INTERVIEW II

DATE: June 19, 1990

INTERVIEWEE: ROBERT FINCH

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Finch's office, Pasadena, California

Tape 1 of 1, Side 1

G: Last time when we concluded you were discussing President [Lyndon] Johnson's interest in finding a cure for cancer and his discussion with you as he was leaving the presidency. Do you want to recount what you can of that conversation?

F: I may have mentioned when we talked before, that the day after the [Richard] Nixon election in 1968, when we were in New York, President Johnson had called Nixon and suggested--he knew that Nixon was going to be vacationing in Florida--that Nixon and his immediate party drop by the White House on the way down so he could chat with Nixon. I was part of that group. We were going down to get a break from the campaign, and as I recall, Johnson said then--even though Nixon hadn't focused on his cabinet, Johnson made quite a point of the fact he wanted to make a smooth transition, that when he picked his cabinet he wanted to meet with the individual members of the cabinet in order to offer them what help or what background [they needed], and that he would be directing his cabinet to really focus on a first-class transition in the sense of briefings and what not. I must say, he certainly lived up to that commitment, because Wilbur Cohen, of course, having replaced John Gardner, went through extraordinary lengths to see to it

that as secretary of Health, Education and Welfare I was briefed, and quite extensively, with a team that I brought in. And in the course of that he had made quite a point that, despite all of the distractions and concerns of the Vietnam War, Lyndon was very, very focused on health, particularly health care problems, and that his one strong regret lay in the field of cancer research and that one of the goals he would have liked to have seen would be a breakthrough in the whole search for a cure while he was president. Sure enough, when I went over and met with Johnson after I was in, he mentioned that right at the outset and said that he had also talked to Nixon about it. Since both of us had a strong interest in that field--we both had lost immediate family members because of cancer--we told him we would put in a major initiative and we did. In fact, several years later that culminated in what by then was the largest single increase for research ever laid down in all of the programs of the National Institutes of Health. Together with elevating the National Cancer Institute into a higher echelon within the National Institutes of Health, reporting directly to the secretary and to the President--we just elevated the whole initiative in that direction.

Just parenthetically, it happened that while we spent a great deal of money in a short time, and it could be argued that some of that money inevitably in research is wasted or doesn't immediately bring fruition, because you're shoving an awful lot of money through the research pipeline. There's a limitation to what you can do.

Interestingly enough, it was clear that some of the cancers are viral in nature and some of that very same research, I was told later, and particularly when AIDS came

along, was quite useful in terms of their efforts to get at the viral aspects of the AIDS virus and its permutations.

G: Was this whole initiative primarily an effort of putting more money into the research, or was there any redirection or change in policy with regard to--?

F: No, it was to elevate it, to force more attention and get on with what was then regarded as the most difficult of the diseases and the least susceptible to research. That was exactly what we did.

G: Any thoughts on the matter of how much money you could put into this problem and still have an effective--?

F: Yes, but we have to be gauged by what the medical profession and the state of the art tells us, and, through the rather cumbersome request-for-proposal technique that was in play then--is still in play for that matter--we tried the best we could to focus on those areas of greatest promise. As I say, there were some complaints that we had not gotten the full bang for the buck, but on balance I'm satisfied it was a very, very useful activity and, I think accelerated--and it underscored a variety of things. There is no single cure to cancer, obviously, because there are so many different kinds of cancer, but on balance I think it was most useful.

G: Was there any change in policy from the Johnson to the Nixon Administration with regard to the related causes of cancer, like cigarette smoking or certain kinds of--?

F: Yes, that was included. We pursued a whole variety of alternatives and things that had to be looked at. But by that time the early warnings by the previous surgeon general had already been pretty well started, and that was just beginning to build at that point.

G: Any new initiatives that you--?

F: I suppose if you got down deep enough you could find a variety of initiatives. But as I've already indicated, at the secretarial level, with the whole variety of other things that then come in to confront you, I of course had a whole lot of other things on the agenda, such as having to deal with the whole question of the continued emphasis on desegregation of schools. By the time I came in, most of the solid South had been pretty well--it was relatively simple to see the problems with the black school here and a white school there and to reallocate the resources. At the time I came in we were then getting into the sticky northern, midwestern and western states where you didn't have the simple black-white distinctions, and you had a whole series of situations where in major metropolitan areas--Boston, here in Pasadena, Des Moines, and so on--where you had "white flight" taking place. And you had court orders coming down, but obviously they couldn't be effected overnight, and you were up against a situation where most of the white population had left and you were trying to enforce court orders that were based on demographics that were already a year old. So you were constantly struggling with that problem, and that occupied an inordinate amount of time in that period that ensued just after I came in as secretary.

