

INTERVIEW I

DATE: November 28, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JOHN H. CROOKER, JR.

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Crooker's law office in Houston, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

F: Mr. Crooker, let's talk very briefly about your early career prior to your being nominated to be chairman of CAB [Civil Aeronautics Board].

C: I was born in Houston, Texas, October 26, 1914, attended public schools here, graduated from San Jacinto High School in 1931 went to Rice Institute, now Rice University, for four years and received my degree, B.A., with distinction there in 1935. Between my junior and senior years at Rice I started law school at the University of Texas, and by going three summers and two long sessions I received my L.L.B. with highest honors at the University of Texas in 1937.

I became an associate in the firm in which my father was one of the senior partners in the summer of 1937. Except for two interruptions, which I'll mention briefly, I've been an associate and later a partner in that firm continuously since 1937. I was away from the firm from early December 1941, going on active duty in the Naval Reserve on the day before Pearl Harbor, coming back in the latter part of October of 1945.

F: Your story varies. Most people, you know, are the day after or the month after Pearl

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Harbor. You're a rarity on that.

- C: I think on the list of persons checking into the Eighth Naval District for active duty my name may be about the last one on the list entitled to wear the pre-Pearl Harbor ribbons, because my active duty dates from 6 December 1941.

My other time of being away from the firm was from February 29, 1968, until November 1, 1969, a little less than four weeks ago. I had been nominated on February 16, 1968, by President Johnson to be a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, with the President's intention expressed to designate me as chairman if I were confirmed by the Senate. So in the days between February 16 and 29 of 1968, I made arrangements to terminate my connection with the law firm in which I had been a partner and was away completely. In the latter part of October in 1969, then having been unemployed since September 30, I discussed with my former law partners the possibility of joining the firm, and I understand the announcements are being mailed either today or Monday telling some of our friends that I have joined the firm now as a partner.

- F: Good. You first knew the President back in his schoolteacher days.

- C: I knew President Johnson in the late winter and spring of 1931. At that time there were five senior high schools in Houston. In the preceding school year, the finalists in the debating competition had been the debaters from San Jacinto High School, which I attended, and from Sam Houston High School. As we came on into January and February of 1931 it appeared the same thing might be true of that year, my senior year in high school. That year Sam Houston High School had a new debate coach, a gentleman who'd come from some smaller town as I recall in Southwest Texas to be a teacher of

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English, and he taught public speaking, a Mr. Lyndon Johnson. He coached the Sam Houston team, and in the city finals his team defeated the team on which I was a debater.

F: As I recall, he made some recommendation to your father about you or voted for you or did something which was unusual for the coach of the opposition.

C: Well, after the regular debating competition was over, Mr. Johnson talked to my dad about the fact that, debating teams then consisted of two speakers, he felt that L. E. Jones of his team and I from the San Jacinto High School team might form what he called an all-city debate team. Obviously there was very little involved except possibly the judgment of my debate coach and of Mr. Johnson that L. E. and I would do well if we barnstormed a little bit. So we formed what was called the all-city team, maybe a little bit self-appointed, but we took on all comers and debated various teams around the state.

F: Did you have his advice and counsel during that barnstorming period?

C: His most active advice, counsel, presence and constant instruction.

F: So you came away from that experience, even though you were in another high school, knowing him fairly well.

C: Yes, and obviously he was a man who always to me has commanded instant respect. I valued his judgment most highly, and I felt myself most fortunate to be able to have those hours, or days possibly, of instruction from him.

F: Did you keep up with him in that period between your high school debating period and when he ran for office in 1937?

C: It seems to me Mr. Johnson went to Washington to become the administrative assistant to Congressman [Richard] Kleberg, and in those days I don't suppose I ever went to

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Washington. I probably did not see him at all until he came back to Texas as administrator of the NYA [National Youth Administration], which, I haven't refreshed my recollection, but I place as being in about 1935.

F: That's right. Now you saw him just informally I presume in that period. You were now in Austin [and] he would have been here.

C: Well, in 1935 as I mentioned I started law school at the University of Texas, and I probably ran into him occasionally, though certainly our contacts were not close contacts in those years.

F: When he first offered himself for Congress in 1937, did you get involved in that? You would have been in Austin I presume.

C: I was in Austin, but I voted in Houston. I had voted in the presidential election of 1936. I was twenty-one years old at the time of the election, well, twenty-two by the time of the actual 1936 election, and supported the Democratic ticket. But my congressman was here. Albert Thomas I guess became the congressman in a special election in about 1936 and then was elected. If I were involved in any congressional race, it was in Albert's district rather than in a district in which I didn't live.

F: Yes. What relationships did you have with Mr. Johnson over the next several years? I know you got active in his campaigns.

C: Well, not any significant amount of contacts until the 1948 campaign. In 1948 I was keenly interested in his campaign and worked on that, but my contacts with him were few and far between until the 1948 campaign.

F: Just enough so that neither one of you forgot the other?

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C: Well, certainly I didn't forget him.

F: Tell me about the 1948 campaign. What did you do? Go ahead and . . .

C: Oh, I remember one of his early appearances here during that campaign. He spoke at a church which is right off of Eagle Street and off of Main Street. There's a Baptist church out there, and I with some others helped plan that particular occasion. It seems to me, I may be wrong, that Roy Hofheinz had a radio station at that time, and the radio station may have had some quarters there adjoining that church auditorium. Later I know that Warren Bellows, Jr., and Bill Francis and I had a breakfast for him down at the YMCA to try to get support for him on the part of two hundred or two hundred and fifty men about our then-age. We were then about thirty-three or thirty-four. Mr. Johnson had just passed his fortieth birthday in August; it was sometime during the campaign after the primary probably and maybe before the run-off, or maybe just after the run-off and before the general election. I don't recall having held any title as I did in 1960 but just worked for him, and essentially I think with Bill Francis and Warren Bellows, Jr., to get the support of young men and young women in their early thirties.

F: Well, now, the people that would have been in your general age group, they weren't necessarily committed to Coke Stevenson. This wasn't a job of peeling off people, but more or less a wide open situation in which you had to convince them, I gather.

C: Yes, of course, I guess even in 1948 there was some polarization of liberals and conservatives in Harris County, and in a Johnson versus Stevenson race you had some of the "vote for a conservative right or wrong" people who were going to support Coke Stevenson.

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F: Right.

C: You will recall that in the first primary there was a Houstonian. Am I right, that . . .
Who ran?

F: That wasn't Peddy, was it?

C: George Peddy? Maybe it was Peddy who ran. There was a Houstonian who got a number of local votes in the first primary just because he was from this county, but I don't think anybody took him too seriously. Nobody really believed he'd be in the run-off.

F: Just wanted him to look good.

C: That's right.

F: Did you have any part at all in that period between when the election day came and those several days while we were waiting for late returns to come in?

C: Well, our law firm did some work in the election contest. Actually, my dad did the courtroom work as far as our firm was concerned. There were others involved in that, as you know, Irving Goldberg, John Cofer and so on. While I did some work, it was essentially work on books and files. I wasn't the spokesman as far as our law firm was concerned. My daddy was.

F: I've talked with your father, but I would presume you would agree that you thought you had a good case or you wouldn't have taken it, and that you were really fairly confident of the result?

C: Oh, I don't think there's any question about the fact that justice prevailed in that case. During World War II in the navy before I went overseas I had served with Bob Smith, the

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man who was United States attorney over in the San Antonio area who really was not for Mr. Johnson in that particular race. He was a Stevenson man. But I believe that Bob Smith was convinced that there were all the votes properly cast and counted in the South Texas counties. I had occasion at some time there just visiting Bob Smith. It used to be that at the time of Bar Association meetings those of us who'd served in the District Intelligence Office of the Eighth Naval District would get together for coffee or lunch or possibly a cocktail at the end of the day, and I had the distinct impression that even Smith, who was pro-Stevenson, felt that Johnson's position in that case was the proper one.

F: Looking back a moment, did you cross paths with Congressman Johnson while he was in the service?

C: No.

F: You were both in the navy, but it's a big navy.

C: No, no, you [didn't].

F: He didn't cross paths with me either, and I was in the navy.

C: I think this. It seems to me that somewhere along the way President [Franklin] Roosevelt sent word to the men who were on active duty, "You either resign from the Congress or you come back and get to work." I was in the States until 1944 and spent roughly fourteen months overseas at the end of the war. He was overseas much earlier.

F: Yes. Well, let's move ahead. Did you have any further relationship with him of any considerable degree prior to 1960?

C: Between 1943 and 1956 I had few contacts with the then-Senator Johnson. He ran for re-

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election in 1954 against Dudley Dougherty of Beeville.

F: Fairly routine campaign.

C: Yes. The only thing exciting Dudley Dougherty did was, as far as I remember, pay for the first talkathon. And probably the night before election he had some telephone on the statewide radio network, but none of us took that very seriously as a means of getting hundreds of thousands of votes. There just wasn't enough excitement to . . .

F: So that your role in the campaign of 1954 just about matches the tempo of the whole campaign.

C: I certainly did nothing that I can recall that was very startling in the 1954 campaign.

F: Yes. How about 1956?

C: In 1956, and when you get into a financial area I think you understand there no names are involved, it became plain that the placing of Mr. Johnson's name in nomination in the convention in Chicago would be a springboard for having him known even better nationwide. He was then becoming quite well known as the Democratic leader, then the majority leader in the Senate, and I did solicit some funds here just for expenses in Chicago to help the cause a little bit, provide some expenses to further his image at the time of the convention.

F: Did you have much difficulty in raising those funds?

C: Among some of the people I talked to, yes. I was turned down on some occasions because by that time Governor [Allan] Shivers had issued a very sharp statement critical of Mr. Johnson, and a number of the people whom I knew were strong for Shivers. As a matter of fact, I had supported Governor Shivers in the primaries in which he ran, but

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there were some of my friends who felt, "Well, if Shivers takes an anti-Johnson attitude, we're just going to take an anti-Johnson attitude automatically without looking into the merits of the matter."

F: Were you able and where you did raise funds, did you get the feeling you raised them because of an advocacy of Mr. Johnson or because of a sort of an appeal to Texas pride. "Let's have the foremost Texan politically make his showing at the convention."

C: Oh, I suppose there were many, many reasons. Most of the people had been strong for Mr. Johnson and strong for Governor Shivers. So had Shivers not opposed him, I think the matter of raising some expense money would have--

F: This was the first time really they had to make a choice?

