INTERVIEWEE: JAMES GAITHER (TAPE #5)

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

DATE: March 24, 1970

San Francisco, California

F: This is another interview with James Gaither now in his office in the Alcoa Building in San Francisco; the interviewer is Joe B. Frantz; the date is March 24, 1970.

Jim, you were present at the Cabinet meeting at which Clark Clifford first became a member of the Cabinet; I'd appreciate your putting down both Clifford's experience and also what you were doing there.

G: Let me start with the last question first. I was there with Leo Beebe who was the executive vice chairman of the National Alliance of Businessmen to--

F: I knew Leo back in the early '50's when he was running a softball program for the Ford Motor Company.

G: He's quite a guy who, when he first came to the government, was referred to by Bob McNamara as about the best man in the Ford Motor Company, and our experience with him certainly proved that out. But anyway, the President had launched the National Alliance of Businessmen in late January of '68, and Leo and I were in to report to the Cabinet on the initial organization of the Alliance; how it had been formed; who was serving; and what they were going to do in the coming year. This by the way proved to be a rather phenomenal success of the President's. The National Alliance did more in the less than one year that they had in terms of really getting at the manpower problem in this country than all

of the programs put together had done over a much longer period. I forget the exact totals, but something in excess of two hundred thousand jobs were found for disadvantaged kids that summer at no cost to the government, and some one hundred and fifty thousand full-time jobs for the hard-core unemployed. What makes it really remarkable is that the whole organization was put together--offices were staffed in fifty cities around the country, and they accomplished all this in a period of less than a year.

At any rate Leo and I were there to describe the program; and perhaps the other events of that Cabinet meeting were more significant than our briefing. This, as you know, was shortly after the TET offensive--

F: Before we get into that, let me ask you one question. You, several times, made presentations to the Cabinet. Now then, you're talking to a group of rather high-powered and quite busy men. Are they patient, are they probing in their questions, do they listen to the reports, do they doodle and look out the window--what kind of a reception did you get?

G: Every time I participated in a briefing I found them to be very attentive. Of course, routine items weren't taken for the Cabinet so that it was normally something quite significant before it was raised at that level. The questioning varied quite a bit. In most cases, they listened, by and large, and it was not a time or place at which major decisions were being made, so that the questioning was not very detailed--if at all. When there were questions or observations, they normally came from the Cabinet officers most interested in the program. Most of my stuff was on the domestic side, either the legislative program or administration of existing programs--

F: That's one thing I was wondering. Someone like Secretary Rusk who would

have no concern with what you were doing--was he sufficiently Administration concerned that he too listened quite closely?

G: He was always very attentive, at least it seemed that way. By way of contrast, however, I would say that Bob McNamara made as big a contribution to domestic programs, particularly on the legislative side, as any Cabinet officer; and some of this concern was demonstrated by things he did--by his Canada speech and other things that he did. But he felt very deeply about domestic problems and about the importance of the Defense Department in using its money and its power to make some inroads; his concern was obviously with the minorities and the disadvantaged people in the country. Sometimes that contribution came at Cabinet meetings; more often it was in direct assistance in much smaller sessions. By way of an example, he always participated--or quite often participated, in our deliberations about the Manpower Program; and he was a major source of help in putting together what ultimately became the National Alliance of Businessmen. And I think if I had not had his support, I'm not sure it ever would have gotten to the President. Fortunately he and the Secretary of Commerce backed me in what I thought should be done over the objections of the Secretary of Labor at the time.

F: What was Secretary Wirtz's objection?

G: That's a difficult question.

F: Had he become sort of negative at this time?

G: Well--

F: I don't mean it unkindly, but I mean--

G: It depends what you mean by the word "negative." I think it's clear that he had more difficulties than most Cabinet officers adjusting to the fact

that there was a White House Staff, and that there was a Bureau of the Budget, and a Council of Economic Advisers in between him and the President. And I think it was that kind of concern more than an objection to the nature of the program. Ultimately he backed the program entirely when it became clear that that's the way the President wanted to go. The specific objections that he raised to the National Alliance of Businessmen I don't think are really relevant because they weren't very substantial. They were questions about the facts that I had developed as to the effectiveness of the different kinds of manpower programs, and my conclusion that we ought to focus on on-the-job training; we ought to focus on the supply side, i.e., the provision of jobs, rather than the way we did in many manpower programs by focusing on the individual.

Obviously the objective of the program is the individual, and the question is how do you get at it. Do you get at it by training the individual, educating him, giving him the medical care he needs, or glasses or what have you or transportation, and then send him on his way to try and find a job? Or do you go the other way and go through business and government--the big employers--and get the job first, and then have the people who know what they need in those jobs, i.e., the businessmen and the government, do the training? Now, I concluded, as did Califano, and ultimately the President agreed with it, that the focus ought to be on that supply side. Now, I don't think Bill Wirtz ever disagreed with that, but for example, a concentrated employment program which also was put together over in the Bureau of the Budget by Bill Cannon working with Joe Califano and me, but with a much larger input from the Labor Department, he felt was his program. And this was much bigger and much bolder and much tougher,

and it was kind of being taken away from him.

Now there was a big jurisdictional battle as to who's program it was, whether it was Commerce's program or Labor's. But with respect to Secretary Wirtz, I think he was reluctant because it wasn't his program; and secondly, it was being put together by the people who were sitting between him and the President which he didn't appreciate very much; and therefore he raised some objections about the facts I developed, about how much the government was paying for on-the-job training. I think some surveys that had been done and information I got from the Bureau of the Budget said that the government was paying at the outside for the on-the-job training of the hard-core unemployed somewhere between twelve and fifteen hundred, and I expressed the view that it would probably cost between four and five thousand per man to do the job right. But the end result would be a man in a job and a man qualified not only for that job, but to move up the ladder.

And if there was any fat in it, at least we were paying for a job--the government was paying for a job. You know, if you look at what you pay to train somebody where he ends up on the street, at least this is not a wasteful expenditure. It may cost more, but you know a good education costs more than a bad one. So we fought about that; Bob McNamara backed me up from his experience in private industry and said that I was absolutely right, that you couldn't train people for twelve hundred dollars if they're the real hard-core unemployed. After the first meeting broke--the first big meeting where we revealed the plans for the National Alliance of Businessmen, the whole plan--the jobs program which was to be run by the National Alliance had not been reviewed by the Labor

Department at that time. Now we, for political reasons to get it through Secretary Wirtz, we later called it the Labor Department proposal. But McNamara backed me and went out and did some work--called the Ford Motor Company, and about nine o'clock one night called Califano back and said, "I checked it out and Gaither's absolutely right." Well, that's just an example of the kind of thing that Secretary McNamara did.

