INTERVIEWEE: EDWARD C. CRAFTS (Tape #1)

INTERVIEWER: DAVID G. McCOMB

April 2, 1969

Mc The tape recorder is now on, let me identify the tape. This is an interview with Dr. Edward C. Crafts, who is the former director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. The interview is in his office, in the Mills Building, in Washington, D. C.; the date is April 2, 1969. The time is 11:15 in the morning and my name is David McComb.

First of all, I'd like to know something about your background, where were you born, when, where did you get your education?

C: All right. I was born in 1910 in Chicago, Illinois. Went to public schools there, and through high school in Oak Park, Illinois. I went to Dartmouth College for two years and it was really there that I first became interested in forestry and outdoor matters. I transferred from Dartmouth to the University of Michigan to enter the Forestry School, and graduated there in 1932 wtih my Bachelor's Degree. I got my Master's there in '36 and my Ph.D. in '42. I spent one of those years in Law School, which I have found since to be of great value to me. A little bit about my early experience, if you want that?

Mc Sure .

C: While I was in school I worked in Utah for the Forest Service, at what was then called the Great Basin Experiment Station near Ephraim, Utah; I worked in northern Minnesota in the Rainy Lake region and I worked on a ranch in southern Wyoming, near Encampment on the North Platte River. All of these things led to and enhanced my interest in forestry and conservation.

Mc What was the nature of your work, were you a specialist?

C: In the experiment station work at Utah, I was a grazing specialist studying plots and this sort of thing, taking records. It was typical of what they call field assistant work. The work on the ranch was mainly handling horses. This was a horse ranch primarily, and raised horses for Estes Park and other dude areas in Colorado. We'd break horses and take down a herd to Steamboat Springs or to Walden or some other place. This type of work was typical of horse work on a ranch. The work up in Minnesota was combination work and pleasure. It was mostly canoe work back in southern Minnesota and the Quetico area of Canada.

Mc Did you finally come to Washington, D. C.?

C: Yes, but before that, after I graduated in '32, I took permanent work with the Forest Service. I worked for about 9 years in Arizona and New Mexico, Flagstaff and in Tucson, still in range experimental work and with a few details to Washington. Then I was transferred in '39 to California where I went into forest economics, which was what my Master's degree was in, at what was then called California Forest and Range Experiment Station. It was located in cooperation with the University of California at Berkeley. I was there for about four or five years, it was the middle of World War II, and I was transferred to Washington permanently at that time. My first assignment here was in connection with the war and was handling Forest Service work on forest products with the Office of War Production and the Office of Price Administration. I did that for awhile and then I was in the division of Forest Economics, became the head of that division. Then in 1950 I became what was then called the Assistant Chief of the Forest Service, now called Deputy Chief, and I handled program planning, congressional relations, policy matters, and this sort of thing.

Mc And you stayed in that --

C: I stayed in that position until 1962 at which time I transferred to the Department of Interior. So my total government service was 36 or 37 years, 29 of which were with the Forest Service and the last 7 were with Interior.

Mc Did you have anything to do with the creation of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation?

C: Oh yes, I was deeply involved in that. Let's go back a little bit. Some of the history of its origins. It goes back to the Forest Service really. One of my jobs in the Forest Service was to conduct what finally was published as the Timber Resources Review. The Forest Service over the years had made about 8 or 9 exhaustive overall appraisals of the timber situation presently and potentially, supply and demand, and so on. This was in timber. The Forest Service is recognized as the timber expert in government and there was no bureaucratic competition from anybody else to do this so long as it involved the matter of forestry and trees. But also at that time there was enacted for the Forest Service the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act which I was deeply involved in, which among other things directed the Forest Service to give equal consideration to the various resources of the national forests, recreation being one of them, water, timber, grazing, wildlife being the others, and to administer all of those on a sustained yield basis.

The people who were interested in recreation and conservation groups around the country thought there should be an exhaustive study of the national recreation situation and potential, roughly analogous to what the forest service had done on timber. The problem was, who to do it? The Forest Service didn't have a lock on recreation as it did on timber. Neither does the Park Service, no federal agency did. Therefore one day in my office Joe Penfold, who was then Conservation Director of the Issac Walton League, and

who still is --

Mc How does he spell his name?