C: That's right, and a number of the people still said, "Well, I'm for Johnson. I'm for Shivers, but we're talking about something where Johnson's name is going to be pushed and I'm going to support that. Shivers is just sniping at him, nipping at his heels. He's not seeking any political office himself."

F: Were you active in the state Democratic convention that year that which was a little bit of a donnybrook?

C: I might say that as far as Harris County was concerned my side really didn't win down here, and my friends who controlled the county convention were not thoughtful enough to name me as a delegate to the state convention.

F: Tell me a little bit about the county convention.

C: Oh, all the county conventions then had been--

F: I'm glad I've seen Frankie Randolph on this subject.

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C: Well, back from I guess the time I got out of the navy on I went. The first state convention after I got back from the navy in 1946, I went to the state convention in San Antonio as a delegate. But the county conventions then for a whole decade would be either the conservatives would win or the liberals would win on the test vote, and they'd never name anybody from the other group. I might say that to me the importance of that ten years was that by 1958, and particularly by 1960, we realized that if the party was going to carry the state we had to be a little more ecumenical.

F: Yes.

C: And since 1960, if the conservatives won the county convention they'd still name a number of responsible liberals as delegates to the state convention, and vice versa.

F: Right.

C: So to me that's the big lesson of the ten years of county conventions.

F: You do learn something.

C: I hope.

F: Yes. Were you involved at all in the sort of pre-convention scrambling coming down in 1960 on the question of whether Mr. Johnson would allow himself to be offered and then trying to get things lined up in Los Angeles.

C: Very extensively. Here is where a major commitment of time was made from the last week in January of 1960 on. We opened the Johnson for President headquarters in Harris County the last week in January of 1960.

F: Did you have his okay or did you do it?

C: We did it. Nobody told us to stop. I'm sure that somewhere within a month or so I

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received a brief letter from him telling me that he'd understood I was saying some nice things about him and he appreciated whatever that was. I don't know that it was spelled out. I'm not sure that our opening of that headquarters made quite that big a splash, but nobody stopped us.

F: But this was voluntary on the Houston end. This was not a coordinated affair?

C: Well, it certainly wasn't by me, and the headquarters were opened in a building which our family owned. So, you know, it was just a sort of a shoestring affair, really.

F: Well, the Washington headquarters more or less opened under the same conditions, you know. It just appeared one day and you were under way. Did you have fairly high hopes of success?

C: Yes. Maybe we were starry-eyed. Maybe we were foolish. But we did have high hopes of success. For some reason I felt that Senator [John] Kennedy would not get the overwhelming support in primaries to permit him to be named on the first ballot. I thought he was probably the only man who had any chance to do so. From time to time you heard from people you knew in other years, and the feeling was that where there were conventions rather than primaries a number of the delegates were going to go uncommitted and maybe many of them would lean toward the majority leader of the Senate. I sincerely felt that if John Kennedy were not nominated on the first ballot there might be six, seven ballots, and Kennedy's name would be run with once or twice more, and maybe [Hubert] Humphrey's once or [Adlai] Stevenson's or [Stuart] Symington's.

F: There'd be a gradual attrition there.

C: But that the only name that could ever make it after the first ballot would be Lyndon

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Johnson.

F: How wide did your Harris County office range? Did it confine itself to the county, or were you active all over the map?

C: Oh, it confined itself pretty well to the county, and I might say here that there are numerous files. I don't know how much you want me to go into this or whether you want me to give you, but I'll . . .

F: I want as full as . . . All right. Let's do that. (Pause in tape). All right. Let's go ahead now and build up toward Los Angeles.

C: Well, this starts ten months before Los Angeles. On September 11, 1959, I wrote Senator Johnson a letter asking for an opportunity to chat with him for about twenty minutes sometime between then and mid-November. His letter in reply was dated September 17, saying as soon as he gets home and gets his bearings he'll be talking to me and so on.

F: Did you tell him what about?

C: Somewhere between there and January of 1960 I recall, this is ten years later of course, that I disclosed to him that I would be interested, and I felt that Sam Low and John Singleton would be interested, in our trying to get a movement started in his behalf in Houston in early 1960. I think at that time Sam Low and John Singleton and I were more active in moving things along and getting some sort of activity started than a good many other people.

F: What did he do, look at you that way he can and not say one thing or another?

C: Well, all I recall at this time is he didn't stop me.

F: Yes.

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C: When we did get the headquarters opened, Lyndon B. Johnson for President, Harris County Headquarters, 1501 Texas Avenue, by this time Speaker [Sam] Rayburn and Governor [Price] Daniel had agreed to serve as Texas' honorary co-chairmen and the two Harris County congressmen had agreed to be nominal co-chairmen down here.

Now let me address myself to the matter I mentioned a minute ago about the squabbles between the liberals and the conservatives in Harris County for ten years. We were at this time very fortunate to obtain the names of two men, one outstanding liberal, Mr. Jesse Andrews, and one outstanding conservative, Mr. J. S. Abercrombie, and they agreed to serve with each other as the senior co-chairmen in this county.

F: That's quite a combination.

C: That's right. I might say that when then the names were listed of the vice chairmen, these are the people at the working level, Ed Smith and I were listed as the first two when Senator Johnson came. This is a clipping from a Harris County newspaper I'll give you. J. Edwin Smith and I were pictured with him. J. Edwin Smith had been and is one of the outstanding champions of a truly liberal cause. And this I'll give you, the line-up of the Harris County Headquarters. I alluded a moment ago to a letter to me in February 1960. You want it with all these others?

F: All right.

C: We'll just keep everything. This was a letter dated February 17, 1960.

F: Good.

C: You might xerox that and send it back if you would.

F: I will.

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C: You will recall that *Reader's Digest* had carried an article in 1959 in which Mr. Johnson had stated that he was, in this order, a free man, an American, a United States senator, and a Democrat. These were the things we were then beginning to line people up to work. With respect to work in Harris County, our first work was just on the precinct level, just as anything is.

F: Good old grass-roots?

C: That's right. Every precinct by number, by section, the meeting place, the delegate votes in 1959, and a place where it would be listed for 1960. I give you that only to show that that's where we started. Our project number two in this time was to pick up a key man or a key woman for Johnson in as many precincts as possible, and at some time during the campaign we had lined up these people that I'll give you on this list as the key men. By that time it was necessary to give instructions to the key men and key women as what to do before the precinct convention, at it, and so on. I prepared the three-page manual, so to speak, for the key men which we gave all the Johnson people.

F: Through all this precinct work in which you touched everything from a bluestocking to the most depressed precincts, you're still keeping that liberal-conservative honeymoon going? I mean, you've got no great problems on this?

C: Oh, there are always problems.

F: Yes, I know.

C: And I will not say that all the liberals or all the conservatives were enthusiastic for Johnson. As a matter of fact, the most outspoken liberals, a majority of them, were opposing Mr. Johnson. And some of the conservatives, a good many of whom

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incidentally have subsequently gone over to the Republican Party, were opposing Mr. Johnson.

F: Well, then you did have a working arrangement that worked?

C: We did, we did. Senator Johnson came here on April 21. This was the letter that went out prior to his visit on which we got Mr. Andrews' and Mr. Abercrombie's signatures, and I guess I've already given you the picture of Senator Johnson and J. Edwin Smith and me, I guess taken at that time. Last minute instructions were sent out to all key Johnson leaders in the precinct in that form. Where we could get good people in various precincts to invite their neighbors to participate, we sent this form. This just happened to be one, but it was sent out precinct after precinct. On April 28, which was nine days before the precinct conventions, we designated people to be area leaders and to tell them whom to call and then to phone into headquarters. So we had, this is just one, Mr. Jack Proctor, one of the attorneys here. But there were just dozens of area people. This again was mere procedure as to how we lined up support for Mr. Johnson at the precinct level.

Now, from that point we then went to the county convention a week later. Garth Bates, who was pro-Johnson, was elected temporary chairman of the county convention. Therefore, we had delegates to the state convention, pretty widespread views, but nevertheless a majority of the Harris County delegates at the state convention in Austin, mid-June 1960 of course, supported Mr. Johnson. I want to go off the record a minute. (Pause in tape). Between the county convention and the first state convention in Austin, in mid-June of 1960, we had a list prepared, it's dated May 28, 1960, of all the delegates from Harris County to the state convention. Those of us who had worked extensively in

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the Johnson campaign, and especially who had attended the county convention and knew the feelings and sympathies of some of these people, rated a great many of these delegates.

F: Did you do that by personal contact? I mean this was just good old head counting in a sense, wasn't it?

C: This was a head count. The people who exercised the judgment on how we thought they would perform at the state convention, Mr. Low and Judge [John V.] Singleton to some extent, Huey O'Toole who was the campaign director of the Johnson for President movement, and Martha Bevis, Mrs. R. M. Bevis--

F: Is that B-E-V-I-S?

C: --yes, who was the principal lady employee down at headquarters, and I prepared a very comprehensive list trying to furnish to the Johnson leaders at a statewide level detailed information about where they could expect support and where they could expect opposition.

F: As you recall, did your list turn out to be pretty nearly accurate?

C: Our list was quite accurate.

F: On the nose, just about?

C: Well, it . . .

F: Reasonably.

C: Yes. Then of course at the state convention, you already have programs from the state convention so I need not particularly give you this, except that at the last minute when delegates were being discussed we had to fill out the forms of street addresses. My copy,

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incidentally, shows the street addresses of such delegates to the national convention as Mrs. F. T. Baldwin, Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., Raybourne Thompson, Leon Johnson, and so on. I was in effect filling out the forms for the Harris County delegates to the national convention, and my program shows I was assembling information both hurriedly and in a rather informal way.

F: At the state convention, was it your feeling that other county organizations had prepared as carefully as you, or did you sort of exercise some leadership in this?

C: Well, let me say that I have never run for an elective office, and I had never been in any other campaign where my work had been as extensive as this. Frankly, I wasn't that smart or that experienced to know, and my work was not on the state-wide level. There were some fine people. I'm sure Speaker Rayburn had some people interested, and Governor Daniel did and John Connally, so that as far as the state level is concerned those people would be able to give you a much better picture. I wouldn't be in a position to say.

F: Now, but without your trying to be modest, you were satisfied with the way the groundwork had been laid in Harris County for its appearance at the state convention?

