problems, problems in which I was embarrassed myself. Because the Bobby Kennedy people got my own kid to do some work against Lyndon--my nephew, for whom Lyndon had been very decent about Waterville Valley--and embarrassed the living hell out of me. When I got hold of my own boy, I said, "For Christ's sake, did you vote for McCarthy?" He said, "No, I got my orders from Bobby." What he did was hold up a big sign, since he was the first precinct to report in "McCarthy this, somebody else this, Johnson zero." It embarrassed the holy hell out of me! The kid's been very desperately sorry for it ever since. But never mind, the damage was done when Lyndon let McCormack off the hook depending on Larry O'Brien.

Now I can only say that Lyndon as a politician dealing with a limited number of people whom he had gotten to know as he knew them in the Senate was absolutely magnificent. But when he had to deal with the problems of local organizations, he just wasn't interested in it. I don't think, it did him one goddamned bit of good to fold up the Democratic committee because he did not think he knew how to handle it, and to put the liquidation of it in the hands of somebody as unimaginative, as good natured and well intended, but utterly un-understanding, as Marvin Watson.

I mean as a politician Lyndon was superb in what I call dealing with people he

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knew. He wasn't interested, or he probably thought it wasn't necessary, to deal with people he didn't know. He knew McCormack. He knew the senators. He knew the leaders. But he didn't want to be bothered with what he did not like, as the organization on an institutional scale that we had in the big northern states. Everything in Texas was personal. Everything in the Senate was personal. I told you why we lost the 1960--was it the 1960 one? The one where we lost to Kennedy because he depended on senators to deliver delegations, and senators couldn't deliver delegations.

F: You mean he never grasped this?

C: I think he didn't grasp it because he didn't want to grasp it! It was a kind of wormy business that he didn't want to be messed up with.

F: What was Bailey--too much of a nice guy to confront him?

C: Bailey was a--well, let me see, I like John Bailey.

F: I haven't seen anybody who didn't.

C: But John Bailey was a strictly local guy. John Bailey was the son of a rich physician in Hartford, who was also a Harvard Law School man, a first-class guy. But John Bailey for wheeling and dealing in the ethnic politics of Connecticut which was a rather slippery constituency that went Republican, went Democratic was not the kind of a guy that made Lyndon feel comfortable with him. I don't think he ever felt comfortable with Bailey and I don't think he ever felt that he could trust Bailey, because he thought Bailey was all tied up with [Senator Abraham] Ribicoff, who was Kennedy. I think all of this business about his inability or his unwillingness, no matter how he rationalized it, to deal with the northern situation was his fundamental distrust that they were all Kennedy-oriented or

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Kennedy-stacked. And Bailey was one of them.

F: It's taken for granted that every president makes his own board of advisors whether it's cabinet level or agency level or what. You have an abnormal number of Kennedy people kept on, and kept on forever. Now, why?

C: Because I think, in a certain sense, he was always afraid. I think Lyndon felt down in the bottom of his heart that they didn't vote for him, they voted against Goldwater. And Lyndon was one of these guys who, being a wheeler-dealer in a sense that he was a compromiser, always had an idea that somehow the Kennedys would get around, if he were nice enough to them, to accept him and that somehow he could patch it up with the Kennedys. Now, this was the same instinct in which, you know, he'd get together a coalition in the Senate. I think Lyndon never liked, never liked a head-on fight.

One of the things that hurt me about him--and remember I love the guy as few people do--for instance when he came back in the interim campaign, the congressional campaign for the Congress before the fight, the big fight before the 1968 one, in which Paul Douglas was up and some fellows in California were up and Lyndon had agreed to come out and campaign for them. They always said that when he got back and he found the tide running against him, he cancelled it because he was tired after his trip to Asia. But he didn't want to get associated with a loser. Now, that reputation went out everywhere--that Lyndon wouldn't fight and take a licking, under no circumstances would he risk a licking. And that hurt him in a great many places.

Then he did something else. He owed Paul Douglas to put his boy in. The one thing Paul Douglas asked me and I asked Lyndon to do for Paul Douglas was to put his

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boy here, who's over in Covington-Burling, on the circuit court of appeals. He wouldn't do that either.

