

INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: JOHN G. FEILD

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Feild's office, Potomac Institute, Washington, D.C.

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F: We're talking about the Plans for Progress controversy within the [President's] Committee [on Equal Employment Opportunity] itself. The issue gradually became joined around the question of whether or not Bobby Troutman was attempting to expand the Plans of Progress concept in the image of a voluntary, noncompliance involvement of corporate America with the committee, with the innuendo, or with the impression being spread, and much encouraged by Troutman by the way, that if you moved into this Plans for Progress program voluntarily, you would not have to worry about the onerous regulatory compliance requirements of the federal committee.

There were members on the committee who deeply resented that innuendo, who deeply resented the notion that there was going to be a "voluntary" participation, and insisted that the contractors, whether they signed up for Plans for Progress or not, were still subject to the full requirements of the executive order and were still subject to the compliance standards of the committee. There was never any question about that. By the way, the contractors in most cases, I'm sure, never thought otherwise. I've never heard Bobby Troutman tell them they had a deal, and I followed Bobby Troutman all over the place.

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The only conceivable distinction that ever got made between the Plans for Progress signatory and the obligations of the contractors under the compliance program was that in the filing of the data forms on the racial and ethnic composition of their work force, the Plans for Progress forms provided for regional composites of a corporate profile. When we gradually developed the committee's compliance form, Standard Form 40, ultimately EEO-1, all the reports had to be filed on the basis of each individual facility. There was a short period between 1968 and 1970, before EEO-1 became fully required, when it was possible for the Plans for Progress leadership to say to their corporate counterparts, "Look, sign up with us and it won't be so difficult for you to fill out all these forms, because you can give them regional totals." Most corporations, by the way, keep their totals on a regional basis. It is possible for them to break it out by facility, but corporations are operated normally by zones and by regions. So most of their data and most of their management planning is done by a zone or by a region, and individual facilities may or may not be significant to them.

But we felt it had to be by facility, because that's the only way we're going to make an on-site inspection. [If] you're going to go to a facility, you've got to know what's in that particular operation. And that little exception for a two-year period is the only thing they ever got out of the deal. By 1970 that was abolished. Everybody had to file EEO-1s, which was a facility-by-facility profile.

But the issue was "compliance" or "volunteerism," and the committee members that were most suspicious of Lyndon Johnson, and thought that perhaps he was tending to give Bobby his head and let him aggrandize this notion of volunteerism, were the ones that did Bobby Troutman in. They did Johnson's work for him. All Lyndon had to do

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was sit back and let John Wheeler and Walter Reuther and Howard Woods narrow in [on] Bobby Troutman, which is exactly what the committee's minutes reflect. When the question came down to reviewing whether they were going to have a single staff, whether it was going to be a composite, single committee operation--see, Troutman had a separate office for Plans for Progress; he had his own boys from Atlanta, Joe Kruse was installed in that office. When it came down to that, the committee made it very clear [that] the committee operation was a single operation.

The material you gave me on Atlanta, the complaints brought by the Southern Regional Council, simply made concrete that problem, because the Southern Regional Council alleged that they had reviewed the performance of the Plans for Progress companies in the Atlanta area and that seven of them were complying with the provisions of their own Plan for Progress and that thirteen weren't, had made virtually no progress. And of course Johnson was very upset by that, because it provoked the question of were these guys operating on the assumption that they were getting a free ride, which was unacceptable; it was unacceptable to Lyndon Johnson.

So immediately we reviewed all the practices of all those companies, and we never had made a distinction about their requirements to fulfill their obligations under the executive order. Nobody ever made a distinction of that kind. But what it did was, it gradually forced Troutman into a untenable position. There was not going to be a separate staff; there was not going to be a separate Bobby Troutman operation. There was going to be a single operation, and Troutman just found that unacceptable. From his career and professional and personal interests, it wouldn't do him any good to be part of a bureaucratic compliance organization in Washington. He wanted to be the champion of

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aggressive, voluntary action by American industry. So he just pulled out. And politically it was important to Johnson to make it clear to the public that there was no less requirement of any contractor because he had signed a Plan for Progress agreement. That would be true of any other contractor. And in fact all of our compliance machinery was always working across the board to all those Plans for Progress companies. It made no difference. They were being reviewed on a facility-by-facility basis.

G: The Troutman letter seems to indicate that Joe Kruse was serving as sort of a liaison between Troutman and Plans for Progress companies.

F: He was; he continued as his surrogate in the Plans for Progress office.

Keep something in mind: The corporations created their own office, which was not Bobby Troutman's office. And Eugene Mattison, personnel director of Lockheed's Marietta, Georgia, facility, as I pointed out to you in my first session with you, was the first director of the totally separate, privately-sponsored, corporately-financed Plans for Progress office. All they did was provide technical assistance to companies that wanted to develop a Plans for Progress participation plan in relationship to the President's Committee. They helped them draw up their analytical material on where their work force stood; they helped them draw up plans for additional recruiting techniques and reviews for promotions and evaluation of wage standards and re-examination of lay-off situations, *et cetera*.

They were a highly professional office. All of them were top-paid corporate and personnel management people. Gene Mattison was one of the top people in Lockheed. The way they operated their office was, they would loan these people for one year to the Washington Plans for Progress office. They would come in here and work for one year

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in the Plans for Progress office and then go back home. That office lasted for about six years. They closed it down in 1970. That's when the final regs became very focused on "goals and timetables," the standard reporting forms were very well delineated, construction was involved, utilities were involved, everybody was involved at that point.

G: How did the problem of Bobby Troutman generate friction between Johnson and Robert Kennedy?

F: Okay, as I've told you earlier on, Troutman was a friend of the Kennedy family by virtue of having been a roommate with Bobby's older brother Joseph Kennedy. By the way, Troutman was Catholic; that's something that you've got to keep in mind.

G: You discussed the background and development of it, but in the first session I never did understand exactly how this was manifested, the friction itself.

F: It was manifested around the issue of whether or not volunteerism was going to replace compliance with the executive order. It was unacceptable to the White House and to the Attorney General that there should be any undercutting of an across-the-board requirement that all contractors had to fulfill their obligations under the executive order, and that no special deals were being cut with big corporations. Keep something in mind, all the corporations that signed up in the Plans for Progress arrangement were the largest corporations in America. They were all Fortune 500 companies. We are not talking about any rinky-dink contractors out there; we're talking about very big companies, okay? And there was a great fear that these big companies were getting off the hook, so to speak, by their association with the so-called Plans for Progress program.

G: But didn't Johnson also share this view, or was there a distinction?

