

INTERVIEW I

DATE: August 23, 1985

INTERVIEWEE: EDITH GREEN

INTERVIEWER: Janet Kerr-Tener

PLACE: Congresswoman Green's residence, Wilsonville, Oregon

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

K: I wanted to start by having you review some of your biographical highlights. I know there are many of them, and when I was looking at your Who's Who entry I noticed you have probably two dozen distinguished service type of awards from national groups, and I realized at that point that it would be difficult to condense and really focus in on highlights. That's a little bit of a difficult task given your background. But I wanted to ask you a little bit about your upbringing and education. What got you interested in public schools, for one thing? You taught for, what, fourteen years before I guess becoming the public relations director of the Oregon Education Association. What got you interested in public education?

G: I think a couple of things. One, my mother and father were both teachers. Then I think probably the most important thing was the social climate. When I finished high school in 1927 there were two acceptable things for a woman to have as a career: one, teaching, and one, nursing. In those days law and medicine and architecture and engineering and whatnot were not beckoning the brightest and best women to go those professions. I personally really wanted to go into law; my mother and my father and a teacher who had a great deal of

Green -- I -- 2

influence on me in my high school days, the three of them persuaded me not to do it on the basis that as a woman I would simply be in the back office drawing up briefs all day and would not ever be able to really practice law.

K: I guess that is one of the problems that Sandra Day O'Connor ran into evidently when she got out of Stanford Law School. She couldn't get a job except as a legal secretary, and she was on the law review.

G: I think that's accurate. I suspect that the time I finished high school had more to do with my going into teaching than anything else, because it was the acceptable, the respectable thing for a woman to do.

K: Then you got your undergraduate degree from the University of Oregon, is that right?

G: That is correct, yes. I went to Willamette University for two years and then taught during the Depression years. I went to Willamette University for two years and then went to it was called the Oregon Normal School then for a year to get my teaching certificate. Then by summers and night school I finished at the University of Oregon.

K: With a degree in English?

G: Yes.

K: And then when did you go to Stanford to do graduate study?

G: I went there just really for a short time in the early 1940s.

K: And then what courses did you take there?

G: Really speech. I was especially interested in radio work at that time and it was an NBC seminar on "radio broadcasting."

Green -- I -- 3

K: Now, that was a field dominated by men and largely still is. How did you break into doing the radio commentary work?

G: I did free-lance work for several years, and then I had a thirty-minute program I think five days a week during the war years. As you would expect for a woman, part of it was giving out recipes. I really am not a specialist in home ec!! But I also gave the news and we had live music.

K: And that was during the war period?

G: That was during the mid-forties.

K: At that point your career as a classroom teacher pretty much came to an end and you went on to the. . . .

G: When I did the radio work? I had intended to drop out of teaching when I left the Salem schools. I taught there for eleven years and did not really expect to go back, but there was a terrible shortage of teachers and I remember one school district, they knew that I had been a teacher and they came to me and asked me if I would come out to this particular school to teach while this teacher was ill, to complete--I don't know whether it was the month or the year or what, but I stayed for three years.

K: When did you establish your relationship with the Oregon Education Association?

G: During the 1940s, having two sons in school, I was active in PTA, as I think almost every mother was. It reminds me of a mother who was asked when she had her third child how she felt. She said, "It was great, but I can't bear to think of twelve more years of PTA." But I

Green -- I -- 4

became active in the PTA and became the state legislative chairman for the Oregon Congress of Parents and Teachers and was on the national legislative committee. In 1946 in Oregon there was a major education bill and I became involved in that.

K: So you actually did some lobbying on behalf [of the bill]--

G: That is correct.

K: --with the state legislature.

G: Then, in 1949, Oregon did not have any basic school support of any kind. All of the money for our schools was to be raised at the local school district; [there was] no state support, no equalization formula at all. Anyhow, I was asked to be the chairman of that campaign to get state basic school support, and I think that was in 1949. I was amazed at the opposition from some of the groups. But we succeeded, it became law. Then I was the representative of both the Oregon Congress of Parents and Teachers and the Oregon Education Association down at the state legislature to work on bills for our schools.

K: And that was pretty much a full-time position or did it depend on the season?

G: In the early 1950s it was a full-time position for the Oregon Education Association, which was a far different organization than it is today.

K: Did that get you interested in running for [office]? You ran for a state office first, is that right?

G: It certainly was the catalyst to persuade me I should run for office. I remember one state senator who was just opposed to everything that

Green -- I -- 5

had to do with schools and the welfare of children; he was such a negative person that I decided I was going to try to get him out of the legislature by running. He was a state senator. That really was the decision I made. And then when--we have a very unusual procedure here in Oregon. We have a filing day and it almost is a circus down at the statehouse; everybody who is going to file for any office goes down there and files on that day. Anyhow, the leaders of the Democratic Party came down and persuaded me that I should not file for the state senate but should file for secretary of state--over my best judgment! I did, I had never run for a statewide office. The incumbent, who was secretary of state, won, but I think in the beginning the polls showed 70-30, something like that. He won by about ten thousand votes. I carried the county, Multnomah County, in which I lived. Then two years after that the party persuaded me I should be the Democratic candidate for Congress.

K: Did you have reservations about doing it?

G: Yes. My opponent turned out to be Tom McCall, who--

K: Who was later a governor.

G: --later was governor. But at that time he was a TV commentator. He was every day on the news.

K: So he had lots of free publicity.

G: He had lots of free publicity and had lots of name familiarity. It was, of course, the most difficult campaign I had.

K: Now you lost to him or you won?

G: I won.

Green -- I -- 6

K: You won your first race for the Congress.

G: For Congress, yes, 1954. Just a footnote there. That year we spent less than thirty thousand dollars on the race, and in the second campaign I was running against Bill Roth, who later became a judge, and we spent I think it was seventeen thousand dollars. After that, in the other eight campaigns, we spent less than ten thousand dollars. And when I see campaigns in similar districts going for five hundred thousand or a million dollars, I am appalled.

K: Is there any state financing of campaigns?

G: None.

K: None. It's all whom you can get to subsidize your effort?

G: Yes.

K: When you went into Congress--that was 1954--did you immediately get a seat on the House Education and Labor Committee?

G: Yes. Sam Rayburn was the speaker of the House, and education really has always been I think my first love. [Inaudible].

K: That was one of your platforms in your election campaign?

G: Yes, I talked quite a little bit about education. But I went to Mr. Sam and asked if I could have a position on the Education and Labor Committee. I also was backed by labor at that time.

K: How did that happen?

G: I guess they approved of my stand on issues.

K: Oh, okay.

G: I had, in 1959, because I was on the Education and Labor [Committee] been very much involved in the highly controversial labor bill of

Green -- I -- 7

1959 in which Jimmy Hoffa was one of the prime targets. I have a cartoon somewhere where I'm at the top of his priority list to purge from the Congress.

K: Now, this of course was before the advent of the teacher unionization movement, so you really had no ties to labor, but you were endorsed?

G: I was supported by the labor unions. I think I was supported by every labor union in Oregon. And in 1959 I was John Kennedy's chairman in [Oregon].

K: I did want to ask about that because--

G: He was the author of a highly controversial labor bill. There were five of us who were swing votes on the Education and Labor Committee, not supporting either the AFL-CIO bill or the Teamster's bill or the Eisenhower bill. The Teamsters and the Machinists very much opposed my re-election in any year after that.

K: Because you had organized his--I don't know if organized is the right word, but you managed his preferential primary in Oregon?

G: Kennedy's?

K: Kennedy's, yes.

G: Yes, I was the chairman of his campaign in Oregon.

K: And he was running against Hubert Humphrey and Morse in Oregon, right? Those were the three candidates?

G: That is correct. Wayne Morse, to begin with, said he would not be a candidate. We had a law at that time that you had to sign an affidavit that you were not a candidate. Otherwise your name automatically appeared in what we have as an Oregon--a Voter's

Green -- I -- 8

Pamphlet that has the pictures and the resume for every person running for office. I had supported [Adlai] Stevenson in 1952 and 1956. Stevenson, I think, was one of the most outstanding, if not the most outstanding political individuals with whom I ever worked, and I have often wondered what would have happened if he had become president. But both Stevenson and Wayne Morse had signed affidavits and filed them with the secretary of state in Oregon that they were not candidates for president in 1960 and would not be candidates. Then later Wayne Morse became a candidate and then at the 1960 convention Eleanor Roosevelt led a drive to get Stevenson nominated.

K: You had been in Congress at the same time as Kennedy. Did you get to know him that way or were you just--?

G: He was in the Senate. The first time that I ever met Kennedy was at the 1956 convention. He made an effort at that time to become the vice presidential candidate; [Estes] Kefauver had won several primaries and had won the Oregon primary; here we're committed, as delegates we were committed then, to support the candidate who won the primary in Oregon. But I was much impressed with Kennedy in 1956. In 1959 he asked me if I would be chairman of his Oregon campaign.

K: And that sort of cemented your relationship with him?

G: Yes.

K: Did it antagonize Wayne Morse at all?

G: Oh, yes.

K: When Kennedy came into office as president, he had, I guess because of his Catholicism, become very hemmed in on the issue of providing

Green -- I -- 9

direct federal grants to institutions of higher education for construction purposes. I know from having done a little bit of research on that particular question that there was a real struggle within the administration to find a constitutional either rationale or exclusion for the aid, but the decision was made, obviously for political reasons, not to directly propose to the Congress grants. The administration I believe proposed a fairly generous program of loans which all colleges would be eligible for. The histories on the subject give you quite a bit of credit for engineering a way around that problem for the White House. What did you do?

G: Yes, I remember very well discussions with President Kennedy. There had been so many attacks in 1959 and 1960 on his Catholicism, and some of the scurrilous literature that was put out, that if he became president the Pope would run the country and they would even dig a canal from the Vatican to Washington, D.C., all kinds of nutty stories. But it seemed to me that our dual system of education in this country must be maintained, and if we followed a policy of providing grants and loans to the public colleges and providing only loans to the private schools, we were being unfair. I did a great deal of research on it, and not once in the history of the United States had the Congress treated the private colleges differently than they had treated the public colleges, going back to the Land-Grant College Act. The Land-Grant College Act, the Morrill Act, did not distinguish between the private and the public colleges in terms of grants. As I recall, Brown University, I think--

Green -- I -- 10

K: Cornell.

G: --Brown was a private college, and yet as a private college and a land-grant college, it received federal funds. There was one, as I recall, in Georgia also, a black college that was a private, church-related college but had received land-grant funds. On the basis that the Congress had never treated the private colleges differently than the public colleges and that the dual system of education was highly desirable, we were successful in providing loans and grants to both public and private colleges and universities.

This became, of course, a major bone of contention in the conference because Wayne Morse was following the line that it would be unconstitutional to give to the private colleges grants, and he maintained that only the loans should go to private colleges. This was after the Kennedy campaign in 1959 and 1960 in which he was very unhappy with me for supporting this outsider and not supporting the hometown son. So it became an unpleasant conference. We were successful in maintaining the House position.

K: And eventually this approach, your approach, led to the enactment of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.

G: That is correct. That is correct.

K: Can I backtrack just for a second and ask you, if Wayne Morse had indicated early enough his interest in running in the preferential-type primary in 1960 in Oregon, would you have felt obliged to endorse him rather than Kennedy?

Green -- I -- 11

G: I have been asked that several times. The only thing that I remember is going to him on three different occasions. Twice I was with the vice president of the Democratic Party in Oregon, where I specifically said to him, "Are you going to run as a favorite son?" and he said no, he had no intentions. I must say that probably that was in my head, that if he wanted to become a favorite son I would not try to disrupt the Oregon political scene and become Kennedy's chairman.

K: As it turned out, you ended up seconding Kennedy's nomination at the 1960 Democratic [National] Convention.

G: That is correct. That is correct.