And in addition, we had all the problems on the campuses--Kent State, Jackson State--all the unrest and all the pressure on the part of Congress to try to cut off funds for those schools under a certain preoccupation. And I had to spend a great deal of time down on the Hill just testifying so that they wouldn't put a silly law through to put a federal monitor on campuses, which obviously were not federal institutions. They were

state institutions. But everybody wanted to do something about the problems of the student unrest and so on.

Then we had a lot of other problems that came along that had to be adjusted as we went. Interdicting cyclamates--there was a constant series of crises. So I couldn't pursue with the diligence I would have liked each of those initiatives that came along, because you had something else on the front burner all the time.

G: Looking back at school desegregation, in retrospect, is there any other course of action that you think would have been more effective?

F: Well, the thing we did, which I think once the courts had taken the lead and we recognized this problem that I was talking about--you clearly can't do it with court orders alone, and so we started setting up in these various states, in the Deep South and in the border states as well, these citizens' councils of leadership and the banking and investment and business communities to help implement the court orders. George Schultz and I worked on that very hard, and I think that helped ease some of the difficulties.

At the same time we were having to implement--and I had talked to President Johnson about this at that first meeting. I was the first secretary who had to literally implement all of the Medicaid-Medicare problems. Obviously all of the testimony supporting the original recommendations--and Wilbur Cohen had warned me about this, that those projections were probably going to be unreliable. And that was the understatement, because obviously utilization was much greater than anybody expected. We went right off the chart. So right from the outset we were coping with a much larger,

more difficult situation in instituting the delivery of those programs than we had anticipated. That problem was further encumbered by the difficulty I had--because I knew utilization was going to be a major problem, I tried to get John Knowles, who was then the CEO of Massachusetts General [Hospital], as my assistant secretary for health. The AMA [American Medical Association] got very obdurate about it and persuaded [Everett] Dirksen and the Senate to take the leadership in objecting to his nomination, and we struggled with that for quite a while. Finally I had to withdraw the name and put in Dr. Roger Egeberg, an old friend of mine, who was then the dean of the medical school at USC [University of Southern California].

G: Why do you think utilization had been underestimated?

F: I don't think at that point our data and the ability to collect data and the state of the art in terms of technology was nearly where it is today in the sense of being able to keep accurate records and to assess health care in any structured fashion. That's one of the major changes between that time and now.

G: Anything else on the post-presidential association between Lyndon Johnson and President Nixon and yourself?

F: Well, not so much myself, but the subject on record is clear. I don't know how much of it is in the literature, but Nixon went out of his way to see to it that Johnson had the briefings. He sent the material down to him. He encouraged him to make sure he had all of the material he wanted from his administration. He took full copies, I know--Wilbur commented on this--for his Library of every one of the secretaries' full cabinet--all of their correspondence, anything he felt might be relative. So he instructed each of his

cabinet members to be sure to follow through on that, as well as everything including the log of those who were at Camp David, as I recall.

G: Let's go back to the period in the 1950s when LBJ was majority leader and Nixon was vice president. You were the administrative assistant to Vice President Nixon from 1958 to 1960, is that correct?

F: Right.

G: Let me ask you to describe the relationship between those two men at that stage in their careers.

F: Well, it was at arms' length. When they had meetings that all three were involved in--Eisenhower, Nixon and Johnson--obviously Johnson, with his fixation on dealing one on one, physically and otherwise, would direct his focus toward the President. I can recall Nixon saying how Eisenhower particularly resented anybody grasping him physically and Johnson had a penchant for doing that. He would give instructions to people around him, "Stand close to me so Lyndon isn't going to maul me." He didn't care for that. But that was part of the *modus operandi* for Johnson.

G: Johnson appears to have had allies that are friends in the Eisenhower White House [inaudible] during the eight years.