F: Did anyone in the Cabinet--Secretary Wirtz or anyone else--play kind of a continual role as devil's advocate just to be doing it, or was that left up to the President?

G: By and large it was left up to the President, although Charlie Schultz was a great one at that for a different reason; he was the devil's advocate in large measure to make you think hard about a program and prove that it made some sense.

F: Is it worth it financially.

G: That's right. But he was just a tremendous ally once you had given it sufficient thought. And of course he would really pitch into the development of the program.

F: Let's get back to the Cabinet meeting.

G: Right. Just a brief continuation of the--I don't know how you explain the differences in terms of the contributions between individuals; I think it's how busy they are, what they're interested in--McNamara could drive himself at a hell of a pace and keep producing, and he did contribute very substantially across-the-board.

Now, the Cabinet--Well, what's really interesting about the Cabinet meeting apart from our presentation which I ran through briefly was that this was Secretary Clifford's first Cabinet meeting. The President asked

Secretary Rusk to review the situation in Viet Nam following the TET offensive, and which at this point I would guess had been about a month before--something like that--I can't remember the exact date of the Cabinet meeting. As I recall, Secretary Rusk essentially painted a fairly dark picture of the situation, not in terms of what had happened in the TET offensive because I think he felt very strongly that in a military sense it was a rather substantial victory--the other side had thrown everything at South Viet Nam, and South Viet Nam withstood it. I think he even felt that the damage was not too great from a psychological point of view, but on the other hand he indicated at that time that in his view more troops would have to be sent, that there was no question about that; that the option, as I recall, was essentially between something like two hundred thousand troops and five hundred thousand. That depending on how fast you wanted to accelerate the action over there, that you might speed up the conclusion of the war if you went to the five hundred thousand level. Now obviously he wasn't talking about something that would be done in a month, but over time.

The President then called on Secretary Clifford. And I was of the impression, and maybe it's because I didn't expect it, but I was of the impression that nobody quite expected what Secretary Clifford said that morning. And as I say, it may be because I didn't. My impression of Secretary Clifford before he became Secretary was that he was essentially backing the fairly hard line on the war, and I personally was troubled by his appointment for that reason. And I was quite surprised at his response to the President's question. He said essentially that he was too young on the job to give an answer as to what his views were, but that he had a

rather comprehensive review going in the Defense Department and the options that were being looked at ranged on the one extreme from the two positions suggested by Secretary Rusk--that is, two to five hundred thousand more troops--all the way down to the unilateral withdrawal, indicating quite clearly that his mind was very much open at that point; that he saw enough merit particularly in the middle range of alternatives, including the bombing halt, to pursue them in a very serious way. And my impression from them on the outside was that he was the guy who went to the middle first. But again I wasn't a party to the subsequent discussions, but it was a very interesting response, I thought.

F: Was his presentation greeted with silence or argument, or what happened when he got through?

G: Almost total silence. I was directly across the room from the President and with Secretary Rusk on one side and Secretary Clifford on the other--and in looking at Secretary Rusk particularly, I didn't think that he had expected this. Now, I'm sure that he was aware of the reviews going on, but it was the way in which it was presented more than anything else. I don't think anybody was surprised by the fact that a new Secretary was discussing or reviewing the situation in Viet Nam, but it was the way he presented it which at least led me to believe that he certainly was not prepared at that point to go along with Secretary Rusk. And indeed that he was leaning very much toward the middle.

F: At a Cabinet meeting like that, did you extra people range around the wall, did you sit, did you stand, did you make the presentation and leave, did you stay for the whole meeting?

G: It varied quite a bit. I don't recall having left any meeting where I was

in attendance, whether I was making a presentation or I was there because something was being considered that I had been working on. But it varied a lot by the Staff members who were present. Normally with the guys like me who worked on the substantive side, you know, we'd sit and observe the full session. For others who were very seldom participating, particularly when the President brought in large groups of the staff, he would excuse them when certain subjects came up, particularly the war. The others normally in attendance--Califano and Rostow and Cater, and McPherson, Marvin Watson, Jim Jones--they almost always stayed through, Tom Johnson as well. They always stayed right through the entire session.

F: Was there any particular member of the Cabinet who was habitually late, any particular member who was habitually contentious, or who prolonged sessions; or did the President pretty well cut off anyone who got strung out?

G: From my limited observation--and I only attended a very small percentage of the Cabinet meetings--they were all controlled by the President. Nobody, at least in those sessions, fought him particularly; there weren't many occasions for that. Most of the substantive decisions on the domestic side weren't made in the Cabinet, and the same thing was true on the foreign side--they were made at the Tuesday lunch sessions, they weren't made there--so it was more a briefing session for Cabinet officers of a general discussion at times--

F: An informational forum.

G: An informational forum. Occasionally the President would use it to get reactions to things that he was thinking about. At other times he was trying to get the views of everybody. For example, on the tax

situation, he very often would ask for the reaction of the members in the Cabinet to different proposals. You know, how would you react to slashing the budget if we don't get the tax bill, and what you would cut first. Very often during the last two years the budget cut business came before the Cabinet rather often. And of course that was the form that the President had to use to let them know that he was absolutely serious; that he had no options; and to discuss with them how he'd go about his obligations to cut the budget. A couple of points there were imposed by the Congress. So that was the subject. But most of your major substantive decisions on the foreign and the domestic side were decided in more manageable forums. You know, it's hard to operate in that big a group, particularly when some of the Cabinet officers don't have any involvements, for example, in health or education or manpower programs and others don't have any involvement in the foreign side. So it's, as I say, an informational vehicle occasionally for discussion of substantive matters where the President wanted a reaction one way or another.

F: Could a Secretary bring along any members of his staff that he wanted to that might be of some expert help?

G: No. I don't recall anyone coming other than the Cabinet officers unless it was to make a presentation. And then the assistants would normally stay outside until they were called by the President, and then be brought in. Of course, when Cabinet officers were away, almost always the Under Secretary would stand in, or, when appropriate, an Assistant Secretary.

F: Was there any general rule that when the Secretary was away the Under Secretary should be in town, or was each department given a fair amount

of autonomy in how it ran it's particular branch of the government?

