INTERVIEW I

DATE: July 10, 1987

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM CLYDE FRIDAY

INTERVIEWER: Janet Kerr-Tener

PLACE: Dr. Friday's office, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

F: There's an interesting little footnote here, if I have the time sequence correct. Robert Goheen was president of Princeton, and he and I got to be very good friends because we were the new presidents in the AAU. We sat with each other and talked with each other about the extent and kind of federal aid, what should we be planning? And he reached down in the economic faculty at Princeton, and that's the way Bill [William G.] Bowen got his first major exposure.

T: When he--

F: And he wrote a little document for the Association of American Universities on federal aid positions, which was the forerunner of this.

T: And--

F: Mr. Bowen became Mr. Goheen's successor in years to come.

T: Was Cosand's [?] study of--I think comparison of Chicago and Vanderbilt and Princeton--?

F: I don't remember what [inaudible]. They had a comparison [inaudible].

T: Yes. They had a comparison projecting these huge deficits into the 1970s for operating expenses, [inaudible]--

F: That was the way that happened. I had been a proponent all along, and of course, the

really interesting thing to you is that when the time came, and the Carnegie Commission got its proposal together based on need, that meeting took place at Chapel Hill, right down there in the Morehead Building, and that was the beginning of the federal [Pell?] grant system; I've got a bronze plaque to go in there, which I got Clark Kerr to validate. So the sequence is there, you see.

T: I may want to ask you a little more about that because I think when I was in California I had a chance to interview Mr. Clark and also Thomas Pettigrew.

F: Yes, Tommy was on our group.

T: And he talked a little bit about that, and then I had some letters from Dave [inaudible]--

F: Yes.

T: --discussing the same thing. I may want to ask you a little more about that position.

F: Well, I thought that would be the last commission I would ever serve on, because it was a hard job. It turned out to be very interesting.

[David] Riesman [?] and I got to be great friends. We sat together a lot. Excuse me. Let me respond to you, and we'll save time.

T: I'm going to stop this and just make-- (Interruption)

T: I wanted to start by asking you a little bit about your upbringing and where you were born and all that sort of thing.

F: I came from the Valley of Virginia. I was born in Rockbridge County, Virginia, my mother's first child; she went home to have her first baby. But I lived all of my life in Piedmont, North Carolina, but the last forty years in Chapel Hill. I went to Wake Forest College on a scholarship, and then to NC State when I graduated in 1941. Then I spent four years in the navy and came here to law school, got my law degree, intended to

practice, and I went to Burlington because I had a degree in technical engineering, and I'd put the two together. They didn't have a vacancy, and I came back here and took a temporary job. I've never tried a case, and I haven't left. My wife was still in graduate school, and she stayed those eight weeks to finish her master's degree, and we've been here ever since.

T: Now how was it that you came into administrative work [inaudible]?

F: Well, before that, before World War II, you see, I was in the dean of students' office at NC State, and I knew the dean here, and when I finished and passed the bar exam, I needed temporary work and he gave me temporary work in his office. I ran into a man in the president's office with whom I had worked with as a student officer, and he pulled me into some things he was doing and that led me to Dr. [Frank P.] Graham. Before I could turn around, Dr. Graham had gone to the Senate, and I then stayed here, and I moved in eight years from that type of status to the presidency of the university, and I stayed with the job for thirty years.

T: And this was not part of the original plan?

F: Never thought-out, never planned it, and it scared me to death when it happened.

T: And you'd had a year as acting president before you were [inaudible]-

F: Actually February until October. That's how long it was. I became president October 1957. February, 1956, I was--

T: Wasn't that about the time when Sputnik went off?

F: No, it was later than that, but we had some interesting times.

T: I was a little curious, not being a North Carolinian, I'm not all that familiar with the history of the university, but how did it achieve the kind of national prominence that it

enjoys today? At that time? Or was that something that evolved while you were in office?

F: It became a member of the Association of American Universities in 1925. That was the result of the work of a man named Ed Kidder Graham and another man named Harry Woodburn Chase, who left here and went on to be president of the University of Illinois and then the president of NYU. They brought here a collection of scholars, research and teaching personnel. I don't think they've been equaled again in concentrated quality, and they are responsible for the fact that in those ten years it moved from being a first-rate liberal arts college to being a research university. The impetus for that came from a man named [Francis P.] Venable, who was president of the university here right after the turn of the century, who had been for his graduate work in Thüringen [Göttingen], Germany, and he found out what research could really do and why it was important, and he moved it literally from a non-research-oriented institution into what it now is.

T: Was it, at the time that you became president of the system, the way it is now, which encompasses [inaudible]?

F: Yes, in 1931 that action initially began under Dr. Graham. A woman's college in Greensboro, and the land grant college [NC State] in Raleigh, and this place were put together as a Depression measure. For over fifty years I've been involved with the university, forty as a student or administrator. The university stayed that way until 1961, when we took Charlotte into the structure. Then in 1969, we added Asheville and Wilmington. Eventually, in 1971, all the degree-granting, publicly financed institutions were put under this system.

T: Yes. And you presided over all of that.

F: Over fourteen years. Fifteen years.

T: At the time that you became president, if you can think back, what were some of the national issues in higher education? I want to give a little of the historical perspective [inaudible].

F: Enrollment growth was, of course, the big pressure. Finance. The public service role of a very good public university. By that, I mean how far did it go beyond good teaching, first-rate research, public service? We're doing things here now that no one even thought about in those years: Institute on Highway Safety, Nutrition, Water Resources and Air Pollution, and these kinds of things. Now, they are very important functions of public universities, but there is a limit to how much you can do and do well, and you shouldn't undertake anything that you don't intend to do well. We had 7,800 students. We thought we were outside the limit. Here we are with 126,000 or whatever. And so they were the more mundane things until we had the encounter with this speaker ban law, and that changed the whole business around.

T: What happened with that?

F: Because of the fact that the university was such a free place--we had people speaking here that they thought were outrageous.

T: This was during the McCarthy period or after?

F: Afterwards. On the last day of a session, without hearing, under suspension of rules, the general assembly passed a bill banning communists as speakers, and for the next four or five years we had an open struggle. The board turned down a plan I submitted, so that ultimately the students filed suit and won in the federal court by unanimous decision, and I was in collaboration with the students. And I didn't tell the board because they had

turned me down, and would have fired me for that kind of conduct. But we cleared the name of the university.

T: Okay. I was kind of curious in looking at--the thought may have occurred to me a little late in the game, but I was curious in looking over things to do with the task force, how it was that you came to the attention of the administration in the first place, and then I was able to get a few documents from the White House Central File. The LBJ Library sent them up to me, and I looked through, and I saw from looking at those things that your association with the Johnson Administration dated as far back as 1963, and the first little thing I saw--this may not have been the first encounter--was a letter that you sent to someone at the White House with a suggestion for LBJ's 1964 State of the Union message.

