INTERVIEWEE: JAMES A. FARLEY

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

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JBF: Mr. Farley, to begin, tell us something about your background, how you came to get into politics.

F: Well, I was born and raised in a little community called Grassy Point in the town of Stony Point in Rocklin County, New York. It's about Thirty-five miles north of New York City on the West Shore Railroad and borders right on the Hudson River. I started in politics when I was twenty-one, by first being elected Democratic County Committeeman in my election district, which in those days--there were three election districts in the town. And several years later I was elected Town Clerk in that town, served four two-year terms, was twice elected Supervisor of the town for two terms of two years each--

JBF: What was a Supervisor?

F: Supervisor is the chief fiscal officer in the town. He handles the town's monies, taxes when collected come to him, and they are deposited in the name of the town, but he is the supervisor and the custodian of the funds. And he presides at the meetings of the Town Board and in those days of the Board of Health--they were later consolidated. They have monthly meetings of the Town Board. Now the town has grown, so they probably have them every week. I served my last term as Supervisor--I ran for the Assembly. I was elected in the 1922 election, when Governor Alfred Smith was reelected Governor. So I served one term in the state legislature. At that time there was a bill introduced known as the Mullengage Enforcement

Act which was the enforcement act for the--to carry out the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment in the State of New York. It had been passed in the preceding session of the legislature. So I voted for the repeal of that act even though my county was very predominantly dry. I thought it--I was against the Eighteenth Amendment and believed and felt that it should be repealed. So I voted "wet," as they termed it, and in that fall election I was defeated for reelection. After that, Governor Smith appointed me.

JBF: On a wet-dry issue?

F: On a wet-dry issue. Governor Smith appointed me to a position known as a port warden of the Port of New York later on and that position had to do with examining cargos--of freighters when they arrived to see whether or not the hatches were battened down so that in the event that there was any spoilage of cargo by water, virtue of water getting in the hole of the ship or into the bows of the ship, whichever way you want to put it, they made their report and the insurance companies paid for the services rendered by the port wardens and their report frequently had to do with claims that were made for damaged cargo. I served there for a year or more, and the Republicans reduced the number when they came into power and control of the Senate a year later. They controlled, they reduced the port warden's positions from nine members of the board to five, and they eliminated the four Democrats, and I happened to be one. So, later on, in 1924, Governor Smith appointed me as a member of the State Athletic Commission which had charge of--supervision of boxing affairs in the State of New York, and I served at that position, I served as Chairman from 1925 until I retired to go to Washington on March 4, 1933.

JBF: You were Chairman during the famous Dempsey-Tunney days?

F: That's right. And I voted to prevent the fight from coming to New York, because before I had become a member of the commission, they had voted not to let Dempsey fight in New York unless he defended his title against Harry Wells, who was a colored fellow, and was a great fighter and a fine gentleman. And there was a terrific amount of pressure upon the part of the hotel people and business interests in the City of New York to get me to vote to permit the fight to be held in New York, but I felt that the resolution--that he was a proper contender--and I felt that the resolution, the provisions of it, should be carried out, and so I voted against the fight coming to New York. My vote and the vote of another member of the Licensing Commission prevented the fight from coming here, and they went to Philadelphia where they had a record gate and then later on they went to Chicago where they had another record gate. Now, I remained as a member of the Commission during all of the years, from the start as I told you, in about 1924, until I retired on March--February 28, I think it was, February 28, 1933, when I went to Washington as Postmaster General under President Roosevelt. And then I served as a member of that Cabinet from March 4, 1933, to August 31, 1940. At that time, of course, I also resigned as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. But before I tell about that resignation, I'll go back and say that in 1928 when Governor Smith was nominated for the Presidency in Houston, when they came back to New York, I was elected Secretary of the Democratic State Committee at Governor Smith's suggestion, and remained as Secretary of the Democratic State Committee for those next two years. I, with several others, managed Governor Roosevelt's campaign for the governorship. Governor Smith persuaded Governor Roosevelt to run

for the governorship to help the situation in New York State. He did run, and he was elected by something under 30,000 votes, and Governor Smith lost the state and of course he lost the election to President Hoover.

JBF: Roosevelt ran well ahead of the national ticket--

F: He ran well ahead of the national ticket. Well, then, I remained as Secretary of the Democratic State Committee during those following two years and a convention that was held in upstate New York in 1930; in the early fall of 1930 at the state convention, I was elected chairman of the Democratic State Committee, and I conducted Mr. Roosevelt's campaign for reelection as Governor, and he carried the state by over 725,000 that year which was a record vote for any candidate for Governor on either ticket. So after he was elected, reelected Governor, the night after the election, the day after the election, I made the prediction that, in my judgment, he would be the nominee for the presidency in 1932 and would be elected President. Well, anyway, after 1931 got underway, I started actively in behalf of the President's--Roosevelt's campaign for the presidency, writing letters and communicating with leaders, and in June 1931, I went across the country on a trip--ostensibly I was to go to an Elks Convention in Seattle and the newspapermen used to kid me about it. They would say I was an Elk on a tour. But on the way out, I was gone I think eighteen or nineteen days, and I visited Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, and--Minnesota--and I went through South Dakota. I think the meeting was held at Aberdeen, and I went over to Missouri, and I saw the people in Montana, and I saw the people in Spokane, and I saw Senator Dill in Spokane. I saw some of the Idaho people who came over to either Seattle or Oregon, I have forgotten which at the time,

and I spent a day or so in Seattle. Went on to Portland, Oregon; San Francisco; on to Reno. From Reno to Cheyenne; Cheyenne to Denver; Denver to Omaha; Omaha to Kansas City; and back to Chicago and home. And when I got home, the morning I got home I issued a statement and said that in my judgment President Roosevelt was certain to be nominated on the first ballot in Chicago and would be elected and would carry, in my judgment, every state but two. Now this was in July of 1931, west of the Mississippi River. And the fact remains that he carried every state west of the Mississippi River, and he carried--the states he lost were in the East--Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Delaware, and Pennsylvania, I think he lost Connecticut, but he lost six states, and he carried all the others. And then after he was elected--when he was elected--when the inauguration took place--before that, he had named me as Postmaster General, and I served from March 4 [1933] to August 31, 1940, and I was elected, after he was nominated in Chicago in 1932, I was elected Chairman of the Democratic National Committee at the organization meeting of the Committee after the convention was over, and I served from then until, I think the date was August 17, 1940, when I retired as National Chairman because I didn't believe in the third term, and I opposed him on that, and my relations with him were severed as of the end of September. However, in the conversation I had with him at Hyde Park before the convention, when he finally told me he was going to run for President, I knew he was going to run all the time but he didn't tell me until that day which was a week before the convention; as a matter of fact I came back from Chicago to have him tell me. And that's another story, of course. And then, but I did agree to remain as Chairman of the Democratic State Committee because the leaders in the party wanted

me to do that, and I didn't want to see him lose the state because I didn't believe in a third term, and I appointed a campaign manager named Vincent Daley, and he was campaign manager--ostensibly the campaign manager. He was the front man, and he was the one who used to hold the press conferences every day, but I used to see the newspapermen. But I remained in that office all of that time. Every day I was down there and put in a full day, consulted with the leaders and did everything I could, and I remained as national--state chairman until after the convention in Chicago in 1944 when he was nominated for a fourth term. And I felt that I should get away from the state committee then. I had served my time. I had served fourteen years as state chairman consecutively. That was longer than any other man in the history of the state, and I had served eight years as chairman of the national committee. Other men have served, I think, that long, maybe some longer. I think August Belmont, I think, served from 1860 to 1872. Then I served as Postmaster General from March 4, 1933, until August 31, 1940. I think, up to that time, longer than any other man except Postmaster General [Albert Sidney] Burleson from Texas, who served during the entire period of President Wilson's administration. You see, I served about five or six months less than an eight-year term.

JBF: You held down then two really full-time jobs.

F: I held down--three were full-time jobs. And the Republicans used to refer to me as three-job Jim.

JBF: Could we pause just a moment and go back to the Houston convention because that has some pertinence. You know this Catholic issue was one of the big issues used against Al Smith in '28, and then, of course, it was in Houston that a generation later John F. Kennedy had this meeting

with Protestant ministers that is generally credited with having dissolved the issue once and for all, and I thought that if you could recall something of the conditions in Houston at the time in 1928.