F: Sure he did.

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G: What I'm trying to get at is, where did Johnson and Robert Kennedy actually disagree?

F: In substance? Zero. In style of management and in apprehensions about relationships, suspicions of separate arrangements and separate deals was a cloud. Who was talking to who and what were they saying and what were they trying to maneuver? And was Lyndon Johnson part of Bobby Troutman's maneuver? As far as Johnson was concerned, at one point, he thought Troutman was Kennedy's maneuver. It was a mutual apprehension.

G: Okay. That clarifies it.

F: But it was this walking around with this aura of suspicion that created this apprehension in the minds of the two cliques. Now, you've got to keep something in mind, there was never any love lost between Bobby Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. You must remember that Bobby Kennedy was the campaign manager in the primary battle for the Democratic nomination and had bruised himself up against Johnson's troops a lot more than Jack Kennedy ever did. That was a brutal battle for that nomination, and Bobby Kennedy had a lot of knowledge about Johnson's operatives. He knew George Reedy; he knew Walter Jenkins, he knew every one of Johnson's right-hand men. And they were all very much present surrounding this committee. They were not in an environment where they had already made a bond of mutual trust, and Troutman just became a loose cannon on the deck. He walked in shooting his little mouth off, playing his little game, and it produced problems. So Bobby's people naturally said, "Johnson must have helped him." And Johnson's people said, "Jesus, how did we get mixed up with this Troutman? He was Joe Kennedy's friend." See, Troutman told them--I mean, the way he worked Johnson was a masterful stroke. Keep something else in mind: Bobby Troutman was close to Dick

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Russell of Georgia, and Johnson was very respectful of Russell's power, and he had to play it carefully with Bobby Troutman. So he gave Bobby a little bit more entrée, coming both from the Kennedy side and from the Russell side, than he might normally have, just looking at a guy who was an operator like Troutman. So he had to play Troutman carefully, and in truth he did give him quite a bit of room to come in.

By the way, I told you something last time about Troutman's expenses. I noticed in the minutes here something that I had forgotten. Arthur Goldberg actually made a motion that the committee pay Troutman's expenses, because [Jerry] Holleman refused to sign them and I'd refused to sign them. And Goldberg protected himself by getting the committee to approve them; that's how he did it.

G: To what extent was the issue of volunteerism versus mandatory compliance strictly a political issue, with regard to maintaining the support of civil rights groups?

F: It was never a real issue in a real sense. It became an issue out of apprehensions among civil rights leadership that it looked to them like Troutman was trying to maneuver a sort of protected environment for those companies that came into the Plans for Progress program, made good-faith pledges that they were going to do X and Y, and nobody was going to check up on them. And they were terribly suspicious of that, because of the earlier aura of volunteerism and the whole idea of conciliation agreements which had surrounded the Eisenhower committee. There had never been a real, hard compliance line drawn prior to this Kennedy President's committee. Prior to that time, nobody ordered anybody to do anything. No government contractor had ever been debarred from a government contract. There had never been any enforcement. The Kennedy committee was the first enforcement action, and this was a very sacred principle to the civil rights

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leadership. They saw Troutman's effort being a little undercutting of that sacred principle. That's why he became so controversial, and that's why Johnson got rid of him.

There was never any doubt, and these documents--and I'm telling you the inside as well--reveal very clearly that Lyndon Johnson eased Bobby Troutman out with great skill. In Troutman's letter--such a charming letter--he said, "I haven't even heard from the vice president in two years." Well, my God, if he was close to Lyndon Johnson, he would have heard from him in two years, wouldn't he?

G: This raises another question, and that is, did Lyndon Johnson seem to lose interest in the committee?

F: Well, not in the time I was there. You've got to keep something in mind: the sequence of events inevitably affected Lyndon's perception. I left the committee in March or April of 1963. Lyndon Johnson became president in November of 1963. He went on in 1964 to make his remarkable effort to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created Title VII, which created a new entity, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with a different set of legal criteria and a somewhat different type of relationship to individual minority, potentially aggrieved citizens. They could file individual complaints with that commission. That commission could take those employers to court under a different set of criteria. So you had a duality of processes. Meanwhile he had become president and no longer had the same relationship to the structure of the committee. In fact, the committee was abolished rather quickly, and the functions that the committee carried out with respect to contractors were transferred to an office within the Department of Labor, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, OFCC. And the staff that was on the President's Committee that had been involved in the compliance activity was transferred

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to the Department of Labor and functioned out of that department. So it stepped down into a cabinet function as far as Johnson was concerned. He no longer had the same personal identity with it.

G: But while he was still vice president--

F: He never lost interest.

G: For example, I can't find any evidence of even a meeting between November 1962 and May 1963.

F: With Johnson involved? None of those minutes? I find that strange. That couldn't be, because he was involved in a meeting when I was there. Here's Johnson involved on March 4, 1963.

G: I'm talking about--yes, that would be the span. I don't--

F: No, he was very active. In April he was involved. Hobart Taylor was appointed executive vice chairman in September of 1962, I think. There was a fortuitous element involved in that, as you may remember. I don't know if I made that clear to you. Jerry Holleman resigned. We discussed that.

G: No, we really didn't. We did not discuss that in the first session.

F: Well, that facilitated the consolidation of the Johnson control of the committee. You've seen the documents so you know that when the committee was being organized, there was an internal anticipation among Johnson's staff that the logical person to become executive vice chairman of the new entity would be George Reedy. How did Jerry Holleman suddenly become the executive vice chairman? And George Reedy stayed on the vice president's staff; never left the vice president's staff. To this day, he never left the vice president's staff. Reason? Basically, the Kennedy White House decided they

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were going to control the committee, and the language of the executive order was that the vice chairman of the committee was its chief executive officer. The vice chairman was the secretary of labor. Jerry Holleman became executive vice chairman by appointment of the president, and he was assistant secretary of labor to Arthur Goldberg.

Now, Holleman resigned in a scandal.

G: The Billie Sol Estes thing.

F: Bobby Kennedy fired Holleman personally.

G: Did he?

F: He didn't personally. The person that personally brought the word to Holleman was Pat Moynihan, but the actual ax was levied by Bobby Kennedy.

G: Let me ask you to recall anything you can about that situation.

F: I was intimately involved in it. That's exactly what happened. The problem was this: the circumstances that caused Holleman the problem were, he and Billie Sol had been Texas friends together, and in fact Lyndon Johnson had been a friend of Billie Sol Estes', too. They all belonged to the same church, the Christian church. It's located up here on Massachusetts Avenue and 15th Street. They all went to that church. That church provides for tithing. It's a very fundamentalist church. And Jerry Holleman did his tithing by going out and spending hours as a carpenter construction man, you know, the building trades, building churches. And Billie Sol Estes paid for the materials and the paint.