C: Frankly, I wasn't as satisfied then as I am now. I was distressed at the number of opposition votes. I felt that the cause was such a just one that no one really should be opposing it. In retrospect, seeing all the splinter groups there were, the then-Democrats who have become Republicans, some of the then-very honorable conservative Democrats who wanted no income tax and a reaffirmance of the Monroe Doctrine and the Bricker Amendment and these things, [I think we did a good job]. Sure, where you get some

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people . . . You see, at my own precinct convention we had Barry Goldwater's name advanced in a motion that our precinct should go on record as favoring Barry Goldwater for the Democratic nomination for President. As the temporary chairman of my precinct convention I guess I was foolish, but I tried in a very calm way to say that the Republicans were holding their meeting just down on the other end of the block, and I thought the lady was mistaken. She gave me a pretty good dressing down. So in retrospect I think we did a good job. At that time, frankly, I wasn't satisfied just winning about three to two in our county for this cause.

F: You went on to Los Angeles.

C: Yes, I was one of the delegates. There were four delegates from each of the two Harris County congressional districts, so we had eight delegates. Then, I think both Judge Singleton and Mr. Low were delegates at large picked from this county, and maybe one of the McCullough brothers. So there may have been a dozen people going from here and one or two alternates. Marcella Perry went as an alternate. I think Judge Bill Blanton went as an alternate, and so on. So we had a reasonable number who went from this county to the national convention. Before the national convention, I might just say, I found in my file a June 17 memorandum from Martha Bevis to me about the status of affairs in the Johnson for President Headquarters here. By this time the scene had shifted from a little countywide operation in Houston because everything was then statewide and "Go to Los Angeles and see."

It's interesting to note that on June 17, 1960, we had spent since we opened our headquarters in late January \$10,159.53. We had only \$57.85 cash on hand, and we still

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had \$5,394.57 worth of bills and bank notes. So we had been optimistic. We thought our man was going to win, and ultimately of course we retired this, probably before the national convention. But it just indicates that that's about what we'd done. So in five months' time, before really the Johnson for President activity was closing down here, we'd spent right at \$15,500 or committed to do so. We'd raised slightly more than \$10,000, and we had another \$5,000 to raise, which we did.

F: Right.

C: You don't need the programs because I'm sure you have those from other people.

In the discussion with respect to delegates from Harris County to the national convention, I know one thing and strongly feel another though I do not know it. I know that John Connally and I discussed who the delegates ought to be, and I strongly feel that Price Daniel and Walter Sterling did. I would guess that the decision as to actual names probably came from those two discussions.

F: Yes.

C: I would assume that the then-senior Senator and Speaker Rayburn probably approved the suggestions that had really been transmitted I think by Walter Sterling and me, Harris County people, to our principal contacts at the state level. I have miscellaneous minor correspondence during the Johnson for President months, none of which I regard as of any significance. Except again the senior Senator seemed to hear about these efforts, because March 29 somebody had told him enough about it for him again to acknowledge. I would like the original of that back. One thing occurred after the state convention and before the national convention that I think is significant. Woodrow Seals, then county

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chairman, wrote a form letter to "Dear Democrat," and sent it to some fifty or sixty persons saying that he wanted these people to serve on the campaign committee for the autumn campaign because of a rather uncertain--

F: This was in advance of knowing who the candidate was?

C: That is correct. I'll be glad to give you this form letter. Woodrow [Seals] sent a list of some fifty or sixty names with each letter so that everybody would know with whom he was serving. I hark back to an occurrence in March of that year, March 22, when Mr. Sam Low had had an opportunity to talk with Woodrow [about] Woodrow's position at that time using the words, "Keep up the fight on Lyndon," not knowing whether that meant the fight for him or the fight against him. I wrote Woodrow Seals a letter of July 5 acknowledging his letter accepting, but observing that after we knew who the nominee was, the committee ought to be broadened so as fairly to represent the nominee. And specifically saying that if Kennedy's the nominee I assume he'd want to add some strong pro-Kennedy people, and the same thing about Johnson.

Now, I was aware of the fact that Stevenson was Woodrow's number one choice for the nomination. So it is my judgment that this letter of July 5 of mine to Woodrow, probably the only letter he got back, may have triggered the designation of Woodrow and me to be co-chairmen of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign. Some of my friends I supplied copies of this letter to, and they felt that probably I'd take an occasion to say to Woodrow, "Now, if Johnson's on this ticket, we're going to have more pro-Johnson people on the campaign committee." But this I think is a forerunner of how the campaign committee was set up after the time of the national election. With respect to the national convention

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I have all this material, but I think there's no reason for supplying you with this. You have this from many, many other people and I'll just forego this.

F: You went out to Los Angeles early, I presume.

C: We went out about Friday before the convention started on Monday. I did not go as early as some, but I did go the Friday before the convention.

F: Yes. What'd you do that weekend?

C: Worked on twenty or twenty-two delegates from downstate Illinois and all of the Louisiana delegation. One without much success and the other with success.

F: I presume Louisiana's the one with success.

C: Louisiana went all the way, yes.

F: Did you still harbor the hope that if you could block Kennedy on the first ballot you'd have a pretty good run from there on?

C: I guess when I heard toward Monday or so that the states west of the Mississippi River other than those which touched Texas were not nearly as strong for LBJ as we had assumed, when he was getting virtually no support from the Rocky Mountain area, the Pacific Coast, my hopes began to fade a bit.

F: What do you think happened there? Did the Kennedy people just get in there earlier and work better, or did you think this represented a real feeling? You know, Arizona's always shown as a case in point. That was thought to be fairly well in the Johnson camp. Total surprise there.

C: Well, I don't have any particular comment about Arizona except that I suppose Secretary [of the Interior Stewart] Udall was a key man. I am not at all sure that the campaign

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organization that had been set up in such states as Colorado had any effectiveness at all. I'm not trying to be critical, but I had the impression that maybe we picked the wrong people in some places such as Colorado. Mr. Johnson had announced late, as you know. It was either July 4 or 5. Other people, those wanting to be on the bandwagon, many of them had committed during the interim. I found this particularly in the down state Illinois group. Incidentally, many, many of them said to me that Mr. Johnson was going to be their choice for vice president, and I was urging, "Well, let's do it the other way around. I think you have the right two men, but let's take the senior man for president and the junior man for vice president." Oh, I had the complete list of the Louisiana delegates with my own notes and tabulation, incidentally, of pro-Davis, pro-Davis but anti-Long, anti-Long, pro-Long, for Perez, pro-Long and pro-Davis.

F: That's Jimmy Davis.

C: And unknown two, not going two, and miscellaneous one. So we had done this with respect to down-state Illinois. That matter came up because of a letter that John Singleton had written Warren Woodward on June 30 about a Mr. Charles H. Kelly of Monticello, Illinois, on whom he had some information. John Singleton and I had worked so closely together on some matters that I think when the decision was made as to who would go and visit with some of the down-state Illinois delegates, [I was chosen]. I don't know that John Singleton's letter to Warren Woodward is significant; it was sent to him at the Ambassador Hotel. [But] I had a good friend who had been very active in politics in Louisiana, Maxine Roy of Lafayette. I suppose that is why I had those two chores during the days from Friday on. I think that's about enough on this particular

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thing. I wonder if we might take a break and let me get another . . . (Pause in tape).

F: All right, you're at Los Angeles, and you soon ascertained that you're not going to win the nomination for president. Were you surprised when he accepted the vice presidency, or surprised when he was tendered the vice presidency?

C: I guess I was more surprised at the acceptance than at the tender of it. As I told you, in talking with delegates from down-state Illinois my discussions with them had been on my part a Johnson-Kennedy ticket and on their part a Kennedy-Johnson ticket.

F: Do you think that any of the Kennedy people had sort of implanted that idea or do you think that was kind of a good national feeling of the people who were committed?

C: So far as I know these were not people who had been brainwashed by any of the Kennedy group.

F: They just decided that if they wanted one, they wanted the other.

C: Oh, I think these people genuinely thought that Senator Johnson and Senator Kennedy were the two most able men in the party, and I think that they felt that there was a political disadvantage to Mr. Johnson in being from the South.

F: Yes.

C: And I think they realized the charisma of John Kennedy. So these were rather members of a maverick group who wanted to show their independence from [Chicago mayor Richard] Daley. I, of course, could never know. Maybe they'd been approached directly by the Kennedys and told some of these things, but I did not have the feeling that it was a party line statement on their part.

F: Yes. Of course, down-state Illinois is always anti-Chicago by the very nature of things.

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C: Yes.

F: And so they would, I think, have come to it independently. All right. Now then we have nominated a ticket of Kennedy for president, Johnson for vice president. You have been so intimately involved in it prior to the convention you can't escape afterwards, I presume. So you come home. What do you find?

C: Well, several things. I get the next week a form letter, I'm sure. On the other hand it's "Dear Johnny" and to the best of my belief signed by the then-Senator Johnson thanking me. But that's just a form letter. Lloyd Hand I had begun to work with, and I exchanged correspondence with him, wrote him on July 23 about the second Democratic state convention, the September convention to be held in Dallas. Because this is my first concern, over the fact that there'll be some rebellion there because John Kennedy is the nominee. At about the same time that I get a letter from Woodrow inviting--

F: Seals?

C: Seals, inviting me to a Dutch-treat luncheon Wednesday, July 27, at the Rice Hotel to think about setting up the Democratic campaign committee. I get a form letter from Price Daniel thanking me for my work and so on. There's a July 26 letter from Senator Johnson inviting the district and county men and women and their husbands and wives to come to the Ranch on August 3 for barbecue. His so-called district and county men and women are people that had done work in the various districts. I had to decline this because my family and I were leaving on August 2 to go to Sun Valley and take a vacation. I had done everything I could and tried to keep my law practice together and put in this time on the side, and I was tired. So I went to Sun Valley on the second.

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I'd been up there I guess about ten days when I received a call and was asked to serve as co-chairman of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign in this county along with--

F: Who called you?

C: I know that during the call I talked to both Lloyd Hand and Will Wilson. I have every reason to believe my recollection that I first talked to Lloyd, and he told me what the request was. Will Wilson was then active in the campaign and he got on the telephone and talked to me further. But those were the people who conveyed the message to me.

F: And you accepted?

C: I did, and came back to Houston a little early and we set up headquarters.

F: Same place?

C: No. The Kennedy-Johnson Headquarters was at the corner of Texas and Milam in a building I think was owned by the Pappas family. We rented space, maybe the whole building, and that's where the Kennedy-Johnson Headquarters was.

F: Did you have any trouble recruiting staff?