K: Interesting.

G: I think I was the first woman who had ever been the chairman of a state delegation for the Democratic Party.

K: Right, you were the delegation chairman of Oregon for, what, eight years, 1960 through 1968, is that right?

G: I was the chairman in 1960 and in 1968, and in 1964 I can't remember.

K: Did you have any impression of LBJ as a senator?

G: Well, one of the things which I ran across today that I said on the floor of the House in 1965: "President Johnson made many eloquent statements on behalf of education. One such passage stands out in my mind: 'The cultivated mind is the guardian genius of democracy. It is the only dictator that free man acknowledges. It is the only security that free man desires.'" I think I would have to say that in terms of his views on education, I was a strong supporter of many of the things that he sent to the Congress. I also believe LBJ was sincere in his

Green -- I -- 12

views on civil rights, in spite of the manipulations of the 1964 convention.

K: How did you judge his legislative skill, even though you were in the House? Did you have any impression of that? There has been much made of his strength as a

G: I think that as the majority leader in the Senate he was generally regarded as a very powerful political leader in the Senate. There were some who thought that he was a little bit too powerful and he twisted arms too many times, along with Bobby Baker, who kept a record on what every senator had ever done; he exerted a great deal of--I was going to say influence, let me change that--exercised a great deal of power. It was certainly said that after he left the Senate, that the senators elected Mike Mansfield, and one of the reasons that they elected Mike Mansfield was that he was a very quiet, soft-spoken individual who was the opposite--

K: The antidote perhaps.

G: --of the arm-twisting. . . .

K: Well, one of the stories I had heard--I don't know whether you had heard anything to back this up--[is] that LBJ used to keep very careful tabs on what was going on in the home states and districts of different senators, and that whenever he needed votes on things, he would be able to go right to a senator and say, "Look, I know you want this project back in such-and-such and I'll see what I can do for you if you'll vote--"

Green -- I -- 13

- G: I don't think that even fully describes the files that supposedly Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Baker kept on every senator.
- K: Okay. I wanted to jump to the year 1965 when suddenly--not suddenly perhaps, but after a twenty-year, fifteen-year deadlock on the issue of federal aid to public elementary and secondary education, legislation was produced and passed. It did not resemble the legislation that was proposed during the Truman and Eisenhower years where the emphasis was on building new school buildings and I guess there was some effort also to raise teachers' salaries, but it was legislation that attacked the issue of disadvantaged students and poverty areas, and also intruded--I think you could use the word intruded--into curriculum decisions, which had long been regarded as sacrosanct and part of the local school boards' responsibility.
- G: Yes.
- K: How did that come about? What changed in Congress? Certainly Johnson is credited for taking advantage of changes in Congress, but what happened in Congress to allow that dramatic a change in its posture toward federal aid to education?
- G: Before I go to that, I think there's one other important fact in connection with the Kennedy campaign.
- K: Okay.
- G: At the 1960 convention, LBJ was running for president. And [at] his headquarters at the 1960 convention, they were distributing all kinds of anti-Catholic literature that was anything but good in my judgment. I was a great fan of John Kennedy's--of Adlai Stevenson's and John

Green -- I -- 14

Kennedy's. I was very, very active in the 1960 convention; there were forty of us that would meet every morning at seven o'clock with Bob Kennedy to map out--

K: Sort of acting as whips.

G: --what each one of us would do. That's right. What we were to do for the day. The propaganda that was being distributed from the LBJ headquarters did not endear me to Johnson, one, because I was very pro-Kennedy and I think when you get into the heat of a campaign there's a lot of emotion as well as supposedly intellectual activity going on. And I think this lasted also through the years, because it seemed to me they were very, very unfair attacks. I remember the morning that Bob Kennedy told us that LBJ was going to be vice president, some of us found it pretty hard to take because he had been so--

K: Well, what was the rationale that was offered for that decision to draft Johnson as the vice president?

G: Texas.

K: That's it?

G: The votes in Texas and the votes that Lyndon Johnson could bring to the election from the southern states.

K: Did Kennedy and Johnson have very warm relations personally?

G: They certainly didn't have warm relations in 1959 and 1960 when they were meeting head-on every day on the hour. I have one picture, I'll show you later, of Bob Kennedy and John Kennedy and Sarge Shriver when they were listening to LBJ at the debate at the convention. You're

Green -- I -- 15

too young to recall, but the Kennedy-Johnson debate at the convention was one of the moving events.

K: Did they have clear distinctions as far as the education issues were concerned? Were they--?

G: I don't know that that was true. As you stated a few moments ago, in 1963 Kennedy, because I think of the 1960 attack on him as a Catholic, had to take the position he did, to not appear that he was turning over the presidency to the Pope.

K: I think the Rules Committee created some obstacles to that legislation.

G: Well, outside of the Morrill Act, the Land-Grant College Act, and the GI Bill, until 1958 there was no federal--well, there was one other bill, the [inaudible]--

K: The Impacted Areas--

G: The Impacted Areas. But those were the three pieces of national legislation that had anything to do with education. You may have read that Robert Taft, who was Mr. Conservative, in 1949 offered a bill supplying federal aid to education, and he was called a communist for having offered that kind [of legislation] or suggesting that the federal government had a responsibility in the field of education. So the Congress was not receptive to the idea of federal aid, and in the first bill in 1958, outside of the three I mentioned--the Land-Grant College Act, the Federal Impact[ed Areas Act], and the GI Bill--we did not call it the National Education Act, we called it the National Defense Education Act in order to get the additional votes which the

Green -- I -- 16

word "defense" would bring to the legislation. In 1958 the Sputnik [had been launched], and the United States was very much concerned that the Cold War had been shifted from the Kremlin to the classroom; the Russians were embarking on an all-out drive to improve the education there.

K: Yes. In fact, the USOE, Office of Education, published a major report I guess around 1957-58 treating that subject, that there was a massive drive to produce Ph.D.s, scientists, engineers--

G: Technicians.

K: Yes--the backbone for a strong military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union.

G: I've said many times that Sputnik did more for American education than Robert Taft or a lot of other people could possibly do, because they awakened the American people to the challenge that was facing them. In 1958 I made my first trip to Russia--it was after the Sputnik was launched--and it was for the sole purpose of studying their educational system and what they were doing in their technical schools, their technicums, their colleges, their universities, their elementary schools. They were teaching foreign languages beginning at the second grade.

K: They still do, I understand.

G: And all of the diplomats who were being sent to every country in the world, all of the developing countries especially, spoke the language of the country to which they were being sent. The United States was sending people all over the world and they never spoke the language of

Green -- I -- 17

the country to which they were sent; I think without doubt it has had an impact on the influence that the Soviet Union has had on the developing countries.

K: I guess one prong, too, of the National Defense Education Act was to try to step up the teaching of foreign language instruction in this country and the creation of foreign language institutes and things to send teachers to.

G: You're absolutely right. It was a major effort. I remember the hearings and the floor debate on it. The other one was of course to improve the science and technology in the United States, to catch up with what the Soviet Union was doing.

K: I have one question on the subject of the NDEA. It is my understanding from the documents in the Eisenhower Library that the Eisenhower Administration really did not envision aiding elementary and secondary education through its original proposals, part of which were incorporated in the NDEA. I guess Elliot Richardson and Lawrence Derthick had headed up a task force and drafted a bill--this was three or four months before Sputnik; that was in July of 1957 and Sputnik went up in October of 1957--and the administration submitted its education program as soon as Congress opened in January. There was really no intention to aid elementary and secondary education originally, that this sort of came as an afterthought on the part of the administration as a result of Sputnik, to aid math and science education at the elementary-secondary level. What about in Congress? Was there some

Green -- I -- 18

move afoot to sort of focus then on the science and math questions, at all of it?

G: A congressman by the name of Elliott--

K: Carl Elliott?

G: --from Alabama was chairman of that. There isn't any question that this was very much on his mind. We had at that time Graham Barden as the chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, who made no bones about his greatest contribution that he made as chairman was to see that no education and labor bill got out of the committee. So it was a real fight. Elliott needs to be given a great deal of credit for his work in 1958.

K: Now, there wasn't a Sputnik to goad people to overcome their fears and prejudices in 1964-65. What did enable the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and of the Higher Education Act, which contained aid for students?

G: This was a time of great social change. I've often thought that the twenty years that I was in Congress were--maybe every congressman feels that way who's served for twenty years--but it seemed to me they were some of the most exciting years that we had. I think that one of the contributing factors without doubt was the civil rights fight, and the evidence was overwhelming that in many of the southern states the education had been sadly neglected. I think that there certainly was prejudice, nobody can deny that, both on the part of the northerners and the southerners. I was reviewing some of the debate on the ESEA today; I haven't had time to review much of it. But I remember in the

Green -- I -- 19

distribution formula of the ESEA that there was a great deal of talk about helping the southern states, but the distribution formula really gave the advantage to the northern states, because--

K: Because of the concentration of population or what?

G: It was distributed on the basis of the number of poor children. I remember one of the fellows, I think he was from Alabama, who complained about the formula that, "You bleeding hearts, you bleed and die for us and you talk about our poor little black children that don't have any education, but when it comes to distributing the money you'll give us half of the amount that you will give to New York or Michigan or some other state." But I think the civil rights fight and the signing of the Civil Rights Bill contributed a lot to the passage of the 1965 education act.

I remember I think it was [on] the 1967 [legislation], not the 1965, that I had an exchange of letters with General [Lewis] Hershey, the head of Selective Service, and the point that I finally got him to put down in writing was that those states which had the highest standard as far as education was concerned, academic excellence, those were the states that were paying in blood when it came to wartime, the Vietnam War. And those states that spent the least on education and had the poorest educational standards were the ones that sent a very small number of draftees, percentagewise in comparison to the percentage of young men from those states with higher educational standards.

K: Because they couldn't pass the army tests, admission.

Green -- I -- 20

G: That's exactly right. They could not pass the army tests and therefore they were not admitted into the military service. But a state that had the highest standards, a much higher percentage of their young men passed the tests and therefore they went to war and a higher percentage of them were killed, which I thought was pretty significant in terms of the need for federal aid for all fifty states; when we first started debating aid to education, there were only forty-eight states. It seems a long time ago.

Then the other thing that happened was the mobility, which brought support for federal aid to education. We found that with the Civil Rights Bill there was a mass exodus from the South and we found that so many people, blacks especially, were leaving those southern plantations to go to the urban centers, and they were not equipped to earn a living in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, you name it. And they became recipients of the welfare system. Therefore because of this mobility of the American population, it was in the national interest for all the states to see that there was at least a minimum standard established, because there were--

K: So the northern states were beginning to feel the consequences of the many years of neglect of education in the South as a result of the migration?

G: That is correct.

K: I think that's a point that has not been addressed very much in the literature that I have reviewed.

Green -- I -- 21

- G: There is one other point that I--and maybe we can discuss it later-- but as far as women's rights are concerned, I'd like to get into that on the 1967 act.
- K: Sure. I'm sure we'll be able to. I wanted to ask a little bit about some changes. Scholars, who of course sort of focus in on numbers, noted that as a result of the 1964 elections there were a lot of hard-core, aid-to-education opponents defeated, that more young, urban Democrats were being brought in, and that--what is the Senate--is it the Democratic Study Group--?
- G: Of the House.
- K: Yes--had some role in loosening up rules in the Rules Committee and some other things that helped to emasculate some of the obstructors, those who had obstructed the education efforts of the past, one of them being Judge Howard Smith of Virginia. That his role as chairman of the House Rules Committee, his power was limited by the changes that were taking place.
- G: I think there's one other factor in addition to the Democratic Study Group. From my standpoint, Mr. Sam Rayburn was by far the best speaker of the House. He exercised power, but he exercised it wisely. He was also--Lyndon Johnson was one of his proteges, as you know. One of the things that I liked--there are several things I liked about Mr. Sam, but I remember in the Eisenhower years that some of the Young Turks in the House were giving Mr. Sam a very bad time--I was at the meeting--because he would not make this particular foreign policy issue a partisan issue. These Young Turks felt it was just incumbent

Green -- I -- 22

upon them, because they were Democrats to be the opposition and oppose Eisenhower. Mr. Sam listened with great patience and finally he said to them, "Listen, there's one thing you don't understand. First of all, I'm an American, and second I'm a Texan, and third I'm a Democrat, and precisely in that order and don't ever forget it."

