

INTERVIEW III

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INTERVIEWEE: DONALD J. CRONIN

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

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G: As we look at 1956, any insights on the natural gas bill that year that was such a controversial item?

C: Not really. I came in July of 1953, so I really hadn't been around a whole long time at that particular point in time. But the natural gas bill was one that we received an awful lot of correspondence on, but one that I really wasn't involved in.

G: This was the point where Francis Case announced that he had been tendered a bribe by two attorneys I think with Sun Oil [Company].

C: As I recall that, they were Superior Oil. And as I remember it, there was a big to-do about that bribe, but I think it tended to phase out. I believe there was a committee appointed that held an investigation and the committee came up with what I'm going to call a "slap-on-the-wrist" sort of thing. And I think it all went by the wayside.

But that's right. Francis Case was a major-domo in that at the time.

G: [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, citing this episode, vetoed the legislation. Any insights on that and how that affected the situation in your state?

C: You're talking about tidelands oil?

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G: No, the natural gas bill.

C: I'm not sure it did. If it did, I wasn't aware of it at the time.

G: As we move to the late 1950s, you had a good deal of labor legislation in the wake of the revelations about irregularities in organized labor. Do you remember the McClellan hearings and the Kennedy-Ives bill?

C: I remember the McClellan hearings.

G: Let me ask you to first describe the atmosphere that provided the motivation for some of this legislation.

C: I think a lot of that atmosphere may have been Jack Kennedy. Labor was not popular in the South, but Senator [Lister] Hill was always labor-prone. I think we found labor a pretty good ally politically and in that particular regard, labor was always available when you wanted them and they were always very helpful. Senator Hill was considered in Alabama too liberal on labor, and that hurt us insofar as the 1962 elections wherein Senator Hill almost got beat. I think we won by something like three thousand votes. But labor was a factor there in that Senator Hill had been too, quote, "soft," unquote, on labor. I don't particularly think he was. Minimum wage was a big factor in these days, and as I recall, the minimum wage hadn't been changed in many a year. I think it went from maybe a dollar to a dollar and a quarter along about that time, something like that, which wasn't a whole heck of a lot, but he was for that and voted for it. Of course, that hurt him politically in Alabama. But I never felt that he was pro-labor in that sense of the word. I think he was fair, and that earned him the title pro-labor.

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But labor was very helpful. Labor you could count on. This was prior to the days of [Jimmy] Hoffa and all that sort of exposé, but even then labor was a helpful force. I don't have any problems at all with his being pro-labor.

G: Any insights on the McClellan hearings and the revelations about irregularities in the pension funds and things of this nature?

C: Not any first-hand insight to that. I think there probably was a good bit of merit in what was being said, but not any personal insight. By personal insight, I'm talking about--I didn't work on any phase of those investigations and so on. I wasn't close to them in that sense. I breathe the same air as everybody up there and, of course, knew what was happening. But I think an awful lot of that was Jack Kennedy getting ready for 1960. And labor was a dominant force in that day and time, and labor did help Jack Kennedy. I think there was a good bit of that involved.

G: I guess the primary bill that ultimately emerged was the Landrum-Griffin Act, which was not one that labor was enthusiastic about. Do you recall that and the circumstances there?

C: Not necessarily the circumstances. I remember the Landrum-Griffin Act, and at that particular time it was extremely controversial in the South. I relate to that because that's where I worked; that's what I know the best. But as I recall, the Landrum-Griffin Act went to irregularities; did it not?

G: Yes.

C: And it went to areas that supposedly were to be cleaned up or liberalized by the legislation. And it was not too popular in the areas I'm talking about; I'm talking about

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the South. In fact, it wasn't popular at all. But as I recall, Landrum-Griffin passed, in modified form, but it passed. Here again, we weren't directly involved with labor. At this point in time Senator Hill was not chairman of that committee. We weren't directly involved with it. But we would have been sympathetic to a good part of it, not every part.

G: Anything here on the relationship between Lyndon Johnson and Ralph Yarborough who was on the labor committee and identified as being quite pro-labor?

C: I don't recall any particular relationship there. Yarborough, as I remember, came to the Senate just about this time. I don't believe Yarborough was ever considered a heavyweight in the Senate, and I don't believe insofar as the pre-Lister Hill chairmanship days that there is really much affect one way or another insofar as Ralph Yarborough. I think that changed some once Senator Hill became chairman of that committee.

G: Any recollections of Eisenhower's veto of the rivers and harbors bill?

