INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: EILENE GALLOWAY

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mrs. Galloway's residence, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: Mrs. Galloway, let's start with your initial involvement with Senator Johnson.

EG: Well, in the spring of 1957 I wrote a Senate document on guided missiles in foreign countries. This was published by Senator [Richard] Russell, who was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. When the Sputnik went up, it was so startling and dramatic and almost everything on the Hill came to a stop at that point. Anyone who had been working on guided missiles at all was automatically launched into outer space. So Senator Russell telephoned me and asked me to write an analysis on the impact on the United States of the Soviet Union being first to orbit a satellite. Then he told Lyndon Johnson that he thought I could help him with outer space hearings. Johnson at the time was chairman of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

So then Lyndon Johnson called me up and he said, "Eilene, I want to make a record in outer space, and I want you to help me." I was really astonished by this, because I had been working on military manpower, and aside from the guided missiles I didn't know anything

about outer space except that the cow had jumped over the moon and things like that.

Before that I had planned a lot of hearings for Senator Russell with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on different issues that came up in the committee. Johnson assigned me to the staff to help with the missile/satellite hearings that began on November 17, 1957, the month right after the Sputnik went up. There was a terrific sense of urgency; I've never seen anything like it on the Hill. The only time that there was anything as cataclysmic as that was when the atomic bomb went off, and that was sudden and startling. But that was used first for war, and outer space was used, you know, first for peace, and hopefully we haven't used it for war yet.

Staff work was a matter of deciding who the witnesses should be and what the problems were and what should be decided. I think at the beginning Lyndon Johnson probably thought that he would have a committee like that of Senator [Brien] McMahon with the Atomic Energy Act in 1946, and there would be just the Senate committee. But as it turned out, when the House realized that the Majority Leader of the Senate was going to have a "Blue Ribbon" committee to study outer space, John McCormack, who was majority leader of the House, thought that he should have a committee. He was a little reluctant about it, but finally they set up the two committees.

But to get started with right away, [there was] this sense of urgency in the Congress which was really Lyndon Johnson spearheading leadership in this new venture. He was trying to find out why it was

that we didn't have a satellite up, because the Soviet Union and the United States were the two countries that were already working within the International Geophysical Year to send up satellites. They were supposed to be just scientific satellites and that's the way ours was planned, with the Vanguard.

So he had all these witnesses come, and I remember one day we met from about nine in the morning till nine at night interviewing all these people and getting answers to questions. Lyndon Johnson was quite different to work for than Senator Russell.

G: How so?

EG: Well, for Senator Russell, I had planned some hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on limited warfare. I did as much research as necessary to write a report, but instead of writing it as a report, it was organized by questions and and issues, so that you could look at an issue and then the Senator could ask questions of any witness. But Lyndon Johnson didn't want his plan arranged that way; he wanted different questions for each witness. That is, if General [James] Doolittle came, he wanted questions for General Doolittle. And furthermore, Senator Johnson didn't want to ask the same question twice. I always liked to have each witness asked the same question [so] that on a major issue, I can really zero in and find out what everyone is thinking about that problem.

But Johnson was very quick and very sharp. If he looked at you, you felt you were being x-rayed and analyzed all in one glance. He

was marvelous at breaking down a witness. If it looked like they were not going to talk very much or say very much, he would say a lot about the country and really break them down. One time he said, "I need some more questions for Nelson Rockefeller. I'll declare a five-minute recess." So I wrote the questions in shorthand on three-by-five cards, and then copied them out in longhand. Sure enough, at the very end of the five minutes he came back, the whole committee came back, and they started with more of these questions.

At that time, this Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee went on holding hearings into the following year, so that we had three volumes and almost twenty-five hundred pages of testimony. So when LBJ decided to set up the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics in 1958, because the senators knew that there was more to space developments than the military, they decided to appoint the chairmen and ranking minority members of all the committees that might be affected by outer space. In the meantime, Johnson was exerting tremendous pressure on everybody to get going with a U.S. program. The Vanguard, you know, only weighed a little over three pounds; it was about the size of a grapefruit, because they had done grapefruit-sized thinking in getting the U.S.-IGY project together. The scientists didn't think they could ever get enough money to have a satellite bigger than that. But the Soviets had put up this first Sputnik on October 4, 1957 and then they put up one the following month with a dog in it. The second Sputnik weighed so much, it was so heavy, that it was evidence that the Soviet Union had the capability of launching

intercontinental ballistic missiles. This was why it was a national defense problem for the United States.

This Inquiry into the Missile Satellite Situation was mostly about defense, and concerned with finding out about space and where the U.S. stood at that particular moment and trying to decide what we should do. But the senators realized all the time that there were a lot of peaceful purposes that were not military and didn't come within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. And the Defense Department didn't have the kind of law that would permit them to do non-military space projects.

G: Where was the decision made that it would be a civilian rather than a military project?

EG: Well, I think that decision was made partly in the executive branch--the Bureau of the Budget and the old NACA--the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics--and partly in the legislative branch. But I think that the main ideas came from the scientists and engineers. They were mission-minded and they were project-minded and they were international in their thinking. They had started this third International Geophysical Year. Usually they were held every fifty years but now the scientists felt so much advance had been made in rocketry they should have them sooner. That idea started in the U.S.; Dr. [Lloyd] Berkner thought about that. So the scientists were the ones that came up with the ideas that got into the NASA act, that the policy of the United States should be that space should be for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind. That act was passed in

1958, and then those words got into the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, and they have been referred to ever since.