G: I'm not personally aware of any flat rule. I would assume however that whether it was responding to the President or to Califano that the Cabinet officers learned by experience that somebody ought to be there. The President obviously didn't want to have to go way down the line if somebody was out of town. So whether it was by way of formal policy, which I doubt, or informally, just responding to the demands of the Presidency, there seemed to have been an effort to keep some very high level person there. It may have been an Assistant Secretary who if senior or not, he could talk to the President.

F: But Califano knew where to go.

G: That's right. And more importantly, the President knew exactly where to go.

F: You were concerned with substantive matters domestically. Now then, once you have prepared your particular program and you have got your facts and you have some sort of legislation shaping up, are you through with it--do you turn it over to somebody like Barefoot Sanders to make the Congressional round, or do you see it all the way through?

G: A lot of the process I covered in the previous interviews. I think that probably ended at the point where the President had approved the program; and then the process which was normally toward the very end of December, then there would be some scurrying around to make sure that it was all built properly into the budget. Cabinet officers were assigned responsibility for drafting messages to the Congress; and at that point they had been involved--Barefoot, for example, would be involved in the last few sessions and meetings in reviewing the outline of the legislative program before presentation to the President, so he knew it a little bit.

Then I would prepare detailed summaries of each of the specific proposals and get it to him at the same time it went out to the Cabinet for the first draft of the message. Now, almost all messages ultimately were drafted in the White House. For some reason, the products of the Cabinet were--in the first place, they weren't the products of the individual Cabinet members, and they just weren't done very well; they weren't in Presidential prose, so to speak, and so they were redone over there.

Skipping that, once the message went, the President's rather firm policy, which was violated very infrequently, was to send all of the legislation to the Congress on the same day, everything covered by a message. This drove a lot of people absolutely crazy, but there was very good reason for it. The President felt that it was terribly important to get messages to the Congress early, and his record on this score, which resulted in a very miserable life for our office during January and February was rather incredible. Twenty to thirty messages would be prepared and delivered during that two-or two-and-a-half months period, which is absolutely phenomenal to be able to do it.

Those are rather extensive documents; each one of them takes literally weeks to get ready; and very often the policy decisions are made as you draft the message. And the departments then, working with the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Legal Counsel in Justice, have to get the legislation ready to go. At times, some of the major disputes, for example, between Cabinet officers are not resolved until midnight of the night before the message is sent; and then somebody has got to go back and get that piece of legislation ready. Now, it's with good reason, because the President felt that if he didn't get his program

up there before those committees early, then the Congress would be considering somebody else's legislative programs. And he wanted his program considered by the Congress, and that was his vehicle for doing it.

F: Also, they could see the total picture that they were getting into.

G: That's right. Everything would be up there; they could manage their workload. But I think more importantly he wanted to make sure that he had the initiative in the legislative process; that was important. And I think if you contrast that with what has happened since he has left--

F: I was going to say--you must have watched with some interest this periodic presentation of one more--

G: Yes, you can see what's happening to this Administration in terms of the dealing with Congress. They're being preempted in almost every field, because they're not getting their stuff before the committees in time.

Now, the role of the substantive guy once that legislation goes up there--by and large, our role was rather small. The Congressional liaison guys took over; we became involved whenever there was a battle going on where it was apparent that some compromise would have to be made, and therefore it was important to get the substantive guys back in the picture. Now, this wasn't always true particularly towards the end when I became more experienced and Califano's office had a larger staff so that we could follow what was happening. Very often then we took more of the initiative in the sense of getting across to the Congressional liaison people what was important; keeping track of what was happening; letting them know, if they didn't already know, that some pieces were in trouble and they were important, often going out and trying to get support.

For example, in watching the National Alliance of Businessmen,

it wasn't really apparent to anybody in the Congress that that program depended very much on the poverty budget. I think about two hundred million dollars of their budget was coming out of the Poverty Program, and the Poverty Program was obviously in a lot of trouble. There working with Barefoot, the President took the initiative; made it absolutely clear, particularly after--as was the normal case, you get a low budget coming out of the House and a fairly decent poverty budget out of the Senate, and then the President became involved in working with the conference, and making it clear that if they cut it they were essentially cutting out the National Alliance of Businessmen. And of course this was a very effective ploy when dealing with the more conservative members who thought that anything that the business community did was good. Then I would go out and get the businessmen who were involved--Henry Ford and Paul Austin and others--to write letters to the heads of the various committees or the conference, saying, "Here's what we're doing; we believe it's important; we hope you won't throw our funds out of the poverty budget."

F: Who is Paul Austin--what's his role?

G: He's the president of Coca Cola who was serving as the vice chairman of the National Alliance of Businessmen, an extremely able devoted guy who, working with Henry Ford, did an absolutely phenomenal job on the National Alliance of Businessmen. He was clearly one of the most able businessmen I ran into in Washington.

F: Did the President's relations diminish in effectiveness after his March 31 renunciation, or did that seem to have any role at all? Does the power of the White House remain the power of the White House right up

till the final January 20th?

G: There's no doubt that the White House always has power, even in a transition. But it is rather astonishing how much power is lost by an announcement that you do not intend to run. And it's not merely in the Congress. It's all throughout the government. I ran into numerous cases--and we didn't stop work on March 31, although there was kind of a lull for about six weeks after that when everybody just kind of collapsed. Everybody was exhausted and the pressure was off, and it was quite a pleasure not to have to be diplomatic to all kinds of unreasonable people who were trying to pressure the White House. Instead of talking to them nicely--

F: And lengthily.

G: --and lengthily, you could tell them exactly what you thought, and it was quite a pleasure, but it was a very much relaxed atmosphere. But after that we kept working very hard all the way through in terms of trying to improve programs; in trying to make it a smooth transition.

F: My own experience in this incidentally is pertinent. When I started trying to set up interviews with people, they would say, "Well, wait till fall when it's quiet," and then, "Wait until after the elections when it's quiet," and then, "Right after Christmas."

G: It never got quiet.

F: It never got quiet right down to the very end.

G: It got worse and worse. The last two months were--

F: Any number of them told me, "I've been fooled by this."

G: The last two months were unbelieveably hectic. But the President did lose a lot of power. As I was trying to get programs in shape to contribute to the preparation of the final budget, very often I found that people

who had been very reliable in the past, particularly lower level bureaucrats--maybe Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Bureau Chiefs or something--were totally impossible to deal with. They weren't a bit concerned about the Presidency at that point, and they had to be driven very hard--I had to make more calls to Cabinet officers than normal to tell them to jack up their guys and get things produced. And occasionally I ran into guys who were so concerned about protecting themselves that they wouldn't do things they normally do--they were trying so hard to establish a nonpartisan record during the end that they actually would buck the White House if they thought that what the White House was doing was in any way politically oriented. And that could be very, very frustrating.

