

INTERVIEWEE: COURTNEY A. EVANS

INTERVIEWER: THOMAS HARRISON BAKER

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B: This is the interview with Courtney Evans. Sir, would you just summarize briefly your career up to the time you joined the Office of Enforcement Assistance?

E: After my graduation from law school in 1940, I joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a special agent. From then until the end of 1964, I was with the FBI in various capacities. During the last few years, I was an Assistant Director in charge of Special Investigations.

B: During that time you were with the FBI--toward the latter part of your service--didn't you serve as kind of a liaison between the FBI and the Attorney General?

E: Using the word liaison in its most informal sense, I think this is true.

B: There's one question that future scholars are going to note and would probably wonder at the omission. During Robert Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General, there was a rather well publicized dispute between him and J. Edgar Hoover over electronics surveillance. Can you shed any light on that?

E: Ever since this so-called dispute first became public, I have refrained from making any comment with regard to it on the basis that the subject matter involved relates so closely to the internal security of the United States that I have felt it would be unwise to comment in any way for fear that some aspect of operations in this field might be compromised.

B: Are most of the salient facts about all of that on a written record somewhere that might eventually be available to scholars?

E: Yes. Once information that is now classified is declassified--and I certainly think it will be with the passage of time--then the written record will speak for itself.

B: We try in these things to give guidance for future use toward that kind of record when we can.

During this time, did you have any acquaintance with Mr. Johnson, either as a senator or Vice President?

E: I had met Mr. Johnson on a few occasions. Generally these were either social in nature or in connection with a meeting of some semi-public body such as the National Association of Governors. I didn't know Mr. Johnson personally or well, however.

B: Another area that really is somewhat touchy because it's largely personal and subjective, there was some indication that, after Mr. Johnson became President--after the assassination of President Kennedy--and after the immediate period of transition, that Mr. Johnson tended to view the Justice Department as more of a Kennedy department than a Johnson department. Did you see any evidence of this kind of thing?

E: I would suppose that the identities of the people involved might lead one to draw this conclusion. The principal assistants in the Department of Justice were, of course, Kennedy appointees. They were men of exceptional capabilities. I think they were dedicated to their careers as lawyers and to their service to the government as a whole. While they had great loyalty to President Kennedy while he was in office, nevertheless, I think it's unfair to characterize these men as being pro-Kennedy as contrasted to being pro-Johnson. They were just outstanding lawyers dedicated to seeing that justice was done.

I didn't see any evidence within the department that there was any change following Mr. Johnson's ascendancy to the presidency, other, of course, than as time passed there were new major policy decisions made that affected the department. But this is only a natural development.

B: During these years in which there were three Attorney Generals--from Robert Kennedy to Nicholas Katzenbach to Ramsey Clark--did there occur under the several Attorneys General any distinct change in tone or temperament or direction in the Justice Department?

E: I don't suppose you could find two individuals having as much difference in temperament than Robert Kennedy and Ramsey Clark, for example. Their method of approach to problems and to people and to the public was just different. But Mr. Clark came into the department, as did Mr. Katzenbach, as early appointees in the Kennedy Administration. They had worked together over a period of time, and while they were different personalities, nevertheless all three were very capable and dedicated lawyers. I don't think you could characterize the shifts in the top position as reflecting that much of a change.

B: I'm going to get off these very abstract, almost metaphysical, questions in a minute, but I have one more. During the '68 campaign and, in fact, before the '68 campaign, the Justice Department generally came in for a good deal of public criticism around the law and order issue, probably criticism that was unwarranted. But did this kind of attention affect morale within the department?

E: I would suppose that with rank-and-file employees that if a department is subject to a political attack it does have some effect, maybe only slight, but there is some there. And I can understand why. A lawyer who has devoted

twenty or twenty-five years of his life to serving the Department of Justice and thinking that he's doing his bit to preserve the law, administer the law in this country, to be subject to attack or for his department to be subject to attack, I think naturally there's going to be some reaction. We all react to criticism one way or the other. I don't think however that there was any reaction or that these charges had any discernible effect on ranking officials in the department.