Well, anyway, what Johnson did was to see what we could do during this interim period while we were trying to figure out how the government should be organized to carry on a U.S. program of space activities. So Congress passed two laws in February 11 and 12 in 1958, and those laws permitted the Department of Defense to do non-military space projects for one year as designated by the President, and they created the Advance Research Project Agency and transferred ten million dollars supplemental money so that that could be going on at the same time we were working on the NASA act.

So then the President sent up--well, the President, you know, in the beginning Eisenhower was not excited about the Sputnik, about the Soviet Union. He just said we weren't in a race. [James] Hagerty had a press conference and said we weren't in a race. One of the admirals said that it was just a hunk of iron. I think because it was downplayed in the White House, that's what made it so important that there was one person--Lyndon Johnson in the legislature--who could take on the leadership and who had what it took to push this through, the money and the ideas. And the ideas were coming from the scientists and the engineers.

Now, the first problem we had was really a political science problem. It was how do you organize the government to carry on space activities? Do you have a commission or do you have an agency or what? This was not really understood at first. Some legislators

thoughht that they could erase the words "atomic energy" in that act and put in "outer space" and it would be the same result. But it wasn't, because atomic energy was a form of energy and outer space was a place, where you did a whole lot of things. So everyone was learning about space and then they were learning about these issues and the fact that there were unique characteristics, that the satellites orbited the earth in less than ninety minutes, they didn't pay any attention to national boundary lines. We needed an international tracking system. The whole thing was inevitably international and Johnson understood that.

G: How do you know he understood that? I mean, how was this manifest?

EG: Well, it was manifest first in getting that declaration of policy into the act. That wasn't an issue, of having space for peaceful purposes, and they were talking about not having it for military purposes, or banning military purposes.

There was recognition that the Department of State had a role in it. This was one of the aspects that I worked on. When they decided that they were going to divide space between the Department of Defense and NASA--they already called it NASA although the executive branch said it was the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. In the meantime, McCormack was calling me over, and I said to him one day, "I don't like it being called an agency. That seems like such an ordinary word. It doesn't seem important enough." And he said, "Well, what can we do about it? We're already stuck with calling it NASA." And I said, "Well, we could call it an administration and have an

administrator." And so he said, "Okay, we'll do that." That was one of the things that happened.

G: I've always wondered how it got to be the administration.

EG: Yes. He called in someone and he said, "Change that from agency to administration." You never know when you write some of these memos or talk whether anything is going to happen.

But to return to your question about Lyndon Johnson. If he hadn't grasped this international part--and this was remarkable because he was mostly oriented toward national issues, and I think this was the beginning of his being interested in international [matters]--it wouldn't have been in the act, that would have been an issue, and there would have been people who would have said, "Well, let's keep it all in the Pentagon." Ninety per cent of space was in the Pentagon at that time. But we knew we couldn't develop all outer space activities in the Pentagon, any of the non-military projects, because they would have to compete in the budget with other programs that were going on, and the Department of Defense has to prove that its programs are defense-oriented. So it was impossible to leave all space there in DOD. I don't think we anticipated the variety of the civilian applications that were produced, that resulted from outer space. But the scientists knew about that, and they had sent up reports which Lyndon Johnson read, and he was impressed with the scientists. They were the top quality people in the country.

G: Were there any particular scientists that he relied on or seemed to rely on?

EG: Well, I don't know that, because I wasn't around all the time he was having interviews. But the main one, the head of the U.S. Committee on the IGY was Joseph Kaplan, and Lloyd Berkner was one, and they were always having James Van Allen in. They relied heavily on Wernher Von Braun in order to evaluate the Soviet program and what the Soviets were doing. Von Braun said that the Soviet Union had a certain kind of rocket they used for the military and they had used the same rocket for their satellites.

The other thing that happened, as soon as they divided space between the Department of Defense and NASA, and as soon as I realized that there were going to be other agencies involved and not just NASA, there were going to be other agencies with space and space-related programs, I thought, well, there is going to be a big job of coordinating this for a total program. So I wrote a memorandum to Lyndon Johnson suggesting that we have a board that would be over all, the Department of Defense and NASA and other agencies. Now, the bill that Eisenhower sent up provided for a seventeen-member board of private distinguished citizens to advise NASA, and it was an internal board and it only met intermittently once in a while during the year and wasn't paid.

I knew that an internal board in NASA would have no clout whatever over DOD or State or anybody else. I mean it just wouldn't work, and there had to be something outside. So I wrote this memorandum about the board being in the Executive Office of the President and Lyndon Johnson liked this very much, this whole idea, because it gave

space a priority in the Executive Office of the President. Well, it happened that Senator [Stuart] Symington, who was a member of the committee, does not like boards. So we changed the name to council, that's how it got to be the National Aeronautics and Space Council in the NASA Act. I don't know what Symington's bitter experience had been with boards, but he had a deep prejudice against them. And so we just changed the name of it. When they had the conference report, this went through, because the House committee had passed this seventeen-member internal advisory board, and that was what the old NACA had and it worked for them. But it wasn't going to work for a total U.S. space program.

So we had Title II in the act setting up "Coordination of the Space Activities", and space was at the top level of the government. The president was presiding, and then you had the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and NASA and a few other outside people. Well, when Nixon was president he abolished this council by a reorganization plan, and to this day the overall functions have been dispersed in the executive. It was handled with foresight, but when they chopped it up and gave the functions a little bit to the National Science Foundation, a little bit here and there, the only way people could get together was by having an interagency committee meeting from time to time on certain projects.

The fact that Lyndon Johnson saw that it was necessary to have

the secretary of state on the council was another evidence that he understood the international implications of outer space.