Jerry Holleman was a relatively limited-means individual; he was president of the AFL-CIO in Texas when he was appointed assistant secretary of labor. [He] did not have a lot of money, [and] living in Washington was expensive. He was operating in a very

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high social level around Washington as assistant secretary of labor, and it was costing him money. And Billie Sol would come into town, as was his wont, flashing his money around, and he said to Jerry, "Jerry, do you need any help with your expenses?" And Jerry said, "Well, I could use a loan." He said, "Look, let me loan you a thousand dollars. How do you want it, check or cash?" Jerry said, "It makes no difference." Billie Sol wrote him a check. That check popped up when the Justice Department was reviewing all of Billie Sol Estes' relationships. Holleman's explanation to Bobby Kennedy was just what I've told you. Kennedy said, "That's unacceptable. You're fired."

Now, they reviewed Holleman's relationship to Billie Sol Estes in terms of any way he could have provided any conceivable benefit to Billie Sol in Texas. The issues were potential movement of Mexican migrants across the border, were there any additional permits allowed to farms that Billie Sol Estes had relationships with? They never found a single thing related to Jerry Holleman's performance in his job associated with Billie Sol Estes in his financial affairs in Texas.

G: Holleman, in his interview, gave a very different version of that. He said that the thousand dollars was money requested by Arthur Goldberg for a Democratic fund raising, or some Democratic party that he wanted some help financing, and that Holleman was a go-between on that. Had you ever heard that version?

F: Yes, I'll tell you what that version relates to, okay? But the one I told you is the truth. But it relates to another little irony of even more monumental proportions about which there has never been any public revelation. The issue that Holleman told you about had to do with a testimonial dinner that was given in the Interdepartmental Auditorium, hosted by Arthur Goldberg, on behalf of then-Vice President Lyndon Johnson. Is that

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what he told you?

G: He didn't mention the LBJ thing, as I recall.

F: Okay. Arthur Goldberg hosted a dinner in honor of LBJ as vice president at the Interdepartmental Auditorium. Everybody around Washington wondered, "What the devil is he doing that for?" It was very expensive. Billie Sol Estes didn't give just a thousand dollars for that little dinner. It was a lot more than a thousand dollars.

G: How much was it?

F: Oh, it had to be maybe fifty thousand dollars. It was a big splash. I mean, this was a huge event.

G: Again, Holleman's version was that Billie Sol Estes was only one of a number of people who actually sponsored it.

F: Do you know what Arthur Goldberg's statement on the record was? "I paid for it." He says he paid for all of it. Nobody contributed a penny to that dinner. Now, you've got to figure that out for yourself, okay? My view is, either way Holleman tells it to you, the way I'm telling you or the way he told you, has got to be more nearly correct than that he was getting anything out of Billie Sol Estes, to help Billie Sol Estes. He was not helping Billie Sol Estes. But he lost his job over that confusion.

G: The last time we talked, when the tape was not on, didn't you mention something about that conversation you had with LBJ about that dinner? Was that the one?

F: No, I don't think so; I don't think so.

G: Where he was wondering who was going to pay for it?

F: No, that wasn't the thing. That involved a big reception at the State Department in connection with a major national conference that the President's Committee was

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sponsoring.

G: Oh, I see.

F: And he wondered who was going to pay for that. I said, "You're going to pay for it," because there wasn't any other money around. But that was not the issue.

But when Holleman lost his position, he created a vacuum. The point of the story is that the job of executive vice chairman was vacant. It provided the opportunity for Lyndon to say, "Well, how about Hobart Taylor?" And Hobart had been performing as special counsel to the committee; he was a competent attorney, he was black, he came from Michigan, which was the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. God knows, Hobart was never a liberal. But no, he had a lot of the credentials, so he became acceptable to Bobby Kennedy and to the White House people, and they went along with it. Arthur, I'm sure, favored it.

Now, I should tell you that it wasn't very long [before] Arthur Goldberg left the secretary of labor's job and was succeeded by Willard Wirtz. Willard Wirtz very quickly perceived that Hobart Taylor was a very questionable administrator for the committee, and began to raise a lot of questions about that problem. And [this] in part stimulated Bobby Kennedy's apprehensions about Johnson as a consequence of that, because the lines became drawn between Burke Marshall, representing Bobby Kennedy; John Donovan, who recently died, representing Willard Wirtz; and Hobart Taylor, on how they were going to manage the day-to-day affairs of the committee.

Keep something in mind, you have a very delicate problem involved politically. I'm just talking politically. Even if these guys had all been in the same faction--which they weren't; they had been political adversaries, profound adversaries--but even if they

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had been in the same faction, they would have had a problem in day-to-day operations, because you were encountering practices by a wide range of employers, big employers, that had massive problems of discrimination. Some of these big employers had political and financial connections to Lyndon Johnson and some had them with the Kennedys. It's only natural that those who had their relationships most would look to that particular channel to get some temperate assistance in resolving these very sticky problems.

We lived in a world that was highly segregated racially, and transforming racial segregation into integration was not socially an easy thing to do. I mean, we could walk into the Lockheed plant in Marietta, Georgia, and overnight we could integrate that plant. We took out all those signs on those drinking fountains, we made one set of washrooms and lavatories, we made one cafeteria where everybody ate. You know, we could do that because of the billion-dollar air force contract sitting in that plant. And the social mores of all those rednecks down there who were coping with that swallowed it. They didn't have any choice. The name of the game had changed, okay?

But I'll take you down to Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingalls Shipyards. You've got a little material here on Ingalls Shipyards. Would you regard that as a simple environment to operate in? Who bought the goddamn shipyard while Lyndon Johnson was vice president? One of his closest friends, a guy named Tex Thornton. Tex Thornton had a right to expect that Lyndon Johnson was going to give his managers--because that's all they were, to Tex--reasonable opportunity to resolve their sticky, residual, ancient, racially-segregated employment practices. And that's what they appealed for, was time. "Give us time to work it out," right? Well, time was no longer an acceptable standard. We were not willing to accept the same frame of reference that

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we used to have. What did the Houston Light and Power ask for from Johnson? "Give us time to work it out," right? When Houston Light and Power refused to sign the contract, we said, "You've got to sign or else." They said, "Or else." They cut off the goddamn power to the Galveston Naval Shipyard. So what did the Kennedy Administration have to do? Hook up the damn generators on the navy ships. Time was no longer a permissible standard. But it was sticky.

