INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: D. B. HARDEMAN

INTERVIEWER: T. H. Baker

PLACE: Mr. Hardeman's residence, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

B: Last time we were talking about Mr. Rayburn in Congress. During those years there, after you got with Mr. Rayburn from the late fifties on, did you see much of the relationship between Rayburn and Johnson?

H: Yes. Of course, I saw only a small part of it. Johnson would come over quite frequently to Rayburn's office. Rayburn would only very rarely go over to Johnson's office because Johnson didn't like to go over on the Senate side of the Capitol, furthermore the difference in ages and the father-son relationship. Johnson felt at home on the House side; he'd been a House member for many years, so it was more natural I think for him to come over to see Rayburn.

Rayburn had two suites of offices. He had what is known as the Speaker's rooms right off the House floor where a speaker normally sees most of his visitors. And then he has a suite of offices back in the center of the Capitol which we call the Speaker's office. Usually when Johnson came over during working hours, he would come over to the Speaker's office. Rayburn would come back to that office from the Speaker's rooms, oh, anywhere from three-thirty in the afternoon to see the mail that had come in that day. That back office, as we called it, or the Speaker's office, handled his congressional work

primarily. Johnson would drop by there and naturally go right in to see the Speaker and usually they would be there by themselves. Johnson and Rayburn also talked over the telephone quite a bit, many times I thought on procedural matters, keeping each other abreast of some little development in their respective branches of the Congress. Then Johnson was a frequent visitor to the Board of Education at five-thirty or six o'clock in the afternoon.

B: Were there many other senators who came to the Board of Education?

H: Not many senators, my impression, because the Board of Education--I never did know whether I was supposed to go down every night or only on specific invitation, and I don't think anybody else was quite sure either. Rayburn left it vague. Tiger Teague told me once, "I've been baffled because every now and then he'll stop me and say, 'Why don't you come down and have a drink this afternoon?' and I try to always go if I can, but I don't know whether that meant I'm welcome every night." I felt the same way about it, so I made a rule of not going down unless he said so. I went down very little in 1957, 1958, more in 1959 and 1960 and 1961 quite a lot. I didn't want to go every night; I didn't want to be tied up till seven-thirty or eight every night. I was tired and I wanted to get home, so I wasn't too anxious to have an invitation to come every night. My impression was that Johnson was not there every night either, but many times he would drop by there and have his driver pick him up on the House side. He'd drop in at least to compare notes for thirty minutes or so.

So, the senators you asked about--Stuart Symington would come over from time to time, he and Mr. Rayburn were very close. I never saw him there, but I was under the impression that once in a while Mike Monroney would come. I thought Mike Monroney was probably the closest man in the Senate to Mr. Rayburn after Lyndon Johnson. I'm trying to think of other senators that were there. I would say not too many senators came over. From time to time Johnson might pick up somebody on the way and bring them over, say, "Come on. Let's go over and have a drink with the Speaker."

But the House and Senate were two separate worlds, and that's why it was so useful, I think, that Johnson and Rayburn had this working relationship. There probably was closer coordination between the House and the Senate in those years than there ever has been before or since.

B: That relationship is often called a father-son relationship. Is that precisely it? That implies that the son, Mr. Johnson, is deferring to the father, Mr. Rayburn.

H: Oh, well, proud, intelligent men, strong-minded men, while they always listen to other strong-minded men, that doesn't mean they defer to them.

B: That's what I was wondering if--

H: It depended on what it was.

B: If Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson ever got into really knock-down drag-out arguments about policy or procedures or--

H: Oh, they differed, of course. They differed in their judgment of men. But they, I think, were more deferential to each other. Mr. Rayburn said to me one time, "I think I know exactly what is my business and exactly what is not my business." I've heard Lyndon Johnson ask him two or three times about something in the Senate, "What do you think I ought to do?" And Mr. Rayburn would say, "I don't know anything about that place over there; I'm not going to tell you what to do, because I don't know anything about that place."