The other evidence was that when this bill was first sent up to the Hill, they included in the declaration of policy and purpose that we should cooperate with other nations and groups of nations in these space efforts. But there wasn't any implementation of that in the rest of the bill. So, I wrote--I mean almost all of those questions that are in the hearings that the different senators asked were questions that I had written in order to see whether we couldn't get a section in the bill that strengthened this. It wasn't legal enough to have it just in the declaration. At first, the administration came up with wording that NASA would have an international program under the foreign policy guidance of the Department of State. And this was turned down completely by the committee.

G: Why was this?

EG: They wanted it under the president. So Section 205 of the bill provides that NASA is authorized to have a program of international space activities under the foreign policy guidance of the president. It was always top level. See, this is what is now lost. It's really terrible to me today to see that for a lack of leadership, of this kind of leadership that Johnson provided to pull all this space together, our total U.S. space program is just being fragmented. It's really sad the way the thing is dispersed. And some of the programs they can't make a decision on. They've taken seven or eight years to

make decisions on what to do with remote sensing, and they haven't been able to figure that out yet.

Now, this Space Council was not a very strong organization from the point of view of management, because it was in the Executive Office of the President. And when Lyndon Johnson was elected vice president, the act was amended so that he could become the chairman of it. And then Kennedy--

G: Excuse me. Was this his doing, do you think, or was it Kennedy's doing?

EG: Yes, Johnson wanted to be chairman of the council. No president wanted to take the time, I think, to preside over the meetings. Eisenhower hadn't wanted to use this council and he had somebody working there who didn't do much with it. But when Lyndon Johnson became vice president he wanted something to do. Now one day he called me up and he asked me to do a report on the history of our vice presidents, because he wanted to know how he could increase the role of the vice president. You know, if you look at it historically, the vice presidents have had very little if anything to do. So he wanted to expand his role and have something more to do, and outer space was one of the main activities he was interested in.

Then the Kennedy people sent down the wording. They put in these words, "as he may request." That is, this council was going to advise the president, comma, "as he may request," comma, and the Johnson people had a fit. They didn't want that wording in there at all. They asked me about it and I said, "Well, it's better than nothing.

You can always get somebody to request it. I wouldn't turn it down and not have it at all just because of that." So then we had Vice Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey, and Agnew. [They] were all in charge of the council until 1973, when Nixon had abolished it by a reorganization plan.

So I think all of those reasons [were significant], and especially the influence of the scientists and engineers. It was very strange, but the political science profession and the public administration people didn't contribute to this at all. I think they may have been scared of it because it was science and technology per se and they didn't know that it was government organization applied to a new environment.

Of course, we were working from morning till night with this. The next surprise came on March 25, 1958. I picked up the morning picked up the morning [Washington] Post and there was an article saying that Glen Wilson and Eilene Galloway have been appointed by Lyndon Johnson to new space jobs. I was appointed a special consultant, and Glen was appointed a coordinator of information. This was the first time, you know, that I got acquainted very well with Glen. I was so astonished by this, and I thought it must be a typographical error, because it was a special committee and special consultant. You know, someone was just typing down. But at any rate, I was still employed in what was then the Legislative Reference Service--it's now called Congressional Research Service--and assigned to work for that

committee. Part of the time they transferred money to me to have a research assistant in the Congressional Research Service.

The next thing that happened with Lyndon Johnson, Glen and I went down to San Antonio to a conference on space medicine. I didn't know anything about space medicine, but I was trying to learn everything I could because this is a field you can't work in unless you study the science and technology. So we were there in the hotel looking at these different doctors and hearing all these speeches when, in the meantime, Eisenhower decided that it would be a good thing for Lyndon Johnson to go to the United Nations and assure the people up there that the legislative and executive branches were together on peaceful uses of outer space.

G: Do you know whose idea it was? Was it LBJ's idea originally that he--?

EG: No, I don't think it was his idea at all. I think it was a surprise, as far as I know. It may have been [John Foster] Dulles, because Dulles was the one who said this should happen on behalf of the President. They were going to send down a plane and Lyndon Johnson was going to go to the U.N. A political committee, number one, was going to meet at the U.N. So this was a speech that was to be advocating establishing a committee on peaceful uses of outer space. It was an ad hoc committee that they were thinking of establishing first.

G: Who was going to establish this?

EG: The United Nations. There had been some fear on the part of foreign embassies that after the election in November 1958, when the Senate would no longer be Republican and the Democrats were coming in, you

know, that there would be an impasse between the President and the Senate as there had been at the time of Woodrow Wilson. So this was another one of the political factors. And of course Lyndon Johnson got along all right all the time with Eisenhower anyway. This was always a curious thing to me when I was working with the House and the Senate in different committees. Sometimes the Republicans and Democrats who were in charge got along very well and then there would be Democrats who didn't like other Democrats. There was always this tension between Symington and Johnson. I think that was because they both at one time thought that they might be nominated to be president. You know, that was in the very early days.

G: Or vice president perhaps.

EG: Yes, maybe.

But at any rate, Glen and I were at this meeting in Texas.

G: Excuse me. Let me ask you, how could you tell there was a tension between Johnson and Symington? Was there anything that you could point to and say this is an example of the tension?

EG: Well, I think this was also between Symington and Senator Russell, because they always kept Symington from getting things, from being chairman of a subcommittee. He was chairman once of one in the Space Committee. You know, they have a way of not letting someone get what he wants, and I think that was it. Well, it was just the feeling that you had. They were both very tall, very big men, so when you saw them together you felt a certain amount of force going back and forth between them.

Well, anyway, Glen and I were there in San Antonio when Senator Johnson and George Reedy and some other people swooped down upon us. You know, he was always surrounded with a group of people, Johnson was. I don't think he was ever alone; I mean, he was always surrounded with a group of people, and it was always very exciting. You felt that something exciting was going on.

G: This was when you were in San Antonio at the meeting?