C: P E N F O L D

Mc Thank you.

C: And myself sat down and talked this whole matter over. We roughed out a bill between us which eventually, with changes, was passed and established the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, taking it out of the Executive Branch, making it consist of members of Congress and private citizens appointed by the President. That's the way the commission really got started.

Mc This started in what, 1958?

C: About that, roughly. There was a three-year study and the study came out in either '61 or '62. It had the unanimous endorsement of the members of the commission and there were some powerful members of Congress upon it.

Mc Did you work with the commission all through this --

C: Yes, I was the Forest Service representative dealing with the commission. Many of the federal agencies appointed individuals to deal with the commission. That report had about 50 recommendations, including about 4 or 5 which were what you might call major. One of the major recommendations was the establishment of a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of Interior to administer a proposed land and water conservation fund to coordinate the federal activities in recreation and to serve as a focal point in recreation between the federal governments, the state and local governments and the private sector. Now that recommendation for this new Bureau was purely a compromise recommendation, because I think the majority of the members of the commission preferred that this bureau either be an independent agency, like the General Services Administration or the Federal Power Commission, or that it be attached to the White House. Their reasoning was, how could it effectively coordinate the

other federal agencies when it was itself only an agency in one department. This view did not prevail, because of the opposition of two senators who felt that there were too many independent agencies of government and that if this bureau was, among other things, to administer a growing program, assuming the Land and Water Conservation Fund became a reality, therefore it ought to be in an existing department. And this latter view prevailed.

Mc Can you tell me who the senators were?

C: My belief is that they were Senators Anderson and Jackson. I'm quite sure of that.

Mc Is it significant that there was the idea that the federal government should take a hand in outdoor recreation at this point?

C: Of course the Federal government had been included for many years. The Forest Service had been involved in recreation since about 1910, the Park Service was established in 1916, the pressure of people on the federal lands was forcing these and other Federal agencies to get into recreation more and more. I think at the time the study was made there were about 35 federal agencies that in one way or another had something to do with outdoor recreation. Right now I think there are around 50 or 60. So, they didn't push the federal government in it, but they felt that the federal activities were so dispersed and so uncoordinated that there was a need for some central coordinating point in the federal government. This was really the controlling thought in the establishment of this bureau. Plus the fact it would give recreation some stature to compete in the use of resources with the commodity use of these same lands for timber or for grass and so on. So the Bureau was established by President Kennedy in a general sense. In actuality it was established not by executive order of the President, but by Secretarial Order of Secretary Udall. He did it with the blessing of President Kennedy.

Now two things happened within a month or two after the Commission report was out. It is quite significant for action to follow so quickly. But this is a reflection of the stature of the Commission. One thing that happened was that the bureau was established. The second thing that happened was an executive order which established a President's council on recreation and an advisory citizen's committee on recreation. These orders have been revised somewhat over the years, but initially there was a provision for a rotating chairmanship of the Council among the cabinet officers, but this didn't work out very well. Laurance Rockefeller was selected as chairman of the citizen's advisory committee, and he still is chairman. Something I was going to say slipped my mind. [See next page]

Mc Why did they put this in the Department of Interior? Why didn't they assign it to the Department of Agriculture?

C: That relates to the old squabble between the two departments. The bulk of the activity in the federal agencies in this field was in the Department of Interior and the White House generally recognized that Interior sort of was the focal point for natural resources activity although by no means had a monopoly. The Forest Service was about the only major agency that was involved in the administration of federal lands and active in recreation in the Department of Agriculture. So if they were going to pick a department Interior was the logical one. Plus the fact that you had Clint Anderson and Scoop [Henry] Jackson on this commission and at that time I think that Clint was chairman of the Senate Interior Committee and Scoop was number two. Now it's been reversed; Jackson's chairman. That I'm sure was a factor, and it made sense. If they were going to put the new Bureau in a department, this is where it ought to have been.

Mc Did the personality of Udall have anything to do about this? Did he want this, and push for it?