F: Well, before I do that, I might mention that I was elected a delegate to the Democratic National Convention and appeared in the Democratic Convention which was held in New York City in 1924, when Governor Smith ran against Secretary MacAdoo for the nomination and that dragged on for a couple of [weeks]--

JBF: That was the all time champion, isn't it?

F: Right. That dragged on for two weeks, and they settled it on the one hundred and third ballot, when they finally compromised; both of them withdrew because there was no chance for either one to be nominated, and it should have been handled many ballots before that because it prevented whatever chances the Democrats had to carry the election. And they nominated John W. Davis for President and Charles Bryan, governor of Nebraska who was a brother of William Jennings Bryan, who had run for the presidency a number of times. And I was a delegate to that convention. I was a delegate for every national convention since then, up to and including the recent convention in Chicago last summer. I carried the banner for Smith when his name was placed in nomination in the convention in New York City, and I also carried the New York banner in the convention when he was nominated, placed in nomination, by Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt. Governor Roosevelt placed his name for nomination in '24 in Madison Square Garden and again in '28 in Houston. That was a very memorable convention. Of course, the religious issue was an issue in that campaign. It wasn't the dominant issue. The country was prosperous at that time, and nobody could have defeated President Hoover in that

particular election. There isn't any doubt that religion was a factor, but another factor in that particular election was the prohibition question. Most of the Southern states, while many of them were wet personally, they voted dry because that was the sentiment in the South. And, of course, that all changed in 1932, and let me go back for a moment and say that, in my judgment, no one nominated in 1928 could have beaten Mr. Hoover. But if Governor Smith had been nominated in 1932, either he or Newton Baker or Governor Richey or any of the others who were mentioned for the presidency at that time, if they were nominated in Chicago, they would have been elected, too. But none of them would have carried the country in the overwhelming manner in which Governor Roosevelt did. Governor Roosevelt was well and favorably known throughout the country. He had been elected governor of New York State in a Republican landslide, and he showed vote-getting abilities and his name--he had made a good record. And, of course, he was nominated at the convention, but the sentiment against prohibition has changed and the Republicans nominated, when they nominated Mr. Hoover they had sort of a soft issue on the wet-and-dry question. They didn't say very much about it, as I recall, and we had a fight on the convention floor for a plank urging the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. And that was carried in quite a substantial manner. I think most of the southern states voted against it, but there was an overwhelming majority for it on the West Coast and in the East, and all over the country except in the Southern states, and so that--

JBF: So it had become an economic issue to a certain extent.

F: Indeed it had, and so that, I'll never forget standing in the lobby of the Congress Hotel during that convention, and in the group was Huey Long

and Admiral Grayson, who was President Roosevelt's doctor later on, and he had also been President Wilson's doctor, and Sam Blythe, who was a very famous reporter for, used to write for the Saturday Evening Post, he was probably one of the great political reporters of his day. And then Arthur Brisbane was there. He was the chief editorial writer for William Randolph Hearst and a great newspaperman.

JBF: They were pushing Garner.

F: They were pushing Garner. And in the convention he said, somebody asked a question that talked about the Eighteenth Amendment--the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the plank the Democrats would insert into the platform. He said, "What difference does it make what plank the Democrats put in their platform urging the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment? It won't be repealed during the lifetime of any one present at this convention." And, of course, after the election, after Mr. Roosevelt was inaugurated, we started a campaign in the state legislatures, and I conducted that myself. I went all over the country and did everything I could to bring about the passage of that resolution by the state legislatures. And, incidentally, I was the only member of President Roosevelt's cabinet who didn't drink and never have, and I was the only member of the President's cabinet who spoke for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. So I went all over the country, and, anyway, it was repealed finally in December, 1933, six or seven months after Mr. Roosevelt's inauguration. And I was in Rome at that time. When I got word that Utah, which was the last state, I got a wire from Utah from Governor Blood, who was the governor of that state, advising me that the state legislature had passed the resolution urging the repeal, and that was the vote that carried the day. That was in December of 1933.

JBF: I was trying to resurrect some of the conditions under which you had to work in Houston, which was not a very pleasant convention.

F: Well, I have forgotten all the details. A special structure was built there, you know, under the direction of Jesse Jones, who was a great person in my judgment and a great friend of mine and was a great assistant to me in the years that I was in Washington. I sought his advice and wise counsel. I have forgotten, frankly, most of the details of the convention. There was plenty of excitement around--the Ku Klux Klan was operating at that time, and I remember I dropped in some meeting, it was sort of an open meeting with somebody else, and Dan Moody, who was then Governor of Texas, I think he was addressing the group, I don't know whether he was, I assumed he was against Smith, I've forgotten today, but Dan was addressing this group of people there in the Rice Hotel--I have never forgotten that meeting. I never had met Dan Moody up to that time, and I don't know whether I met him then. But I met him in the years that followed. He and I were great friends.

JBF: After you retired from your job as state chairman and left your work with the Democratic National Committee, what have you done politically since?

F: Well, I have not been active politically as such but--I've been attending all the state and national conventions since that time. I have always tried to be helpful to the party, and I have made speeches for them. In 1944, I, of course, supported Mr. Roosevelt; I didn't make speeches for him, but I supported him, openly supported him. The war was on then, and they didn't want a change of an administration. I talked to some of the people in Chicago who were active and close to his administration in those days, and they were very much opposed to having Wallace renominated

for Vice President. I was against Wallace being nominated for Vice President in 1940, and I begged Mr. Roosevelt not to put--not to nominate him, to name anybody else--name Sam Rayburn, name Barkley, name Jimmy Byrnes, name McNutt, name Jesse Jones, or anyone. There are any number of outstanding men in the party that I urged him to nominate. And I told him that in my judgment Wallace was a mystic, and I would hate to see him President of the United States. I have a great respect for the man, his courage and his integrity, but I didn't think he was the kind of fellow--

JBF: Wrong job for him.

F: Yeah, the wrong job for him. I told him that in conversation over the telephone from Chicago, and he told Wallace, and Wallace came around to my office in the Congress Hotel where I was staying, and he was very much disturbed. He said he thought I was a friend of his, and I told him I was, but that didn't mean that I would like to see him President of the United States. And he was very much distressed about it. Mr. Roosevelt, of course, had no right--he could have told him that I was opposed to him, but he had no right to tell him that I said he was a mystic--sort of a mystic character, see. And, of course, he was nominated and in the fall--in the following election they persuaded Mr. Roosevelt that Wallace on the ticket would be a detriment for Vice President. And there were a number of candidates mentioned including Mr. Truman, Senator Truman, and Lou [William O.] Douglas, and there were several others. But those two were the ones who seemed to--names seemed to be mentioned most and apparently Bob Hannigan, state and national chairman, and Flynn of New York and the other leaders of the party felt that Truman would be a better nominee than Douglas, and I think they used good judgment

at that time, and he was the nominee of the party, and he wasn't too well known at the time, and he wasn't too well known during his term--during the time he was Vice President during President Roosevelt's term, except that as Chairman of the Investigating Committee he had made quite a reputation around the country. That was before he was nominated for the vice presidency. But when he assumed the presidency in a most crucial time in the nation's history, he did an excellent job, and he soon convinced the American people that he was a man of real ability, of common sense, and great courage and great integrity. And he did much during the years of his presidency when he succeeded Mr. Roosevelt, and I think it can be truly said that he met more important decisions head-on than probably any president in the history of the country up to that time. And I think President Truman will go down in history in the first five of American Presidents. I don't think there is any question about that.

JBF: You wrote two books in this period.

F: Behind the Ballots I wrote in 1937. I told the history of my activities in the Democratic Party, how I started, and my activities in behalf of all of the Democratic candidates, and my activity in behalf of Governor Roosevelt in his candidacy for governor on two occasions and in the pre-convention fight for his nomination for President and in the management of the campaigns in 1932 and 1936. And then in 1948 I wrote another book, The Jim Farley Story, which followed up on the things that I--that happened in the intervening years, and in that I told, not in intimate detail, but quite intimate detail, as much as I could tell at the time, of why I broke with Mr. Roosevelt on the third term. Both of those books were widely circulated, and the Behind the Ballots was for many years. I don't

know whether it is now--times have changed in that sense. That's thirty years ago since that book was published. And in those days it was must reading at most of the eastern colleges of the United States and maybe in some of the western and southern colleges where they taught science of government or politics--Yale, Harvard, and all those colleges in the East. Princeton and others, and many others probably too numerous to mention. But that was one of the books that they were asked to read whenever they started to write about politics or government.