F: Well, obviously he had to work with Johnson. He was majority leader. And so it was a marriage of necessity and convenience. Everybody knew what Johnson's talents were and everybody understood he knew the Senate unlike any majority leader [or] minority leader had ever known it. I'm sure that's one of the reasons why [John F.] Kennedy was

smart enough to pick him, because he knew he himself was not a creature of the Senate--that is, Kennedy--so he made good usage of Johnson in that sense.

G: If Johnson was the leader of the loyal opposition, to what extent was he loyal? To what extent was he opposition?

F: I think he crafted that very intelligently in terms of protecting what he regarded as the party's interests and adapting to his view of the national interest and trying to be helpful to the administration within reason. I think he was probably better able to accommodate both his constituency, which were the Democratic senators, and his view of the national interest quite extraordinarily well.

G: Anything on his association with Everett Dirksen during this period, when Dirksen was minority leader?

F: Every sense of it I had was, they had a great deal of respect for each other. I was not present often when they were together at leadership meetings or so on. But what little I know about it in that sense, I think they recognized each other's talents.

G: Was it apparent that Johnson had presidential ambitions before 1960?

F: Oh, yes. It was bruited about as the Democratic primary season began that while [Hubert] Humphrey and the others were in the field, Johnson made the deliberate decision--which I think was a wise one from his standpoint at that time, knowing what--the primary process hadn't yet taken its dominant force in deciding the nominee. And he obviously predicated his approach on the fact that the primaries couldn't produce enough votes to guarantee you a nomination, that he could withhold an announcement, let the others fight in the early primaries and still, with his attachment to the senators, go in

with enough delegates to have a chance at getting the nomination, a good chance. I think that's probably the first--that turned out to be a false assumption in the sense that just the sheer focus of Kennedy's rise through the primaries, his set of victories and the telegenic effect--even though, again, it wasn't enough to dictate a first ballot--proved that his assumption had been wrong. And ever since, anybody who's been a majority leader, or a minority leader for that matter, has found that you can't do both jobs.

It also made clear another fact which [President George H.W.] Bush was smart enough to pick up on. Johnson was relying on the senators to deliver the key states that he needed. Kennedy was working the governors. [Senator Bob] Dole in the last go-round was working the senators because he knew them and he had a relationship. Bush was working the governors, like [New Hampshire governor John H.] Sununu. And the governors, being on top of the situation, having their own spoils system and their own appointments and so on, have a lot more political potency in presidential primaries than do U.S. senators.

G: Good point. Others have suggested that one of the reasons for the tension between Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon was Johnson's friendship with Helen Gahagan Douglas.

F: I can't put any particular credence in that. I think those are political friendships, and I think they're marriages of convenience. I just don't think--I'm not aware that that had any particular impact.

G: Okay. I have a note that indicates that when Vice President Nixon returned from Caracas, LBJ met him at the airport. Do you recall that?

(Interruption)

G: After his [Nixon's] South American trip, Johnson met him at the airport as a show of support.

F: I remember his being present. I just don't remember any particular--

G: Were you on the trip?

F: No, I did not make that trip.

G: But you were there at the airport?

F: Yes.

G: Tell me about that scene at the airport.

F: Well, obviously it had gotten a lot of U.S. attention. It was a remarkable demonstration of support for him. It meant a lot to him, and Johnson's presence particularly underscored that. That's really about all I can say.

G: Were there many Democrats there?

F: I can't recall. I think there was a pretty good cross-section of leadership. I just don't remember it all.

G: Any other significant effects of the South American trip in terms of policy?

F: Not in terms of policy. I think obviously it tended, as did the trip to Russia, to put him in the position of being an advocate for the United States, and having been less than respectfully treated worked to his advantage. And he may have carried the lesson of Caracas to Moscow, in sort of harsh assessment.

G: Johnson during this period, in the late fifties, was very interested in the space program and the preparedness subcommittee.

F: Right.

G: Any insights here on this interest and his association with the Vice President in this regard?

F: None that I am aware of. I just recall Nixon was interested in it. I don't recall any direct collaboration that they were involved in together. During his vice presidential years, I mean.

G: Right. Was Nixon also interested in space exploration during this period?

F: Well, [inaudible] space, I think more in terms of following the Sputnik situation, more in terms of our relative competitiveness and the satellite capabilities, and more of that than I think any direct possibility in those years of going to the moon or any other specific mission. I don't think we had moved far enough along to assess that at that point.