B: To get into the work of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, you had retired late in '64 and entered private law practice, I believe. Then you returned to public service with the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance. How did that come about?

E: Mr. Katzenbach was Attorney General in mid-1965, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Act had been passed. The appropriation was imminent. It was necessary to get the program underway. He asked me if I would come back and assist him and the department in this effort of getting the program organized, securing a staff, and getting the operation underway. This I agreed to do on a part-time basis, and it was expected by both of us that this assignment would be of very short duration. Things developed, however. It didn't proceed as fast as we thought, so I was there for a good deal longer than the initial few weeks we anticipated.

B: Actually you stayed until the fall of '68 when that office was replaced by the new Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

E: Yes. Once we got the very limited seven million dollar a year program that the earlier act provided for underway, we were greatly concerned with the passage of permanent legislation. We had thought that certainly this would be passed by the Congress in 1967. There were several roadblocks that

developed, however, and since the legislative process continued, I stayed on to help as best I could. It was my feeling at the time that the logical end of this assignment was when the permanent legislation was enacted.

B: When Mr. Katzenbach first approached you about serving in this position, did he outline what the administration hoped the office would do?

E: Only in very general terms. I had been involved with the Organized Crime Section of the Criminal Division of the Department and with Mr. James Vorenberg and his group. I was involved in the beginning steps that were taken in connection with the appointment of the President's Crime Commission. So in general I was familiar with the legislation, the people, the program, what was being done by the Crime Commission. We didn't have any long detailed discussion.

B: Did you ever talk to Mr. Johnson about this area of the relationship between federal and local law enforcement agencies?

E: I never did. The contacts with Mr. Johnson were generally held by the Attorney General, and while I was called in in kind of an advisory capacity on a couple of occasions, I really didn't have any direct responsibility or any direct dealings with the President.

B: Did you ever form an opinion as to how great an importance the administration put upon this area?

E: I thought it was the greatest importance that any administration had ever put on this area. No president before had ever sent up such messages to the Congress on crime as did President Johnson. It just seemed to me that on every occasion he was emphasizing this. He would go out of his way to appear at relatively small gatherings, such as the Bar Association meetings, the conference at the University of Maryland. These are hardly the type affairs

that a president will go and speak, and yet President Johnson did this. It just seemed to me that his concern about crime was evidenced very strongly.

B: How extensive was the financing and personnel of the office when it began?

E: Are you talking about the initial office?

B: Yes.

E: Oh, this was very meager. When we first went up to the Congress, the administration had recommended a ten million dollar budget. This was the understanding, that it was just a temporary office, really to get things started, to experiment a little bit while the Crime Commission was conducting its hearings, and to try to establish some new methods and procedures.

The Congress reduced that requested appropriation to an actual appropriation of seven million dollars. I guess it was really seven-and-a-quarter million dollars. And for the part of the first year that remained, it seemed to me this was probably a reasonable figure. The fiscal year started July 1, and our appropriation came along in the fall. So in effect we were getting ten million dollars at an annual rate. The unfortunate thing about it was that everybody regarded this program as temporary, and when the new legislation was not passed the next year and efforts were made to enlarge the initial program, these didn't meet with favorable action from the Congress insofar as appropriations were concerned.

B: Did you conceive of the purpose of this office to be primarily planning as opposed to operational in the sense of grants and so on?

E: Oh no. I think planning was a very important part of its activity. But there was more to it than that. This office, as I saw it in the program, was responsible for beginning efforts to develop new and innovative approaches to the crime problem. And this was not just planning, but it was actually

going out and testing some of these ideas to see if they were worthwhile, to see if they were workable. So it was more than just planning.

B: Did you also conceive of it, without meaning to use the phrase invidiously, as kind of a public relations operation between the federal government and local law enforcement offices?

E: I didn't see it that way, but you may well have a point. In fact, I'm certain that it did serve as a good public relations vehicle--a new means of contact between state and local law enforcement and the federal government. This was particularly true in the police field, for example.