F: That was to Eric Goldman.

T: Eric Goldman? Okay.

F: You'll see a reference to this in his book, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson*. That happened because he called me the week before Christmas, after the President had been elected [inaudible] and said, "Bob Goheen said for me to call you. He said you might have some ideas for us." That's where it all started. But the real pressure for this appointment came from John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation when I became a president. They had a program for the development of new college presidents, and I was asked to take one of those grants and went to attend the program at Harvard. Mr. Gardner was there. That visit led to a friendship that I cherish.

T: I'll go back to that. Yes. I wanted to ask about that.

F: This first exchange led to the White House Fellows program.

T: Right. That was my next question. Then I saw some documents relating to your appointment [inaudible].

F: John Gardner put up $300,000 out of Carnegie, for Goldman, and then later I went to the White House on a Sunday morning to see him. John Gardner had laid out his plan of bringing in a dozen or so bright young people young people, potential leaders, to spend a year on grant assignment. We had a marvelous commission: David Rockefeller, Douglas Dillon, Mrs. [Olive] Beech of Beech Aircraft, Edgar Kaiser, Jr., John, and others of us. John Ochs, who was editor of the editorial page of the *New York Times*. Oh, gee, I can't remember--do you know who was in that first group?

T: I--let's see--

F: [Edgar?] Edwards? David Gold? [Inaudible]--

T: No, I don't. I just have--

F: Well, I mean just so you'll get some idea the first of the talent in the initial competition. We had Tom Johnson, now publisher of the *Los Angeles Times*.

T: Is he the one who worked at the White House?

F: Yes. He was twenty-two years old, had a wife who was going to have a baby at any moment, and nobody wanted to vote for him, too young.

T: Oh, yes.

F: Libby [Elizabeth] Dole didn't make it. She was a candidate for that first group. She didn't apply the second time. She would have been chosen if she had. Timmy Wirth, who is in the Senate. I could go on. It was just a powerful group of young people.

T: Tom Cronin? Was he--?

F: He was in there. Another idea developed with Eric Goldman was to get the President to

invite the student body president of every major university in the country to come to the White House for a Saturday afternoon.

T: What was the purpose of that?

F: To introduce this program, show its value. And I have a picture somewhere, and we're there in the East Room [inaudible]: McNamara, Rusk, Wirth, all of them, explaining the cabinet, explaining themselves, and Frank Keppel and some others were explaining the [White House] Fellows program. Goldman writes about this suggestion in his book. After that, I got involved with Bill Moyers. He asked me to come up there to work with him, and I didn't do it.

T: To work with him while he was still in the White House?

F: Yes. He and Joe Califano were the contact points.

T: Okay. I notice that between 1964-1967 there was a fairly steady stream of invitations either from you to people in the administration--Califano, Moyers, Gaither, the President himself--to attend academic or education-type meetings--

F: Yes.

T: --and then invitations to you to come and--

F: Well, I did a lot of work for them. It was an interesting experience for me. It's all a memory. I never think back on those things. I saw Doug Cater just four months or so ago. We were doing a series here on the Constitution on university television with Mortimer Adler, and he was one of the panel.

T: Is he with the Aspen Institute?

F: No, he's now president of Westminster College in Maryland.

T: I believe LBJ made a visit in--was it October of 1964?

F: To Raleigh. The *Lady Bird Special*.

T: To Raleigh, right before the election.

F: Yes.

T: What was the purpose of all that? You were involved in that.

F: She was making a swing through the East to stimulate women. Terry Sanford brought her into Raleigh; this was just a typical political thing. The President was running very late, but we had held eighteen thousand people in the coliseum by playing "Hello, Lyndon." Finally when he walked in there, the whole crowd just came alive. It was so interesting, watching the sociology of that.

T: And then I believe--was it in, let's see, March of 1967, Vice President Humphrey came down to UNC for a talk with students and faculty?

F: He was very close to my predecessor here. I'll try to pick up on that. And he had a sister who used to work here.

T: I didn't know that.

F: Long years ago. He was a big favorite in Chapel Hill. Everybody loved him. I'd do anything for him. He was a politically responsible person. He was a great spirit, I thought.

T: And then once, or twice maybe, you had Califano and Gaither, James Gaither, and Doug Cater come down for a--

F: Dinner discussion.

T: --round-table type discussion with--

F: Joe provoked that first. He called and said, "The President is doing this around the country. Will you put one on for us?" And I did.

T: And who did you round up to come to this?

F: I got all the responsible people around here in industry and government.

T: And not just university people?

F: Oh, no. No. He wanted to get a cross-section of opinion. This was Mr. Johnson's way of picking [up] ideas. What are they thinking about out there, the really responsible people? This is the way it happened.

T: So it was really just to come down and do a little brain-storming with people and hear what they had to say.

F: That was the whole idea. They'd come down about five o'clock; we'd eat dinner and have that [talk] and he'd fly back that same night. They had this little air force jet, takes about thirty minutes to get back up there.

T: All this suggests that you had a fairly close relationship with the White House, as an outsider.

F: With a lot of people, but I was clearly an outsider. I was not a political person. I could have been, but I didn't want to be because I went through Dr. Graham's campaign with him and became--well, that really was a very, very harsh thing to experience because it was so offensive, and the use of race and the hatred.

T: Who was he running against? Do you know?

F: He was running against a man named Willis Smith whose campaign was directed in part by Jesse Helms.

But working with Mr. Johnson's staff, I saw ways of mobilizing the universities to help the country, and that's what's so short-sighted about this administration. Instead of mobilizing people, they've driven them away, and that's a very, very--in my view--very

improper way to utilize the educational strength of the country. Fifty or sixty major institutions in this country, as well as the agencies like the Bell Laboratories and others constitute major research capability and Mr. Reagan's attitude is one of less, not more involvement. During the Johnson years--these were the great years of expansion, and then came the civil rights legislation, which made him a legendary figure in his own time. Now I've talked to enough reporters and seen enough myself to know that he could be very harsh, very mean, very difficult. I couldn't work for him. He was driven in lots of ways. Goldman states all this in his book.

After that experience, I just sort of dropped out of sight until Kent State. Pat [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan was on the President's staff and he came over to meet with the AAU. We met in Washington, and we told him the research programs of universities were getting in bad shape and Mr. Nixon had to do something. He went back and told the President that he ought to invite some people over. I was one of the six who went, six or eight, and the conversation was beneficial. Well, within a month after that meeting Kent State occurred, and he called us all back into a second session. Mr. Nixon really was totally out of touch with student attitudes. [Henry] Kissinger came into the room, sat beside me and asked, "What should we do?" And I said, "I'll tell you. You have got to establish a place in this office where people can call you and vent their anger about demonstrations. They need to know. [Inaudible]" He said, "Who should it be?" And I said, "Alexander Heard."

He had been here as a graduate dean, you see. He was on this commission, and--

T: And he went on to Vanderbilt?