C: Not really. I would have to say that we criticized it at the time because in Alabama we have a lot of rivers and quote, "harbors," unquote: the Chattahoochee, Apalachicola and so on, the Tennessee Tombigbee and all these various waterways. We would have been very much prone toward a waterway system and a completion of a system. I think the Waterway Tombigbee was just recently completed and that was something like thirty or forty years in the making. We would have been very much in favor of waterway development. Again, I come to the proposition, is it because the waterways helped develop a system that was essential to the people or--a little bit of the chicken and the

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egg--is it because politically that's the way that you want to go and that's the way you grew up in politics and that's the way it had to be.

I'm not so sure the merits of the rivers and harbors act--bill, whatever they called it at the time--really was ever taken apart for its merits as much as it was for its politics. But the politics of that bill would have been that we were for it all the way.

G: Was it seen as sort of an anti-recession measure in that it would generate employment?

C: It may have been by the proponents of it, but, again, I come back to the politics of it--would have been that we're for waterway development in Alabama; we're a waterway state.

G: Okay. Alaskan statehood passed that year. Any insights on that?

C: Alaskan statehood--I remember going to the celebration for the passage of that act because a fellow named Price was with Senator [Edward J.] Thye, and they were very big in the Alaska statehood movement and he took me along with him. I think it was down at the Mayflower Hotel here where you're staying. I remember they had a huge block of ice carved out like the state of Alaska and so on and so forth, and it was tremendous. But I don't recall precisely how Senator Hill voted on that. My guess is he would have voted for it. But no ripples insofar as the politics of it either way. I think it sold largely on the fact that it's across from Russia and strategically both Hawaii and Alaska should have been grabbed during the days of the Cold War. I think that had an awful lot to do with it. I'm not so sure today that you'd have the same votes for it. I've been to Alaska so I'm glad they annexed it.

G: Anything on the Jenner-Butler bill?

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C: Refresh me on this.

G: This was a bill relating to the Supreme Court.

C: I remember a good bit of traffic on that one, but I don't remember the specifics of it.

G: Okay. In 1958 you had a big Democratic majority elected in the Senate. How did that change the politics within the Senate?

C: In 1958 there would have been a tremendous influx--I remember 1958. There would have been a tremendous influx of new Democrats in the Senate. I don't specifically recall how it changed the politics in the Senate, but if I had to guess, it logically follows that it would have changed them to the extent that Ike--and I don't say this in a partisan way--Ike was never a great leader. If I look at it objectively, I would say that Ike was always vulnerable as a president. His election may have been a good thing in 1952, or whatever it was. It may have been a good thing because the economy, the nation, in my own opinion, was moving too fast. It needed a cooling-off period. I think with Ike you got a cooling-off period.

That may have been good but, by and large, Ike's philosophy, whether it was intentional or accidental, was, "Let's have another study made." As I said earlier, that may have been a good eight-year period in history to have another study made; that may have been good for the country. It gave everybody an opportunity after the surge of the post-war era and so on to slow down and collect themselves. I think it was good. Whether it was intentional or not, I don't know. I happen to think that it probably was not. I happen to think it was coincidental with history.

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But regardless of that, this fellow was always vulnerable because he was not really a doer and, again, maybe that was intentional. Maybe his advisers told him, "This is a time not to do; just have another study made." And he got through his eight years that way. But because of that philosophy, he was vulnerable. And while I don't specifically recall the 1958 year politically, I'm sure that because of that vulnerability those were years when the Democrats should have and probably did politically romp a good bit and plan for 1960.

G: Did the big Democratic majority elected in 1958--or at least part of it was--make Lyndon Johnson's job as majority leader easier or more difficult?

C: I think easier. I would think easier. More difficult in the working sense you're talking about, but easier as a majority leader. I think that would have been minority leader at the time.

G: As you'll recall, during the mid-1950s he had a very narrow majority, one or two votes.

C: Had the Wayne Morse situation and so on.

G: Frank Lausche.

C: Yes. But I'm not sure--then again, I'm going backwards. I'm not so sure anybody really wanted a working majority. I think the majority in the Senate as well as in the Congress as well as in the nation wanted more of a do-nothing attitude, and they got it. It may have been good; only history will tell. But it might have been a good time to cool off, so to speak. I think there was a lot of that fervor around, so I'm not so sure that too many people cared how big the majority or how much they could do with it. I think there was more reticence which, again, may have been good.

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G: The Senate also seemed more liberal during this time.