JBF: When did you first become aware of Lyndon B. Johnson?

F: Well, I first met Lyndon when he was secretary to Dick Kleberg.

JBF: That early?

F: That early. Dick was a Congressman from the Corpus Christi district. And I can always remember Dick. He would come down with his Texas hat on and his boots and all that, you know. He was quite a character. On one occasion I went down and visited him with my son Jimmy. Jimmy was about eighteen at the time, and we spent the night around the ranch there with Dick and a number of others--Tom Armstrong and a number of other neighboring ranchers. And my boy Jimmy was with me. We rode around in a jeep. He was at that time attending New York Military Academy in Cornwall, New York, and was knocking rabbits off like apples from a tree. He got quite a kick out of it, and so did I. So I saw a great deal of Dick during those days, and Lyndon used to come down to my office in those days with messages from Dick. Maybe I assume my messages, recommendations for Postmasters or other matters that came before the Postmaster General's office. And then I saw him a great deal during that period. And then he was appointed by Mr. Roosevelt to a position there--was it the Youth Administration position as State Director, and

I remember full well in the Congress, and I remember full well his election to the Senate. It was a very close election.

JBF: Do you remember the campaign of 1941 that he ran against W. Lee O'Daniel and lost?

F: Yes, I do. I remember that.

JBF: One of the charges at that time was--that O'Daniel used with some success was playing on some of the anti-New Deal feeling and was that the national party was pouring money in on Johnson's campaign and that in a sense he was not going to be a Texas Senator but just a rubber stamp to the government.

F: Well, I don't know anything about pouring money in there, but I know full well--I remember full well that the administration was very much interested in his campaign and wanted to see him elected. Now the question of money--I would have no knowledge of that. That's a long time ago. Now, of course, Governor O'Daniel was perfectly justified in using that argument against Lyndon if--whether it was justified or not, whether the facts were--in the campaign many charges are made and much of it unfair. So he probably figures that maybe there was a feeling against the administration in Texas, and he would take full advantage of that feeling if any existed to try to get that support back of him as against Lyndon.

JBF: He was trying to appeal to Texas pride as against any outside influence. Do you recall the senatorial campaign of 1948 that was such a squeaker for Mr. Johnson?

F: Yeah, he won by less than a thousand votes, didn't he?

JBF: Eighty-seven.

F: Eighty-seven votes. There was a recount, wasn't there, at the time?

JBF: Right.

F: I watched it with much interest. I've forgotten the details of that, but I knew Lyndon--felt as those he--I knew him intimately and knew him well and was very much interested in that campaign. Of course, I was very much interested when the final tabulation showed that he was elected and the election was certified by the proper authorities in Texas.

JBF: You weren't called upon for any role in the '48 election--advisory or otherwise?

F: No. And frankly I haven't been called in very often since. When Governor Stevenson ran against General Eisenhower, I openly supported him and did what I could for him. But there wasn't any chance for anyone to defeat General Eisenhower, then. He was a world war hero and his name--

JBF: And altogether too pleasant a person, really.

F: That's right. I'll never forget, I saw him in Paris. He was in NATO. I called on him one day with a friend, an associate, of mine in Paris. At that time I kidded him. I said, "This is a Tammany Hall Democrat calling on you, and I'm probably one of the few persons who will call on you who is going to tell you he thinks you are going to be nominated. He thinks you are going to be elected, and he won't vote for you." And he said, "Well, that's all very interesting." He was in a dark room, a bedroom, and he had dark glasses on. He had what we called, when I was a boy, pink-eye. Now they refer to it as conjunctivitis. And I guess you get a cold in the eye just like you do anywhere else. But they treat those things differently now, those ailments. And he laughed, you know. And he hadn't announced at that time, and he asked me why I thought he was going to be nominated. "Well," I said, "I think the Republicans would nominate Taft if they thought they could elect him.

They like Taft, he has been a great party stalwart, but they want to win if they can, and you look like the fellow that they think can win and I think you can, and I think they'll nominate you, and I think you'll be elected." "Well, now after getting me nominated, you said you wouldn't vote for me." I said, "No." And he said, "Why?" "Well," I said, "I've been a delegate to every Democratic Convention up until this one, and I'll be a delegate to this one, and I'm a party man, and I'll vote for the nominee at the convention." He said, "That's fair enough." And in years that followed, whenever I called on him or saw him to pay my respects, he'd always refer to me as his Tammany Hall friend.

JBF: I see.

F: He was a fine man, and it's marvelous the way he's recovered from this recent attack--it's terrific. And miraculous, to say the least.

JBF: Actually, you will recall in 1948, there was some speculation whether he was going to be a Democrat or a Republican.

F: That's right. There were a number of Democrats, including Jimmy Roosevelt and Mayor [William] O'Dwyer of New York. I think they said [Mayor Frank] Hague of New Jersey and there were others--very strong outstanding Democratic leaders in the party. I remember those three in particular. There were undobtedly others, too, who did, or tried to get him to accept the Democratic nomination at that time. And of course he hadn't indicated what his politics was. But apparently he was Republican-minded, and he probably had a Republican background, if he had any political background at all. And I don't think that they had much difficulty in persuading him to run as a Republican rather than as a Democrat. He would have been elected on whatever ticket he was nominated on, at that time.

JBF: Did Mr. Johnson, in his younger Congressional days, ever ask you for any advice on how to approach a campaign?

F: No, I doubt very much if he ever did. No, I think that whenever I saw him during those years, it had to do with matters that came before me as Postmaster General and as National Chairman, but he never sought, as I recall, my advice on anything of a political nature at that time. I don't know that I was that close to him in those days, frankly. I got closer to him in the years that followed when, particularly when he became the leader of the Senate, I saw much of him in those days and in the years that followed.

JBF: Well, let's move up to the 1950's. There was a slight boom for Mr. Johnson in 1956, when Stevenson was renominated. It never really got started, and then, of course, there was that beautiful dog fight between Kennedy and Kefauver for the vice presidency, in which Mr. Johnson supported Kennedy, and Kefauver won, which I always thought was a great thing for Kennedy because he wasn't associated with losing causes. Do you have any recollections of that particular event?

F: I don't remember that incident, but I supported--you see, when the nomination for the vice presidency was made at that time, Wagner, Mayor Wagner of New York was also interested, and his friends were interested in his behalf. And so I seconded the nomination of Wagner. I've forgotten who nominated him, or placed his name in nomination. But I seconded his nomination for the vice presidency in a short, brief few minute nominating seconding speech. And, of course, he never had any chance, and as the balloting took place, New York finally went over and supported Kennedy, as I recall it, as against Kefauver, and Kefauver won the nomination. Now I thoroughly agree with you that, had Kennedy run for Vice President at that time, he probably wouldn't have been the nominee for the presidency in '60.

JBF: Did you have any active part at all in the pre-convention strategy in 1960?

F: No, none at all. I used to see Lyndon frequently, and I, of course, never really made any announcement. At different times I talked to him, and I also talked to Sam about it--Sam Rayburn--and I said, "He's certainly going to have to announce his candidacy if he wants people to come out for him." At different times I said that, in my judgment, the best ticket to nominate would be Johnson and Kennedy, in that order. And I felt very keenly about that and said so, and Lyndon knew how I felt about him at that time. But he never really made a real fight for the presidency until almost the very end, and he'd hardly, I've forgotten just how he announced his candidacy or permitted it to be announced. I don't know whether he ever did as such.

JBF: I don't think it was ever actually announced, formally.

F: I think that he had the wrong--at that time--let me put it this way--I felt that he thought that his position in the Senate as the Senate leader and the influence of Sam Rayburn in the House was sufficient to have influence with the governors and the delegates of a lot of states that would enable him to get those delegates, but the history of the Democratic Party is such that, in my judgment, as a rule, the governors don't have as much influence on the delegation and neither do the Senators or the Congressmen as do the political leaders of the state--the State Chairman and the national committeemen. They, more or less, select the delegates and they, more or less, run that show, and in many places the governors, for their own political advancement and rather than get into any difficulties, they don't take as much leadership as it is assumed they do in the selection of delegates. Now it was true, up to that time.

What's happened in recent years is something else. But I think he had the mistaken idea that his influence in the Senate and the influence that Sam had in the House would be sufficient maybe to put him over and nominate him without the necessity of going through the campaign. And, of course, if that was his judgment at the time, it wasn't good judgment.