F: He was there at the time as chancellor.

T: Oh, at Vanderbilt.

F: We recessed, and I told Nate [Nathan] Pusey of Harvard, who was chairing our group at the time, of the suggestion I had made. Heard wound up being up there for a year. But I don't know if it contributed very much, but at least it defused it. And then Mr. Carter came along, and one of his Georgia friends called to ask me to chair an educational task force for him.

T: I know nothing about that.

F: Well, that report is a collection of documents and studies.

T: Was this in the early part of his administration?

F: Very early, yes. Very early. Even before he took office.

T: Who were some of the other people?

F: There is a long list of names available for you.

T: It was sort of like a pre-inaugural type of task force.

F: Yes, same kind of thing. Not as structured as the Johnson group. But Mr. Carter didn't think anybody in education, health, or welfare ought to be secretary of education. I guess they figured I'd have some kind of political ambition about an appointment, but I did not. The irony is that I was one of those people who recommended Califano. And then Joe and I got into this terrible fuss over civil rights legislation.

T: This was over the segregation in higher education?

F: Yes, we were not able to resolve the issue and the Secretary later filed suit against this university. The Supreme Court sustained our position and regrettably the plan the Secretary managed to get one state to accept has failed. And the irony of it was that when Mr. Reagan got in, Terrel Bell called me and said, "I know you struggled with this

thing for years. Let's talk it over." I went up to the Secretary's office, and in nine months it was all over. It was most unfortunate in having such an unnecessary experience that proved costly to both interests. I have not read Califano's book.

T: I've read it.

F: I've left it alone.

T: I can't recall the details of it.

F: And I'll tell you another little story. Stuart Eizenstat called me one day and said, "The President would like you to get eight or nine university presidents together so we can talk about universities one Saturday morning." We did. During the course of this discussion we had parceled out the work among members. Dave Saxon was there from Berkeley, and we asked him to talk about research. He started in and the President said, "I used to sit on the commencement platform and read the titles of research projects and I found this is about the biggest waste of time you ever saw," and boy, that threw the sand in the gear box. After it was all over, Joe Califano came running up to me and said, "We better turn his mind around about this." I said, "Joe, don't worry about this. Every governor who's ever sat on a commencement platform has said identically the same thing." And he said, "Oh, no! Oh, no! He won't put anything in the budget." So we had to back up and write another letter of explanation and advocacy.

Kingman Brewster was in that group, and he believed that it was that exchange with the President that led to the appointment to the Court of St. James as our ambassador. But my work has been kind of in-and-out. And I did not take a full-time appointment.

T: Would that have meant giving up the presidency--?

F: Yes.

T: --or you could have gone on a sabbatical or taken a leave?

F: Taken a leave. At least that was the current practice all over the country. But this administration, of course, has been adversarial. Bill Bennett's role when we created the National Humanities Center in the Research Triangle was as an assistant to Charles Frankel, who was the first director. Frankel got murdered in his home in New York by those terrible people, and Bill eventually became head of the Humanities Center, and I worked very closely with him. In fact, he got married in Chapel Hill. His current perception is never going to strengthen the academic enterprise the way this country's got to have it perform if it's going to survive.

T: You mentioned that you'd had contact with Califano. Was he the person who first called you directly about taking the chairmanship of--?

F: Yes. About the task force [inaudible].

T: --the task force? How well defined was the mission? I mean, did he say over the phone exactly what he wanted the panel to look at? Or was it kind of open?

F: Open. It was put this way. John Gardner had done the same thing a year or so before. We were to look at his recommendations, pick up on them, and chart whatever was necessary beyond there. We were not to worry about expenditures; we were to worry about ideas and vitality, and that's what the starting conditions were [?].

T: Were they interested in more of a short-term, what's-the-very-next-step, or taking a longer view of what ought to be done?

F: Always the latter. We were trying to lay out a course of action which would obtain in several Congresses. Bill [William B.] Cannon and I never varied from that. I don't think

anybody in the commission did. We had some very strong views.

T: And that's what you felt the White House wanted, was the longer view.

F: Oh, yes. Yes. It was a resource document. It could be in and out with--this time we'll do this, and next time we'll do that. And also, I guess primarily, I guess it was to maintain a continuity. John Gardner's commission had done its work; it opened the door. We came right in behind that with a series of proposals. Another one would follow us, updating things, keeping it fresh, keeping it current. That was the pattern that was set. I don't know what happened after I left. Joe was the person who called me and asked me to come up there. He wanted to talk about it.

T: And you didn't hesitate; you went?

F: That's right. Well, I--John had called me and told me that I was going to be asked. He said, "Now, don't you turn this down." "Well," I said, "I've just got to see." I just didn't have enough knowledge about it to talk to anybody, especially that first-rate group of people.

T: Can you tell me a little bit about some of those people?

F: Well, Sid Marland, of course, was the man who took the role of advocacy for elementary and secondary education, and--

T: And he had been on Gardner's--?

F: Yes, he had been involved with it. He and Mr. [Samuel] Brownell. Hugh Calkins and Mr. [J. W.] Edgar--

T: Who was Mr. Edgar?

F: He was state superintendent of Texas.

T: Was he a friend of LBJ's, or--?

F: Yes, I'm sure he was. He was not a very effective member. He was the weakest member in the group. He was faithful, but he never would say anything. The strong people in there were Marland and to some extent Ed [Edward H.] Levi and Tom [Thomas] Pettigrew. They all in the end were very good about involving themselves. There were no weak people in the sense of non-involvement. Professor [Walter] Ong was a very interesting man.

T: This was Walter Ong from St. Louis University?

F: [Inaudible] 1954-1955. [Inaudible].

T: Yes.

F: I got to be a very great admirer of Hugh Calkins. I thought as a layman he did a superb piece of work. [Fred] Harrington spoke well for higher education. Pettigrew really was an architect of the integration argument; he was. They sort of fell into places of advocacy. Each took an area to be developed and worked on it, but not exclusively. Every Saturday morning when we were together, we'd all do the scramble session. Everybody had his say, and toward the end, Bill had to organize it topically so we could make some sense of order out of our work.

I: This was Bill Cannon?

F: Increasingly, he became the architect of the document.

T: What would he do--like try to congeal what he had heard and put it out on paper and then send that out for people to react to it, or--?

F: Yes. We'd write up on a flip chart everything we could think of. And then we'd start eliminating. And once we'd eliminated down, then we'd ask, "Why is this a problem?" Bill's group would do back-up research between meetings. One time, he had six or eight

people working.

T: Were most of these people from the Budget Bureau?

F: Yes. Harold Howe became involved with it. He worked with us; we invited him, and he cautioned about costs. He, of all people, would start fussing at us, but in a good way. He was very pleasant. And I enjoyed him. He had been here, too. His first big job was in North Carolina.

T: Did you know him before?

