INTERVIEW I

DATE: May 10, 1979

INTERVIEWEE: ROY L. ELSON

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Mr. Elson's home, Washington, D.C.

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G: Let's start briefly with your background and how you came to work for Carl Hayden.

E: Well, I, for the most part, grew up in Tucson, Arizona, and went through the public schools out there, though I was born in Pennsylvania originally, the last of nine. [We] moved out to Arizona because of my mother's health; she had tuberculosis. In those days you either went west to Arizona or New Mexico to either get well or die or do both, which she eventually did. I went through junior high and grade school there, Tucson High, then the University of Arizona.

Actually, in 1952, I went back in the fall. Although I had plenty of hours, I never quite took the right hours to get my degree, so I was going back to finish my degree. Also, I was taking about ten hours of graduate credit in political science. Though I majored in psychology, my interest was really in political science. I was also working at a deaf and blind school, where I supervised some boys for two years. Then I worked at a county hospital every night of the week from midnight to eight o'clock in the morning. So I was working about a hundred hours a week, and then clearing these eighteen hours

and averaging somewhere between six and ten hours sleep a week. I was taking Dexedrine about every four hours, you know. It was crazy.

One night I passed out, so I decided, well, this was killing me, and so I decided to quit school. I had my ROTC commission because [of] Arizona being a land grant thing [university], and Korea was coming. Then I had a contract. In those days, you could sign a five-year contract, and that's what I had. So I thought, well, I can always go on active duty or probably will get called anyhow. But I just was exhausted. So when I went in to sign off on my [courses], one professor, who was head of the political science department out there, who's still alive, when I went in to get him to sign off on one of these graduate courses, he said, "You can't quit school. You're doing too spectacularly. You can't do that." I said, "Yes, I can." He said, "Well, I just recommended you to a position on Carl Hayden's staff." You know, I'd never met Carl Hayden, hadn't seen him. He was a legend then. Christ, he'd been there forever. And he said, "Are you interested in being considered?" I said, "Of course." I didn't have anything better to do. So I got interviewed along with about fifteen other people from around the state, and they offered me a job. I sent back a one-word telegram, "Yes." They asked me to be there December 1, 1952. It was right after the election, of course.

So I went back. But Carl Hayden, in those days, used to go back to the schools, the universities, to get people to serve on his staff, because he never wanted politicians that had a political record or background, because he didn't want them telling him how he ought to handle his politics, because he thought he was handling it pretty good after all those years. So he always went back to get young people to join his staff. There were only three men on his staff. That would be the AA [administrative assistant], the

secretary, and the assistant secretary. Then he would break them in his way, starting with the files and then handling veterans' cases or social security, then into projects and into contracts. The whole theory being if anything happened to any of the men, any one of the other two could take over. So he always had this training program going on, and you got to do everything. That's what made it really great to be with Carl Hayden.

So that's how I came back with him, and it was right at the height of McCarthyism when I came back right from the University of Arizona. Of course, [Dwight] Eisenhower had been elected and [Harry] Truman was going out. I was with him for seven months, until the middle of June of 1953, and all of a sudden I got called to active duty, going to the Korean War, which I always like to tell how valiantly I fought it over in Germany and France. It was a hell of a war.

But I was with him those seven months. I didn't want to come back to Washington, but after I got back from overseas and was going out home to Arizona to get separated from the air force, they asked me would I come back, or at least come to Washington to talk to him about coming back. Because I wanted to go back to school, and I'd enrolled in the Sorbonne, the London School of Economics, and the American School of Photography in Mexico City. So I said yes, because I had to get a divorce anyhow. So I came through Washington, and the old man and his AA said, "Well, since you don't know what you want to do, why don't you just come back and stay through the 1956 campaign?" So I said okay. So I came back in the summer of 1955 and stayed with him until he retired. That was with the exception of [the time] I resigned from his staff for about four months when I ran the first time in 1964 for the Senate.

G: What was Carl Hayden like in the early fifties?

E: A powerful man. I've never met a man--and then it's hard to go back and project how it all started. But I remember that, because it was the height of McCarthyism when I first went back, and I had access to all his files. As I mentioned to you before we started taping this, [I remember] having taken down all that material on [Joseph] McCarthy that he had gotten the two investigators to do: one from IRS and one from the FBI. And [he] was the one responsible for putting on the mail cover on McCarthy from the Rules Committee. I remember having taken that down.

I was sort of outspoken. I was looking for bad things about him. How could a man be in politics as long as he had? There has to be something, particularly in that era. I kept looking and had total access, as I say, to the files and everything going on, and I just marveled at the man, his attention to detail, his thoroughness, his knowledge. First of all, as anyone will tell you, he was a great constitutional lawyer. Although he wasn't a lawyer, he probably knew the Constitution better than anyone I've ever seen. Even Sam Ervin will tell you that, although he used to call Sam his constitutional lawyer. But the old man really knew a lot about the Constitution. Then he knew that legislative process backwards and forwards. What I really marveled at, he was the type of guy that knew where he wanted to go with legislation or with appropriations or with a project. Although a lot of people would try to make a big fight, make the gigantic step, he was willing to take the half step, always looking ahead like he was going to be there forever.

I'm told, and the way he used to tell it, when he first came back in February, 1912--[Sam] Rayburn came in March of 1913. Remind me to tell you a story about

Rayburn's funeral if I haven't already. But anyhow, he knew he had to build a territory into a state, so he got on all those committees that were going to do that. Then when he won and came over to the Senate in 1927, he was lucky because he had had appropriating experience to get on the Appropriations Committee almost immediately. [Kenneth] McKeller came at the same time, and I think only as a matter of days because of the way they were sworn in, McKeller got to be chairman ahead of him in there until McKeller left the Senate in the fifties.

So he had this knack of building, of always laying the groundwork. Say it was on a reclamation project or someone else's project, he would always get it in writing, always probing the departments, the agencies. And he always knew their business better than they did. It was incredible. He had such a great knowledge of everyone else's problems, you know, their political problems, their pet projects, and he always had time for theirs. It wasn't the typical log-rolling; he just believed in capital investments in this country, of building them, the dams, the roads. Of course, as you know, he's the father of the whole highway program, the Hayden-Cartwright Act and all that, and the formulas that were used then, which were sort of the basis for the whole interstate system when it came. Because again, it was opening up the West and developing resources. He believed in all that.

So the way it was to work for him, you just had to respect the man. Then he let you do things. He gave you responsibilities and then let you go ahead and carry them out. But I remember the first assignment [I was given], which might give you an indication of what the man was like. He also had this fantastic memory. I mean, God, he could almost tell you the day something happened on the floor, or who said

what when, and things like that.

The first assignment I was really given that the old man wanted personally was on something to do with the Grand Canyon and its formation. Of course, he was sort of the father of the Grand Canyon National Park, and this was an amendment that was made in 1927. He was looking for something that had to do with why we left the boundaries of the park in such a way and the monument, because it tied into the Colorado River and the litigation with California and all this. He was looking for something, so he had me research this whole project. I got the assignment from the AA, but it was [for] him.