JBF: Right. Well, I have talked to any number of his campaign workers in that pre-convention campaign, and they have all complained that he wouldn't turn them loose to work and that they felt that they were hampered, and they never really got started in time.

F: Well, I know people around New York that were very anxious to be for him. But they never got the green light, so to speak. I don't know if he ever made an official announcement that he was a candidate, did he?

JBF: No, he didn't.

F: I remember he appeared before the Democratic Convention or the Democratic delegates from New York in the hotel there in Los Angeles and made his plea. But at that time there was no--he had a few votes I think in the delegation. Vic D'Anfuso from Brooklyn, and maybe a few others. I voted for Kennedy in that delegation because I felt that he was, frankly, in it as much as Lyndon didn't make any move, and I couldn't wait until the last minute. So the sentiment in New York was for Kennedy, and I went along with that sentiment. But I was delighted, I'll never forget, I had a long talk with Sam Rayburn. I ran into him at breakfast the morning after the nomination for the presidency and there hadn't been any official word as to what was going to happen on the vice presidency and Sam was very much opposed, at that particular time of the morning, against Lyndon accepting the nomination for Vice President. He said to me, "He'd be stronger in the Senate. Why give up the Senate's leadership to run for

Vice President?" "Well," I said, "listen." And my son Jimmy was with me at the time. I'll never forget that. I argued with Sam that it was highly important that he accept the nomination for the vice presidency if it was offered to him, because it would be a great thing for the ticket. It would be a great thing for the party, a great thing for the country, and it wouldn't do any harm, even if the ticket lost, he would still be the dominant leader in the Senate, and there was no--Sam was rather vehement at that particular--well, it could have been seven or eight o'clock that morning. But of course his mind--the events that followed in the hours that followed changed the picture, and I never talked--I think I talked to Sam once after when it was officially announced, and I went up and kidded him; he rather smiled and said that "it was the right thing to do for him to accept it. I changed my mind." I didn't go into details with Sam as to any discussions that took place and there was no reason why--he would have told me anything I wanted to know, but I didn't ask him. But at that particular hour of the morning, he was very much opposed to it. I assume you know that, too, don't you, or do you?

JBF: Right.

F: I don't know what his attitude was, and I think that morning, I think he told me that Lyndon was in a receptive mood, and he had argued with him about it--if my memory serves me, I think he told me that. Do your facts justify that? But I can still remember that breakfast. We went over and sat with him. He was there eating alone.

JBF: Did Mr. Rayburn, as far as you know, contact Johnson to urge him before the convention to get his campaign under way?

F: I would assume so, but I don't know anything about that.

JBF: I see. You must have had some idea, then, that after Kennedy was nominated, that he was going to offer the vice presidency--

F: No, I had no knowledge of it.

JBF: You were just guessing?

F: No, I had no knowledge of it. I wasn't close to the Kennedy picture at all. Now, before Senator Kennedy was nominated for the presidency, that day before the nomination, he sent for me and Bobby came up to my apartment. I had an apartment on the floor above, I guess it was the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles. I've forgotten which hotel. I think that's the one. But he had an apartment on the floor below, and Bobby came up to my apartment and asked me if I would go down to see his brother. He said he would come up but there were such crowds in the corridor that he had difficulty in getting through. I went down there, and I sat with him. And he asked me a lot of questions about the campaign. He was assured of the nomination at that time. It was obvious that he was going to be nominated, and he asked me a lot of questions about the campaign, and if I was running his campaign the same as I ran Mr. Roosevelt's, what would I do and what kind of an attitude would I take and what states would I concentrate on. And we had quite a discussion for half an hour or more. And before we left I said, "Now, I'm going to presume to make an observation. And you don't have to comment." I said, "There are all kinds of rumors that if you are nominated and elected, and I believe you will be, you're likely to nominate Stevenson as Secretary of State." I said, "Don't do that." I said, "I think it would be a mistake. I think he is a fine man, fine character, but I don't think he is tough enough for that position. He is a very intelligent man, and I think he's wonderful. But you ought to give a lot of consideration to

that post before you nominate him. I think that in expressing this viewpoint, and I have no personal feelings against the man, I have a lot of respect and admiration for him, but I think I'm expressing a viewpoint of a lot of other friends of yours that would not like to see you make that decision." Well, anyway, he was finally nominated. And after he was nominated he sent for me again. Bobby came up, and I went down the following day and I talked along the lines of our previous discussion. And I said, "May I go back to the Stevenson observation?" He said, "Yes." And then I repeated what I had to say, "hope you never do that." And he said, "It's a funny thing." He always called me general. He said, "It's a funny thing, general. I just can't get through to Stevenson or quite make him out." He said he could sit in a room with a lot of men there, he's very quiet, he doesn't enter into the conversations the way that other fellows do. In other words, he couldn't quite--apparently they didn't--they never could get together. Now that happens, you know, you can know them and like them, but you just can't communicate. That's with one another, like you can with another fellow. I felt that way about Stevenson. I made at that convention, before that convention--earlier that year in January I was having breakfast in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel and a fellow named Roy Ownes, he's a real estate man in Los Angeles, and he was the head of the Rotary Club. At that time, it had been indicated that the convention was coming to Los Angeles, or going there. And he said, "Jim, you will be out there during the convention." And he said, "I'll be chairman. I'll be doing my term as president, and I would like you to address the weekly meeting of the club during the convention." Now, I said, "Roy, that's all right. I'll do it." So, I went out and delivered an address at that luncheon club

and then I made a short talk, maybe ten to fifteen minutes, and I took a shot at Stevenson and said that I didn't think he would be a good man to nominate for the presidency because sending Stevenson to negotiate with Khrushchev was like sending the cabbage patch to the goat. See, it was a rather rough observation. Well, it appeared in the newspapers and Bill Blair, who was very close to him and his law partner was afterwards made Ambassador to Denmark and later to the Philippines, and he was in the Philippines until within the last year. And he wrote me a mean letter--not a mean letter, it was all right--criticizing me, and he said that Stevenson, if he ran for the presidency in the convention, could get more votes than I did in the convention when I ran against Mr. Roosevelt in 1940. So I wrote a jocular reply, and I told him that I wasn't a candidate for the presidency, that I was merely the repository for votes of those who didn't--as was Mr. Garner--of those who didn't believe in the third term or of those who, like myself, was not in sympathy with a third term--Mr. Roosevelt knew I wasn't--give them an opportunity to have a candidate to vote for. I sought no votes and was in no sense a candidate, and the only reason I let my name go in the convention and the primaries in Massachusetts was to prevent a fight. You see, it was said that Mr. Garner was going to enter, and I'm sure he wouldn't, but [Burton K.] Wheeler and [Millard] Tydings and Joe Kennedy and others were being talked of for the presidency in those days and the leader up there, a fellow name Bill Burck, the state chairman, thought that if I would let my name go in, that would hold the delegation and prevent a primary fight. So I went over and talked to Mr. Roosevelt about it, and he said it was all right. Well, I said, "Now don't say it's all right and then a few weeks later tell me it was a mistake and I shouldn't have done it

or tell somebody else that you couldn't say no to me. If you don't think it's the thing to do, tell me now." And that's exactly what happened. Two weeks later Dave Walsh, the Senator from Massachusetts, came over to me, and he said, "Why, I just left the President and he started talking to me about your name being in the primaries." I said, "Now, Dave, before you tell me anything about your conversation with him, I want to tell you of my conversation with him--how I let my name go in, and why." And I put it up to him that "You don't have to say yes now if you don't want to." "Well, he said, "that's just what happened this morning. He told me that he couldn't say no to you." Now I went in to protect the delegation for [Cordell] Hull; you see, he was for Hull and I was for Hull and that was the basis on which I had my conversation with him. And I said, now if my name goes in I can hold that delegation for Hull when he's ready to make his move. And I said as you indicated, you're a--and I am. It was a funny situation. And you see, then, they were, under the rules and laws of the State of Massachusetts, they were obligated to vote for me on the first ballot but Mr. Roosevelt apparently and those around him felt that if that did happen, and there were other scattering votes for me and for Mr. Garner, it would show that approximately a third of--a quarter--of the convention might be opposed to the third term. And I think he was fearful to have the record that way because we abrogated the two-thirds rules at the Philadelphia Convention. And I engineered that. I visited with all the delegations, the leaders of the delegations, to make sure that we had on the resolutions committee which handled that motion for the abrogation of the two-thirds rule; you see, a lot of the southern states were opposed to that.