G: The Democrats during this period maintained that the U.S. was weaker than the Soviets in terms of--

F: Ballistics and what not.

G: --ballistic capability. Let me ask you to assess this criticism.

F: Well, I think the record is pretty clear now that that was overstated at least [by] Kennedy during the campaign. In retrospect the revelation of what the actual capacities were of course that we still had--without getting into the specific systems--a substantial advantage on our side, and that was clearly why Kennedy was able to push Khrushchev off on Cuba. That dwindled over the next couple of decades so that we were materially weaker, by the time Nixon came in as president, relative to the sheer throw rate of

satellites than was the case clearly when Eisenhower went out of office, just because where the Russians were and where they had to get to achieve some close balance.

G: You also had a major highway bill in 1958. Any recollections of that and the--?

F: Only that it was a particularly important project from the Eisenhower standpoint and it certainly has continued to stand over the decades following in terms of one of the major initiatives that--and Eisenhower took a lot of interest and pride in it, and obviously Nixon supported it and enjoyed that plus for the economy as a whole. But I don't know that at that point it got the attention it deserved. It's looked better in hindsight as time went on, and as all of our transportation problems and car ownership and all the rest of the elements continued to explode, and it did at the time.

G: Any insights on the labor legislation during this period, the Kennedy-Ives bill and the Landrum-Griffin Act?

F: No. Obviously that was a continuing struggle that went from Taft-Hartley on right up straight through the 1960 election. But I don't recall--except Nixon getting involved in the steel strike at Eisenhower's request and so on--his really getting involved and I don't recall any votes that were that close, that forced him to actively intervene in any one way or the other in terms of legislation. They were all pretty well--Johnson didn't bring them to the floor unless he knew where he was.

G: Let me just ask you to characterize Johnson as majority leader during this period.

F: Because of his insights into what motivated each of those senators, he knew when he had the votes and when he didn't and when he had to cut a deal and when he didn't. He was just the ultimate legislator. That's the only way I can characterize it.

G: In addition to making deals, did he also have the tendency to use the parliamentary procedures to his advantage?

F: Absolutely. He was extraordinarily skilled in every aspect of the leadership and that's a big part of it.

G: Was there an aspect of deviousness as well?

F: He was accused of it, but you can't--if it looks like you're playing games, you can't sustain your authority, and he never, to my knowledge, was put in the role of having been cute or misrepresented something.

G: Any insights on the 1960 Civil Rights Bill?

F: No, I think the record is pretty clear as to why that came into being with Johnson's leadership. I don't know of anything related to either Nixon or Johnson in terms of their relationship that played into that at all.

G: Let me ask you to talk about the 1960 campaign. You were President Nixon's campaign director. Was that the equivalent of a campaign manager or--?

F: Well, to be more precise in this instance, the general campaign chairman was Len [Leonard W.] Hall, and he really focused--because of his background and his skills on the delegate struggle, which of course going in we assumed would be with [Nelson] Rockefeller. He did a superb job of working the Hill and working with the state chairmen and with the governors. I was essentially running the internal operations relating to the vice president's schedule. We would meet when I was in town--every morning, practically--with our inner core of leadership and cover those things that needed

to be discussed in terms of agenda and activities on the part of the Rockefeller people and so on.

Coming out of 1958, you have to recall what the situation was. The Republicans had taken a tremendous battering in the 1958 election and then they'd lost seats in the House and Senate. Nixon had been the only one out campaigning, and we took this battering, and the only bright star that presumably came out of that was Rockefeller's success in winning New York. So the polls all showed him well ahead of Nixon in terms of support for the presidential nomination. So we had to begin working from scratch to rebuild his role and continue to try to mount his success. We just assumed that we were going to have a bloody battle in New Hampshire, which would be the first of the primaries, of course, and Rockefeller's strength in having gone to Dartmouth--it's a small state. He could spend enough in walking-around money to send out five or six mailings, and we just thought that was going to be a really tough struggle. So we were building towards what we thought would be the key--and presumably the early polls showed that Rockefeller was quite a bit ahead in New Hampshire. But both Len and I worked on the senators and the governors from New Hampshire and the leadership to build a very strong organization within the state, and then when Rockefeller--I forget now the months, the dates--made his major tour of the nation to begin to take samplings of his support--this was, as I recall it, in 1959--by that time we had begun to build enough of a head of steam so that Rockefeller found out that Nixon was really the first choice among those that were going to be the delegates and the party leadership. All three of us--Len Hall, Nixon and myself--were astonished when Rockefeller pulled out of active

candidacy well in advance of New Hampshire. He of course came back in later, after most of the primaries were by, and of course particularly prior to the convention when he challenged Eisenhower's defense spending and all the rest and they had the so-called accommodation in New York just prior to the Chicago convention.

