

INTERVIEW I

DATE: August 15, 1988

INTERVIEWEE: DAVID GINSBURG

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Ginsburg's office, Washington, D.C.

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MG: Why don't we begin, Mr. Ginsburg, by asking you to simply describe your earliest contacts with Lyndon Johnson when you were both young men in Washington.

DG: Well, I got here in 1935. I don't recall the exact date, but in 1937, 1938, 1939, somewhere thereabouts, I met the young Congressman; actually I met him once before when he was an administrative assistant, I think, to a congressman from Texas named [Richard] Kleberg, the one who had the very big ranch.

MG: The King Ranch.

DG: The King Ranch, that's right. We spoke; he was a vital, impressive, emotional, exciting young fellow. I was approximately the same age myself, and it was just fun talking with him. Clearly, he was serious-minded, ambitious--you had a feeling of intensity. I knew him later, of course, but even at that time he was to me very impressive.

Then the war came and in the early part of the war, before we got into it, the National Defense Advisory Commission was organized, and I became counsel to what was then called the Price Stabilization Division. This was under Leon Henderson. Later

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it became OPACS, Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, and then, first under executive order followed by legislation, OPA, the Office of Price Administration. And again, I recall this young Congressman visiting the office asking for an "adjustment," which in those days meant an increase, in the price of oranges. I didn't realize then that there were oranges in Texas, but he was very voluble and persuasive, and I remember our talk. He came to me because we had known each other. I felt it would be wrong to grant the increase, but I did talk it over at length with Henderson and John Hamm, Henderson's deputy; their feeling was that nothing could or should be done. I brought the decision back to him and explained the reasons for it. He understood and, I thought at the time, agreed. That struck me as admirable, because for us the usual response to an adverse decision in those days was anger, "You'll hear from me, and I'll see about your appropriations." There was nothing of that sort from him.

Then I went off to the army for about four years, came back and saw LBJ from time to time when he was in the Senate, during the early part of his career, later as majority leader, and then as vice president. After Kennedy's death, I saw him quite often.

The Women's National Democratic Club had a private dance group, and he and his wife would join us from time to time. The group met infrequently, but we did continue to meet, and I liked him. The qualities that marked his early years marked him even more clearly later: vitality, intensity, often what seemed to be intuitive judgment. He didn't seem to arrive at his conclusions from data garnered from recent issues of the *Wall Street Journal* or the *New York Times*. But somehow he knew; he seemed to have read widely and picked up much by ear. And it was often fun being with him. I remember sitting out a dance with him and others at the Women's National Democratic

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Club, just sitting around, laughing, talking. He was then already vice president. We had a good time together--all of us.

But your main interest today is the airline strike.

MG: The airline strike.

OG: So now we're talking about--.

MG: 1966, yes.

OG: 1966. This was a long time later. I was already spending a good deal of time at the White House, at the request of the President, but not employed there, not on the government payroll.

Initially, I had a call to come over and talk with him; the meeting had to do with the price of copper. I had a number of friends in the White House--Gardner Ackley, of the Council of Economic Advisers; Joe Califano, and others--Bill Wirtz at the Labor Department. But the first issue was the price of copper. I remember that the President [was] deeply concerned about the movement of the prices of commodities--it reminds me somewhat of what's happening today--and he said that the price of copper was going through the ceiling, that something had to be done.

A lot of our copper was imported from Chile. Chile's price controlled the price paid for American copper. Ultimately the President determined that Averell Harriman should go to Chile and see what could be done with the government there--whether with reasonable economic aid the government of Chile would undertake to stabilize at an acceptable level. This was done; the scheme worked, and it was helpful.

I remember the beginning of the airline controversy because it came shortly after my birthday, April 20. The next day I received a call, I think from Joe Califano, to come

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over, and I did. My office was then located at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, just a block away. I walked over and talked with him about the origins of the controversy. The key in my mind was the purpose and public significance of the strike. We were going through a period of rising inflation. The government had adopted guidelines that called for relating wage increases to increases in productivity. The CEA was pushing for 3.2 per cent limitations. No more than that for price increases, no more than that for wage increases, so that prices and wages would both be related to increases in productivity. Adjustments in prices and wages then would not add to inflation.

