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INTERVIEW I

DATE: January 3, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: PHIL G. GOULDING

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE [McSWEENY]

PLACE: Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

P: This interview is with Phil G. Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Today is Friday, January 3, 1969, and it's approximately eleven a. m. in the morning. We are in Mr. Goulding's Pentagon Offices and this is Dorothy Pierce.

Mr. Goulding, you have had a long career as a newspaperman from 1947 to 1965 with the Cleveland Plain Dealer, of which a majority of this time--from 1950 to 1965--you were assigned to the Washington Bureau and covered both Washington congressional and political moves and then the last seven years of this, as military correspondent for the Cleveland Plain Dealer. In 1965 you first came to the Defense Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs under your predecessor, Arthur Sylvester. In February 1967 you were nominated and approved for your present position, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. You reside at 7210 Glenbrook Road in Bethesda, Maryland. Is all of this background information correct?

G: It's all correct. I think it needs a very minor addition. In the fifteen years that I spent in Washington with the Plain Dealer, it is correct that the first seven I specialized in political and congressional reporting, and the last seven or eight in military affairs. However, during the last seven or eight, as well, all of us in the Bureau--and there were three at one time and four at another time--continued to cover politics

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in the sense that we all went to the political conventions in '56, '60, and '64. We all covered the political campaigns, so that my military experience as a newspaperman the last seven years or so was interrupted by the presidential conventions and campaigns. Aside from that, it sounds reasonably accurate.

P: I'd like to begin back with your newspaper career and draw some of your answers from reflecting back upon that time. Did you have any contact either during your military affairs period or political congressional news reporting with Lyndon Johnson?

G: Yes. Not very much contact. I covered the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings when the President was chairman of that committee, and when Cy Vance, as a matter of fact, came down from New York as Counsel. I believe those hearings were after Sputnik, if I recall correctly, which was when--October '57? I saw a great deal of the President as a newsman covering the hearings. I had some personal contact with him, as any reporter covering Capitol Hill would, in background sessions occasionally, or lunches occasionally, or simply in interviewing him in his office. But that was relatively minor. I was not assigned on a full-time basis to cover Congress, and I did not know him nearly as well as some of the reporters--such as Sam Scheaffer of Newsweek, who did nothing but cover, not only Congress, but nothing but cover the Senate. So my relationship with him was as a reporter covering a figure in public office. There was nothing intimate about the relationship.

P: Do any one of these particular times stand out in your mind, or have any particular impact or importance to you?

G: No, I think not. I was, in fact, a Bob Taft Republican most of my life.

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I was impressed, as I think most newsmen were, by the fairness with which Mr. Johnson--then-Senator Johnson--acted while President Eisenhower was in the White House. I think that he displayed a tremendous amount of patriotism and a great lack of political partisanship during those years. I think--this is certainly now a novel idea of mine; it's one that's widely accepted by both friends and foes of President Johnson. He did an outstanding job as Majority Leader--that was my impression. He had an uncanny knack of getting a Southern conservative and a Northern liberal in the Senate voting for the same bill for totally different reasons. I think I was impressed by that. There was nothing in any personal relationship with him that impressed me because our personal relationship was not that close.

P: During any of this period, were you involved in any examinations or coverage of what we were doing in Viet Nam in the late '50's?

G: In the late '50's--I certainly did not go to Viet Nam in the late '50's. I did write a long series of stories--which I had forgotten until now--after a great many talks with Mike Mansfield, who I think was more interested in Viet Nam in those days than anyone in the Senate. He would go to Viet Nam as part of a Senate task force and would come back and make very lengthy reports on Viet Nam to his committee. I took three or four or five weeks at one stage back there in the '50's and attempted to become, at least, a Washington newspaper expert, and did a long series of pieces on Viet Nam. I'd forgotten about them, and I have no idea where they are now.

P: Did you arrive at any conclusions or ideas about Viet Nam during that period?

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G: If I did, I've forgotten them now.

P: Such as, should we be there?