C: Well, we got two ladies who were really running the office. One was Shirley Jay, whom Woodrow got, and I got Martha Bevis, who had run the Johnson Headquarters. Those two girls really were co-chairmen of the staff. They ran the staff effort there. In our work we again tried to keep the liberal and conservative coalition alive. The lady co-chairmen were Mrs. A. M. Ball, a liberal, and Mrs. F. T. Baldwin, a conservative. The co-chairmen of the speakers committee--

F: Mrs. F. T. Baldwin, is that Governor [Price] Daniel's mother-in-law?

C: It is. Mrs. Star Baldwin. The speakers committee: W. N. Blanton, Jr., now a district

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judge here, was the conservative who was the co-chairman of the speakers committee, and Don Yarborough was the liberal chairman. As far as the finance committee was concerned, we agreed that there could be only one. You couldn't have co-chairmen. You had to have one man, and Lloyd Bentsen, Jr., was chairman of the finance committee. We set up the campaign. There were various special occasions down here, some of which I recall. I'm not sure I recall all of them. [George] Smathers was here, [Mike] Mansfield was here, Bob Kerr was here and spoke at the big fund raising dinner on October 10, Senator Kennedy of course was here and spoke at the auditorium and then had his meeting with the Protestant ministers that were asked to attend.

F: Were you involved in setting up that Protestant meeting, which was, of course, one of the dramatic highlights.

C: Yes, Woodrow and I set it up.

F: Did you have any difficulty getting the local ministers to participate? Were they kind of wary of the idea when it was first broached?

C: Oh, I think these were people with very genuine motives. I think they honestly wanted to know what John Kennedy thought about aid to parochial schools, using tax dollars to spend in parochial schools and private schools of any kind, and so on. No, I don't think they were leery.

F: Well, now then, we've always had the politicians' side of that which it's agreed was very successful. Did you ever get any feedback from the ministers afterwards--how they felt about it once they had participated in it?

C: No, no. I don't feel . . .

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F: As far as you know, they were very well satisfied themselves with the way things [went]?

C: Oh, I think they felt that John Kennedy gave them some very forthright answers.

F: Yes.

C: We prepared these folders to give to all the people who would work in the campaign.

This was just a sample of what we passed out down here to all the people we really thought would work diligently, the Kennedy-Johnson folder.

F: Did you have much difficulty with some of your more conservative people who thought that in effect Texas had been sold out by Lyndon Johnson going on the ticket?

C: Well, we had some people who had supported Mr. Johnson for the nomination who now made it plain they were going to vote for Richard Nixon for President.

F: They were for the man rather than the party in this case.

C: They were. Some of them I think felt that what they really wanted was a race between Johnson and Nixon, because some of them very openly said to me that if Johnson and Nixon were the nominees the country was going to be in good hands, in their judgment, no matter which man won.

F: Did you try to counter this in any way, or did you just sort of sadly bid them good-bye?

C: Well, I think the answer to that would always be on an *ad hoc* basis. Where it was perfectly plain a man had his mind made up, and I might say that one or two stated that for religion reasons they would not support Mr. Kennedy, those people I kissed goodbye. Because if a man had his mind made up he was going to vote against a Roman Catholic there was no use in trying to persuade him. I just went out and looked for some votes that we could get. On some of those who were wavering, stating some opposition but

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wavering, of course we always tried to convert them.

F: Harris County has had some rather bitter political fights. I think one reason being that it is so nearly evenly divided, which makes it more intense in a way. Did you have fairly good hope that you'd be able to deliver the county for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket?

C: No, I did not have any such hope. In the 1956 election Eisenhower had polled five-eighths of the votes and Stevenson three-eighths, almost to a tenth of a per cent. And somewhere along the line, I guess Will Wilson was down here not long before the election, and he asked me. And I said, "Well, I'm predicting 320,000 votes. If you take that five-eighths to three-eighths, that will be a net loss of a fourth." You see?

F: Yes.

C: And applied to 320,000 votes, we would lose by 80,000 votes. I said, "Already we have whittled it to less than half that. If the election were today, we'd not lose by more than 40,000 votes in this county, and I am firmly convinced that by election day we'll not lose by more than 20,000. I think we'll come within 20,000.

F: You were trying to get the deficit down to the point where it could be made up in the other part of the state.

C: That's right. In other words, the rest of the state would be all right if we didn't lose, in my judgment, by more than 20,000 votes in Harris County.

F: Did you think that having Lyndon Johnson on the ticket was what made you able to trim down that 80,000 to something more nearly manageable?

C: Yes. I think if Scoop Jackson or Hubert Humphrey, possibly Symington, certain Stevenson, had been the vice presidential nominee, the loss would have been at least

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80,000. Incidentally, the total vote was about 325,000. So we predicted the total vote fairly accurately.

F: What was your margin?

C: The margin was about 18,000 votes. I might say that there were some 7,000 or 3,000 votes for the Constitution Party candidate, and all of those would have been Nixon votes if it had not been for a third party candidate. So all those votes were just lost to Nixon. We didn't lose any to the third party candidate.

F: Okay. The election is over. You've got your man in. What do you do? This is very interesting from the standpoint, and would be interesting in the future to people who want to know just how a county political arrangement is made. What do you do to dismantle your machinery, besides to take the pledge to go back to work and never get involved again?

C: Well, of course, we had a chart up, and we posted it that night. These are the five girls who did the most work at the headquarters. The following day we took the picture in front of the thing on electoral votes that showed that Kennedy-Johnson had won. Here, you can have it if you want it. That's the first thing we did.

F: Fine.

C: We then made immediate plans to dismantle. We made for future reference the tabulation, precinct by precinct, so that we'd know where we stood and what the situation was.

F: Incidentally, how much attention did you pay to Johnson's senatorial candidacy?

C: Very little, because I took it for granted.

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F: That if they'd vote one way, they'd vote the other.

C: Oh, well, that many, many people who would not support the Kennedy-Johnson ticket would support Mr. Johnson for senator. And he did carry this county against [John] Tower in the Senate race. We sent congratulatory letters, or letters of thanks, to various people. Financially, we had a wind-up of our financial affairs, and, maybe much to our surprise, we didn't stand too bad off. For example, I find my memorandum to the file on November 17 that we have a bank balance of \$1,383.35. And that, except for final phone and light bills and the cost . . .

(Interruption)

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F: All right, you were giving me a financial statement.

C: On November 16 or 17 we had \$1,383.35 left in the bank. We had three bills that in-hand totaled \$185.00. We didn't know what the final phone and light bills would be. The last payments to the girls who were working in the headquarters were made on about the seventeenth. That's when we cut off--at Friday after the election week. Let's see, the eighth was a Tuesday, so that would have meant the eleventh was a Friday. We closed up on Friday, the eighteenth of November. We had some question about an additional bill to the Rice Hotel that the Democratic National Committee had been committed to pay part of, for the room where Senator Kennedy spoke with the Protestant ministers. That was a potential liability. Actually, the next year, it seems to me, we had a couple of hundred dollars left over when the thing was finally dismantled.

F: Good.

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C: We sent out many, many invitations to the inauguration, of course, to the people who had done the most in the Kennedy-Johnson campaign. And a great many people from Houston went to the inauguration in January of 1961.

F: Did you go?

C: I did go. In 1961.

F: You got to get in on the snow, too?

C: Right. I did.

F: Was there a fair amount for the Johnson adherents to do at the inauguration, or were you kind of made to feel that you were second-class in this case? I realize it is the president's show, and not the vice president's.

C: Well, I certainly had no feeling I was second-class. I think that the Texas people who were there were not only people who had supported Mr. Johnson for the presidency before July. In fact, some of them who were there had not been Johnson supporters, Woodrow Seals, for example. But everybody were people who had supported the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. As you know, by that time they had five spots at which the presidential ball was held, and those were allocated by states. So that the Texas group, along with people from, say, ten other states, were at the Ball at one particular place.

F: Kind of a good Texas political convention.

C: And there were many Texans there. I guess that even if there were eight or nine other states invited to that particular presidential ball the Texans constituted a third to a half of the audience, because our man was one of the two people being sworn in.

F: You have shown yourself to be almost in the Las Vegas gambler class at making your

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predictions in Harris County. Did you take soundings over the state? Were you surprised when Texas went for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, or did you feel fairly confident on that?

C: I was discouraged until the Friday afternoon and evening before the election. On late Friday afternoon before the election I heard about the occurrence in Dallas where Mr. and Mrs. Johnson had walked through the hostile crowd between the Adolphus and the Baker Hotel.

F: You felt Bruce Alger couldn't have done you a better turn?

C: I met them at the Houston airport that night and drove them into downtown Houston and talked to them.

F: Did they refer to it?

C: I think you'd have to talk to them about that.

F: Okay.

C: I might say that even before they arrived I had been quite busy on the telephone, and I told everybody in our campaign organization I possibly could, "All the speeches you have--tear them up. Throw them in the wastebasket. There's just one thing to do, and if you want to hear the pitch, come out to the east side YMCA at seven-thirty tomorrow morning--Saturday morning--because I'm going to speak out there." And I talked only about this occurrence that would not have been surprising had we read about it happening in a Central American republic, but I thought was shocking.

It brought overwhelming and favorable response. I got a call, immediately after the Alger occurrence had been made known on radio and television, from a very highly

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respected man here in Houston whose son was active on the Republican side. He just wanted me to know that he sort of leaned Democratic, maybe planned secretly to vote Democratic, but with his son so active on the other side he hadn't said anything about it. But he was so shocked by this occurrence he was going to make known his support for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. A number of calls like this came in. From then on I thought we had Texas won. Mr. Johnson came here on the Monday, the day before the election, went by motorcade from downtown out to the Shamrock. We had a wonderful turnout at the Shamrock. And from Friday night on I thought we were going to carry Texas.

F: What did you do in the period following the inauguration?

C: Well, let me back up between election and inauguration. I said we closed down our headquarters here on November 18. There were other things. I was a presidential elector. I received mail then from that time until about December 20, which I guess was the day that we cast the electoral votes, bitter mail from some Southern states, mail urging me to do something other than cast my vote for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. There was an election contest filed by Hardy Hollers. As an elector, I was named as one of the defendants in the suit. So I gave a little attention to the election contest in trying to mollify some of these people from other states, and even make some suggestions about keeping any Democratic electors from other Southern states in line so that none of them fell for the propaganda they were receiving.