G: Do you have any examples of the reverse situation where some of the political friends of, say, the Kennedy Administration, the Kennedy faction, were being pursued by Hobart Taylor and Lyndon Johnson?

F: Well, sure, we pursued everybody across the board; we weren't picky. They were self-selective. Keep something in mind, we didn't have to pick anybody. All you had to do was walk out of here with your eyes open and you're going to run into somebody who had a problem.

The one property that comes to mind that I thought was the most interesting, Philip Morris was a particularly big contributor to the Kennedy crowd. And Philip Morris got caught, because we were just walking around out there, and one of our GSA operators walks into a Philip Morris facility down in North Carolina and says, "Hey, you guys got a little problem here. You've got dual seniority lines for blacks and whites; you pay the blacks less than you pay the whites, blah, blah, blah. The game is up." Boy, I got a call so fast from Rip [Ralph] Horton, who was Bobby Kennedy's roommate at Choate, you could hardly--I mean, the cage was rattling. "What are you going to do about Philip Morris?" I said, "Rip, I'm going to do the same goddamn thing about Philip Morris as I did about Ingalls Shipyard and about Lockheed Aircraft. The jig is up. We caught

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them." He said, "Who's going to handle this?" I said, "We've got competent people who are going to go down there, and they're going to lay out a little requirement and going to tell the managers down there, 'Now, fellows, you're going to have to do this and that.'"

All right? But he was giving me this same importuning, "Oh, can't we get a little reasonableness here, to give these fellows some time?" I said, "How much time do they need, for Christ sake? They had two hundred years."

(Laughter)

But the Johnson people never picked on any of the Kennedys, and the Kennedys never picked on any of the Johnson people. But they were all available.

G: Did anyone in the administration on either side ever get the committee to back off of something? Did they ever try to get them to do it other than the sort of phone call you're talking about?

F: Well, the one great game--I thought I told you this history. I think I gave you my recent study on affirmative action sponsored, by the Ford Foundation, which has the whole story in it. The Houston Light and Power case was fundamentally an issue of public policy, because the issue was, were public utilities exempt from the provisions of the executive order? They had been exempt by formal action of the Eisenhower committee. And in realizing that reality, it was not without accident in my judgment that, number one, Donald Cook was named to the Subcommittee on Franchise Industries in the first instance. If you go back to some of your documents, you'll see a list of names that Johnson was proposing for membership on the committee. An interesting list of names, by the way, that he was proposing. Donald Cook's name popped up. You asked yourself, "Gee, how come Donald Cook?" Donald Cook was a lawyer in Washington for the

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Federal Power Commission when Johnson was in the House of Representatives. As a House member, Johnson was concerned about Texas utilities, especially oil and natural gas interests, and he got to know Donald Cook through that relationship. Cook was allegedly regulating Texas utilities, notably natural gas and oil, but gas in particular. Cook had moved on from government and had become president of American Electric Power Company, which is a holding company for a whole chain of electric utilities whose power source is natural gas and oil, but it's a heavy user of gas, one of the few big electric utilities that early on started to use gas. Cook pops up on the President's Committee, but more than that, Cook pops up as chairman of a Subcommittee on Franchise Industries.

There's two other members of the subcommittee. All the subcommittees were appointed by Lyndon Johnson, remember that. Who were the two other members? John Wheeler, who was the president of Farmers and Mechanics Bank in Durham, North Carolina, and a big civil rights activist, black. And Silliman Evans. Who was Silliman Evans, and how did he get on the subcommittee? One almost hadn't asked the question. Interesting that this guy would pop up on the subcommittee. Silliman Evans was the publisher of the *Nashville Tennessean*. Which candidate for the Democratic primaries did Silliman Evans support? Jack Kennedy? No, he was one of Lyndon Johnson's biggest supporters. He was young, relatively inexperienced, thirty-six years old, an interesting man. Johnson had every right to expect that that subcommittee would review the issue of whether or not utilities were going to continue to be exempt and would agree that they should be.

At the first meeting of that subcommittee--I was there--Donald Cook raised that

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question. That was the only question before the subcommittee. Johnson had every right to expect that Silliman Evans would vote with Cook, and they would make a recommendation to the full committee, two-to-one, that utilities were exempt. But it didn't work out that way. Silliman Evans voted with John Wheeler, recommended to committee that utilities were no longer exempt. Utilities were then in the soup.

G: Now, what makes you think that Johnson either expected or wanted Evans to vote with Cook rather than with [Wheeler]?

F: Just normal history. Utilities, Johnson's relationship with them was very profound, especially the Texas ones. Exemption had been the law of the land under Eisenhower, it was the normal thing. Why not just continue them exempt? Not very complicated, because they don't sign contracts, normally.

G: Was there any visible reaction on Johnson's part that led you to believe that he didn't--?

F: Never said a word. The minute they were no longer exempt, Lyndon Johnson said, "That's the policy, and that's what we're going to do." And that's exactly what we did. And Johnson never flinched from the requirement that Houston Light and Power was covered. Now, there is a lot of indication that he went through a lot of negotiations, but there was never any question that they were going to be forced to sign a contract with a non-discrimination clause in it, and that they would in fact hire blacks and promote blacks and pay blacks the same as they did whites, because that became the policy. But if you could have avoided that policy, man, it would have made it a lot easier. Otherwise, how did those guys get on the committee--both on the same subcommittee, by the way--and what was their purpose in being on that subcommittee? Did he appoint them to ensure that utilities should be covered? I don't read it that way. You can't read it that

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way. There's no possibility you can read it that way. The relationships and the history are too clear. But the record should show that once that became the committee policy, Lyndon Johnson never wavered from that policy, never once, by any informal means. There was never even a suggestion. And, by the way, we were arguing with all kinds of utilities; Southern Bell was refusing to comply.

G: Yes, I want to go into that.

F: One after another, it was all over the place.

G: But let's finish the Houston Light and Power situation. Let me get you to go into that in some detail, on cutting off the power.

F: Right.

G: You had discussed that last time but we weren't on tape then.

F: Oh, well, keep in mind something about that, because it was an especially focused problem. Who was the secretary of the navy--there was a naval facility involved, right?

G: Yes.

F: On--what's it called, Presque Isle? I forget the name of it.

G: Pelican Isle, off Galveston's coast.

F: Pelican Isle, right. Okay, who was secretary of the navy?

G: John Connally, from Texas.

F: Who was John Connally close to politically in the real world at that time and subsequently for a long time?

G: Well, Lyndon Johnson.