F: Oh, sure. He came to North Carolina from Scarsdale School in New York. I knew Fred Harrington, of course, worked with Fred, Lee DuBridge, Dave Bell.

T: You mentioned something about segregation as being a concern, from elementary and secondary education. Now your group covered the waterfront. They looked at everything from elementary on through graduate school, and--

F: That's right. I don't think you could do that in a commission today, [it's] much too complicated. Way beyond one's ability to grasp.

T: And in elementary and secondary education, what were the main concerns?

F: Well, those men, the ones I mentioned were the people who sifted through everything that came before us. It was numbers, it was money, it was teacher preparation, facilities--Sid got all involved in this cluster concept, the magnet school idea, and we did recommend--

T: It's enjoying a revival now.

F: Oh, sure. We recommended some rather large sums to start in certain cities.

T: Sort of pilot programs?

F: Yes, that was the idea; test the thesis. John had done the same thing in his commission

with two or three ideas of concentration on geographic interests. The secretaryship was in here.

T: Oh, did that come out of your report, too? I wasn't aware of that.

F: Oh, we were very strong about that. I don't think John wanted it at first, but we held out. But it's in here. It was the right decision. I noticed Mr. Reagan did not press too hard to eliminate it this time. But there's a strange viewpoint toward education. Something as big monetarily, manpower-wise, product-wise, and so important, to be always the object of ridicule. I don't understand people that think that way.

T: Was the task force, as far as elementary and secondary education was concerned, sort of looking at the problems of the group of students that fell in the lowest quartile in terms of achievement tests and that sort of thing, and that could be--

F: Yes--

T: --poor, and many of them were minorities and--

F: --a lot of emphasis was on that, but they didn't lose sight of the others either, but you can't do it all. And there, I think, was really the beginning of the anxiety about poor children, abused children, blacks and Hispanics. We laid a little groundwork there for the next twenty years. We heard an awful lot of testimony, and Mr. Edgar came from Texas. And we listened to everybody who wanted to talk. We had papers to read from everybody.

T: Did you solicit those papers?

F: No, not that many, but we did solicit some because they were very competent people.

When I was in Sweden I recently asked a vice chancellor, "Why is it that 98 per cent of your people are so literate?" And he said, "Well, they learn two languages, if not

three, before they even get out of the twelfth grade. We don't ask anything difficult." That's what they do.

Well, anyway, going back to your other question, what I had hoped was happening here was the establishment of continuity in such reports. John Gardner and I had interlocking reports. We picked up where his task force stopped and we moved through the issues before us.

T: It was my impression from reading some of the materials in the LBJ Library relating to the task force that the group had an easier time dealing with the elementary and secondary issues. The problems were clear, and the consensus emerged more readily--

F: Very clearly.

T: --versus [those issues in] higher education.

F: There was a lot of diversity about that. The issue that was beginning to raise its head at that time was public vs. private and public finance--

T: In the universities?

F: If you look in the *Chronicle* this week, there it is on the front page. It's finally come to the front. It is probably the most divisive issue in American higher education today, although nobody will talk about it. Because what's happening is that states are funding private institutions, but they are not funding in the same manner as they do the public sector, and that's going to start generating resentment.

T: But this was something that your task force recommended, but for all institutions.

F: But on a different basis.

T: Right.

F: We were dealing with a brand-new notion. We knew that it wasn't going to get too far,

but we knew that some way you had to raise the question.

T: And to get a compromise between the public and the private interests.

F: And led to the Pell Program. I'm sure Clark Kerr would tell you that this generated conversation as to what his commission would do, and after a year or so of it, it was perfectly apparent that no Congress would ever appropriate money this way, in lump sum capitation grants. Interestingly enough, that's the very thing that states are doing here. No questions are asked, no references needed, no anything. Just a capitation grant. So the argument has been accepted at the state level but not nationally.

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T: --by training? Yes.

F: Well, he would get right in there, and he would argue his case just as strenuously--

T: A good Jesuit is able to do that.

F: Well, that's where the Social Science Foundation emphasis came from. He had [inaudible] he had heard the political side. All of us believed in it.

T: I saw a letter that I believe he wrote you after the task force had finished its work, saying that he would be willing to go on a week's trout-fishing trip with any--I'm speaking of Walter Ong--with any of you all. It was such a congenial group and--[inaudible].

F: Yes, we had a good time together. There was no quarrelsomeness there.

T: Well, how were decisions made, say when there was a group difference of view?

F: We worked to reach a consensus.

T: I was wondering about--I believe David Bell had some reservations about the notion of giving these capitations or issuing grants to institutions.

F: Yes, he did.

T: I believe he was more in favor of funneling any large increases in aid through student aid, and he and Lee DuBridge and Harrington sort of parted company on that. Was that an amiable discussion?

F: This was one of the finest groups that I ever worked with. There was no meanness in it. We all were aware of the fact that we had a rare opportunity to talk to a president. They were experienced people, very competent people, didn't waste time. And as I look back on it, it's probably the most remarkable group I ever worked with. We didn't have a woman on it, though. [Inaudible]

T: That was kind of interesting. And no blacks?

F: No blacks at that time. But we called people in and went to see people. I don't know how many people I went to see personally. [Inaudible]

T: On your own time you went?

F: Yes. I went to see the heads of the teacher's--Bill Cannon set all this up. I'd go see the teachers' association people and--I was trying to learn and listen and to convince them that we didn't have horns and a tail. You know, we were going to be helpful. You almost get the feeling sometime that Washington overpowers and they forget why they are there in the first place.

But you can't just put together a group like that and not enjoy it. You look forward to it, and when you have a first-rate director like Bill Cannon, you know something good will result.

T: And you met where, in Cannon's office or where?

F: We had a room in the Executive Building, which was assigned to us. We all met there for every session. We'd meet on Friday afternoon and leave Saturday afternoon, Friday

afternoon and night and Saturday morning.

T: And I understand that this was pretty much done on everyone's personal time, and I believe the government reimbursed you just for expenses, and that's it.

F: That's right.

T: That's a pretty significant contribution of time from busy people.

F: It sure was. But gladly done.

T: I was interested; you earlier mentioned, I believe before the tape was on, that the White House decided to violate its own policy of task force secrecy by engineering some kind of leak from the-

F: It was a leak to *Newsweek*.

T: To *Newsweek* magazine on--

F: I had nothing to do with it, knew nothing about it until I got a phone call, and I never have yet understood why. It didn't make any difference. I don't think it influenced anybody.

T: Very shortly after the leak, I believe there were some requests from people like McGeorge Bundy, who was at the Ford Foundation, Goldman, [and] Clark Kerr for just the discussion portion of the report.

F: Well, I gave Clark my copy; I loaned it to him for his reading.

T: Yes, and the White House did uniformly refuse to release it.