So it was fairly busy up to the time of the meeting of the Electoral College. Then, of course, there was Christmas and New Year. By this time we had not any headquarters, but a bucket shop operation going to be sure we hadn't overlooked anybody. There were

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phone calls from people who had not received invitations to the Inauguration wondering why the mail was late or why they had been left off, and the usual last minute matters.

Then I went to the inauguration and came back. This was just almost exactly a year from the last week in January of 1960 to the last week in January of 1961. I found that some of my law partners had handled well some business for our clients during the time I devoted much time to Mr. Johnson's campaign.

F: They almost remembered your face, didn't they?

C: But they remembered me and came back, and I was very busy in the practice of law.

F: As a presidential elector, do they send you any instructions on how you are to proceed? Anything like one of these police statements, you know, that you're entitled to right of counsel? In other words, that you're entitled to vote your conscience, *et cetera, et cetera*?

C: I don't recall any. I just don't remember.

F: They take it for granted you know what you're doing.

C: Well, I hosted a luncheon for the presidential electors at the Commodore Perry [Hotel] in Austin at noon on the day where we were to meet at 2:00 p.m. Zollie Steakley, now a justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, then the secretary of state, came and read to all of us the provisions of the law. So all of us were there. What is it, twenty-five electors? I guess. Maybe it was twenty-four then. This was before the 1960 census took effect. So whether it was twenty-four or twenty-five, all were present, as I recall, and Zollie Steakley came.

F: Anyone threaten the break the traces, or were they going along with the vote?

C: There was no open statement of anything, except a concurrence in what was being done.

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If there was any unhappiness, it was not reflected there. And, of course, when we went over and cast our votes, the vote in Texas was enough.

F: Let's take a moment and talk about that. Zollie Steakley has read you the statement; you've had a good lunch at the Commodore Perry; where do you go? Over to the Secretary of State's office?

C: No. We go to either the Senate Chamber or the House Chamber. I'm ashamed to say I don't remember which. I think it was the Senate Chamber.

F: Then are names called, or do you fill out a form, or what happens? How did you vote?

C: See Zollie Steakley on the details. It seems to me that Zollie called the meeting to order and indicated that the first thing to do was to elect some temporary chairman of that gathering. You have a procedure where you organize for the purpose of getting the vote cast, and I am sure there is a statement that each man signs. He fills in his choice for president, his choice for vice president, and he signs his name. Those are turned in, and the Secretary of State of Texas, I think, tabulated them and then filled out a form that he certified all these. And John F. Kennedy [and] Lyndon B. Johnson were named in all the ballots.

F: Okay. So you're back in the practice of law. Do you have any particular relationship with Mr. Johnson except just the occasional either friendly note or friendly visit before campaign 1964?

C: Oh, we exchanged correspondence a little bit in 1961. He was down here, as I recall, in about December of 1961. I think there was some reception given in his honor in December of 1961. December 14, 1961, we had a little reception here for him.

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F: You were involved in that?

C: Yes, sir, and then it seems to me that he was here when Jim Noel was sworn in as United States district judge. I'm not sure of the exact time of that. So occasionally . . .

F: An occasional visit for some reason or other.

C: Yes.

F: But nothing in the way of planning or working, just, "How are things going, John," sort of proposition.

C: I was pretty busy handling a professional practice that had been slightly neglected, I might say, during the year before. Probably I saw very little of him during 1962.

F: He came in here, of course, in November of 1963 just before going up to Fort Worth and Dallas. Were you mixed up in that?

C: Well, he had been here back, I guess in October of 1962, when Rice University was fifty years old.

F: Yes, the semi-centennial.

C: And there was a visit to the Space Center. I'd been at the Ranch a couple of times, either in 1962 or maybe March or April of 1963. Really, then, in connection with the visit in November of 1963, I think Jack Valenti, because of Albert Thomas's involvement in the matter, had been asked by many, many people to be the lead man locally in making plans. I would guess that as far as details . . .

F: I talked to Jack about that.

C: Yes. Well, Jack could give you far more details on the plans. We did set up a little receiving line at the airport when Air Force One came in, and I recall having worked with

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some others to be sure that the receiving line would honor the proper people. I have a picture in my home of President Kennedy shaking hands with me as I stood in the receiving line that day. But I did not have any major part in planning the Texas visit.

F: What were you doing on the day of the assassination?

C: I was on my way to Austin to attend the dinner that was going to be held there that night.

F: By car?

C: Yes.

F: Did you pick it up on the car radio?

C: I did.

F: Where were you?

C: Just this side of Columbus.

F: I imagine that is one moment that's etched in your mind, kind of like Pearl Harbor. I can tell you exactly what happened at Pearl Harbor much better than I can what happened last week.

All right. You went on to Austin?

C: I did.

F: What was the situation there?

C: It was just as quiet as you could imagine. I owned the Commodore Perry, so when I walked in the manager was waiting in the lobby, knowing I was coming and knowing about what time I'd be there. He said, "An hour or an hour and a half ago this was the busiest place you ever saw, and when John Kennedy died this lobby emptied. There hasn't been a soul coming in or going out of here. Everybody's just gone. There's

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nothing going on in downtown Austin."

F: What did you do?

C: Went up to a room and turned on the radio and television to try to keep up with what was going on.

F: Did you get in contact with anyone, or did you . . . ?

C: No. I did not. The next thing I did was fly to Dallas on Sunday afternoon.

F: You stayed in Austin until then?

C: No. I came on back to Houston, probably the following day, Saturday, and I flew to Dallas and saw John Connally's brothers and some people there, some Connally friends, because as you probably know I'd known Connally an awfully long time. Seating at the law school at the University of Texas is alphabetical, and Connally and Crooker sat next to each other in a class or two.

F: Got together now and then, yes.

C: So that's really the only thing I did. I wrote the President, I guess, on Tuesday after the assassination. That's about all there is to that story.

F: Did you take any part then in the campaign of 1964?

C: Yes, sir.

F: What did you do?

C: I headed the Office of Regional Coordinators at the Democratic National Committee in Washington.

F: Let's describe that.

C: Well, I went, I would judge, somewhere around July 23 to Washington. I took a leave of

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absence from my law firm and went there and was asked to head up the regional coordinators' activity at the Democratic National Committee. We divided the country into seven regions and had a regional key man for each of the seven regions. Those were the people who were, first, to be in contact with the delegates who came to Atlantic City; and secondly, to work with the state campaign organizations that were at the Democratic National Committee--of course, bureaus, speakers' bureaus, young people's bureaus, the women's section, and so on, and supplies. If a man in a state Democratic organization, state Democratic chairman or somebody, wondered where in the world those forty thousand bumper stickers were, he usually talked to the regional coordinator.

F: Where did you get your seven regional men?

C: Well, some of these people had been very active in the 1960 campaign. John Singleton and Culp Krueger were two Texans who were two of our seven. Irv Hoff, who had worked the northwest part of the country in somewhat of a similar capacity in the Johnson campaign at Los Angeles, became the regional coordinator for that area. The others: in the Northeast area, Bill Dunfey, who was a Kennedy supporter, but was a Johnson supporter in 1964.

F: You didn't feel then, in 1964, any Kennedy-Johnson division? That is, there was no cliquishness there that you noticed?

C: I felt that all of the people who worked as regional coordinators were firmly committed to the election of the Johnson ticket, and after the convention, the Johnson-Humphrey ticket. I was not concerned about the loyalty of these people to President Johnson.

F: Did you have any intimations that it would be Hubert Humphrey?

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C: Oh, I don't really.

F: Just educated guessing?

C: I don't know that I had any strong feeling on that. About the Sunday that was nearest to the first of August, Eugene McCarthy was on some one hour TV program. Whether it was "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation" I do not know. I watched that program with keen interest, because I could not help but feel at that time that Eugene McCarthy might potentially be a vice presidential prospect. Bear in mind that at Los Angeles I thought the only good speech, outstanding speech, that was really delivered was Eugene McCarthy's speech. I'll back up. There were a number of excellent speakers, not the only good one, one of the outstanding speeches.

F: And he had the advantage of another section and [being?] Catholic.

C: Of course he and Mr. Humphrey were from the same state, and after his one hour appearance on television I did not really feel that he would be the vice presidential nominee. But until that I thought it was possible.

F: Did you think he had eliminated himself in that television appearance?

C: Well, had I been the President he would have eliminated himself. I have no idea what Mr. Johnson thought.

F: No. I was just trying to get your own reaction on this.

Back to your regional group. What did you do then?

C: We set up an organization, and we had a tremendous amount of detailed information on each state. We had them divided into the seven areas. We had who the regional coordinator was and his secretary, and every Democratic officeholder of any

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importance--the national committeeman and committeewoman, the state chairman and the state vice-chairman, state coordinator, where the state headquarters was, who the staff people were, who the rural American man was, who the Young Citizens chairman was, and right on down the line. Just a tremendous bit of information to coordinate the activities with these people.

We funneled out campaign materials of all sorts. We had, again, just information as to what we'd done. For example, here I've got how many thousands of bumper stickers and thousands of posters and badges and decals, cases of matches, and all these things, how many went to the various states. I did a considerable amount of negotiating with the printers on the cost of furnishing these materials because they're rather expensive in these quantities.

F: Yes. An eighth of a cent in that many units will mount up.

C: We had instructions to poll watchers at various places where we were concerned about the validity of the electoral process. Just day after day after day. I've got a list probably of every call I made, every call that came in. These are just daily sheets, none of which are of any real importance. At the convention we handled the so-called "Workshop Programs." I didn't do anything except a little procedural work in seeing that it moved smoothly. Cliff Carter did a good deal of work, and Cliff was well-known. He was then the acting treasurer maybe. No, I guess [Richard] Maguire was treasurer of the [Democratic National] Committee. But he was at the National Committee more or less as Mr. Johnson's personal representative, and we ran those "Workshop Programs" at the convention time in Atlantic City.

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Much of what was done publicly by the so-called director of campaign organization had already been started by the regional coordinators. For example, on September 24 I find a memorandum, another earlier than that, September 13 two memos, one back on September 10, which in effect set out the same program discussed by Larry O'Brien to the regional coordinators. Larry made the trips out from Washington. I think it was very effective for Larry to do so. His name was known. My name was absolutely unknown. Cliff's was halfway known. But as far as setting up the program was concerned, regional coordinators had done much of this work.

F: Did Mr. Johnson take a personal interest in this, or did he sort of have Larry O'Brien working in-between, or Cliff Carter, between you and him?

C: I wouldn't say that Larry O'Brien worked between the White House and the national committee. I feel that Cliff was at the White House much more than I ever was.