On the other hand, something that had to do with the House, Johnson was quite likely to take Rayburn's judgment on it, not without challenge. If Johnson knew something that Rayburn didn't know, he'd say, "Well, Mr. Speaker, you just haven't talked to him," or "This man's changed on you," or something like that. But he had such respect for Rayburn's judgment as to what the House would do and would not do that he understood, too, that was Rayburn's business and not Johnson's business. And on the other hand, Rayburn understood that the Senate was Rayburn's business and not Johnson's business.

B: Did Johnson really understand the House? I've heard it said--

H: Oh, I think so, yes. He was in the Senate for twelve years, and he was in the House from 1937 to 1948, eleven years as a member and then he had all those years of service as a staff man. I think many times staff people, if they're the stripe of Johnson and move around a lot and listen and learn, may know more about the operation of the House overall than most congressmen ever learn because they tend to work on their districts and their committee, where an energetic staff man like

Johnson would know, as a staff man, a great deal about the operation of the whole House. I think his judgment in the House was good, but of course there were many, many new members coming in all the time in a body as large as the House that Johnson could have only the most casual acquaintance with if he knew them at all. But he had a lot of loyal friends from all over the country in the House all during those years. He worked at it. But it's next to impossible for a person to know four hundred and thirty-five members, especially if you're spending nearly all your time at the other end of the Capitol. But, as far as the techniques of the House are concerned, I think Johnson's very good. He proved that as president. He knew how to pull the levers in the House very, very well, I think. But, again, Johnson was normally smart enough not to substitute his judgement for the judgment of John McCormack or Sam Rayburn who were right on top of the situation.

B: Do you recall any specific legislative fights in those days to illustrate how Rayburn and Johnson worked together? I know that's a tall order. Skip it if it's too vague.

H: Well, I wish I knew the details of how they worked together on the first Civil Rights Bill in 1957. I don't know it, because I didn't go to work for Rayburn until July of 1957, and for some months after that, I knew very little about what he was doing on things of that nature. I am under the impression that Johnson was the one who decided that the time had come in the nation's life when there had to be a civil rights bill and that he, over a period of time, convinced

Rayburn of this fact. Rayburn did not want to agitate the issue, and he did not believe that you could find a legislative solution to it--that only time and prudence would work out a betterment of the situation. But this again I can't document.

But my impression is that there had been an unspoken agreement among the two parties, the leaders of the two parties, ever since Reconstruction days to let sleeping dogs lie. And some of the men, I know, feel that the man who broke the truce was Robert Brownell as attorney general. So when the Republicans started to make a political issue out of it, then that meant that both parties had to begin to take an interest in it. The results, of course, first was the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 and then the Civil Rights Bill of 1960. This I can't document, but this is what I think is the basic background of this.

Then I know that they--this again was before my time--had to work very closely on such things as the Tidelands Bill and the Natural Gas Bill, the Kerr Natural Gas Bill, the Harris Natural Gas Bill, although it would not be a matter of Johnson trying to line up votes for those bills in the House or Rayburn trying to line up Senate votes, but they would keep each other informed as to the outlook and the amendments that might be necessary to accept and so forth and so on. And on the second bill, on the Harris Natural Gas Bill, why, of course, an ad hoc lobbying organization was set up and John Connally was the head of that organization. Well, Rayburn had an extravagant, very high opinion of John Connally. He said he thought he had more natural ability

than any man of his age that he'd ever known. And they worked together very easily, very closely; but probably more stormily, with Johnson. Nevertheless he had the most complete entree at both ends of the Capitol to those two men.

B: How close were those two to the Texas big money, the oil and gas people--Rayburn and Johnson?