B: I was wondering if at the level of the operational policeman--at the state and local level--if you ever found any resentment against the federal government, that might have been, say, a kind of feedback from Supreme Court decisions.

E: Oh yes. It was there. It's probably still there today. This is one of the major areas that we're going to have to attack if we're going to progress in the criminal justice field. The responsibility that is placed upon the police officer on the street is tremendous. He is responsible every day for the safety of hundreds of people. His actions affect materially the lives of ten, fifteen, or twenty people. Whether he arrests a boy who has committed some minor infraction or whether he just warns him may change the whole life of this boy.

Here is a police officer who is charged with all of these responsibilities, who affects the lives of so many people, and yet if he has a high school education he's fortunate. At least today this is about average as far as police officers on the street are concerned. And you contrast this with the responsibility of a social worker, which really is much less. She can affect

far fewer people and fewer families. Yet you almost have to have a master's degree to be a social worker in a big city today.

So there's an imbalance here. Sure there's resentment on the part of the police officer. It's understandable. The facts haven't been explained to him. He doesn't understand the law. He doesn't realize what the Supreme Court is doing when it hands down these decisions. He sees it as an attack on his own work. Sure, there has been a reaction!

B: Am I not correct that long before the Supreme Court decisions on handling of suspects and so on, the FBI followed arrest procedures that are essentially what the Supreme Court now requires?

E: Oh, I'm sure this is true. But, once again, you have to recognize the big difference between being a police department and being an investigative agency. It was not the same situation that faces two different organizations. So, therefore, what the FBI could do a police department might not necessarily be able to duplicate.

B: Did you find that on the administrative level--at the level, of say, chief city police commissioners, state public safety directors--they welcomed the possibility of federal assistance, or was there a resentment there too?

E: With certain very limited exceptions, I don't think there was any resentment. The needs are so great--were then, and still are--for financial aid to the police that they welcomed the federal government's recognition of their problem and a willingness to do something about it in a very material way. The only real exceptions were from, shall we say, very reactionary police departments and police officials who felt that this might be an attempt to control and to dictate to them as to how they operated. But this is unfounded, too. The law specifically prohibited it.

B: In that context, you mean I gather, reactionary in the sense of set in their established procedures rather than any political connotations?

E: Oh yes. They're very staid persons, some of these old police chiefs. They've run their department one way for thirty years, and they don't see any reason why they shouldn't continue to run it the same way.

B: You mentioned that the office went beyond just planning into innovative and experimental techniques. What were some of the devices you tried?

E: There were scores of them. Let me mention one or two by way of illustration; and once again, the reports that were submitted to Congress will detail these as much as I think anybody could ultimately want. But such ideas as the determination as to whether the helicopter could replace the automobile as a patrol vehicle to prevent crime and to take action when a crime was committed; to enable one very progressive department to try training its police officers in special methods of handling family disputes, recognizing that this constitutes a great problem to the average department. They're called into a domestic squabble--it's not a criminal situation. The officer needs some special training. This is the kind of innovation that we were endeavoring to promote.

B: Did you try in this area to establish some ordering of priorities? For example, can you generalize as to whether the average city police department needs help in the area of personnel or administration or equipment? Are generalizations like that possible, or does it just depend on the department?

E: Oh, I suppose that it's going to vary from department to department, but there's almost a unanimity in the police field today that their greatest need is for training--recognizing that most police officers haven't had the benefits of higher formal education, so therefore you substitute for

this as best you can with added training in sociology, psychiatry at the layman's level, added instruction in the law and how it should be applied. This was then, and I think still is, one of the greatest needs.

B: Is the selection of personnel involved in that, too? The selection of men to be policemen?

E: Oh yes. Of course, many progressive police departments have moved well ahead in this field. More needs to be done. But we were endeavoring to encourage this kind of thing and what tests could be developed that you could give to an applicant for a position of patrolman and try and make some prediction on the basis of this as to the suitability for this type of work. Actually, there are many police departments that are moving forward, and more will come.

B: Did you find many police departments who became bemused by the mechanics and equipment?