F: Now on things like bumper stickers, and so forth, did you clear these with the President? Or were you pretty much on your own to decide that, one, Louisiana will have "X" thousands of bumper stickers, and that they will say so-and-so?

C: Well, it wasn't cleared with the President as far as I know. Congressman [Olin Earl?] Teague's boy, a very fine, hard-working young man, but young, was at the place, separate physically from the other offices of the Committee. He was over there where the supplies were, and he did a good job. But I think he had tremendous pressure put on him. You know, well, "Send this to us for free; we haven't got any money in our state to help defray the expense of it." We had the so-called two for one program we tried to sell pretty widely: "You will buy one unit of supplies, and we'll send you two." Because, as

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always, the money was scarce. So that was the two for one program we instituted.

Actually, on about the twenty-third or so of October, I made a decision to get everything sent out. You know, it's not going to do us any good here after election day, and we pretty well cleared everything out. I made a very comprehensive report, written report, on the night of Halloween, as I recall, the night of the thirty-first. I sent [it] to the President, as to the final distribution of all supplies and what had been sent out in what quantities to what places.

F: Were you mainly concerned with promoting Mr. Johnson rather than [attacking Goldwater]? In other words, was your approach positive, or to a certain extent were you also running against Mr. Goldwater?

C: I don't think anything sent out from any office in which I had a part was negative against Goldwater. You know, I remember the 1948 campaign of Mr. Johnson for the Senate, and Jack Porter was the Republican who ran against him. I remember Mr. Johnson was down here. We had some meeting where he was speaking, and he was going to make himself available to answer questions. Some local man asked him, "Congressman, how many votes do you think Jack Porter will get in November?" He looked the man in the eye, and he said, "I think Lyndon Johnson will get a million votes." That has always stayed in my recollection. I don't think you have to run against anybody. Here was a product that we could sell very easily, and, "Let's talk about the Johnson-Humphrey ticket."

F: Yes, and not advertise the opposition.

C: That's right. Why give them any more name familiarity than they have? No. I don't

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think . . .

F: Did you feel fairly confident about this campaign?

C: Well, that's . . .

F: Did you shift over a period?

C: Yes. I shifted a little bit. I have a theory, and there may be nothing to it, that foot traffic in headquarters, especially where it's a ground floor, in various . . .

F: Where you were incidentally?

C: Oh, no. We were in the building on K Street there, 1700 block of K Street. No, I'm talking about the reports we were getting in from other cities, that the volume of foot traffic is important. For example, in the last days of the Stevenson campaign of 1956, after the Suez Canal incident of late October had come up and Eisenhower and Stevenson spoke about their reactions to the Suez crisis, the foot traffic in Stevenson headquarters dwindled to almost nothing. Now, this is a subtle way the people tell you something, and they don't even know they're telling it to you. But if things are going poorly, they don't want to come around. They don't want to be part of the ship that sank.

Just the reverse was true in 1960: from Friday until Monday more and more people. You'd be surprised how many people were at the Kennedy-Johnson headquarters on Sunday in 1960 before the election. So I watched very closely and got continuous reports of foot traffic in headquarters all over the country in 1964. There was a time, starting on Thursday, October 15, the day after disclosure of some information that wasn't at all helpful to the Democratic ticket, when foot traffic at many, many cities dropped off very sharply. Don't ask me why it bounced back on October 23, but it did, just a sheer

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count of people. It was off from the fifteenth through the twenty-second, eight full days, and on the twenty-third--

F: Gets you wondering if something has developed.

C: On the twenty-third it was back where it had been on the fourteenth. It kept going and from the twenty-third on, there was no doubt in my mind about the outcome.

F: Okay. So you elect your candidate smashingly. What happens after that?

C: I came back to Texas on the night of the election, went back to work one more time.

F: What do you do, keep a bag packed in your office?

Okay. Aside from being interested in what's going on and the inaugural and so forth, did you have any sort of real involvement prior to your going back to Washington with the CAB?

C: Well, from time to time people would come to Houston and one or two of us would be notified. I had a reception for John Macy down here at one time when he was in Houston, and for Secretary [of Commerce John?] Connor. Just people who were here. We'd see key Administration people when they came, but no particularly involvement.

F: Were you sounded out about other appointments prior to accepting the CAB appointment? [Did] the President ever ask you what you wanted?

C: The President never talked to me about appointment at any time except the day before he announced my nomination to membership on the Civil Aeronautics Board.

F: How'd that come about? [Did] he phone you?

C: Well, let me say that I lived in Washington at that time. The firm in which I'm now a partner and was then a partner had maintained a small Washington office from 1928.

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F: 1140 Connecticut, isn't it?

C: Well, at that time it was in the old Transportation Building down at Seventeenth and H, and an office had been there since 1928. In the fall of 1966 the resident partner, John C. White, advised my three seniors here, who are still active in the firm, though the retired partners I'm . . . But Mr. [Leon] Jaworski, Mr. Gresham and Mr. Buck were then the three active partners here who were to some extent the senior partners. John White told them he wanted to take early retirement. Well, we knew he'd retire some day, but frankly, this was a surprise, the timing was. I think Mr. Jaworski, Mr. Gresham and Mr. [Hugh Q.?] Buck concluded in their wisdom that I ought to be, for a time, the firm's resident partner in Washington, and that I should study, make plans, and then execute the plans for a long-range handling of the firm's operation of its Washington office.

F: You had the advantage not having to be broken in to the Washington scene.

C: Well, I didn't know much about it. But at the change of school semesters in late January of 1967, we moved to Washington. I became the firm's resident partner there. By May had moved the office to some attractive new quarters.

F: Those are the ones on Connecticut?

C: Yes, that's 1140 Connecticut. [I] had begun to reach a conclusion as to whether the firm should close its office or maintain it, and in the summer of 1967 had made a recommendation, which was accepted by the partners here, to keep the office and revitalize it and find a man who would live permanently in Washington, rather than rotating, sending a partner from here every two or three years.

F: I don't want to get into your business affairs, but did it make any difference in your firm's

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activities in Washington the fact that you did have a president from Texas, one; and two, a president who was known to be known to [Rufus Clarence] Fulbright, Crooker, *et cetera*?

C: I don't think it made the slightest difference. We'd had that office through [Herbert] Hoover, [Franklin] Roosevelt, [Harry] Truman, [Dwight] Eisenhower, and John Kennedy. And I think the same considerations which had motivated the firm in having a Washington office . . . Bear in mind there are many, many more things to be handled in Washington now than there were in 1928 when the office was set up, so clearly I think that we would have kept the office if Mr. Nixon had been president then, or if John Kennedy had been. But anyway, by the late summer of 1967 I was given the task to find a man to be resident partner of the firm's Washington office. So, my first recommendation having been adopted, I then began to look for someone who might be the firm's partner.

By January of 1968 I had had the most serious discussions with Everett Hutchinson, then the under secretary of transportation. He expressed to me the fact that he had made a twelve-month commitment to President Johnson to serve in that capacity. He really didn't know when the twelve months should start from, the time President Johnson had talked to him which had been then over twelve months, December of 1966, the twelve months would have run out in December of 1967, or when he actually came aboard before the Transportation Department was actually set up. But he told me that he wanted to talk to Alan Boyd, and that by reason of their schedules it would be about the thirtieth of January before he could talk to Alan.

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At all events, without going into the details, early in February it was agreed, both by the partners in this law firm, and by Everett Hutchinson, that he would be the resident partner in Washington of the Fulbright-Crooker firm. So I would say that in early February my wife and I started talking about moving back to Texas when school was out in June of 1968. Those were our plans for a few days. I was eating lunch at the University Club in Washington with Wayne Gibbens on Thursday, February 15.

F: Who is Wayne Gibbens?

C: He was then John Connally's man in Washington, the Governor's representative in Washington. He's since left that spot and gone with API [American Petroleum Institute]. He works for Frank Ikard now. We were at the University Club having lunch when a call from Marvin Watson to my office was referred to me over there, and he asked that I come by immediately.

F: Did the President know that you were due to come back to Houston? Or do you know?

C: I'm not sure.

F: So Marvin asked you to come over at once.

C: Yes. Which I did.

F: Did you see the President?

C: I did, and President Johnson stated that--

F: Why do you think he picked you for this particular job?

C: That would be presumptuous in a way. I have only an impression that President Johnson felt that probably the chairman of the CAB should be a lawyer. That if someone had been a specialist in aviation law, if the man were good, he would have been snapped up

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by some airline to work for the line. If he wasn't any good, he surely didn't want him.

F: Didn't want him, yes.

C: And that maybe he was looking for someone who had had some administrative law work, in a rather broad practice with some emphasis in the administrative law field, but who had not been involved in aviation law. I had never handled a matter before the CAB.

F: You didn't come, then, with any real preconceptions or any party line, as far as aviation was concerned.

C: No.

F: Right.

C: I didn't know where the CAB office was in Washington.

F: You were ushered into the President's presence, and what did he say?

C: Well, essentially that he wanted to send my name to the Senate nominating me as a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and that he would, at the same time, express the intention to designate me as chairman if I were confirmed.

F: Did you decide on the spot?

C: I suppose that any discussions with the President of the United States really ought to be released by him, but I did make an inquiry as to the possibility of talking with two or three people about the matter before making a decision. The conversation, at that point, proceeded fairly quickly to the point that I felt it would be best if I made a decision then, without leaving his presence and without talking to anyone else. And upon reaching the conclusion in my mind that I should say, "Yes" or, "No" at that time, I then reached the second conclusion to say, "Yes."

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- F: Before Marvin called you, you had no intimations at all that this was in the wind?
- C: That is a difficult question to answer. I will say that I really had none that I recognized then as intimations. In retrospect, there may have been some things that occurred that were forerunners, and I just didn't put two and two together. I had some statement from Leonard Marks a day or so in advance that I've often wondered whether Leonard was just being pleasant, and commented to me--
- F: What did he say? "Welcome to the government?"
- C: Not so much that, as that if I were ever asked to serve in government it would be fine from my standpoint and fine from the government standpoint. But other than that, and you never know, it may just have been a sheer happenstance. But you wonder later whether . . .
- F: So basically you took a short ride holding one job, and you left holding another one.
- C: That's right.
- F: You must have been a little stunned by it, in a sense.
- C: Yes.
- F: I bet your wife was more so when you called her.
- C: Well, I went on home and talked to her about it, and I'm sure she was surprised. But her attitude was that whatever I wanted to do was what she wanted to do. So we solved that fairly quickly
- F: You were nominated on the sixteenth of February in 1968.
- C: Yes, sir.
- F: And you were confirmed within two weeks, which is pretty quickly.

