INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: IRVING L. GOLDBERG

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Judge Goldberg's office, Federal Courthouse, Dallas, Texas

Tape 1 of 1

MG: Judge, President Johnson I guess had already been overseas--he went in 1942--by the time you went to work for him I think in 1943. Is that correct?

IG: It was either 1943 or 1944. You're in the right time frame. My recollection is that he had returned from his overseas tour of duty. I arrived in Washington, as I recall it, in 1943 and was assigned to what was then known as the Procurement Legal Division of the Navy Department. Its name was changed later--although its functions were the same--to the Office of General Counsel. Its duty primarily was to furnish advice to the secretary of the navy and his subordinates with respect to matters pertaining to the civil relationships of the navy, that is primarily the manufacturers, labor unions, anything that say a civil lawyer would be engaged in. It had nothing whatsoever to do with the criminal aspects of the navy. The judge advocate general of the navy was in charge of that, and we had absolutely nothing to do with it. We were divided, sectionalized in certain ways. I would be the counsel to the procurement section, and so forth. Also for a while I was rendering general advice on just general ideas. A good illustration--but it has nothing to do with Johnson--when Forrestal was secretary of the navy he came up with a question. He had such a long name, James C. Forrestal,

would it be legal for him to just put Forrestal in signing legal documents? I remember writing a memo to the effect that I could see nothing illegal about that. But that was a more or less very minor aspect of what we did. But that was in the office, what was generally known as the Office of General Counsel.

Johnson wanted to know from me if I would like to work for a subcommittee on preparedness of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House, chaired by Carl Vinson of Milledgeville, Georgia. [I have] a picture of the destroyer called the ***Milledgeville***. It was a destroyer. I guess if it had gotten to be a battleship it would have been the state of Georgia; if it had been a cruiser, you'd have had to have a bigger city. All they could do for Milledgeville, I suppose, was to give it a destroyer.

Nonetheless, he created this subcommittee and our primary purpose was to investigate the economic aspects of the navy's--not their procurement so much as the civilian operations such as building ships, and repairing ships, and things of that sort. Our primary concern was with shipyards, spread, as you know, throughout the United States, at least at that time. Congressman Johnson at that time wanted to know if I would like to join the staff doing that sort of investigative work. He was going to staff it with accountants and some engineers and some lawyers.

MG: How did he know you were working in the Navy Department, do you remember?

IG: When I arrived in Washington I contacted him because of my relationship with Harris Melasky and with a law partner of mine who is since

deceased, by the name of Martin Winfrey, who was also a very close friend of President Johnson's. So he knew I was there. As a matter of fact, I had been invited out to his home on a number of times before this changeover to working only for the navy to being lent to the committee. And of course I asked him if in his opinion it would make any difference to the navy, what would I have to do. He said, "Well, you'd still be in the navy. You'd be on the navy payroll, but you would be really working for me." I said, "Well, fine." So he had orders entered and cut, as we would say then. I was transferred on detached duty with him. So we proceeded to divide our work. Donald Cook, who later was--I don't think you met him or know him.

MG: I know who he is, but I haven't met him.

IG: Donald Cook was with the SEC at the time, and he was really the I guess you'd call the counsel to the committee, but he was really running this investigating committee. I interviewed with him and the final selection was made by him, I'd say.

So my work consisted of trying to find out what the navy was doing in its construction work at the shipyards and repair work. Several interesting things flowed from that, but they really had nothing to do with Johnson. Johnson's injunction to us was, "Go out, find out all you can, report to us as to what you think can be done to improve it." The only rule he had was: you don't have to change a word, but if you're going to criticize navy personnel or their operations, let them read it first, so if they wanted an answer they would be prepared to either give it to you at that time or later on down the line. Which I thought was due process in the finest sense of the word. [There was] no obligation

to change anything, but if you had missed something or they wanted to show you something, of course you would look at it. I cannot recall a single incident where anybody asked us to change anything. I heard them defend their position as to why they did this. For example, we found great disparity in the cost of the same operation in one shipyard as against another. Same operation. Something new in the field of radar would come along, and you'd put it on all of the ships of a certain kind. In some, the man-hours, the material would be worth so much money, in another it would cost a completely, tremendously different sum.

But all of these reports, I don't know whether they can be found or where they are, but they were written. We did the shipyard in Brooklyn and we went to Brooklyn. We went to Newport and did the torpedo station. And I think we went down to Charleston. I'm not sure, but we did a good deal of work in studying the Charleston situation. We also did a little work in connection with the labor relations and a little work with respect to draft deferments. People could get draft deferments by working in a naval installation.

We had an office, and I would see Johnson quite often during this period. He would want any reports as to what we were doing, how we were doing it, what were we finding and so forth. I also met some other members on the committee, including Vinson, who was quite a character, who had a big spittoon and chewed tobacco. Every time he'd chew and let loose one, I'd figure he was going to miss it, but he hit it every time I ever met him.