Stabilization was important because personal incomes and government expenditures were rising. The possibility of draining off increased income through taxation was remote. The Congress was reluctant, and the Ways and Means Committee was totally unwilling to consider action. If we broke the 3.2 guidelines we would confront the need to re-establish price and wage controls of the sort that we had found essential in World War II and subsequently in Korea. This we all wanted to avoid. Price and wage controls, we felt, would be acceptable again only in a crisis, under duress. For so distant a war thousands of miles away, mandatory controls simply didn't fit. And the need didn't exist. The problem could have been handled by taxation. I remember a meeting in Joe Califano's office in which--I think Joe was there--LBJ walked in, and we spoke of the need to do something about the tax situation. Revenues had to be increased. I had been talking with Joe--the secretary of the treasury--

MG: Fowler.

DG: --Joe Fowler, about the need. He was then urging a 5 per cent surtax. Ultimately, it became to a 10 per cent surtax. I remember LBJ listening carefully, and then suddenly

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smashing his hand on the table, "Yes, I know it's desirable. I know it's needed. But you tell me how I can get--" at that time it was the chairman of the--

MG: Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills.

DG: --Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills--"you tell me how to get Wilbur Mills on board, and I'll get the taxation." He was frustrated but gripped with the problem. I had the feeling then, for the first time, that he would finally press for taxation. It would be interesting to have Wilbur's views about this. LBJ was convinced that Wilbur Mills would not permit a tax bill to go through his committee.

I talked with Joe Califano about the risks of an airline strike. I had followed the press reports simply because it was clear that Roy Siemiller, who headed the International Association of Machinists, IAM, was totally against the guidelines. He was trying to break the guidelines. He wasn't trying to settle a strike. He was trying to use a strike to destroy a particular government policy. This was also true of his deputy, a man named [Joe] Ramsey, a Republican, very able, very bright, like Siemiller himself. But clearly they weren't joining in an effort to resolve a labor dispute. We were dealing with a union attempt to alter a government policy. This was more difficult.

The President appointed Wayne Morse, a senator and a friend. I had known him for years. He had been the dean of the Law School at the University of Oregon--

MG: And had an expertise in labor.

DG: --and obviously a skilled tactician in the labor field. A knowledgeable man, with a deep understanding of labor disputes and a clear knowledge of the law--knowledge comparable to that of John Dunlop's. Dick Neustadt of Harvard, another friend, was the third member of the Commission. We met with the President and with Joe Califano.

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MG: I want to ask you a couple of things about the make-up of this commission. Did Morse's opposition to Vietnam figure into his service on the commission?

DG: I saw nothing of that sort. That is to say, on Vietnam, Morse was one of the focal points of opposition to the President in the Congress on Vietnam. Outspoken, acerbic, difficult, pugnacious, all of that, and it was evident to the press that he was a leader of the opposition. But I must say that when we were in our own working group, I saw absolutely nothing in Wayne's position that reflected his attitude toward the President and the administration. He served as a labor expert. He was extraordinarily helpful, insightful; he tried sensitively to use whatever personal judgments that Dick or I could provide. He was a marvelous colleague working on a difficult technical problem.

I don't know how or why any of us was selected. I had been around there for a while so that, presumably, my name came to somebody's mind. Many others could have served as well. I didn't know Jim--the undersecretary of labor--

MG: Reynolds.

OG: --Jim Reynolds, at that time. I did know and respect Bill Wirtz. And this subsequent relationship with the members of this commission--I've forgotten the name of--what was it, railway labor--?

MG: It was [the Presidential Emergency Board]--

DG: Well, it was created under some old legislation. In any event, the relationship among us became close and trusting. Basically we were seeking first to maintain the guidelines, recognizing their importance in stabilizing the economy; second to listen, to receive information and make a record. We sat, we heard the evidence as presented to us both by the companies and by the--

(Interruption)

MG: Where did you meet, first of all? You were describing your meetings.

DG: Yes, we first met, so far as I recall, in Joe Califano's office, and then Joe took us to the President, in the Oval Office, where we listened to the additional remarks of the President, the importance of the guidelines--essentially, what I've just recounted.

(Interruption)

The President described the situation in the context of inflation. The emphasis was less on this particular labor dispute than on the risks to the country, the importance of the guidelines for the stabilization program. We reconvened later in a different office-- actually I think in my office in the White House--in an effort to try to get started fast and get the parties started fast. We began hearings shortly thereafter. My guess is within ten days to two weeks, giving the parties some opportunity to prepare.