Now this is what I want to show you. Look. (Interruption)

He kept hoping that he could bring the Kennedys around. He had brought pretty nearly everybody around. I think Bundy was loyal to him, but a lot of people weren't. I think that the people with whom he could have direct contact as he had them in the bureaucracy down there and once in a while saw them, he trusted a lot further than he trusted the local politicians at the precinct level, at the county level and the rest of it. In places like New York and Massachusetts, he depended on dealing with them through the satrap, and the satrap was John. But I mean maybe it was impossible in the circumstances for him to do anything else. Now Lyndon had his own judgments in these things.

F: Did, as far as you know, the Kennedys ever try to give him any advice?

C: The family never tried. You must understand--and remember I know the Kennedys and I know their sense of destiny--the Kennedys never treated him decently. They never tried to give him any advice that he could trust. They treated him as a usurper. Now I understand that the Honorable--wait a minute now, I'm getting old--who's the press secretary to--

F: [Pierre] Salinger.

C: No, the press secretary to Lady Bird.

F: Oh. Liz Carpenter.

C: Liz's book is all about the Kennedy business. It's out, isn't it? *Ruffles and Flourishes*.

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F: It's due out in another month or so.

C: Well, it's all about just exactly what you and I are talking about. I don't think the Kennedys [tried]. I think certain individuals like Bill Bundy, like McGeorge Bundy, like Larry O'Brien, and certain others of them like this boy from whom I just got the letter, Bernie Boutin, who tried to run the campaign in New Hampshire [tried]. That was a letter from Bernie this morning. I think King. That was a very nice letter from Bernie; you can see it when it comes in. He's now the head of a college in Vermont. They tried hard. King tried hard. Boutin tried hard. McIntyre tried hard. A hell of a lot of these guys really went to--but by and large I think those he didn't know intimately and personally, he just didn't feel he could trust as against the constant boring in.

I think that the tragedy of Lyndon is the tragedy of the unwillingness on the Kennedys' [part] to accept the rules of this game. You play with your crowd.

F: Do you think that Bobby really thought he might be the vice presidential nominee in 1964?

C: I think he was certain he could be.

F: That there would just be an overwhelming surge that Johnson couldn't ignore.

C: That's right. I remember the night he stood up in front of that convention and took the applause for fifteen or twenty minutes. And, maybe, you know, it would have been wiser if he had.

F: It might have neutralized him.

C: Maybe it would have been easier. We said, "If you take him in, it's like the Greek that put the fox inside his cloak and it ate his stomach out, ate his vitals out." Maybe in the

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long run the risks of dealing with him inside were less than the risks of dealing with him outside.

But that comes back to the thing I've already told you about. What the Kennedys had were people. What the Kennedys had were intellectual people. What the Kennedys had were the kind of kids I brought down during the New Deal from the North.

Now, as I say, if Lyndon had been willing to let Jim [H. Rowe, Jr.?], who came out of that breed and at the same time was a westerner and Lyndon's man--if Lyndon had said to Jim, "Jim, you recruit me and let you, not me, deal with them, so that my oddities of relationship are insulated. Jim, you be my deputy to run the bureaucracy," as Roosevelt let me be the deputy to run the bureaucracy in my time, Lyndon could have gotten those guys.

He didn't have to recruit through the Kennedys. He didn't have to make his relationship to the smart guys up north, the intellectual guys. There was plenty in Lyndon to appeal to an easterner. Christ, he was doing what the Kennedys hadn't done. Christ, he was doing what these guys wanted done.

But in the same way, you know, he took on this guy [Richard] Goodwin. I distrusted Goodwin to the bottom of my soul. After 1940 I distrusted everything Frankfurtian, and Lyndon was always sucking up to Frankfurter, too. Frankly, Lyndon would be praising him and flattering him and this business. But this guy Goodwin! You know this guy Goodwin was the guy that first jumped to McCarthy and then jumped and said, "Give me a typewriter and a month and I can pull a revolution." For a while Lyndon was utterly fascinated with this bird. He let him write all his speeches. The guy

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that put "We shall overcome" into that goddamn fool speech up there was Goodwin!

That cost Lyndon plenty. But in trying to find his own, he should have dealt with Jim as a broker.

F: What has Johnson got, a kind of outsider's wish to be included in the club?

C: No, I don't think so.