But anyway, it was an interesting experience. Now maybe that isn't clear but . . . .

MG: No, it is. Marvelous. Well, what were Lyndon Johnson's connections with the Navy Department? Did he have pretty good pull there?

IG: He was very well respected by the navy, I think. I think that Carl Vinson, who was from an inland city, a little town of Milledgeville, Georgia, I think he depended on Johnson as I think a lot of people depended on Johnson, because he was a very hard worker. He tried to find out what Vinson wanted the committee to do and [he would] go out and get the job done. Whether he did it himself or the people that he picked to do the job, myself excluded, I think were in the main extremely adequate choices. He had Donald Cook, who is a very brilliant man, right at his side to help him. Now Cook I think had been recommended by other people to Johnson, but I don't know anything about that except just pure hearsay. I think that Cook was known, for example, to [William O.] Douglas and to people in the SEC. But really, this is beyond my ken of absolute knowledge.

MG: But in the Navy Department, the admirals and the higher-ups there, who would he go to, say, to get you detailed to his committee staff?

IG: Oh, I can't answer that question except that I would think that once the committee was set up, a letter from him to the chief of personnel saying that Irving L. Goldberg, so and so, "I would very much like him detached from his present assignment, in order that he can assist in this operation." I must say that one advantage of this was the fact that it cost the government less money in the sense than he had a staff. The navy was paying me.

MG: To investigate it.

IG: That's right. But they didn't know this. I always appeared in civilian clothes. We went through this whole thing. Until at the very end--I don't think any one of them ever knew. I'd go in and generally would be a spokesman and say, "My name is Goldberg and I represent the subcommittee on naval affairs. We wanted to do a study of so-and-so, and would you make arrangements for us to talk to the following people?" And [I asked to see] the following documents and so forth. I don't think anyone knew that any of the staff--and there were about six or eight of us, I don't know--were actually in the navy. I don't think that was any big deal. I think that was almost a routine matter, once that committee was set up. I never thought that amounted to anything.

Now during the Korean episode I went back. I don't know if the records show this. But I went back. He asked eight of us, I think, to go back. Picked up a couple of other people. One of them became a federal judge, Joe Sheehy.

MG: Joe Sheehy.

IG: In Tyler. And Paul Popple, who's in the State Department, he was, may be retired by now. We were in teams of two. Paul and I went out to the West Coast and did the marine base in San Diego, the naval station in San Diego, and we did Fort Ord in Monterey and we did Roberts near the Salinas Valley, mid-California. In that case I was practicing law. He called me one night and he said, "Well, you want to be patriotic again?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "I want you to give a month of your time to the government." This time he was senator. He told me

that he wanted the morale of the draftees investigated. Was this in my prior [interview]?

MG: Not in great detail though.

IG: So I went up to Washington and we were briefed by some people in the navy as to where we were going and so forth. It was an interesting experience. One interesting event occurred that I will always recall. It was very informative to me. One of the things--first thing I found out after a day or two, that if you interview them for morale purposes, people in the navy, you don't want any braid there. So I hit upon the device of entering a barracks and then I, in a loud stentorian voice, would say, "Admiral Jones" or "Captain Smith" or what have you, "Will you please leave?" That immediately gave me more authority than he had, and I would say I was representing the Senate committee and so forth.

In the course of our many studies, the only thing that we were finding that was giving us any concern was shortage of food among the black troops. It really puzzled me. We devised every method we knew. We ate with them. I checked out all the commissaries to see how much butter, how much bread, how many pounds of beef, everything that went to a white man and a black. This was an all-black unit because it was National Guard, and at that time the National Guard was black. This was a California group. I could not figure it [out]; I was completely confounded. Paul Popple was with me.

So I finally went to the general, I guess, whoever was head of Camp Roberts--this was at Camp Roberts. I told him very frankly why I was puzzled. He said, "I don't understand it." I showed him what I had. Finally I said to him, "What is the highest ranking black officer

that you have in the National Guard here?" He said, "Colonel So-and-so." I said, "Well, I want to see him." So he called him up and told him that my name was Goldberg, was representing the Senate committee, and I wanted to see him.

I went over. I can't remember the man's name. I told him. He looked at me a long, long time. He said, "I can answer your question but I don't want you to go back to Washington and make a big stir about it, because it isn't worth it. There is an answer." I said, "If the answer is not any discriminatory concept, I don't know why I would have to make a big deal out of it. But I'm not going to tell you that if I found out that they were discriminating against black troops in the dispensation of food that I'm not going to say something about it. But if it's something else that I just can't figure out--" He said, "It's in that category. I won't make the promise. I'll take a chance on your judgment." I said, "Well, that's what you'll have to do."