E: Oh yes. I guess we're a nation of gadgeteers, really, and the police are no exception. Once again, looking at them and their backgrounds, and the fact that many of them have operated from inferior headquarters with old dilapidated equipment, sure, they were impressed with the idea of new modern devices and particularly if there were claims made that they could do things that they thought were important.

B: Particularly if they could get the federal government to pay for it?

E: No, I don't think this was a factor with the average police officer. He didn't much care who paid for it. He just thought if he could get it, his job would be easier and he could do it better.

B: In this matter of training, the FBI for a long time has operated the National Academy. Did your office consider the idea of using this as kind of a

nucleus for an expanded national college level police training force?

E: Oh yes. I think this was a part of President Johnson's program. It was developed separately, but in 1965 or '66--the record will reflect the exact date--the President recommended an expansion of the academy ten-fold, and several million dollars were appropriated to build in effect a new academy complex to take care of these people.

B: Did the curriculum of the academy change to emphasize these new sociological training areas?

E: Actually, I don't think the academy--the enlarged academy--is as yet even in operation because it has taken a period of time to get the buildings constructed. There was a freeze on construction for awhile and this slowed it down even more. But I don't think there's any question that the FBI is moving in this direction and that they are seeing to it that their own agents, who are instructors, are better trained and better educated in these fields. And they're bringing in outside experts to assist. They're not offering the same course now that they did twenty years ago.

B: Did your office also get involved in areas of criminal justice other than operational police departments--prison rehabilitation, court assistance?

E: Oh yes. The whole concept of the office was that criminal justice should be viewed as a system and that there had to be a relationship between the various factors in the criminal justice process--and a closer relationship. This included the police, the prosecutor, the courts, probation and parole officers, and the corrections system. So our effort was directed over this whole spectrum.

In fact, we took a clue from the state and local governments as far as the division of the limited amount of money we had available was concerned. We knew, for example, that state and local governments at that

time were spending about four billion dollars a year on criminal justice. Of this amount, some place between 60 and 65 percent was spend on the police. So, therefore, we devoted about 60 or 65 percent of our finances in the police field. But the rest was divided among the courts and the corrections system--about on a line with what the local authorities had done. We don't know necessarily that this was right, but it was really the only guideline we had.

B: Did you come to any conclusion in these areas, too, about priorities in prisons, for example? Do they need mostly physical facilities or emphasis on rehabilitation, or precisely what? Again, so far as you can generalize.

E: I would think that the best minds in this field feel that the first object of the correction system should be aimed at rehabilitation, that confinement is a secondary object. After all, society has confined criminals in one way or another for centuries and centuries. With more modern buildings and facilities this perhaps could be done better, but it still is just a confinement process. The important thing, as far as society is concerned, is to recognize that this man who is put in the penitentiary ultimately is going to come back into society. Therefore you have to do everything that it's possible to do to rehabilitate him and to try to insure that when a prisoner comes back to society he doesn't repeat his criminal offense.

The recidivism rate has been high as far as we know. Statistics are very, very limited. You can't say for certain much more than it has been high--and too high. If we're going to make a dent in the crime problem, it will have to be in reducing recidivism and cutting down this vicious circle of a man committing a crime and going to the penitentiary, getting out and committing another crime and starting the circle all over again.

B: Did your office consider grants or other assistance to what might be called pure research in the area of criminals and sociological and psychological research?

E: Yes, we did. There was a good deal of interest in this field on the part of certain members of Congress. The Crime Commission emphasized it. I think law enforcement as a whole recognized that we were never going to meet our problems by just doing more of what we had done in the past even though we did it better; that there should be new ways of meeting this problem.

The desire for change here was predicated, I think, on rapid changes in everything else. If we could send a man to the moon, then perhaps we should be able to solve these problems. It was known that the space program was predicated to a great extent on pure research, so therefore why shouldn't pure research be used in connection with the crime problem? It moved along slowly. There wasn't, of course, the financial ability to launch a great program, but one was started at any rate.

B: Did you ever discuss with Attorney General Clark this area that we've been discussing here--where the most was needed in the field of criminal justice?