MG: What did you do for staff?

DG: We didn't have or use staff. We worked with Jim Reynolds at the Labor Department. We told Jim what we needed, what we wanted. He sat in on some of our meetings in order to be available and to respond with background data. We didn't want staff; we wanted to use what was immediately available and proceed. Although Jim was present, he didn't involve himself in our recommendations. He let the three responsible members of the commission do their work.

MG: You reflected on Senator Morse and his background in labor. Were there experiences in your own background beyond the OPA experiences and earlier that--?

DG: No. My most intense experience with labor issues came earlier, in World War II, and, indeed, I think it was then that I came to know Wayne Morse. He was much younger, but

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already effective We lived these problems, comparable problems, during World War II.

MG: Yes, but your law practice did not--

DG: No, I was not a labor lawyer; I was not involved with labor matters, and as I said before, I don't know how I came to be selected or indeed how Dick Neustadt or Wayne Morse came to be selected.

MG: Was there anything in Neustadt's background that--?

DG: No, Dick, so far as know, had had no prior experience in the labor field. He was basically an observer of the presidential process, had written a major book about presidential power and how presidential decisions were arrived at. I had seen him here in Washington from time to time when he visited from Harvard. We knew each other. I had read his most popular book; we'd discussed the themes several times, but I felt that only Wayne had had personal and current involvements with labor and labor problems. Wayne's essential contribution was a special sensitivity to the likely public reaction. It was odd; he didn't try to tell us what was happening in the IAM. Jim Reynolds kept us abreast of current union thinking and consensus, so far as he was able. But we did not have three labor experts; we had one. We had background guidance and information from the labor department, and the other two of us were laymen with some knowledge of the importance of the issue. My own background and experience had been in economics and law, so that I was aware of the consequences of breaking the guidelines: what it could do, and, indeed, what it did do. So we worked hard, we set up the hearings, and there were very good presentations on most issues--not all--by labor, by the IAM. The companies provided through Bill Curtin, the lawyer for the--

MG: Airlines.

DG: --carriers, much that was helpful. We had a good record. We pored over the exhibits trying to calculate the costs, trying to think through what could be done, how close we could come to labor's demands without impinging too much on the guidelines. An essential point that remains in my mind is that the government was focused on a 3.2 per cent guideline. We ultimately came out with--I don't recall--I think it was about a half a percentage point over the guidelines. About 3.7, 3.6, something of that sort. We were trying to give on some of the issues, which we did. The total amount in dispute was, at least by present-day standards, relatively small. I think that the package which the commission recommended to the President was something in the order of seventy-five million dollars. I think the package that labor was demanding totaled something like eighty-five million. Only about ten million dollars was in dispute. I'm not sure of these figures, but I believe this was the order of magnitude. The important difference was between holding to the guidelines or accepting about a 5 per cent increase. A second issue that still remains in controversy was the COLA, the Cost of Living Adjustment. That one gave us a lot of trouble.

We developed our final recommendations within the board without the assistance of the Labor Department. The Department provided information, but not decisional guidance. We told Jim what we had come out with and why, and he then prepared, or had prepared at the Labor Department, a first draft of an opinion with recommendations. You asked before whether we had staff. We didn't; we used the Labor Department. They provided a draft which was perhaps 60 or 70 per cent acceptable to us; together we reworked it. The three of us edited, rewrote, added and deleted. We agreed on an

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opinion. That opinion we gave to Reynolds and he offered no further comment. It then went to the President. If I remember correctly, we wanted to get it to him as quickly as possible; we wanted to explain the issues so that he would have them clearly in mind.

MG: There was a question of presenting it to him in person at the Ranch or sending it to him and then meeting with him later, and I think Morse was in favor of going to the Ranch and presenting it in person.

DG: Yes, and I think in part it was because Morse had another axe or two to grind. Other legislation concerned him and I suspect, now that you mention it, that what he wanted to do was discuss other matters as well. I thought it would be useful to have a face-to-face meeting with the President to identify exactly how we had reconciled labor's demands with the guidelines. I was almost sure that the companies would accept any recommendation we were likely to offer. So, basically, we were faced with a contest between the union and the guidelines. I don't recall that we did go down to the Ranch.

MG: No.

DG: Later we met with the President, but it was brief, and he was already reasonably well-informed. Joe Califano and Jim Reynolds must have kept him abreast of developments. We did meet; it was almost a cursory meeting, and then of course, came the strike.