JBF: It would have saved you a lot of trouble in 1924, wouldn't it?

F: That's right. And so I did everything I could to bring that about in Philadelphia, and Senator Bennett Clark from Missouri handled it, and John O'Connor, who was Congressman from New York, he handled it, too. And we abrogated the rule then. But I don't think he wanted to see those votes recorded because I was getting scattering votes around the country--people who felt as I did. And, anyway, the only conversation I had with Mr. Roosevelt over the telephone during that convention was about something and I mentioned that to him. I said, "Now, Mr. President, why don't you stop that situation in Massachusetts? Don't ask those delegates to violate the rules of the party and the laws of the state. Let them vote for me on the first ballot." There's only going to be one ballot, and at the conclusion of the role call, they could, before the result is announced, they and the others, I did myself in New York, I went before the convention and asked that the votes recorded for me in New York. I moved the nomination by acclamation. So did Sam. Sam got up for Mr. Garner and did that. The record shows all that. And he said he'd try to do it, but he didn't. Now John McCormack was Speaker of the House and a lot of those other people. [Harry] Hopkins got them to do that. They shouldn't have done that at the time. But young Joe Kennedy, Jack Kennedy's brother, was a delegate to the convention. He went to Arthur Krock, the political reporter for the Times, and he asked Krock what he should do. And Krock said, "You're instructed to vote for Farley in the primary. Don't you start a political career by running out on a commitment like that. Vote for Farley." And they polled the delegation, you know, and he voted for me in the delegation.

JBF: To come back to 1960, did you take any part at all in the campaign?

F: Oh, yes, I made speeches around. Oh, yes. I've forgotten at the moment, the record will show, but I--oh, yes, I did everything I could.

JBF: Did you appear with Mr. Johnson, as you recall?

F: I don't know whether I appeared with him or not, but I remember the day that Kennedy toured Brooklyn, that night he toured Brooklyn. I was with him during that entire tour, and I spoke with him and presided at the convention--not spoke, presided, but I spoke from the platform here at Madison Square Garden--or, in the Waldorf-Astoria the night he addressed a gathering there. Oh, yes. And around this state I made speeches for him. Oh, yes. Everybody did. I did all that I could for the success of the ticket.

JBF: Now, then, in 1964, of course, there was no convention contest. But you did have the Goldwater-Johnson campaign. And particularly noteworthy in 1964 was the fact that so many of the business communities declared for Mr. Johnson. Did you have a hand in that?

F: No, I had with individuals, but no real concerted effort in that at all. Where I knew businessmen I talked with them, but I wasn't really a part of the machinery that brought that about. I was on all those businessmens' committees like a lot of other businessmen were, but I wasn't actively engaged in the work of the committee.

JBF: Do you recall whether you had any contact with President Johnson either before the convention or during the campaign?

F: I can't recall at the moment. I'm sure I did. But I can't recall any particular incident or instance.

JBF: Let's go back to the 1950's when he was Senate Majority Leader. You said that you did have a fair amount of contact with him at that time. Along what lines?

F: Well, whenever I would go to Washington I would drop in to pay my respects; I would always do that, you know, when I was up in Washington. I would call up and pay my respects to him. I would do the same with John McCormack as Speaker in the House. And I tried to keep a close personal relationship with the men whom I knew actively politically, you see; I did that all the time. I do it now when I go to Washington. If I couldn't get up to say hello to Mike Mansfield, I would call him up. The same with McCormack.

JBF: Did you have any conversation, as you recall, regarding any particular legislation?

F: No. No, I don't.

JBF: You will recall, of course, that both Johnson and Rayburn, at that time, pretty well were responsible for Eisenhower's success in his domestic programs.

F: Oh, I don't think so. I don't think that any two leaders of any party ever cooperated with the President of the United States in a manner that was as good--good isn't the word--as cooperative and as loyal as was their cooperation with President Eisenhower. I think they did everything they could to help him in the prosecution of his program, except where it interfered with, particularly interfered with the policies of the Democratic Party. And I think in some instances probably even though it did, if they thought it was for the best interest of the country, they went along with him. And I think President Eisenhower would admit that. There isn't any doubt that their cooperation meant much to his--he got more cooperation from them than from some of his Republicans, I think.

JBF: Has he consulted with you on any problems, political or otherwise, since he has been President?

F: Well, no. I've seen him a number of times. Whenever I go to Washington I try to see him. I always see him. I've been invited to a number of White House dinners. Whenever he comes to New York, I see him. I correspond with him a lot.

JBF: Along what lines?

F: Well, for instance, on his birthdays and on his addresses I had a lot of correspondence with him. Whenever he made a public utterance--now I didn't get a chance to drop him a note about his latest public appearance, you know, on TV, on this bomb halt. I'll do that tomorrow or Monday. But he was in New York, you see, at this dinner in New York, and I sat between he and Nixon at that dinner, and I listened to all the discussion that took place. It was a very interesting discussion. I've completely forgotten the substance of it and will, see. But there was no politics involved. It was a discussion of domestic problems and more particularly the Viet Nam problem which they discussed very frankly, which I have forgotten what they said and will forget it. I can forget the things I don't want to remember. Because that was a private conversation. What he had to say and what Nixon had to say, I was the only one who was a participant in it. And so, as far as I'm concerned, no one will ever know what they said; I don't know whether they remember everything that they said, you know.

JBF: It was sort of like watching a tennis match.

F: They might ask questions. I'd ask the President, "What about this?" and I'd ask Nixon, "What about that?" and I participated in the conversation. I was more of a listener, but I asked questions and they both answered. I've forgotten what I asked. When you are sitting there, and my daughter was at the dinner, she said everybody at her table was wondering--we were

sort of in an animated conversation. And they would wonder what was up. I was serious and maybe they were serious. Once in a while we would smile about something, but most of the time there was a serious expression on all our faces. Well, we were talking about serious matters that affected the country and the world.

JBF: Without prying into what was said, did Mr. Nixon use the opportunity to gather information, or was it just general discussion?

F: Just a general discussion, you see, because I know he had talked with Nixon before briefly, and he referred to that conversation, but to be honest with you, if you gave me $10 million dollars now, I couldn't remember it--the substance of it.

JBF: Well, I'm not going to.

F: I know you wouldn't, but I am merely telling you that I have the faculty of forgetting the things--now, I can remember a conversation--an instance that happened, like with Mr. Roosevelt, is as clear in my memory as they were at the time. Like this conversation the other night--I just don't remember and don't want to.

JBF: The New York State Democratic Party at least, maybe not the state party but here in greater Manhattan, seems to be changing character somewhat, and it was here that people like Paul O'Dwyer and Allard Lowenstein began the Dump Johnson movement. I wonder if you have any comment on that. Have you had any contact with these people?

F: No, I haven't any contacts with them, and I don't want any contacts with them at all. I saw Lowenstein in the Chicago convention, and I saw him at a meeting of the Democratic State Committee here, down at the Commodore Hotel when they selected the delegates at large for the convention, and he got up and opposed everything and everybody. I am thoroughly disgusted

with Paul O'Dwyer. He would never have been nominated for the Senate except when the tragic death of Senator Robert Kennedy caused the Kennedy followers to declare a moratorium so to speak and during the balance of that primary campaign, they made no effort to get votes to the ticket, to the polls, to nominate Kennedy delegates. And the Democratic State Committee, like in Brooklyn and some of these counties, their delegates were Kennedy delegates as such, you see, because the local organization went along with them on most of those delegates. And so within a week after his passing, or maybe before that, the McCarthy crowd, these young people and his followers, they conducted a very--and they had money, too, apparently--they conducted a very extensive campaign in the city and upstate and in Nassau County and they won a lot of delegates. And in winning a lot of delegates, they also nominated--Paul O'Dwyer filed for the Senate. He got a sufficient number of signatures to do that, and I think they came mostly from the McCarthy followers, because they were organized pretty well. He wouldn't have been able to do it. And so with the Kennedy vote not going in substantial numbers to the polls because he was out of the picture, they felt it was no necessity, for the delegates, if elected, couldn't vote for him anyway because he wouldn't be there. His name wouldn't be before the convention. And so Nickerson, who was persuaded by Bob Kennedy to run for the Senate at that time, or permit his name to be presented to the convention, or to the delegates, or to the primaries at least, in the primaries, he was defeated by about ten or fifteen thousand votes by O'Dwyer which was a distinct surprise to everybody. Everybody. When I heard the early returns, I said, "That can't be." Well, the answer was the McCarthyites got their votes to the polls, only 200,000 or 300,000, it was a minimum

number of votes, so to speak. But they beat Nickerson by about 15,000 votes. And that was what brought O'Dwyer into the picture. Had Kennedy lived, he would have--his delegates would have been elected, his votes would be far in excess of the McCarthy votes upstate, in my judgment, in Buffalo, and Rochester, and Syracuse, and those upstate cities and in the large villages. He would have had a better organization than McCarthy because the county leaders were for him, as such, most of them, not all of them, but most of them. And here in New York City, too. So Nickerson would have been the nominee.