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- C: I was confirmed within two weeks, and I've made no study on how quickly people are confirmed.
- F: There wasn't any opposition? No problem with the confirmation? It just got through?
- C: So far as I know. I believe that vote was unanimous. I don't recall any opposition. There was a hearing and I appeared. Bear in mind that Mr. Charles Murphy, I think, had made it known from December on that he wanted to leave the Board, so that it's entirely possible that the leadership and Senate Commerce Committee knew that there would be some name coming. I think Senator [Warren] Magnuson, Senator [A. S. "Mike"] Monroney, and on the Republican side, Senator [Norris] Cotton, all knew that a name would be forthcoming soon.
- F: Where was the swearing-in ceremony?
- C: At the White House.
- F: Where?
- C: In the East Room.
- F: Any particular situation around that?
- C: Well, of course I was highly honored and flattered that the ceremony could be in the East Room of the White House, and the President of the United States would be there and speak, be present, when I was sworn in.
- F: Was this for the tail-end of a term?
- C: Yes. For the remaining nine and a half months of Charlie Murphy's term.
- F: Well, then, did you figure you'd be reappointed?
- C: I had no particular thought about it.

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F: The President didn't look ahead to that?

C: I was entirely relaxed. If I was, fine. If I wasn't, fine.

F: You were reappointed fairly early.

C: That has been said to me once or twice, but at one time I looked back historically as to when some people were named, and there were a number of instances, Republicans and Democrats alike, who were named several months before the end of a term. Bear in mind, irrespective of the outcome of the 1968 elections, the one man who was going to be in the White House on January 1, 1969, was Lyndon Johnson. The rules seemed to be pretty plain, that he's there; he's President that day. He might be out twenty days later, but he exercises the function of the President of the United States on January 1.

F: Was there any particular fuss kicked at the fact that this would give you a Democratic majority into the new administration, regardless of who won?

C: I think some of the Republican senators felt that if there were any reasonable way to delay the matter in the event Mr. Nixon beat Mr. Humphrey in November of 1968, they would be.

F: Of course, then you didn't even know it was going to be Nixon and Humphrey. You knew it wasn't going to be Johnson.

C: By the time I was confirmed it looked like . . . Well, let's see, I guess neither convention had been held, and yet I'm not sure of the date of confirmation for the full term. It may have been just before the conventions. It may have been before Congress recessed for the two conventions. But we strongly believed by the time I was confirmed for the full term that it would be a Nixon versus Humphrey race.

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- F: Yes. You wouldn't have had any opposition from Mr. Humphrey on this?
- C: On being named?
- F: On your being continued.
- C: I would have had every reason to believe that Mr. Humphrey, had he become President, would have been happy.
- F: Right.
- C: I have never been close to him. If he had had someone whom he personally would have wanted to serve, of course he could have sent that word to me any time, and I would have done anything in the world he would have wanted to make the place available. So I'm sure he probably would have known that and would have been pleased for me to be confirmed.
- F: Okay. You are now on the Civil Aeronautics Board. How soon were you made chairman?
- C: Well, I was designated to become chairman the day I became a member.
- F: Charlie Murphy had been chairman?
- C: That's right.
- F: So there was a vacancy there.
- C: That is correct.
- F: Not only on the Board but in the chairmanship.
- C: Right. That's correct.
- F: What does a chairman do when he comes in cold on a situation?
- C: Well, he educates himself as quickly as he can.

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F: He finds out where the building is.

C: And in the three and a half weeks Charles Murphy was most helpful to me. I met the other Board members very quickly after I'd been nominated and before I'd been confirmed. They certainly offered me every cooperation, all the information they could give me. Mr. Charles F. Kiefer, the executive director of the Board, prepared a most comprehensive file for me, and I read it in great detail. Probably more than any other one thing, the file Mr. Kiefer put together for me gave me some background as to problems that would confront me as chairman confront other Board members.

F: Very briefly, what is the line that divides the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] from the CAB?

C: At one time, of course, they were all together. When divided, the FAA had the safety and other operational responsibilities, and the CAB function became essentially an economic one. After the Department of Transportation was set up, the last vestiges really of operational responsibility were taken from the CAB. The Bureau of Safety, investigating accidents, was put over in the Department of Transportation. So the Board's functions are economic, the two best known areas: routes and rates. Of course, additionally, there are approval of mergers and interlocking directorates and so on, but it's an economic function.

F: Did the President give you any particular instructions at all when you accepted this assignment, or did he just say, "Go do the best you can"?

C: You asked if he gave me any particular instructions. He didn't give me any instructions, particular or not particular really. Just, as you say, either expressed or implied, that, "Go

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do the best job that you're capable of doing."

F: Well, newspapers and critics on either side, you know, are always charging about pressures on the CAB and the fact that the President came from Texas, the fact that Braniff is Texas-based, for instance. And we needn't confine this to the Johnson Administration; it's been in all other administrations, too. One administration is captive of Eastern Airlines, another one is captive of Pan Am, *et cetera, et cetera, et cetera*.

What pressures is it possible to bring to bear on the Civil Aeronautics Board?

C: I don't know what pressures it's possible to bring.

F: That are brought, then. Let's put it this way.

C: Well, as far as any that are brought, I don't think there are any. I served for ten months of the Johnson Administration. I served, along with my other four colleagues, two of whom are Republicans, during eight and a fraction months of the Nixon Administration, and to the best of my knowledge there were no pressures brought by either of those two Presidents on any member of the Board, Republican or Democratic. I think this business of whether it's Eastern or Braniff or Pan Am is just something to fill up space in the newspapers.

F: This is just press talk?

C: In my judgment, yes, sir.

F: Do you have a sufficient research staff to work out the economics of awarding of new routes and the closing of old ones, and the transference of routes, and so forth? Or do you have a budget handicap? I know you very early got active and asked Congress for an increase in the budget for salaries and expenses, on the basis that if you could get a bigger

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staff you could save money, and substantive.

C: We did ask for an increase. I found that in about six years' time the size of the staff at the Board had remained about the same, although traffic had increased about fourteen per cent per year, compounded in the years from 1963 to 1969. And I felt that a budget increase was warranted in that we would be doing a service to the public to have a larger staff. We asked for fifty additional persons for fiscal 1970.

F: Were you, as chairman, in a position to contact congressmen, or did you have someone who acted as your congressional relations person?

C: There are two people at the Board who are definitely in the field of congressional and community relations. That's a two-pronged job. Colonel John Dregge and Mr. Charles Donnelly are in that area. Part of their time is involved in contacts with persons on the Hill, other parts of their time, probably a majority of their time, involved in contacts with civic groups out in the localities served by the certificated carriers. I made some effort to get three or four bills favorably considered by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House and the Commerce Committee of the Senate. [I] made a few visits, but only a few. I didn't have any spectacular success in getting hearings on some of the bills that the Board felt should be passed.

F: You didn't have any great difficulty getting past the Bureau of the Budget in this?

C: We submitted some recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget, but any that were rejected obviously we made no effort to take it to the Congressional Committees. The three or four I mentioned relate essentially, well, relative entirely, to those approved by the Bureau of the Budget.

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F: What problems did you inherit when you moved in, besides the fact that you had a one hundred per cent increase in business and no increase in staff?

C: Well, I might say that Alan Boyd and Charlie Murphy had been outstanding chairmen. The state of the nation, as far as the Board was concerned, was good. We did have quite a bit of backlog of work. There were between fourteen hundred and fifteen hundred pending dockets undisposed of when I became chairman. You ask what the norm might be. I don't know. But I felt that the norm should be less than a thousand, and this is one thing that I made every effort to do. That was to pass on matters until we could get the number of docket applications and their file . . .

F: So, to a great extent to cut down on that time lag.

C: To cut down on the time lag. Let's talk in round figures. If there are ninety or ninety-five per month filed, and suppose--not that everything takes a year's time, some matters take more than a year, some take considerably less--but I thought that a year's backlog on the average was about as much as should confront the Board. At all events, at the time I left there were less than one thousand pending docket applications. In the fiscal year, the government's fiscal year, the full fiscal year when I was chairman, we disposed of more dockets than had been disposed of in any other fiscal year in the thirty-one year history of the board. So we addressed ourselves to our work. We rolled up our sleeves and got with it.

F: Do you have a fairly adequate operating staff, research staff? I presume each docket application has to be run down by your group.

C: Well, of course, sometimes your docket applications are consolidated into one case.

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There are not a thousand cases pending.

F: Yes. Are any of them so sure-fire one way or the other than you can either accept or reject almost out-of-hand?

C: Bear in mind these docket matters are on a variety of things. One might be on equipment lease. Suppose that one carrier has essentially a summer season peak, and another a winter season peak. I've always favored utilization of equipment to best advantage, and if they want to take one of two planes, and one of them own them and lease them to the other carrier in a peak season, I'm for that. It seems very foolish to me to make both carriers buy for their peak season and then have that interest and depreciation going on. Then they'd have to charge the public more for transportation. Then you'd get a situation where somebody wanted to be director of a bank as well as a director of an airline, and those things moved pretty quickly. I think there are some routine matters, yes.

F: Very early you had the question of whether the Civil Aeronautics Board should permit non-scheduled airlines to conduct all-expense charter flights.

C: Yes. You see the Supreme Court acted on that case in about June of 1968, and then the Congress solved the problem by enactment of legislation in September of 1963, authorizing these all-inclusive tours, these inclusive tour charters.

F: Did you testify in this?

C: I did.

F: In what wise?

C: I testified in support of legislation that would permit it, but require that there be a tour operator or travel agent and not let the airlines themselves put together the inclusive tour

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charters. Because when you do that you are putting the supplemental carriers in the business of soliciting individuals.

F: What do you do to relieve congestion? I know at one time you said unless the airlines themselves would take over you might have to direct some of them to less busy airports.

C: You see, many, many things are done to relieve congestion. The FAA does some of it, and has done some of it, in rationing flights at the busiest airports. The Board did a number of things. We permitted carriers to use satellite airports. This is Ontario in the Los Angeles area, and San Jose and Oakland in the San Francisco area, and so on. Where an airport like Dulles was constructed late, and there isn't as much traffic in as Dulles can take, in giving certain new route awards to the Washington area in some instances we specified Dulles. In others we specified Dulles or Friendship to keep the traffic out of National.