The other thing that happened with Mr. Sam, even though he came from Texas, he was the one that was responsible for appointing liberals to the Education and Labor Committee, and that cleared one of the main obstacles to any education legislation in the House. When I came in in 1955, Stew [Stewart] Udall, Jimmy Roosevelt--I--were appointed to that Education and Labor Committee. It had been dominated by the most conservative members, who obviously were opposed to federal aid to education, and largely opposed to labor unions.

K: And a good number of them from the southern strongholds.

G: That's right. Well, Graham Barden--

K: From North Carolina. And then there was Phil Landrum from Georgia.

G: Phil Landrum was on the committee, he never was chairman. Adam Clayton Powell had the seniority over Phil Landrum. Phil Landrum and I became very good friends. We obviously differed on some bills.

But anyhow, Sam Rayburn has to be given great credit for some of the change in the House that made it possible to pass education legislation, because he made the House Education and Labor Committee receptive, or at least got members on it who were receptive to the idea of federal aid to education.

Green -- I -- 23

Then the second thing which you mentioned is the Democratic Study Group. That was organized, as I recall, in 1959?

K: I don't know.

G: I know I was one of those, and Gene McCarthy I know was one, and about twenty others. But it really was a research group. It was not so much an activist group as it was to provide the members material. We didn't have anywhere near the staff size that they have today; I think I worked fourteen to sixteen-hour days, seven days a week for twenty years. And one of the reasons was [that] each member who wanted to do it really had to do their own research work; that Democratic Study Group, I think without doubt, was also a factor in making it possible to get some of the education legislation through.

K: Would you say that the White House, that Johnson's role in pushing for this elementary and secondary education was crucial or could it have happened without him?

G: I think that--and maybe it's because I'm biased in defending John Kennedy or in supporting him, because I had worked so hard in his campaign and we had worked together very closely after he became president and he had offered me a couple of positions. So maybe I'm overly sensitive or biased in that, but I like to think that really had he not been assassinated that the Civil Rights Act would have become law the same as it did after his assassination, and that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act would have become law. So I guess I'm unwilling to concede that it was only because of LBJ's personality, though certainly that was significant. When you have a

Green -- I -- 24

president who felt as strongly as LBJ did about the importance of education in the country, there's no question that it contributed to the success of the legislation.

Tape 1 of 1, Side 2

K: You proposed a judicial review, I guess, amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act when it was being considered by the House Education and Labor Committee. What was the reasoning behind that? There are conflicting accounts in books that have talked about the act.

G: I know at the time that it was alleged that I wanted to defeat the bill; that I was anti-Catholic. That's ridiculous; at one time I belonged to the Catholic church. They felt that if we got into an argument over church-state that it would defeat the legislation. That was not the purpose for which I introduced it. I felt that there ought to be the judicial review to protect the bill and a recent court decision supports the position I took at that time. It seemed to me it would have been just a more honest way to approach the legislation. But the wheels were greased; Hugh Carey was adamantly opposed.

K: Because he came from a heavily Catholic district in New York.

G: Yes and he was Catholic.

K: Oh, he was?

G: I like Hugh Carey, I don't say this in a derogatory way. But I just felt that it should be in the bill.

K: The point of the judicial review proposition was to enable school

Green -- I -- 25

districts to challenge the allocation formula of Title I if they felt they had not been treated fairly under it?

G: I had forgotten that part of it.

K: I know some interpretations suggest that the judicial review amendment would have allowed individual taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of the appropriations to the parochial schools. Was that your understanding of what it would do?

G: I really would like to review that debate. That's been twenty years and I really do not remember all of the thought that went into it.

K: Well, the administration's reaction I know to this--I'm sure the administration informed you of its reaction, but evidently the administration saw it as an effort to divide and conquer the Democrats. The administration thought the judicial review section was going to really alienate the parochial school interests and that it was the one issue that could split that coalition that had been very carefully constructed, beginning during the Kennedy Administration. Francis Keppel was sent out to sort of make amends with the Catholic church and to bring some of the monsignors and NEA people together and begin dialogue, and that that coalition was so fragile and that the implications of the bill were so unclear--people had different interpretations of what it was going to do--that the judicial review amendment would crack the whole thing open and that--

G: I do remember that, that the Johnson Administration did make that argument, that it would kill the bill. I did not think that it would. I felt that that was an honest approach to it, and if it were that

Green -- I -- 26

fragile, maybe we ought to reconsider it and get a bill that would stand the scrutiny. As I recall also, the proponents of it alleged that all of the churches and everybody were in back of it, which was just patently false.

K: In back of the bill itself?

G: Right. And opposed to the judicial review. I had letters from different church groups that they felt that the judicial review should be a part of the legislation.

K: I bring this up, and I'm not sure that I should, but I do recall that Adam Clayton Powell, who was chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, became very upset with you over this proposed amendment, taking the administration's view that it was going to crack this fragile coalition apart. Powell proposed what he called reprisals to the White House. Were you aware of that?

G: I don't remember that I was.

K: Oh. It may ring a bell, but I know in a memo to, I think, Doug Cater he proposed that vocational education be removed from your jurisdiction. That was under your special subcommittee on education. That was one of the things. Also that the higher education bill which the administration wanted to introduce, that that should be introduced through John Brademas instead of through you, or that he should take the lead. And also there was something about removing your sister from a committee [staff]? And LBJ saw the suggestions and responded apparently in a joking manner, "Okay, let's do all three." Did you ever--?

Green -- I -- 27

G: No, I didn't--

K: Now, why would Powell have done something like that? Was that just sort of in keeping with his general reputation for being a flamboyant individual?

G: Well, I think it's in keeping with his reputation that he would win at any cost.

K: He evidently had a very different administrative style as far as the committee was concerned than his successor, Carl Perkins, is that right?

G: Very different than his predecessor, Graham Barden, and very different than his successor, both of them.

K: How did the committee react to Powell? He is certainly a person who drew a lot of attention to himself.

G: I remember one thing, that you had to be careful when you went into his office of what you said because it was generally conceded that he was taping all the conversations. I think that when he became chairman, on the part of the liberals around the committee it was welcomed, because we had been under Graham Barden, who was so dictatorial. Usually in Congress, both in the committee and on the floor, if a person's name is mentioned, the other person is required to recognize them and to give them time, you know, "Will you recognize me to answer the charge?" I remember in 1959 there were five of us that were swing votes on that controversial labor bill, and there was a guy from New York whose name I can't remember who was working with Graham Barden; I had prepared a paper that had received the approval of all other four

Green -- I -- 28

members, five of us. Stew Udall was one, and Jim O'Hara was another, and Frank Thompson, who later got involved in Abscam. Who was the fifth one? Anyhow, the guy from New York took the witness table and for one hour--and all of the press was there--he made a scathing attack on me, personal attack. I put out a newsletter in green [ink], and I made the mistake of putting this summary of the labor legislation on my green ink duplicating machine, and [he talked about] "this green letter," so sarcastically. And Graham Barden would never recognize me during the whole hour to respond to this just scathing attack. My other colleagues, the four who joined me except for Stew Udall, were conspicuous by their absence.

Anyhow, after Graham Barden's chairmanship, certainly I felt very friendly to Adam Clayton Powell, and one of the reasons was that Graham Barden really treated Adam Clayton Powell pretty rotten. He was next in line on the Democratic side and frequently Powell would seek recognition and Graham Barden would just look over his head; he never recognized him. He was pretty badly treated. So we were very friendly to the change. Powell was flamboyant, and he had his own agenda, and he certainly changed the staff members to suit his convenience. Eventually, of course, his misuse of the committee, enough of the members were fed up with it so that we took action to remove him as chairman, and then he was censured by the House. I always thought his style--until he got mad at me on this bill, I thought he was really pretty fair in the committee. He had hidden agendas and you had to really be aware of them. I never was aware of the fact that he

Green -- I -- 29

had written those memos. I do remember that one of the--Bob Smith, who wrote for the Oregonian, was down at the White House on the day that LBJ received word that I was offering amendments to--I've forgotten whether it was ESEA or the poverty legislation--and LBJ called me every four-letter word in the book. He was just furious that I would offer amendments.

Then when Carl Perkins became chairman, his style of course was entirely different. Carl Perkins' main--he wasn't nearly as bright as Adam Clayton Powell--

K: That's what I understand.

G: --and he came from eastern Kentucky and he certainly represented eastern Kentucky. That was his world. The things that the people of eastern Kentucky needed were the things that the Congress should pass for the United States.

K: He evidently was more of a point man for the administration. I mean, I understand that when the White House gave an order to do something, he would try to do it and he would do his best to execute the President's will.

G: There was always reciprocity involved.

K: What kind?

G: Eastern Kentucky.

K: Well, as a whole did the committee function better under Perkins than under Powell?

G: Yes, I think it did, I think it did. The 1959 labor bill was highly controversial and caused a great deal of dissension in the committee.

Green -- I -- 30

But the mandatory busing, I always felt that that was a terrible mistake and I separated from the liberals on that issue. I remember one time, I've forgotten what bill it was, but I remember talking to Carl Perkins in his office. I had gone to him and told him that I was going to offer this series of amendments, and we both agreed that without the amendments the bill couldn't possibly pass. He was 100 per cent for the amendments in order to save the bill.

K: This sounds like the story behind the 1967 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

G: I was thinking that that was what it was, but I am not sure. But I do remember--this is Carl Perkins' style--I remember talking with him; we had both agreed that the amendments were desirable. And I met with not only the Republicans in this office--at his request--but also a group of southerners to get them to support this series of amendments that I was going to offer, and with Carl Perkins' full approval. A few days later, somehow something came up and I said, "Well, you're going to support these on the floor, aren't you?" And he said, "Well, you know I couldn't do that, I'd have a revolution in the committee." So on the floor--he wanted the amendments to pass, to save the bill. He worked with me in terms of getting Republican support and the necessary southern support--and the amendments did pass. But on the floor he acted like he really was opposed to them and joined the other liberal Democrats in opposition. I couldn't believe it.

K: So there was at one level collusion, and at another betrayal, or playing both hands.

Green -- I -- 31

G: He did not volunteer that he was going to oppose me on the floor; I asked him. There was something that came up and made me think, "Well, what's that guy going to do?" and so I specifically said, "You're going to support these on the floor, aren't you?" And he said, "No, you know I can't do that, Edith, I'd have a revolution in the committee."

K: Well, this sort of brings up the question of the Quie amendments which were proposed to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1967. Albert Quie, who was the Republican moderate, I think, and the ranking minority member on the committee, offered an amendment to turn some of the control which was under the 1965 authorization of the act, control of the Elementary and Secondary Education titles, to convert some of that Office of Education control to control in the hands of the state education leaders and agencies. As we mentioned, one of the problems that this created was the fear on the part of Catholic education interests. The state constitutions in the vast majority of states, thirty-five of them, had very strict prohibitions on the support of private or sectarian education, and Catholic education interests feared that this would mean the end of ESEA aid to their parochial schools.