JBF: I was free-floating at the convention. I heard Lowenstein on one occasion saying, this is when they were getting ready to vote on the Viet Nam plank, that "if we don't get this through, I'm going to wreck the convention." And I was interested to see whether one man could. And I thought he made a good effort at it.

F: Oh, it was a terrible thing. I went to one. I wasn't in at the convention--at the roll call of that in the caucus. And they voted me, they voted everybody else, you see. But then, I was in at the one--the one caucus I attended was the Alabama caucus to seat the Alabama delegation. And we were in this caucus room, and when New York was called on that roll call, they passed, and they went into caucus. And so I went into the caucus, and there were two colored fellows from Alabama who got up and pleaded for the approval of this particular delegation. And they made a very--what I thought was a very sound argument. And then after the arguments were made, somebody else got up and then I moved for a roll call. Well, they hissed and booed me and said, "Sit down." A lot of those fellows, I don't know whether they knew--here I was state chairman for fourteen years and pretty active in the party, and I just sat along

side of Eddie Weisl and I said, "What are you going to do with these kind of people?" So I sat down and the discussion went on. Meanwhile, the convention roll call was on, and the convention roll call was completed without the votes of New York State being recorded at the completion of the roll call, but the delegation had already been seated by the convention. But we argued and argued for, I would say an hour, and then I finally made another motion for a roll call. We had the roll call, and New York State, much to my surprise, carried it 82-80. See, we only had--they only let those who were present--that was 162 out of 190. There were 28 delegates that didn't appear, and their alternates didn't appear. And much to my surprise the resolution carried. Now, a number of the New York City colored delegates, apparently, and some upstate went along with all this reform or liberal crowd--they were opposed to it, you see. And it carried, much to my surprise. And that's the way it is finally recorded on the final roll call at the convention. But here we were still arguing about it when the decision had already been made.

JBF: It's an academic question.

F: Of course. And they were still just as bitter at the finish as they were at the start. And the way he's acted ever since, this fellow Lowenstein, I hope he's defeated for Congress. I think it's terrible--going around the country the way he did against President Johnson. I think it was atrocious, and the attitude of Paul O'Dwyer and all of these people, they have no sense of party loyalty, they have no sense of party responsibility, and I think it's an outrage the way these people have acted against the President. I don't think any President in history, and I say this freely and frankly, has done as much for more people in

this nation than President Johnson has done by the legislation that he proposed and which has been enacted into law. Now it covers all phases of life's activities--what he has done for education, what he has done for what might be called the poverty group, and what he has done for all mass elements in American society. No mention is made of it in this campaign to speak of; you don't hear anybody say a word about it. They've completely forgotten what he's done--he's done more for civil rights, and those benefited by the civil rights movement, than all the Presidents of the United States put together starting with Wilson, if you will, or even with Lincoln. No President of the United States has done more for civil rights and everything that is referred to as the civil rights movement--the things that he has done, the appointments that he has made of colored people to the Supreme Court and the Cabinet. I remember in the early days of Mr. Roosevelt's administration, it was difficult to get colored fellows appointed here and there. I remember we appointed a fellow named Tompkins from Kansas City as the U. S. Marshal, I think it was, in the District of Columbia. And we named a man named Bob Vann from Pittsburgh as a member of the Attorney General's staff. And then there were a number of other appointments of a like character, rather meagre if you will, in 1933, after he was inaugurated, and the progress that has been made down through the years.

Here in the Johnson Administration you have--I think maybe this is under Kennedy in New York, and maybe under Johnson, we have a colored Postmaster in New York City, but they have only 10 percent of the population. We have a colored Postmaster in Los Angeles, and I know there are others in a number of places around the United States. I mean, the recognition that has been extended by Kennedy, if you will,

but more particularly the Johnson Administration, is fantastic. And no reference is made to that at all. Nothing is said about the Johnson Administration except the criticism on the Viet Nam war, and the courage that that man has shown in the light of all the criticism is fantastic, and I'm amazed, knowing him as I think I do, to think that he has been able to publicly, at least, keep cool and calm. And there's no evidence of--no visible evidence of his showing any impatience with the criticism that has been directed at him. No, I travel a great deal. I've been in Indonesia, I've been in that part of the world. His stand in Viet Nam has prevented that whole section of the world from going under. Indonesia couldn't have possibly have stood up the way it has if it wasn't for his determination to stay there and try to settle this by force if need be. The same is true of Thailand, the same would be true of Cambodia and Laos. This could effect, if we pulled out of there, the greatest bloodletting in the history of mankind, even greater than they had in Germany or even greater, probably, than they had in Indonesia. It would affect the Philippines, and it would bring about another world war. There isn't any doubt about that. And still he gets no credit for that at all, and poor Humphrey is being blamed because he had been loyal to President Johnson as he should be. I wouldn't vote for him myself if he wasn't loyal to Johnson. He would never have been Vice President of the United States except for the President. He has worked closely with the President, and the President has supported him, and he has done everything he could, I think, to carry out, but he's the recipient of all the criticism directed at Johnson by the Lowensteins and the Paul O'Dwyers and all of that ilk, the college professors and all of these people who, for months and months and months, all these peace movement

groups, that's what--but he's stood up under it, and if we're defeated in the Tuesday election, we'll be defeated because of that issue and because of the law and order issue, if you will, which the Administration is blamed for here and in every other large city of the United States, and it doesn't come under the control.

JBF: It's a local issue.

F: It's a local issue. But they blame it on the Administration in power. Now, unfortunately, a lot of ethnic groups, and I won't mention any one in particular, they are a little bit annoyed because of the housing, you see. On account of the colored people coming into their places where they have their homes, and so forth and so on. And they're against the Democratic ticket in spots, and they're Democrats, and they've been the beneficiary of Democratic legislation that helped down through the years.

I'll tell an interesting story that I heard on a radio program one night. This fellow had been complaining to the radio commentator that he had been an outspoken and a very liberal fellow and he had helped on civil rights and on liberal causes, and he had done so much for the colored people. Then he was criticizing because one of them had moved into a very beautiful home along side of his home in the suburban community outside of New York City, and he said to this radio commentator, "Why should they do that to me after all I've done for them?" This fellow was for integration and all that sort of business on the other side of town, as long as it didn't affect him.

Now, another thing that is happening, I think, is in the unions. I think maybe it has been happening in Detroit and Chicago and other industrial centers. A lot of those union laborers or union men are disturbed about the influx of colored people into the unions. They were

helped in the days that are past, but they're a part of the establishment now and they don't think these other people should come in and take their jobs. And some of the colored people are probably annoyed because any time there is talk or riot and disorder, they'll say they are talking about the colored people. Well, they are, because those are the ones that are rioting. Like in Washington, I was amazed at what happened in Washington. If there is any city in the United States where the colored people have received recognition and help, it is in Washington. There are thousands of them on the payroll. They have good positions, and they have pension rights and all of the other things, and I would have thought that was one city where their influence could have prevented what happened there. But these things get emotional, and it gets beyond the control of people.

JBF: Your speaking of other ethnic groups--I noticed Muskie pointing a finger a couple of days ago at some workers' group saying, "How did you think your parents got here if it hadn't been for the open immigration policy of the Democratic Party?"