F: You're damn right. Okay, along comes a guy named Herbert Hill who, just as he had done in the first incident with Lockheed, sets these guys up for round two, okay?

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Because Herbie knew historically Eisenhower had exempted utilities. Herbie had found out that we had gone through this series of meetings to make a judgment on were utilities covered or not. He knew we had decided they were covered. He knew that we had Lyndon committed to that policy. Then he filed the complaints. Why did he wait so long to file them? He could have filed the complaints against the Pelican Island installation on the same day he filed the Lockheed complaints. The reason he didn't file them was it took the committee several months to hold subcommittee meetings to make a judgment on whether the utilities were covered or not. He had known that was an historic issue in the previous committee. Once they were covered, he filed the complaints.

Well, Christ, then you had John Connally as secretary of the navy, and you had Lyndon Johnson as vice president of the United States, both chairmen of the subcommittee--and Connally was a member of the committee; you know, all those guys were members--just exactly where you wanted them. And there was never any question in the minds, I'm sure, of John Connally or Lyndon Johnson that there would be a solution that would result in the Houston Light and Power Company signing a contract with that clause in it. It was just a matter of how they were going to do it. And they did go through a series of very correct and very positive negotiations.

I must say, John Connally did not appreciate the fact that his admirals were telling him, "That's a hell of a goddamn thing for us to do, to burn out our damn generators down there. Can't you solve this problem some other way?"

G: After the utilities cut off the power and you had to use the generators from the ships, how long did this go on?

F: I was going to say--it's dim in my memory, but my recollection is it had to be at least two

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or three months, because I recall very vividly getting a call from the admiral in charge of Installations and Logistics who called me up one afternoon and said, "Now, look, I got to find out when are you going to get this damn problem solved, because these damn generators are expensive and they wear out. You're putting a hell of a drain on my ships, because these generators are not at sea; they're just docked there, chained to that dock, burning up their goddamn machinery." He gave me a long spiel. "We get authorization from Congress to put these ships to sea, not to have them sitting around at dockside." When am I going to solve this problem? I said, "Well, it's being worked on right now. The Vice President's working on it; Hobart Taylor's working on it, John Connally's working on it. It's going to be solved very soon." "Well, by God, it better be soon! Congress is going to hear about this!" He was threatening me basically by saying, "I'm going to take it to Congress." I said, "Admiral, you just go right ahead and take it to Congress, because we're going to solve the problem. But until we do, you keep those generators turned on." And he backed off, he didn't take it to Congress. I thought we had a potentially tough little [problem] if he had made a flak about that. You know, he could have made it look terrible. It could have looked terrible, as a matter of fact, except we were right on principle.

G: Ultimately an agreement was reached?

F: Exactly. It was indeed reached and was a good agreement. And Houston Light and Power kept its word.

G: Why do you think they caved in?

F: In the end they had to. Johnson I think told them that the reality was that there was no choice, that his own maneuvering room--if they felt that he had had a capacity to

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maneuver, they probably wouldn't [have caved in], but he was telling them he had no maneuvering room, that he had no way of maneuvering for them. And, you know, Johnson could tell people that pretty well. He could say, "Look, you son of a bitch, I'm boxed. What do you want me to do? There's no way."

G: The two cases we've discussed in some detail, the Houston Light and Power Company and the Lockheed case, in both instances Herbert Hill played the major role.

F: Well, he filed the complaints, that's all he did.

G: That was evidently one of the major parts of it.

F: Oh, absolutely. It was brilliant.

G: Explain his involvement. I know who he was and his position with the NAACP, but what was his relation with the committee?

F: None. Very formal, very formal. His relationship with us was very formal literally. All the complaints were filed correctly, they were well documented. Herbie was a very experienced person; he had been doing this for years with the Eisenhower committee and he knew all the state commissions. He'd filed with them. He knew all the district court cases that had been processed. He was an exceptionally professional, experienced person in advocacy for equal employment opportunity. So he was very formal with us, and he made it very clear, "I'm testing you in terms of your intention to carry out the requirements of this executive order."

G: But did he have a tie on the committee who would--

F: Tell him?

G: Yes, or signal him?

F: Oh, sure. Christ, there were dozens of members. Walter Reuther would have told him;

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John Wheeler would have told him, Howard Woods would have told him. Marjorie Lawson probably would have told him, but she was more tilted, curiously and interestingly, toward ambition with Johnson.

G: Really?

F: Oh, yes, she was trying to get in with Johnson all the time, although she came out of Massachusetts, you know, and was part of the Kennedy cabal. But she would have told Herbie, too. Any of the black members of the committee would have told Herbie. He didn't have to have--no one person needed to be a channel. And by the way, what was going on was really quite public. He didn't have to have any back channel. He could get it from our press releases; he could get it from the daily press.

G: I just wondered if he was in some respects an informal part of your compliance apparatus.

F: No, he wasn't, because Herbie didn't operate that way, number one. He was always an adversary. He never gave you any quarter. He expected clear responses to every complaint he ever filed. He had a very clear sense of the legalities of what he was doing and what he expected of any government body, whether it was our committee or a state commission or a city commission or a court, what have you. Herbie was a pretty straight, hard-line advocate for justice.

G: Any insights on his relationship with Lyndon Johnson?

F: God, I think he gradually came to admire Lyndon, perhaps grudgingly, but I think he certainly did come to admire him.

Herbie was here recently, by the way, about five or six months ago, and he came out to my house for lunch. We were talking about old times and whatnot, talking about

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Pelican Island and talking about Lockheed and talking about the Lorillard Tobacco Company. He'd filed complaints against a lot of other companies, by the way. He filed complaints against dozens of companies, most of which we just sort of handled routinely because they weren't that big or the facility--I think one of the cases that Herbie was involved in did take on unusual significance, as I recall. He filed a case against a rice-flour milling company in Arkansas, [a] very unusual case, and the company refused to respond to our order. It had to do with the classification of workers. They would refuse to put black workers in certain jobs. We ordered them to put black workers in those jobs. They refused. And I think historically you'll find that that company was the first company ever debarred from a government contract. We took that case up to Jerry Holleman, we recommended debarment. We told the company we were going to recommend it. They said, "Fine." They didn't give a shit, really, which was what it amounted to, because the commodity they were selling was a relatively minor, highly-available commodity anyway.

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F: He also filed cases against United States Steel in Birmingham, Alabama. The issue there was separate seniority lines. Herbie was involved in dozens of cases. He never gave up.

G: Let me ask you about another utility case, the Southern Bell case.