G: Well, at that time I don't think that was the issue. You know, we were not there in so much strength that anybody was really paying any attention, as I recall, to whether we should be there or not. The study Senator Mansfield was doing was what this war is all about, and how it seems to be going, I think, rather than anything to do with U.S. p rticipation. We had a small mission that was rather taken for granted, I think.

P: To continue this chronologically, did you have any association with Mr. Johnson during his Vice Presidency? Let me back us up. What about the campaign of 1960? You must have covered that.

G: I covered the campaign of 1960, and the campaign of 1964, although by 1964 we were doing more moving around the country without the candidate--we on the Plain Dealer--than we were actually traveling with the candidate as we had in past campaigns. In 1960, I don't believe I saw anything of President Johnson when he was running with Jack Kennedy, as the Vice Presidential candidate. We paid no attention to the Vice Presidential candidates at all. We didn't have the manpower to. I saw him as a reporter, at the convention in Los Angeles, when he arrived there [and] had a couple of press conferences in the delegate-wooing period before the balloting. I remember that two or three of us tried to pressure him to tell us just how many delegates he had when he and his campaign managers were making claims of lots of delegates. We doubted that he really had that many, which is, I think, a perfectly proper way for a candidate to behave before the convention.

In 1964 I did make some trips with President Johnson as a reporter,

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covering some of his campaigning, but not more than four or five trips at two or three days each. I spent much more time drifting around the country on my own, feeling people's pulses.

P: In 1960 were you particularly caught offguard at Jack Kennedy's nomination of his running mate as Mr. Johnson?

G: No, I was not caught offguard by it. It seemed to me, before it happened, to be a very definite possibility. Many then were writing that it was ridiculous to think that anybody in the powerful position of Majority Leader would consider accepting the Vice Presidency--which at that time did not have the status and stature it has achieved since--partly, of course, due to the assassination of President Kennedy, and that thought being much more in people's minds now. But I felt then--and I was certainly not alone, there were many who so felt--that the Majority Leadership of the Senate is one kind of a job when the opposition party is in the White House, and is a totally different kind of a job when one's own party is in the White House and administration policy is made by the President of the United States. I think there are few cases in history of strong Majority Leaders of the same party as the man occupying the White House. It seemed to me that the power position that Senator Johnson had as Majority Leader under a Republican president would not at all be the same thing as Majority Leader under a Democratic president. So it did not surprise me that he was willing to give up the Majority Leadership to be a Vice Presidential candidate.

P: In other words, if I read you correctly, it was almost necessary for him to be the Vice Presidential candidate in order to win the race. If he

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did not do it, there was a greater possibility of Mr. Kennedy's losing and then he'd be a Majority Leader to a Republican President.

G: No, you've gone one step beyond my thinking. I was assuming in his mind a Kennedy victory when he accepted the Vice Presidential nomination. You're suggesting that he could have not been on the ticket, and then there would have been more chance of Nixon winning. Then he still would have been a Democratic Majority Leader in a Republican Administration. I don't know whether that many steps went through his mind or not.

P: Did you have any contact on your reporting status with Mr. Johnson as Vice President?

G: Practically none. I was with a group of reporters two or three times who had sessions with him. But again, I think, in small bureaus of three or four here in Washington, the manpower is just not thick enough to concentrate very much on any Vice President. I had very, very little. No private sessions with him that I can recall at any time during my entire reporting career. I just did not know him that well.

P: You've practically answered my next question of during the Presidency which would be '63 to '65.

G: During the Presidency from '63 to '65, again, I was by then--In fact during most of this time I was covering the Pentagon basically. I went to White House press conferences, but another man in our bureau was covering the White House. The other man traveled with the President wherever he went, as the White House people do. I did not, and I had no contact with him whatever aside from being a participant in his press conferences.

P: Let me back this up just one moment. You were covering the Pentagon during the '62 Cuban missile crisis--

G: I was actually sick at that particular time, but I was covering the

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Pentagon during the Cuban missile crisis.

P: Do you have any thoughts about that in retrospect?

G: Well, I have heard Secretary McNamara's accounts of the Cuban missile crisis at great length since I have come into the building. I consider those to be privileged and confidential conversations, and would not want to go into what I have heard Mr. McNamara say about the Cuban missile crisis in any way.