G: Were you there at that meeting?

F: No. The only one that went with him was his military aide, Don Hughes. I had already gone to Chicago with Len to help set up the convention. We heard about it in Chicago, and Don Hughes called me to say that he was meeting with Rockefeller and not to say anything about it. Then of course we had then to move the delegates to support their joint agreement and [work] with Chuck Percy, who was the platform committee chairman, to reflect that view, and that was a pretty good struggle. We worked all night through two nights to bring that about, and he had to come out and personally intervene--Nixon did--to satisfy the delegates [that] he hadn't sold out, so to speak.

G: To what extent was the 1960 campaign sort of the first modern presidential campaign?

F: I don't think it was the first modern campaign. I think it was the last of the genuine political struggles in the sense of a combination of media, not because it was the first thoroughly televised campaign, which it was, or that you had a first in terms of two very young, able, attractive candidates who campaign strenuously and physically as well as with the electronic media. But I think because it was the first genuine postwar election--Eisenhower being the symbol of our ascendancy in his years--where people really still believed in politics as the solution to the problems and that that battle, that election, was critically important. That's why I think you had the highest turnout that

there had been in some time, and that was the high water mark of presidential turnout in terms of percentage of voters actually participating, and it's been downhill every since. That's because I think that campaign fully engaged most of the voters. So in that sense it was the last of the participatory presidential elections, and since that time it's been increasingly media-driven and there's been less and less direct sense of involvement by most of the electorate.

G: Is that because campaigns now are more media-driven?

F: Unfortunately, yes, in my opinion.

G: Let me ask you to analyze Lyndon Johnson's role in that campaign.

F: It was obviously absolutely critical to holding the South and he did just exactly that. I think without Johnson there Kennedy could never have carried the election. I don't think there's any question about it. If you look at what's happened to the South ever since, it's been all Republican.

G: The irregularities recorded in Texas and Illinois--

F: And Arkansas and Missouri and Hawaii and so on. Well, they just point out the fundamental weakness. It is not, in the literal sense, a national election. Each of those state elections have different requirements, different sets of rules, and obviously when we came back to Washington after being out here for the returns and we began to look into each state law--for example, in Arkansas they can't have a recount until they convene the legislature, and it takes thirty days to convene the legislature and then they have to come back into session, and by that time the ballots are all gone or they're stored or whatever. But that was a totally controlled Democratic legislature. And ballots in Cook County had

been done away with, and I don't know about Texas. You probably know more about that than we do. But the point was that the vagaries and the differences among the various state laws in terms of how you count them--it was clear that you would have held the presidency in hostage for a period of three to six months if you were to go through all that and try to reconstruct [inaudible], if you were even able to find the ballots. So that was essentially the reason why we didn't contest it.

G: Did you have evidence in Texas that--?

F: We were told of evidence in Texas but I never happened to analyze it. We of course had heard of the anecdotal material about the earlier struggle. We didn't have any suggestion or possibility--a lot of Republicans in Texas said we should challenge, but it didn't appear realistic to us, particularly when you looked at the other states that would have to be called into contention as well.

G: How much did you travel with Vice President Nixon during the campaign?

F: Well, quite a bit. I can't remember the exact--that was probably one of the problems, because it was a fifty-state campaign. He wanted me with him but at the same time I needed to be back with Len Hall, so I would come and go as best I could. But I didn't, for example, make that final stint when he went west and then to the islands, into Alaska and then back across, because we were back trying to arrange for the final television broadcast. So I tried to divide my time, or do the best I could, so that I could help Len Hall in Washington with the dynamics of the media campaign, together with making sure that he was getting enough rest. He of course was the consummate campaigner in the sense that he overextended himself. Even though he had some very able speechwriters

with him, he insisted on writing all of his own material. I would have to say in candor, because he was a young man--he and Kennedy both--he pushed himself physically to the limit, and I was very much concerned about just that aspect of it. He also had, if you'll recall, even before the Chicago convention, his knee that became infected and he was hospitalized for a period of time. And that weakened him and in part accounted for his rather drawn appearance in the first debate and so on. So we were concerned about his health throughout that campaign, not [in the sense of] his endangering him but just his fatigue, his being vulnerable in a physical sense. And that was one of the reasons why when after he came back to California to run for governor I opposed it on the basis that he really--I was concerned about whether he could physically--his stamina would give out. California is a very tough state to campaign, too because everything is north and south. It's not a box where you can move around in the same sense that you can in other states.