F: Well, I lost touch then. I never saw those letters. They weren't referred to me. I did this on my own. I didn't ask anybody in the White House. I didn't tell them. I just got in touch and told Clark Kerr, "If you'll protect me here, you ought to read it, if you're going to chair this Carnegie Commission group."

T: I understand that James Gaither very much recommended in favor of releasing at least the discussion; take the specific recommendations out and let these people see the reasoning of the task force, and I don't know whether Califano went to LBJ with the request, but there were three or four requests that were turned down, and Califano came back and said, "No dice."

F: "No dice."

T: But I think it was somewhat ironic in view of the fact that one of the recommendations that LBJ made in his 1968 special message on education, which was the 1968 legislative program for education, was to follow up on this whole question of financing for higher education, long-term financing, by appointing an HEW task force headed by Alice Rivlin, who became the assistant secretary, and her task force report dovetailed very much with the Carnegie Commission's report, which was released at about the same time.

F: She was a consultant to Carnegie.

T: Ah, is that it?

F: That's where I first knew her. She's a great friend of Kerr's. They had known each other for years. I saw Alice two or three months ago here in Raleigh. I told her, "I appreciate very much what you had to say about the finance and the budget the other day." She took on the whole establishment.

T: She's up to it.

F: Yes. She's a good scout [?]. But--

T: But I thought it was somewhat ironic in view of the fact that Rivlin's report was made public. Then the "Quality and Equality" report, the Carnegie's Commission's first major report was made public and became very much part of the currency of the discussion--

F: That's right.

T: --on this issue in Congress and among higher education groups and, subsequently, in the Nixon Administration when he came in, and yet, no report which provided a different angle on it was ever made available.

F; It was first.

T: It was first, preceded these, stimulated these subsequent discussions, was never made available, and I often wonder whether that would have recast the balance on the debate in the long run, if your report had been available to people on the Education Subcommittee in Congress and to some of these other places. Would that have made a difference?

F: Have you ever read Fred Graham's book on the task forces in Washington?

T: Oh, yes. In fact, you loaned me your copy.

F: Is that it? I want to be sure you had seen it because--it was interesting; he comes at this thing not on a substantive basis, the way you do, but the structure of it, and I really don't know why this thing was not made public. They said they were--some people have alluded to the fact that they were afraid of it; it was just too strong a document. I didn't think so, and I don't think anybody on that commission did. That was because we had worked in it so much, and were so steeped in the problems that were out there that we thought it was very conservative in a lot of ways, because there was so much to do.

T: What were some of the problems that were being anticipated at that time? I don't think we discussed [?] them.

F: It was a case of trying to get the poor kid in a college. When you start thinking about what that costs the students--the extra teachers and the extra buildings and the larger number of books--it's astronomical. But do you know of a major nation in the world

today that isn't doing it? That is why the Council has their study under way.

T: That's the ACE [American Council on Education] group?

F: Yes. We're going to meet next Wednesday and Thursday. We're coming to the end of the study period. You should see what will be the final recommendations. They'll come out in November.

T: And the focus of this particular study is?

F: Priorities.

T: Priorities. And also, are you looking at the problem of equity or getting minority enrollment?

F: Well, that will probably come out of this, either the first or second. You see, what has happened is that integration as a social perception has taken third place or fourth place. Nobody is worrying about it today, and the problem is just as acute, if not more so, than it ever was, and the work is not getting done.

We've learned a lot in terms of logistics out of this, and we intend to have a major invitational press meeting with this document: "Here we are, and this is what we have to say. What do you want to know about it, because we think we're right, and we think we can prove it." And we're showing that the manpower problem, a first-rate manpower problem in this country, can be met, and that we're going to document it.

T: You mentioned integration, and that made me think of a sort of interesting proposal that your 1967 task force put forward to deal with the dual system of higher education. And I believe one of the main proposals was to pair up traditionally black colleges with relatively near-by, strong, white colleges.

F: We have been doing that in North Carolina. A person from this campus was graduate

dean at NC Central; the law faculty here was law dean there, and we've been trying to help all these years. It was not a novel idea. I didn't originate it; I just appropriated it. That was twenty-five years ago. Have you heard of one black school being closed since? No, and you know why? Differences in preparation require a range of educational opportunity.

T: Was the idea not only to strengthen the historically black college by this association but to also encourage some integration as the result of people taking programs or courses--?

F: At the graduate level.

T: At the graduate level? Okay.

F: That's where it is in the country today. The best evidence is that there is no duplication of major facilities at the doctoral level anywhere in the country. Most black schools today do not offer large numbers of Ph.D. programs. It would be a nonsensical policy for a state or a government to try to duplicate all offerings at every level. The community college system evolved here as a means of getting that marginal student up to where he could go into a good four-year school and make it, because there's just too much variation in secondary schools.

T: Well, the system as it stands now--and please contradict me--but it strikes me it doesn't prohibit the cream from rising to the top.

F: Not at all.

T: But even as it stands, with the relative quality differences between different types of institutions you still have--there's enough ventilation in maybe cross for opportunities [?]--

F: Very true.

T: --for talent anywhere to rise to the top and be recognized and get the kind of graduate or professional education that--

F: Take this system. In 1971, we had 14,400 blacks in all public institutions. A year ago, we had 23,800. So [that is] a 50 per cent increase. The white presence in the black schools is now in excess of 15 per cent at each institution. The black presence in white schools is not at the 10.6 per cent we hoped for, but it's right at nine and a fraction. But in an institution like Chapel Hill, that means there are eighteen hundred black students here. Now I don't know that a democratic society has any business going beyond the voluntary choice at doctorate or the higher educational level, because it has all the elements of economics, preparation, social-outcast concepts that some people get; all those things enter into it.

On the other hand, I think we put too many of society's burdens on the schools to solve, and it's a terrible drain on them. So for the government itself to become that arbiter is the difficulty here. What you've got now is the case not only of benign neglect--total neglect. Nobody is worrying about this. It's a state obligation. You know yourself that the difference in what a child experiences in a state that is as rich as New York or Pennsylvania or Florida and some of us down here in the Southeast or in those Rocky Mountain states, is rank discrimination.

That's what we were trying to get people to start thinking about. How do you balance my right as a citizen of this country to that level of educational opportunity? It's taken twenty-five years to get people to even begin to talk about it. Most people just don't want to hear you, because most of the generations that we deal with out here did not go to college, and they think you are snobbish to raise the question in the first place. In

the country today, two out of three young people who finish high school go to some form of post-secondary school; in this state, we're still 45 per cent, and that's not just a black problem. When we accepted that consent decree in the Title VI litigations, a hundred million dollars was granted these five historically black schools. They are very much improved. They are all arts and sciences institutions. They all have a minimum salary schedule. They all have a minimum library funding. Every building on those campuses was examined and repaired if necessary. We've done about all that money can do. The question then is the matter of what is in the mind and the hearts of people, and you don't legislate that, and you don't coerce people. This is why choice is still so important. I don't think we need as many as we have, but there's an historical reason for that, too.