My own on-the-spot knowledge was simply as another reporter. I was ill during part of it, and was here during part of it. I think we knew so little in the newspaper world at that time of what was going on, and I might say quite properly so, that I think it's impossible for anyone who was here in the Pentagon--any newspaperman who was here in the Pentagon--during those days to have any kind of a valuable assessment of the situation. I don't think we had enough facts while it was happening. Now a lot of people have made deep studies of it in retrospect. I have not.

P: Was you assessment on what information you had very different from what you came to understand after being here in the Pentagon?

G: Well, I don't know if it was very different. I think the basic thought of the gathering of adequate military power to perform a task, and then the application of that power in the most restrained possible way--I think those were the factors that made a success of the United States operation at that time. I think we all noted as reporters that this was successfully happening. But I would think that I did not at that time spell it out in those philosophical terms, and think, "The reason that this is happening along these lines, and successfully for the United States, is

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that we have adopted this principle of really a massive collection of military force with a very controlled and limited application of that force." Which I think is the great--I don't know if it's a lesson learned, but it's the successful lesson of the Cuban missile crisis.

P: Who was most instrumental in bringing you into the Defense Department?

G: Cyrus Roberts Vance.

P: What did he say to convince you to leave the newspaper business and come into government?

G: That's a long story. I had known Cy Vance since he came to Washington in '57 or '58 to work with then-Senator Johnson in the Preparedness Subcommittee. I'd seen considerably more of him in after-committee question periods, as a reporter, than I had Senator Johnson, who was the Chairman. We became at that time acquaintances. When President Kennedy's Administration came in [and] Secretary Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense, Mr. Vance was brought in as General Counsel.

In those first few months--first few weeks actually--Secretary McNamara made the determination that he wanted to know exactly how much he could change the building and the structure of the Defense Department without going to Congress. He had no objections to going to Congress for additional authority and power and for changes in the law. But the first thing he wanted was to get some picture drawn for him of what changes he could make within existing law. To get such information he turned to his lawyer, or his General Counsel, who was Cy Vance.

Because of that, Cy Vance played a very, very major role in the McNamara changes that first year; and he worked hand-in-glove with McNamara during that time. Those of us who were in the reporting

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business covering the Pentagon saw that this was so. So we zeroed in--two or three of us at least, Dick Fryklund, who was with the Washington Evening Star, and Dan Henkin, who was editor of the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, and myself--zeroed in on Cy as someone who knew very well what was going on, someone in whom Mr. McNamara had great faith and trust; and in my case, someone with whom I had had some previous relationship. So a reporter-official relationship developed over the next two or three years. Mr. McNamara, true to his own policy of management, promoted from within, and promoted Cy from General Counsel to Secretary of the Army. I continued to see a good bit of him as Secretary of the Army. He took a trip to the Far East in 1964 in the fall. Dick Fryklund and I asked him if he would take us along with him. He was going to Army installations throughout the Western Pacific and the Far East. He hoped he'd get to Viet Nam, although he did not get to Viet Nam. By the time the trip was over, Cy and I were--by this time we had become friends--and by the time the trip was over, we had become still closer friends.

Subsequent to that we discussed the possibility of me coming into the Defense Department. I told him first that I did not have any desire to do so, that I was happy in the newspaper business, that I had never thought of joining the Defense Department. But that conversation led to other conversations. He, I later learned, talked to Secretary McNamara. Eventually, after several meetings, and several lunches with both Cy and Bob, I decided that I would leave the newspaper business and come to work for the Pentagon. Arthur Sylvester was, of course, later involved in those discussions as well, since he was to be my immediate superior. But

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the initial notion was Cy's.

P: What was your feeling regarding the changes that did take place--that were instituted by Mr. McNamara--from the outside point of view?

G: From either the outside point of view, or the inside point of view, I think most of them were badly needed changes. I think Bob McNamara is a management expert. I think he's a management genius, in a dozen different ways. He was paid as such as the first non-Ford ever to be president of the Ford Motor Company. I think that, without any question, this building badly needed overhauling, and it needed someone of his strength to do the job. From the press corps of those years, as well as the press corps of today, or people within the building today, I think this is the generally accepted fact. There are critics of McNamara for various reasons, but I think you won't find many of those among the press who cover the building so far as his management techniques are concerned or the changes that he brought about in the management of the building.