C: He wanted it and he pushed for it, yes. But the Administration was fairly new at the time, and he had not at that time really established himself nor did he have the reputation that he built over the eight years. So I think probably it was the Commission's prestige more than Udall's that really got it started. Although it was certainly Udall who grabbed the opportunity, who picked it up, and through all the period of his administration he gave it his blessing and stood behind it. He gave it every break he could.

The thing I was going to say a moment ago was that this commission was created during President Eisenhower's Administration. When Senator Kennedy became President, there was serious question whether he would retain these citizen appointments of President Eisenhower. But he did. And the net result was that by this action he put a bi-partisan, non-political stamp on the findings of the commission. This has held until a month ago when I stepped out. The Nixon Administration wanted me out mainly for political reasons, to the best of my knowledge.

Mc Well, did this non-political stamp help in the operation of the bureau?

C: Oh, tremendously. Because you see one of the things we accomplished -- now you're getting into the programs of the Bureau -- was the very large amount of legislation that was passed during the seven years that I was there. The bureau really served several purposes. It was Udall's front line testing ground for new ideas. It made numerous studies, most of which were imposed upon it either by Udall, or by the President, or by the Congress, such as the Missouri River, the Hudson River, the Connecticut River, the Redwood Parks, North Cascades, and similar things.

A surprising number of these studies resulted in legislation, putting the findings into effect. I have a list here I was just glancing at: There was no such thing as a national recreation area until the bureau came into being. It conceived this idea. National Recreation areas are sort of a cross between national parks and national forests, in the sense that recreation has priority but you still can use the other resources. There were about six or seven national recreation areas that were established. Also, there was the Guadalupe National Park, the Canyonlands National Park, the Redwood National Park, the North Cascades National Park. Never, Never has so much happened so quickly in these major conservation actions as long as I can remember, and that goes back quite a while. Then there was the Land and Water Conservation Fund, The National Scenic Rivers Act, and the National Trails Act.

The conservation fund provided, as you may know, a federal fund to buy federal areas, also half of the money went to the states, and some of it through them to the counties to match local dollars to buy and develop state or local recreation areas. Now the main purpose was to buy the available areas before urban sprawl, before price escalation, or before something else happened that committed the areas irrevocably to other uses. And the fund has been very effective. What also has happened is the Congress passed so much new legislation and there was so much land acquisition to catch up with from legislation already on the books, that the fund as it was initially passed was not anywhere big enough. So in the last Congress that fund was amended by earmarking into it as much of the offshore oil receipts as is necessary to put into the fund each year for five years $200 million dollars. This money still has to be appropriated, but it's in the fund. It can't be

appropriated for anything else and it stays there until appropriated. So even though you have a tight budget and Congress may not appropriate up to the level of the fund now, which it should do if they're going to beat the price escalation, eventually they'll appropriate. And this putting into the fund the off-shore oil receipts was a very major step, which really made the Land and Water Conservation Fund. And without it, things like Cascades, and Redwoods, and Padre Island, and Assateague and so on, they'd have been on the books, but there wouldn't have been the money to implement them.

In the last Congress, we had five major pieces of legislation. They sort of peaked in the last year of Johnson's administration. We had the enlargement of Land and Water Conservation Fund, which was a pre-requisite to the other four. The other four were the establishment of Redwood National Park, the most expensive national park ever created. It's going to cost over a $100 million dollars; North Cascades National Park, which won't cost much, but that was a fight between Agriculture and Interior; the system of national scenic rivers, and a system of national, state and local trails. Now these are five major pieces of conservation legislation. The rivers and trails statutes are patterned somewhat after the Wilderness Act, but they will be implemented out of the Land and Water Conservation Fund. And if Congress hand't taken this first step to really put some money muscle in the fund, then these other things would never have happened.

Mc Well, you've raised a number of points. I think it might be wise to get you appointed to the bureau. How did you come about to get this appointment to the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation?

C: In the first place, I'd had a small hand, as I've said, in developing the original legislation. I had worked with the commission; I had known Udall

since he was a freshman congressman. He and I had been good friends; we'd worked together on a number of things on the Hill. You see, in my last ten years in the Forest Service, I handled Congressional relations for the Forest Service and that put me on the Hill a lot. So I knew many members of Congress on the Interior and Agriculture Committees and others. Udall was casting about, he knew this was going to happen, so he was casting about for somebody. He contacted me and asked me if I would be interested and to come over and talk about it. So I did and we discussed it, and that's how it came about. How he picked on me, you'll have to ask him.