He liked [one-page reports]. If you couldn't get the stuff down on one page, you didn't understand the problem. As you know, that's the toughest thing of all, to get something down to one page that's very complicated. I looked. I had the Library of Congress look, the Legislative Reference Service; I had the Department of Interior, I had the National Park Service, I had everyone looking for this, and we couldn't find it. Finally this went on for weeks. He'd keep asking me if I'd been able to locate it. I'd say, "Senator, gee, you know. . . ." I had books stacked on my desk this high and I couldn't.

Finally I got this damn thing down to about two and a half pages, and I couldn't answer the question. So finally I took it into the AA, and he looked at it. He said, "Well, take it in to him, but it's a little longer than he likes." So I go in with a great deal of trepidation. And I sit down, and I hand it to him, and I said, "Senator, this is the best I can do. I've spent six weeks on it. I've had all these people and these man hours." He sort of looked at me, and he had his feet on the desk, smoking a

corncob. I'm practically in a brace. He said, "Sit down." He started going through it, and he read it and looked at it, sort of a little disgusted at its length. But then he read it. He said, "Oh, yes, now I remember." After all that research, all I had done, and all we had done was remind him of a conversation that had taken place in the Republican cloakroom in the Senate in 1927, fall, or 1928, between the then-Majority Leader and the Minority Leader and himself, where they had worked out this little arrangement. You could have looked for the next thousand years, and you'd never have found the answer to the question that he wanted.

I learned a great lesson; we all did in the office. What we would do, if he really wanted something else researched or do anything, we'd do a very quick job, a real quick job, then try to get it down on one page and take it into him in between something, [and say] "Does this remind you of anything?" We must have saved the taxpayers millions of dollars doing it that way because of his memory for the details of things that you'd never find in the record, would not be in the Congressional Record, or conversations that took place. He was a great historian. He loved history. So this was just a fascinating individual.

G: Let's go back to that McCarthy incident. First of all, do you remember McCarthy's attack on Hayden?

E: Well, yes. I don't remember exactly what the attack was, but I know that he accused the Senator of doing something underhanded. That's the last thing you could accuse Carl Hayden of being was anything but direct with you.

G: What was Hayden's reaction to this?

E: Well, there were very few people that Hayden ever said anything about that he disliked.

There were only two that I ever heard him talk about. One was McCarthy, and the other was Welker from out west.

G: Herman Welker?

E: Yes. He didn't like Welker at all. Yet he took it from what it was and where it was coming from. My recollection is more of remembering [Roy M.] Cohn and [David G.] Schine and that whole crowd, because I would see them drinking over at the Carroll Arms. Cohn I really didn't think very much of at all. He was an evil person in my book, and McCarthy deserved him. I mean, they deserved each other. Then I also remember Bob Kennedy being there, which I thought was sort of funny, because he never commits [inaudible].

But back to McCarthy. I think the way he used it, it didn't really offend him personally because they knew that the Senate had to do something about the irresponsibility of McCarthy. So he was already laying the groundwork for bringing up the type of information that would be necessary to either quiet him or let the club's will--I mean the Senate's will--be taken, or get him censored.

G: Hayden had started this investigation before McCarthy's attack?

E: Oh, yes. Yes. It started, my recollection, because I wasn't there yet, and it would have been certainly after his Wheeling, [West Virginia] speech and some of that. So it probably would have been 1ate 1951. I'd say somewhere in 1951. Because as I told you, to do that type of work in all those documents, because he had to go to Truman to get these two individuals that he wanted for the investigation.

G: Where did he get the [investigators]?

E: One was gotten from the FBI. He was a very fine investigator who's still alive, and his

name was Paul Carter [?] The other was an accountant for the Internal Revenue [Service]. As I recall, T. Coleman Andrews was the Internal Revenue director at the time, and he wouldn't give them this guy, so he had to go to Truman to get him. I can't remember his name, but Paul Carter, of course, would or some others. But he had these two. That's when they got the authority to do the mail cover and start checking where the mail was going, and the bank accounts, and just all the stuff that went on.

Remembering, 1ooking over those documents back then before we took them down, it just appeared to me that he was doing a lot of illegal things that were against the law. The financial transactions were very complicated. They involved great banks and ships and European bank accounts and New York bank accounts and [were] just very complicated.

G: Do you recall essentially in more detail what McCarthy was doing here?

E: What do you mean?

G: Well, in terms of say the Greek shipping interests?

E: Oh, that was more he was making some money out of it, but it would appear in my recollection that he was also doing things for foreign governments and foreign people, which was sort of against the law without registering and all this. He was bypassing diplomatic channels and doing all sorts of things for foreign governments. That's my recollection of what that was about. But it's been so long and when we turned over those documents--I know we saved some and I don't know where they are now, I mean the original set. I don't know whether the Senate Rules Committee still has them somewhere or where they are.

G: Was Truman still president when the documents were turned over or was Eisenhower?

E: No, no, Eisenhower. We took them down after Eisenhower [took office]. Who was it? [Herbert] Brownell was the new [attorney general]. Then we took a set of them down to Justice, to the Internal Revenue, and I don't know whether we took one to the White House or not. But I know we took at least two sets that I know we personally delivered, the Senator's secretary at the time and myself, whose name was Bob Koch. We hand-carried them down. There were like nineteen, twenty boxes of documents in all, Photostatted and here they were--the report. But as I say, the man who could really tell you about it [who] is still alive and around is Paul Carter, who was one of the two investigators.

G: Was Hayden disappointed that nothing was done?

E: I think so, but then he also understood the politics. I think he was disappointed that they didn't pursue, particularly then when McCarthy attacked George Marshall and Eisenhower didn't respond. They had the evidence that they could have used to shut him up or could have used it in other ways politically to shut him up. I think he was very disappointed. I know he was very disappointed in Eisenhower and the fact that they didn't use the material, because it was there. Because he thought George Marshall was one of the greatest Americans we've ever produced. So I think he probably would have been disappointed because they had ways of maybe shutting him up or being a little more righteous.

G: Did Hayden play a role in the censure of McCarthy?

E: Oh, very definitely. Oh, Jesus, yes. Behind the scenes though. He was, no question, a moving force, because he was on the Rules Committee that was handling it, all the hearings and everything. Oh, yes. He was one of the four or five men in the Senate that

were responsible for his demise. And the worst thing that you could have done to someone like a McCarthy was to censure [him] in the United States Senate, despite whatever the programming I heard. Did [Bill] Moyers do one, or who did one on that period not too long ago? I know I made a whole bunch of notes about the episode, because they were talking about how [Edward R.] Morrow and the press were really responsible for bringing this about, or that was the inference. I still have the notes around here somewhere, because I must have made ten pages of legal-size paper notes on it. The Senate was going to get, no question--because in those days they didn't play to the galleries that much, you know, to the press. It was not the press that did him in. It was really the evidence that they had on him and also his embarrassing the Senate as an institution. He'd go willy-nilly and I really think he thought it was funny in a way. He really didn't think people would take him seriously to that extent.