H: Oh, that's hard to say. Rayburn had some very close personal friends among the so-called independents--Jim Abercrombie in Houston was very close to him; J. R. Parten was a lifelong devoted friend, just couldn't have a closer friend that J. R. Parten. Of course he knew Sid Richardson and Clint Murchison. I never felt that there was any warmth there; I had a feeling that Rayburn really didn't have great admiration for Clint Murchison and that Richardson's super ego was an obstacle in their relationship. He told me that Richardson said to him one time, "I'm going to be remembered a hell of a lot longer than you are, Sam, because I'm going to leave all my money to build boys towns and things like that." And this irked Rayburn; he didn't believe it. And he didn't think Richardson should be saying it anyhow. Rayburn's attitude--I can't speak about Johnson's attitude--I suspect it paralleled Rayburn's. Rayburn felt that the many people in the oil industry were greedy sons-of-bitches, and he used to say, and he was thinking about the oil people I think among many others, that, "I think I know a lot about human nature, but there's one thing I never ceased to be surprised at--that the people who will gripe the worstest and we help the mostest and made the richest hate us the

worst." The arrogance--he had a great dislike for arrogance. He liked pride, but he despised arrogance. And the arrogance of the big-spending oil man was personally offensive to him.

On the other hand, his feeling about such things as the natural gas bill and oil depletion and so forth were that there were certain national needs that had to be supported regardless of what you thought about the individuals that would profit from them. And also that there were certain things that were right and wrong, particularly on oil depletion. You could abolish oil depletion and the majors would get along all right, but since the independents, as he reasoned it, did most of the exploration, if they did not have the source of capital that came from oil depletion allowances and tangible drilling costs and so forth, before long they would be short of capital and they would be swallowed up by the majors and pretty soon you would have in effect a tightly held cartel controlling vital oil and gas resources in this country.

Furthermore you had in Texas hundreds of thousands of landowners who had a direct stake in the oil business through their leases, through some production. And then you had many people in Texas, workers all the way from roughnecks to the people in oil well supply houses, people in banks, so forth, who were dependent on the oil industry for a livelihood. And then the parochial interest that every member of Congress has that if an industry is important to your community, they have a right to expect you to present their point of view in the great debate in Congress. All of these things. But I

know that he felt that there were many actors in the oil and gas industry who were real sharks, rapacious, ungrateful sharks.

Harry Sinclair, Sinclair Petroleum Company, told me he put up a good part of the money in 1944 to try to beat him, and that he was having lunch out in California one time, 1948 I suppose it was, with Ed Pauley. He always liked Ed Pauley or defended Pauley at the time when Pauley was an anathema to many people. [He said] that Harry Sinclair came over to his table and said something to him about "Oh, I'm sorry that you had an opponent in 1944." G. C. Morris came very close to beating Mr. Rayburn. Mr. Rayburn said something to the effect, "You needn't be telling me that, when you put up most of the money against me." Sinclair said, "Oh, no, there's no truth in that. That's not true." And Rayburn said something about, "Well, it's hard for me to believe that you didn't know it, but if you don't know it, you check with your man in Texas and find out how much of your money he did spend in my district trying to beat me."

So this was an ambivalent attitude. The closeness was restricted to some individuals; as I say, Jim Abercrombie was one of them that he was very, very fond of and J. R. Parten certainly he was very fond of. At one time the Eisenhower Administration was toying with the idea of the Treasury revoking the tax exemption of the funds for the Republic, and Rayburn told Bob Anderson, the secretary of the treasury, with whom he was very, very close, "Now, Bob, you'd better think long and hard before you do that because you start this kind of business, there's going to be all sorts of organizations all the way across the

spectrum with just as good a case of cutting off their tax exemptions, and some mighty fine people like J. R. Parten [are] connected with the fund for the Republic." He said, "Now, my advice for you is to look this one over very, very carefully." And they didn't revoke the--

B: I was going to say, that kind of advice from Mr. Sam might have carried a lot of weight.

H: Well, of course, if you can do it, you can do the same thing to the John Birch Society. And Bob was a wise enough man to understand this was a real Pandora's box. He persuaded me that he felt that the national security alone justified the oil depletion allowance, but that he was just sorry that some of the major beneficiaries of the oil depletion allowance were people that he didn't have a very high regard for and were certainly not grateful politically or personally.