P: Mr. Goulding, since 1965 have you served on the task force, committees, boards outside the Defense Department?

G: Outside of the Defense Department--none whatever. I haven't had time to serve on any outside the Defense Department. It's an eighty-hour a week.

P: Since your appointment, have you become closer acquainted with President Johnson?

G: Well, not really, no. I haven't seen that much of the President. I have been to a few meetings at the White House--quite a few meetings at the White House, but only a very few at which the President has been present. I see him socially occasionally and he shakes hands and says nice things. But this is not a job that requires or demands very

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much personal contact with the President. I think very few jobs in this building are of that type but certainly this one is not.

P: Have you ever traveled with, or for, the President?

G: I have not.

P: Have some of the meetings that you have attended at the White House been due to a critical situation or a very topical issue?

G: None in which the President has been involved.

P: What about the others? Is this on a staff basis, do you mean?

G: I'd rather not go into any White House meetings at all. There have been very few, and I think it's up to the people in the White House to discuss those rather than those of us outside the White House. There are meetings, for example, such as--this is a somewhat different issue--there is a regular Monday afternoon meeting at the White House, which actually I rarely attend, which is chaired by Walt Rostow, and which includes--or used to include, it has been so long since I was there; Dick Fryklund of my staff, a deputy Assistant Secretary, goes over for me--but it used to include Walt Rostow, or Mac Bundy before Walt, and both the public affairs and the operational sides of Viet Nam. For example, from State, Bill Bundy goes, and either Dixon Donnelly, my counterpart there, or his Deputy for Viet Nam. Now, when I used to go a couple of years ago, I would go and John MacNaughton would go, who was Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. So there would be Bundy and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from State, MacNaughton and myself from the Pentagon, Walt Rostow and George Christian from the White House, and the appropriate people from USIA. That was not a crisis meeting. That was a regular weekly Monday afternoon meeting.

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P: If you're not called to the White House in your capacity in Public Affairs, are you on sort of standby in the development of a critical situation?

G: Not at the White House. George Christian is there. I am here, and my counterpart is at State. There just really isn't any reason in the world for either the State Department person in this job or myself to be there.

If we have a crisis going on, the Secretary of Defense will be coming back here. The Deputy Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and I, and our staffs, will undoubtedly be back here waiting for his return. In that case--in the case of Mr. Clifford when this happens, he'll get back into the building and will call Mr. Nitze, Secretary Warnke, and myself into his office to fill us in on exactly what has transpired at the White House, let us know just what decisions have been made, or what decisions are pending; go over with us whatever messages have been received that have gone directly to the White House from wherever the trouble spot might be around the world; and discuss with us what is going to happen next; and how we should deport ourselves here.

P: Mr. Goulding, is it necessary during the development of these situations, that you be fully involved in order to prepare the response or releases?

G: Absolutely. It's not just a question of preparing responses or releases, which is the easy part of the job. Anyone in today's world who occupies a public affairs position must be totally, totally, totally informed of everything and anything that is developing in the area that he has some responsibility for. This is the way Mr. McNamara worked. It's the way the President has worked. It's the way Mr. Clifford has worked.

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George Christian, I know, has total access to information in the White House, and is a part of just about every meeting that takes place in the White House that the President is involved in, including, of course, the Tuesday lunch meeting. He must be. We follow exactly the same practice here, and every item of any importance anywhere in the world that the Defense Department is, or could be, involved in is something that I must be aware of.

There are a great many things in the building. There are a great many very important jobs in the building that that's not true of. An Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, for example, does not have to be cut in on all the message traffic from Cy Vance and Averell Harriman from Paris; or all the message traffic from Ambassador Bunker in Saigon. It's just not part of his job. Alain Enthoven doesn't have to be cut in on those messages. The Secretary of the Navy doesn't have to be cut in on those messages. The Comptroller doesn't have to be. Johnny Foster doesn't have to be. Al Fitt, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, doesn't have to be--has no need to be. But Secretary Nitze as Deputy Secretary, Assistant Secretary Warnke as Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and I, on the civilian side, must be, or else we just can't possibly do the job.