G: Anything else on McCarthy?

E: I wouldn't mind looking at those notes I made from that other thing, because it did bring back a lot of memories. See, by June of 1953, I had left, and, of course, then, by the time you had the Army-McCarthy hearings, I was over in Europe at the time. So unfortunately, I missed that other than what they would send me from the office. So I was gone at that critical period when they finally did the actual censure.

G: Now you were talking earlier about the Bricker Amendment.

E: Yes. Carl Hayden probably did as much as any single individual to prevent the Bricker Amendment from passing. He had one man who had his master's [degree] and doctorate, that's all he did in the office--the Senator's secretary, this same Bob Koch when we took down the records. He spent practically all his time working on this; we had so many

files. He wrote letters all over the country and got people in to testify on the constitutional questions. In the Senate [he] did more to quietly talk to members about the problems that adopting the Bricker Amendment would cause, and how it would handicap the president and the separation of powers and all this. He just had a personal interest in it and thought John Bricker wasn't the swiftest guy in the world. But it was a very emotional question, particularly at that time, with the China lobby and all the other things going on, and McCarthyism, which came later, but, of course, this went back to--when did the whole thing start, in 1950, the Bricker Amendment, 1948, somewhere in there.

G: I thought it was later.

E: It seems to me it was 1950, because when I got back there, Bob Koch had been working on it for two years. I think it was 1950 myself. That could be wrong.

G: What did Hayden do in particular? Did he talk with Senator [Walter] George?

E: Oh, yes. With George, with all his good southern friends, [Richard] Russell, and all of them. He not only would talk to them, but he'd write not a "dear colleague" letter, but he'd write a lot of letters. They did research, just drawer after drawer of research. They would do a lot of memoranda and papers to members, though he was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. But he was one of that inner circle that people respected, and they respected his judgment. It was the usual Hayden thoroughness that, I think, impressed everyone. It wasn't just talking. He knew it backwards and forwards. It was very impressive.

(Interruption)

I don't know where we were. Were we still talking about the Bricker Amendment?

G: No, I think we--

E: Okay. Of course, after they had the National Security Act and under Truman set up the watchdog committee, he was one of that group that oversaw our intelligence activity, along with Russell who was chairman of Armed Services. Who else served on it? A couple of members from Appropriations, I think, the Majority Leader. Anyhow, there were six or seven senators on that. So he knew where all the hidden money was in the budget and participated in all that. Of course, [he] still blames John Foster Dulles for getting us into Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

G: Oh, really?

E: Oh, yes. Because 1954 is when the advisers went in there.

G: You were going to talk about the Mansfield Resolution for the CIA.

E: I wanted to show how he was respected. When he would get really involved in something, like the Bricker Amendment, or remember there was the move to limit the income tax to 25 per cent or something like that. Jesus, we wrote everyone in the country on that. He really got personally involved in that, that that wasn't going to work. That was sort of like the Proposition 13 stuff going on now. There's still a document that we published that circulated. In fact, the first time I was on radio--I don't know how--I went out to debate one of these guys that was going around the country doing the same thing. It wasn't using that document, but. . . .

[Mike] Mansfield introduced a resolution--this had been around 1957, 1958, somewhere in there--to set up and create a select committee to oversee the intelligence activity, namely the CIA. It had, as I recall, sixty-eight, sixty-nine, just short of seventy sponsors, more than two-thirds. There were hearings held and it moved along. It's the only time that they really voted on it, in my recollection. They were setting [it] up in the

Senate. They voted it down decisively. About thirty-five members who co-sponsored the resolution ended up voting against their own resolution. Carl Hayden had again written letters to every member of the Senate, talked to every one of them, had laid out the arguments, all the arguments and documents, and so personally lobbied that as much, if not more, than anyone, although the other members did. It was just soundly trounced. Now, I don't know how he'd feel about it with all the other stuff that has since come out, because I don't think he would have condoned some of the stuff that went on, particularly that that's been directed against American citizens, eavesdropping and all that, on American citizens.

G: Hayden was on the Policy Committee and the Steering Committee?

E: Oh, yes. Forever it seemed like. As I mentioned to you earlier, he was also chairman of the Senate Democratic Patronage Committee, and he was chairman of that from 1933 until he left the Senate. I was his clerk of that patronage committee from 1957 until he retired. I once asked him why he didn't get on [a legislative committee]. Well, for instance, when they set up NASA, and they had the Space Committee and all that that Johnson had gotten on, I wanted the old man to get on there because I wanted to help keep, quite frankly, Lyndon honest. Because I knew here we were in Arizona, sitting halfway between California and Texas, and we should have been able to, not steal enough, but certainly make sure Arizona's subcontractors got their fair share of the work. Because you're going to have that big complex, and Florida was trying to get its share and I knew Texas was going to get it, and California obviously had it. But I couldn't get the Senator to go on it.

I once asked him, "Why, Senator, are you not on a legislative committee?"

Because he was only on Appropriations, Rules and this, and then on the other working committees of the Senate. He looked at me and he said, "Well, first, when I was in the House, I had a lot of legislative background," because he was on all the legislative committees in the House. He said, "But I don't understand, what do I need? Here I am, chairman of the Appropriations Committee; I'm ranking or chairman of the Rules Committee, which handles by the way,"--he was giving me a little lesson--"all the spending resolutions, space, parking, all the little frills that go, and then besides, I'm chairman of the Democratic Patronage Committee. Now what else do you think I need to get my work done?" So what do you say? Finally, when [Barry] Goldwater left the Senate Interior Committee, when he was running for the presidency or getting ready to, Carl Hayden went on the Interior Committee, mainly because we had Arizona v. California being settled and the Supreme Court about to rule. So when Barry [left, he] got on, though the Senator didn't want to. He got on that committee as a junior member just to make sure he was going to get his project. And he did.

G: That reference to Hayden and LBJ on NASA reminds me of a question I was going to ask related to appropriations for NASA that LBJ was obviously interested in. Would Hayden defer to LBJ in a situation like this and pretty much give him whatever he wanted?

E: Well, the Senator believed in the program, number one, and, as chairman, knew a great deal about it, even though he didn't have a scientific background. But [he] recognized all the potential in communications and miniaturization, all the real fallout. I was always impressed. So actually, it was even more than that. I think he was an active helper of Johnson's and others. Though we would try to get him to maybe look out for some of our

interests, he would defer. But actually I think it was more than that. He would probably in most cases go along with some of it because he was a great chairman. I think if you talk to anyone that served with him, he was a classic chairman, what you would expect in a chairman of a committee. Because he gave his subcommittee chairmen latitude, but he also made sure everyone got to participate.

When new members came aboard, like freshmen, one of the things that I think Johnson's got to be given credit for is on giving junior members a major committee when they first came into the Senate instead of going through all the crap of serving on minor committees. Senator Russell finally went along with that and broke tradition during the 1950s.