Mc Okay. Now you mentioned earlier that the creation of the bureau was a compromise and that there was a potential problem of coordination.

C: I meant to say the creation of the Bureau was not a compromise, but the location of it in the Interior Department was a compromise.

Mc Oh, I see. Well, what about this problem of coordination?

C: Yes, all right. This was why they set up the President's Council. It was supposed to be the vehicle by which coordination would be achieved. There was passed, after the bureau was established, what was called the Organic Act of the Bureau which gave it the authority to promote coordination, but only that, which is not very strong. The act also gave the Bureau a directive to prepare a nation-wide recreation plan with the requirement that the federal agencies conform to the nation-wide plan. Now there was a little muscle. But it was mainly conceived that this coordination would be achieved through the President's Council, and the Director of the Bureau was the staff director of the President's Council. Incidentally, I also wore a third hat as staff director of the Lewis and Clark Trail Commission.

But unfortunately the President's Council didn't work out too well. Udall was the first chairman for two years, and then Freeman was. During

those four years it functioned rather effectively. However, there was a problem even then. The principals often didn't come, or only a few of them would come. These men were cabinet officers. They'd often send undersecretaries or assistant secretaries. In the initial period, a number of disputes were settled. There were about seven policy statements that were issued that all the departments conformed to. And I would say there were some real things accomplished. Then John Connor of Commerce succeeded Freeman in the order of rotation, and he had no interest whatsoever. Then he left, and his successor, Sandy Trowbridge, tried to pick it up, but Trowbridge wasn't there long enough. Laurance Rockefeller, through the Citizen's Committee was quite active, and he was concerned about the Council. Through his influence he managed to get Vice President Humphrey made Chairman of the Council. This was a good move. The unfortunate part is that Humphrey was only chairman for about 8 or 9 months, not long enough to really be effective. But he did wind up some things, and he was getting things done, which hadn't happened before. So if the Vice President had stayed on, the Council would have become an effective instrument I am convinced.

One of the problems was that when two departments had an issue between them, such as Agriculture and Interior, or HUD and Agriculture, the preference of the secretaries was not to lay it before the Council and their colleagues, but to settle it bilaterally between them. Of if they couldn't do that then take the problem direct to the White House. The Council was advisory only. Why would Freeman accept the advice of the Defense Department on a matter on which he was dealing with Weaver of H.U.D.? This was the weakness in the Council, and it just never worked too well. I would say the coordination the first 4 years worked fairly well, but it became less effective as time when on.

Mc Was this a factor in the users' fees that were supposed--

C: No, that was political. The user fee was part of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act. There was both an entrance fee and a user fee. It became symbolized by what they called the Golden Eagle Passport. There were many problems with that, most of them were surmountable. One of the problems, it was a case of coordination, was getting the agencies to charge the same fees, and to work out their different practices so that the same fees could apply. This we did.

Mc Oh you did?

C: Oh yes, this we did. We got it working pretty well. It's still in effect this year; and I think with time it probably would have worked out fairly well, but it didn't bring in much money. It brought in about five or six million dollars in the first year when we expected it to bring in about thirty million dollars. There are many reasons for this. Many people preferred to pay a daily fee than getting the yearly passport, the people who traveled all around would use this passport so it was too much of a bargain and you lost money that way. Also, there were many violations of it.

The reason it foundered was that there was central oppostion in Oklahoma, East Texas, Southwest Missouri, and Northwest Arkansas. In that central area, there was philosophical opposition by the members of Congress; there was opposition from the people; they continued to make a fuss. Really the core of it, I think, was that they were afraid of the establishment of a fee for recreation use of water. This applied to land and it applied to, not to water itself, but to access to the water. They were afraid there would be a precedent set for the establishment of the user fees for the waterways of the United States. This would affect the barging systems of the Mississippi and Ohio

rivers, establish tolls on locks and this sort of thing. Now commercial barging is a very big business. There is a very powerful lobby on this, and they have much influence with the members of Congress from the areas that I specified. The waterways are free so the barging interests enjoy a substantial subsidy over the truck and rail haulers. They would never admit this, but I think that was the case. So when we got to the question of enlarging the Land and Water Fund, we used the oil receipts. The very simple gut problem was: you could get the support of these opponents of the fee for the oil receipts, if you would give up on the Golden Eagle Fee Program. So you were in effect trading a five million uncertain income for a sure income of $100 million dollars. So why not do it?