E: Oh, yes. Attorney General Clark expressed great interest in the work of law enforcement assistance. He did more publicly, I think, than any other Attorney General to involve himself directly in this. He, for example, addressed the Chiefs of Police Association and the National Sheriffs group. He went to visit the Southern Police Institute at Louisville. He has a great interest in the crime problem, and I talked with him many, many times about it. As a matter of fact, every grant that was made by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance was personally approved by the Attorney General.

B: Did you get much adverse criticism from congressmen?

E: In a limited kind of way. We did some things that aroused their ire a bit. For example, the police department in the District of Columbia had an idea that if they made their department more visible then it could do a better police job. And one of the things that they wanted to do was to make their patrol cars distinctive. Previously they had been just plain black automobiles. So one of our grants provided for some research as to what color would be best and to enable them to repaint their cars and see what the effect was. One member of Congress didn't think that was a very good idea.

We also used the District of Columbia as the one area where we financed efforts in many fields. If there was concentration in any place in the country, it was here in Washington, D.C. What can you do with one system? This resulted in somewhat imbalance as far as allocation of funds were concerned, and we got some reaction from Congress on this, too.

B: I think it's clear on the record that there was this kind of an idea of using the nation's capitol as a model experimental program.

E: It may well be one reason why the permanent legislation has funds allocated to the states according to population.

B: I had not thought of that. That could be it.

E: Of course, this all ties into the whole bloc grant theory. I'm not saying that this one reason was the only basis for it.

B: I was going to ask you in a moment about the bloc versus individual grants business. Did you during this period get involved in specific events? For example, I have an idea that there was some federal assistance to the police forces in Los Angeles and Memphis in regard to the prison jail circumstances of Sirhan and James Earl Ray. Did you get involved in this?

E: This must have come along--

B: It would have been '68.

E: I was going to say it came along after my time. It was at least toward the end of my involvement. I think this may well have come from the Justice Department, but from other divisions, perhaps the Bureau of Prisons or the FBI, the litigative divisions of the department may have been involved here. But I don't have any personal knowledge of this.

B: Did your office find itself getting involved in any of the urban disorders in that period, particularly the one in Washington in April of '68?

E: We were involved to the extent that the few experts we had in the police community relations field were called upon for advice and counsel in connection with these disturbances. In addition, we helped the county as a whole by financing a series of educational conferences for the chiefs of police and for mayors, city managers, to review what had been done, to try and learn from the past what might be a better approach in the future if additional disturbances arose.

B: Some of these involved controversy. The urban disorders created a number of disputes--for example, the one on the treatment of looters, whether or not to shoot looters. Did your office get in this?

E: No, I think this is essentially a political decision. This is not a law enforcement decision. There really wasn't any way that we would have become involved in this. Obviously, the Attorney General took a very firm position, as was entirely proper as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States. But for an office that's concerned solely with financing and with trying to improve operations, it wouldn't have been within our province, I think, to get involved in that, so we didn't.

B: During this period I assume the preparation for what became the permanent legislation was going on--that is, the legislation involved in the Omnibus Bill of '68.

E: Oh yes, this had a rather long and torturous route through Congress.

B: Before it got to Congress, what about the drafting of it? What kind of route did that have?

E: Generally, I guess it followed rather normal procedures in the department. The Attorney General himself was greatly concerned. There were numerous conferences as to what the proposed legislation should say. We had many, many talks about it. I don't want to say disputes, but there was some difference of opinion.

Initially we started out with an idea, for example, that we should try and put more dollars into the criminal justice system by requiring the states to increase their previous effort before they would become eligible for this additional federal aid. But we soon found out through conferences with state and local government officials that we probably wouldn't accomplish this because of the availability of other federal dollars to do other things where the matching ratio wouldn't have been nearly so high.

If it's going to cost a city a dollar-and-a-half to get a federal dollar to do something in the police field and only one dollar to get a federal dollar to improve the sewer system or provide a Head Start program or anything else, we were told--and I think with some justification--that we might lose in the competition for these local dollars. So we got away from that idea and went back to just the standard approach that you have to maintain your effort. You can't substitute federal dollars for local dollars, but anything additional would be just on the established ratio.