The strike was a long one. Its purpose was to break the 3.2 guidelines. There was a vote of the--I don't know whether *you* know the story of how Roy Siemiller came before the union membership--I think Bill Wirtz told it to me. Siemiller stood before the group and told them: "I want you to know what the Board's recommendations are and I want *you* to know that I am right behind them, 100 per cent." He then opened his coat;

under it was a big sign saying, "Vote No." Whether it all happened in this way I don't know, but I remember the story was extant at the time.

MG: This is after a settlement had been reached at the White House and was going to be voted on *by* the union membership; is this what you're describing?

DG: Yes.

MG: And the union membership voted it down.

DG: Yes, voted it down.

MG: Did you have an indication that this was in fact going to happen, that the machinists union was not going to go along with this?

DG: Bill was pessimistic almost from the beginning. We were not. We thought--the three of us thought that we could come close enough to labor's requirements that the carriers and the union could thereafter work out a settlement. We were not pessimistic. Bill, on the other hand, felt that nothing could resolve the controversy except acceptance of the union's demands--I think the union wage formula was 5-5-4: a 5 per cent increase the first year, 5 per cent more the second year and 4 per cent the third year.

Then came the strike and the disruption. One trouble was that Gardner Ackley--with whom I spoke many times--was convinced that the strike did not have a dramatic impact on the economy of the country. Not much was carried by the planes in the way of freight; passengers could generally be carried to their destinations by automobiles, by trains and by buses, so that the impact on the economy was limited. That, of course, was a significant barrier to further action.

But the harder problem was whether the government could or should accept destruction of the guidelines. The guidelines had been broken, and that meant the

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consequences it would ramify. Although the level of inflation was relatively low, we faced a surging economy--rapidly rising expenditures, defense and private--on account of Vietnam. The dilemma was real and sharp. How do you resolve the problem between the White House and the Congress? Who should take the initiative if the parties couldn't settle their differences on the basis of something close to what the Board had recommended? That was a tough one.

Who would want to vote against labor in those years? Obviously, the President would prefer to avoid a break with labor. Few members of the Congress were ready to volunteer. The President then made recommended legislation to set up the equivalent of a disputes commission. This made sense, but basically it was setting up a second level of review. We already had had a disputes commission. This would set up a second tier with comparable standards. But basically it would insure delay. In a labor dispute time is an ally of resolution; the more time you have to find a solution before a crisis, the more likely you are to avoid crisis. The President was unwilling to recommend specific legislation, and the Congress was unwilling to take responsibility for breaking a particular labor dispute. Ultimately something was worked out; legislation was not enacted.

MG: Now, at the time of the settlement, before the union membership voted against accepting it, he had taken the leaders with him and announced on television that a settlement had been made.

DG: Oh, yes. There was a major effort within the White House by statements from Wirtz and the President to force a settlement. I think the President did meet--I'm not sure of this--with the leadership of the unions and of the airlines in order to resolve their differences.

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The problem was that there was relatively little economic impact. Had there been significant economic impact, as certified by the President, legislation could probably have been enacted. Lacking that, the effort was to bring the parties together and force a resolution through public disclosure and discomfort. By this time, the traveling public was facing a mess.

MG: Do you have any insights on what the White House, the administration, did to try to secure the necessary votes among the union membership here?

DG: Nothing beyond meeting with the leadership of the union and exhorting them to do what they could to secure approval of a settlement, pointing out over and over again the relatively small area of differences, and stirring the country to bring pressure to bear on the unions--public pressure through the media. There were many meetings with individuals associated with the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post* and others to explain the issues. I have no personal insight about what, if anything, was done on the Hill to involve members there.

I want to emphasize again that the airlines were ready to accept anything; they just wanted to settle; they were outraged by Charlie Murphy's decision to let other regular airlines take their routes for the time being. The President clearly understood what could happen if the guidelines were destroyed. We were all fearful that if the guidelines went under and we didn't get increased taxes, we would surely have to ask for price and wage control legislation, an apparatus which none of us wanted at the time or thought we needed. All I can say in light of what happened on the airline settlement is to tell you that Siemiller succeeded. He did not yield to the President. He got his 5 per cent. He came close to getting his formula; he beat the 3.2 per cent guidelines.