T: You said it's taken twenty-five years for these things to percolate to the top, and I think I was wondering at the time you were crafting your specific recommendations to deal with these problems in the task-force setting, did you have a sense that they may not be palatable politically at this time--

F: Oh, sure.

T: --but they were worth putting out there?

F: Tom Pettigrew was the strong advocate. Walter had another reason for his advocacy. Alex Heard and I knew another dimension of this. Mr. Edgar had a Texas view. Ed Levy was from a metropolitan region, along with Dave Bell and Sam Brownell, and they all looked at it from the governmental level. We had every mix in there, but everybody in there knew that we couldn't sit still. You cannot leave an issue like this and let it lie fallow, because it won't. And then the obvious question, "Why didn't you guys do something about this?" And that's a hard question to answer when you've had a year to

work on something with minds like those and you didn't do anything about it. We all realized it.

T: So you took a calculated risk in putting--

F: Well, I wouldn't call it a risk. We just stuck it out there and said, "Here. You've got to look at this." And I still think that the way we went about it, had it been followed, would have been a lot wiser [than] what we did.

T: Did you get any explanation from the administration at any point after the task force had completed its assignment as to why some of these programs were picked up in the legislation that followed and why some of them weren't?

F: No.

T: And you didn't ask?

F: No. Well, I was off on another gambit then, working on something else [inaudible]. I think all of us felt that if we'd done anything that could stimulate anything, then it was worthwhile. If they took one, two, six ideas, great! We tried to be a force that said, "This book is not going to be stagnant." So many of these documents just get put up there, you know, like--right up there like all the rest of those, and we said, "No, that isn't going to be the fate of it." Because we knew we had a great human issue. Now we weren't all-wise, and we didn't foresee what has happened. None of us would say so, I don't think, especially Tom, but I think each of us would say we weren't so blind we didn't know that behind what we were saying was the common concurrence that something had to move, and Mr. Johnson knew that, too.

T: I understand that James Gaither called you from the White House to brief you on what was going to be in the 1968 education message. Then apparently you offered to support

it because there was an article, I believe, that appeared in the *Raleigh Times* a day or two following the message, which was February 5, 1968. You and some other person were quoted in the *Raleigh Times* as having endorsed--

F: Well, the reason for that, of course--

T: --the program.

F: --was it was obvious that was all we were going to get. My theory then was that any movement forward was a gain. I had learned that from dealing with state politics. Sometimes you lay out a plan and know it takes three sessions to get there, but always press; always push.

T: Right.

F: Modify, but just adapt as situations change, but always forward, and that was what was going on there. Gee, you've done a lot of reading.

T: Well--

F: Like a novel to you, isn't it?

T: Yes. Very interesting.

F: Especially when you know the people. It makes it very interesting.

T: One other thing that has intrigued me a little bit is why once, say in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this issue of broadening the base of federal support for higher education, by bringing in some kind of regular institutional aid grant that was basically no strings attached--I mean it wasn't categorical aid--that idea apparently gained currency in a number of quarters. There seemed to be a lot of statements issued by higher education associations endorsing the general concept. Now, whether they could agree on the particulars, I don't know, but I'm curious as to why that didn't--I guess why it didn't--it

ultimately was enacted, as you said, in the Pell Grants but as a rider to student aid, and then it was never funded because there was some stipulation that Pell Grants had to be funded up to 90 per cent of the appropriations, or something that prevented--

F: It was then that the political realities that prevailed, we knew it would never happen.

T: What happened? Do you have any sense for why this didn't [inaudible]?

F: I think there is a question of trusting the process, once you've made the appropriation, trusting it to do what it said it would do, and this grave suspicion of lump-sum grants. I don't care whether it's the Defense Department or whoever, and that's been true here.

I'll give you a parenthesis to show you how hard this is. I was a member of a recent commission to study the State University of New York for Governor [Mario] Cuomo. When we got into that situation, I don't think I've ever seen a state as inhibited by state regulation as that one, that university. Cliff Wharton was president then, and we all went to see the Governor--not all of us, but several of us--and we just said, "If you just give them the appropriations that are made and let them do what they'll say they'll do, and they'll report to you on what they do, you don't need to add to the appropriations. Just turn the money loose." It's taken a year since then to get the first step authorized. It's a basic, an inherent check-and-balance of the democratic system that is so carefully husbanded by the legislative granting body. They just don't want to turn that decision-making loose. In states where they have, it's made the greatest difference in the world. Look at them: Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Texas--great universities--California; all have got that block-grant system in the constitution. You just want to be able to meet situations. But they'll go through all kinds of contrivances to keep you from doing it. We knew we wouldn't get that kind of authority, but we knew that to keep pushing it back,

something else would happen in between here and there, and it did. But it's still--I wouldn't attempt it today. Well, there's no point in trying the thing; Mr. Reagan would laugh at you. The really hard decision, not in this task force but in those since, and one this country is going to have to recognize, is that there are research universities, and then there are good comprehensive universities, and then there are good four-year colleges. We had a recommendation to give special grants.

T: A little bonus?

F: Like the NSF [National Science Foundation] grant.

T: Yes.

F: Where is that now? Every senator starts in, "But wait a minute," and his constituencies got on it: "Why did you let Chapel Hill get that when you didn't get one for us?" Then the whole thing broke down.

T: The discretionary--

F: It's almost a favored-nation policy among universities. Well, you do it another way. The basic point being that this country cannot get the intellectual leadership, development, ideas, advancement that it's got to have unless it maintains forty or fifty first-rate research-driven institutions. That's just plain as day. This administration doesn't understand; Mr. Johnson did; Kennedy did; Truman did and Nixon to some extent; Mr. Ford did, but the great thing is the bottom line, not the future of the country. There's some of that in all of this.

T: I was kind of curious--if it isn't divulging confidences--what the Carnegie Commission's thinking was on this issue. Here you had a fair amount of overlap, at least between the interests represented in your task force and those represented or who appeared on the

Carnegie Commission, and yet the commission took a different view of things.

F: I think Dave [David D.] Henry and I were the two people who argued for this thinking and it was indeed a new thinking, for a while. But I was remembering--now you can correct me--but David Riesman was the fellow who took the other tack.

But here again, when you've been in a public university system the thing you learn is that you have to make a decision somewhere, and political realities are harsher to private-institutionally driven people than they are to us because we live with them every day, the politics of it. You're not of politics, but you're in it because you are a public body. Pat Harris and I disagreed on this issue.

T: This was Patricia Harris?

F: Yes. Now this is memory and it's very foggy; I cannot for the life of me remember any real detail about it. Clark Kerr had convinced himself that that was all he could put over and therefore he led the commission in that discussion. These, again, were like the original task force group. They were very bright and able people. They don't sit around and argue that question. You knew what the realities were. You hoped that if you could get the federal government to do anything, like the GI Bill, to extend it, to put the sum up to where it would make a difference; we could make a difference in educating the youth of this country. I think that has [inaudible].