So the White House vigorously opposed the Quie amendment. In fact, it went so far as to leak one of its education task force's recommendations. The recommendation opposed what was called general aid to elementary education. The White House leaked articles, you know, White House views and opinions, to the New York Times. I think

Green -- I -- 32

it was the reporter Marjorie Hunter who wrote some things very critical of a Quie-type program. And you offered three amendments, one of which was to adopt uniform desegregation guidelines in all states, to strip the commissioner of education of his 15 per cent discretionary funds, which had been set aside by Title V of the ESEA for state departments of education, and also to strip the commissioner of education of his Title III authority and to turn all of the money and control of the program over to the states so that all innovation money would be channeled, in effect, as it turned out, through the council of chief state school officers, who supported the Quie amendment.

Now, the administration was very upset with you over these amendments, because the administration wanted to preserve the commissioner of education's control over discretionary funds, a control over the elementary and secondary education supplementary services, over the education labs that had been established. The fear on the part of the White House was that this would in effect take the pressure on the states to produce innovation, which would help disadvantaged students, off. It would take the pressure off and the states would once again just have a little bit more money to spread around to all the school districts, and the objectives of the act would be diluted. But you thought differently.

G: I think by that time and probably for a long time before, I had come to the conclusion that that tremendous bureaucracy that we had in Washington in various departments, and we were fast getting in education, was not what we needed. I remember arguing many times that

Green -- I -- 33

all of the brains and all wisdom and all good intentions do not reside on the banks of the Potomac. That there are plenty of chief state school officers in the different states, including my state of Oregon, that wanted to do everything they possibly could to improve the quality of education. Also the evidence was pretty conclusive at that time that some of the southern states, while they had neglected education for a period of years, that their most progressive people were recognizing that and were investing far more than some of the northern states. Also that the conditions varied so much in Tallahassee, Florida from Anchorage, Alaska, and to set up one set of rules and regulations--

K: Criteria.

G: --for guidelines that would apply to Tallahassee and to Anchorage, Alaska and to the farms in the Midwest and New York City was ridiculous. And because the conditions varied, they ought to leave the rules and the regulations to the state department of education that was charged with that particular responsibility in each state. I believed it then and I believe it today. I just cannot accept this concentration of power in Washington.

K: Well, all of these amendments passed and it did end up altering the character of the acts somewhat, and Quie's amendment was defeated. Isn't there some legitimacy to the argument which you typically heard from people like John Gardner, who had come out of the foundation setting and wanted to use HEW grants like foundation projects, where you fund a little innovation here and there? Wasn't there some legit-

Green -- I -- 34

imacy to the criticism that the states could not be counted on uniformly, all fifty states, to focus money and efforts on the disadvantaged, because of the politics of states and the fact that the disadvantaged have always been a minority and are not represented in political circles by very persuasive individuals, not represented at all in many cases?

G: I have tremendous respect for John Gardner. He was one of the best. But, I think I argued then--and we had hearings across the United States--and I think I argued at that time that there would be a few states that might fall flat on their face. It seems to me that there was some state, and I'm not sure it wasn't Kansas, that had an elected school superintendent and they paid him ten thousand dollars a year. You certainly aren't going to beckon to the brightest and the best people to run for state superintendent of schools at that salary, even in those days. Without doubt, there would be states that would misuse the money and would do nothing of great consequence, but that it was my contention that in the big majority of states they would be much more able to make a contribution to academic excellence than if the Washington bureaucracy drew up the rules and regs and passed out the money.

I think in connection with that, when we got into the Job Corps, and I had visited them all over the country, the best Job Corps program that I ever saw was here in Oregon; it was in the little town of Estacada; it was run by the labor unions. Only boys in this particular Job Corps; they built houses, and they gained this hands-on

Green -- I -- 35

experience, from digging the foundation to pouring the cement to putting up the siding to doing all of the finishing work and all of the cabinet-laying and the wallpapering and doing the plumbing and the electrical work and putting in the sidewalks and doing the landscaping. Then the houses were sold, and as I recall, the boys in that Job Corps would benefit by some of the profit from the sale of that house. But here was, to me, a wonderful demonstration project of what we could do in terms of vocational education. We did not need the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. to say to the people in Oregon, well now, you have to do this sort of a thing. There are people, and there were then and there still are people, at every state level who are just as bright, just as ingenious, just as innovative as the people in Washington. But for some reason, so many people who have been in the state legislatures or they've been governors, as soon as they get to Washington they think the only people that really ought to make decisions are the ones that are in the federal government; I think it's just a lot of baloney. I think it's one of the reasons we're in the trouble we are.

K: I wanted to ask you a little bit about one of the things that occurred to me in the course of looking over materials on this issue. There was such a big stream of memos between HEW and the White House over these amendments that Quie was proposing and the amendments that you countered with and what all of this would mean for administration of the ESEA and so forth. One of the things that occurred to me, taking maybe a little bit of a devil's advocate's view, is why did it matter

Green -- I -- 36

so much? Why was the federal control such an issue when at that time, and even less than is true now, the percentage of federal support--the federal government underwrote approximately 8 to 10 per cent of the entire elementary and secondary education budget in the United States. We're not talking about huge amounts of money. Why was it such an issue? Why did people really care that much? Was it the principle or was it going against the historical grain of the country?

G: Well, I think in some places it was that margin that would make the difference, that every state with their own funds could go up to a certain level, but if they had this additional 10 per cent or 8 per cent or whatever it was, and were able to really use those to the best advantage, it might make an awful lot of difference.

I also came to the conclusion that whenever you started any new program--I think this has been one of the great frustrations in the last thirty years--and you have the best of intentions when you set it up, that it develops a bureaucracy of its own, and you get people in there that are far more interested in keeping their jobs or creating high-priced jobs, and they really couldn't care less about the money going to the intended beneficiaries. I found this out time after time after time, and after I came back to Oregon I found out the same thing. I don't know what there is about the human race, but you start out the program and you think, well, now it's going to accomplish this and this and this, and you've got that damn bureaucracy that just has a life of its own.

K: Self-interest takes over.

Green -- I -- 37

G: Yes. And the other thing that was important, it seemed to me, even though the federal share was small, it was important to set the precedent, because if the federal government's share was to become greater, and there were all indications that it would, that it was important to establish the fact that we were not going to have the decision-making on the banks of the Potomac, that the people in Oregon were just as smart as the people back there.

K: Another piece of legislation that came up in 1967 was the Education Professions Development Act. You had something to do with that, didn't you? This was the act that provided funds for the training of teachers and administrators. I think the idea was that we had created all these Great Society education programs but didn't have any program to develop the manpower to help run them. I saw some reference that--

G: Yes, there was a Teacher Corps bill.

K: The Teacher Corps, which had been enacted under the Higher Education Act of 1965, was one of the titles there, was transferred to this new Education Professions Development Act in 1967. And that you had had some problems with the Teachers Corps. You didn't like it too much, is that right?

G: That's my recollection. I don't recall too much about it, though, to tell you the truth. And I haven't had a chance to review it.

K: I know it was a pet project of the administration and that there was some resentment at the local level against the national government sending people in to teach in the schools.

Green -- I -- 38

G: As I recall, one of the problems that came from the educators--and I really should have reviewed this, because I'm pretty hazy on it--but it seems to me that you established a two-tier or a three-tier system of responsibility. That you had your local teachers who were paid at the local level a certain amount, and then you sent in the Teacher Corps and they could be paid with federal funds. I think it was creating problems and a lot of resentment. Again, I think pretty much the longer I worked in the Washington area the more I became convinced of the importance of local control.

K: And that evidently the Teacher Corps, some changes were made in the program to give the localities greater control over the use of those people and also the issues concerning their salaries and that sort of thing. I don't know the details on that.

We've talked a lot about the Elementary and Secondary Education [Act]. I wanted to switch a little bit to Higher Education, if that's all right.

G: I remember far more about Higher Education than I do about ESEA.

K: I guess the passage of the ESEA in 1965 almost overshadowed the passage of the Higher Education Act that year. But this act was also a major breakthrough because it was the first program of sort of unconditional grants or scholarships to needy students. Prior to that we had had the National Defense Education Act, the student loan provision, and there were certain provisos attached, contingencies, to that program, although I have to say I'm one of the people who benefitted from that program. But there was also, as I understand it, some

Green -- I -- 39

opposition in the House at large to the idea of giving students grants rather than loans. What was the origin of that? Can you shed a little light on that?

G: As I recall there were two--well, there were lots of arguments. As I remember, that was a real fight, but I think we got that through the House--the 1963 act and the 1965 act both, we succeeded in getting the committee bill pretty much through the House and maintained it in the conference with the Senate.

K: I think that's right.

G: I recall--well, the NDEA in 1958 provided, as you said, just the loan program. And in 1965, as I recall, we added the economic opportunity grants for the low income students, and we provided the grants or the loans through the banks--

K: Federally subsidized.

G: --for the middle income. A tremendous feeling, and I was one of those who felt very, very strongly that the middle income group was having the toughest time. That we had lots of programs for the poor or the underprivileged or the people of low income, but the middle income family that had no housing subsidy, no food stamps, no free medical care, no free legal aid; they had no special programs of any kind. They had to provide all of the money to get their kids through college as well as pay the taxes to send other kids to college. Then in addition to that, as I recall we had--we called it the three-legged stool. We had the economic opportunity grants, and the loans, and the work-study, those three. There were some who felt that we should

Green -- I -- 40

never give grants, that it all should be in loans, and that people should repay, and also that it should be done through the banks. That neither the university nor the federal government should be called upon to do all of the necessary book work and so on that was required and since it was to be loans, turn it all over to the banks.

I think that this is probably one of the things that I am most proud of during the years I was in Congress. I was the author of the equal pay for equal work act in 1963 and I take considerable pride in that, and also the 1972 Higher Ed Act, Title IX, that ended discrimination in all education programs on the basis of sex. That was one--

K: Radically changed higher education.

E: Yes, it did. But that was one hell of a fight. I could never get Title IX out of my subcommittee. Thompson and Brademas always opposed it, joined with the Republicans. Finally, after two years, I decided to take it to the full committee; I visited every office and when I knew that I had the votes--I offered Title IX as an amendment in the full committee. Title IX was approved in the full committee and approved in the Senate. It's now the law.

But you know, we said a few moments ago that these twenty years were years of tremendous change, and certainly they were years of great change for women. I've looked back and I think that the 1965 Higher Ed Act and Title IX of the Higher Ed Act of 1972 have had a more positive influence on the lives of women than any other of legislation, including the efforts to get the ERA through. You can have

Green -- I -- 41

all the equal rights in the world, but if you don't have any money to go to college, what does it mean to have those rights? When I graduated from high school I think 5 per cent of the female high school graduates finished college. I remember the testimony, voluminous testimony, when I--I held the first hearings that were ever held on sex discrimination. Equal pay for equal work was one of the bills I lobbied John Kennedy [for] when we were traveling around Oregon, to get him to support this and a juvenile delinquency prevention act. I introduced the first bill on equal pay in 1955 and I couldn't get hearings on it. They'd had lots of hearings on discrimination on the basis of race but none on the basis of sex. And the reason I say the 1965 act and Title IX are more important for women than anything else, it allowed women for the first time to have equal opportunities in going to college. Because traditionally in the United States, a middle income family, if they have two sons and two daughters, who's going to get the money to go to college? The sons, because, quote, "they are going to have to be the breadwinners of the family," unquote. And so the girls in the family stayed home. You can watch the charts, you can just study the enrollment at colleges and universities prior to 1965, from the time I finished high school all through those years, and then from 1965 on.

So you had equal rights, but you can't do anything with your rights. You're in that, quote, "airtight cage of poverty," the same as the blacks maintained they were. But when it was possible for a woman who wanted to go to college, who wanted a career, who wanted a

Green -- I -- 42

professional position, she had the chance to borrow money or to get a grant or to have work-study and get that degree in college which would open the doors. I think the 1965 and 1972 acts have done more for women than any other legislation, because it made it possible for her to achieve her objectives, and I don't think that's generally recognized.