We heard the White Plains-Islip case, certificated three carriers to mount operations out of Islip to Chicago. We had a number of cases where improved authority from certain cities would automatically result in bypassing other areas. The Memphis-Huntsville-Birmingham to the West Coast case meant that there would not have to be connecting flights at St. Louis or Dallas or some such place. So the Board has done a number of things in this area. I'm very proud of the Board's record as to what we did without absolutely coming in and using government interference too much with the industry's judgment as to where the public wanted to travel at what times.

F: Yes. It is Board policy to try to keep some of these, you might say, backwater airlines--that's not the right adjective but I'm thinking of places like Midway in Chicago,

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because it's in too congested an area you've had to direct larger flights into O'Hare, and there are others around over the country--do you try to keep airports like that alive? Are they economically justified?

C: As you know, Midway was not used for a time. It's beginning to be used again just because of congestion at O'Hare. The move out of Midway to begin with was because the FAA didn't let some planes go in. The four-engine jets don't go into Washington National. But this is an FAA matter. I think Midway will bounce back some. I think you'll see some flights going in. The problem there is, how do you know what the flights are where passengers don't want to transfer from that flight to one of the four-engine jets. Because a man doesn't really want to come in from Springfield to Midway and then have to take a taxi from Midway to O'Hare to catch a four-engine jet to San Francisco.

F: When you've got something like this Pacific route case how do you decide which airline should get which routes? Who goes to Hawaii? Who goes to Tokyo?

C: I think the Board's opinion would speak for itself on that, obviously. As far as the judicial process is concerned, no one who sits or has sat on a judicial or quasi-judicial panel would think of saying, "Well, you know member 'X' said so-and-so, and member 'Y' said so-and-so." The opinions are lengthy, pretty detailed, and I just would refer anybody to the Board's opinion, the majority opinion and the dissents where there were dissents.

F: This is pretty much handled, though, just like a case in court? With a panel of judges sitting in?

C: Yes, sir.

F: Is it pretty much decided on economic grounds?

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- C: I think so. Several things you will see from the opinion: how these various airlines are identified at the cities they're chosen to serve, what kind of traffic.
- F: What do you mean by how they are identified?
- C: Well, for example, on the West Coast you'll find that Western Airlines and Northwest and Continental are considerably better known than Braniff or Eastern, let's say. So, it would seem clear that when you're talking about lines that start their service to points in the Pacific, from some of those points you might be talking about any one of the three big domestic carriers, United, American, or TWA. But when you get to the smaller ones, as far as West Coast points are concerned, you'd normally think about Western, Continental and Northwest more than you would Braniff or Eastern, for example.
- F: Well, now you've got this case, again in the Pacific, in which you make certain awards, and you've got people like Continental and Braniff all geared up to go. Then when you get a new administration in it doesn't go along with the CAB decision.
- C: Well, any international case goes to the president of the United States. The feeling there is that in international route awards there are so many considerations involved in our relationship with other countries that the president understands all the things involved with Japan that the Board cannot possibly know. The same with Australia and New Zealand. So it goes to the president, whoever he may be. This particular case, by happenstance, went at a time that a change in the presidency became involved.
- F: As far as you know, historically, do presidents ever rescind a route that has been granted some time before and has been operating reasonably successfully?
- C: Where there have been operations?

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- F: Yes.
- C: I don't offhand recall one where there had been operations.
- F: In other words, if this decision had been made earlier and President Johnson had been able to authorize it, you don't think probably President Nixon--and you'd already been under way--probably would not have reversed the decision.
- C: I don't think the President could have reversed it. Bear in mind, there are procedures for these things. Unless someone goes into the Circuit Court within sixty days after the finality of the Board's decision, then the only way to take away authority, other than in the courts, would be to file a new docket to seek to rescind "X" airline's authority and go through the same procedures from scratch, from the very start.
- F: Okay. Now you're in the position of rejecting/accepting lower rates, higher rates and so on. Do you try to keep some sort of presidential economic guidelines in mind on this, or do you work this out somewhat on the basis of what the airlines should have or what they can have?
- C: I think that by statute the Board is admonished to provide a fair rate of return for the certificated carriers. This doesn't mean each carrier, nor does it mean each year. But I think for an average number of years, if we assume that the administration of policies of the certificated carriers is honest and efficient, then what would be a fair rate of return is a thing for which we must strive; the Board must strive. The matter of passenger fares, particularly, was under study all through calendar 1969. From the very beginning of the year until the decision in September this matter was under constant study by the Board.
- F: Did you find that by making certain route changes you can effect the sort of economies

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that will lower rates?

C: Yes, I think the route awards in many instances would be designed to lower rates.

F: Do you work with local airports to try to make certain that they have the facilities to handle new routes or increased traffic?

C: This is one of the things to which I gave particular attention in late 1968. [I] made public a position of my own that, among other things, we were going to be interested in every case argued to the Board, in an expression from the cities involved, as to how they were handling and how they planned to handle in the future, traffic, passengers and baggage and freight, in a cargo case, at the airport. And with respect to passengers, [we were interested in] how they processed them between airport and city center. So, yes, I definitely made known my interest in that. And some cities--I recall particularly the city of Oakland in a couple of cases made a very excellent presentation of its position as to the handling of passengers more so than freight, particularly passengers, and what their plans were for the future.

F: Do you show any great concern on the Board as to whether airports are economically feasible as far as the operation of the airport itself is concerned?

C: In other words, the . . .

F: Well, I'm thinking Love Field has always been rather proud up in Dallas that it pays its way. Whether it's true I don't know, but it says it does.

C: Oh, I don't know. I don't think we made any study of how they were processing their municipal bonds there.

F: Do you yourself, that is, your Board itself, make studies of what airports should be like in

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1980, say, and what sort of airline service we should have? Or do you leave that up to individual airline associations?

C: In the planning section of the Bureau of Economics at the Board there were studies conducted. I had one conducted to bring out in advance what airports would suffer from congestion problems by 1975, and with the request that that section of the Bureau of Economics constantly stay five years ahead, that each year it update the study. Of course, I don't know what'll happen now, but I assume the study may be continued.

F: It didn't get underway.

C: It did, and a report was published in the middle of 1969, calendar 1969, as to which airports would be plagued with problems of congestion by 1975 and so on. I think we also had a study from that same section on the impact of the new large jets. For example, many buildings have been built so that the passenger level is even or about even with the door of the 707 or the DC-8. But what's going to happen when the 747 or the DC-10 comes? Is the accordion-like corridor going to be able to go up that much in the air so that you walk up a little hill to get into the big planes? I don't know. But yes, the planning section of the Bureau of Economics has done some work on this. Obviously, the industry and the aircraft manufacturers, the Airport Operators Council International, all these people are interested. ATA [Air Transport Association?] is.

F: Do you work pretty closely with the individual airlines, or is there a certain antagonism here, a wall between you?

C: Well, I'm not conscious of any antagonism. I don't know in what areas we're talking about it working. Many, many times we've requested information from them in order to

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be able to pursue our own studies. In my opinion, they've been most cooperative.

They've even give much information on the extent and nature of complaints lodged with them.

F: Oh really?

C: Yes. So really there haven't been any secrets of which I'm aware. Now, we don't work with them in the sense of sitting down with them and agreeing on anything, or even discussing routes with them. We will hear, once a year really, their general prognosis for what their own operations may do in the year ahead. I know that this might be said to be a subtle way of giving the Board a little propaganda about the fact that they need more favorable treatment from the Board, but all this is done in open session with a public reporter there, court reporter, who prepares a transcript. And it's filed, so there aren't any *ex parte* communications on this.

F: Yes. When you went in, the CAB did not have the authority over airline acquisitions, did it?

C: If the acquisition was by another airline. But [not] if it were merely by someone not theretofore engaged in any phase of aeronautics. So that the later legislation did come during calendar 1969.

F: And you pushed for that yourself?

C: I did. There were various discussions about the percentage that ought to be involved, and I expressed my opinion on that, not always along the same lines as others. I thought there ought to be reporting at the five per cent level and approval at the ten per cent level.

F: What do you mean by the five and ten per cent level?

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C: Well, "X" comes in and he wants to buy five per cent of the stock of "Y" airline. He reports to the Board if he acquires five per cent or more. Whenever his acquisitions would get to the ten per cent level, he must get advance Board approval

F: Why'd you resign?

C: Why did I resign? Oh, I suppose a number of things.

F: You had more than five years to go.

C: That's quite true. First, I felt that we had accomplished and put on the road toward accomplishment many of the things I had set out to do. I could foresee a decision in the area of passenger fares that I thought would set a pattern for years ahead. It's a formula approach to fares which had never been followed in the thirty-one year history of the Board.

F: How did that get worked out?

C: Well, by the airlines making their various presentations and the Board acting on them as it must under the statute. It suspends certain tariffs and approves others, and if it suspends, the Board is perfectly free to say, "We're suspending this but we would approve if filed in this modified form." We followed the statute and decided it. We approved a particular filing, and when that one was approved the airlines, pretty quickly, seeing what was approved, most of them filed under the formula that the Board would accept.

As far as routes were concerned, I've already commented on how many cases we passed on, and I thought that a great many of the major route matters were solved. Not all, to be sure. We had worked out a procedure pretty much as suggested by the present

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Department of Transportation for handling some of the international cases. The East Coast Points-Europe case will be processed in two phases: first the routes, and later the carrier selection. We've made our presentation to the Congress on the number of additional people I thought we needed with something of a forecast for the future. This was spelled out in great detail to Chairman [Edward] Boland's Subcommittee on Appropriations in the House. I think the transcript of our presentation there ought to serve as a pattern for years ahead as to the size the CAB staff should be.

Finally, bear in mind that when you get into the field of legislation and what is national policy, in a sense there can be only one quarterback and only one team that's directing things. I didn't feel we had enjoyed any spectacular success with our legislative program. I think I've already commented on that. I felt that possibly with a little more aggressive pushing by the White House some of these bills that we at the Board felt would have had a salutary effect might have been passed. I did not know whether by any chance the Republican administration thought that if there were a Republican majority at the Board, and this could be labeled as a successful bit of legislation passed during the Nixon years, some good things might follow. And to a certain extent with our necessary work with the Department of State and the Department of Transportation and the administrator of the FAA and the chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, all of which agencies are now supervised by Republican appointees, it seemed to me that the work of the Board might be more effective if the Republican Party had the majority and the chairmanship.

F: Right.

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C: So I offered my resignation.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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