So the President did lose an awful lot of power in terms of dealing with the government; the Cabinet officers at times, as the record shows, felt their oats a little more toward the end, felt far freer; the Congress didn't seem to respect the power of the Presidency nearly as much as they had in the past, although the power of the President was still very important to some major legislative battles that were won that last summer, but it wasn't the same kind of respect for Presidential power that we had seen before. It got worse and worse as we went into the fall.

And I remember one instance, and I can't remember whether it was the Poverty Program--I'm quite confident it was either something in civil rights or poverty, something for disadvantaged people who have no political power--whether the President felt very strongly about a piece of legislation and was actually advised by the Speaker and the Majority Leader that he would kill the program if he made any public statement. Now, that's a very unusual thing to have happen. But I think they were probably

being quite sincere and not disloyal in any sense to the President; that the atmosphere in the Congress was such that they'd be better off fighting the battle without the President publicly on their side. So there's no question about the loss of power.

F: Were you there during that last week of misunderstanding between Stewart Udall and the President, or was that outside your purview?

G: Well, it was outside in part.

F: I'm sure everyone was aware of it.

G: We were aware of it; Joe and DeVier Pierson were obviously working very hard on it--I never got into the facts of it; I knew the problem was a serious one.

F: How did the staff get along with the President? You hear all these public reports, you know, the President riding them to death, and his extravagance in praise and extravagance in condemnation--is this an accurate picture?

G: Well, it's hard to draw a very--

F: For instance, if you didn't deliver by a hoped-for date what he was looking for, would he get after Jim Gaither personally--would he chew out Joe Califano and tell him to do something about that assistant of his?

G: That varied. As time went on--

F: It depended on whether you happened to be coming down the hall at the wrong time.

G: Well, part of it if you were coming down the hall; certainly if Joe wasn't there and I was handling the matter, I'd catch it directly. Most often, particularly in my first year over there, it went through Joe; later on, it came more and more to me. It's hard to paint an accurate picture, because I found the President to be a very complex human being.

But I think it's most troubling when you're first exposed to the President and until you understand that people let off steam in different ways. The President bears an incredible burden and he has got to have a staff that can perform, particularly when he wants to run the Presidency the way President Johnson did. He wanted a powerful Presidency; he wanted to be able to do what he thought was right for the country. And to have that, he had to have a very hard working staff that was good and that could produce and could produce when he needed it. Now when the people didn't produce, the President let off steam; some people do it by swearing, and some people do it by hiding themselves on a shelf. He very often did it by loud language, gross exaggeration of what had happened, which was very troubling the first time you were exposed to it. Once you know the President, you didn't take him personally. He was the same way obviously with praise, and very abundant in his praise and his appreciation of a job well done; very intolerant of a bad job. I personally think that this is important because it makes people produce the right way.

F: When he was dissatisfied and he did let you have his full temper, I presume he would have been the most surprised person in the world if you had quit at that point. There never was really any great consideration that he might fire you after you had gotten used to the treatment?

G: No, I don't think any--certainly, me personally. I never felt when any of these things happened that I was personally in trouble. I realized that something I had done did not please him, or had not, but I never took it personally, mainly because I thought I understood what he was doing. Whether, understandable or not, he disagreed with what had happened, he was letting you know loud and clear that he did. But it

wasn't personal, it was never to the point of saying, "One more time, and you get out!" Instead, he exaggerated kind of the old parade of horrors that young lawyers are taught at law school, saying how awful it was--what had happened. Just an example of something I'll never forget.

But you know I grew to take these things and understand them and not to take him seriously or at his word. Because he obviously didn't mean it; this was his way of letting steam off. But my first day at the White House, which came on rather short notice anyway, I had thought that day I was going to make up my mind as to whether I was going to go over there and got notice that a rather large meeting had been scheduled at which time I was to take over a committee for the development of the '67 legislative program. So I rushed over there, not even with time to clean up. It was the last day of the airline strike in the summer of '66, and they had the all-day sessions over in the Executive Office Building--reached the settlement, I guess, at about seven-thirty or eight o'clock. I helped Califano in part in preparing the President's statement; there was quite an internal argument about whether the President should go on television to announce the settlement, with some people saying that Seamiller couldn't be trusted and that the deal would fall through and the President would look very bad; and others saying, no, it was a solid settlement and the airline strike was over, and he ought to so announce to the public. At any rate the decision was to go on television at ten o'clock. We worked madly to get the statement out, and I guess at about twenty minutes of ten, Califano went down to the President's office with the final statement which the President had seen once before and had been edited in response to his suggestions. And the secretaries left to go over

to the theater to watch it, and I was sitting alone in Califano's office. Now, this was my first night there, and all I had been told was that the little button on the telephone that said POTUS--

F: Said what?

G: POTUS--the President of the United States--if it ever rang and Califano wasn't there, be sure you know where Califano is and just tell the President where he is. Well, the phone rang. And as you know, the President's phone doesn't stop ringing. And I sat there and looked around, not really wanting to pick up the phone, and finally realized that no one was there and no one was going to come to my rescue; so I picked up the phone and I said, "Mr. President, Joe has gone down to your office, I think." And his response was, "You don't think. I know that--he's sitting right here with me." And he then went on to say, "Can you put this damned speech on a teleprompter?" At that point I knew absolutely nothing about a teleprompter--I didn't know how you could possibly do it--and I said, "No, sir." And he then went into a big spiel about how when things got down to the crunch, he always had to do the work himself--there was never anybody to help; and that, by God, I was going to take care of it, and he would hold the line until I found someone who could put it on the teleprompter.

You can imagine! On my first night I went charging out of Califano's office, couldn't find a soul, went upstairs, downstairs--I asked the guard, knowing that he sat there holding the line; and I obviously never found anybody. What had happened was actually the two guys who could do it had been discharged at five o'clock by the military adviser who controlled them. But anyway, I ran back up there and picked up the phone, not knowing what the hell to say, and fortunately he had handed the

phone to Califano.

Now that was an obvious case of overstatement--the President was obviously unhappy at what had happened; it was something that never should happen to the President, an obvious blunder, and I was the first guy there and I took a little of the heat. And that was the kind of thing--. As I say, you learn very quickly that that was the way the President let off steam.