B: Was there anything that you would have liked to have had in that proposal that didn't get in it as it was present to Congress?

E: As it was presented, I think it was a reasonably good piece of legislation. As it was passed, however, I have a rather strong personal feeling that the amount of support available for research, for providing a means for seeking new and better ways, is restricted. There just isn't enough money there. I guess that can be provided more in the future. The legislation did set up a national institute. I hope that it can be adequately financed and move forward.

But in the shuffle, some things were lost. The statute doesn't provide for fellowships at the present time, for example. I think these are needed as well for training at the operations level and for elementary education.

B: Before the bill went to Congress, while it was still in the drafting stage, did you within the Justice Department consider this question of bloc versus individual grants?

E: I think you could say that it was considered, but the overwhelming majority involved in this felt that it would be better if the federal government could deal directly with large metropolitan areas rather than having to go through the states. This was predicated on the fact that state government lacks experience in many of these fields. A state government will have jurisdiction in the police field over a very small number of officers who comprise the state police force of one kind or another, whereas the great majority--practically all police activities--is under control of county and city governments. So it was felt that this was a needless channel--to go through the states. Particularly in the relation to large metropolitan areas, more could be accomplished faster if there were a direct channel.

B: Did you find in your experience that within the states there's a certain amount of rivalry between the municipal governments and the state governments in police areas? Or a certain amount of potential resentment on the part of the cities against state interference?

E: Oh yes. My friends in state government wouldn't particularly like to hear me say so, but that rivalry exists; the jealousy exists. There are too many examples of difficulties between cities and state governments not to make it obvious.

B: Of course that bill as proposed by the administration underwent considerable changes in Congress. Were you called upon to testify on some of these areas that were questioned by congressmen?

E: No, I was not personally. Of course, I went up several times with the Attorney General, but he took the lead and he did practically all of the testifying himself. There were several occasions when the Attorney General was testifying and some particularly detailed point might be raised where he didn't have the facts at his fingertips--although he had most of them--when he would turn to me and ask if I would explain, or if I would take this particular question and answer it for the committee. So in that sense I testified, but only as a back-up man for the Attorney General.

B: I gather you don't approve of the change in the grants--the substitution of bloc for the individual grants.

E: I didn't approve of it at the time. I don't approve of it now, but it is the law and rather than making any immediate change, I would like to see the states given an opportunity and let's find out how it's going to work out. They really haven't had a chance yet to put the law into operation, so let's go along and not change immediately. Let's have some real experience,

and then the Congress can make an intelligent judgment.

B: You know, an outsider reading the newspapers at that time got the opinion that a good deal of Congress' activity was motivated either by emotional reasons or political reasons specifically aimed at the Attorney General. For example, the change in the character of the board of the new Administration could be, I think, interpreted as an attempt to limit the Attorney General's power in this area. Is that just a wild guess, or would you agree that there was some--

E: There's some justification for that assumption--not much. The bill came out of the House, even with all its changes, without this kind of a feature. There was much activity in the subcommittee in the Senate along this line. In fact, the subcommittee was seriously considering making this as independent agency outside the Department of Justice. The Attorney General prevailed in his discussions with the committee--at least with the full committee--and they came back to the concept that this would be an administration under his supervision and control.

B: Were you considered for appointment to the permanent board of the new Law Enforcement Assistance Administration?

E: I don't think so. I told the Attorney General that I felt I had discharged my responsibility; that I wasn't seeking such a position, and that I felt it was time for me to be relieved and for somebody else to come in. So I don't think I was considered on it. Certainly, I told everybody I didn't want it.

B: You were finished with that temporary job you started about three years before?

E: Yes, I thought I was through with that job.

B: Actually, you're still active in that area. We were talking before the interview started here, your work with the law firm here deals with federal-state relations in criminal justice.

E: Yes, I do some of that. I have many friends in state government--many governors and state attorneys general. Some of them have asked me privately to help their particular state with a particular problem, and this I've been glad to do.