Mc Yes.

C: And that's what was done; it's not generally talked about, but that is what was done. These members of Congress from that area strongly supported the amendment of Land and Water Conservation. That was their price!

Mc So the user fee will be done away with.

C: The Golden Eagle Entrance Fee as between all federal recreation areas will be done away with a year from this past month. But the individual agencies still can, and are encouraged to charge their individual fees. And these monies will go into a special account in the fund to be made available, if appropriated to the agency that collected it. Related to this area of opposition, there were many Corps of Engineers developments--dredging, lakes, dams--this is the heartland of the Corps of Engineers operations. I have some sympathy with the corps on this; I worked very well with the corps, and I have high respect for General [W. F.] Cassidy and his predecessors and his assistants, particularly Woodbury. Their problems were different than the problems of the Park Service or the Forest Service. You had to drive a hundred miles

sometimes to get from one Corps recreation area to another area; so how would you administer this? Whereas with the Park Service, they are all right together in a little area. And with the Forest Service they might be two or three miles apart. The corps didn't have the personnel; the money that it collected didn't necessarily come back to it; the corps got no acquisition benefit from this fund. The money to acquire land went to the Forest Service, the Park Service, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of the federal agencies, and half of it to the states. So here was the corps collecting money for somebody else to use, so what was the incentive? But they tried. They were good soldiers; they are good soldiers. They tried, but they might have tried harder and made it work if they'd really wanted to. But it was hard to read the corps. I am not as critical of the corps on this fee matter as most of my colleagues were. I think I understand their problem better and they had real problems.

Mc Did you get opposition from the park users?

C: Oh, you got a little bit at first, but the Park Service had been charging over the years for their major areas, and this was just a little change in the system. You'd get an occasional complaint here and there.

Mc From the grassroots, from the people, you didn't have much--

C: They had escape devices. You had this fee, and you were supposed to buy and use a sticker. Well what happened at West Yellowstone one year, the fellow who was running one of the motels there bought a whole bunch of the passports. He had one for each room. So he just put it in the box where your key was, and when you checked in you got a key and you also got a pass to the park. When you checked out you turned the pass in, and the next person got it. This was the escape device and unless the Park Service had stopped every car, looked to see whether the man's signature on the pass-

port checked with the signature on his driver's license, they could get away with it. You couldn't do such checking because there were too many people going in and out.

Mc How do you go about just getting the cooperation of other agencies, say on the user's fee? Did you have meetings with them?

C: Numerous meetings, we worked with them very closely, very intimately, constant meetings. If you got into trouble you went upstairs, but I would deal with the top people in the bureaus if my assistants couldn't do it. If you got in enough trouble you'd go up to the cabinet level. If you got into more trouble, you'd go to the White House. Once in awhile you'd go to the White House, but not too often. [Occasionally to the] Budget Bureau or the White House. Sometimes you'd go to the Hill, but most of the time, you didn't have to on the fee matter. Agencies in general would cooperate; both the Forest Service and the Park Service cooperated very well.

Mc Did the fund have the right of eminent domain, could it go in and condemn land?

C: The fund did not carry any new acquisition authority. The fund was a financing measure. The Park Service could have money from the fund. We would have to approve the Park Service purchases, and give the Park Service money. But if it acquired land at Assateague, it used the acquisition authority contained in the act that established the Assateague National Seashore, not the authority of the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Practically all of the acquisition authorities of the federal agencies do carry eminent domain. In some cases it's limited, like Cape Cod and some others. In some others, it's unrestricted. But they didn't use the authority of Land and Water Fund for acquisiton authority.

Mc In working with and creating recreational areas, did you have any problem with

preserving the wildlife in the area? Did that fall into your--

C: It would not fall on us, but it would fall to the administering agency. I know of no case where that has ever come up. The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife didn't get much money. They were authorized to get it for endangered species and for incidental recreation at wildlife refuges. They did get some money but this was for the purpose of enhancing and protecting wildlife. At National parks of course which were established, there is no hunting permitted. Recreation areas would be subject to hunting, but under provisions of state law. So there was no particular problem there at all.