I think that in the maturity of the experience, maybe some form of unrestricted grant can be put forth sometime soon, but it will take a bold president to do it, and he'll have to understand, why do it? That's the English system right now, the grant system. I'll bet you if you look at most of the universities, they get sums of money that allow them to be innovative, creative, and different. It's a painful thing to do sometimes.

T: I wanted to go back to something you said earlier. You said that Doc Howe attended some of the task force meetings.

F: We kept him there for most all of them.

T: And occasionally--

F: He got right in the thick of the conversation.

T: --he would alert you all to the cost implications.

F: He'd wave a white flag, pull out his handkerchief or do something like that. It was all in good humor. We needed him as a resource person. He was very good.

T: You said it was sort of ironic that here he was the good liberal thinker and he was the one having to raise these flags on these issues.

F: That was the realism of the Johnson Administration.

T: Right. I was going to say, one of the things that was interesting was that the follow-up task force, the in-house inter-agency task force that was regularly appointed to help develop the legislative program from year to year, looked at your task force report in quite a bit of detail. There's a section in that report which really kind of gets to the heart of the problem. There appeared not to be any fundamental, philosophical differences in terms of--the Friday task forces analyzed the problems correctly and the solutions they have identified are the right solutions. The problem is that we've got all these programs from 1965 and 1966 and 1964 on the books. We can't fund them up to level.

F: That was it.

T: You were getting all sorts of flak from the Congress and from interest groups which had coalesced around the programs by that time.

F: And education had had its day earlier.

T: And that we could simply not take on that kind of commitment at that point in time.

F: There you go. That was it. That was Gaither's explanation to me.

T: You talked to him about that [inaudible]?

F: That's when that phone call came you were talking about. We just can't reach around the Christmas tree. And I understood that. I think everybody on the task force did. We knew we were unraveling something, but that was the knowledge base that was in that room. We didn't have to reinvent the clock; we knew what time and sequence it was. We just wanted to put an agenda out there. And if you noticed, every group like that any of us have been in since, you just keep pushing it forward. It's not that we have any greater wisdom; we just had access.

T: And the continuity of the experience.

F: That's right. And I know other groups, when I was not a member of them, I would call somebody up and say, "Look, be sure you read this document or that document or have somebody give you a digest of those recommendations, because you need to know that that field has already been looked at, and you've got the people, but don't waste your time." I just wish that--well, that's really what we're trying to do in the ACE thing. And we've had Senator [Paul] Simon over there with us; we've had Bob [D. Robert?] Graham, we've had Terry Sanford. We've been bringing these senators in these months with us while we worked, and we're trying desperately to reduce this thing to simple language but to show the relationship between the future of the country and this enterprise. Now you can go back to page one, thirty-five years ago, and you'll see the same thing. I can show it to you right here. The mission hasn't changed a bit.

T: Do you want to read it?

F: I'll just show you. I don't mean that it's archaic; I mean that it never changes. "The conviction that major steps should now be taken to extend the equality of opportunity for learning and to advance the quality of American education at all levels. Why? Individuals who through knowledge and understanding that see their duty as citizens to act responsibly for the greater fulfillment of liberty and freedom for all men." You'd write that very sentence today. You'll find it in that new task force. So it's a never-ending issue. But now it has such a massive international connotation, which nobody--we have a sentence in here about it, but you'll notice that we always got it authorized but never funded. When the rector of Uppsala says to me--and I ask him, "Why is it that Sweden for a hundred and eighty years has avoided war? Tell me why." He said, "Education." "Why is the illiteracy rate then less than 2 per cent?" "It's education." I said, "What do you require that we don't?" "Well, let's just use one thing. Swedish first, English second. Proficient in both [languages], and a third. The discipline of the mind; it's not the subject they learn, but they learn to think. They're independent people." Well, on and on. He's one of the most stimulating men I've talked to in a long time. That's what this says. You haven't seen language like that in the last eight years.

I stood up in a meeting with Bill Bennett and I said, "Would you please point [out] for me any statement made anywhere that says the academic enterprise is essential to the ongoing quality and strength of this country? Not only in men, but ideas and quality of service and all." Well, he got angry with me, of course. I just get a little weary of all this. I asked his chief finance officer--we were somewhere in a discussion--he had given us such a hard time on the higher education status. And I said, "Well, who will stand up and defend the B-1 bomber? One hundred have been authorized; let's cut that to

ninety-eight. You give me the difference. I'll take it over here in the education department and I'll put 35,000 more young people through four years of college. And you tell me that that's less for the security of this country than two airplanes, and I'll be quiet." That's a rhetorical exercise but it sure makes the point.

T: It does, and I wonder if LBJ didn't come to this realization--I think he realized that that's why he cared so much about education, but then to have been faced with the problem of the guns and butter in Vietnam.

F: He had to cope with it, that's right. The interesting thing, and Hugh Graham's [?] book showed you--this is literally the truth--Joe Califano called me at eleven o'clock, "The boss wants to see you." This was to hear what we had to say out of our effort. We sort of parceled it out assignments by topic. We go over, sit in the Cabinet Room; the President, he finally comes in. He got in that presidential chair, sat down, and turned to me and he said, "Well, what have you got to say?" Just like that. I said, "Mr. President, we have some things we want to share with you." I think I got through two of them and he interrupted me. "I want to talk to you all a little bit." One hour later he was still on Vietnam, and he got up to leave. You weren't depressed because you knew what was on his heart and soul, but you just felt so deeply frustrated. We didn't know what to do. Here was all of this work done by all of these people, and suddenly it came to an end. You just said to yourself, "What on earth can I do to help him, to make use of this?" And you felt such a sense of futility. But it's so frustrating today: I guess I'm just getting older. I don't see anything happening. I think when Mr. Reagan goes out of office there will be a Democrat elected this time; it's going to be terribly important who is put in there, what the reasons are and how much freedom he's getting because we have got a lot

of ground-gaining to do; we are a decade behind. And lots of people who look with disdain on federal service, and particularly that position--but if it stays in there and it's a cabinet job I hope we had find somebody who will go in there and just raise the dickens all day long the way Ted Bell did. I think he was a very good secretary.

Of course the whole perception turned around, as you well know. I hate to see a little warrior like that find--I called him out there not so long ago and I said, "I haven't heard from you. Where are you?" He said, "I raised my price to make speeches, hoping to drive the invitations away, and I get more now than ever."

(Laughter)

I: Well, good for him.

F: I said, "I learned something today." That surprised me.

T: Well, I had just a few more questions I wanted to ask you. Your association with the White House didn't end after the task force assignment, but I believe you were asked to serve as a trustee of the Urban Institute.

F: I went to the Urban Institute with Charles Schultze. That was Bill Gorham's shop. Joe Califano, Frank Keppel. An interesting little fellow from Texas--what's the big department store down there? Double name.