F: That's right. Take the early days of the Republic. My forebearers came here from Ireland in 1840, at or about the time of the Potato Famine when literally thousands died of starvation because the British wouldn't help them--so it was a religious issue in those days. My forebearers came here, and I'm the recipient of the help of my parents before me, and there are millions like me. Then the Irish came in first, and the Germans came along in the '60s or thereabout, a lot of Germans came when the difficulties happened in Germany, a lot went to St. Louis, and they went to Wisconsin, they went to Minnesota, and the Danes came, too, and they went into that area, and later on the Jewish people came that were

persecuted in Germany, and other parts, and they came here and then in the years that followed, the Italians came. And the people from other sections of Europe came. Not many Spanish came here, not many English, and the English that came here never became citizens. I remember Mr. Roosevelt used to kid his mother--their butler was an Englishman, but he never became an American citizen. I think he's dead now, and he used to kid her, why didn't she "make so-and-so a citizen so he can vote for me." He never became a citizen. That was true of the English to a great extent. They never gave up their--but there were that in the numbers for the other groups that came here. The French came here, but not too many. So by all of these groups the doors of immigration were opened, and now they've opened them now to some extent--for instance, the Irish quota, they've had an argument on that. There's a number there and there's a limit to the Irish quota even now, and an effort is being made to raise it. There's quite an agitation on that. And I assume there are with other ethnic groups, too. I assume there are, you see. But Muskie's father came here as a tailor, wherever he came from--Poland.

JBF: To wind up, do you think history is going to vindicate President Johnson?

F: No, I don't think that there is any question that history will place President Johnson in the same position it has placed President Truman, and he in my judgment will go down in history. When the historians another day get away from the present situation now, they will be able to see through all the criticism, and they will be able to see that the stand he took, the courageous stand he took and stayed with to the bitter end, was justified. There isn't any doubt about it, and I'm sure that his place in history will be secured. It may take longer for him to

get the recognition that he is entitled to receive than it took Truman. It may not happen during his lifetime. In Truman's case it has. It's an unusual thing. It can very well happen in Johnson's case because this situation will be resolved. Now whether it will be completely resolved during the remaining months of his administration, I'm in no position to judge, and I don't know that he is. But I think the patience he showed and the courage he showed when, on that night of March 31, he got on the television and took his position, may I say to you that I never was more shocked in my life. I sat in my living room alone and when he made the statement, tears came to my eyes. And I'm sure that happened to millions of Americans. Now, the courage he showed in taking himself out of the political arena in an effort--so his efforts to try to bring about a peaceful solution, like some of them try to make it appear that this latest move was a political gesture--my God, he stopped all those political gestures the night he stepped out--that night of March 31. And that will be a memorable night in the history of this country--it's bound to be. And I do hope, and I don't know anything about it, as to how long it is going to take to bring about the solution to this problem, but as long as they are going to get to the negotiating table, and I see where those people from Saigon, and that group, according to the headlines I have read, are not going to have representatives there. Well, we will have to go on without them. But we'll certainly protect their interests. We won't see anything happen that's going to--maybe they're doing that for political reasons at home. I just don't know. I haven't read the story. Have you?

JBF: I've heard a little more on it, and it says that President Thieu would probably go along, but its Vice President Ky has a stiff back in this thing.

F: Well, he may be taking a political advantage for himself after this is over. He may be a candidate for the top office there. But the fact remains that if they can get them to sit at that negotiating table, now you can be assured they are doing this because, in the north, because of the Russian influence. Russia doesn't want a world war. They got enough problems of their own. There are some things that are likely to pop off in the Middle East, and they don't want that to pop off. And they probably, right now, are quite willing to get this Viet Nam thing in back of them. That could go on for a long time, but I hope for not too long. I do hope it would be possible that President Johnson could bring it to a--the negotiations to a successful conclusion in the couple of months that he will be in office. Now I don't know whether that is possible or not, but not only for his sake but more particularly for the sake of our country and the free world. It means much to the people of this country, it means much to the people of the free world, and it means much to him. And you could tie all three in hoping for a successful conclusion because he's entitled to all the credit that a man could ever receive for his courage and his leadership.

JBF: One final question. You have a reputation as a master politician yourself. What do you think of Johnson as a politician? Quite apart from--

F: Well, I don't think that, and this is--

JBF: I'm talking about the science of politics.

F: Yeah, I know. But this is one of the few words of criticisms that I would offer on the President. I don't think that he played, played isn't the word, I don't think that he cooperated as closely as he might have, or should have, with the state organizations around the country--the state organizations, I don't think, the state chairman, I don't think

they were as close to him as, for instance, in the years when I was National Chairman under Mr. Roosevelt, I had my oar in with every state organization and so did he.

JBF: Do you think he has sort of a Senator's view of the overall machinery?

F: Yes, I think he has a Senator's view, and I don't think--and this, I would tell him this, see, I don't think that he played as closely, now he may have been suspicious of them. Maybe he felt that he didn't get to know them well enough. And it may be that he was so involved with his domestic problems and the foreign problems of Viet Nam, that he just didn't have the time to devote to some phase of that activity. Now Bailey was his chairman during these years and Bailey's term, position, wasn't a very strong one. I don't know what his relations with the President were, I don't think they were unfriendly, but I don't think they were close. Now, for instance, I don't think Bailey had a damn thing to do with recommendations for public office outside of his own state. He's still state chairman of his own state, and as state chairman of his own state, I'm sure the President listened to his recommendations for public office where it affected the residents of his state. But I'm sure he didn't have a damn thing to do with what happened in New York, you see. And Bobby Kennedy had been Senator around here, and they had to deal through him, and he dominated the state organization. Now, when I was National Chairman, I was Postmaster General at the same time, I saw Mr. Roosevelt three or four mornings a week in his bedroom before he went to his office, and I would come over with matters that had to do with politics. For instance, if there was a federal judgeship for appointment in Texas, or in any other state, I got all the information on those who were recommended for the post and

had them checked with the Attorney General's office and the FBI, and I would go over and sit down with Mr. Roosevelt, in the morning, and maybe at night after supper, we would sit around and go over, I went over, I recommended; now this isn't said in a boasting way, it's a matter of fact, I recommended every federal judge appointed in the United States under Mr. Roosevelt's administration, every collector of internal revenue, every collector of customs, every U.S. marshal, every appointment that went to the Senate for confirmation other than cabinet members, Supreme Court, and, maybe, some under secretaries in the cabinet, I recommended everybody else, and he only made two appointments in all that period that I didn't recommend. One was Josephus [Jonathan] Daniels, whom he appointed as Ambassador to Mexico after he had already promised Mr. Garner that he would appoint Ralph Morrison, who owned a hotel in San Antonio; but he finally appointed him--Garner was very much distressed when the appointment of Daniels was announced because he had promised, Mr. Roosevelt had promised him that he would appoint Morrison. But he finally appointed Morrison to the famous economic conference in London with former Governor Cox of Ohio and Key Pittman and Hull and others. Now the day that appointment was made, I saw it in the newspapers, and I knew Mr. Roosevelt had made a commitment to Garner, Vice President Garner, and Garner called me and said, "Jim, did you see in the papers about Daniels' appointment?" I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "What do you know about it?" I said, "Nothing." He said, "Did the President talk to you about it?" I said, "No. I was shocked when I saw it."

So when I went down to Washington the next day, I went in to see him, and I told him that Garner was very much disturbed. I said, "Why didn't you tell me?" He said, "I forgot about it." I said, "Well,

Mr. President, you can't forget anything you promised to the Vice President. He's pretty damn sore." He said, "Well, you talk to him." I said, "There's no sense in my talking to him. You send for him. No use at the start of the administration having a difference between you. Explain to him why. That you overlooked telling him. Tell him why you appointed him." And then he did appoint Morrison. Well, he called in Rudolph Foster that morning, who was the chief executive clerk in the White House. He's dead now. And he told Rudolph in my presence, "Never send a name to the Senate for confirmation until Jim okays it or he knows about it. Never send it." And they never did during all those years, except in '40 they appointed a fellow named John T. Cahill as a U.S. District Attorney here. I had recommended a fellow named Charley Murphy, and I stayed with Murphy because Flynn and the other leaders here had gone along on Murphy, but Jimmy Forrestal and Tommy Corcoran and some of the crowd were pressing Cahill, and Frank Murphy was the Attorney General. He used to come over to my office, and he said, "The President says you're for Cahill." I said, "He isn't telling you the truth. I'm not against Cahill, but I know Cahill better than I know Murphy. I knew him way back when he was a Deputy Attorney General under John Bennett in Albany in the Roosevelt administration, but Murphy is the one entitled to this. Murphy is qualified, and if there is any doubt in your mind as to whether I am for Murphy or Cahill, you make an appointment with the President, and I'll go over there and in your presence I'll tell the President that he's entitled to appoint anybody he wants as District Attorney in New York, but I'm for Murphy and I have no second candidate. But he's the President and he's at liberty, it's his right, he doesn't have to appoint Murphy because I want him, but I'm for Murphy, and I'm not against Cahill.