EG: Yes. They came there, and he gave a speech at the Space Medicine Conference.

G: I see.

EG: Some of the speeches that were written at that time were really not very good. One paragraph would have one sentence, and the next paragraph would have two sentences, and it would go on like that, and they wouldn't really say anything.

So anyway, Glen and I then were taken out to the Ranch, and I was really astonished at all those telephones and all the activity going on all the time at the Ranch. Glen didn't stay. Mary Margaret [Wiley Valenti] was there, and Mrs. Johnson and George Reedy and these other people who were working. Then some of them were working in Austin and we went in to Austin one day.

By this time, someone had written the draft of the speech for the United Nations. We were sitting around a table, I don't remember all of the people, but Horace Busby was there and George Reedy and several other people, and Lyndon Johnson and myself. I read this copy, and I was absolutely appalled. I just was really distressed by it, because

I thought that it wasn't saying anything. In fact, Johnson was much better when he talked by himself without anyone having written anything for him. If he was in the mood and he got up to talk, he was very good and very persuasive and very knowledgeable. But I suppose sometimes he got tired and he had to have a prepared speech on hand.

Anyway, he went around and he said to Horace, "What do you think of this?" and George Reedy, "What do you think of it?" And he came to me and I didn't say a word, I just looked at him. He said, "Now, Eilene, you get out from under the table and tell me what you think of this." And I said, "Well, it won't do. It is not statesmanlike, and you have got to give a statesmanlike speech at the United Nations." And when I said it I thought, this will be the end of me with all the staff people, because I didn't know who had written it. The minute I said it Johnson said, "I'll go back to the Ranch and we'll rewrite it. It has to be all rewritten."

G: This meeting was in Austin?

EG: Yes. This was in Austin. Was there an office in a post office or near a post office somewhere? Yes. That was in Austin.

So we all went back to the Ranch and started in again writing the speech so that it would have some punch and meat in it. So finally we got a draft of a speech. It was pretty much like this, except it had to be checked again with people from the State Department once we got to the U.N.

Oh, George Reedy came up to me afterward and he said, "I'm awfully glad you said that, because I couldn't say it. If I had said

it, the Senator would think that I was jealous of Buzz." That's how I found out Buzz had written it. So no one seemed to hold it against me, anyway.

We all got on the plane and went to New York. I was always surprised by everything that happened. This was the plane the President sent down. It had a long sofa. It wasn't like a plane you usually ride in. Lyndon Johnson was drinking some Scotch and Mary Margaret handed him some peanut brittle. He turned it over this way and that way, and he said, "Give me some with some more peanuts in it," and I thought--I have never cared for Scotch but I do like peanut brittle--that has been my trouble. I've never had any peanut brittle to eat when I had to drink some Scotch.

Anyway, we got to the U.N. and then we went to the Waldorf Astoria Towers and we had a meeting that night with Henry Cabot Lodge. He went over the draft of the speech. There were two people from the State Department, and one of them wanted this taken out, and another wanted that taken out. Then Lyndon Johnson, you know, he was really paying attention to what they had to say at first, but when he found that the two of them disagreed about one thing, then he didn't care for either one of them very much. He said, "If I do what you want me to do, I would be taking everything out of this speech and I'd just get up and say, 'My name is Lyndon Johnson,' and sit down." So he wouldn't bother with them anymore. So we kept giving him things like this, you know, to put in the speech. Then the next day we went to the U.N.

G: Before you get on to the speech itself, let me ask you more about the preparations. Didn't he go to Mexico right before the speech? Did he meet with the President of Mexico or something like that?

EG: I don't know about that. Maybe someone else who was there [knows]. There must be a record of it.

G: There is some indication that he was going to meet with Rayburn that Saturday before the speech and that he was going to fly to Mexico. Also, [there's] the question of when the speech was going to be delivered. I gather he wanted it later and Lodge wanted it sooner in the week; he wanted it on Thursday and Lodge wanted it on Tuesday or Wednesday. Do you recall that dispute?

EG: No, I don't recall. I wasn't there when they were talking about that.

G: Did you fly to New York from the Ranch?

EG: No, we had to go from the Ranch to someplace to pick up the plane. I guess it must have been Austin.

G: Or San Antonio.

EG: Yes. Because the plane couldn't land at the Ranch.

G: But it was in Texas, it was not--?

EG: Oh, yes, yes, it was in Texas, yes. No, about the Mexico [trip], you know, with Lyndon Johnson there were so many things going on at the same time it would be very difficult for any one person to keep track of it. I think that's really why all these people at the same time--you know, I was working on outer space. I wasn't working on civil rights. I wouldn't have been able to say what he had done on that. But I didn't anticipate that Johnson's civil rights staff would have

completely ignored this record in outer space. Because you can tell from the way in which space has developed how important it was to get started with it.

G: Well, excuse me, go ahead now with your [story]. You went to the U.N. the next day. You met with Henry Cabot Lodge that night.

EG: Yes. Then we went the next day, and he gave the speech. As a result of the speech, the United Nations established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. At the time, the Russians wouldn't participate in that because they didn't want to be in anything where there was voting, where they might be outvoted. So it wasn't until later that the full Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was established. And the way that issue was settled was that the committee would try to do its work by consensus and not by voting, and they have done that ever since. They have never voted on anything. I don't know how long it's going to last, but we have negotiated five treaties, and four of the treaties have been ratified; I don't think the U.S. will become a party to the moon treaty. But all of those ideas were very important, and some of the ideas in the NASA act got into the treaty of 1967. So it was a very exciting time.

G: Well, how was the speech received by the delegates?

EG: Well, it was received very well, because you see they voted in favor of it; they voted in favor of the resolution. This was a speech in favor of a UN resolution then, which was passed.