F: Was there anyone on the staff who never learned to take it, who always remained thin-skinned?

G: Gee, that's a question I hadn't thought about. I was of the impression that Doug Cater took it fairly seriously, probably harder than most. Nobody got completely adjusted to it.

F: No one enjoys it.

G: Obviously it would depend on how much time you had spent with the President, but he was the President, and when it would happen to anybody, you know, it was a startling event.

F: Did he behave that way toward someone like George Reedy, who practically trotted alongside him for years and years?

G: I can't answer that personally--I never saw it happen to George. I assume it did.

F: In those latter days, I never figured what George did. Did he have any role, or was he just around as kind of a resource person when needed?

G: I guess the latter. He had been brought on for the campaign, which is one question you raised briefly before which we might get to now. But George came over with Murphy at that point to work on the campaign. Once the President withdrew, there was very little for George to do. The President had Joe give him some things to do, but he didn't have a great deal to do. Charlie Murphy did become fairly active by taking over the

transition in large measure, but George didn't seem to have any particular role during that period.

F: Were you under pretty good pressure from Washington news people to one way or another get news out of you, you having always to be close-mouthed? How did you handle that?

G: Well, obviously, the guys who were higher up the ladder got more pressure than I did--Joe was under constant pressure. I didn't get too much, and I never felt that could be a very serious problem unless it was something that the President was working on at that time where it just would have been wrong under any circumstances to disclose what the President was thinking about, or what we were doing. There was much more pressure on people like Joe and Harry McPherson than on the younger guys on the staff. And I think Joe felt rather restricted in terms of what he could say, and in part because of the President, but I think also in part because of Joe's view of his own role.

F: You develop a certain defensiveness, I guess, against premature disclosure of anything you're working on.

G: I think Joe came to understand and to feel that we were--and certainly I did, and I think everybody working on the substantive side--that by and large the President had good reason to keep his options open until the last minute, and that was the primary reason to keep things down. If you disclose part of your legislative program, particularly big items, all you do is give the other side time to build their defenses. And very often unless you move very fast, and this is particularly true in reorganizations that you can accomplish without legislation, you give the other side a minute's jump on you, they'll beat you through political pressure. So I think Joe understood this and therefore it wasn't like

having some kind of bridle on, but instead it was a sensible way to do his particular job. And I felt the same way too.

F: Did you have a vantage point where you could discern whether there was a difference between the President as a private person and the President as a public person, or istthis pertinent to your career?

G: I don't think I'm really qualified to respond to that. Almost all of my contacts, except for a few visits to the ranch in the business side--

F: When you went to the ranch, did you work full time, or was there some opportunity for recreation?

G: All my visits were full-time work.

F: You went down there on specific missions in effect?

G: I went down on two occasions to present the legislative program, and on two other occasions in connection with the National Alliance of Businessmen--going down with Henry Ford and Paul Austin and Leo Beebe. And those were short trips, almost in all cases arriving down there by nine o'clock and leaving that night.

F: So you've had four visits and not very much assurance that you've been there.

G: That's right. It was all work except for some very pleasant meals and so forth, but by and large we just went down there to work.

F: Were you caught off base on March 31?

G: Very much so.

F: Were you listening?

G: I was definitely listening. I was in the White House at the time, and--

F: Was listening almost required, or was it just the sort of thing you did because it was good to know what was going on?

G: For anybody who was concerned with the campaign, it was a very significant address, and if you had to watch it--. Now, let me go back. At that point I was essentially preparing papers on the substantive issues for the campaign. I was working with Senator Muskie for the Democratic Policy Committee which prepared these briefing cards on the accomplishments of the eight Democratic years and the substantive issues for the future, and what the Democrats were proposing. And those were the things that I was working on at the time, as well as the California campaign. And on Saturday, the day before the President's speech, we had gotten five guys to resign from their jobs to go out and work in California--Larry O'Brien and Marvin Watson had gotten some people for New York, and they were working on the campaign. John Robson and I and Joe and Larry Levinson worked all day Saturday on these substantive documents, and were sitting there Sunday night in the White House, having worked all day on these documents. So we were obviously caught offguard.

There had been speculation; nobody believed it so far as I know, and if anybody did other than perhaps Buz [Horace Busby], I don't know who he is. And it went back a long time. When we were down at the ranch in December, we recommended in the legislative program holding a couple of major proposals for the campaign: one, the Child Health Act, which was a major program to bring comprehensive health services to mothers and their children through covering all poor children through the first year of life in the first year and then going ultimately to school age--a major proposal; and we thought that he ought to save it for the campaign. And he said in front of Joe and Larry and Matt Nimetz and me that he might not be running, and he was going to present the whole proposal--the

whole legislative program in the State of the Union and in his messages and forget about all this talk of holding things.

A little later on that day he took us for a tour of the new wing that he had just built for Mrs. Johnson, and said, "Now, that we may be coming down here to live fulltime, she has got to have more space." Nobody really took it very seriously. Although I was not a party to the conversations that last week, I know he called Joe on two or three occasions to essentially run through the gist of what was in that last section of his speech about his ability to be an effective President and to provide leadership to the country, to unite the country--he bounced that off Joe, and obviously made it clear to Joe that it was very much on his mind -- the possibility of not running. But I don't think that even as of Sunday that Joe believed that he would go through with it. Harry McPherson got a different kind of piece of information, and obviously they're more competent to comment than I, but he was told I guess on Friday or Saturday by the President in a very unusual way. The President called and apologized because he said he was changing the ending to the statement. Now, the President very seldom apologized about doing things his way. You know, he gave Harry McPherson plenty of praise at times, which Harry deserved, but very seldom if he wanted to make a change would he apologize. And that was the first time, as Harry explained it to me, that he thought there might be something serious. But I think everybody was--

F: What was the reaction in the White House from your group? You were watching it on TV, not in the TV room?

G: Right. We were down working and watching it at the same time. My

reaction was interesting, and I think was shared by most of the guys in the substantive side. The first part of the speech I think everybody felt would have been of great importance to the campaign. A statesmanlike statement on the war, no partisanship, no harsh words about those who disagreed; and then all of a sudden, he shifted gears and it looked like he was getting back to the kind of thing that we felt was hurting him politically--statements about those who disagreed and the unification of the country. And I think if it hadn't had the kicker on the end that, "Therefore, I will not seek office--"

Second side of tape

G: The reactions, when he finally made the statement about not running, I guess was received by mixed emotions by many people. An awful lot of us were literally exhausted at that point, and I would be less than frank if I didn't say that I was greatly relieved in many ways.