P: You're very emphatic about this.

G: I sure am.

P: Could you give me your reasoning?

G: Well, sure. I don't know any quicker way to wreck negotiations in Paris than having people in my position start spraying out press releases or giving confidential guidance to some columinst if (a) we don't know what we're

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talking about; and (b) we don't know which areas are truly sensitive and which areas are not sensitive. If we are not aware exactly of a secret meeting that Ambassador Vance might be having with his counterpart from Hanoi, we are unwittingly, unknowingly, apt to say something that will destroy the entire thing he's trying to do. It's just as simple as that. Further down the line, just a strict position of no comment can be maintained in a sensitive time. But unless somebody at the top knows that this is a sensitive time, you can't even do that.

P: Has this ever happened to you during your tenure?

G: Has what ever happened to me?

P: Been caught offguard by either question referred to you--or category?

G: I've often been caught offguard, perhaps, but neither in the two years that I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary nor in the two years (I'm using round numbers) that I have served in this job, has there ever been a time when I did not have full and complete and total information on what was happening.* If there were such a time, I wouldn't stay in this office because then you're just reducing it to a mimeograph machine operation which can be run by anyone.

P: Would you tell me a little bit about--?

G: Let me give you an example on that. Take the Pueblo case. Richard Fryklund, who is my Deputy Assistant Secretary, was the Defense Department's representative in Korea, and was armed with a piece of paper from Secretary Nitze so designating him. Now he was not running the Public Affairs side of the return of the Pueblo crew, he was the Defense Department representative on the scene in all respects. He had with him some people from Mr. Warnke's shop. He had with him some people from

*Insofar as that information was available to the Secretary of Defense.

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CINCPAC-Fleet in Honolulu. And it was basically a State Department operation. But so far as the Department of Defense was concerned, Dick Fryklund was the authority on the scene and empowered to make all decisions on the scene regarding our Department--because it was basically a Public Affairs operation. I don't mean it was a press release operation. I mean the whole issue--in this case at this time--of what do you do, what can you do, what should you do, once force has been ruled out is really Public Affairs. It has nothing to do with mimeograph machines. It's a question of what is the proper role for this country, and what steps should it take in order to attempt to get back these eighty-two people. This isn't Installation and Logistics or it's not Systems Analysis. It's a question of the proper role of the country, what will the people support, what won't they support. As soon as military steps are ruled out today, then Public Affairs become an extremely important part of government's decision-making.

Go back to the President's speech of March 31st. One of the inputs into that speech certainly had to be from somewhere, "What is the temper of the country today? Will the country accept sending two hundred thousand additional men to Viet Nam? What is the temper of the Congress? How rapidly is support for the war slipping away from the Administration? Is it slipping away at all? Is there any feeling of it? Is the country interested one way or the other? Is the President's decision in any way limited by the feeling of two hundred million Americans?" These are the kind of contributions to a decision which people who have some knowledge in public affairs can make, and must make.

P: Since your coming to the Defense Department, can you isolate or name

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major areas that you have worked in?

G: This year the area I've worked in has been almost exclusively Viet Nam. Secretary Clifford has a meeting each morning at 8:30. The people who attend that meeting, as I've mentioned, are Deputy Secretary Nitze, Assistant Secretary Warnke, myself, and then George Elsey, the Secretary's civilian special assistant, and Colonel [Robert] Pursley his military assistant. At this meeting, which lasts always an hour and often two hours or two hours-and-a-half, we discuss everything, every problem of major importance facing each of the participants of the meeting. Secretary Clifford begins, goes over the things that are most on his mind, the latest telephone conversations from the White House and the State Department. If there are decisions to be made that he is going back over to the White House to participate in, he will ask our advice on these matters. He will then go around the table asking Secretary Nitze for his ideas, Paul Warnke and myself for ours, and then George Elsey and Bob Pursley for theirs. Clark uses this roundtable discussion as a decision-making aid in his own mind. He calls this his executive council or inner-council or whatever. Since his arrival, I think he has spent far mre time on Viet Nam than on anything else. I have spent almost all of my time working with him on Viet Nam, and really have spent very little of my time running this office which has been done almost entirely by Dick Fryklund and Dan Henkin.