K: You mentioned that one of the sort of struggles in the Congress was over this issue of we want to support the disadvantaged, but also there is the problem of the middle class without all the benefits, the federal and state subsidies that are provided to the economically disadvantaged. In I believe it was in the mid-sixties, 1966 maybe, a really interesting proposal gained currency, and it was backed by one of the White House's little study groups, a group headed by Jerrold Zacharias of MIT. The study group endorsed the idea of creating a federal educational opportunity bank, which would have been, after an initial grant, self-financing because students would repay graduated payments according to their income over many, like twenty years' time or some such thing, out of a deduction out of their tax returns. The administration didn't really endorse the idea or really back off [from] the idea. It floated the balloon and it got shot down by the National Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities, and there was a lot of writing, in journals, magazines, academic journals. The idea gained currency among the academics, economists particularly, because it endorsed the market power of student choice.

Green -- I -- 43

This was obviously a program that would have been ideal in some ways for helping the middle class. Was it ever discussed?

G: Yes, I remember it kind of vaguely. As I recall, the three-legged stool of student financial aid was preferable to that. There was also, as I recall, a lot of feeling that the bookkeeping and the paperwork connected with it would be horrendous. I'm not sure, but it seems to me there was some feeling that success should not be penalized. That if you really worked hard, why, you were going to have to pay back more than if you weren't successful. And there certainly was the question of possible sex discrimination, the commonly held belief-- women never would achieve much success and therefore they would not pay back as much to the colleges! Would this lead to additional barriers for women in terms of college admission standards? Some colleges already required higher G.P.A.s for women. Since women college graduates earned less than male college graduates, the men obviously were going to be more successful and they would return more money to the colleges.

K: And there was no consideration of the fact that women generally were paid less than men and had fewer opportunities to earn the kind of money that men had.

G: Everybody accepted that at that time. You know, I look back--I'm not a militant women's libber, I really am not, and I think that some have done a great disservice. But when you look back over the period of years that I've lived, the various kinds of very blatant discrimination and the various kinds of very subtle discrimination that occurred,

Green -- I -- 44

but it was accepted that women would never earn the salaries that men would. Therefore if you had this kind of a program that you would pay back on the basis of how much you were going to earn, that it would be unfair to men--and because women did not earn as much--colleges, in their own self-interest--financial interest--might maintain different admission requirements, favoring applications from young men.

But I think the three programs--the economic opportunity grant and the new loan, the guaranteed student loan, which was designed especially for the middle income family, and the work-study program--we felt that that kind of accommodation was much preferable. These in addition to the NDEA program.

K: Now, this issue of enlarging student support, or focusing on student support, really came to a head in the debate over the 1972 education amendments. If I can give just a little tiny bit of background, there was a move within the White House, while Johnson was president, from about late 1966 through 1968, to propose a program of institutional aid grants to colleges on the basis of enrollment and a percentage of instructional costs. This was a proposal that had been endorsed by one of Johnson's education task forces, one that was headed by William Friday of North Carolina. The report gave a resounding endorsement to the idea in 1967. The White House, particularly Joseph Califano and James Gaither, liked the idea very much and wanted to include it in the administration's 1968 higher education proposals, but they ran into a stone wall in the form of John Gardner, Budget Director Charles Schultze, and Harold Howe, and also from Clark Kerr, who had just

Green -- I -- 45

started chairing the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, to which he had been appointed. So the administration dropped the idea. In the meantime, before Johnson went out of office, the Carnegie Commission came out with its report, Quality and Equality, its first report, probably the most famous of the reports, in which it said institutional aid grants is a nice idea in theory but when you look at all the practical problems that you're going to run into, it's not going to work. Focus aid through categorical programs and through student aid, let those be the main avenues of federal support of higher education. And then an HEW in-house panel which Johnson had appointed, headed by Alice Rivlin while she was assistant secretary for planning and evaluation, came to almost identical conclusions with the Carnegie Commission's report. They issued its report just shortly after the Carnegie Commission issued Quality and Equality.

Well, to make a long story short, the higher education groups, with the exception of the Carnegie Commission, everyone fell in line--and this was sort of unusual I guess for higher education to fall in line behind one idea, given the differences in the sectors--behind the idea of some form of institutional aid for higher education that wasn't of a very specific categorical nature. And they came to you, did they not, in the early seventies? What was your reaction?

G: I can't remember what year that was brought down. I was sympathetic to it. It seemed to me that if we could provide--we'd already given grants for facilities, buildings, libraries--the money for operating expenses that they then would be able to hold the tuition costs down,

Green -- I -- 46

and that the students would be the eventual beneficiaries of such a plan. I remember it did run into a buzz saw.

We didn't get very far with it, I know that. I can't remember too much about that, but I do remember it being brought to my attention and I was friendly to the idea.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

K: Well, you had mentioned that the proposal for institutional aid grants hadn't really gotten anywhere, that they were generally sympathetic. But I was wondering, in reading about that period, whether Congress was becoming increasingly impatient with higher education and thought on the one hand they're crying wolf about their financial plight, and really on the other hand thinking that a current underneath this rejection of their institutional aid request, that Congress was feeling that the campuses had not done a very good job of keeping their own houses in order, particularly during the late sixties in the protests over Vietnam and all sorts of other things. That there had been so much disruption that members of Congress just did not view higher education as sympathetically as they might have had this issue come up prior to that very turbulent period.

G: Yes, the Vietnam period was very difficult. I remember Brademas, one of the violent opponents of that approach, and [Walter] Mondale and I think it was the guy from Rhode Island, I can't think of his name--

K: That does ring a bell.

G: [Claiborne] Pell. They really distrusted the colleges, and they felt that the colleges would favor the elite. Pell, especially, he talked

Green -- I -- 47

about all of the disadvantaged kids in his--Rhode Island, isn't that where [he's from]?--his state, and how they never had a chance to go to colleges, and the colleges never would give them a fair shake.

I think that the violence on the campuses was a separate issue but was a good excuse for some to oppose federal aid. I really do not think, as I recall, that they were that--

K: That didn't influence their judgment?

G: Vietnam didn't help. There were some, however, who just simply did not trust colleges. An anti-elitism. Maybe that's an oversimplification. Because on the violence on the campuses, this was another time when I separated from the liberal members of Congress. There were two reasons that I did it: one, I really was offended by a lot of the campus unrest where the professors and administration joined with the kids in the violence, which seemed to me totally uncalled for and did nothing but harm to everybody. I remember a speech Mel Laird made, that if on a college campus, students demonstrated, caused violence or vandalism resulted, all federal funds should be cut off. [Inaudible]

K: Now, this came up during the discussion of 1968 amendments.

G: Yes, I believe 1968. I took violent exception to that view. I can't remember what amendment I offered, but I did offer some amendment, and it was really to try to quell the opposition, to say yes, we're concerned about it but we're not going to go as far as Mel Laird wanted to go in just saying "if you disagree with us on the Vietnam War--and some students or some students and some faculty demonstrate--

Green -- I -- 48

accompanied by trashing--destruction of property--violence--then the institution receives no federal funds."

K: I remember what your amendment was, I think. You offered an amendment which proposed that all universities submit a plan for handling student disobedience.

G: That's right. That is correct. And there would be no federal control over the plan. It was to simply say that a lot of colleges and universities have not really thought this through and they have not tried to think of what they would do if violence occurred. As I recall, I gave some examples where it came as a complete surprise to the college administration. They had absolutely no warning that it was coming. One, I felt that it would be good as far as the university was concerned to have that plan of action, to think it through. And secondly, that it would say to the people who at that time felt like Mel Laird did, that Congress is concerned about student violence, destruction of property. It is an effort to minimize the anti-college sentiment because of campus violence in opposition to Vietnam. We needed every bit of support we could get from Congress from higher ed.

K: This issue, the anti-student disruption problem, movement, was being discussed in tandem with the problem of the draft and the effect of the draft on college students and the supply of graduate students. And you led a sort of an effort to get the President and I guess General Hershey, who was head of the Selective Service Commission--is that right?--to deal with the problem of drafting. I guess boys who were graduating from college in 1968 were going to be the first ones

Green -- I -- 49

called up the following year, and so that meant a lot of those students wouldn't be going on for their graduate training. Do you remember any--?

G: I remember parts of that. I had always felt that a lot of young men took unfair advantage of escaping the draft; they would either study to be a minister--having no interest in really being ministers--or spend sixteen years in graduate education because they were exempt from the draft. That seemed to me to be unfair. I don't know whether you recorded--did you?--the exchange of letters I had with Hershey?

K: Yes. Yes.

G: That was on your--?

K: Yes. Your feeling was that a more random selection process needed to be substituted for the calling up of those who had been deferred because of college education?

G: If we're going to have war and people are going to be drafted, it ought to be as fair and equitable as possible and not depend on whether a person can spend seven years in graduate education or decide that he's going into the ministry and therefore escape it.

K: Now, in the debate over the 1972 education amendments, the scholars who have written on that have said the upshot of the amendments was that the commitment to equalizing educational opportunity was confirmed, because I guess they instituted something that later was called the Pell grants and basic educational opportunity grants, BEOG. That the tide was essentially turning away from the idea of considering more substantial federal support of institutions and that

Green -- I -- 50

the flow of federal funds would continue to go through students and in fact be enlarged. You mentioned before that you led the drive to incorporate the Title IX amendment, which prevented discrimination against women on the college campus. Was that intended to cover students and employees?

G: Yes. Students and faculty.

K: There was a court case over that, wasn't there, later in the seventies? It may have been in the eighties, in fact.

G: Yes, there was.

K: The [inaudible].

G: And it was a terrible misreading of the congressional intent, because we debated that on the floor. It was to cover not only faculty salaries, that there would be no discrimination on the basis of sex. That if a woman had the same educational background, the same experience, that she should be paid the same amount as a male professor.

K: And this included staff people?

G: All.

K: All the way down the line?

G: That there should no longer be any discrimination in terms of admission standards. For many, many years colleges would establish a higher GPA for women applicants.

K: University of Virginia probably was one of the most notorious, yes.

G: A lot of them did. And Title IX also amended the Civil Rights Act. People have forgotten that Title IX included the amendment to the Civil Rights Act that now is just put over as an amendment to the

Green -- I -- 51

Civil Rights [Act], but that originated in Title IX of the Higher Education Act.

I remember one of the funny things. I told you I couldn't get it out of the subcommittee.

K: Yes. What was the problem there?

G: The male members of that subcommittee, all the Republicans and Brademas and Thompson were the swing votes. They just felt it was perfectly all right to discriminate against women. We had that also in terms of athletics. I remember arguing with them that there probably were quite a few Billie Jean Kings in the world, and that if women who paid the same tuition and the same fees at the college or university, they should have access to athletic scholarships; it was only fair and just. Anyhow, I worked on that really for about two years. That 1972 act was probably one of the worst disappointments to me in my whole twenty years in Congress. We finally--I took it to the full committee without Title IX as an amendment to the Higher Ed Act of 1972. I'll always remember one opponent's eloquence, "If this amendment passes, we'll not only have stewardesses on airplanes, but we'll have stewards!" And the committee room was pretty filled and there was just a roar of laughter over it. Imagine! How awful! Stewards on airplanes!

As I said before, the 1965 Education Act, which made it possible for women to go to college without the financial barriers, the Equal Pay Act, and Title IX of the Higher Ed Act have done a great deal for women and I'm very glad I played a part in those legislative efforts.

Green -- I -- 52

When I watched the Olympics last time, I really took quite a lot of pleasure in the fact that Title IX made it possible for a lot of those women athletes--

K: That's exactly the thought that crossed through my mind, too. Almost all of them were on college athletic scholarships.

G: Yes. Yes. I really feel that my efforts in those three areas have really contributed in terms of the opportunities that women have, today.

But anyhow, the Higher Ed Act, if you want to go to that now, the 1972 act.

K: Yes.