I remember, to give you an example, Carl Hayden got Gale McGee from Wyoming aside when he just came, because he got on the committee when he first came into the Senate in 1958. The Senator got him aside and said, "Senator, you don't know it, but you're going to be doing a lot of traveling. What I want you to do--and you might as well be prepared for this--I want you to go everywhere Allen Ellender goes. Anyplace in the world he has been, I want you there no later than a week behind him. So when we get into a mark-up on the foreign aid bill or something else, and Ellender, who can take lots of photos and make these detailed reports and do all this traveling, when he starts making his pitch I want to be able to turn to you and say, 'Senator, weren't you there about the same time? Do you have any views on what the Senator is saying?'" And that's how he kept Ellender honest and all that. Because if you look at the minutes of the Senate Appropriations Committee, for instance, on the foreign aid program--and Tom Scott and some of these others will tell you--you look at the minutes, Carl Hayden never had the

votes for the foreign aid program, never, ever, if everyone was there and would have voted their conscience or would have voted the way they [believed]. He'd either get some of his southern friends to take a walk, not show up for the mark-up, or he'd get their proxy, and he'd vote on it. But you'd look at the votes. It would be fifteen-twelve or fourteen-thirteen, you know, twelve-eleven, things like that.

G: There was some indication that the Democrats would hold that foreign aid program hostage pretty much every year until the end of the session. That was one of Eisenhower's pet projects.

E: No question about it. Of course, a lot of that was responsibility, because that would be one of the last authorization bills that would go through the Foreign Relations in the House, too. Then [Otto] Passman of course, they'd wait until the last over there. Those were some of the most interesting conferences. This is where Carl Hayden excelled, was in a conference. He was a master at handling and saying, "Yes, we give here, go there." Conferences to me are the delight, or at least they used to be, when they were in closed session, because this is where the real give and take took place. This is where so much legislation took place. In fact, that's how l4-B got into the Taft-Hartley Act. If you'll study the history of the Taft-Hartley Act, you'll never find any reference to it on the floor or passing either House or anything. That came out of the damn conference.

G: Can you recall the specifics?

E: Oh, yes, I did a lot of research on that. I had a lot of background on it, and it was inserted in the conference and came out that way.

But anyhow, I'm sort of jumping around. But you're right in that they would hold it hostage right to the end. But the Senator believed in the foreign aid program, Carl

Hayden did, and so did Johnson, in my recollection. He was a big believer in it. While old Russell had questions about it, he sort of believed in it, too, and would go along although his constituency didn't exactly support it.

G: Can you give me an example of those senators holding up the foreign aid bill until they got something they wanted from the administration?

E: Well, Lyndon. He was of course a super-bargainer, and he would go along with holding it up until the--

G: But I'm looking for specifics.

E: Oh, okay. Right offhand I'd have to think about that a little.

G: How about as used against the threat of a presidential veto? Did they ever use it that way on the foreign aid appropriation?

E: The President vetoing their limitation and all that? You mean by the timing for the late [sessions]?

G: Yes.

E: Oh, yes. No question about that. Very definitely. That was always a consideration, sure.

G: But can you recall a specific piece of legislation that they were interested in that Eisenhower was [threatening to veto]?

E: That might have been a trade-off or something like that?

G: Yes.

E: I'm sure I can. I'll make a note, but I can't right offhand. Because that was always going on, and the foreign aid bill was notoriously used for some of this horse-trading. It might not even be a project or a piece of legislation. It could have been an appointment, a judicial appointment. It could have been lots of things. Because I know we engaged,

once in a while, in getting their attention about some problems that we felt they were impounding the funds. What they would do in a lot of cases would [be to] impound the funds. They just wouldn't spend the damn money. The Bureau of the Budget would impound them. So a lot of times they said, "Okay, we'll just hold the damn thing up. When you get around to spending it, well, then we'll talk about this." So that happened lots of times. It wasn't necessarily just legislation. It could be programs. It could have been a defense contract. Different individuals had different reasons for their maybe acting the way they did at a given time.

G: I get the impression that there was almost a pattern in terms of committee assignments that would send a lot of the southern conservative senators onto, say, Armed Services and Judiciary, and put more liberal senators on committees that often handled more liberal legislation. Is this a trade-off?

E: Well, part of it was. But part of it was also--at least according to the Senator, that in the old days before Johnson and others [came to the Senate], but going back to his coming to the Senate, at least the way I understood what he was trying to tell me--that they would try to take into consideration a person's background. Like when he came over he had had appropriating experience, because in those days each legislative committee also did its own appropriating, so he did have that experience. Then, when they went to just the Appropriations Committee under reorganization, well, he'd had experience. Then there was a vacancy on it for someone from the West. You know, they tried to take in regional considerations, and then some of the politics of it. But I think it was more later on even, perhaps when I was around there and, say, after World War II up through there, that liberal-conservative thing might have been a factor in some committee assignments.

As you know, some of that class of 1957, like [William] Proxmire, didn't get on some committees that he wanted because he mouthed off against Lyndon. A couple others felt his wrath and didn't get the committee assignments that they might have gotten otherwise, had they maybe have gone along on some things. But really, when they started making these assignments, and particularly when they start giving freshmen [major committee assignments]--see the Republicans didn't. That was always held very tightly, and they forced their junior members to go through hell. That's why I say there were these other factors that went in, when they did change the rules as far as the Democratic caucus and appointments to committees. So when they started getting these major committees, they'd try to consider someone's background, whether he had been a governor. You know, lots of things went into it. They also looked for balancing a very delicate majority, people who were going to be able to support a legislative program that the leadership in the Senate wanted, which was Lyndon then. And he was very skillful.

The southerners, of course, they'd be going on Agriculture, because it was [James] Eastland's office, [John] Stennis' office, and our office, and maybe with Clair Engle or some of the others. During the 1950s and up until 1965 I think those offices--because one represented the Delta, the other represented Stennis' small southern cotton farmer, and we represented the arid Southwest--pretty much wrote all the goddamned cotton legislation that was ever enacted into law in those three areas. In fact, the West--Texas, Arizona and Southern Ca1ifornia--could have wiped out every place but the Delta in cotton if it hadn't been for people like Stennis and some of the others, and Russell, who protected those small farmers in that part of the world. And Hayden went along with that. You just don't wipe out another whole part of the country just because you might

have better land and cheap water, and you were able to get better yields because you have this cheap water that's federally subsidized and all the other things.

So it was always a compromise. So southerners were put on there mainly for economic reasons, to protect their regions. A lot of the committee assignments were done that way. But you'd find a lot of the liberals like [Philip] Hart and some of the others, sure they might get on Judiciary, but they'd be on Labor [and Public Welfare], some of the other committees because of their interests. There was some discrimination against the liberals, even though I think Carl Hayden, if any of the truth be known, was really a true liberal. I mean by that he supported every piece of progressive legislation that was ever enacted into law. Where people would get confused [is that] when he knew the votes weren't there, he'd go along with his southern friends or something and vote with them on something when it wasn't going to go anywhere. He was the best head-counter of anyone I've ever seen, better than anyone that I've ever seen in the United States Senate.