F: You felt like you might last.

G: That's right. I had not anticipated staying that long at the White House; we worked unbelievable hours in Joe's office, and I physically was just whipped. We were also very aware of just an awful campaign ahead. The President asked me to come out to California the week before he made that speech, and it was absolutely awful out here. You looked at the Democratic party and you had the worst segment of the party behind the President; the really good people--I'm not talking so much political spectrum as I am just human beings--the very best people in the Democratic party in this state were not with him. And it just looked like a terrible job, and everything was in total disarray out here as of March.

It was quite clear that the President's record on the domestic side had never gotten across; that most people were totally unaware of what had happened. They regarded his domestic program as a continuation of the welfare program of the '30's, and didn't understand it was an entirely different concept, one of opportunity rather than a handout. But that message hadn't gotten across, and then it was the war. You'd get both extremes. I went on a question-and-answer period, and it was awful. On the one side were those who wanted out and who thought they'd been misled on the war, and the war was destroying the country; and on the other side, people were calling about how could the President keep a guy like Walt Rostow, whom President Eisenhower (they said) had found to be a Communist, on his staff. Those were the kinds of things, so it was obviously an incredibly tough campaign that was coming up. I think most of us believed that the President could win it with the important qualification that he did do something like he did on March 31st about the war. But it would have been tough, and therefore there was kind of a sigh of relief that I think was probably felt more--

F: You weren't thirsting for battle in that summer of '68?

G: Not really. You know, we grew to feel badly about the prospects for everything we had done, but I think the President felt, and he did mention this the prior December, that politics goes in cycles; and that the next President, if he were Lyndon Johnson or someone like him, would find it a terribly frustrating job to have because he would be defending everything that he had done, not making new strides, but defending everything that he had done.

F: The President has a fairly strong feeling for the kind of rhythms of

history--the upbeats and downbeats?

G: He talked about it very often. Not being a historian, I don't know whether his concept is a correct one, but I think he obviously feels very strongly that politics does go in cycles; and there are times when politics demands a step backward; there are times when it demands do-nothing; there are times--

F: And he hit it at an upward--?

G: He hit it at an upward period, clearly took advantage of it, moved the country a great distance--one that I don't think will be appreciated at least on the domestic side for years to come, but I think ultimately historians will realize what was accomplished. But he recognized, and it was very apparent to us, that the trend was towards the right and everything we had done--you know, every battle, in civil rights and in the poverty field, was an incredible battle that couldn't have been won without the President.

There's just absolutely no doubt, whether it was elementary and secondary education--you know, the states backed it the first time, then ultimately they wanted to take it over; and yet any educator who took a hard look at the facts of the situation and state allocation formulas would not want to switch away from money being allocated to the poor districts that needed the money. But the state boards were coming in and they wanted that program, and it took literally everything the President had to hold it together. All the pressure the Administration could exert to get the appropriations for any program designed to help the poor who have no voice and no power.

And it was apparent during that last year that--just to give an example of the trend of history which the President kept talking about, and talked about about six months before this, he sent up in his education message a program that essentially reallocated the same budget level to programs providing services--teachers and services--to disadvantaged children. And there was an increase in those kinds of programs of about eight hundred million. He took it all out of construction and maintained a level budget that way.

When that bill first came out of the House Appropriations Committee--very little of it was legislation--and when it came out of the House Appropriations Committee, all of the money was back in housing. There wasn't a penny for the disadvantaged. And that's what was happening that last year--just awful battles to even hold the program together. And without the President, we couldn't have done it; and now we see what happens when the President isn't there to defend those programs.

F: Did you ever get the feeling that he had a certain disillusionment in the results of some of the program? For instance, I think everyone would concede that he awakened, say, the blacks to new possibilities which of course increased their militance since people who don't see possibilities don't get militant; so instead of leading us into green pastures, in a sense he led us into a lot of confusion and charges and countercharges and so on. Did that bother him, or did he think this was just one of the prices you pay for progress?

G: I don't know, and I never heard him speak to that other than the public pronouncements that he made.

F: He never wished he hadn't put through something that he did, publicly?

G: I never heard him say that publicly or privately.

F: "If I had it to do over--"

G: He was obviously distressed, as many people were, about what was happening, and he felt very strongly, particularly with the blacks becoming militant, that they were hurting him and hurting the very programs that he was trying to put through to help them. But I don't know of any instance where he disavowed as a total mistake anything he had done. The closest one where he had the most trouble was the poverty program. But it was totally apparent that he would not have thrown the poverty program if he had had the choice later on. He backed it very strongly, and without his support we never would have been able to hold it together. I think what he was most concerned about was--and I think it was just a problem of political nomenclature--if all of the programs had been labeled by what they were doing, I don't think we would have had such a political problem as we had with the poverty program. Because we didn't have any problem with Head Start or Upward Bound or VISTA; where we had it was in something labeled Community Action. The problem was that nobody ever knew what that meant. We didn't have a problem with Neighborhood Youth Corps or anything like that. But what was Community Action? And an awful lot of people, particularly the more conservative, felt that Community Action meant community disruption.

F: It sounds like a popular front in the '30's.

G: Yes, something like that. If you ever went into what Community Action agencies actually did, I think that you can see that we never would have had that problem if we didn't try to encompass so many things under one big umbrella. They were doing everything from adult education to nurse training and child care and everything--some really rather remarkable--

F: I'm sure lots of people had the sense of a takeover.

G: Oh, there's no question. That label was just dynamite. And if we hadn't had that problem, I don't think it would have been nearly that severe. But I'm quite confident that the President knew the importance of that program, particularly the flexibility that he had under the Poverty Program to do things that needed to be done, and the tremendous accomplishments. Now the accomplishments there--you know, on the one side it did--there's no question it had some impact on militancy and community disruption; but on the other hand, the changes that it was bringing about not directly, but indirectly, by changing--well, really through its impact on other agencies of the government despite all of the pressure from the White House, the Poverty Program did more to turn the Labor Department around from an organization that served the high school graduate son of the union man to minorities who were disadvantaged; the same thing in Student Aid and HEW; the same thing in the Office of Education; and indeed in the country. In 1963 preschool education was a very dirty word in the educational community. After Head Start, the school systems wanted preschool education, and they wanted to take over Head Start. Now, the President wouldn't give up any of that; I'm sure he would have liked to have shed himself of some of the political problems, but, you know, some of them I think were problems that you have to tolerate--others involved a lack of looking ahead in terms of political defenses in part.