G: In the House, we defeated the Pell amendment. Quie offered it, the basic education opportunity grants. Their theory was, again, one of not trusting colleges and universities. If you recall, the NDEA loans, the guaranteed student loans, the work-study and the equal opportunity grants were all under the jurisdiction of the college. The kid would apply, the young man or young woman would apply to the college, and if he or she were admitted, the college person would put together a package that would make it possible for that young man or that young woman to go to college. And the student had full opportunity to choose the college or university of his or her choice, and they would make applications in more than one place.

I opposed the Pell grant, the basic educational opportunity grant, because it took decisions entirely away from the college. BEOG had some mathematical formula that if you had this and this, and if

Green -- I -- 53

your parents had this and this money, and they put it on a computer and if it came out thus and so, well, then you were entitled to X number of dollars in the basic educational opportunity grant. It just seemed to me that if we would expand the EOG, the educational opportunity grant, enlarge that, instead of establishing a new one and then ask the college to put the total financial aid package together for the student. Not treat BEOG separately.

K: Wasn't it aimed at the same constituency, both EOG and BEOG, aimed at the disadvantaged student?

G: Yes. Yes. But again, that was the same distrust of the college or university. When we spoke a moment ago about financial aid to an institution and if they had that money they would be able to decrease the tuition and fees and therefore make it possible for more kids to go, there was that distrust of colleges and universities, and the Pell grant was based entirely on distrust of the colleges and universities.

K: Had there been any hard evidence of misuse of college funds or inappropriate use of the existing program?

G: I do not remember one iota of such evidence, not one iota. I remember Pell raving about his kids in Rhode Island, the poor kids that weren't going to college and blaming it on the colleges and universities.

I was the manager of the floor bill in 1972 and we defeated that amendment in the House. I remember when it came to the appointment of the conferees, Carl Albert loaded the House conference committee with the opponents of the House position on the 1972 Higher Ed Act. I went in to see Carl and I said, "You have loaded it. You have made the

Green -- I -- 54

majority of the House conference committee, people who voted for the amendments that the House defeated."

But anyhow, I had fought very hard and I had worked for a good two years on that Higher Ed Act of 1972. I think there was one amendment that I did not defeat in the House. As I said, I managed the bill. But other than that, we were able to defend the bill as it came out of the committee in every instance except this one amendment, and I can't remember what that was. But then I knew that as soon as the conferees were appointed that the House-approved bill was dead. And we also had mandatory busing as an extra burden on the Higher Ed act.

G: In the conference committee I held the proxies of three or four of the people on the committee, and Brademas held the proxy of Phil Burton. A vote came to the amount of the EOG. And Brademas cast Phil Burton's vote in favor of cutting EOG. Later, I saw Phil and I said, "Phil, why did you instruct Brademas to vote against EOG? You always supported it in the committee." He was on my subcommittee. And he said, "Did Brademas vote that way?" and I said, "He sure did. He cast your proxy that way." And he said, "I'm going to call him." Brademas had done directly opposite of what Phil Burton had told him to. And we had a special meeting that night, special committee [meeting] to reverse that action. It was the whole purpose of calling the extra [meeting].

K: Well, what was his motive in reducing the EOG?

G: To support the BEOG--Pell's program--that the House had defeated.

Green -- I -- 55

The final conference committee, I got up and left at 5:00 a.m. I tried to get them to adjourn, because we had gone in at two o'clock in the afternoon, and I said, "Nobody can think straight after fifteen hours"--and there were a couple of them drunk. I said, "It's just not the way to do legislation." But anyhow. . . .

K: So you were on record for opposing the busing as a solution to--?

G: Absolutely. I think it's one of the worst social mistakes we have made.

K: You said something about Mondale in 1964.

G: Mondale was the greatest proponent of mandatory busing. In 1972 in the conference he insisted on the Senate position on that, and for some reason felt that if we just would put all the black children and the white children together in a certain ratio, certain number of them sitting side by side, that we'd immediately have an improved quality of education and equality of opportunity. And I thought, what a contrast. I remember in 1964 at the Democratic National Convention, I had been asked to be on the credentials committee, and we went a few days early to the convention and had hearings from various people in the southern states. This is right after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As I recall, Martin Luther King was there working with me on that, along with Aaron Henry, Andy Young and several other people. I was persuaded that there had been systematic exclusion of the blacks in the voting process, and the big fight was over the seating of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. There was the regular Democratic Party from Mississippi and the Freedom Democratic Party

Green -- I -- 56

from Mississippi. On the credentials committee I took the position that there ought to be a compromise and that we ought to have a certain number from the regular Democratic Party and a certain number from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. Mondale led the opposition to that and was opposed to the seating of a single black in the Mississippi delegation on the floor of the convention. Now, this was at a time when your commitment to civil rights and your standing up and being counted could have meant something. It was fine for him to be in favor of mandatory busing in 1972, but [not] in favor of letting a single black from Mississippi serve in that state's delegation at the convention in 1964. His compromise--if you can call it that--allowed one black--from Mississippi--to be a delegate-at-large, but not to be seated as a part of the Mississippi delegation. As I recall, it was Aaron Henry.

There was a rule that you had to have a certain percentage of the members of the credentials committee in order to file a minority report, which was a sensible rule. You had I don't know how many, I've forgotten whether there were two people from every state or one person from every state--I think it was one person from every state on the credentials committee. And it would be silly to have three people out of fifty in favor of this or that and file a minority report. I had more than the required number to file a minority report on the position to seat part of the regular party and part of the Freedom Democratic Party in the Mississippi delegation.

Green -- I -- 57

I am absolutely persuaded that the scenario was as follows: that LBJ said to Hubert Humphrey, "If you can prevent a floor fight over civil rights, you will be the next vice president of the United States." And Hubert Humphrey said to the then-Attorney General of Minnesota, "If you can prevent a minority report from coming out of the credentials committee on civil rights, you will be the next senator from Minnesota."

On the night when the credentials committee was to report, the first night of the convention--Governor [David] Lawrence was the chairman of the credentials committee, and John Bailey from Connecticut was the chairman of the national Democratic Party. John McCormack was presiding. The agenda had been given out to every delegate, and with the three-hour difference in time, the credentials report was going to come up the last item on the agenda, which would be around eleven or twelve o'clock. I've forgotten whether the convention was called together at eight o'clock or nine o'clock, whichever. Oregon was out caucusing precisely on this issue of the minority report on civil rights, the seating of this Mississippi Democratic Party. Wisconsin was out caucusing. California was out caucusing. New York was out caucusing. Pennsylvania was out caucusing. I came in with the Oregon delegation at about fifteen minutes after the convention had been gavelled to order, and it was all over. John McCormack, the first thing, had reversed the agenda and he called on Governor Lawrence of Pennsylvania to give the report of the credentials committee, when he knew damn good and well that all of these

Green -- I -- 58

states were out caucusing on the credentials committee minority report. He gave the report as if there weren't any dispute or anything else, and John McCormack gaveled and said, "Without objection the credentials report is accepted." Then I came in fifteen minutes afterward and I went up to him and I said, "This seems to me pretty dirty politics." John McCormack just kind of smiled as if, well, that's the way it is. But it was one of the hard lessons in 1964 in the way politics sometimes does operate. But I don't think there was any question that the scenario which I outlined was accurate.

K: It certainly sounds feasible.

I had a couple of things I wanted to talk to you about, and one, when you were talking about the problem of blacks and education and the issue of busing, this prompted me to remember one thing that occurred to me about the developing colleges title of the Higher Education Act, which according to all reports was intended largely as a means to aid traditionally or historically black colleges who were sort of out on the financial margins of higher education. And that you had held hearings on the subject of the marginal colleges a good year before the Higher Education Act was passed.

G: The administration opposed it then.

K: Right, and you pressed [Francis] Keppel to incorporate something like this in the legislation, and the 1964 Gardner education task force that Johnson appointed proposed some aid to developing colleges. My question is, every time this title has come up for reauthorization in the last twenty years there has been a big fight over who is supposed

Green -- I -- 59

to benefit from it. According to the most recent reports in the Chronicle of Higher Education--I guess the reauthorization hearings took place about two weeks ago--the committee, I guess this fellow named [William] Ford from Michigan, [who] is now on the House Education and Labor Committee, was saying that all the complaints he gets from the black college spokesmen about how this act was originally designed to help them don't hold water, because there's nothing in the legislative history which indicates, there's no reference to black colleges. You were quoted in the article as having said, "Yes, this was intended to primarily aid the black colleges." But that Fordham has a right to have money for its computer center, the community colleges have a right to have money. This is the greatest discretionary spending program in the Office of Education and that it's really up to the Congress and Office of Education to decide who should get this money in view of the absence of a specific reference to black colleges in the legislative history. My question to you is if it was so clear that that was the intent of this title, why wasn't some designation made? Why were people afraid to say, "We hope by establishing this title to promote the education of blacks at traditionally black to shore up, strengthen, and improve these institutions"?

G: I think the reason is very basic and I think it has application today. I was a strong supporter of the Civil Rights Act. I think innumerable times I showed my support. I was invited down to the White House when he signed the Civil Rights Bill. I think the march in Washington in 1963 probably was one of the most awe-inspiring sights I'd ever seen.

Green -- I -- 60

I felt very strongly on civil rights. In voting for the Civil Rights Act I did not want to substitute one form of discrimination for another form of discrimination. At that time there would have been a headline in every paper across the country if I had introduced a bill for white colleges only, and I think it would have been clear discrimination.

K: You mean for black colleges only.

G: No, I mean if I had introduced a bill that this money shall go for white colleges only, there would be headlines in every paper across the country. I felt it was equally wrong to say that we are going to have funds for black colleges only. I considered it a form of discrimination. And I feel the same way today.

Any time that you show preferential treatment for one person or for one group of people, you obviously are showing discrimination against all of the other groups.

Now, to get back to the real meaning of the developing institutions, there is no doubt in my mind that when I introduced that bill it was primarily designed, not exclusively, but primarily designed for the black colleges. And the reason was very clear. At that time, when I think I held the first hearings on that, it was either in 1962 or 1963, and by far the large majority of blacks had to go, had to go, to the black colleges, and by far the largest majority of those black colleges were offering an inferior education, and it seemed to me patently unfair. If this was the fact of life, that the blacks, out of choice or out of necessity, were still being educated at black

Green -- I -- 61

colleges, then just in terms of the national interest, we ought to do something to improve the quality of education that these young people were receiving. We could not, I could not, say that this was for black colleges only, and I don't think it would ever pass. It just seems to me that anybody with an ounce of sense wouldn't vote for it.

I have been on a board of an Oregon community foundation, and I get pretty upset, I guess is the word, when black groups come and they want funds for black this or black that. My answer to them [is], "Would it be all right with you if then we give an allocation of funds to the white education group or to the white this or the white that?" No. Oh, no, that's something else. I see no difference in it at all. The fact that we could not say that it was and did not want to say that it was exclusively for black colleges made it possible for all of this argument since, I suppose. But that was the intent, and there certainly were white colleges that were developing institutions, also.

K: And junior colleges and community colleges.

G: And junior colleges that were just starting out.

K: I heard that they had sort of seized on the term "developing colleges" as a way to justify their inclusion.

G: The community colleges got pretty selfish. We didn't really intend that as a community college bill; they had their own legislation. But anyhow, that's the history of it and what happened.

K: As I said, it's been an issue almost every reauthorization hearing, including the most recent.