G: Did you stay in New York long after this speech?

EG: No. No. I didn't stay there. We had a big dinner that night at the hotel, the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, in one of the places where there was dancing. I came home the next day. I don't really know what the other people did.

But when I got back, there was an unusual thing happened. I had been away from my own desk in the Library [of Congress] for quite a while, and I had told the bibliographers to give me every reference on outer space. I had a stack of three-by-five cards on my desk about space. I went through all of these, and I found that there were quite a lot on space law. And I thought, that's a very esoteric kind of far-out thing, but there were so many, and some had been written before a satellite was sent into orbit. They were written by people who were comparing outer space with "how high is up," you know, how far up does air space extend where we have sovereignty, and should we have sovereignty in outer space and what were the problems, and comparing air space with the law of the sea and so forth.

So I thought, well, there's no place in the world where all these articles would be in one place. I can get hold of all these articles here, and we could get out a committee print on them. So I went to Lyndon Johnson with all these cards, and I said, "I think I could get out a committee print on space law and that would develop one aspect of this subject." He said, "Well, Eilene, if you want to do that, that's all right, do it." It was toward the end of the year. Well, this was the time when Lyndon Johnson was majority leader. If you had anything you wanted published and you took it to the clerk in the

afternoon, you got a galley the next morning. That reminds me of something else.

Anyway, I got out this symposium on space law. It was a compilation on space law. At that time, you could get a thousand copies and as many more as you could buy--no, you could get seven hundred copies and as many more as you could buy with a thousand dollars, or vice versa, one or the other. So we got the maximum number of copies, and within two weeks every one was gone. There was that much interest. And this interest has continued to this day. I got involved with space law from that moment to this.

Then I had to get out another one later, and I called it Legal Problems of Space Exploration, because I thought that was better for people to understand. Because they thought of space law as being just something way out there in outer space, whereas if you think of legal problems arising from, say, communication satellites, that's something right here on earth that's very practical. So Johnson got started that way with space law. This went along with the international, because space law has now become a branch of international law. It's a well developed branch of international law.

G: Now, you mentioned that in having the committee print, that he could get it the next day or something, get the galleys, and that reminded you of something else.

EG: Oh, yes.

G: What did it remind you of?

EG: Well, one day while Glen and I were sitting fairly calmly working on something, Lyndon Johnson--suddenly we got word that he was having a press conference the next day at ten o'clock and he needs a committee print to send out. Of course, I had kept all kinds of records. I had all these records of the scientists. Glen had some resumes of the testimony that had been given before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. I had all of the clippings from the Congressional Record, and all of the options for congressional organization, everything. So we got all of this together, and I took it down to the clerk--the printing clerk was in the Capitol--and I said, "We have to have a committee print by nine o'clock in the morning." I thought I'd give myself an hour. He said, "Mrs. Galloway, that is more than I could get printed overnight." And I said, "Well, how much could you get printed?" and he showed me. So we divided this up and we called it Compilation No. 1 and Compilation No. 2. I didn't think so much of it at the time, except I thought it was amusing. I thought it was a little comical at the time, but the fact is that there's information in there that is extremely valuable. You can trace back to 1957 the suggestion that we should land a man on the moon and bring him back safely to earth.

G: How? Can you recall the origin of that?

EG: Well, it was the scientists and engineers. It was the American Rocket Society, they had a panel. Do you have copies of those compilations?

G: I'll check. I'm not sure that we do. We should have them.

EG: Yes. They were committee prints. And of course everyone just grabs up everything that was space, there was so much interest in it. There was even interest in these resumes of Von Braun's testimony and [Major General John B.] Medaris or whatever we had in there. But I have used these Compilations, No. 1 and 2, many times. I've gone back and found all of the ideas in the NASA act are in there, the idea of dividing it between military and civilian, the idea of using the NACA as a nucleus for NASA, and the peaceful purposes, and even they predicted the space communications, meteorology, navigation. You can just go back and pick up the predictions there in 1957. That was really exciting. So I think it was worthwhile. I don't know whether Glen ever uses it, but I have used it on a number of occasions, especially when people said that Kennedy was the first one that thought of going to the moon, you see. That's not the way it originated.

G: Then would you say that Johnson was the first?

EG: No, it was the scientists and engineers but they could not go anywhere without a leader politician to put through the ideas.

G: They gave the idea to the senators?

EG: Yes. It's interesting the way in which these scientists and engineers had this much influence. You see, when the atomic bomb went off, many of them were so horrified that what science had done had produced this horrible weapon. And yet it was something that could also be used for peaceful purposes, cancer research and energy and whatnot. So they learned about the government then. They hadn't paid much attention to the government before this. They started the Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists and they came and testified before the House and Senate, and the House committee had a panel of these scientists and engineers that they could call on at any time and they came to Washington once a year. The scientists and engineers are organized into unions like astronomy and geodesy and all these different [fields], biology. They head up in the National Academy of Sciences. The government often asks the National Academy to do a study on some problem; it could be transportation or cancer or whatever. So they have a great deal of status and knowledge and this was quite evident when the President had a science advisory committee. Eisenhower finally, after the second Sputnik went up, was alerted to the seriousness of this, and he appointed James Killian to be the science advisor.

So I think that the scientists and engineers not only had the ideas, they were right in the midst of the work of the International Geophysical Year, and they knew how to bring proposals to the attention of the House and the Senate. Now, somehow, they seem to have lost this. See, what has happened now. Some of these decisions that were made with foresight, the problem evaluated and deciding what was needed and how to solve it, are being lost and it isn't just because of money being reduced, it's because of not having any one place where you have an overall view of the total U.S. space program and all the interrelated parts such as was originally provided in the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

Another thing in the act that Johnson was responsible for was requiring the president to give an annual report to the Congress.