Now, on the natural gas bill, that was a different thing. I thought Rayburn sincerely believed that Congress did not intend at the time of the passage of the Natural Gas Act to give the Federal Power Commission the right to control the price at the wellhead. The Supreme Court said the language of the bill gave that power to the Federal Power Commission. But Rayburn persuaded me that whatever was wise or unwise, the Congress never intended that power to be in the hands of the Federal Power Commission. And that's what these natural gas bills were all about, was trying to reaffirm the congressional intent in the way that Congress intended it. I don't know when that act passed, 1935, 1938, back in the New Deal days. And Rayburn, of course, his committee had jurisdiction over interstate movements of

oil and gas. So I can only say that if he believed that was not the intent of Congress, I would have to bow to that because he appointed the subcommittee that investigated the interstate movements of oil and gas, the famous Cole Subcommittee and so forth. He certainly knew what he intended at the time, because he had an almost perfect memory, an almost total recall type of memory. But his closeness to the oil and gas industry, his personal closeness in my opinion, was restricted to specific individuals that he would have been close to had they been in the shoe business.

B: I believe you said last time you got closely involved in the Landrum-Griffin Labor Reform Bill.

H: Yes, that's right. This bill quickly became very controversial. The excesses of labor and the racketeering in labor, primarily stemming from the Teamsters Union but not restricted to the Teamsters including, I think, some of the bakery officials who were indicted and convicted and the president of Carpenters Union was convicted. They were playing fast and loose with union funds, and some of the unions were doing all sorts of things. And the McClellan Committee had been investigating. Then of course Dave Beck was president of the Teamsters Union, and he went to jail; and then the Hoffa incidents. The nation just turned very much against labor unions, which had been out of bounds with a lot of their practices. So this became quite a burning issue. They had first the Kennedy-Ives Bill; Jack Kennedy and Irving Ives of New York had this bill which was a rather moderate effort to correct some of the abuses in labor.

At that time, the House Committee on Education and Labor had a chairman, Graham Barden of North Carolina, who was very anti-labor and a very temperamental man, difficult to work with. Most people found him very difficult to work with. So this bill in 1958 did not pass. But my recollection is Rayburn held it on his desk without referring it to Education and Labor Committee because he felt that the committee would turn it into a strong anti-labor bill. So he held it on his desk without referring it. I heard one man say, "I know how long Noah was in the Ark; he was in the Ark forty days and forty nights, because Sam Rayburn held that bill on his desk for forty-one days." And this was an exercise of the power of the Speaker which was quite unusual. But it's the power--as I interpret the rules, there's no way to make a Speaker refer a bill except by the vote of the House, and the House wasn't about to vote and tell you, "Speaker, you've got to go ahead and refer that bill."

So then he called this up for a vote in order to make a record for the 1958 election. Then after the 1958 election the House leadership was able to put a lot of people who were moderate or friendly to labor on the Education and Labor Committees and take control of it away from Barden, and it was a much more moderate committee from the point of view of the unions. But the tempo of anti-union activity had increased so much over the country that this became the issue of 1959 and resulted in a furor in a campaign which, in my opinion, was the second most ferocious lobbying campaign in the history of the Congress, exceeded only by the public utility holding company fight in

1935. Old-timers told me at the time that the pressures exerted and cruel heat turned on by both sides in the Griffin-Landrum fight was much in excess of that generated over Taft-Hartley.

B: I guess I didn't realize that. That kind of pressure tried to be applied to Mr. Rayburn, too?

H: Well, yes, surely, from his district. Because he had some very strongly anti-union manufacturers in his district. I don't think they were able to have much influence on him because by and large those were the people that had never been noted for loyalty to him or the Democratic Party either. So many of them were the wrong people who have any--he had to respect them as any man has to respect even his political enemies, but they were not people for whose opinions he had such a high regard anyhow. But he always on labor matters as on many other matters had two hats to wear. He had the pressures from his district and the political problem in his district, but then he always had to remember that he was one of the major factors in the national Democratic Party. But over and above that on labor relations, I think he understood the excesses of labor very well in a general way. Nevertheless in this eternal struggle between labor and management, what he was trying to find always was a fair middle-of-the-road plan with which both of them could live. He didn't believe the government should throw all of its weight on the side of either labor or management, but it ought to try to curb the abuses and excesses of both management and labor and this is what he tried to do.