Green -- I -- 62

- G: Well, if they'd looked at the committee hearings testimony, you know, you have to go back to that and not to the debate on the floor only. But the testimony was the black colleges couldn't charge the tuition and fees anywhere near comparable to what the white colleges and universities were charging at that time. And they simply could not get the kind of professors. It seemed to me, as I said, just in the national interest, if we could provide a better education for more blacks, we could be doing everybody a service.
- K: Well, now that blacks have access to other institutions of higher education, do you think we should still be subsidizing black colleges?
- G: That's a different issue.
- K: I think one of the things that I've read or [that] was pointed out to me when I asked this question of someone else about the developing colleges, what was intended--oh, I had talked to Thomas Pettigrew, who served on the Friday education task force in 1966 and 1967, because the task force was very concerned about developing colleges. But one of the things that he pointed out was that the black colleges then and now accept students who wouldn't be accepted at a lot of other four-year colleges, who come from marginal academic backgrounds, need a tremendous amount of remedial work, and they get it at these black colleges.
- G: That was true then though, too.
- K: Yes, that's what he said. It was true then and it's true now, still.
- G: I think that's absolutely true, and I think that--I haven't looked at statistics recently, but I suspect it's no different than it was a few

Green -- I -- 63

years ago, that still the largest number of blacks are going to black colleges for a variety of reasons. But I think one of the unfortunate things that happened was that a lot of the prestigious colleges wanted to prove that they were entirely fair and they would offer special inducements for the brightest and best black students and best black professors, which was really a great disservice. So at a black college that desperately needed an outstanding professor, if nothing else to provide leadership, to provide academic stimulation, to provide an incentive to others to improve the whole quality of education at that college, here comes a Harvard or a Yale or a Princeton or some other college, and they offer the guy three times the salary that he's getting at that black college. And the Harvard or Yale or Princeton no more needs one more good professor than the man in the moon, but in terms of proving they are liberal, and to meet affirmative action quotas, they are hurting the black leadership in black colleges.

K: Well, don't you think that's a consequence of the affirmative action program?

G: Sure I do. Sure. Sure it is. But it hasn't improved the quality of education one bit. If there were an incentive. . . . I remember arguing for an exchange of professors. I felt that at a college, even though they weren't recognized as one of the outstanding colleges academically in the country, that if they could have a couple of just really outstanding professors, it would raise the whole level of teaching in the college. Reed College, here in my city, is one of the best academic colleges, and I remember using it [as an example]. That

Green -- I -- 64

if a couple of professors from Reed College would be willing to go to Tuskegee or, well, to one of the others not as good as Tuskegee, and Reed College would continue to pay the same salary that they were paying the professor--he would not have to take a cut--and the professor from that sister institution could come to Reed, either as a graduate student or as a professor for a year, it would raise the academic quality of the black colleges. I don't remember whether that ever became a part of the law.

K: Yes, it did, and I'm trying to remember whether it was part of the 1965 developing colleges title, or whether it was part of the 1968 higher education amendments, because I know there were proposals to increase that kind of activity between the black colleges and sister institutions generated by the White House or came out of the White House. So whether that particular one was among those or among an earlier group [I don't remember], but I do believe it was in fact part of the act at some point.

G: I've forgotten. I just remembered that was a part of the original bill that I had envisioned, and I remember when we had hearings about the quality of education in the black colleges. But I think that if those hearings are still available, it would really establish the fact that it was designed especially for black colleges. Because I remember several of the presidents of black colleges came and testified.

K: Well, one of the things I did want to hear you speak a little bit about was your relations with the Johnson White House and to address specifically the suggestion that they became increasingly strained

Green -- I -- 65

during Johnson's term in office, in part because of your independence, and in part because of your criticism. You took an early stand against escalation of the war, you and a few other congressmen. I wanted you to address also the fact that in spite of the administration reacting in a negative way toward some of the things that you did, there was a real effort on the part of the White House to court you throughout. Judging by the things that I have come across in the files, you were invited to lunch with Douglass Cater, even though the White House was upset with you over your counterproposals to the Quie amendment and things of that nature. Can you talk a little bit about that?

G: I guess I had mixed feelings about LBJ, and probably part of it goes back to 1959 and 1960 when I was very active in John Kennedy's campaign and at the convention when the LBJ headquarters were distributing a lot of campaign material that was anti-Catholic. I thought the rottenest material that was produced at that convention against Kennedy came from the LBJ office and it did not make me very happy. I had not been a particular admirer of his because I had heard all the stories in the Senate about twisting arms and Bobby Baker's involvement. And then the assassination of Kennedy and the stories that were circulating at that time, true or untrue. Yes, it didn't make me feel very enthusiastic about Johnson being president of the United States.

At the same time, I say this: there are some things I liked about Johnson. I agreed with him in terms of his placing education in a

Green -- I -- 66

high priority, although I disagreed with some of the ways in which he would achieve those goals. We did disagree on some things and I'm sure it strained the relationship. The Job Corps, when I suggested that the Job Corps ought to be for girls as well as boys, I got a lot of static from the Johnson Administration. They really did not like to be challenged, and especially by a woman. Now again, maybe I'm oversensitive. I say on the one hand I'm not really a women's libber, but at the same time the message came through loud and clear that since I was just a woman I ought to just accept whatever they said as being superior wisdom. I had no right to challenge the decisions "they" made.

We did amend the Job Corps bill--and the program became available for girls as well as boys, though a smaller number of places for girls.

I remember on an education bill during those years there was a panel of school superintendents, and they talked with great pride about the special classes they had for disadvantaged boys, and when it came my turn to question them I said, "Did you choose your words carefully? Do you mean that you had classes only for disadvantaged boys? You didn't have any for disadvantaged girls?" And that same answer, "Well, the boys have to be the breadwinners and, no, we do not have any for disadvantaged girls." And I already had the figures on the number of girls unemployed between sixteen and twenty-four. I said, "Why don't you have classes for both boys and girls, or at least have classes for disadvantaged girls, too?" One male colleague asked

Green -- I -- 67

me if I'd yield and I said sure. He said in a very sarcastic way, "I suppose on that basis the gentlewoman from Oregon would be opposed to having segregated classes for unwed mothers," and I said, "I sure would. I'd include the unwed fathers with them." These things were-- I don't know whether the Johnson Administration felt I was a thorn--

Tape 2 of 2, Side 2

K: You wondered if the Johnson Administration considered you a thorn, and in fact as early as 1965 a little article on you in the Washington Evening Star described you as something of a thorn in the side of the Great Society, meaning White House. I don't know whether they got that from the White House or [it] was the author's own choice of words. But I think the evidence suggests that, yes, the administration considered you somewhat of a thorn, and yet at the same time was eager to figure out ways to win your cooperation or support.

G: Well, you know, I look back and I think I tried to cooperate with people when we could agree, but it seemed to me if I disagreed either with the goal or with the way of reaching a goal, I had the same right to express that disagreement as did any of my male colleagues.

K: Well, do you think that the administration was worried that you were too influential a person to let loose?

G: (Laughter) I don't think he ever worried about me being influential!

You spoke of the Vietnam War, this was another part, and it was related to this campus turbulence which was causing all kinds of problems. I was chairman of a subcommittee on higher ed, all post-secondary education, and the Vietnam War was causing lots of problems

Green -- I -- 68

in terms of legislation itself. Yes, when he sent up the bill in 1965--to escalate the Vietnam War--there were seven of us in the House and three in the Senate who opposed the escalation. As I recall, LBJ wanted an additional seven hundred and fifty million [dollars], and he made it very clear that he didn't really need the money but he wanted the congressional support to show that the United States was of one mind and that they all wanted to escalate the war. Wayne Morse from Oregon and [Ernest] Gruening from Alaska and Gaylord Nelson I think were the three in the Senate who opposed it, and there were seven of us in the House. That was a lonely minority with lots of pressure. I do remember that. I remember the Johnson Administration putting lots of pressure on the basis that we were sending the wrong message if there wasn't a unanimous--he wanted a unanimous vote of support.

K: Well, the administration wanted to send a message to Vietnam or to the American public?

G: Both. Both. In 1965 the polls I think showed that the American public was supporting him. The opposition among the American people had not--

K: --crystalized at that point.

G: No, it really had not in 1965. He wanted to send it as a message all over the world, I guess. You may or may not recall that other countries were questioning our presence there. So my opposition to escalation in Vietnam did not endear me to the White House. On the other hand, I remember, I don't know how many occasions, but I was invited

Green -- I -- 69

down to the White House. I remember one time when Lady Bird Johnson and Liz Carpenter--

K: Oh, yes. Carpenter, Liz Carpenter.

G: Liz Carpenter invited me. She was going to visit some Job Corps centers and invited me to be their guest, to go on that trip, which I did. So we had pleasant relationships a lot of the time. But he did not like opposition, and if he sent up a bill--

K: Did he vent his anger at other people, too? I mean, other people on the committee opposed him, a lot of Republicans, of course, but from time to time other Democrats joined ranks with you.

G: I don't really know. But I look back, and with some degree of pleasure, I think in most of the battles in which I participated we won: on the amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; on about twenty amendments to the War on Poverty legislation, and as I recall we carried every single one of them against strong White House opposition.

K: That needs to be the subject of another interview, because I'm sure you have lots to say on the War on Poverty-civil rights legislation.

G: But I think, you know, that if I had been in a minority, it wouldn't have bothered him. It was when you opposed him and were well enough organized to win.

K: He just didn't want someone from his own ranks defecting.

G: That is true. And I think there was a measure of sex discrimination. You know, "What's this woman doing here? Who does she think she is?"

Green -- I -- 70

K: There has been some speculation, unnamed, in interviews that scholars have conducted for their own books on your own motives for some of the legislative initiatives that you led. Occasionally the suggestion is made that although you would claim that what you were doing was in the best interests of the legislation or in the best interests of education, that in fact you were motivated by the desire to aggrandize your power and things like that. What was the source of that kind of talk? I mean, was that said about anybody who led initiatives against the mainstream?

G: I don't know what the basis of that would be. You don't really lead a fight against the powers that be out of fun. You know it's going to be a tough battle; it's going to require hundreds of hours of preparation and work, and going to every office to explain what it is in detail, because when you get on the floor, you have X number of minutes to explain it and you really have to have laid your groundwork pretty well. From my standpoint, I don't take on any battle unless I really believe that it's worthwhile doing.

K: So you weren't motivated--as there's sort of a very subtle hint in some of the explanations--out of a desire to rub the administration the wrong way?

G: No. I think it would be much easier to rub the administration the right way. Life would be much simpler.

K: Okay. One last question, if you have a few minutes to address this: there has been so much criticism in the last four or five years, a lot of it initiated by the conservative revolution that has accompanied

Green -- I -- 71

Reagan's ascendancy in political life, about the effectiveness of the education programs. Head Start, as you know, has been the subject of a lot of discussion, programs of aid to elementary and secondary education. Really, one of the criticisms that has been launched by the conservative side is that we created these programs when political opportunities seemed right, but without enough thought about what they could actually accomplish, and we had high and false expectations as to what could be accomplished by Title I appropriations. The Coleman Report came out of the United States Office of Education; the 1966 Civil Rights Commission report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools [?], suggesting that--of course, those were only measuring one year of implementation--we can pour all sorts of money into improving curriculum and books and what have you, but it doesn't seem to be having any discernible impact on academic achievement by the lower quartile of students, and that this was, after all, what we wanted to accomplish.

Now more recently, counterarguments coming from the Head Start advocates have shown that there's more to life than just increasing academic achievement. That children have been shown to benefit in terms of their self-esteem, which is a foundation for learning later on, that parents have become more involved in the schools, taken greater initiative and interest in the education of their children, and that sort of thing. But are the conservatives at all justified in making the criticism that these programs, particularly those focused on elementary and secondary education and some of the poverty relief

Green -- I -- 72

programs in the inner cities, were very hastily conceived without due care and due thought as to what the consequences would be, and as a result a lot of people were disappointed and the American public has taken the view that, well, programs like this don't work?

G: I think it's an accurate accusation that not sufficient thought went into the planning. I would say this, and I think I argued this when I offered, as I recall, a series of about twenty amendments to the poverty act in 1967, that not enough time and consideration had been given in planning it. And as I recall, I used used the analogy that in my city of Portland, a blue-ribbon committee was appointed to study race relations in the public schools, and they worked for a year and a half to draw up a plan for the Portland schools. We had at that time 6 per cent minority. I think I'm accurate on this.