C: I don't know. There are just too many factors to take that one apart. When you say it seemed more liberal, maybe the times demanded a lot of so-called liberalism, changes, whatever. Maybe it coincided with that point in time in history that it was more, quote, "liberal." I'm not so sure that it was any more liberal then than it is today or yesterday or a year from now.

I guess what I'm getting to here is when you use the word liberal that's a very, very difficult term to break down and to take apart. It really is.

G: Well, I guess I'm just contrasting the senators who were elected in that 1958 period with some of the people they replaced.

C: Well, again I go backwards, though--you've just sort of answered what I was asking. Given under another set of circumstances, would those same people be considered liberal or conservative? That's a hard one; that's tough.

G: Everett Dirksen replaced Bill Knowland as the Republican leader. Let me ask you to describe how Lyndon Johnson worked with each of those men, first Knowland then--

C: I think Lyndon Johnson worked well with both of them. I think Lyndon Johnson was a political animal and I think he could get along--I think he was the kind of guy who analyzed what was there, whomever it was, whatever the name may have been, and found a way to work with or against--whatever the case may be--but I think one of his great skills was the ability to analyze the people on the other side, and then to figure out a way into those people and to get the most out of them. I think this was part of Lyndon Johnson's ability.

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G: Was he able to out-maneuver Knowland?

C: I don't know that I would say that he was or wasn't. Again, you come back to the times at that particular point in time and you come back to semantics of, "What do you mean by out-maneuver?" I think that an awful lot of politics in the Senate, in this case that you're talking about, is appearance. And there may have been appearance that he outmaneuvered or somebody out-maneuvered the other one or whatever, but did they really, or did they use that appearance to their own benefit? It's difficult, unless you take apart each person and each situation. I think I understand your question. I don't know if he ever outmaneuvered him or not. I just don't know that.

G: How about Dirksen, did you have a sense that he was closer in his relationship with Dirksen than he had been with Knowland?

C: I think he was closer with Dirksen than Knowland. I sensed that he was for a number of reasons. I think Dirksen was more like Lyndon Johnson in that he was a skilled political maneuverer, and he was. I don't think it took long for the two to recognize each other, and, as such, he most likely had a pretty close working relationship.

G: There was, I guess to some extent, a revolt against LBJ's style of leadership in the Senate in the late fifties. [Senator William] Proxmire made a series of speeches against what he called the one-man rule, and others were critical of Johnson, the extent to which he controlled the Senate appointments, committee assignments, the scheduling of legislation, things of that nature. Let me ask you to talk about this and how you analyze this whole--

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C: I would start out by saying that Lyndon Johnson, as leader, whether it's majority or minority, I think by his colleagues--by and large--was considered ruthless. And again, we're talking about semantics because ruthless--maybe in comparison to what they had before; maybe he was a stronger personality and therefore considered ruthless. But I do know that he was considered tough. He was considered strong, but he was considered tough. I think what your question really goes to--regardless of all these things which could be assets rather than liabilities--was he considered fair? To the best of my knowledge, he was. He was considered fair but tough in his fairness.

G: Did you feel that too much power was vested in one man?

C: I felt so.

G: How about Senator Hill, did he share that?

C: I think he did. I think he did. Ambition in politics is part of the system and I think from day one a fellow like Lyndon Johnson had his eye on the presidency. [He] knew where he was going and how he was going to get there, or how he thought he was going to get there if he ever got there; and he ended up there. But in the process, I believe, in answer to your question, that many of his colleagues--I would say probably a majority of his colleagues--felt even politically that he was overly strong.

G: During the time he was majority leader, you're talking about?

C: That's right.

G: Was there any thought given to reducing his powers as majority leader?

C: No. I don't recall anything that lent itself to that. I'm not sure. I'm not so sure that you really ever could. Maybe somewhere down the road that would happen, but I don't think

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in today's climate that you would ever have that. I don't think you can have it. I know you didn't have it then, and I don't believe you'd have it today.

G: Have the kind of power vested in the majority leader?

C: That's right.

G: What is different? What is changed that makes it--?

C: Changed in what regard?

G: Well, how has the Senate changed so that you can no longer have this kind of authority or power in one individual?