Every year he had to send up a description of every agency, and what it was doing in space, and there were a great many agencies. The title page would just show you a whole lot of agencies. And we got this on the Hill, we got this report beginning with Eisenhower up through Gerald Ford. Then when Carter came in, the Office of Management and Budget decided to present it topically. They were only going to consider what was cost effective, so they only chose programs in agencies that had a line item marked space. The result was they eliminated the Department of State, which has the biggest role to play in the United Nations, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, that has the big role to play in the SALT talks and arms control. When you have decisions made by economists who gauge everything by whether it's going to pay off, and is it cost effective, you almost always wash out these values of international relations and foreign policy. And in fact, we have very few people who know how to use science and technology in the conduct of foreign policy.

Now what happened on the Hill and in the executive branch, they passed the National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act, 1976, and outer space is one among thirteen goals. You don't have the top level consideration of space anymore in the Executive Branch. The House committee changed its name, took out Astronautics and became the House Committee on Science and Technology with space as one thing in subcommittee. And the Senate abolished the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and turned it over to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. So that

space is handled by two or three subcommittees, and they don't always get together. So it's really hard, you know, it's like having a garden full of flowers and then all of a sudden it's attacked with Japanese beetles. And you wonder what's going to happen next.

G: Fascinating.

One more question on that U.N. speech. Did you sense any competition between Henry Cabot Lodge and Lyndon Johnson when they were working out the arrangements?

EG: No. I remember Henry Cabot Lodge as being kind of awed by Lyndon Johnson. You know, he had so much charisma, he exerted so much energy and force. It wasn't like somebody was coming in just to sit down and talk about some speech. I mean, this was really a high level energy directed toward a goal and it was going to get done. You know, we were can-do people and we were going to do it. I got the impression that Johnson was not going to be pushed around by these State Department people.

G: Do you recall what LBJ's reaction to the speech was? Was he pleased with the way. . . ?

EG: Yes, I think he was very pleased.

G: Let me ask you about his view of outer space. Were there occasions in which he talked about it during the fifties and what he thought the different programs ought to do and whether or not he was in favor of one more than the other or that sort of thing?

EG: Well, you see--I don't remember too much of that. The main thing that he did was to get the NASA budget authorized every year. That was a

very important thing. Because otherwise the committee, especially in the Senate, would not have had too much to do. But the other thing was that space programs would not have gone on. I don't think he did this just because he would have more to do, because he always had a lot to do. I think that it was one of the things that made space so important, as a total subject. You know, he pushed that through. First it was temporary and then it was made permanent that NASA's budget would be authorized every year. This is the way in which different programs are decided and how much money should be authorized.

G: But do you think he thought of the space program ultimately in terms of defense, keeping up with the Soviets or getting ahead of the Soviets? Do you think he thought of it in terms of pure science or even gadgetry perhaps? I mean, as he would talk to you about it, what were some of the concepts that he used?

EG: Well, I felt that he had a grasp of both the subjects. Having been on Armed Services, he certainly knew the military side of it. And he knew what was important about the civilian side because the most important thing that came up was the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. By that time, you see, he was vice president. So there wasn't too much time in between. Now, that was 1959 and 1960. What year did Kennedy come in?

G: He was elected in 1960, came in January 1961.

EG: Yes. See, we got through the NASA act in 1958. The international space law subject developed toward the end of 1958. So it was only

1959 that he was chairman of the committee. So there wasn't too much [time].

Then I didn't have contact with him working with the space council. Charles Sheldon would have. Unfortunately, Sheldon died last year of cancer. He would know more about that than I do. But I suppose you've had an interview with Ed Welsh, haven't you?

G: I think we have. I'll have to check it.

EG: Ed Welsh was executive secretary of the council. So he would know, I think, about that. But even in those early days it was evident that the space communications was going to be a big thing, a big commercial venture.

There was one funny thing happened at the Ranch. Mrs. Johnson and Senator and Mary Margaret were invited--and myself--to dinner at the next ranch. Judge somebody.

G: Judge Moursund, A. W. Moursund.

EG: And Mrs. Johnson was coming out from Austin, and we were to meet at Judge Moursund's. So at the time that we were supposed to start, Lyndon Johnson and Mary Margaret and I got in the car and Mary Margaret was sitting in the middle and I was sitting over on the right-hand side and Lyndon Johnson was driving the car. I guess you've been at the Ranch, haven't you? Yes. We went along the road and all of a sudden turned right, and of course I didn't know this, but the Pedernales River runs there and we drove straight into the river, because it was paved at the bottom of a waterfall and you could go across. It happened however that the water was pretty high

so that I wasn't prepared for this, I was sitting here, and all of a sudden I was driven into the river with this cascade of water coming down right outside my window.

So I thought, well, I really have strange assignments. I couldn't help thinking what strange assignments I was having with this. There was a man who worked on the Ranch who was waving his arms telling the Senator not to do this. But the Senator was just hell-bent that he was going to get through there. And we got almost to the other side and then couldn't get up the bank. And of course the brakes were wet, the car was wet. So this man went and got a truck and pulled us out. We got on the road and the Senator started driving, and I declare, he must have been driving a hundred miles an hour. And I knew that the brakes wouldn't work. I thought--I could just see the Washington Post saying, "Lyndon Johnson was killed in the auto accident," and then way down here it would say, "Mrs. Eilene Galloway was in the car." I thought, what will my husband think? He thinks I'm in San Antonio at this space medicine conference. How can I explain that I got killed? I won't be able to explain this to my husband. Mary Margaret said to me, "He's trying to scare you. Are you scared?" And I said, "No, I'm not the one that's going to be arrested for speeding." By this time we had gotten to the other ranch where we had the dinner. But that was really a near miss. I never thought that we would get there alive. (Laughter)

G: That's remarkable.