He said, "Did you eat lunch with them today?" I said, "Yes." He said, "What did they have for lunch?" I said, "Canned peaches." I'll never forget that. He said, "How many pieces of bread per man do your figures show they had a day?" I had the figures, I don't know, three or four a day. He said, "Now, the problem here is, these people I've been used to, you think black people have canned peaches for dessert? That doesn't fill them. That's not the kind of food they're used to. They're used to eating a half a loaf of bread a day. Let me tell you something. Young man," he said then, "I was in World War I. This same thing happened. It's their dietary habits. So it will all pass. But you go back to Washington and make a big blast, I don't know what will

happen. They'll get a special kind of food and then we're going to have real trouble. I can assure you that this is not a permanent condition. When they've been in this army another two or three months, they'll adjust to this food." That was one of those not great historic moments, but it was very interesting to me. I learned something by that.

But anyway, I don't think it took any influence for Johnson to get anyone transferred to this unit. It was temporary.

Now on the Korean thing though, he said I was going to be in a month. I said, "Suppose something happens to you?" He said, "Well, would you take a chance if I got Sam Rayburn to say that if I didn't get you out he would?" I said, "Sure. I'll take a chance that both of you aren't going to die in a month." So he laughed, we laughed. Rayburn was in the car with us when this conversation came up. I went to his house for dinner I remember. I was driving out there. Rayburn said, "I don't know why you come out there working for him, but if you're up here, if he won't get you out, I'll get you out. I know it's a volunteer operation." Then he laughed. That was not important.

Anything else on this I'll be glad to answer.

MG: Did he ever talk about his experiences overseas in Australia?

IG: No. No. Not at all. I can't remember any conversation about that at all.

MG: Do you remember talking about meeting MacArthur?

IG: Oh, if he did it was not anything that was important. I think he might have made a statement that "Bird ran the office very well while I was gone." He might have made a statement which you see in all sorts of biographies, which he might have made to me, too, because I know that's

the way he felt about it. That was about all. I never discussed it with him.

MG: He seems to have been very interested in the Corpus Christi Naval Air Station.

IG: Well, I went to Corpus with him once. I can remember that it was about the time of Hiroshima, because we got on a plane in Dallas to go to Corpus and he had gotten a telephone call in the Hotel Adolphus. Whenever he got a call I would always step out of the office. He never said anything about the call and I didn't say anything to him, of course. But when we got in the airplane and we were airborne he said, "Now sit beside me, because I'm going to let you listen in on one of these earphones." It was, I think as I recall it, Truman on the air announcing something about Hiroshima. Now who he talked to, I never asked him and he never told me. But he knew. He knew to listen. We got down to Corpus, and as far as I knew, in Corpus all we did there was to ride around and he would ask them when this was built, and when was that built, and how was it operating. He'd ask just the questions that anybody looking at an installation like that would be interested in, what kind of an operation were they conducting down there.

MG: He seemed very concerned about morale in places like that, too. Did he ever raise [that issue]?

IG: Well, at that time nothing was said to me that would indicate that he [was concerned about morale]. He was more interested that that be a good station because it was a Texas station and he wanted it, as he wanted everything to be that he had anything to do with, operated in the highest tradition. But I never heard that anything was askew about

that; he never discussed it with me. I remember this going down to that naval station is not connected with Korea, you see. That's different. I wasn't investigating morale as a matter of assignment in the first thing. I was really looking at what was Corpus doing, what were they operating, kind of a thing.

MG: Another thing that seems to have disturbed him, and I want to ask you if this is the case throughout these investigations during World War II, and that was duplication of services.

IG: Oh, yes.

MG: Can you elaborate on that?

IG: Well, that's really why we were organized in the first investigation. He had the feeling--and it was a correct one--he couldn't prove it, but he had the feeling that Philadelphia would never tell Charleston how it was doing. And that was the truth. There was not a good communication between the two. As I told you, they were putting new things on the navy ships, but no one told anybody else that that's the most efficient way to do it. The records of the navy were simply unbelievably bad with respect to their draft defermency. They could get the right numbers, but they couldn't match the names. I remember [Burton] Wheeler just raising Cain when he was senator about this. I had problems with that. Finally I asked a friend of mine, Buz Necados[?], who was a real statistician from Princeton, to come give me a little course in basic statistics. Well, that's impossible! You know it wasn't, but you got two hundred and fifty thousand names, you've got the numbers right but the names don't match. You know, you wondered "how does this work?"

But that sort of thing worried him, and it worried him that they were not equally efficient. Also, he was very much intrigued when I told him that it took, I forget the time, three-and-a-half, three years or four years, I can't remember it now, from the time that a navy ship of any size hit the water to know how much it cost. Also, they had the most outmoded system of accounting known to man. One of the great achievements of Johnson which is very rarely mentioned is that he was very central in merging the Department of Defense. And one of the great motivating factors back of this was that in connection with this you changed the whole accounting system of the Defense Department. The costing process, the comparisons and so forth, were much easier to get at when you had the navy with five bureaus and the army with I don't know how it was divided up, but certainly into divisions, and nobody telling or comparing it. It got to be just a jungle, a jungle of numbers. I'm sure there are many reasons why the merger of the three departments into the Defense [Department] was successful, but I think one of the great results was this accounting [system].