F: The Southern Bell turned out to be relatively less complicated in some ways. There was a very strong disposition, as you probably know, in the AT&T family to comply with the executive order. Southern Bell had always enjoyed a rather special niche within AT&T, partly because of its size and partly because of the social mores of the way the company operated with telephone operators and all the rest of that, the work force composition as

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such. So that they had never been exposed to the same kind of personnel management discipline that the other components of the AT&T family had been. We, running into them as we did, in a sense provoked what became an internal corporate discussion. The real solution to that problem came from AT&T as much as it came from us. All we did was insist, and AT&T really in a sense said to them, "Look, you've got to comply, and it's only going to be a question of how, and in a sense when you're going to take the necessary steps to create a single personnel management process in your segment of this company, because we're committed to it."

As I recall--God, I'd have to go back and look at the record--I don't think AT&T signed up as a Plans for Progress company. I'm pretty sure they didn't. I think they were sensitive to the fact that they had Southern Bell under their wing, and they didn't want to complicate things. They never volunteered. IT&T did, but IT&T had a different environment, a different work force. Southern Bell did not seem to me to be the provocative problem that Mississippi Light and Power or Houston Light and Power or some of the others had been. In many ways, as I recall it, the California Light and Power people were more obstreperous but finally caved in. Southern Bell was just a matter of negotiation.

G: Okay. How about Lycoming Division of Avco in Bridgeport?

F: Very interesting case. The problem with Lycoming had less to do with Bridgeport than it had to do with their southern-based operations, which were in Nashville and other areas. They were purely protecting a kind of a corporate posture in becoming an adversary of ours; they were thinking corporate-wide. I think they felt they had a stronger case in Bridgeport that they could defend, although they couldn't defend it and in the end they

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caved.

I mean, you've got to keep something in mind. The multifacility corporation always had this problem of dealing in different racial environments when they had the problem of single corporate policy. Well, they didn't have a single corporate policy. U.S. Steel in Pittsburgh was a goddamn different company than U.S. Steel in Birmingham, Alabama, and every time we would hit them someplace--you hit them in one place and start raising questions: "What are your recruiting practices? What standards do you use in making promotions? What process do you use? How objective is it?" Blah, blah, blah. What you're doing is, you're pulling them into corporate commitments that I could walk in tomorrow to their shop in Nashville and say, "You're not following your company policy. You're in violation of this executive order, [in] *prima facie* violation of it." And they were conscious of the fact that we could do that to them.

General Motors was a master at this process. I mean, they were brilliant at it. We had the hardest time getting them to fill out Standard Form 40 of any company in the country, partly because of their size. They had 650,000 employees. They had 220 facilities around the country. So I don't think the Lycoming case was unusual, except that it was typical of the multifacility national company protecting its practices elsewhere, especially in the South. We finally caught up to them in the South, by the way. We finally brought reviews against the men in Nashville and other sections of the South.

G: Now, how about California Light and Power? You've mentioned that.

F: There again, they were operating on the utility internal industry concept to resist acceptance of contracts, and thereby the clause that this would require. They were

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simply resisting any kind of a legalistic frame of reference, that they didn't have to do that. They weren't required to do that. And it wasn't finally settled, by the way, until quite late in judicial terms. That wasn't settled until 1973, that was ten years after we had first started these arguments with them, and it wasn't settled until we got to the Mississippi Light and Power case that became *the* case that settled the utilities issue. That became the definitive ruling case. And all of them resisted it down the line, and they did it on [the] purely narrow, legalistic grounds that they didn't enter into contracts and therefore weren't required to observe this clause, because it wasn't in any contract.

G: What could you do with California? What leverage did you have?

F: Same thing we did with Houston Light and Power. (Laughter)

G: Shut off?

F: Yes. The only leverage you ever had with any utility was one of public pressure and raising a public argument on public policy and their accountability to the public. They are a regulated utility; they are a monopoly. How can they operate under standards that are going to be different than anybody else, as a monopoly? All we had was the public argument. In practical terms, it was ridiculous. You know, they could cut off your telephones, what are you going to do? Have to hook up on some new telephone company? We didn't have naval vessels everywhere, by the way. That was a lucky break.

Herbie, by the way, admitted to me that he had made a mistake; he never should have picked anyplace that had naval vessels nearby. He never figured we'd do that. Had he figured otherwise, we had no alternative but to go public. What Herbie wanted us to do was to go public. We solved that thing without going public. You've got to realize

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that. Nobody knew we hooked up those generators; Herbie didn't even know, by the way.

G: Is that right?

F: Until much later.

G: Let me ask you to go back to something mentioned earlier with regard to the administrative style of Hobart Taylor. You've indicated that Burke Marshall and Robert Kennedy had reservations about this. Now, is this in addition to whether or not Taylor would take a softer line on industries that Johnson had ties with, or was this basically a general feeling that he was either not aggressive enough or that he didn't manage well, or that he didn't have the right philosophy?

F: I don't think it was terribly focused politically really; it was a style problem. Hobart was relatively formalistic in a protective sort of way; he protected himself that way as a good lawyer. He was difficult to deal with. He was very--

G: When you say difficult to deal with, what do you mean?

F: He was quite obsequious; he was quite haughty. He had sort of an imperial manner. He forced people to wait for him all the time.

G: That doesn't sound like he's obsequious.

F: Well, he was all of those things.

G: Really?

F: All of those things. He could be very flattering in one style, then you find out he's giving you a lot of bullshit the next day. It was sort of a suspicious nature of people like Burke and Bobby about a guy like Hobart, because they saw him, to begin with, in suspicious terms. I think you know the history of Hobart Taylor. Taylor's father and Lyndon had

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ranches that adjoined each other in Texas, you know that.

G: You had told me that, and the cab companies; we talked about that last time. But did you feel that Hobart Taylor was not aggressive enough? Did Kennedy feel that he wasn't aggressive enough in pursuing compliance?

F: No, I don't think anybody ever raised that particularly.

G: Okay. It was mainly personality and style then, is that right?

F: Yes. Well, there's a lot of other things about Hobart that were factors that provided a degree of unease about Hobart.

G: What were they?

F: When the original FBI file was presented to Jerry Holleman on Hobart, he refused to sign off on it. It was bucked to Arthur Goldberg. Arthur Goldberg said, "I don't think I need to rule on this. I think this is something the vice president rules on." And Johnson signed off on it. Bobby Kennedy had access to that file. I almost brought charges against Hobart when I was executive director of the committee. I had two female employees come to me and give me very detailed descriptions of Hobart's actions with regard to them. And I put it to both of them, "If you want to prefer charges, I'll go with you. But it's up to you." Our administrative officer, who had been an Eisenhower appointee, was privy to all that as well. He brought these to me, told me about them. And it was a big problem with this guy, and it involved boys as well as girls. Now, that was an underlying component of suspicion. Nobody ever brought any charges against Hobart.