T: Neiman-Marcus.

F: Neiman-Marcus, right, Stanley Marcus. He was a funny little short fellow, and he would always bring these very expensive Cuban cigars.

T: I saw an ad for those, as a matter of fact.

F: He smoked those confounded things. I enjoyed him. That was an interesting assignment. That group has done some good work. Bayless Manning was the other one I was trying

to think of. Bayless was then dean of the law school at Stanford. Robert McNamara, [ex-] head of Ford.

Anyway, no, I stayed with them to the end.

T: What was your reaction to Johnson's announcement that he wasn't going to seek re-election?

F: I'll respond to you this way. Two days after that, I met Terry Sanford. He said, "I'll tell you something interesting. Two days ago I was in the White House and the President asked me to manage his campaign. You knew as soon as I did that he was not going to run." I was not surprised at it, but I felt an emptiness after it was over because I knew that there was nobody ready to take it on. And I felt like I feel right now; I don't know where the Democrat is. But you have to be very careful about that because when you're ten, twelve, fifteen years older than anybody in the field, your natural tendency is to say, "Well, they're just not prepared," and all that kind of stuff, when they certainly are. I have served with Bill Bradley on the Sloan Commission on Higher Education in the Federal Government--

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

F: He sent for us [inaudible].

T: What's Paul Simon like in person?

F: Very personable. You like him.

T: I've heard he's very articulate.

F: He is. And for a man who has had no formal training whatsoever, he is really an impressive fellow. But there are lots of others; they're late comers but--I've worked very closely with Governor [D. Robert?] Graham. He's very competent. You've got other

governors--although governors scare me now. We haven't had such great successes with governors of late.

I know this, I know we can't go along treading water on education the way that we've been doing and be the great power we once were. When you look back on what happened in this country, when the universities were mobilized for the moon shoot and the space race and the enormous surge to do something to feed the world, we've done it all, and it came out of these laboratories and classrooms.

Where the arguments break down, you take an institution like you came through, or this one or any of the others, the reason that I never had any discomfort with the advocacy of that position was that people who graduate from those institutions serve the country. You are running all over the United States contributing, you see. I spent my life so far doing that kind of thing. The nation profits from this. It should pay its fair share to achieve that service. They did it for me with the GI Bill and nobody ever asked any questions. They put it on the basis of paying me back for my service, but look at what it did; it rejuvenated this country. Now it's got to keep that up and the Pell system, rather than go down, has got to go on up. Now you can call that whatever you want to, but we're not doing the job yet.

But where we have broken down is beyond that undergraduate [level]; we're not financing graduate work, fellowships; we're not refurbishing the research capability. We're not providing instrumentation; we're not looking at facilities. And that's why we exist, this ACE commission.

T: I think the timing couldn't be better.

F: Well, we're going to see; I hope so, anyway. You have given me a very interesting

afternoon, because I--I want you to tell me something. Do any of these other people strongly disagree with what I've said here?

T: No.

F: That's interesting.

T: We talked about things from their particular positions. I think they see the issues in very similar ways. I think Pettigrew in his interview felt very strongly, or talked quite a bit about the segregation problems and his contribution to that.

F: He was a pioneer.

T: Putting them together you get a much more complete picture of--

F: Well, you'll be the one person in the United States who would have had that opportunity.

T: Well, anybody who reads these at the Library will have the same opportunity.

F: It's an interesting story.

T: It's fascinating. I wanted to ask you one last thing you brought up earlier in the interview, and that was whether you had been aware of all the various posts you were considered for. You mentioned that Gardner called you and asked you about picking up--I guess Keppel resigned in 1966 as assistant secretary.

F: That was the only thing anybody ever called me about.

T: I believe before Tom Johnson left the White House LBJ asked him for a short list of people for top ambassadorships, and he sent five or six names and yours was one of them.

F: I didn't know that. Isn't that interesting?

T: And also Bill Moyers recommended you exclusively for the position of commissioner of education--no, I'm sorry, to succeed Francis Keppel--he was a very strong advocate.

What was your connection to Bill Moyers? Was that private?

F: That came out of the White House Fellows.

T: White House Fellows program. And did you also have any connection to Henry Hall Wilson?

F: Yes, Henry is from North Carolina.

T: That's right. And did he run, not LBJ's, but Kennedy's campaign here?

F: He was a part of our Terry Sanford team a long time ago. Henry was quite a guy. Moyers actually asked me one day in the East Room--I was going through the White House Fellows program--"Why don't you come on up here and help us out?" And I said, "This isn't the place to talk about it, Bill." I might have gone then; I don't know. I'd been here a long time then. You can deceive yourself; you can fool yourself, and you have to always watch that those things don't happen, because when you're in a position of authority, you never really know what you need to know because a lot of people won't tell everything you need to know; you have to go hunting for it, and especially that which is harsh and critical and bad, and there's a lot of it. If you're in public life, it's going to happen; you have to accept that as a given and understand it and not get so mad about it. But I don't know--I guess I might have been afraid. I hadn't finished what I was trying to do here, whatever it was. But in hindsight, it was a mistake.

T: And one last one that I came across that I didn't know anything about before was that when Gardner resigned--that was in late January of 1968--Wilbur Cohen was going to take his place; Wilbur was under secretary. And Wilbur Cohen and Doug Cater offered you up to LBJ as the replacement for the under secretary position. I don't know exactly what became of that. There was a note on the memo in the White House files that I saw,

if I can recall it correctly, that LBJ scribbled at the bottom saying, "I need to talk to you later about this," or, "I'll talk to you later about this." And I don't know [if] it was resolved.

F: Well, I guess his reasoning was that I was not a political figure; I didn't make any brownie points for him.

T: On the contrary, didn't you, though?

F: Well, I would have with the educational people. They would have looked upon me as a friend and voice. The Terry Sanford check-out system would be less than favorable because I was not in his political organization.

T: I see what you're saying. Okay.

F: That's happened to me over and over and over again. But that's all right; I haven't suffered. I felt like that you make your contribution where you can. I'm also Presbyterian enough to believe that if you do your day's work and you work hard, whatever there is out there that's to be will come. But you don't try to contrive it. Now that isn't a politician's view, but I have not suffered from a lack of chance and opportunity to do things I'd like to.

T: That must be your own Blue Ridge [Shenandoah?] Valley of Virginia heritage speaking.

F: Well, my grandfather was a great ARP. If you've ever known an Associate Reform Presbyterian, they're the hardest Presbyterians of all. I've been driven the other way. No, it's just that I always felt that being president of the University of North Carolina was the finest position anybody in this state can have, governor, senator, anybody, because you had access to everything in the world. The question was how well were you doing what you were put here to do, and I never felt that comfortable about achieving what needed to

be done because I was caught up in the race question and--there's no way I can ever interpret to you how--

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview

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