MG: What role did he play in that unification?

IG: Well, I know that he was strongly for it. He thought from all purposes, operational, in the field, it made sense. He thought that the main tie of distribution made sense. He thought that the managerial functions at the civilian--I call them civilian--part of the armed forces would be more efficiently run because it followed a more corporate analogy than the other. That's all I know. Now what he did politically to achieve it, I don't know. I had the feeling that because of his close relationship with Vinson--Vinson was very fond of him. Vinson's over

here in the House, he's in the Senate, this also helped, because he was a Vinson boy, so to speak, when he was in the House. I think that was helpful politically. But what he did, I can't tell you. That was after my time. When were they merged, do you remember the year?

MG: Late forties, I don't know.

IG: Yes. See, I'd gone then. But he had a background by this time.

MG: He introduced a work-or-fight bill--do you recall that--that would address absenteeism in the war-critical industries.

IG: I don't remember the bill, but I can remember that he asked me if our analysis showed what the absenteeism *in* the navy was, and we did a study of that. I don't recall now whether we had done it before he suggested it or afterwards. But we did have a chart or two that would show, and it would show in comparison, yards, and it would show as I remember it, functions. So that would indicate [levels of absenteeism]. I had not thought about that; this is the first time it's been mentioned to me since I was there. But he did; he was interested. I don't remember the bill.

MG: Did you take a look at the Brown shipbuilding situation in Houston, the Brown brothers?

IG: Never was in it. In fact, I don't think I ever met anybody in connection with that. Never went there, had nothing to do with it.

MG: There he seems to have felt that one of the main problems was labor, labor problems, absenteeism, strikes, things like that.

IG: Well, it could have been, but that he never mentioned to me, and I wouldn't know anything about it. This work bill is an interesting concept that I never heard of.

MG: Did he have a good relationship with Jim Forrestal?

IG: Yes. I don't know that they were intimate, but they were good [friends], yes, I like to think so. At that time [John] Connally was a good friend of his. I think that Connally, when he came back--he was in the navy--I think worked around or near--didn't he work in or near the Forrestal operation? I think he did. But I didn't know anything--I don't think I ever had to go see Forrestal in my work. The only man that I talked to was the under secretary or assistant named Ralph Bard. I did go to see him on a couple of matters but I really contacted mostly the chiefs of the bureaus of the navy: chief of ordinance, Bureau of Ships. Because I was telling them the things we were interested in and where we were going to find out about it. Because I always felt that I didn't want to walk into a yard and say, "My name is so-and-so." If they were cleaning it up, I'd find out when I got there. I didn't have to have any--to go there. I figured it was only fair they knew I was coming.

MG: Did he participate in any of these investigations? Did he go off?

IG: No. No, he never went. He kept up with where we were going, and he knew exactly where we were and what we were doing. We'd tell Cook very often. Cook would take me to his office, quite often, take some of the other men with him, and we would tell him what we were doing and how we were going about it. And as I said, the only real instructions that he ever gave me, he said, "Cook will brief you on how you should do it," but he said, "There's only one thing I'm going to tell you, whatever you write about anybody, you show it to him before you put it in there. You don't have to change a word. I never ask you to do that."

MG: Did any of your investigations of shipyards in other states or other districts create any problems for him with the congressmen involved?

IG: Well, if they did he never said anything about it. I can also tell you--I know enough about how an office is run--he never bucked a letter to us to write, to answer. So my answer to that would have to be on the evidence, circumstantial as it is, that it must not have been a problem. I don't think it was. You've got to remember, in those days people wanted to see us win the war. They weren't awfully worried about this or that or the other thing. Oh, we had a few people that--not that I had a connection with him, I had more problems with that when I was with the general counsel's office where you had recalcitrant producers. But that had nothing to do with Johnson; that was with the general counsel's office.

MG: Did you ever have any insight as to his relationship with Walter Winchell in helping Winchell out when the Navy Department was after him?

IG: Never knew that he had a relationship with Winchell.

MG: In this absenteeism, work-or-fight bill that he was promoting, he would use the statistical argument that so many destroyers and so many cruisers were being sunk--or so many men were absent--that with a full work force they could have built this many more. It's the equivalent of the Germans sinking fourteen destroyers.

IG: I don't know how--those figures were not developed by us. If they were developed, they were developed somewhere else. What he could have picked up from us was how much absenteeism there was in the yards. But we didn't attempt such a transfer.

MG: Was he active in the presentation of these awards for shipbuilding or anything of this nature?

IG: If so, I don't know anything about that.

MG: How about renegotiation of contracts? Was this an issue that you all worked with?

IG: No, I was not involved in that at all. No, the only thing I had to do with that was when I was also in the general counsel's office. It had nothing to do with this and Johnson was not involved.

MG: Another thing he appears to have had some interest in was the role of the Navy Department in censorship.

IG: You mean in what it was doing, how it was operating and so forth? I would not know about that. We would not be involved in that. I knew nothing of it, if it's true.