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MG: But the letter said, "David Ginsburg had called to fill me in on the extraordinary job you'd done in getting Siemiller to settle with the airlines." So there was some persuasion--

DG: Oh, no. Siemiller was then unwilling to settle for what he ultimately accepted. He was still holding out for 5-5-4, although later he accepted something less. Not much less, but something less. I remember being deeply impressed with LBJ's persuasiveness and his ability to weave together the important issues as he saw them. There were both major issues and many subordinate issues, union by union, plus local issues. But I called Neustadt to tell him that the President had done a marvelous job in dealing with Siemiller. I was certainly not trying to tell him that the outcome was acceptable. Oh, no. It wasn't; we understood that from the beginning.

MG: American Airlines was not one of these; I guess it was the only one that had these sort of national routes.

DG: That's correct.

MG: Was anything done to encourage American Airlines to cooperate in this important interval?

DG: There was a secretary of commerce then who had earlier ties to American Airlines. I did not personally have any contact with him, but I suspect someone else, Joe Califano or Bill Wirtz--probably Bill Wirtz--was trying to ensure that American Airlines would hold out as long as possible. Who was the secretary of commerce?

MG: Was it C. R. Smith? He'd been president of American Airlines.

DG: Yes, C. R. Smith. Oh, well, that was it then. Had been, that's right.

MG: But after the union voted down the settlement, did the President tend to put some distance between the negotiations and himself or the White House?

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DG: Bill Wirtz had predicted from the beginning that this would happen. The President did not himself wish to be--or to appear to be--anti-union, breaking strikes. Bill himself, I think, came forward with a formula for settlement or for legislation--I think it was the latter--which the President endorsed and beyond which he would not go. There was an effort on the part of the White House staff to ensure that the President stayed with whatever it was that Bill said from the Department of Labor. That was an effort to step back a bit, push Bill out in front, and leave the White House out of it. That was the initiating event in connection with the effort to obtain legislation.

MG: There was a lot of discussion in the press that at one point Senator Morse condemned the strike and the unions attacked Morse, and at another point you and Dick Neustadt were also critical of the settlement.

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DG: I remember that Wayne said he would lambaste the unions on the floor of the Senate. What he actually did I don't recall. We were all deeply disturbed by the destruction of the guidelines. Wayne fully understood the importance of the issue. I remember attending a press briefing at which Wayne spoke out. Dick Neustadt was there and he and I decided it was essential that the other members of the Board clearly support the chairman. Certainly we felt at least as strongly as Wayne did. Wayne was much more pragmatic, I think, than either Dick or I would be. He was more a mediator than an arbitrator. I was fully persuaded of the need to maintain the guidelines. I think Dick was as well. This was less true of Wayne who, sitting in a legislative arena and having himself been on both sides of labor issues, would have accepted more readily, I think, than either Dick or I. So we released a very sharp statement. And I would again endorse

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the overreaching and the intransigence. We saw this as a one-man crusade on the part of Siemiller to break the guidelines; his efforts were not applauded by the rest of labor although they were generally supported. We had no help from George Meany or other labor leaders, including Lane Kirkland. Labor understood that it could gain from this. The administration was strategically weak.

MG: Well then, should the administration not have gotten involved so early, or certainly not have invited--?

DG: What are the lessons, you mean?

MG: Yes.

DG: I do not believe that the administration could have delayed entering this controversy at the time. I think that it should have focused more attention on the role of Siemiller himself. I think that the effort to treat this as a normal labor dispute--the resolution of demands for wage increases and differences over perks and so on--that was not what this was about. I think that the administration was too soft. I don't believe that the dispute could have been settled by a railway labor board, our board. We were set up to hear the facts and to give our views on the basis of the facts. We had certain laws, "laws" in quotation marks, like the 3.2 per cent guidelines, and we were obligated to operate within them. But even then we stretched the guidelines to the maximum to offer a set of recommendations that, in my view, even in retrospect, should have appealed to any rational and responsible labor leader who recognized the government's need, the country's need, in time of war, to find a resolution that maintained stability. We weren't that far apart. But the man, single-mindedly, wanted to break the guidelines. I thought at the time, and now believe, that he was wrong.

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What else could the President have done? I recommended at the time that the President meet one-to-one with Siemiller to try to use his extraordinary persuasiveness with Siemiller. Others felt that this would be wrong, that it would give Siemiller too much prominence, and so on. I can understand that. But I do not believe that we came in too soon. I think the President would have been subject to warranted criticism had he refused to intervene and delay the strike. The strike was scheduled to begin before the Board was established. We delayed it for sixty days.