Mc Did you, in this Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, come across urban planners?

C: Oh yes, we dealt very closely with HUD. Let me say this. The Bureau of the Outdoor Recreation really was the lead agency in pushing Interior east of the Mississippi River, and in pushing Interior into the cities, because about 35 per cent of the land and water money was spent inside metropolitan areas. For instance, we rehabilitated Prospect Park in Brooklyn; we bought a waterfront park in San Francisco Bay; we bought land in Los Angeles, in Chicago; we bought land at Florida, in Biscayne Bay in Miami, which is now right south of where President Nixon has his house; and we were in the cities up to our neck.

Now this involved relationships with HUD. The way we worked that out as far as the federal agencies was that they could go buy where they had the authority. As far as the states went, to get our money they had to prepare, submit, and have approved a state-wide outdoor recreation plan. When they did that, we had HUD review that plan and give us their comments on it. Then when individual state projects were proposed that were inside the area in which HUD was carrying on somewhat related acquisition projects, we would

exchange proposals. They would send their projects to us, and we would send ours to them, to make sure there was no conflict and no problem.

Initially, we had a little difficulty working this out but it got so it functioned just fine. I would say we had excellent cooperation with HUD and through this exchange of projects they knew just when we were going in an area they were authorized to work, and we knew what they were doing. There was no duplication. The types of programs were closely related. They supplemented each other. There wasn't enough money between them and us to go around. One year the states said they wanted 7 billion dollars. There wasn't that kind of money. So there was no problem of competing in trying to finance the same project. There just wasn't enough money to go around.

Mc I have heard that the Department of Interior before the 1960's was mainly a western department.

C: Yes, that was the general concept, the old Buffalo symbol, and it was. It had the Indians; it had the public lands; it had the mines; and parks which were mostly in the West. This is one of the things that Udall did and one of the things where BOR was, as I say, the lead agency. Udall conceived the department's functions as nation-wide. Of course, the Bureau of Reclamation can't function except in the 17 Western states. It still has that restriction. But that is not the case for the rest of Interior. For instance, we're in on the Hudson River; the Delaware River Compact; we made an exhaustive study of the length of the Connecticut River; half, anyway, of the national recreation areas are in the eastern part of the country; I think the bulk of the land purchases from the conservation fund have been east of the Mississippi River. I'm not sure about that. New York gets the most money of any of the states. Then when water pollution came to Interior, this was far bigger and

far stronger than BOR, and the pollution assignment inescapably clinched the point that Interior was no longer a western department, but was a national department. Because where is pollution the worst? It is worst in the East. This national function of Interior is one of the things that some people still don't understand. For example, when President Nixon a few weeks ago in making his rounds of the different departments, and talking to the high officials, he made the comment that Interior was a western department and a department of the countryside. You could just see people wince at that. He was thinking of Interior more in terms as it had been up to and through the Eisenhower Administration, and he had not absorbed the fact of the change in what Interior is now from what it used to be.

Mc Is Udall the key man in this change?

C: President Kennedy, President Johnson, Udall, Senator Jackson, and Wayne Aspinall, they're the key men right there. Udall was the pusher. And both Kennedy and Johnson gave him their very strong support and, of course, Mrs. Johnson helped with her interest in beautification. As a result of the natural beauty interest, the President revised the Council on Recreation and broadened it by a new Executive Order to make it a Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty. The Citizen's Committee was changed the same way. Mrs. Johnson, of course, had a great interest in these things and I'm sure had an influence on the President in making life easier for us and the things we were trying to do. There's another person or two who should be mentioned here within the Administration. Secretary Udall had some good under secretaries. And there was Sam Hughes, who was the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, who comes from the State of Washington, who tramped the Cascades, whose daddy was a logger and lived south of Spokane, who grew up in this atmosphere, who was very responsive and carries tremen-

dous weight, who without his help [with] things would have been a lot harder. I doubt whether a number of these things would have happened. Sam paved the way for us in the Executive Office of the President.