In no other area of governmental activity did you find the tracings of federal funds the way you did in that case. Let me give you an example. Every time a kid who was given a job by the Neighborhood Youth

Corps got into trouble, and this was a job for disadvantaged kids--how you expect they're not going to get in trouble is beyond me--every time one of those kids got in trouble it was a national scandal. It was an OEO employee. That never happened when John Gardner spent some money on a hospital, or sent a welfare check, or hired a kid, or made a grant to a school and somebody in the school got in trouble; nobody ever traced federal funds that way. We're always better with hindsight, but if we'd done a little thinking about the potential problems, a little work on labels, a little better explanation to the public of what was happening--

F: How did you arrive at titling it? Was there somebody who was particularly gifted, or did you kind of hammer it out by--?

G: No. Sargent Shriver was one of the most imaginative guys that I've ever run into, and particularly when it came to labels. And with the exception of Community Action, which I don't know who came up with--I think Shriver personally came up with most of those, with Head Start and Upward Bound and Neighborhood Youth Corps and all the names--

F: He could have had a career as a sloganeer?

G: No doubt about it. And that was fine if he had gone a little bit further. The problem was he left too much under that Community Action umbrella, and it just gave us impossible political problems.

F: You've been very patient, but let's do one other thing. Let's talk a little bit about your experience with the transition. First of all, did the transition really become effective, or was it just so much talk?

G: With the exception of HEW where it really worked and in Foreign Affairs, where I think it worked but I was not a party to it, I think it was smooth, but ineffectual. The reason I think is clear--there

was no interest on the other side. That takes a little background.

We started working in April to try and make it effective, and working very hard--Charlie Murphy and Jim Frey, who was clearly one of the most able guys in the Bureau of the Budget, were heading it; an awful lot of pressure was put on the agencies to produce transition papers, identifying the most significant issues coming up for decisions, describing programs and so forth. They did a hell of a good job. There was an awful lot of feeling, particularly after--well, in anticipation of a possible Nixon election and particularly after he was elected, there were a lot of Cabinet officers and several members of the White House Staff who felt very strongly that we ought to act quickly to lock up as many things as we could so that they couldn't be destroyed--to commit funds, to reorganize where we thought it was right, and get things done. Because if we didn't do it, there wasn't a chance that it would get done--not in a malicious way, not trying to hamstring another President, but in some cases to do things like the reorganization of the Labor Department, which would ultimately be very helpful. As it turned out, for example, the reorganization plan we put together came out of a task force headed by George Schultz in 1967; and then he became Secretary of Labor. We had gone part way, it was all developed, the President decided not to push it through, but that was one of the first things George Schultz did. Anyway, a lot of work was going on--

F: You didn't know you were preparing a Cabinet member, did you?

C: No, I must say I was delighted by that one appointment because he did an awful lot for the improvement of the Johnson Manpower Program, and he was obviously a guy who believed in it, and that pleased me a great deal.

Anyway, a lot of work was going on and at the same time there was pressure to make it a tough transition by taking the initiative away from the incoming Administration and locking them in to certain programs and policies and committing money and so forth. And the President, for whatever reason I don't know--you know, there are a lot of people who are suspicious whenever Lyndon Johnson does anything, but whether the motives were good or bad, there is no question in my mind that he was totally responsible for a smooth transition. And he made it absolutely clear that we were not going to do things to bind the next Administration, whether it was in the interest of his programs or not. He wasn't going to do that; he wasn't going to have any last minute reorganizations or anything like that. He had had his shot at it, and this was too late to be making any more changes. And he flatly, you know, in large measure just had to tell one Cabinet officer after another no, no, no! And even telling his own White House Staff.

F: Did you personally work with anyone in the incoming Administration, or were you pretty well left alone?

G: That's the second kicker. Despite all the President did--and he made his entire staff available, he made it absolutely clear that the whole government was going to serve the incoming Administration--they by and large did not take advantage of it. Now the old-timers--Charlie Murphy, Sam Hughes, told us, "They're not going to come see you. They don't trust you; they don't believe in what you've done in the past; so don't wait for them to knock on your door." That's exactly what happened with the major exception being Finch, who did spend a hell of a lot of time with Wilbur Cohen and all the key people in HEW and worked very

closely with them. On the White House level, no one with the exception of one interview asked to see Califano. That I find rather incredible.

We had one joint staff meeting, and Charlie Murphy described his recollection of previous transitions; and he said, "I'd like to make one suggestion. Come talk to us. You don't have to agree with us, and you don't have to do anything we say, but I do think that it would be worth your while to listen, because we've been through these problems and they're not easy, and it's worth your while." By and large they didn't do that. I think it's understandable, but I think it's rather tragic. Just to give you an example. An outgoing President, as you know, takes all his files with him. A new President gets hit, for example, with a problem in the District of Columbia. A new staff isn't going to know what to do, or what's legally required. The Attorney General isn't sitting there. You know, it's a very complicated procedure--it takes a Presidential declaration--first, a decision by the mayor, a Presidential declaration, and all the mechanics for bringing in the troops. All of our files as to how that was done came out of the White House before noon on the 20th. The same thing is true of labor disputes--the President has to act to halt a major strike. Again, no files. They're left in the cold. So very practical problems, not political problems but very practical ones--how does the White House staff deal with it--nothing, in the way of transition. They did on Friday night which would be what--the 17th, and Saturday--the people on Moynihan's staff finally recognized that they had some problems; and they madly requested meetings with us, and we spent quite awhile Friday night and Saturday primarily telling them what to do if a riot broke out in the District during the Inauguration ceremonies.

But they didn't have the slightest idea what to do! So there was a little of that last minute business.

But other than that, almost no contact. We did discuss generally how to deal with Cabinet officers and problems that you get into--you know, who are good people in the Bureau of the Budget, and how can you best use them, and how can you use the counsel, some last minute conversations of that sort. But by and large no transition at the White House level. To my knowledge not much of a one in any of the agencies except HEW; some infrequent contacts but not much; a little more in the Bureau of the Budget. Of course that was easier for Mayo--they all knew Mayo. And of course that's a critical place.