B: Sir, is there anything else you think should be added to a record of this sort? Looking back over your service with the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, is there any accomplishment that stands out that we haven't mentioned; or something left undone you would have liked to have done?

E: I think that the important accomplishment here was, of course, the creation of the permanent program, the arousing interest on the part of the academic world, a broader reflection of interest on the part of commerce and business, so that for the first time in this country we're beginning to get across the idea that criminal justice is a system, that the problems have to be considered as a whole, and they have to be attacked as a whole. The means for starting to do this are now at hand, and I think this really is the greatest accomplishment.

B: Do you feel that perhaps there is still some education yet to be done along the lines that ultimately law enforcement is a local problem, not a national problem? I was thinking, the recent presidential election involved a good deal of sometimes heated debate about the federal responsibility for crime, whereas there isn't any federal police force.

E: No. This is true, but I guess philosophically the country perhaps has said there's a federal responsibility because only the federal government seems to have financial means to try to do something about it.

We've proceeded in the last forty or fifty or sixty years through many fields where the federal government was called upon to provide assistance,

going all the way back, I guess, to the building of the railroads across the nation, the founding of colleges, the aid to agriculture in the 1930's.

The last two principal areas of life in our society that haven't received federal aid were education and law enforcement. And the country backed into education very slowly. It was all right to found colleges three-quarters of a century ago, but under today's conditions they would perhaps build buildings--make loans for buildings--but they wouldn't get directly involved in education. This has moved along.

Now we're to the position of law enforcement, and the federal government is assisting financially--again, on the premise that state and local government have responsibility, but they're just aiding--supplying the means to discharge this responsibility. And I think there's a reason for this because these are two areas of life that are very important to people.

Really though, there's a great deal more education to be done, because we now have law enforcement units in communities that are too small and lack financial resources to supply the kind of services that the citizens should have. So therefore we may have in the future some realignment of jurisdiction with regard to criminal justice agencies.

B: Would this be, for example, the concept of metro-government in which a city and a county combine all their facilities as well as law enforcement?

E: This is the most recent example. But I'm also thinking that there's going to have to be some consolidation in government on a nation-wide basis. For example, we have midwestern states, essentially rural, where we have from eighty-five to a hundred counties in each state. Each county has a sheriff, a county jail, a county court. Some of these counties are not only in the Midwest. California has one county with 5,000 people in it. The

counties can't afford to supply the service that's needed. And with modern transportation and people being able to get further away from home to secure service, with the service getting to people faster, perhaps we can have some consolidation. In Cook County, Illinois, there are over forty individual police departments. Here we're getting into a metropolitan area. A person driving down the street hardly knows what city he's in, what town he's in, or where to turn for help if he needs it from law enforcement.

There will come a consolidation. It will be slow. It will come about, I think, because they start to consolidate services first. Forty-four police departments could have one dispatching unit; they don't need forty-four. They can have one records system, one laboratory. This perhaps will come first, and then ultimately we'll get around to providing society with units of criminal justice that are large enough to be efficient and do the job.

B: And the federal government would play the part of a catalyst in this kind of change?

E: This was our original intention under the Omnibus Crime Bill. As it stands now, however, the ability of the federal government to act as a catalyst is somewhat restricted, because really its only power to do anything is to approve or disapprove on overall plan that a state submits. And this is entirely different than being able to hold out a promise that x-number of dollars would be given if a certain improvement were made.

B: That's the difference between the bloc and the individual grant system.

E: Right. But by the same token states have the same problem with counties and other local units of government.

B: I was going to say--presumably such consolidation could be done by the state

authority.

E: Yes. But once again, as I said, the states have this problem, too. It's not just the federal government with the states; it's the states with the local units.

B: Anything else that you think should be mentioned here, sir?

E: No, I think not.

B: Please don't let my questions restrict you. If there's something I've omitted to cover, by all means let's do it.

E: No, I think you've been very thorough.

B: All right, sir, thank you very much.

E: Very good.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Courtney A. Evans

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Courtney A. Evans, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.
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Courtney A. Evans

Date

March 27, 1972

Accepted

Harry J. Middleton
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Date

5/24/73