G: Why do you think Johnson cleared him?

F: I have no idea. I think he figured what the hell, he could cope with it.

G: Was it something that interfered with his handling--?

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F: Only in the sense of his being always a question mark, "Is he going to cause trouble? Is he going to"--you know, what's going to happen? And the son of a bitch would have these women that worked for him report to his house at night to work, and they would do it once and find out what was going on, you know, and that was it. There was an uneasiness about this guy. I think that was just an overlay problem. They weren't comfortable around him at all.

But I don't think it had to do with the issue of whether he was aggressive, whether he was carrying out the policies of the committee. I think he carried out the policies of the committee. He understood them very well. He was a skillful negotiator. He could resolve and did resolve problems on behalf of the committee. I don't think they had any grounds for--no, as far as I'm concerned, they'd be very hard put to make a case that Hobart Taylor wasn't performing his job within the reasonable professional limits, with the exception of the area that I mentioned. But nobody ever raised that issue either.

G: Let me ask you about your own departure from the committee. You left in March?

F: March, I think it was, yes.

G: Why did you leave?

F: At that point?

G: Yes.

F: The battle over Troutman had gotten to be so sticky, and the innuendos about was Troutman going to be able to continue; I was so opposed to Troutman pursuing an independent course for the Plans for Progress arena that I just joined the issue and said, "It's either going to be Troutman or me." Then what happens in those situations is they throw you both out. Now, I knew that Johnson would never fire me, because it would be

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too damn difficult. On the other hand, it seemed to me desirable if we could get Troutman off the scene, it would be perfectly fine for me to just clear the air and let a whole new set of relationships settle down on the committee. That was my judgment. And I left voluntarily, nobody kicked me out, nobody fired me.

G: Did you have the feeling that Johnson was trying to ease you out?

F: Sure, he'd like to see me gone. He wasn't trying to ease me out, however. He never took any overt step to do it. I have no indication he ever took an overt step, nor did any of his people, by the way. And certainly George Reedy--with whom I worked very well--George never gave me the implication that they would just as soon I left.

But also I should say when Hobart was named executive vice chairman, that produced another clear set of issues. I was privy to the fact that Goldberg had brought in Ted Kheel. By the way, that was Goldberg's maneuver, not Johnson's. Ted Kheel was Goldberg's friend. I was privy to the fact that Kheel had recommended that my position be abolished, and the issue there was clearly one of structures. In many ways, it was not an appropriate structure to begin with. It was a function of the fact that the executive vice chairman under Holleman did not devote full time and there had to be one full-time officer on the scene. The minute Hobart was appointed as a full-time executive vice chairman, it became clear to me, it was a matter of time when they were going to abolish the position of executive director. Because a full-time executive vice chairman is all they needed; they didn't need two of us.

G: Right.

F: To that extent it seemed to me logical. And that wasn't a function of any political maneuver, that was a function of inevitable administrative course of events. And Hobart

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was clearly Lyndon Johnson's chief choice for executive for the committee.

G: Let me ask you about some of the government agencies and their efforts to upgrade blacks in jobs and hire more minorities--NASA, for example--and also in seeking compliance with contractors that dealt with them. The space agency seems to have been one point in which Johnson and Robert Kennedy were at odds with regard to how much had been accomplished. At one of the committee meetings, evidently, Kennedy focused on James Webb and Hobart Taylor and indicated that they had only one man working part-time in the entire space program compliance office. Do you remember this issue?

F: I remember it very well.

G: Let me ask you to go into that in some detail. First, describe the meeting, if you will.

F: That meeting was nothing more than a kind of a picayune exploring thing, as far as Kennedy was concerned. It was quite clear that NASA had problems. They had not moved as rapidly to follow the Defense Department model of creating an internal management structure that could deal with their contractors, on the one side, or their own internal personnel problems on the other. And in part that was a function of the way NASA did business. NASA delegated huge areas of responsibility out of their Washington control command center. I mean, NASA was not run like the military; NASA was run basically through delegation by contracts to private companies that acted for NASA. Pan American, peculiarly, ran the Cape Canaveral facility. Ask yourself the question, how could Pan Am do it? They ran it under a management contract that Jim Webb gave to Pan Am to run Cape Canaveral. They hired everybody on the damn facility; they ran the whole goddamn thing. It was all run by contract. Very few people worked for NASA. I recognized their management style and management problems. We

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had recommended to them repeatedly, "Take a look at trying to create some structures to cope with this, both internally and externally with respect to your contractors, because they're out of control. You're not really giving them the kind of surveillance, the kind of review, that you ought to be giving them."

Ultimately Webb came to appreciate that, and he did in turn designate a very top guy on his personal staff to begin to do that job for NASA. Now I'll tell you, that was late. I'll tell you how late it was. I left in March of 1963. I came to Potomac Institute and I worked for a year on a big DOD contract. I didn't do it early on; I did it within the prescribed six months or whatever it was under departure from the government. I think within that period of time, Jim Webb's guy approached me and hired me as a private consultant to make a review of what NASA was doing and make recommendations to Jim Webb, which I did, professionally. They then translated those into a set of internal administrative actions to create a machinery and a structure dealing with both problems. But they didn't do that until 1964; I mean, it was late in 1963 before anything concrete began to happen within NASA. I flew down on a Jetstar airplane from Washington with Kurt Debus, the German in charge of Canaveral, Wernher Von Braun's counterpart, the German scientist. And I drank Scotch whiskey with him all the way going down there. He's asking me, "What do we need to do?" He's vibrating. "Mr. Webb wants something to happen." I said, "Don't worry about it. It can be done. It's just a management problem. You understand that." "Whatever you want to do, we want to do it; we're going to do it." Boy, I could hear this old German discipline, "If Mr. Webb says we're going to do it, we're going to do it." I had the feeling the guy's going to convert this thing from an out of control operation, all of a sudden it's going to be highly controlled, highly

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centralized. They didn't quite do it that way, but they did it with a high degree of sophistication in the way they managed their contractors, ultimately.

Now, I think Bobby hit them too late. If he was going to hit them, he should have hit them earlier because they were vulnerable. By the time he was picking on them, they had already begun internally, administratively, to realize that they had problems and begun to set the wheels in motion to do something about it.