P: Could you go on back through the years--'67-'66?

G: Well, it's a crisis operation. That part of Public Affairs is crisis management. Obviously the Liberty case, the Pueblo case, the lost H-bombs in Palomares and Thule; the inadvertent bombing of the Soviet

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ship, the Turkestan; the Pierrelatte reconnaisance over-flight in France that shook up France for so long. You can go back over any problem anywhere in the world in which the Department of Defense has been involved, and it has been a problem of this office. Of course Viet Nam on the Public Affairs side--aside from the decision-making side in my efforts with Mr. Clifford--from a purely public Affairs side, has obviously been something that more people in this office devoted more attention to than anything else.

Our charter makes us responsible for the dissemination of news of national or international significance wherever that may be in the world. So that if a destroyer runs into another destroyer out in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean somewhere, and no damage is done, this is not a story of national or international significance. The Navy, in its chain of command wherever it wishes, can handle all of the public statements that are made on it. If a destroyer runs into a Soviet destroyer somewhere, even though no damage is done, this is no longer a matter for the Navy. This is an event--whether it becomes a story or not--an event of national or international significance. We take it away from the Navy immediately. What is said, or what is done is decided in the Public Affairs side, is decided by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President, George Christian, Dix Donnelly, and myself, working at our different levels. You name the crisis, and this is the one we've participated in.

There's the usual routine of running Public Affairs, which is not just the press side, but relations of people--of the military with people. There are four-point eight million people in the military establishment.

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Any relations they have with the public is our responsibility in one way or another. We exercise that responsibility more on the news side than we do on the community relations side. A base commander's relations with the people of the small town surrounding his base are in fact our responsibility--my responsibility. However, it's so clear that the way to have the worst possible relations with that community would be for someone here in Washington to try to dictate how they should be done, that there's total delegation of authority to that base commander to handle his local community relations any way he chooses until he gets in trouble from a public standpoint. Then, perhaps, he needs some help.

P: In looking over your area, I notice that there are breakdowns regarding special projects. What does this concern?

G: It's the name of an office--troubleshooters whom I can see. There are basically four directorates here as your little charts will show you. There's the Director of Defense Information, which is the organization of thirty or forty people, headed by an Army colonel, who deal principally with the news media. They handle thirty-five or forty-five thousand inquiries a year. They are the prime link between the press and the Department of Defense--by press I'm including the television and radio people.

They also have shops in there that work with movies on films that we have agreed to cooperate in. We will not cooperate unless we feel that the script is in the national interest. There is no reason why the taxpayers should pay for a bunch of movie cameras climbing over a destroyer to make a picture that is anti-American. They--the film companies--are quite able to make the picture if they wish and more power to them, but

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when Hollywood seeks our participation, we must make a decision--our people make a decision, I rarely see them--on whether this film is in the national interest. If it is, we will authorize some kind of Department of Defense participation. If it is not, we will not authorize Department of Defense participation--which is in no way censorship, because the moviemakers are quite free to make any films they choose. But that's all under the Defense Information Directorate.

A second is the Community Relations Directorate which deals chiefly with community relations on a national level. They deal with the veterans organizations, with the Chambers of Commerce, with the labor unions, with industry. All the relations with the public that are not the press are handled by that director.

The third is the Security Review Directorate, which is responsible for clearing for public distribution speeches and Congressional testimony--. Another section of it handles advertisements by Defense contractors to make sure that something classified is not disclosed in the advertisement.

Then the fourth is a Plans and Programs Directorate which does the longer range planning. If we are today developing a fifteen-page paper on how the loss of a hydrogen bomb would be handled from a Public Affairs standpoint, it would be that organization working with the State Department and with the Atomic Energy Commission and with the representatives from the Services who would be putting that kind of paper together. They're not mixed up in day-to-day crises.