B: The bill, as it finally ended up, did contain some things that labor liked. I think generally labor, at least publicly, disapproved of the bill, but there were features in it that labor itself wanted. Was that the kind of compromise that Rayburn would work out?

H: Well, of course, when you get in one of these fights, both sides get frozen into ridiculous positions. In order to appease their members, they in public can't take a reasonable position or accept a reasonable compromise. Just as labor talked about the Taft-Hartley Act as the slave labor act; well, of course, it wasn't. The proof of it is that we've had it on the books now for twenty-two years and there's never been a major amendment of the act. It's worked, not perfectly, but it hasn't ruined labor and it hasn't freed management from the bothers of the union movement.

But the Griffin-Landrum Bill, the real fight, the two major fights there--one was the fight on the bill in the House originally; Rayburn and his forces working for a less severe bill were able to get what was known as a committee version--a committee bill, the Elliott Bill--out of the Education and Labor Committee to the House floor. Then Landrum and Griffin had their bill to offer as a substitute. And the heat generated was so intense that on the House floor this substitute, this anti-labor bill which its opponents charged was drafted by the NAM and so forth and so on, was adopted on the House floor. Then the Senate passed, or maybe it had already passed, a much less restricted bill. It went to conference committee and the conference was on the verge of of breaking up, day after day and week after week,

and did stay together long enough to bring in a bill that was, I thought, in the end a pretty fair bill with respect to both management and labor. The main thing labor did not get in this was when they called the situs picketing provision, that involves the construction unions. And they didn't get that, they haven't gotten it yet. It's a complicated thing, but this was something that apparently both the contractors and the construction unions, craft unions, were agreed on, yet they've never been able to get it on the books. And it has been ten years since Griffin-Landrum. Griffin-Landrum didn't pass, but the conference committee compromise on the Griffin-Landrum versus the more moderate bills did pass.

B: Did you see anything of Mr. Johnson's involvement in all of that?

H: No, I didn't. There was gossip around the House that Johnson had complicated the factor by telling friends like Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry that they would probably be defeated if they voted against the Griffin-Landrum Bill. Johnson was not for the Griffin-Landrum Bill, I was convinced, but whether he ever said anything like that to them I have no way of knowing. But there were whispers around there that maybe he added to their decision to vote for the Griffin-Landrum Bill and against Rayburn's position, but I never did see it.

B: About the same time, too, was this business of the Democratic Advisory Council that the national party tried to put into effect. Did you see Rayburn's and Mr. Johnson's reaction to it?

H: Yes, their reactions were not secret at all, very public. When your candidate for the presidency has lost, from the beginning of our

political parties there has always been the question of who speaks for the party outside the White House. And the situation has never been resolved satisfactorily. I saw Hubert Humphrey on television the other day, and he said that, "I suppose there is no such thing as a titular head of a party when it has lost the presidential election." And yet the people who are the warmest in support of the defeated presidential candidate traditionally think that he should be the spokesman of the party. Those who are still in office or those who are in the highest elected office that their party holds in the Congress will never buy that. For example, Barry Goldwater had no voice as a titular head of his party after he was defeated. The Stevenson people felt that Stevenson--and a group of people, close friends of his, felt much as he did--should be the voice of the party, they should enunciate party policy. Well, Rayburn as speaker and Johnson as majority leader took the position that "we are the highest public officials that our party now has in office, and while we are not going to try to be the voice of the party, we are not going to let somebody else arrogate unto themselves the right to set the policies of the party. What policies are going to be written for the party are going to be written in the record that the party makes in the Congress when you're out of power. And so Paul Butler came forward at the urging of many of these people with the Democratic Advisory Council.

B: Was it his idea?