G: What was the basis of his friendship with Lyndon Johnson?

E: Well, first of all, the basis was that he saw Lyndon at work. But you've got to remember that I think Sam Rayburn did more for Lyndon in the sense of even when he came up, because I started to tell you one time the story about when Rayburn died. But Carl Hayden and Sam Rayburn were the closest of friends, and that friendship went back to 1913. Lyndon Johnson was only four years old then, but Lyndon was a protégé of Sam Rayburn's. So when Johnson got elected--and of course Carl Hayden was the one that also supervised that vote recount down in Texas, the landslide that Johnson won.

G: Do you want to tell that anecdote about Rayburn's funeral?

E: In 1961, I was really concerned because I was one of the few people that really believed and knew that Carl Hayden was going to seek his last term, his seventh term in the United States Senate, and not very many people did. But at the same time, from the last time he ran in 1956, 40 per cent of the people in Arizona didn't even know who Carl Hayden was, because we didn't have a press secretary, didn't put out press releases. It used to drive me nuts when you had a Barry Goldwater there that even some of his staff used to call and ask us what the whole problem was about because we had done all the work and they'd put out the press release. They'd get the credit.

So I wanted to also raise some money. So we decided to come up with a big fund raiser, a hundred-dollar-a-plate [dinner], which had never been done in Arizona, and to have Kennedy come out to be the speaker. So I got together with Irv Hoff, who was at that time Senator [Warren] Magnuson's administrative assistant, because we knew Kennedy was reluctant early in his presidency to get involved in fund-raisers and party activities right off the bat. We were trying to do this, because it was Maggie's twenty-fifth anniversary of service in the Congress, and it was Carl Hayden's fiftieth. So we decided to try to put these dinners back-to-back. Then Kennedy in his answer to any other Democratic politician could say, "When you have your fiftieth or your twenty-fifth anniversary"--and we'd check that all out--"I'll come to yours." Well, he didn't have to worry about that for something like another five years.

So Irv Hoff and I went down to see--this was in late summer of 1961--Kenny O'Donnell. The one thing I really admired about Kenny O'Donnell is that he told you right where you were. There was no bullshit. He was very direct and gave you a yes and a no. He agreed and made a commitment for Kennedy that held come to these two

dinners, first in Seattle, and then fly down to Phoenix for one that I had put together in Phoenix. He'd be the main attraction. So I went rushing back that afternoon--I'll never forget it--and I said, "Senator"--because it was difficult for him to think people wanted to honor him; it was tough to do. But I went back and I said, "Without saying any word to Lyndon Johnson, I want you to go over and tell him that your friends out in Arizona are putting on this dinner, and you want him there to participate in it and be the master of ceremonies or something, and would he come." So the old man did. He went over and he came back [with] sort of a little chuckle. I said, "Well, what did the Vice President say?" He said, "Well, Lyndon said, 'Carl, Carl, I'll be there unless we've gone to war, and they've picked up all the red phones and the missiles are flying. You name it, I'll be there. Unless we just are at war and national emergency and we may all not be here.'"

So later on, and eventually as they found out, I even got a call later on as we approached this dinner from Walter Jenkins: "There seems to be some scheduling problems and I'm not sure that the Vice President can get to the dinner." I said, "Walter, come on. Don't make me get the old man to go corner the Vice President. Half of the United States Senate is going to be out there." See, I made him master of ceremonies where he introduced everyone and did all the other things. So they kept trying to get out of it because Kennedy was coming. That's the whole reason for never telling him in the first place who was really coming after we'd gotten the commitment. So then, of course, Sam Rayburn got sick and then he died, both Irv Hoff and I thought, "Jesus, I bet you he's going to die in a day or sometime and ruin both dinners. We won't have either Kennedy or Johnson or any of them."

So, sure enough, he died. Well, as it turns out, he died right at the right time

because they could still come to both Seattle and to Phoenix and still then go on to Bonham, Texas, for Mr. Rayburn's funeral. I was on the other line when Lyndon called the Senator after Sam Rayburn died, from Texas, and said, "Senator"--no, I had got word from Walter that he couldn't come because they were in such grief, he and Lady Bird. So I got the Senator to get on the line and call the Vice President down in Texas. I'll never forget that conversation either because Lyndon was explaining how wrought he was.

G: What did he say, do you recall?

E: He said, "Sam meant so much to me. He was like a father. He was my sponsor. He taught me everything I knew. Lady Bird is all [upset]. It just seems inappropriate to come to a political-type thing." I'll never forget Carl Hayden's remarks. He said, "Lyndon , I came to the House and to the Congress in February 1912. Sam Rayburn came in March of 1913, along with George [?] and Carl Vinson. All of us were the closest of friends, and you were four years old. Now we have been friends, Mr. Rayburn, Sam and I, all these years, and it would seem to me that Sam Rayburn would want you at my affair. Because we're all going to come down to the funeral after this dinner is over." There was this long silence. I could just see him. Lyndon said, "I'll be there." Then, did he chew my ass out when he got to Phoenix.

G: What did he say?

E: Oh, it was a type of thing, you know how he could get. He did it to his own staff. We had so many senators there, both Republican and Democrat, that on the podium you couldn't get them all there, so I had to put them down in the pile. I had so many pissed-off people. Then he wanted to know where everyone was. Liz Carpenter was--he was just really annoyed: "You got this thing all fucked up." He just got me aside--and I

cried. I had to go into the bathroom and I just started bawling. I was tense enough as it was with all this.

G: Was he mad at you, too, for having--

E: Well, he knew goddamn well who had put the old man up to all this, very definitely, because Walter and I kept having these conversations. Oh, yes, he knew. But he came and he did an incredible job, those two men. It was one of the best dinners that I have ever been to. Kennedy took about twelve minutes, twelve, fifteen. He was funny, light. Johnson handled everyone so [well], just great one-liners. Just a classic dinner. We had it all over within two hours. Then the next morning they all left for Bonham. He was superb. They both were. You talk about two pros. Incredible.

(Interruption)

The next year Johnson and Russell really helped me. Carl Hayden, in his last campaign, never showed up, except for three days to open his headquarters back in the primary in the state of Arizona. He spent the last thirteen days in Bethesda Naval Hospital. That was during the Cuban Missile Crisis and all that. People were accusing us from Arizona, because this was the height of John Bircher activity in Arizona. A Mormon-Bircher [Evan Mecham] was sort of running against the old man. They must have had fifty, a hundred calls at Bethesda Naval Hospital accusing the hospital, and accusing me, of having him on ice, just waiting until after the election, and then we'd have another special election and all that. Awful.