C: I think you probably still can have it. Did I say otherwise? If so, I didn't mean to say that. I think today you'd still have it. What I said [was] I don't think you can ever change the inherent system whereby you would effectively curb that power. I think there are means of curbing and, one, which you're about to get into, was the filibuster rule and that sort of thing. I think all of that lends itself to a curbing; there's no doubt about it. Because without that curbing, of course, any one member could tie up the Senate forever, and did. So that inherent in the system there are ways of curbing, but you were really going to the majority leader as such. And I think the majority leader as such where he has the ability to schedule by and large--he can be overridden, but, by and large, he can bring up whatever he wants; he can suppress whatever he wants. That's almost unlimited power and I don't see today where that power has changed any; the majority leader still has that prerogative. He can be overridden; a majority of the Senate can override him. But as a practical matter, unless he's pretty unpopular--and if he was pretty unpopular he never would have been elected in the first place--as a practical matter they're going to

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work it out to where he doesn't get overridden as a practical matter. If that be so, then by and large, his power is unlimited.

G: Did you have a sense that LBJ during the late 1950s was becoming weary of being majority leader?

C: No. I never had that sense. I can say that without reflection.

G: Let me ask you to talk about the change in rule twenty-two; you referred to that. Any insights on that or what was an issue that really divided the Democrats in the Senate?

C: It divided the Democrats. Rule twenty-two is the filibuster rule, isn't it?

G: Yes.

C: And they chipped away at changing that, as I recall. I don't have it chronologically, but at one time rule twenty-two made it possible for any group to tie up the Senate as long as they wanted. Depending on your parliamentary abilities, if you knew the rules well, you could literally tie it up *ad infinitum*; there was no problem there. I forget what it's down to now, but they whittled away at that rule until they got it down to where it was possible to break a filibuster. And they did break filibusters as a result of changes in rule twenty-two. Of course, the southern bloc was always against any change in rule twenty-two. We were against any change in rule twenty-two and we argued and fought against any change in rule twenty-two, but philosophically you come down to who's getting gored. That's what it really comes down to. Rule twenty-two is good if it's helping your cause. If the other guy is getting gored, it's bad. I personally happen to think that there ought not to be any rule that allows an institution like the United States Senate to be able because of the cause not to have a vote on the merits of the issue itself. I wrote a lot of

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speeches defending rule twenty-two--and rule twenty-two was a tremendous weapon for us--but ultimately, there ought to be a vote on the merits of the issue, whether it's pro-North or pro-South. Somewhere along the line, the people have a right to say yea or nay, or the whole system is wrong.

G: In 1959, LBJ supported a more liberal interpretation of the rule to allow cloture when two-thirds of the senators present and voting--did the southerners feel that he had betrayed them?

C: Yes, sir.

G: Describe that attitude.

C: Well, Texas had always been considered part of the South. I personally never totally agreed with that concept. Geographically it's the truth, but I never really felt that in their heart of hearts the people from Texas were that southern. But Texas was considered a southern state. We could go historically into cotton movements and all that kind of stuff, but leaving all that out, it was considered a southern state and Lyndon Johnson was considered from the South. Lyndon Johnson I think, reverting back to ambitions, come 1960, felt that he had to be just a little more liberal than the average southerner was at that time. And yes, I think he was. I think Lyndon Johnson made himself a little more liberal but I think, again, that the lure of office and politics of that level can do an awful lot to your philosophies. But the answer to your question is, he was considered more liberal than he should have been, being from the South. There were those who then started to take apart Texas and said, "But it's really not the South." I think geographically

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it was the South. I think it still is the South. But he was ahead of his time in the minds of a lot of people.

G: How did Senator Hill react to LBJ's action on rule twenty-two here; do you recall?

C: The same as I've just described. I think Senator Hill, if he were living, would probably agree with the proposition that even though we used this vehicle--rule twenty-two--in the civil rights fights, that at some point in time you have to have a vote, whether it be in a parliament, in the Senate or whatever. I mean somewhere along the line you've got to have a vote. Rule twenty-one served us well. I have a speech in one of my drawers here that's never been given on rule twenty-two that's about that thick that I wrote which we never got around to giving, because they invoked cloture and it was all ended before we ever got to that final speech.

G: This was a rule defending the right of unlimited debate or--?

C: That's correct. And I think academically you can defend it. Everything I've just said allows for the proposition that you can defend it and I think it can be defended. I repeat, at some given point in time, I think the people are entitled to speak by way of a vote. I don't think that parliamentary mechanisms and abilities should really defeat that right to speak with the vote. That's a strong right and it's one that we exercise every time we go to the ballot. But then you want to say that if you exercise it there, you can't exercise it up on the Hill. Not so; not right.