Other areas were very interesting. One that I worked hardest on to try and provide for a reasonable transition, mainly because I felt it was extremely important, was the National Alliance of Businessmen. And it was one of the most frustrating things I've ever gone through. In early November it became apparent that the Alliance would have to appoint about ten more city chairmen--guys were tired and had quit and in a couple of cases, they just weren't any good. Now, we could have appointed them, but I recommended to Leo Beebe and Henry Ford that they only make appointments from then on that were acceptable to the new Administration. Unfortunately--I met with that fellow, the former Congressman from Canada who was a very high level Nixon aide who has since been made an Ambassador to somewhere--

F: From Canada?

G: Kansas. I can't remember, but anyway, one of the top four or five guys. I met with him two times, talked to him on the phone; they clearly were

unwilling to do anything other than tell me that they'd get back to me if the names were unacceptable and they essentially said--I said, "Well, you ought to make the calls." And they said, "No," but they said, "You can say that the appointments are acceptable to the new Administration." You know, when you start calling one of the very biggest businessmen in a big city and you're a member of an Administration that's going to end in about thirty days, they don't want to hear from you; they want to know whether the new Administration wants them. And some people just flatly said, "Well, we'll wait and see if the new Administration wants to call."

That was one problem. Then the Alliance had a board meeting, and these were big by and large Republican powers--obviously, Henry Ford had backed Vice President Humphrey, but the bulk of them were Republicans and I think they were solidly behind President Nixon. You know, the presidents of IT&T, Alcoa, Safeway, Coca Cola--you know, the whole list. They requested very early on at my suggestion a meeting with the President at which time Ford--and --President Nixon, that is--at which time Ford and Austin were going to submit their resignations and ask the new President whether he wanted them to stay on to help in the transition, or suggest if he didn't that he immediately appoint new people to carry the program on. Well, the closest that those two got was this guy's name--I can't remember, the Congressman and one of the powers of the campaign--. Anyway, they called him in, called both of them in to New York on the assumption that they would meet with President Nixon. They got there and never even saw him. And a statement was issued saying essentially the new-coming Administration thinks it's wonderful--all the things they've done--and urges them to continue the good work. Boom! The end of it! They were

obviously very upset by this, but they still believed in their program as I did, and so they had one more major meeting some time in December of their entire board--not a person was absent. They invited the old and the new Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce--both parties--Bert Harding who was head of OEO, they didn't have a replacement; two new guys on the new White House staff and me from the old; and rather astonishingly not one representative from the Nixon Administration showed up. And they were livid!

We got [to] talking about the budget -- we had worked on it for many months and were convinced that the program ought to be expanded from fifty cities to a hundred or a hundred and twenty-five. I said, "Look, the only way this is going to work is if you don't announce it now, and I'm sure that President Johnson won't insist that it be announced. We will put the money in the budget for it," which we did, "You take it to the new Administration; tell them, 'Here is what we think ought to be done--you announce it right after you get in office.'" And I said, "From a political point of view, what will happen--" and these businessmen didn't believe this, I said, "They will want either to change the name or call the Johnson effort a peanut effort and say we're going nationwide now, or do something like that to take the political intiative." And I said, "If we put the money in the budget and you give them that opportunity, you might get a big push from the new Administration and it will save the program." Well, that's exactly what happened. About the middle of February, there was a big announcement by the Nixon Administration that the pilot effort of the Johnson Administration wasn't too bad, but they didn't recognize that it was a national

problem; and the "new Administration recognizes that and by God, we're going nationwide." That's exactly what was done, and the money was already in the Johnson budget. But essentially, again, we, working with the business leaders of the nation, made the transition smooth with no help at all.

F: And that's amazing because of course this is one of the seats of power of the Republican Administration.

G: Yes. In the business community. And if they were going to endorse and adopt any program or at least cooperate with this rather incredibly powerful group of human beings, you would have thought it would be this group. But we couldn't generate anything. And they were furious. I must say that one day convinced that group of businessmen about President Johnson; they were more than ever his very devoted supporters. You know, he backed that program from day one, in a way that no president has ever backed a program, and they really appreciated that--and particularly when contrasted with the unwillingness even to meet with these guys who were spending millions out of their own pockets, literally millions, and all of the time and effort that they were putting into it, and couldn't even get a young White House Staff guy to come by and say hello to them.

F: I would gather from what you've said that Henry Ford was not just window dressing and a titular leader--that he actually was committed and he worked on the program. I'm sure Beebe and Ford was what made it go.

G: Well, Beebe made it go but Beebe wouldn't have been there; you know, Beebe was running marketing for Ford in Canada. And the background of this which I may have covered earlier, I think, tells the story about

Henry Ford. I flew up to Detroit to try and convince Henry Ford to take this; he had three vice presidents in to grill me and went through all this, and he set two conditions when I left. He was convinced the President was sincere, that it wasn't a political effort, and it was a solid program. He said, "I've got to be able to name my own man to the staff, and I've got to have the right kind of title for him. That's it." So he said, "If the President agrees to those two things, I'll take the job."

I flew back to Washington and it dawned on me that I couldn't go in to the President just saying that Henry Ford--

F: Lays down these conditions.

G: Wants a blank check. I've got to at least know who it is. So I called Ford back from the Washington airport, we were under very sharp time demands because the message was going up the next day, so there was no time for an FBI check or anything. I said, "Can you tell me who the guy is? I really can't go in to the President saying you want to name the staff guy and not say who it is." He said, "Yes, it's Leo Beebe." And he told me he was running their operation in Canada. I did one thing--no, I didn't even do this until afterwards actually, I checked afterwards with McNamara and I told you what he said. But very sheepishly I went into the President telling him what Ford had said, and I thought he'd say, "Hell no," you know "I'm going to control that appointment." Very interestingly he said, without seemingly any thought or reservation, he said, "Of course." And his comment was, "Ford either lends his name to a cause, fund raising or something, and nothing else; or he commits himself wholeheartedly. There's no middle ground with him. You know,

he doesn't do just a little work--he either just gives his name or he gives his commitment." And he said, "Once Ford says that, that he wants to name his own man, you watch! He wants to work on this one." And there was no question about it in terms of time and effort and expense; he didn't miss a meeting; he held parties for the staff; he wrote letters to the staff; he really worked hard with Leo at every stage.

F: The President and Ford got along.

G: Very well, there's no doubt about that. And Ford deserved his confidence and the appreciation that the President often expressed--that he did a-really rather remarkable job for the President.

F: Jim, you're a good witness.

G: Well, it's an interesting period.

F: It is, and I thank you.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By James Gaither

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, James C. Gaither, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed James C. Gaither

Date May 31, 1971

Accepted James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States

Date Jan. 25, 1972