So we had to do something. Vice President Johnson and Dick Russell came out to Bethesda on a Saturday, and I had already arranged it with the papers out home. We had a press conference up in the tower at Bethesda Naval Hospital. On the front page of the

Arizona Republic--it permeates the whole state, Eugene Pulliam's paper--we showed, right under the major headline on the top of the fold, this big picture of Lyndon Johnson and Dick Russell consulting with Carl Hayden, who was confined to the hospital, on the Cuban missile site and briefing him and bringing him up to date. We had invited in all the press. We couldn't stage that. And there they all came. Johnson and Russell were just--you talk about pros, Jesus. It was beautiful to watch those two men.

G: What did they do?

E: Oh, just the way--if there was an antagonistic question come up, they would [say], "No, Carl is aware of that," and, "This is why this happened," and, "No." They'd answer for him before the old man had even had a chance to comment on something he didn't know was going on because he just hadn't been there. And the Senator was beautiful himself; he handled himself well. And there were a lot of antagonistic questions directed at me. They were accusing me of manipulating the old man and doing things like this. Both of them, particularly the Vice President, piped up and defended me. That front page, that picture alone in that whole press conference--because we had the whole Washington press conference in there. They thought that we were staging something. Well, he won the election.

G: Throughout the period of the fifties, when LBJ was majority leader and Hayden, I suppose, certainly one of the deans of the Senate, if not the dean, what was Hayden's attitude toward Johnson?

E: [He had] great respect for him, his abilities as a leader. He thought he was a good judge of men and the art of the possible. He was one who could really grasp and move things along, and understood the makeup of the Senate and valued the institution.

G: Did Johnson do things to cultivate Hayden's friendship?

E: Oh, in the way he'd do it. He could flatter you. I've never seen him or ever recall his trying to take on Carl Hayden in a confrontation. He was too smart to try something like that. I only know of one or two things. Once I was responsible because of his calling Lyndon down on something. I mean, where Lyndon was trying one of his quick maneuvers and bypassing the rules of the Senate or something. I'm trying to remember exactly what it was. But the reason I remember it is I was reading, was it [George H.] Haynes' two-volume work on the Senate? [*The Senate: History and Practice*] I had my own set of them and for some reason I did a lot of reading of that stuff then. I was reading some precedent that's in there. I guess those were written about 1929, weren't they? Anyhow, I came across a precedent and I said, "My God, Lyndon can't do that!" I remember it was very questionable. So I went rushing in the next morning and I showed the book to the Senator, and of course the Senator had read it, the work. I pointed out this one citation to a ruling the chair had made back in 1916 or something like that, I don't remember, but it was right on point.

So the Senator took the book, went over and saw Charlie Watkins, who, I guess, was parliamentarian then, and said, "Is this right?" He said, "Yes." Then he went over and told him, "You just can't do it. If you do, I'll call you down." He was really pissed. I mean, Lyndon was really pissed at the old man. But he got over it, and they worked it out some other way. But on this particular maneuver, which involved the rules of the Senate, just more by accident, the Senator didn't like it, but it was only by luck more than anything [that he stopped him], because Watkins was going along with what Lyndon wanted to do.

G: You don't remember what it was?

E: I've got it down somewhere. I remember it was one of those things that you'd get a thrill out of coming across something from your scholarly reading of something, and you can see it being put to real work in an immediate situation. It was one of those thrills you get in working around the Hill and on legislative matters that you don't want to talk about at the time but later, and I made some notes somewhere because I didn't want to forget it. Of course, like everything else, you forget it.

G: Did LBJ routinely bend the parliamentary rules?

E: He would try. But see, you had people [like Carl Hayden]. Carl Hayden knew the rules about as well as anyone. I mean, he helped write a lot of them. He knew the parliamentary procedure probably as well as the parliamentarian did. So did Dick Russell. In fact, I think the Senator probably might have even known the rules better than Russell did in many ways. But anyhow, Lyndon had to be very careful. He'd try it when he was in a hurry or something like that. But he more than once said, "You just can't bend them that much, you know." In most cases they all agreed with what they were trying to accomplish, but at the same time without doing a real violation of the rules. There were some others around that really did know their Senate rules. So I think he didn't get away with as many things as he would like to leave the image that he twisted--or someone would like to say.

I'd just think that the rules were certainly a lot more respected than they are now, unfortunately. Because Lyndon was part of the compromise on Rule 22. He was a believer in doing that. Well, Carl Hayden was a firm believer, and so was Dick Russell, in maintaining Rule 22. The Senator had a very personal reason for feeling that way and

very strongly about it, because we fought like hell. That's the one thing, that there were very few compromises with Senator Hayden on Rule 22. Mainly because he would never have been in the United States if it had not been for unlimited debate, because in 1906 they attempted to bring Oklahoma and the New Mexico, Arizona Territory in together. I forget the name of the senator that got up and filibustered that and killed that proposal at that time and then permitted a plebiscite in both the New Mexico Territory and the Arizona Territory to come in either as a separate or an independent state.

In those days, New Mexico was very much a Republican territory, and Arizona, of course, was heavily Democratic. There used to be an old iron Republican, a doctor in Phoenix, Arizona. The Senator used to love to tell the story about when he was campaigning for sheriff of Maricopa County back in territorial days. That's his gun over there by the way, I'll show you, that he used to carry when he was sheriff. This doctor, every election day, because he was a Republican and there were so few of them in the territory then, in Phoenix or Maricopa County, that he used to just take the day off and get drunk and get out there on the front porch. One day the Senator was walking by on his way to vote, and he was sort of ribbing the doctor a little bit. The Senator said to this old guy, "How do you account for the fact that this territory is so heavily Democratic? It must mean something. Why don't you join up and forget all this and participate and join the Democratic Party?" The doctor staggers and gets up from his chair and said, "The only reason this territory and this county is Democratic is because of the vigilance of the peace officers in Texas!" (Laughter) Which I love.

G: That's great.

E: But he felt very strongly about Rule 22.

G: It seems that Hayden might have resented a young upstart who had only been in the Senate since 1948, who, in 1953, became Democratic leader and accumulated a great deal of power. They didn't feel that Lyndon Johnson was taking too many shortcuts?

E: No. I never heard him express that. I think, first of all, you've got to remember Carl Hayden--and I remain the example of it--always surrounded himself with young people. In fact, at one time--and I think I was only thirty-three or -four--I was the oldest person on his personal staff. So, the fact that Lyndon only had that much time in the Senate did not bother him. He saw, as a lot of people did, and I think Russell and the rest of them saw, a very skillful politician who understood power and the uses of it, and leadership. So they didn't want to get involved in that. Russell couldn't for obvious reasons, and Hayden didn't want to be majority leader. He already had his colleague, who wasn't very much of a majority leader, [Ernest] McFarland, and so [he] needed a young [whip]. This was fine with Carl Hayden.

I have never heard him express resentment about his accumulating too much power, because he always felt that there were checks and balances to power in the Senate itself. Also, like this one occasion that I mentioned to you that he went out of his way to call Lyndon down on something, I don't think he honestly felt he was abusing it that much because in trying to pass legislation and get things accomplished, the rules as they developed were a very viable thing. He [Johnson], I don't think, violated them that much, though he supported changes in the rules particularly in cloture, which the Senator didn't. But he didn't resent the fact that that was where Lyndon was trying to accommodate the whole leadership thing, I mean, as a leader in the Democratic Party and all that.