G: Let me ask you to describe that meeting in which Kennedy confronted--

F: Those meetings got to be very sticky. Bobby would act quite inquisitorial, quite like a prosecutor; he was an unrelenting questioner. What's reflected in the minutes is really not a reflection at all of the tensions that developed in those meetings. After I left they got worse. Dave Mann would tell me the stories of how Bobby would just take this prosecutor's pencil and, boy, he would get Lyndon Johnson [to answer] question after question after question and wouldn't let up. And it became a matter of considerable embarrassment to the other members of the committee that Bobby was being so demanding to have answers to questions that maybe Johnson didn't even have the answer to, but were implied that he knew more than he actually knew. It was really an embarrassment kind of thing, because he was clearly trying to create the notion of Johnson's associations undermining the commitment of the committee to an evenhanded compliance-requirement-enforcement posture.

Johnson was very defensive about it, because he saw he was being assaulted, and it was true, these were long-time associates of his. But they were high quality people. I mean, nobody ever accused Jim Webb of not being a good public administrator, basically. Bobby was off the mark on that. Webb may have not done what he should

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have been doing, not out of lack of conviction or commitment to the administration's policy, but out of preoccupation with a whole lot of other administrative problems, and a style of doing business that was not easily fitted into the mold that we had by that time, two years later, sort of thrown out to the whole government. He was caught by a bad comparison, because DOD moved fast, they moved well, they moved professionally, and they were clearly way ahead of NASA.

G: One source indicates that Robert Kennedy got up and left the meeting after he--

F: He did, he walked out. He did it deliberately as a clear affront to Johnson. There was no mistaking what his intention was.

G: What was Johnson's reaction to this?

F: Cool. Never said a word, not to me. I wouldn't have expected him to say a word to me, particularly. But George Reedy never said a word to me about it except [he] would raise the question, Bobby was being kind of--what was he after, was that going to do any good or what's the purpose? And I had to say to him very clearly, "George, I don't know. I really don't." I happened to be a very strong admirer of Jim Webb's for a long time in public policy and public life, and he wasn't listening. I know he wasn't listening, because I tried to get his people to listen and they weren't listening. And Bobby picked on him, and he just picked on him as a target.

G: But then it was a legitimate complaint?

F: It was, it was; they were far behind. Bobby was privy to good information on that, by the way. Keep something in mind, we had a very good system of evaluating performance by these agencies, and there were no secrets around there. All you had to do was make a simple comparison [of] where NASA was standing against others, and you could tell

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what was happening. There was a degree of exposure.

G: Do you think that Robert Kennedy felt that Johnson was simply trying to use the committee for publicity?

F: Yes, he was, and they did have that feeling. They had the feeling that Johnson was getting more out of it than they were, which by the way was not of Johnson's making. I mean, they had every opportunity to do what Johnson was doing. In fact, they did call me on the coals a couple of times, "How come we didn't get more exposure on this? Johnson got too much." John McCully, our public affairs officer, was quite sensitive to that. John McCully, who was from Texas and was part of the Yarborough faction, was not about to give Lyndon Johnson any more than his due and certainly would have been delighted to give the Kennedys any amount of due that he could have. And the Kennedys knew we were not disloyal, but they were sensitive to the fact that Johnson had decided to make something of it.

G: When you say the Kennedys, who do you mean in particular here on the publicity? Who would call you?

F: Oh, we'd get a call from Harris Wofford or from Frank Reeve or from Fred Dutton, who was secretary of the cabinet. See, we had a subcabinet committee of under secretaries that met regularly on civil rights matters. The politics of the civil rights posture of the Kennedy Administration was managed by a subcabinet committee that met every week in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The under secretaries of every department of the government, or the deputy administrator, belonged to that committee. They were all political appointees. And the politics of what we were doing was reviewed constantly by that body; our problems with segregation internal within the government; our problems

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of Route 40 going up to New York; our problems with public accommodations; how could we use the pressures of the Post Office to get certain service industries to do a better job. The trucking industry, for example, was slow to comply. The utilities were discussed in that committee. All kinds of things were discussed in there. And one of them was the image problem, how were we looking, were we looking like we should be looking, like real activists? You've got to keep something in mind, public accommodations were segregated throughout the South. Bobby Kennedy was sending troops down to the South for the sit-ins. John Siegenthaler, his deputy, was getting bounced around down there. It was a different world than we live in today.

G: Let me ask you to reach some conclusion on this Johnson-Bobby Kennedy feud in this one instance. You indicated that there was a certain amount of justification on each side. If you had to summarize it, where would you yourself come down? Who was right? Who was wrong?

F: I would not fault Lyndon on that, no way. Look, any one of the--

G: You think he was legitimately trying to get the most out of the government agencies?

F: Sure; sure he was. He was just as activist about that as anybody else. He was just as conscious of the fact that we were exposed. We were all subject to the same degree of public criticism, the same degree of political reaction on the part of civil rights. Lyndon felt sensitive to all kinds of criticism. In many ways, he was more sensitive to it in some ways than Bobby. Shit, Bobby let half of it roll off his back. He saw them as no-good sons of bitches. Lyndon would always quake in response to civil rights criticism. "Let's get an answer. Let's get a correct response." You could see his pencilled notes all over the place: "Look into this." "Check on this." "What's this, what's behind this?" "Let's

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get this straightened up." His attitude was they weren't going to catch *him* on the wrong side of this issue. He had long since lost all of his concern about former friendships, and it was quite clear to him he was not going to be faulted in this area. And I just think the record shows somebody's going to have a hard time making a case out of it, to fault him, because everything I saw him do was consistent with that policy.

G: Why do you think, then, that Kennedy went after Johnson in this?

F: I think again it's historical. I think it relates to an early competition, the early animosities, the early conflicts that were there. I don't think they ever were resolved. I don't think in Bobby's mind he regarded Lyndon Johnson's political base as one that he could expect much from and remain competitive as a base with his own ambition. Indeed, I think that was borne out by the subsequent challenge that Bobby was about to make to Lyndon, that he was quite prepared to view separate political bases. He did not regard Lyndon's base as his base, and he regarded friends of Lyndon's as suspect, because they were friends of his. He saw the historical connection Lyndon had with all the southern base. He had every reason to be suspicious of it. I mean, Jim Webb did come from Alabama. There was that history. He had every reason to believe those things, except for the facts. But the suspicion was profound, and it became a matter of opportune political method, *modus operandi*, paranoia, fear.

G: Were there any other examples of the friction besides this particular one?

F: Yes. As I told you, Dave Mann would tell me stories later on after I left. That feud continued. That feud really continued.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview II

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
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