Anything else on his use of space during this period?

EG: I don't think of anything else. I think the whole thing was set in motion very well by the end of 1958, that is--and that was really remarkable when you think of it. October, November, December, and by eleven months, by the time you got the thing, fourteen months--in fourteen months, we had got interim legislation, interim appropriation for the army to go ahead and do these projects. We got the Explorer I orbited in January 31 of 1958. We got NASA set up, some programs transferred from the DOD to NASA, and the appropriation, and the international development.

G: When LBJ was in New York, he also gave a press conference and the staff prepared some questions for I guess the U.N. or the international press corps, whoever it was. Do you recall that episode?

EG: No. I don't remember that. Was that after I had left, I wonder?

G: It could have been. I don't know.

EG: If it was the next day, I think I might have left by that time.

G: Of course, I guess Sputnik also generated other activities, such as the National Defense Education Act. Did you have any role in that?

EG: No. No. I didn't work on that.

G: And he seemed to have an interest in locating part of the space program in Houston, of course, he and Albert Thomas. Do you have any insight and recollections on how that was done?

EG: No, I didn't know anything about that. You know, he would have different people work on things. For example, when we set up the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, he needed a staff director. So he called me up and asked me to get him a staff director, and

he didn't want anybody to know it, that I was doing this. You know, he had a lot of offices. He had a Texas office and an office in the Capitol, the Democratic Party office, the Space Committee, the Preparedness Subcommittee, and all these people. So he did not want anyone knowing that I was working on it.

G: Who did you come up with?

EG: I had to think of somebody who knew the subject of defense and space, knew enough to do the job, who knew the legislative process in the Senate, and who could work with Lyndon Johnson. Because he was very hard to work with.

(Interruption)

Gerry Siegel and George Reedy really had hard times sometimes. They seemed to live in a constant fear they were going to be chewed out for some reason. There was some editorial that criticized Johnson in the New York Times and I didn't think much of it. I've forgotten now what it was about. I wouldn't have paid any attention to it. But the Senator took it very seriously; he was really upset with it. When something like that happened, I guess somebody would be chewed out. I don't know, I never had that problem of his chewing me out. But anyway, some staff people seemed to live in constant fear of it. When I was first appointed special consultant, several people phoned me and said that I would have a real hard time, it was very difficult to work for him. But I didn't think that I would have a hard time. I knew that he wanted everything done in a hurry, but I know shorthand and typing. I can do things in a hurry if I have to do them in five

minutes or ten minutes or one page. You know, he wants something one page, I can do it.

So that's the criteria I had to have. I had to have somebody who was willing to work with him, who knew the Senate, who knew the legislative process, and who knew the subject matter. So the person I came up with was Kenneth Belieu. So I called Ken Belieu and asked him if he would like to be the staff director, and he said he would. I said, "Well, don't say anything about it, because I have to check it." So I called Lyndon Johnson back. He knew Belieu because he was a staff member at the Senate Armed Services Committee. But he said Belieu was satisfactory to him, but that I had to get the vote of everybody who was a member of the committee. There were thirteen members of the committee; he was the chairman, and then there were all these other people. There was Senator [Theodore] Green and I don't know, all kinds of people were members of it. I think Senator [Howard] Cannon was even a member then.

So the Senate was not in session, and I had to find out where these senators were and phone them. There was one, I've forgotten which one it was, who was in Rome on his way to Madrid. You know, when Johnson asked you to do something, you felt that you had to do it instantly, just instantly you had to produce whatever it was. I felt like the princess in the fairy tale that was put in the dungeon with straw and told she must weave it into gold by the following morning or would be beheaded by the wicked witch or something. Well, anyway, I wondered how am I going to get hold of that senator who was on a

commercial plane flying from Rome to Madrid. I got hold of Senator [Alexander] Wiley and I got his vote, he said that was okay. This other senator--and I thought, well, now, the navy has worldwide communications. I'll call up the navy and tell them that I have something for Lyndon Johnson and I must speak to this Senator who was on an airplane, and the navy did put me in touch with him. I got his vote. I finally got all of the votes together, so Ken Belieu became the staff director.

Then in 1959 what I was doing, that early part of 1959, I wrote the final report of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. Do you have a copy of that?

G: I think we do.

EG: Yes. His UN speech is at the end of that, too. Well, I wrote that report and then he said, "You have to get a unanimous vote on it." I had to go around to each office and get everybody to vote yes on it. There was one person who was really going to argue about something, and I said, "Would you be happy if we put a comma in there?" and he just roared with laughter. He said, "I never thought that a comma would make me happy, but we'll put it in, we'll put it in." (Laughter) And I finally got everybody to vote for it.

G: Was this characteristic of Lyndon Johnson's committee work, wanting unanimity or. . . ?

EG: Yes. He wanted a unanimous vote, and he would do anything to get it. This surprised me very much. He would plead. I'm sure he'd get down on his knees. He'd do anything at all to get a vote.

G: Did you ever see him in this sort of situation?

EG: Yes. We got word one time that Senator [William] Proxmire was going to vote against something, some bill. It wasn't the space bill, it was something else. So Proxmire was going to vote against it. Johnson was really furious when he heard about this; this was before the vote. His face was very grim. He immediately sat down at the desk, picked up the phone and called Proxmire and in the sweetest voice you ever heard appointed him to a really juicy position. I just stood there speechless with astonishment and the Senator must have thought he needed to explain the situation to me. He said, "When I feel someone nipping at my behind, I throw him a little piece-a meat!" And naturally he couldn't vote against Johnson's bill afterward. You know, it was like putting money in the bank. He would do things for new senators, get them good assignments or anything like that. And then naturally you're going to go along and vote for whatever it is, if that's what it takes.