But as a young man with his first term in the Senate, in effect, and then moving on to great leadership responsibilities, I think he respected it and felt comfortable with it because he had the enthusiasm; he was willing to put in all the long hours, and would always consult. I think that's where Lyndon Johnson was very shrewd. He always made sure, in those days [that he consulted with the senior senators]. It wasn't like you felt later. Some did hear that when he became president, once he got you with him, he'd ignore you, that sort of thing. Well, the demands of the office--I don't know whether that's a just criticism or not, but I've heard that expressed. I've heard even some comments. But there when you were in the Senate, and you saw each other every day, and you were working together, he had to consult with him. So as a result, it was not a case of, "You're on my side and I can rely on you and go on," but he would always touch base. He always touched base with those senators, like the [Robert] Kerrs, the Russells.

G: Did he always deal directly with Hayden, or would he go through you or another aide to the Senator?

E: Well, directly not so much with the personal office. Like my dealings were either more with Walter or Bobby [Baker] or something like that. I know when he thought maybe I was having too much [influence]. You know, he had great antennae. When he thought you were having too much influence on the man or something like that he might call you in and say, "Now, Roy," or something like that, "You really don't think this is right," or "You shouldn't be. . . ."

G: Did he do that with you?

E: Oh, not very often but on a couple of occasions. I know he did it once to me when he was president, when we had the salinity problem on the Colorado River in Mexico, and I

was being accused of manipulating the Senator into saying that we're not going to give them a dime, or holding up the money for putting a bypass channel and all the other stuff in. The Senator was down there at the White House and I got a call first from Walter and the Senator left, then a brief one from the President saying that "the Senator has agreed to go along with the solution we have worked out with the State Department and the Department of Interior and all this. Certainly hope that you're going to go along." All I could say is, "If Carl Hayden agrees, I don't think that there's much that I can say, Mr. President." That was the end of the conversation. Then I come back, and I talk to Carl Hayden, and he hadn't agreed to shit.

G: Oh, really?

E: No. Or he didn't think he had. But, like, for instance, on appropriation matters, that's why I recommend to you very strongly talking to Tom Scott and some of these others, because he would go to them when he was working on things, because they were close by and their offices were over in the Capitol. So he would work with them, and he was on the committee. But a lot of times he would deal directly with the Senator, most of the time I'd say, particularly if it was a delicate thing.

G: Was he able to persuade Hayden on something that he was interested in? We always hear about Lyndon Johnson's treatment, the persuasiveness of the man. Do you recall any examples of him persuading Hayden to go along on something or to do something that he wanted Hayden to do?

E: Yes. You ask me specifically something I'd have to look, sort of refresh my memory. But I know there were occasions where we and the staff were recommending that he not go along, and he would go along with the Leader. Whether or not it was because of

Lyndon's persuasiveness or his wanting to support him because of his leadership position [I don't know], but on a couple of occasions I know I felt very strongly on some things and had gone to him. You know, just the way the whole Hill worked. You had people come to see you because it was going to affect them, just a typical lobby situation. So you looked for those sorts of information and when you knew what someone was trying to do, then, if it was sort of against what your political instincts were or how it might affect your state or your region or its politics.

One of the times we got embarrassed, Lyndon and [the Senator], was on the goddamned Medicare. You know, Medicaid, the first way back there was a thing where--

G: The original social security?

E: Yes, the social security. The first time it was voted on, Lyndon, I think, was very persuasive in getting him to do, or would have gone along on, a position that was not in his best political interest, because in Arizona they were really bitterly opposed to that. That was on the first go-around where it didn't get enacted into law. I think I'm right on that. Because he was pushing the program, you know, and it was a shitty bill. The initial one was a bad bill. It wasn't going to pass the House at that time, and it was just putting members [in a bad position], particularly the old man [who] was coming up for [re-election]. Well, [it was] just bad politics in Arizona. That was the initial one.

But that's not the best example I can think of. I'm trying to think. Well, my mind is blank right now. But I know there were a good number of occasions I should say where the staff felt that the Leader was going too far. But again, in those cases that I know he went against our advice--and whether Lyndon himself persuaded him to do it [I

don't know]--I always knew that Carl Hayden had always talked it over with Dick Russell. He'd always talked it over maybe with Kerr, but you know, some of the other group there, which was also Lyndon's power base. So I had the impression that the old man was always sensing whether it was worth making a fight by also checking some of the same sources and sort of judging intensities, and whether he really wanted to go along or he wanted to make an issue out of it. And though that old man looked like he moved very slowly, he got there. He was always covering those bases. So when he would come back and we would be upset, you know, "Why didn't you do that?" you'd find out later that it was not because he hadn't taken the time to look into the problem. It's that he looked into it very thoroughly and either didn't feel he had the votes to do it, or it wasn't important enough to make the issue, or when he went back to Lyndon he'd convinced him that it was the right thing to do.

The way Johnson handled the Senator, I think in so many ways it wasn't the typical Johnson image of arm-twisting and bullshit and all the other things. He would deal very factually with Carl Hayden, you know, sit down seriously. You could see them there looking eyeball to eyeball. Then you'd see the Senator scratch his head. It was fun to watch, but it was normally a recitation of the facts, the political situation, those realities. It was, I thought, on the most part, a pretty good way for a leader to handle a senior, respected man. He could really judge people and he could give the right little touch.

By the way, the guy you've got to--I don't know whether you have, and who's still around if you haven't--the senator that you ought to talk to that was there during all that time was Tom Kuchel.

G: I haven't and want to.

E: For sure, because he would have a lot, because he was assistant leader and all that, from the Republican side during all that, so he has some great stories to tell about Lyndon Johnson.

G: Good. Well now, did LBJ ever prevail on Senator Hayden to lean on other senators?

E: Well, I would have to say probably yes, but again I can't think of [anything] specifically. When the Senator felt something strongly and went along with it, he'd go do it himself. You wouldn't have to draw him a diagram. I know there were occasions that Johnson would ask Hayden would he talk to so-and-so on the committee or one of the others, and would you do that, and he would, on lots of occasions. He really knew where he needed the help, and it wouldn't be like there was a formal bloc of votes. But on certain issues where Lyndon might know that the old man had helped him with appropriations or something else that he might suggest to the senator, "Would you mind talking to so-and-so?" knowing full well the guy would feel some obligation to Carl Hayden, because he had just given him a hundred million dollars for his pet project or something like that. So he was always knowing what the needs of the members were and how well they were accomplished, Johnson was, which was really remarkable I think.