I have no second choice." But Roosevelt would never have a showdown on it. Well, I heard the ticker in my office, in the Postmaster General's office, and it sounded four times which meant there was something special, so I went in the room where the ticker was, and it showed that Mr. Roosevelt had sent Cahill's nomination to the Senate for appointment as U.S. District Attorney in New York. And shortly thereafter the White House phone rang and Rudolph was on the phone. And in his low voice, he said, "General, what time do you have breakfast, or what time do you buy your papers in the Raleigh Hotel in Washington?" I said, "It all depends, Rudolph, on what hour I leave the office. Sometimes I leave at five, most of the time seven or eight." I said, "What time do you?" He said, "Well, about five fifteen every night." I knew he wanted to see me, you see. And I went over there, and I shook hands with him. Before I had a chance to say anything, he said, "General, I want you to know this morning at the White House when I brought in that Cahill appointment which he asked me to have prepared, before I had a chance to say it, he said, 'Rudolph, it won't be necessary for you to call Jim on this. He knows all about it.'" And then he said, "General, I knew he wasn't telling me the truth, because I knew you were for Murphy." But, he said, "I couldn't say anything to him, but I wanted you to know the reason I didn't call you."

Now, that's a story I think I ought to tell. It's a part of history. But now I was merely telling you that story to show that I was in on every appointment, and he refused for a long time to let a reappointment of a fellow named--this is highly confidential unless I publish it myself--a fellow named George Starr, the Postmaster of Seattle, who had been appointed in the early days of Mr. Roosevelt's administration. He

had been the state chairman, he conducted the campaign, and he made a fine Postmaster. And every year when the Post Offices were examined by the inspectors, he was always within the first five, a very fine gentleman and a very conscientious Postmaster. Mr. Roosevelt's son-in-law and daughter went out to run the Hearst newspapers out there--John Boettiger--and they started a lottery campaign to try to build up the circulation of the Seattle Intelligencer. I think that was what they called it. And George wouldn't let those issues of the newspaper go out of the postal area because it was a violation of the rules and regulations of the department. And they threatened to have him not reappointed and dire things would happen to him, and I used to send George's name over every Monday morning, and I would look at the Congressional Record and it was never in there. That was always crossed off the list. That went on for a goodly period of time--two or three months. I finally called him up one day and said, "Are you in trouble? I sent your name over for reappointment but it doesn't get up to the Senate." He said, "I'm in a lot of trouble. Apparently they are being successful in their efforts to prevent my reappointment." And he brought it up in cabinet meeting one day, and he told me about this in open cabinet. He said, "A lot of people are opposed to Starr. He isn't a good Postmaster." "Well," I said, "your information isn't quite accurate, Mr. President. He is a good Postmaster, and his record shows that. If you want to see his record, I can bring over the inspector's report. He's always within the first five." "Well," he said, "I have a different story." I said, "Mr. President, this is a cabinet meeting. I'm sorry you brought this up, because there is nobody opposed to George Starr's reappointment except Anna and John, and they have threatened to

stop his reappointment because he wouldn't let them conduct a lottery, and have the newspapers go out of the postal area. It's a violation of the rules and regulation of the department. He had no choice. And nobody else is opposed to George's reappointment, except those two, really. I don't know whether you have that information from them or not, but, for your information, Mr. President, in the years that I am Postmaster General, no other name will ever be submitted by me as Postmaster for Seattle." (pause for phone call)

I've finished that story. And all of the cabinet members, you know, had their heads down. They were afraid to look at me, afraid to look at Roosevelt. It was a very tense moment. And after the cabinet broke up, I went outside. Mr. Garner said, "Well," he said, "that was a rather interesting session this morning." I said to John, "He had no right to do that to me. He had no right to bring that up at a cabinet meeting and embarrass me because I was recommending somebody. He did it only for a purpose of putting me on the spot. I'm not going to be on the spot. I'm going to stay with Starr."

I saw Roosevelt the next morning. He made no mention about it, and neither did I. We never discussed it. But every Monday I sent the name over. One Tuesday morning I picked up the Congressional Record, and his name was on it as having gone up there. So I called up Senator McKellar from Tennessee, who was chairman of the Post Office Committee, and told him the story. I said, "Ken, you confirm that just as fast as you can and send what you have to down to the White House so that the confirmation has been made before he has a chance to ask to withdraw it." And he said, "All right." He called me back. I don't know whether he even polled the Senate committee--he just did it--you know, McKellar,

like all chairmen, he ran the committee. And it went down, and, of course, the next day it appeared in the Record. That was the only Postmaster confirmed that day. And so, I didn't see Mr. Roosevelt that morning, but I saw him the following morning. And I went in, and he used to call me "Shamus" a lot when I was alone with him, and I would call him "Boss," you know, with anybody around it was Jim or Mr. President. And so he said, "Well, you moved fast on Starr, didn't you?" I said, "You're damn right I moved fast on Starr." And I told him exactly what I did. And I said, "I don't know whether that got by in a mistake or not, whether you let it get by, but whether you did or not, I'm not concerned about that. It's good that it has been handled. It would have been a terrible thing, Mr. President, to deprive that man for reappointment as Postmaster because he wouldn't violate the rules and regulations of the department for your daughter. That would have been a terrible thing." George served as Postmaster until about two years ago when he retired at 70. And he has been Postmaster from 37 to 70 because I stood up to the President of the United States.

JBF: He stayed on right through the changing administrations?

F: Yes, because he was appointed for life or until he reached the age of 70--retirement age. And now he's on a pension. He had no children, he and his wife. Now he has a good pension, and he's working in the Office of the Democratic State Committee out in the State of Washington--really runs the committee. And there's a man who would have been deprived of that income for 33 years because the President of the United States wasn't going to reappoint him because he wouldn't violate the rules. That's a hell of a story.

JBF: Yes, it really is.

F: And that's the story that I think I ought to tell.

JBF: You have had some fascinating ones.

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*see page 2

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By James A. Farley

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, James A. Farley, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

*1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed James A. Farley

Date Mar. 11, 1970

Accepted Harry J. Middleton - for
Archivist of the United States

Date 1-28-76

Preparation of "Gift of Personal Statement"

A. If you do not wish to impose restrictions on the use of your tape and transcript and if you do not feel the need to retain literary property rights upon the material, please sign the enclosed statement and return it to the Oral History Project.

B. If you wish to restrict the use of your transcript for a period of time beyond the date of the opening of the Johnson Library, a new statement will be prepared (either by you or by us) deleting paragraph 2 and substituting the following, with one of the alternatives:

> It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of the instrument available for research in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. At the same time, it is his wish to guard against the possibility of its contents being used to embarrass, damage, injure, or harass anyone. Therefore, in pursuance of this objective, and in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 507 (f) (3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) this material shall not, (be published)
>
> for a period of __five__ years
>
> or
>
> during the donor's lifetime
>
> or
>
> for a period of _____ years or until the donor's prior death
>
> or
>
> for a period of _____ years or until _____ years after the death of the donor, whichever occurs earlier
>
> or
>
> for a period of _____ years or until _____ years after the death of the donor, whichever occurs later
>
> be available for examination by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it.

C. If you wish to have the restriction imposed above apply to employees of the National Archives and Records Service engaged in performing normal archival work processes, the following sentence will be added to paragraph 2:

> This restriction shall apply to and include employees and officers of the General Services Administration (including the National Archives and Records Service and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) engaged in performing normal archival work processes.

D. If you do not wish to have the restriction imposed above apply to employees of the National Archives and Records Service, the following sentence will be added to paragraph 2:

> This restriction shall not apply to employees and officers of the General Services Administration (including the National Archives and Records Service and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) engaged in performing normal archival work processes.

E. If a restriction that extends beyond your lifetime is to be imposed in paragraph 2, the following paragraph (appropriately numbered) will be completed and added to the end of the "Gift of Personal Statement":

> I hereby designate _____ to have, after my death, the same authority with respect to authorizing access to the aforesaid material as I have reserved to myself in paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 above.

F. If you wish to retain the literary property rights to the material for a period of time, the phrase in paragraph 1 "and all literary property rights" will be deleted and either of the following paragraphs (appropriately numbered) added to the end of the statement:

> The donor retains to himself for a period of _____ years all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of the instrument. After the expiration of this _____ year period, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

or

> The donor retains to himself during his lifetime all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument. After the death of the donor, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.