G: How did the fifty-state strategy evolve, and in hindsight was it a mistake to--?

F: I think it put an undue limitation in the sense that he felt he had to do it himself, even though Len Hall and I were arguing we should work the heavy states more. But that's an anachronism, I think, from part of his earlier political background, and he likes to set those--the first so and so, the first this, this historic first. And he genuinely felt that was something he wanted to do, conduct the first fifty-state campaign, and he did it.

G: How helpful was President Eisenhower?

F: Well, that's pretty clearly covered, I think, in Nixon's own writings, but both Len and I had been talked to by Jerry Persons and by Mrs. Eisenhower saying that she was

concerned about his health. And Nixon I think was talked to by her as well. But Eisenhower was quite clearly--when we went to see him up in Newport after the nomination and so on, he wanted to be more active. But there was also the element that Nixon wanted to win this on his own so that he would have some strength, so that--he didn't encourage us, even though Eisenhower offered through Persons to Len Hall to go into Chicago or New York one more time or wherever we wanted him to. Nixon didn't push it because, as I say, I think he felt he had the tide with him as the election closed and he wanted to win it on his own. So I think there was an ambivalence there on his part.

G: You've talked about the concern for his health and the problem that he had being hospitalized before that debate. In retrospect, is there anything in that 1960 campaign that you would have done differently?

F: Sure. You could have made sure that instead of running around doing four or five street corner stops the night before in Chicago you should have gone to bed early, and that he probably should have engaged in a little direct confrontation with some of us, but he wanted to be alone to work on his material and prepare his own case. And I suppose those are technical differences, but by and large I think it was a full-gauged, full-bore campaign. I think, as I said, it was one that fully engaged the American people. I don't think we've seen its like since in terms of just the sheer physical commitment on the part of two very young candidates for president. I wouldn't change much of it in terms of [strategy].

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F: I wouldn't change any of the basic elements other than to maybe--we spent a lot of time--again, styles have changed. We spent a lot of time really working the volunteer element. We had Citizens for Nixon-[Henry Cabot] Lodge [Jr.]. I can make a case that if you had had a more dynamic--if we'd had someone who brought to the Nixon ticket what Johnson brought to the Kennedy tickets in terms of a real impact--and we looked at some others in that campaign. I think basically the reasons that Nixon picked Lodge were that Eisenhower had indicated a preference for him and also because he, as an ambassador in the United Nations, underscored the importance of the world leadership aspect of the campaign. But I think a real firebrand like Judd, who electrified the Republican convention--Walter Judd--might have gone out in terms of pure evangelism and excited more white Protestants in the South--you can argue that--than Lodge, who conducted a relatively low-key campaign, one or two appearances a day. You can argue about such things as that.

G: There's also the question of whether Lodge brings anything in terms of electoral votes.

F: Well, yes. We knew going in, because the ticket had already been set on the other side, that we didn't expect him to carry Massachusetts. The question was what did he represent. Obviously he wasn't going to get us much in the South, but we figured we weren't going to get an awful lot there after Johnson was on the ticket anyway. So then it came down to who had the greatest symbolism in terms of what the issues would be. We were--because Kennedy-Johnson could be clearly a politically inspired decision--we were trying to point a contrast. With Lodge from Massachusetts, we didn't expect to carry Massachusetts. We were there because he would be a staunch student of the U.S.

role in world affairs because of his background, as opposed to what was a politically accommodated ticket.

G: Was the fund-raising, the campaign finance, roughly equitable in that race?

F: My recollection is it was. You can never measure the amount of money big labor puts in because it's not directly attributable, but I think both campaigns were probably in the twenty-million-plus category. From any direct expenditure--it's impossible to get what the states and the local political organization--because the campaign reporting requirements were almost nonexistent at the lesser levels. That didn't come into play until much later.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II

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