LBJ became president quite by accident in 1963, and he had a campaign in 1964; he was most anxious to have an issue that would have the clear LBJ imprint, and that the War on Poverty was going to be that program, clearly LBJ's. He appointed Sarge Shriver, as I recall, [as] the chairman of a task force, and Sarge Shriver worked for about six months in throwing this poverty program together. Here in the city of Portland with a 6 per cent black population and [it's] a pretty homogeneous area, the Portland task force worked eighteen months on a program just for this city. In Washington it was to be a poverty program that was supposed to work down in Alabama and work in New York City and work in the rural areas of the Midwest and work in Los Angeles and Alaska. I think we raised expectations way, way too

Green -- I -- 73

high, and I think not sufficient thought was given to what it really would accomplish in a different areas of the country.

By and large I supported the education bills that were passed, including Head Start. I think certainly the higher education bills that were passed were good. I think in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act we talked too much about what we were going to accomplish for the disadvantaged child and gave too little consideration to the fact that out of twenty-four hours a day he was going to be in a disadvantaged home for, what, eighteen hours, and he was going to be in the school for six hours, and how you could perform that miracle, I'm just not sure.

Then the social trends, the number of single-parent families, the number of women who were raising children and were the sole means of financial support. Today the number, the millions of latch-key children who--although I read an article fairly recently that they said the latch-key children were measuring up to the other children, I'd sure like to see those statistics. But I can't believe that children who come home and open the door and they are there alone in their home from three-thirty, or whatever it is, until eight o'clock at night are going to have the head start that other children will have.

I think one other big factor that we do not consider in terms of the quality of education in the United States is in the number of women who are going into the teaching profession, the bright and best women. We discussed earlier that when I finished high school there

Green -- I -- 74

were two respectable professions for women: teaching and nursing. Today you have every single profession open to women and you have your brightest and best women going into law, into medicine, into engineering, into government, into communications. Some of the studies that I have seen in terms of the academic level of the college students who are going into education are down. We are no longer getting the brightest and best, and I cannot help but think that is a major factor in terms of the quality.

K: I have talked to so many people who have sort of been in a position to know, who have made that same observation, the generation of bright women who went into teaching has gone out of teaching, and the next generation has been scattered to the four corners of the earth in terms of occupations. But my question is, why hasn't that subject been a central focus of debate? If you don't have good, imaginative teachers who have mastered academic material themselves, who are adept in interpersonal relations and things, what can you expect in a classroom? Whenever you talk to anyone about education, almost invariably their positive experiences relate to an exceptionally good teacher.

G: Sure.

K: I mean, in my case, my decision to go into teaching was influenced by good teachers. Of course, I'm teaching at the college level and now maybe I should be at the elementary and secondary education level. But a lot of women have been tempted to go into these other fields because of the pay.

G: Well, both pay and prestige. We have downgraded women and downgraded

Green -- I -- 75

teaching, I think partly because it has been predominantly women who have filled the positions. And again, if you can't do anything else, why, you can go and teach. That's an old cliché.

K: Well, would the education associations, the NEA, the AFT, resist criticism of that nature?

G: I have been very pleased that Albert Shanker of the AFT has come out in favor of the changes. I do not understand the opposition of the NEA. I really do not. And I think they do a great disservice to the members of the teaching profession. It's my contention that unless you have merit pay, you will never pay your best teachers what they deserve and you will always pay your poorest teachers more than they deserve. And I think this has an impact, the best teachers then will leave the profession.

K: Well, in reading some of the critiques of the NEA to proposals for merit pay, one has been that we don't, number one, want to create morale problems, and number two, we don't want that kind of competition in the public schools. But there is that kind of competition in every other profession. I mean--

G: There certainly is that kind of competition in the field of politics, of which I'm fairly familiar, and I can't see that it has ruined morale. On the college level there is certainly [competition], tenure and so on, at least there is a judgment made--whether you approve of tenure or not, and I'm not sure that I do--there is at least a judgment as to whether the person is meeting the criteria.

Green -- I -- 76

There are other social problems, too, that I think we have not taken into consideration. We have mentioned the one-parent families, the number of millions of latch-key children. There was a report a few years ago put out, I think, by the NEA in terms of the number of physical attacks on teachers, and as I recall that year there had been seventy thousand physical attacks on teachers, including rape in the classroom. There was a case of one man who some of the boys--it was I guess junior high level, as I recall--who were mad at the teacher because of the grades that he gave them, they waited for him and poured gasoline on him and set him on fire. The discipline in the classrooms today, I think this would drive an awful lot of your best teachers out, the ones who can do something else. They just won't take it. And you have not only undisciplined kids, but you have an awful lot of undisciplined parents of undisciplined kids. And if a teacher tries to correct a child, then you've got these undisciplined parents coming and yelling and screaming at you, you know, "why do you do this?" I think this has a very adverse impact, and I think that a lot of teachers are critical of the administration in not supporting the teachers, that they don't want to rock the boat.

I think the schools today are required to do far more than teaching the three Rs. When I went to school, you know, if I got in trouble in school I sure as hell got in trouble at home. I don't ever remember my father or mother taking my side when there was a dispute in terms of school. Why don't you cooperate with the teacher? The teacher was always right, and there was respect for the teacher. I think probably

Green -- I -- 77

my mother and father were right, too, that there wasn't any question about it! Today we require the schools not only to teach the three Rs, but we serve breakfast in a lot of places for the disadvantaged kids, and we serve all kids hot lunch. When I went to school I always carried a brown bag. We have to provide drivers' training, we have to teach sex education, we have to have winning football teams even in the elementary level, you have to have winning basketball teams, you have to have musical groups. I'm not opposed to these--

K: Something for everybody.

G: But I may be opposed to the priorities that we choose. The juvenile delinquency prevention becomes the problem of the schools. If a kid misbehaves, you have a heck of a time suspending a kid these days because these undisciplined parents will raise hell.

(Interruption)

I was going to add one other thing. When I went to school, a handicapped youngster was not in the classroom, an emotionally disturbed child was not in the classroom. In my first teaching assignment, I had forty-eight sixth graders, the first class I ever taught, and I think they all learned a lot. But if you have twenty-five youngsters or twenty youngsters and you have one emotionally disturbed child, the teacher is required, compelled by necessity, to give most of her time to that one disruptive child and let the other nineteen or twenty-four or whatever it is go. I think this mainstreaming the handicapped, whether they be physically handicapped or emotionally handicapped or

Green -- I -- 78

mentally handicapped, whatever, mainstreaming them has changed--I'm not going to argue whether it's good or bad--but has changed the classroom from what it was.

I think that the PTA was really a very positive force in the neighborhood because it brought parents together who became interested in the school and who met and understood the problems of school. There was more of a cooperative relationship between the school administration, the teachers, and the parents. I think back to the days of Tom Sawyer. You know, Aunt Polly, she kept little Tom in line, and if Tom's friends got out of line, Aunt Polly phoned up the mothers of the little friends that got out of line and they phoned Aunt Polly if Tom got out of line. There was something about the parents working together, and that neighborhood cohesiveness I think has been destroyed and I think it's partly been destroyed by the mandatory busing, to bus kids out of a neighborhood, to bus them twenty miles away or forty miles away on the basis that somehow--I think it was the most patronizing thing in the world for people to argue that somehow a black child can't learn unless that child is sitting next to a white youngster. I think that was just absolutely crazy.

K: Isn't it true that the majority of blacks themselves did not favor busing?

G: When I opposed busing I got hell from different groups, both white and black. It was going to be--somehow it was the "enlightened" thing to do. And the ones who were opposed to it kept kind of silent because--

K: They seemed unprogressive?

Green -- I -- 79

G: Yes, something like that. We spent millions of dollars to strengthen neighborhoods, and at the same time we adopted social policies that destroyed the neighborhood. The PTA today is nothing compared to what it was in the 1940s when I was active in it and legislative chairman for Oregon. It was really an organization that had influence not only in that neighborhood but statewide.

K: Well, it exercised a great deal of oversight, as I recall. I remember my parents being very active in it.

G: That's right. So when we talk or when we're trying to measure the degree of success of the federal programs, it seems to me that we just simply say, well, today a kid can do this and twenty years ago, before there was any federal aid to legislation, they did this. We don't measure it in terms of the social changes that I think are irreversible: the number of women who are working; the number of one-parent families; the number of latch-key kids; the discipline; the mainstreaming of emotionally and handicapped children in the classroom; the additional requirements that are placed on the school besides the three Rs. I think if those were all factored in, it would have a different picture.

K: And a lot of those things just could not have been foreseen at the time.

G: That's right. And they're irreversible. Whether you like it or not, I don't think you're going to change these things.

K: Are you suggesting that these things, the social trends, the changes

Green -- I -- 80

that took place, may have completely offset impact that the programs might have had if we had had a steady state situation?

G: I guess I'm suggesting that if you had not had the federal aid and had had all of these social problems, we might be much worse off. But there were a lot of additional problems that we did not see in 1965-- when plans were being made to launch the War on Poverty legislation.

K: I know my generation has been accused of being the "me" generation, that my generation lacks a social conscience. Do you think that that is a valid criticism, and if so, how has it come about? We're the product of the Great Society legislation. I'm one of the beneficiaries of it.

G: I don't think I've ever thought about a generation with no social conscience.

K: Yes. Well, I heard a partial explanation, or read a partial explanation, or an answer to the problem of why don't we have more of a national conscience, a moral conscience, a sort of an American character of the kind that Ralph Waldo Emerson described, in a book by a fellow, I think it's an educational historian named R. Freeman Butts, and he wrote a book a few years ago, not long ago, entitled something like A Call for the Return to Civic Learning [?]. He says in the rush of the sixties to secure the needs of the special interest groups, the disadvantaged children, the Hispanic children, the Indian children, the children who have physical handicaps, emotional handicaps, and what have you, that we have somehow lost sight of what it is that makes us American, and that there was a tremendous fragmentation of

Green -- I -- 81

what used to be sort of--of course, this is a view, an interpretation and is certainly open to a critique. But that what used to be a united American philosophy about what education is to provide, now reflects--it's like a hall of mirrors, you go in and you get all sorts of distortions, depending on the group that you talk to. He's saying what we need is to reinstitute basic civic education in the classroom: American government, politics, ethics, and all those things.

G: I would agree. One of the things that really disturbs me is we got so involved in the First Amendment over the separation of church and state that you can't teach religion in a school or anyplace else, and we have equated religion with moral values, or moral values with religion, and we have abandoned the teaching of both. I think this came to me most forcefully about the year after I left Congress or a couple of years after. A friend, very sophisticated, graduate of Bryn Mawr and very involved in the study, wanted me to go on the board of Planned Parenthood. I didn't think that was my cup of tea. Anyhow, she said, "Well, will you come down and sit in on a class?" I said sure; there were about fifteen girls and one boy, girls from thirteen on up. And the only purpose of the class was to prevent pregnancy. They passed around all the contraceptives and what not. As I came out from the class, this friend very enthusiastically said, "Well, what did you think of it?" and I said, "Well, I found it interesting. They didn't have the classes like that for girls when I was in high school! But you know, there's one thing that really bothers me; I did not hear one word about individual responsibility or

Green -- I -- 82

moral values." And her immediate response--and this is a highly educated person--was, "We can't teach religion." It seems to me that the schools have abandoned the teaching of moral values, and there are an awful lot of kids--

K: Because you step on too many toes when you try to.

G: And there are I don't know how many families in the country that do not teach moral values at home. I remember a quote of Teddy Roosevelt's that I have always liked; I think it is so accurate and I think it is so relevant to what's happening today. He said, "To educate a man in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society."

I hope I haven't wandered too far from your questions.

K: No. No.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I

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