Mc He would be your man in the Bureau of the Budget?

C: Definitely, yes. And then, of course, there were the appropriations committees. Julia Hansen was chairman of the House Subcommittee. For the Senate, it was Hayden; but Allen Bible was really the key to it, and now he's the chairman this year. Those are the key public officials. Freeman played a role in this. Freeman and Udall signed what they called the "Treaty of the Potomac," shortly after they took office. They instigated a study of the North Cascades. Freeman had a great interest in recreation and this sort of thing. He didn't like what happened in taking and establishing a North Cascades National Park by carving it out of the national forests. This was really the major clash between Freeman and Udall. Also, near the Sequoia National Park there was the Mineral King problem, and they clashed on that. I would say toward the end their relationships were deteriorating, but initially they were very good in this field and they cooperated very well.

Mc Was this Treaty of the Potomac an agreement to cooperate?

C. Yes, and to move forward on a number of things, to try not to steal each other's land, and to go ahead on the North Cascades study. They appointed me as chairman of a study group, figuring I had been in Agriculture and now was in Interior, so hopefully could be a little more objective.

But they began to have their conflicts in the conservation field. They remained friends--I don't mean that--but in this field they began to have problems toward the end of their administrations. But for the first four years, I would say, there was a degree of cooperation between the two departments that had never existed to my knowledge before in this field.

Heretofore, Agriculture and Interior had always been competitive.

Mc Did you discuss in all of this development the idea of moving recreation to the people, where the mass of people were?

C: This is what we were trying to do by moving into the cities. You see, it's hard to believe some of these figures, but they say in this day of mobility that maybe 50 per cent of the people never go over six blocks from home. This is hard to believe, but we were trying to get into the cities, particularly in the poor areas where the people are. One of the things we did was to finance I don't know how many swimming pools in the cities, all over the country. And this, of course, was a tremendous move. And then we helped--

Mc Were these widely used?

C: Oh my yes, just teeming with kids. And then we worked on these vest-pocket parks where you get an old house torn down, and you have a little vacant lot and develop a park. These are all through Harlem and other places in New York City; they're in San Francisco and some other areas. So we did both. We tried to take care of the countryside and the cities. You'd be amazed but 35 million people live within half a day's drive of Assateague. And while there are a lot of people who don't have cars, there's an awful lot who do. Take Fire Island, on Long Island, you can get to that from the subway. And this is now a national seashore. Fire Island was one of the first national seashores, and it's tremendous. This was bringing parks to the people. They're not all out in the wilderness areas by any matter of means.

Mc Yes. This would be a rather significant--

C: Very significant, and we did it deliberately and purposely; and I think rightly.

Mc Did this idea about carrying recreation to the people arise from a number of areas? Or was there any basic discussion?

C: The Land and Water Fund, when it passed, was conceived more in the sense of

new parks, new recreation areas, new wildlife refuges, or adding to the ones that were, which are mostly not close to the people. But there was a little legislative history, and there's a line in the bill that opens the door to the local governments. We took that one sentence and just opened it wide, and they never criticized us for it. But you won't find much in the Act that says "take recreation to the people, or move into the urban areas." We just did it. There was just that one sentence that we utilized that gave us the authority to do it. The committees knew it, and they were responsive to it.

Mc Do you have any problem say on Fire Island in working with local authorities on these projects?

C: You really should ask that of the Park Service, because once we got these things authorized and financed, we didn't administer them. You see this was one thing about the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, it didn't administer an acre of land, so we removed the bureaucratic jealousy that we might have had from the Forest Service or the Park Service thinking we were trying to muscle in and administer some areas they'd like to administer. We stayed out of that deliberately although sometimes members of Congress wanted us to. As for dealing with the local people, sure they have problems. There were always problems with the local people when things were in the formative stage, usually more so then than later. It's characteristic of areas, like Indiana Dunes, or Sleeping Bear Dunes, or the Redwood Park, any of them that I've been involved in, Assateague. Where was the center of opposition at Assateague? The County Commissioner. The closer to the area, the greater the opposition. The further away you get, the greater the support; and this is because the locals are afraid that it's going to take land off the tax roll. They're suspicious of whether it really will bring in enough tourism trade to offset this; they'd rather have a bird in the hand than two in the bush; they'd

like to open it up for real estate development, and this sort of thing. In the case of the Redwood Park, they were afraid of putting some lumber companies out of business. What are they going to do for jobs? What is it going to do to taxes, and what will it do to schools? This is where the opposition comes from. As you get away from local people, others don't think about the local problems, but consider the regional and national needs.