So he was very gifted in knowing who to bring to bear on and who was the best one to talk to another member. But on any issue it could change, it would be a different person, maybe not at all. Or just knowing that the old man was going to go along with it, that sometimes would have been enough, or if Kerr was going to go along with it, or Russell, and that's what they wanted. Lyndon was very good at saying, "This is what Carl Hayden and Dick Russell want." He had no compunctions about whether or not

they really had said that or not. He knew them well enough to know that they would, in most cases, go along with it. So that carried a considerable amount of weight.

G: Did Lyndon Johnson take care of Texas?

E: Oh, yes! You had such a great ruffle [?] there with the Speaker over there, and Johnson as leader. Jesus, hell, yes, they took beautiful care of Texas. You wouldn't have the space center and all those other things. Because we fought for a lot of stuff that went to Texas.

G: Oh, really? What in particular?

E: Oh, sure. Well, there were a number of sites, tracking stations, the space center itself. Arizona was considered as a site, and we were all fighting Florida, the Cape and all that, trying to fight it. But between the Speaker and. . . . Oh, and then on projects, like the TFX, the fighter that went to Texas. No question why that contract went down there. We were working on that because we were more interested because we'd get more subcontractors, West Coast types.

G: How is something like that resolved? What was the process?

E: The process was your Texas delegation, but then Johnson was an expert at getting people in. For instance, he knew the defense establishment. He was on the Defense Subcommittee, as I recall. His friend was down there at NASA, and his people were all over, and he didn't mind picking up the phone and calling the administrator in, or getting generals in and talking to them. It would depend on what the issue was how he would talk to them. For instance, when we were fighting anything like that, you knew you were all supposedly equals in this ball game, but you know he was using his weight as majority leader, and he could indicate that you would be lucky to get any money or whatever for this project, and he controlled the legislative flow of activities to the floor, as the policy

chairman, and all the other things. Well, when you were trying to counter that, and you were playing your little game as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, because the staff over there really couldn't get involved. Carl Hayden wouldn't let a lot of his people get involved in the political arm-twisting, which is [what] I guess you'd consider [it]. When I was doing it to try to protect Arizona's interest and using the Senator's name in bringing pressure to bear, I couldn't get Carl Hayden to pick up the phone as easily as Lyndon Johnson would pick it up without hesitation and get them on. Sometimes he'd yell at them, and sometimes he'd cajole them, and sometimes he'd say, "Well, gee, I just don't know whether we'll be able to consider that project," whatever it was, another system. Sometimes it was subtle, and other times it was about as blunt as getting hit with a two-by-four.

G: Did he often come to Senator Hayden to get appropriations that he wanted for Texas?

E: Oh, sure.

G: Can you recall any in particular?

E: Oh, on water projects. Jesus Christ. I think he credits us, and so does Sam Rayburn. You know, [they] used to consider Carl Hayden the third senator. Christ, all up and down Texas [on] water projects and dams and stuff like that, the old man would go out of his way. He'd stick more in over and above the budget, a little here and there if they had a political problem and help them. Even with [Ralph] Yarborough on the committee and that hatred and all the other things, the Senator even managed to help both of them. But he believed, because they were southwestern and they had this identity of their land in developing their territories. So hell yes, he'd come, and he sometimes was a better advocate than their delegation.

G: How genuine was the antipathy between Johnson and Yarborough?

E: I think it was genuine.

G: Did you ever see any evidence of it?

E: Yes, nasty little remarks, and then, of course, between the staffs there was just some cutting, sarcastic remarks. You just don't say that about other members. No, there's no doubt in my mind. Of course, Yarborough, I think, hated Johnson's guts. I mean, the feeling was mutual, I think. I don't see how anyone could doubt that. Have you been told it, the question whether it was genuine or if it was for show? Maybe so, but it sure seemed real to me. I'm familiar with that sort of game that you can play, but I never saw them. . . . For instance, the difference in the Senate then, and under his leadership, and before that, and say today, well, say a Yarborough and a Johnson could get up or someone from another state, you know, a Republican, and fight like hell on the floor, really genuinely get into some bitter arguments. But then they'd go have a--like a Phil Hart--would go have a drink with a Lyndon Johnson afterwards. They could be friends, and it was not personal. Staffs were the same way. Your word was most important, and you didn't have to make commitments, but you'd honor them once made and you didn't play for the gallery. That started changing with that class of 1958 when you had those nineteen new senators come in, six Republican and thirteen Democrats. So that seems to me to be one of the major differences in the make-up of the Senate today and then.

So back to Yarborough, I don't recall [their going out for a drink], but I wasn't drinking with them, because you didn't quite do that that often unless you were working the floor or something like that. I don't recall their going out and drinking too often together. You would find Lyndon more doing it with a Kuchel, even on the Republican

side and others. I thought it was genuine; I could be wrong. If I was, I sure was reading things wrong.

G: How did the Policy Committee work? Did Johnson dominate that?

E: Well, yes. They were all his people. But see, the Policy Committee is entirely different today than it was then. It was really not a very powerful body. They had people like [Gerry] Seigel on there and Harry McPherson and then Pauline Moore, the old timer there. Yes, it went along with the leadership, but the power didn't--I guess Lyndon really started making the Policy Committee and expanding it and making it more than what it is today. But more of the legislative power was really over in the Secretary of the Majority's office than in the Policy Committee and running the floor and doing all those things. The Policy Committee was more, in those days, like providing you with technical information. It was really a support group. It did not really make policy. That was more done among the members, and it was more informal, and the staff didn't have that much input to the members of the Policy Committee. And Bobby had more influence on running the floor activities than the Policy Committee, because you never went to the Policy Committee for much in those days.

G: But all of the whales were on it, weren't they? People like Hayden, Russell, Kerr.

E: Oh, yes. But they would talk among themselves. It was very [informal]. And what I'm saying, the staff of the Democratic Policy Committee--the Policy Committee [itself] was very powerful because all of the big boys were there, and they were the ones that did, but it wasn't like today where you have a bigger staff, and where under Mansfield and certainly under [Robert] Byrd, a lot of the power shifted from there, from the Policy Committee from a staff standpoint as well as membership, leadership, senators'

standpoint, away from the Secretary of the Majority and that area.

But the Policy Committee was a committee, and they met, but it was more informal. It wasn't structured. The staff wasn't doing a lot of position papers. They were doing it more for Lyndon Johnson. That was his little fiefdom from the staff standpoint. But yes, that's where all the decisions were made on the committee assignments. Everything was sort of decided among the members of the Democratic Policy Committee.

G: I thought that was the Steering Committee.

E: Well, yes, but it was pretty much one and the same thing.

G: The same group?

E: Same group. That was one of the bitches, because they started expanding the Steering Committee to include better regional representatives, younger members and all that. But back in those days, as I recall--you look at the list, they're pretty much one and the same and it just did different things, made recommendations and recommended the caucus, certain stuff. But the Policy Committee was the one that really cleared all the legislation. It was the one that [cleared the] legislative program with the leaders. And that's where he got his strength, of course, because he made sure he had the right people on the Policy Committee. For the most part they were always backing him up. I really misunderstood what you were driving at, because I see it changed a little differently.

G: Shall we take a break?

E: Yes.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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