But under the existing rules we made good arguments defending that rule twenty-two, and I can still make some good ones.

G: The Eisenhower Administration was cutting the defense budget during this time.

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G: --military expenditures. This was about the time you had the Berlin crisis. Any insights on this issue at the time?

C: No, not really. I don't remember much involvement in that. In fact, I don't remember any involvement. I would just make one side commentary for whatever it's worth, and that is I think you have to remember that due to then-climatic conditions, nearly all of your military bases were in the South, and I assume Texas, too. So it really wouldn't surprise me politically to see that bloc favor either a tension and/or build up of the military situation. But, no, I don't have any particular insight into that.

(Interruption)

G: It sounds like a good story, go ahead.

C: Well, it's an accurate story. We had an air base up for closing in Selma, Alabama. Zucker came up and he had a list of bases and said, "One of these has to be closed. What's your feeling on the one in Selma?" The Senator said, "You can't close it. No way. Close one of these others over here." He said, "Senator, I don't know if I can do that." He said, "Well, who sent you over here?" He said, "The President." He said, "He's commander-in-chief; just tell him, 'Damn it, strike ours off and put another one on there!' He can do it. He's commander-in-chief," which is true. That particular base remained open, and I can tell you, it was only because of that meeting in that office; that's the only reason in the world. Let's assume that it was no different than five others; something had to go, something had to give. Dulles County is Selma, Alabama, where the march began, but that was a different story.

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We did that because we knew we were in a close race in 1962 for reelection, very close. In fact, we won it by three thousand votes, roughly. Do you know, after all the publicity we got on that we lost Dulles County, Selma, Alabama. We lost that county. And, do you know, the Senator kept in his top drawer here a copy of the results and when a group would come in representing, say, the Dulles County Chamber of Commerce, he would open that drawer [and] before they came in he'd look at Dulles County. Not totally fair, but [it's] politics.

G: Any insights on the Democrats' contention in the late fifties that there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, that we were behind?

C: No particular insight. I remember the climate at that time, that we were behind. And I remember in 1957 when Sputnik went up, because Senator Hill and I were in Europe at the time. I think we were in Germany at that time, and he told me then when the news came out about it, "That's all I need now for the National Defense Education Act. I've got the vehicle I need." But [I have] no particular recollection of . . .

G: How about Hawaii's statehood, do you remember the passage of that measure in 1959?

C: The only thing I remember about it is, as I recall, there was a package deal that if you get one, you get the other. I think it was pretty much sold that way, as I recall. I forget which one came first, Alaska, I believe. I think as long as the same bodies were around to vote, I think that was pretty well set. The only problem with those kind of deals, is you might have a different majority. You better get it fast; you better get it while the bodies are hot because they could go out of office and then your deals are all off.

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G: There were two controversial nominations in 1959. One was the nomination of Clare Boothe Luce to be ambassador, and during the course of that process she made some disparaging remarks about Wayne Morse.

C: She never took the office, as I recall.

G: She didn't. Do you recall that?

C: She talked about him being kicked in the head by a horse.

G: That's it?

C: Drew Pearson had used that same thing. I'm not sure she's the originator of that. Drew Pearson for some reason fell out with Wayne Morse and he used that. It may have been quoting her saying it or whatever, but I recall that quote of getting kicked in the head by a horse.

Wayne Morse, I think he went from Independent to Republican to Democrat. He was all three at one time or the other. When he lost out in Oregon--he and Tommy [Thomas] Corcoran knew each other pretty well--I was assigned to work. He demanded a vote recount in the state, and by state law you could if the numbers were such-and-such. And he got it, but he lost. But I went out to Oregon and worked on that. I think Tommy recognized that it was rather futile from the outset, but he was entitled to that right, and he demanded it and got it. And he lost.

In the process, I got to know the fellow a little bit. Leaving out politics, I think he was a rather good guy. As I remember, he was a college professor before, and he was academic in that sense of the word, but he wasn't a bad fellow.

G: He had a reputation of being a very prickly guy.

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C: Yes. He was a maverick and he prided himself in that. I always said--I've said it to Tommy--I've always thought Wayne Morse voted certain ways just so he would be different. I may be wrong there.

G: The other nomination was that of Lewis Strauss.

C: Strauss, as I remember, was AEC chairman?

G: Yes. Atomic Energy Commission.