G: Do you remember what it was that he appointed him to?

EG: No, I don't, but it was something that several senators wanted to go to, probably some trip somewhere.

Oh, I was the first staff person he ever approved for foreign travel. That was interesting. This was in 1958, and it was in August, the end of August. The International Astronautical Federation was having a meeting in Amsterdam and The Hague. I wrote a paper called "The Community of Law and Science," and it was on outer space. A lot of these scientists and engineers at the conference had worked

on the space program or on the IGY program. So I wrote a memo that I had been invited to the IAF Congress and wondered if I should go. I didn't hear and I didn't hear for quite a while. Then all of a sudden I heard that it had been approved and I was to have counterpart funds. It was much easier then to go on some foreign trips because we had counterpart money in some banks abroad. So if you arrived at a place--like, I went on an army plane to Paris and then took the train up to Amsterdam. You see, when you arrived in Paris you could get some counterpart money. Gradually this dried up, so we only had some left in Poland or some place like that where you didn't particularly need to go.

Anyway, I didn't think anything would come of this. I wrote the article. It was published. But all of a sudden I got word that my travel was approved, and Senator Johnson had never before approved a staff person to take a foreign trip. So I thought, oh, some of these people will be jealous of me. There were so many people in so many offices. But instead of that they were just delighted; they thought I had made a breakthrough and I had set a precedent. Later I found how I happened to be allowed this foreign travel. There were several senators who wished to go, but the legislative situation was such that Johnson said he needed their votes. Then he said, "Eilene doesn't vote so she is expendable--we'll let her go."

G: Now they [the staff] can go.

EG: And I could go. So that proved to be very fortunate.

The following year--that was 1959--I was invited to give a paper at Lincoln's Inn in London. So I sent this memorandum in. You know, prior to this time my travel in the government had just been going from the Library of Congress up to the Bureau of Standards here on Connecticut Avenue. But in 1959 and I was supposed to attend the space law colloquium in London and I wrote the memo but I didn't hear anything. My trip was approved by the director of the Congressional Research Service but I thought that I couldn't leave town without Lyndon Johnson's approval.

Glen Wilson said, "Don't give up hope. This will be like The Perils of Pauline." The phone call from Texas came the very day, you know, that I would either have to go or not go. I had an official passport but it was down at the State Department. Walter Jenkins called: "Lyndon Johnson said to get you on that plane." I said, "What plane?" And he said, "Well, there's a navy plane taking off for London in just two or three hours." So my husband drove me down to the State Department to get my official passport and we had only a half hour before closing time. You know, you aren't supposed to keep this kind of passport in your office. After this I always kept mine in my office. We drove the wrong way on one-way streets and speeded. I got to the State Department with ten minutes to spare. I came home, threw all my travel clothes on the bed, put the suitcase on the floor, threw the clothes off the bed into the suitcase and was driven over to Andrews [Air Force Base] to our plane. That plane, stopped in Argentia. So there at four-thirty I was working at my office, and at

eight o'clock I was asked whether I wanted lobster or steak at the navy base in Argentia, where we stopped to refuel.

Oh, but on the other trip, that was exciting, too. I thought we were going by way of Newfoundland, and I fell asleep. They had given me some shark repellent, you know, but they didn't tell me what to do with it, whether to sprinkle it on the shark or myself. And I was thinking about that, and anyway I went to sleep. About one o'clock in the morning I was awakened and they said, "We have stopped in the Azores. You have to be the first one to get off the plane." And I said, "Well, I don't want to get off the plane. I'll just stay here." "No," they said, "you were given the status of a four-star general to ride on this plane"--that was what Lyndon Johnson had arranged--"and no one can get off until you get off." So I got off and there was a red carpet and I was sleepy and I was surprised to find myself in the Azores instead of Newfoundland. I shouldn't have been, because you never can tell what was going to happen when Lyndon Johnson made up his mind. We went to the officers quarters and we had a party and then I got back on the plane and that was when I got to Paris and then went up to Amsterdam.

G: Did he utilize you to do research on other things for him?

EG: Well, I did the long report on the vice president. I went back and wrote a report on what vice presidents had done from the beginning. I had a political science background so that research was easy for me to do. So I said, "Well, you know, when Roosevelt decided that he wasn't going to have Henry Wallace anymore to be vice president, he sent him

abroad. The thing to do before a nomination comes around is don't go abroad, don't take a trip out of town." That was the thing.

But the role of the vice president increased beginning with Johnson. That's a very interesting study, just on what the vice president does such as representation on the National Security Council. And then you find Nixon using his vice president some, Carter using the vice president more, and Reagan using Bush quite a bit. I think Johnson really was the one that expanded the role of the vice president.

G: Did he use other people in the Office of Legislative Reference?

EG: Well, we had Edward Wenk who was a senior specialist in science and technology. He came and I introduced him to Lyndon Johnson and explained that Wenk needed an assignment at that level and I thought we needed a study on space communications. The CRS just had one person in science and technology, so Wenk got that assignment, and his report was one of the first publications that came out on space communications, and it was a committee print. It was really valuable. Now if you go downtown to the L'Enfant Plaza and see the offices of INTELSAT and COMSAT and all that's happened in global space communications you realize that all those jobs result from satellites. And they are so little comparatively speaking, you know, you get three little ones out there and can communicate with the whole earth, and television programs and phone calls.

I don't know if anything else happened. I didn't know that I remembered all that much.

G: That's incredible. Well, I thank you so much.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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