MG: Another item, the navy's use of able-bodied naval personnel in clerical jobs.

IG: Yes. He was interested in our study of that. He wanted us to find out. These people--were they really mechanics or did they just make them mechanics so they didn't have any active duty to perform? Yes. We had figures. We had figures. We had statistics on that. I don't know where they are.

MG: He really took the Navy Department to task on this one. Who was it? McNabb[?], was that the head of the--?

IG: I think that's right. Yes. That's right. That name strikes a familiar tone. We did our statistics, however, internally. We would ask a fellow, "How long did you do this before you were in the navy?" In other words, you got a lot of guys that learn on the job, so to speak.

So, yes, that's interesting. I hadn't thought about it. Yes, he would have gotten some of that from us. That's a different type of thing than what you had been talking about before.

MG: Right. Sure. Was this particular investigation one that you initiated?

IG: Well, a lot of this would come not so much from him, but from Donald. Donald would talk to him much more than I would talk to him, and Donald would come down--Cook--and talk to me. We'd figure out how we could do it or the best way to do it. Donald was a very smart and ingenious person. Between us and the other people on the staff we would get it done. I would say he let us operate through Donald more.

Johnson was the type of man, once you earned his confidence, it was given completely. He never checked to see how you were doing it, never had that I ever knew anything about. He expected you to do what you were supposed to do and do it. His success or whatever, however you want to measure it, I think is in large measure measurable by whether he was good or bad in his choice of people. I think he benefitted more from people working with him and under him than any man I have ever known, and I've been in law firms, head of a law firm. He could get more *out of* and benefit more *by*, and I think this is a personality trait more than anything else. You never went in there but what you didn't feel that you had his absolute loyalty and respect of your judgment. I found later in life I think it's better than anything, it's the best technique you can use. I have law clerks. The more confidence I show in them the more competence they show. Now once in a while you get a lazy one or you'll get a guy who don't care. That's the exception, and that's easy, you can find that out very quickly, and you do something

about it very quickly. You let them know you're depending on them and the whole legal system is going to collapse if they don't do it right. This is the way to do it.

MG: What about his role in hearings? The Naval Affairs Committee and the subcommittee conducted hearings. Did you ever watch him?

IG: No. And this operation of ours was done, we did it as a research project. We would write and support by tables, computations, quotations from people, write it up, show it to him. He would show it to the members of his subcommittee, and I suppose eventually to the committee. [I was] never asked to come. But it was written up. I think one time he asked me, I think he said, "Would you mind taking this over to Senator Saltonstall's office?" No, this was in the Korean thing. I get them mixed sometimes. "Go over and let him read this." He said, "Stay around. If he's got any questions to ask, let him ask them." Saltonstall was in the Senate at that time. That was in the Korean thing.

Other than that I don't ever remember--except going to Vinson. Now I would go to Vinson and say, "Mr. Chairman, we finished this report, and Congressman Johnson wanted you to see it." [inaudible] He used that spittoon.

MG: Vinson had a reputation for really ruling that committee with an iron hand. Did he?

IG: Well, as far as I was concerned he was Mr. Committeeman, yes, that's right. I think that's right. When I went in there I didn't have any doubt, except for Johnson, I was talking to the boss. But Lyndon was like the boss's right arm. If Lyndon said it was right, it was right.

MG: So he didn't come into conflict with Vinson?

IG: Never. I don't think I ever--not only did I ever see it experienced, if anyone told me that, I would completely disbelieve it. He'd have to prove it to me. I just don't believe it happened. You're right to the extent of suggesting that Vinson ran the show pretty much. Yes, I think that's right. It's very interesting, because to me as a general philosophy, I suppose, his charge of the navy, really, he had no naval experience, came from an inland city, was just marvelous. But anyway, he knew everything about the navy. There's nothing you could ask the man he didn't know. Made a whole life study out of it.

MG: Do you recall the Elk Hill investigation?

IG: No, no. I know it, but only from history. No knowledge of it myself, know that such a thing existed.

MG: Another naval personnel problem that was investigated was the situation of overmanning a problem.

IG: Yes. We were in that, we were in that. Our investigation covered that. There again it was a statistical matter. You compare how many man-hours it took to do certain things in Philadelphia compared with Charleston, you come up with the answer. I knew about that.

But I'll tell you one story. We had the whole thing completed on the Bureau of Ships. We had the bigger one that dealt with big stuff. Admiral [Edward L.] Cochrane, a little fellow, chief. I walked in there with a--Cook wasn't there either--I was there and the rest of the staff. God it was cold, December, it was snowing, getting dark outside. As Johnson had us do, we had to show them and I said, "I wanted to bring

you this." He said, "Well, will you come and tell us in a general way what you're going to say and have my staff there?" I said, "Sure."