Each of those directorates has people with continuing responsibilities. The special projects people--that's a little office that we've set up

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to keep people free from day-to-day routine responsibility so that when Crisis X is initiated, I can just reach in and take one of those who is not all wrapped up in routine work and pull him out for some special event.

P: In any of these areas that you've mentioned, have particular issues developed from them during your tenure?

G: Oh my goodness, yes! From all of them, every day!

P: Great ones? Big ones? Major ones?

G: Well, you have to--

P: Can you give me some examples?

G: I'm not sure I understand your question.

P: For instance, in Community Relations or some of the other areas that are not related directly to the military or critical crisis situations that you have been discussing.

G: Well, the Community Relations people have been all involved, for example, in the Paris Air Show which the government gets into every year. The big question that we raised this year was whether government participation in the Paris Air Show was something that would benefit the interests of the Department of Defense. Now it has always been assumed in the past that this was the case. The Defense Department has always paid a major share of the costs of participating in the Paris Air Show, a major share of the personnel, and a major share of the effort.

Our Community Relations people a year or so ago made the recommendation to me that the Defense Department did not gain by the Paris Air Show. They came to no conclusion as to whether the country gained or not. That's a different issue. The Commerce Department thinks that it's a very good

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Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781]
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thing for the country. The State Department thinks it is a very good thing for the country. Our position was not that it is not a good thing for the country at all, but simply that we could not see the benefits for the Department of Defense.

So our position for a year or so has been fine, let the government go right ahead and have a Paris Air Show, and let those elements of the government that think it is important pay for it. We don't, and we won't! And we aren't!

That's the kind of thing that the Community Relations Directorate has been terribly involved in--with great differences of opinion, as you might imagine, with other Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries about the government, and a lot of people in the White House. But as of now, we have won the case and it will remain won at least until January 20. I can't speak for the next Administration.

P: Are there examples in any of these other areas?

G: Well, Security Review is a little tougher to give examples in. The Security Review people have a half-dozen different missions. The testimony given before the closed doors of Congress in executive session by Defense Department witnesses comes to our Security Review operation from the committee to be cleared for public distribution. On matters such as this, the Security Review people review only for security, and not for policy.

An Assistant Secretary of Defense must respond to any question put to him by a Congressional committee, and should respond to any question put to him. That response, from a policy standpoint, should be part of the public record. It's Congress' job to ask these questions. It's the

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executive branch's job to answer them. It's the public's right to have these opinions.

A speech, however, made by that same Assistant Secretary--a public speech--is reviewed not only for security, to make sure that there is no violation of either military security or national security, but also for policy, and so it should be. You have chaos if every brigadier general, or every Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, or every Assistant Secretary of Defense is permitted to dash about the country making his own speech on what he thought was right or wrong with the President's policy in Viet Nam. There is only one President. He sets the foreign policy for this country. And it's up to the members of the executive branch to support that policy, not to sabotage it--whether the person be a military man or a civilian. For me to go out and start making speeches as an Assistant Secretary of Defense saying, "I believe that President Johnson is wrong in Viet Nam. I think we should have pulled out two years ago. I don't think we should have stopped bombing. I think we should start bombing tomorrow." This would cause headlines all over the country. If I take one course, if Alain Enthoven takes a second course, if Paul Warnke takes a third course, and Bill Bundy takes a fourth course, if the Under Secretary of the Navy takes a fifth course, and if a dozen major generals each take courses of their own, there's going to be total, total confusion, not only in this country, but around the world on what the Administration's policy is.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Phil G. Goulding

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Phil G. Goulding, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of the instrument available for research in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. At the same time, it is his wish to guard against the possibility of its contents being used to embarrass, damage, injure, or harass anyone. Therefore, in pursuance of this objective, and in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 507 (f) (3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) this material shall not, for a period of 10 years be available for examination by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it. This restriction shall not apply to employees and officers of the General Services Administration (including the National Archives and Records Service and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library) engaged in performing normal archival work processes.

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4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed Mr. O. J. McClung

Date March 4, 1971

Accepted Harry J. Middleton - for
Archivist of the United States

Date March 12, 1975