F: Sometimes he strikes me--

C: But I don't say it's an outsider's wish to be included.

F: --like a fellow who's made good but who can't crack the old families.

C: Well, it isn't that. I don't think it's that. I think Lyndon has a very, almost Christian idea that, after all, there is something in this formula of his, "Let us reason together," a belief not that he could crack the club. I don't think he wants to be, as they say, a little brother of the rich, nor a little brother of the intelligentsia. I think his sound, Texas, middle-of-the-road, practical background makes him understand.

But I think he really had an idea he could convert them. I don't think he wanted to belong to them. I think he wanted them to belong to him. I think he underestimated the cynicism. Lyndon isn't really a cynical guy.

F: No.

C: But I think he underestimated the cynicism of these birds. While he was trying to take them in, they were trying to cut his guts out, because he never was their guy and they knew it!

These are the fringe people, as I say, of high velocity trying to take all the rest of us over. The boys up in New York and Lyndon made some very strange choices.

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F: How did Lyndon get on that [Eugene?] McCarthy, [Hubert] Humphrey, one or two other possibilities--he had Tom Dodd in there at one time as a--

C: Oh, Tom Dodd was only a cover. He got Tom Dodd to ride on that plane because he couldn't get McCarthy to ride on it.

F: Did McCarthy really think he was going to be a nominee?

C: He sure as hell did.

F: Why didn't he go on the plane?

C: Because by that time he knew he wasn't going to be. By that time he knew about the Bobby Kennedy conversation.

F: Which Bobby Kennedy conversation?

C: The Bobby Kennedy conversation, I've told you, in which Lyndon talked to Bobby Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy made it damned clear to Lyndon that if it weren't going to be Bobby Kennedy it couldn't be another Catholic.

F: No, you haven't told me that.

C: Well, I think the key to this whole goddamned debacle is the fact that Bobby Kennedy wanted to be vice president. That when Lyndon made his decision not to make Bobby vice president, with the advice of all you boys down in Texas including Connally, who'll tell you all about it. Connally, all your Texas fellows, thought they were safer with McCarthy. They figured you'd have to take a Catholic. They figured they'd be safer with McCarthy than they would with Bobby, and they figured they'd be safer with McCarthy than they would be with Humphrey! Now there was a very well organized southern movement to persuade Lyndon to take McCarthy and Lyndon passed the word back, I

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assume, because McCarthy talked to me about it. I was sent to talk to him by Walter Jenkins to hold him down in the convention in Atlantic City.

F: What do you mean--to hold him down?

C: To make him still think that maybe he was going to be. And Lyndon asked him to ride on that plane, although he had already made up his mind about Humphrey. But McCarthy, through the Minnesota businesses, found out about it.

But if you want an over-simplified explanation of the debacle of the convention and of the election, McCarthy thought he was going to be picked. And I think McCarthy had reasons to think he was going to be picked. Bobby Kennedy nixed McCarthy because he didn't want any other Catholic nexus. Then McCarthy hated Bobby, Lyndon and Humphrey. McCarthy took it out on every one of them. He ran against Bobby in the primary and Humphrey in the primary.

F: There never was really any warmth between McCarthy and Bobby?

C: Oh, McCarthy hated Bobby. He thought Bobby had clipped him, McCarthy, out of the vice presidency.

F: Do you think Bobby saw a potential rival there in 1964?

C: Bobby said it in so many words. There was going to be no other Catholic nexus but the Kennedys. No question about it. But this explains the whole goddamned debacle. Do you remember Victor Hugo in 1893 when the cannon got loose in the ship and began to pitch around? Well, Mr. McCarthy was the cannon loose in the ship! And he just destroyed everybody, including himself.

But if you know the Irish as well as I know the Irish, if they think you double-

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cross them, God help you. There ain't any end to it. It's a *L'outrance*. And this is the whole story of the campaign.

But to get back to Lyndon, I mean let's forget about the mistakes, let's think of what he did. Usually you have a cycle, and a lot that Woodrow Wilson did was wiped out. But the great thing that you could say about Lyndon is that Lyndon institutionalized the New Deal as a plateau. As I say, he pulled the whole goddamned scheme of things, and the whole system, and the whole institutionalism of the philosophy so far up the beach that no tide of reaction can ever pull it off. That is, he started a new plateau for handling the social problem of the United States, the internal tension of the United States, which is the test of whether this representative democracy can hold together at all. And that is to his eternal credit. He did something magnificent. He probably settled things as Lincoln settled things. He took the arrows in his breast as Lincoln took the arrows in his breast.