So we went there and we marched in. I gave them an outline, a very broad outline. He turned to me and he said, "Well, I really don't have any answer to a lot of these things that you have told me are going to be in the report. But I just wonder if you looked at the picture in the rear of this room when you came in?" "No, sir." "Well," he said, "Turn around if you don't mind and look." It was a beautiful picture of the landings at Oran with every ship, every little dinghy in place. He said, "I have one answer. Everything you see got to the right place with the right equipment at the right time, and all you can say, and you may say it with justification, is it cost more than it should." I said, "Admiral Cochrane, I have one thing more to say to you. I don't think that's a complete answer, but I'm going to put the answer in the concluding part of our report." That was the end of that meeting. I remember that was a very dramatic type of thing to me as a young man, him saying this.

Yes. He [Johnson] didn't want any [favoritism]. He wanted us to tell them just [the facts], let the facts come out as they were. If he had a lot of friends in the navy who had any influence on what he did and didn't do, it was never known to me. It was any indication we should color one thing or another. Now I'll admit, we were not investigating who was going to win the war or anything like that. We were talking about money matters.

MG: Any other staff people on the committee that you care to mention by name. Was Harry Coles on there?

IG: Is he dead? I think Harry died. Yes, Harry was on, and a guy named Clarence Kuhlman, who the last heard of was teaching economics at the school--I think it's called the Citadel, isn't it, in Charleston, South Carolina?

MG: Yes.

IG: But I think he's retired and he may even be deceased. He was older than I am, and that makes him as old as Methuselah. So I cannot say whether--Clarence Kuhlman was on and there was another man who was older, too, and I can't recall his name even. He was on. There were a couple of others. It's been so long ago I don't recall.

But I would say if Coles was living he would be very helpful. He's a lawyer. I think after he left he worked for not Averell Harriman, but Harriman Brothers in there. I have a feeling he's not living. Only would be based on something I think someone told me many years ago.

MG: Let's hope it's exaggerated.

IG: Of course.

MG: He went to Europe in May, 1945, at the close of the war. The war in Europe had just ended, and he went as part of an investigating team with Edward Herbert and Sterling Cole.

IG: Yes, and wasn't Cook on that trip?

MG: Yes.

IG: Yes. I remember the trip and that's all. I was not there. I remember Cook telling me he was going or something, that's all.

MG: Did he talk to you about the trip after his return?

IG: Except, I think--the only thing I remember him ever telling me, he said, "As usual, Cook did his usual brilliant job." Have you talked to Cook? Have you taped an oral history with Cook?

MG: Yes. I didn't do it, but it's been done.

IG: Is it a good job?

MG: Well, I think we need more on this particular period. You know, he had a long association with LBJ.

IG: Well, you'll find him a very intelligent man. I would almost wager that he would have total recall on a lot of things that I have much less recall on.

MG: Well, it was shortly after his return from Europe that Mrs. Johnson became desperately ill and you gave her a transfusion.

IG: I guess that's the time frame, although I don't recall. All I remember is, whatever my blood type is, it's sort of a rare one and she had a rare one. And of course you know the navy had a complete record of what you had. I was up working somewhere, and I got a call to immediately go to--I think it's the Georgetown Hospital, if I'm not mistaken. I don't know what hospital it was. It was not far from where we were, the old navy building, which was on Constitution Avenue, and it didn't take me long. In those days they gave transfusions on parallel--it was direct. Maybe they still do that in some extreme cases today, I don't know that. But now, you know, you get it out of a bottle for the most part. The President, as I understand it, when he was shot they put it in bottles, tubes. But that was a direct transfusion, I remember that. I guess that's what it would be called. I remember it was in early afternoon.

I think I drank some milk before or after or something and that was about it.

MG: Did you talk to LBJ on that occasion, do you recall?

IG: No, he was so worried, so excited, I don't think I'd even--as a matter of fact, I think [Walter] Jenkins is the one that told me to go and where to go and how to get there and all that. As I remember it he sent someone for me is what he did, because I didn't have a car. In those days everybody used the bus and here I was on the bus.

When I worked for the committee, however, I would work sometimes up in the office of the Congress. My family was there. He lived a little bit further out than I did. I lived at the Broadmoor, if you know anything about Washington, which is out on Connecticut. He lived, oh, you'd go eight or ten blocks and then you'd turn right and weave a little and it wasn't too far. I imagine, he took me home, oh, many, many, I'd hate to estimate the number of nights. Sometimes the Speaker would be along and Paul Porter with his stories and so forth. Some of those rides were very, very interesting. He would pass right by my [apartment] out there.

MG: He seems to have interacted a great deal socially with his staff people; he had them over for dinner and things like that.

IG: Absolutely. Just all one big family. Absolutely. In that connection I'm sure you've taken the Nichols, Phil Nichols and Dorothy. They know a great deal about that, just like Mary Rather, just members of the family.

MG: After Secretary Frank Knox died in 1944 there were rumors that LBJ might be made secretary of the navy. Do you remember this at all?

IG: That's all news to me.

MG: Did he ever talk about his visits with President Roosevelt?