H: I have no idea. I imagine it was something that came out of many conversations over a drink and, "What do we do to pick up the pieces

now? We've suffered a major defeat. How do we keep policies in front of the people that eventually they will buy? How do we gain the White House in 1956? 1960?"

B: It also involved the kind of policies that those people behind the Advisory Council who were on the liberal wing--

H: Well, primarily in the Stevenson wing of the party, not exclusively. I don't remember the details of the original proposal, but it included a number of members of Congress, including both Rayburn and Johnson, I believe initially, and then some people of various shades of opinion in the Congress. But it was the liberal wing of the party, there's no question about it. But many of those people were people who had not held political office, who had never held a political office, and in the opinion of old pros like Rayburn and Johnson, it was nonsense! These people could make all the speeches they wanted to and have all the meetings they wanted to, but to try to draw around themselves the cloak of spokesmen simply wouldn't be tolerated. So again I don't know about this from personal experience, but I assumed and everybody says that Rayburn and Johnson contacted the members of Congress who had been invited to serve and persuaded all of them not to serve. Well, that, of course, shot the idea down for all practical effects. They had meetings and they had a small staff, a small paid staff. Charlie Tyroler was executive secretary and so forth and so on, but it never did in my opinion amount to anything. Rayburn and Johnson always--I'll speak about Rayburn, I don't know about Johnson, but my impression is he felt the same way which was that the record we take

to the people for the next election is the record that the Democrats write in Congress. That's what we're going to have to run on. It's not on what somebody said in a speech, some ex-officeholder or some person who never held office. That's not what we're going to be offering the American people. We're going to be offering the American people. We're going to be offering the American people the record written in votes in Congress.

So this was just an honest difference of opinion between people all of whom wanted the success of the Democratic Party as to the wisest way to proceed. Both Rayburn and Johnson, I assume, of course were prejudiced in favor of officeholders. They felt there was a great difference between what a person can say, what a person will say as a private citizen, and what he will say and what he will do if he had the responsibility of having to get elected to office.

B: When in this time did you first hear anybody start talking about Lyndon Johnson for president?

H: Well, I think that everybody that ever knew Johnson felt that certainly his ambition or his dream was that some day he'd be president of the United States, but the odds were very much against him as they had been against Rayburn, for all the reasons that you know--location, votes, and so forth. I did not see any evidence of a serious Johnson effort after he made his effort in 1956 until, I'm not sure, I suppose 1959. Johnson had become a really truly national figure by that time from his operation in the Senate. An enormous amount of very favorable publicity and exposure, accomplishment. So it was quite natural

with all the people speculating privately and in columns and "Meet the Press" and so forth that Johnson would be certainly a man that the party would look at. I couldn't pinpoint the date without going back and checking it. I'd say early 1959.

B: Did you ever hear Rayburn comment specifically on the possibility of Johnson getting the nomination?

H: Yes. Again, I can't give you specific dates. He thought Johnson was by far the ablest man we had. And I remember arguing with him once; I argued that Johnson could not be nominated for president and that if nominated, he couldn't be elected. This was along in 1959, I guess, early 1960, and Rayburn said, "Well, you just don't know what you're talking about! There are just millions of Republicans that don't want to vote for Richard Nixon, but they're not going to vote for Jack Kennedy; they're not going to vote for Hubert Humphrey; they're not going to vote for Adlai Stevenson. They're going to vote for Nixon in preference to these other fellows. But they will cross over and they'll vote for Lyndon Johnson, and if we had sense enough to nominate him, why, he would beat Nixon, in my honest political judgment. He'd defeat Nixon. But the problem is the nomination." He also said at that time--this is off the subject--that if the Republicans had sense enough, which he didn't think they had, to nominate Bob Anderson for president, he'd beat any Democrat.

B: I remember the talk at the time--"Anderson for President."