F: He brought us to a point--

C: He brought an equilibrium--a plateau of equilibrium--from which everything else . . .

That's never going to be shaken, as Lincoln brought it. After all, the organization of the internal equilibrium of the United States is much more important than any foreign war.

F: So now we move forward to tackle new problems having disposed of the old ones.

C: At least we have a plateau of acceptance that we'll think about this balancing of forces in the United States. We've got all the machinery to do it with. We've got all the machinery to handle a depression. We've got all the machinery to handle social adjustment. We've got all the machinery to handle the tension between the Congress, the president, and the

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Court. The Court's no longer God. But on the other hand Congress can't lie back on their britches. We have a new set of dynamics and Lyndon institutionalized them and created them. And fifty years from now that will be great.

F: Oh, I think the Vietnam War will recede in importance one of these days, taking the long gun-sight.

C: But Lyndon was right about the Vietnam War. Two nights ago I had dinner with a fellow named Henry Taylor. Henry Taylor is a conservative columnist who was the Eisenhower ambassador to Switzerland, but who was with the Intelligence with Bill Donovan [OSS] during the war and has the same feeling that fellow [Ernest] Cuneo had. Have you talked to Cuneo?

F: No.

C: Well, you better talk to Cuneo, who's a great Lyndon man. The guy that writes this column. Ernie is wonderful to talk to. As I say, he'll talk your ear off. But Ernie has a sense of depth about this thing, and remember, Ernie started as the administrative assistant to Fiorello LaGuardia. Ernie understands urban politics--particularly the urban politics of New England and New York and Pennsylvania where his own people, the Italians, are so important--as nobody else in this town understands it.

But I mean, Taylor said to me, "You know, Johnson was absolutely right in his estimate of the situation of Vietnam. He was absolutely right on the domino. He was absolutely right about Australia. He was absolutely right about everything. But he let himself be kidded by [Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara." McNamara, having made false estimates of how much the thing would cost in his arithmetical--the great guy,

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the great budgeteer. Even sucking from the pipelines that will take years now to fill up in order to shift so it wouldn't look as if it were. McNamara kidded Johnson and Johnson was under a fascination. McNamara made it seem easy. McNamara made the Vietnam War seem so easy that like every politician wanting to have things made easy for him, Lyndon wishfully thought McNamara was right.

F: You think Johnson was not just indulging in sort of politician's rhetoric when as president he used to say that McNamara was the greatest secretary of defense.

C: No, I think for a time he believed it. But that's because McNamara could phony the figures. He could prestidigitate the figures to make them come out right for Lyndon. He could make them show how the war was costing so much less, how it was all going to be over, these other people were going to give up and quit. Anybody like me who had lived with the tenacity of these Asian people, I know goddamn well they're going to keep going. There is going to be another war. The billion people business that Rusk dared to show for a minute is true. Do you think that the smartest and the hardest working people in the world with the command of resources they've got aren't going to take their whack at being the king on the rock? Nuts! I've sent every one of my kids around the world, particularly to Asia, to see what they face in their time. Lyndon was right, but Lyndon was fascinated. I told you the story about John Connor. McNamara had credibility for telling you what you wanted to know, whether it was true or not!

F: Was this McNamara's own personal dissimulation, or was this McNamara just operating as a computer mind?

C: He could kid himself. McNamara was a computer mind.

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F: So he could always come up with a set of figures to fit a situation.

C: And he did something else, too. He could always come up with the figures. Remember, Lyndon being a budgeteer, figures always fascinated Lyndon.

F: Yes. I suppose he spent more time with the budget than any other president.

C: Figures, figures, figures always. McNamara did another thing, too. The other day [Senator Claiborne] Pell came to me. Now I don't particularly like Pell. I mean I don't admire him. But Pell was all I had at the time when Denny Roberts popped out in Rhode Island. Cuneo and I went to work and we elected Pell senator. Pell is a dove of doves! Pell came to me and he said, "I'm having a hell of a time in Rhode Island"--where there is the great naval base and the war college at Narragansett Bay--"getting anybody worth a goddamn to apply for Annapolis. I can't get anybody who wants the job." He said, "Well, part of this, of course, is that you and Johnson"--and I was the guy that I think first put the bug into Lyndon's job--"be the guy who made an education possible for every kid in America."