IG: Nothing that I can recall, nothing that is of any mention. I don't even remember it being mentioned, but to say that he didn't, everybody wanting to know, talk about when they'd seen Roosevelt, I can't imagine that he didn't mention it. But what he mentioned didn't make any impression.

MG: Anything else that you remember about--

IG: The navy?

MG: Yes, during the World War II period?

IG: No, nothing. (Interruption)

MG: We were going to talk about Dallas politics now.

IG: One of the great mysteries to me about Johnson is the fact that he would not accept the fact, and it was a demonstrable fact, that Dallas County was a Republican county. He couldn't understand why he couldn't carry Dallas County or do better in Dallas County than he did, when the fact of the matter is that for years and years it has been a Republican enclave within perhaps a Democratic state. It always amazed me, and to me it was almost ludicrous, because it was so obvious. I was in Dallas when the incident occurred at the Adolphus, and all of this. All of these things add up to the fact the Dallas constituency was not a Johnson constituency.

MG: On the Adolphus episode, you discussed that at the time in your first interview. I want to ask you one more question about it. Did he recognize the political advantage that that incident was bringing to him at the time?

IG: No.

MG: He didn't?

IG: No. I would say just the opposite. He thought that this was just an insulting episode that had no rhyme or reason. I don't think his mind inverted to the political implications other than you had a bunch of people out here that were intent on creating a disturbance that might be embarrassing to him and to Mrs. Johnson on a personal basis. I don't think that he ever translated it into political terms, I really don't. I really don't. It would be just like someone slapped your wife. He was just furious. "How could anybody do this?" Not "Are we going to lose or gain a hundred?" I don't think it ever crossed his mind. It was a personal thing. I think his whole attitude toward that--he never understood it. He never understood why this could happen. Why did Dallas have this attitude toward him? He'd go around Houston, he'd go around Fort Worth, but Dallas. It's just something that he couldn't accept.

MG: Now with regard to that incident, did you ever understand the origin of it yourself?

IG: Well, the only thing, as I remember, is that we were having a hot congressional race here. It seems to me that my general hazy recollection is [Bruce] Alger might have political motivations. You see, if you start out with the assumption you've got a Republican constituency here, and here is a guy, he can make a big doings, it could rebound to his benefit. But I don't think it dawned on him that it might have a backlash against Alger. I don't think he thought of that. It could be true on one side and not true on the other side.

MG: Why was Dallas Republican?

IG: I think you ought to go to a sociologist for this or a demographer. The native-born Dallasite is a rarity. This is a mobile community. Dallas has no large manufacturers. It doesn't have people coming from the farms to man the factories. Dallas is a distribution center. A guy, he's worked for Procter & Gamble or Kohler Plumbing or whatever up in Wisconsin, or wherever it is, Minnesota, or wherever these places are, and they come down here. The little industry you have is nothing; this is not a big manufacturing operation. Did you ever drive around just to see the warehouses in and around Dallas? That tells you what kind of a city Dallas is. It's a banking center. Bankers, it used to be that the banks were inherited; the presidency was inherited from father to son to grandson. Presidency of a bank today changes every four or five years, where they get new ideas and new people. Where do they come from? If you asked where the presidents of all the banks in Dallas come from, very few of them have any connection with Texas, not even to speak of Dallas.

But listen, I'm out of my field. A sociologist could give you this. Dallas I would say was the least Texan of all of the metropolitan cities. Now they're different. San Antonio has a Texas flavor for one thing; Houston has it for another. Most of Houston are either living there or they come from the little towns around. Or like the hometown I was born in, Port Arthur, it's Louisiana, it's southern and western Louisiana. It's not really Texan. You've got to look to see what you're talking about in these terms. People tell me the vote is going to be so-and-so in Dallas, and of course the black community is--you

see, you get a different polarization, too, here, it depends on who the establishment is. It would be very interesting to see how many people holding political office in Dallas of any consequence were born and reared here and relate it to other parts of Texas.

MG: In Houston, Johnson was able to get the support of a lot of the business leaders there, financial support and backing. Was he able to make similar inroads in Dallas?

IG: To my knowledge very, very little.

MG: Did he try?

IG: I assumed that he tried, but if he tried I knew nothing of it and it didn't work. I remember one time somebody called me--I think it was Walter Jenkins--and said, "We're getting up a list of people to call in Dallas, our friends down there." I could furnish him some names, but they were a long way from the establishment. There weren't any binoculars that you could use whereby one could see the other. That's a long step. That would be one test. We had one banker here by the name of [R. L.] Thornton he had some relationships with.

MG: Didn't H. L. Hunt support him for a while in 1960 maybe?

IG: I don't know if he did or he didn't. But H. L. Hunt, he was a rich man, he had a lot of prejudices, but he wasn't really a part of the establishment, I don't think. Maybe others wouldn't agree with that.