Should the President himself have explicitly recommended legislation beyond setting up the Board? At the time, I felt that he should not. I didn't like the idea that an American president ignore the tradition of non-government involvement in labor disputes. Was this an emergency? Well, Gardner Ackley had said, "No emergency." The Defense Department had said, "We can continue to fight the war and move our troops; there's no emergency." How could the President then justify intrusive action? I felt that he should avoid the affirmative act of recommending legislation; that ultimate responsibility, I thought, belonged to the Congress. We of course debated these issues within the Board, because each of us was being asked by others within the administration, particularly Wirtz and Jim Reynolds, what we felt, what we would recommend.

Have you spoken with Bill Wirtz?

MG: No.

DG: Bill's recollections would be helpful.

Anger wells up in me when I think of what this man did, and the cost to the country and to labor. I don't think he had the wisdom to understand the costly consequences of victory. For him, for the IAM and for labor, it was ultimately a defeat.

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MG: Well, I think it was Bill Wirtz who noted in one of these documents that the IAM had never voted to accept a settlement offered the first time around, that they had always--

DG: I see. Well, there was a lot of information about the IAM in Bill and in Jim Reynolds. We were guided essentially by their knowledge.

MG: Well, that speaks for itself.

DG: Your first question was, "Did the government come in too soon?" No, I don't think the government came in too soon. The next question must be, "Should the White House have been clear about recommending specific legislation to deal with this dispute?" To that I also say no. No, even in hindsight, I don't know what more the President could have done, other than taking Siemiller on one-on-one. But a reasonable question then arises, "Should the President meet with the man who is responsible for this particular problem?"

MG: This is a matter of putting his prestige on the line--

DG: Exactly.

MG: --increasing his exposure without--

DG: That's right. And the costs of a presidential defeat can be very great. Just as the story I told you about his banging his hand on the desk and saying, "How can I get the legislation through?"--the tax legislation. LBJ had decided not to go up and ask the Congress for it. I remember my answer. My answer was, "Mr. President, you may lose the first time up. But you'll win a year from now because you will have laid the groundwork." And his answer was the obvious and correct one, that "As president I can't afford to lose." This is exactly the point that you've made. And it's true. I'm not sure, however, about the tax issue. There I still think that he made a mistake. On the labor issue, probably not. To have been denied by the Congress is almost conventional for any

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president, although not in the early years of an administration. But for a president to be denied and beaten by a private citizen, even a labor leader, that would be bad and potentially dangerous.

MG: Okay. Is there anything else that we haven't touched on in connection with the airline strike?

DG: The airline dispute? I remember that I was impressed with the information and ultimately persuaded by its accuracy that we had from the Labor Department. Before that experience, I did not know how close the Department was to these disputes, how quickly they could amass information, the degree of their "intelligence" in quotation marks, the information they had. This was enormously helpful. I was impressed with the maturity and wisdom of Bill Wirtz, his political savvy. By "political" I don't mean in terms of Republican-Democrat, but how to deal with human beings. He was so good.

One always comes in a matter of this kind to, "Could this have been done in a more satisfactory way?" I once spoke about this with Dick Neustadt. We had no alternatives. I don't know how we could have resolved the problem in such a way as to serve the public interest with a man who had no understanding of, or interest in, the public interest, or saw it only in terms of the interest of his own special group. No, in retrospect, I don't know of any way we could have done the work better. Perhaps not to have temporized about when to request legislation, because the only alternatives after the Siemiller rejection would have been legislation or capitulation. Perhaps the lesson is that, in these important circumstances, we should have asked for legislation sooner. But the question remains: how could we have come to the Congress to say, "We need legislation" when we couldn't declare an emergency? Perhaps there should be permanent

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legislation on the books that anticipates these circumstances--legislation that's adopted, not in the midst of controversy but as a result of a re-examination of the existing labor laws. That, I suspect, is probably the best way.

MG: Rather than going from crisis to crisis.

DG: Yes, we ought not to leave so much to the president's personal political strengths and insights--how far he can go with the Congress, with the country, with business and labor, in matters of this sort. The weakening of labor unions is a factor. But I think that the country does need legislation on the books that would enable the president to respond to labor problems of this sort.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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