I remember, coming down to Lehman's funeral on the plane with that MacArthur girl telling him, "This, Lyndon, if nothing else, you can always be remembered by. And if you manage to extend the capacity of this country by education it'll pay off a thousand times because every kid that goes to college will see to it that his kid goes to college. I don't care what waste there is in the goddamn problem. There's always waste in everything. This will be great. This, Lyndon."

But as Pell said, "In the old days many a southern boy of real character and capacity, where the South was cash poor, went into Annapolis"--as Ike confesses he did,

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as Collins confesses he did--"to get a first-class education that he couldn't otherwise afford to pay for." He said, "What you've done now, they don't have to go through that discipline to get that college education with the government paying for it. You're paying for it now."

I'm telling you all over the armed services this is true. One of the reasons for the *Pueblo*, the spy plane, the *Scorpion*, the *Enterprise*, the *Evans* is that you're no longer getting into the officer class that capacity of man you once got because there was no other way he could get a first-class education. The officer problem in the navy is very serious.

Now part of that is Mr. McNamara. Because one of the things you went in for, in addition to a free education, was status. But now all the ruffles and flourishes, all the fringe benefits, all the glory is out of it, and you are nothing but an assistant secretary of a conglomerate corporation if you do become chief of staff. That is, he pushed this civilian quiz-kid business so far, he took the glory and the ruffles and the flourishes out as an incitation for first-class guys to go in. The damage he has done in that regard may be irreparable. Don't ever kid yourself. There is a limit to what you could do in humiliating guys that you want to take on a second-rate paying job when you take all the glamour and all the fringe benefits, but particularly the ruffles and flourishes, out of it. And the damage that has been done in that respect may be irreparable.

F: Let's talk just a minute about 1968. The pundits said that Johnson's hand lay heavy on the convention, that it lay heavy on the campaign afterwards, that the whole thing was stacked, *et cetera*, the way Johnson wanted it, that then he desired Nixon's victory over Humphrey's. Let's talk briefly about this.

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C: No. I don't know. I have heard that story. I have heard that Johnson expected to be drafted at the convention. I have heard that he had arranged the convention to be at a bad time to coincide with his birthday. I understand that John Connally was out there to arrange it. I've understood lately that he fought like hell with Humphrey over Humphrey's weakening--trying to weaken toward McCarthy on Vietnam. I don't know whether any of the stories are true. I would expect, Lyndon being the kind of a masterful guy that he is, that he made life difficult for Humphrey. I have heard Humphrey afterwards say, even during the campaign, "He never would give me a chance. Every time there was a big public relations operation to be done like opening a dam or something, he always grabbed it for himself as president and never let me have it."

But I refer you for those questions to Rowe, who was closer into that thing and, remember, was Humphrey's man and was desperate. During that campaign, since nobody asked me what to do, except to do my own job because I didn't want anybody telling me what to do.

F: Well, somewhat late in the campaign, you did take a hand in it.

C: I did that job and somewhat later in the campaign I took on another job. When nobody would take care of him, I took on helping [Edwin] Muskie, because poor old Muskie had nobody helping him.

So later in the campaign--I never, never talked to Lyndon about the strategy of the campaign--I simply went to work. I did the analyses of the bread and butter stuff and Cuneo did them and will show them to you. It was a goddamn shame that that stuff which we broke down with the help of a boy down here named Cronin whom I took on in

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this office from Lister Hill, who managed the executive assistants of all the senators . . .

Ask Cuneo to show them [the statistics] to you. We broke down by category, and by county, and by congressional district, all of these great big figures about what had been spent on education, what had been spent in urban relief, what had been spent in

unemployment, what had been spent. And we did that job and we did the Muskie job.

But outside of that, as I say, I carefully did not second-guess Rowe. I talked with Rowe.

I worked with Muskie. I did the statistical work that had to be done in this office because there was no Democratic National Committee. I did the research work, but as far as talking to Lyndon about it, no.

F: Thank you, Mr. Corcoran.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview III]

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