MG: Well, who were Johnson's key supporters here in Dallas? Was it Bill Clark--

IG: Bill Clark and people like Fenton Baker, who had the Baker Hotel, and a fellow named Smith, who was the--oh, what was his name? I'm not talking about the head of the airlines.

MG: Oh, Robert J. Smith?

IG: Yes, Robert Smith. You could count the people who were in the establishment--most of his supporters here were young, upcoming, struggling lawyers. When I went over to get the few votes over in--I didn't have any establishment man ride over there with me. There wasn't anybody. I'd have to think who would go. Bob Clark. There are just a very, very few people in Dallas that I could name that were supporters.

MG: One of the characteristics of Lyndon Johnson was that he seems to have tried doubly hard to win over people who were his adversaries.

IG: Yes.

MG: Can you recall any specific examples where he tried to build bridges with some of the Dallas establishment?

IG: Well, he'd come up, make some speeches. Sometimes some of us would call some people and try to get them to come out. I can't really remember whether many of them came out. All I can tell you is, you can look to the election returns. I don't think you'll find that he ever did very well here. It's just one of those things. I can understand it, but you've got to live in Dallas to know what kind of a community it is. Today Republican candidates, Ford, Nixon, you name them, just carry this county by a tremendous vote. And yet interestingly enough, while our black population is not large--I think the percentage is around 20, which is not extremely low--and he gets most of that. So that means he didn't get much of the rest. There's when you get down to it.

Now Bob Strauss was my old law partner, and in those days Bob was a struggling lawyer. Yes, he would work for him; he wasn't part of the real political powers in Dallas. I had a law partner who was a very

good politician by the name of Martin Winfrey who supported him and helped him. He was not young, he was a little older than I was. I don't think he really courted them in any way, I really don't think. Yet he expected them to vote for him. It was one of those--I never understood it.

MG: Did he ever try to moderate the opposition of the ***Dallas Morning News***?

IG: If he did I didn't know a damn thing about it. I remember when Barefoot Sanders was running for Congress--it may be in this other thing, I don't know, but if it is I'll repeat it--and I was just furious, the ***News*** was just writing horrible editorials about [how they] can't stand him. Lyndon was coming to town and called me. Anyway, I brought Sanders up there. I said, "I want to ask you something. This is what they had been saying about him in the news. I want to buy an ad and say it's a damn lie, a bunch of damn lies." He shook his head, he said, "One thing I don't guess you'll ever learn, newspaper's got that last word. You're just wasting your money; you're throwing it down the drain."

MG: You said that to him?

IG: I said. Yes. Because they've got the last word. I was furious because what they were saying--I thought--about Barefoot wasn't right and wasn't fair. My only idea of a way you could beat it I thought was to buy, like [Congressman Jim] Wright did over in Fort Worth, ***Star-Telegram***, buy an ad. I would have published, "***Dallas News*** was not telling the truth." He said, "Oh, no." I remember him saying, "Irving, I thought you were smarter than that. That's no good. That won't work because they've got the last word." I said, "Yes, I guess you're right." That's the way it happened.

One thing I'll say about Lyndon, I always wanted to say it, he knew how to be a friend and he knew how he expected you to be a friend, and it's an art. A lot of people look upon it as quid pro quo, but it isn't really quid pro quo. You don't put it on the scales, "I'm going to do this for you today, you do that for me tomorrow." This is the thing that very, very few people in all the writing that I've read, the thing that I always wanted somebody to say. They always put it in a minor key. They'll talk about how he cussed his staff on Monday and sent a little present on Tuesday. It seems to me that's simply illustrative of something a whole lot deeper. He really loved that person, and that's what makes a friendship. And we carried on and on and on. His friends remained constant, unless they proved to be absolute traitors, and then damn near had to do it. The people who were his friends to begin with, he lost very few of them that I know of. Now, I'm not talking about Vietnam because there you're in an issue-oriented thing; that's a different thing. Yet his friends even who might have disagreed with him on that loved him so much, in my opinion, that they didn't even tell him. That may have been the moment of tragedy. The loss was that even if you could reason out that it was wrong, you knew to begin with that you couldn't convince him. But you didn't want to hurt him, because you knew he would never hurt you. It's almost like a paternal or maternal relationship. I've tried not to get into Oedipus or Freudian or anything; it's more simple than that, it's a simplistic thing.

I saw a man the other day that came up to me, he said, "You haven't seen me I guess in I don't know how many years." I looked at

him, I said, "I know I've seen you, but I'm going to be honest with you, I don't [remember your name]." He said, "I was the man that flew the helicopter around for the President running for the Senate."

MG: Joe Mashman, I guess that was.

IG: Yes. The tears almost came to his eyes when he was talking about the man. He'd seen him under all conditions and. . . . That's about all. That's as good a way as I know to close this thing as I can think of, sir.

MG: Well, Judge, I certainly do appreciate it.

IG: Anything I can do more, I'll be glad to. Why don't you send this to me? Let me read this with the other and then if I want to I'll tie it together and do something. How will that be?

MG: Great. Thank you so much.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II

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