C: And Senator Hill took a large share of the credit for defeating Strauss, and I think he probably did. Hill never went for the headlines, but he was a pretty effective Senator. He was admired by his colleagues. He took out for Strauss because, as I recall, the Strauss nomination was a set-up whereby Strauss, I think, was tied into Dixon-Yates. And Dixon-Yates was the power combine that in fact had been on record as saying we're going to destroy TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority], AEC and all these government agencies. Hill, I don't think at that particular time but after the fact, was chairman of the appropriations subcommittee on TVA and AEC. It may have been at that time.

Anyway, they more or less selected him as the leader of the fight and he dug out successfully an awful lot of material on that. I think I worked on it some. Everything that we dug out was indicting. It just fell into place. Some that we dug out, we didn't even expect to dig out, but as we started digging, things just unfolded and they were beautiful for our side of the argument. He was defeated. I remember the Strauss nomination well.

G: This was a case where the Democratic Party in the Senate was relatively united against that nomination. Any insights on that aspect of it?

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C: Not really insights, but I would say, again without being partisan to Senator Hill, that they had picked an awfully popular senator, who had nominated FDR [Franklin Roosevelt] in 1940 and had always kept his nose pretty clean in the Senate, who until that 1962 campaign to which I referred, never once took a reimbursement or a travel expense. Boy, you look at them today and . . . So this guy was known as Mr. Clean and Mr. Popular and I think, knowing that system up there, that had to have an awful lot to do--a guy who is that way today is Sam Nunn. I noticed on the front page of yesterday's paper Sam Nunn had been critical of some defense posture. Because it's Sam Nunn up there it carries all kind of weight. And Hill had that reputation. I think that had a lot to do with it.

G: Two Republicans joined the forty-seven Democrats in opposing the Strauss nomination. They were Bill [William] Langer and Margaret Chase Smith. Why did they vote against the President's nominee in this instance?

C: I don't have the answer to that. I wish I did. I remember those two. I don't know Langer, but Margaret Chase Smith I had a good bit of contact with. I would say, knowing Margaret Chase Smith, if I had to guess the answer to your question, I think she was the kind who would leave party lines if her conscience told her otherwise. Langer I didn't know. I knew who he was, but I didn't know him. She served on our appropriations subcommittee on health and I got to know her pretty well working with Bill Lewis, the general, and so on and so forth. I got to know her until she fell out with Senator Hill.

She came to our office one day and was storming mad because Bill Lewis' mother wanted into NIH, National Institutes of Health, and we purposely wrote that so that there

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were two requirements. First, it has to be a disease entity for which there is no known cure to mankind at the time, and secondly, you had to be referred by your physician. The purpose of both of those are obvious: to keep it out of politics, to keep it so that nobody can pick up the phone and say, "Hey, I want so-and-so in." You can't do it. I assume today you can't either. Bill Lewis' mother at the general [?] who was held up pending Jimmy Stewart's generalship--once he got it, then Bill Lewis got his star. But she came to our office and wanted Bill Lewis' mother put into NIH and she was on our subcommittee. Again, the Senator had that sixth sense. He said, "You better sit in on this one," and I sat in on it. She said, "You can pick up the phone and do it." Well, he could have, but he wouldn't. So she stomped out of that office mad.

G: What did he say to her?

C: He just told her, "Margaret, you know how the act is written and the act says such-and-such. There's no way I can violate that." And she insisted, as I recall, "Pick up the phone," and this and that, and so on. It finally came to push and shove to where he just had to say, "I won't do it. It would defeat the whole purpose of the act. I won't do it." And he didn't.

She stomped out of the office and within thirty minutes a messenger brought a letter by. I took it in to him. I opened it, which I did everything that came in of any consequence to him. I opened it and looked at it and it was a letter saying, "I hereby resign from your committee." That's too bad. I like her. But that was him and that's the way he did it.

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A lot of this goes backwards when you talk about the Strauss nomination. A guy with this kind of direction in a body like that gains admiration pretty fast, and he had that reputation. When they picked him to lead the fight against Strauss, again, I have to think that had to have a lot to do with it. Whatever he touched was never tarnished.

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



Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of

DONALD J. CRONIN

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Mary Cronin of Bethesda, Maryland, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted with my late husband Donald J. Cronin, on September 14, 1989; December 4, 1989; December 14, 1989; February 15, 1990; March 14, 1990; March 29, 1990; April 17, 1990; and May 16, 1990, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

- (1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
- (2) The tape recordings shall be available to researchers.
- (3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tapes.
- (4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.
- (5) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.


Donor

Date

Archivist of the United States

Date