Mc Well, it sounds like most of the opposition is based on an economic--

C: That's right, it is; it's mostly economic. Almost entirely.

Mc Does it appeal to preservation of natural beauty or conservation--

C: Sure you appeal to those things, but when you've got to choose between that and a job, you take a job.

Mc I see.

C: The opposition isn't all that way. Take up on the lower end of the Connecticut River between Hartford and Old Saybrook. There the opposition was from wealthy people who owned large properties. Their view was: "We've got this, we like this the way it is; don't put a national tag on this; we don't want all those people from New York swarming up here and ruining our place. Keep them away, just leave us alone." There's nothing economic about that; people who've got something good don't particularly want attention brought to it. There's that aspect of it.

Mc Through all this work, did you have any contact with Lyndon Johnson?

C: Yes. I went to many bill signing ceremonies with him. I've been in conferences in his office, but always with the Secretary or somebody else, never alone. Probably the most contact I had with him--I might interject here I had quite a bit with Mrs. Johnson--but the most contact I had with him was three months ago near the close of the administration when Secretary Udall presented to him in the Cabinet Room a proposal for administrative action to set aside a very substantial acreage in Alaska and other areas in the western part of the

United States. That was a very interesting meeting to me. Udall had had his homework done in the department; I was really brought into it at the last minute. The Secretary made a presentation to the President with slides--or charts--and some photo albums. The President sat there and listened and it took about 45 minutes or an hour. Mrs. Johnson came in about half-way through and listened to it. The President had one or two staff men present; he had Charlie Murphy there, who was counsel; and the thing that surprised me, he had Clark Clifford there.

And they sat and listened; Udall got through and then he asked for comments. They went around the people there. The President asked Mr. Clifford first, and he was critical (I think he was performing a function which the President expected) Udall told me afterwards. Udall said the President often operated this way. He would have another Cabinet officer who was really totally unrelated to it, to look at it very critically. Mr. Clifford raised a lot of very good, very penetrating questions. Charlie Murphy raised just one. He wanted to know whether Udall was going to take any national forest land. The staff men raised some questions about the legality of what Udall was proposing, and this sort of thing.

The President was obviously interested, and he ended up by complimenting the Secretary and instructing--you'll have to get the name, I think it was DeWitt Greer--that's not quite right.

Mc I'll check it.

C: Or I can check it. But it's slipped my mind--he's a good friend of mine; that's what bothers me. He said, "You staff it out." He said, "Let me have a paper and your recommendations on it by tomorrow." This was characteristic, very quick action; the President didn't give him much time. They did the staff work and then they got into some problems. The President's final action, I think it

was inauguration day, was to accept a small part of the whole. I don't know, but I've been told that Udall and the President developed some problems about this.

This was my longest experience with the President personally, watching him operate. He used to lounge back in his chair, with his eyes half closed, but he didn't miss a trick.

Mc He understood what was going on.

C: Oh, you bet he understood what was going on. He asked some very sharp questions. He understood, and he knew what was going on; and he was interested, and he didn't miss a thing. I had great respect for him. I think he was a much maligned President. In the domestic field, I think his goals were splendid; and I think he accomplished a great deal. The war brought him down. The same goes for Kennedy. Kennedy had a deep interest in these things. In a way though, I think it may have been more superficial than Johnson's. I think Johnson knew more about the subject. I don't really know. My dealings with Kennedy were very superficial. Again, a few meetings with other people and bill signing ceremonies and that sort of thing, where you can't, you know, really understand a person.

Mc This might be a good time to break. I have some other questions for you.

C: All right.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
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Gift of Personal Statement

By Edward C. Crafts

to the

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In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Edward C. Crafts, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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Signed Edward C. Crafts

Date May 25, 1972

Accepted Harry J. Middleton for
Archivist of the United States

Date October 4, 1974