H: He loved Bob Anderson, not only for his ability and his brilliance, but his very high character. Bob Anderson, when he decided to leave

the Democratic Party and support Eisenhower in 1952, he made a special trip to Bonham to tell Mr. Rayburn what he had decided and why he had decided it. He came out of rock-ribbed Democratic family, his father was a brass collar Democrat. Even after Bob left the party he was very critical of his son becoming a Republican, but Bob said that he felt the country needed a change. Now, this is of course all third-hand, but he believed Eisenhower was a unifying force and he believed the fiscal policies of the country would be better served by a Republican in the White House and that reluctantly but firmly he had come to the opinion that he had in all good conscienceness to support Eisenhower. Mr. Rayburn thought that was the manly way to handle it instead of having been a Democrat all these years that Shivers had and then suddenly turn up in the Republican camp. He didn't appreciate that. But he thought Bob handled it in a very manly, honorable way. And he said he told him, "Well, of course this disturbs me greatly, but I know it's an honest decision on your part and I think you for your frankness in discussing it with me and giving me your reasons. A man has to follow his own conscience."

B: Did Mr. Rayburn distrust or dislike or fear Nixon?

H: Well, of course, his antipathy to Nixon came from Nixon's service in the House. Rayburn was very unhappy with and felt very deeply about the charges made by the Republicans and some Democrats that Truman was soft on communism. He believed that was a complete lie, was a political lie, and the Un-American Activities Committee had been a thorn in his side for years. And Rayburn put a lot of stock in his own

capacity to judge men just by looking at them and talking to them. At one time somebody said to him--he said something about a man's face, he didn't trust that man because of his face--"Well, a man's not responsible for how he looks, Mr. Speaker." And he shot back and said, "Every man is responsible for his face after he's forty years of age." He thought he could read a man's character very well by watching him, looking at him. He said many times that Nixon had the cruelest face he'd ever looked into. And when he left the House, he said to people, "Well, good riddance! I hope he never darkens the door of the House again!" He thought he would go over to the Senate and be forgotten; he ended up as candidate for president. He felt that Nixon was very reckless and unscrupulous in some of his campaign speeches, as other Republicans like Sherman Adams were in charging by innuendo, not in so many words, the Democrats with twenty years of treason. This was the unforgivable in politics. Fight a man as hard as you want to, but you don't question his loyalty to his country. And Rayburn met this issue head-on the second and last time he talked to the National Press Club. This is a matter of record; the transcript is available on his appearance over at the National Press Club.

It went something like this: after the formal presentation of the speaker, then the reporters write out anonymous questions and send them up to the president of the Press Club and he selects the ones that he wants and asks the speaker to answer them. Somebody had said, "What can you tell us about your personal relations with Richard Nixon?" A rather mildly worded question along that line. And he

said, "Well, there has been a lot of talk, irresponsible talk, going around all over this town about how I hate Richard Nixon. Now, I don't hate anybody! I don't have time enough in life to love all the people that I ought to love, much less be spending time hating people, so I don't hate anybody. But there a few that I loathe!" And so he said, "Mr.Nixon said what I consider to be some very harsh and unfair things about the party of treason and so forth in political campaigns, but I think we took him to the woodshed in 1954 and gave him a pretty good treatment; I don't think he'll be saying those things anymore." Now, this is all a matter of transcript available on all this. So he met this issue head-on.

Then I was told by a man that allegedly Nixon had told this to, on the other side of the coin Rayburn and Nixon sat by each other for about four hours as they counted the electoral votes in 1961. And then it was Nixon's constitutional duty to announce the results of the election. So he and Rayburn sat up there during that very boring procedure all afternoon, chatting with each other. I never did ask Rayburn about this, I don't guess I knew about it before he died, but somebody told me that Nixon said as he got up to leave, he had adjourned the session, he almost fainted. Rayburn reached over and patted him on the shoulder and said, "Dick, we're going to miss you around here." Now, I don't know whether that's true or not. That's a story. But he felt that these charges of a whole party being treasonable or soft on the security of this country were beyond the pale of legitimate political tactics.

B: Back in 1960 there, a lot of people have said that the campaign to get the nomination for Lyndon Johnson, if indeed that's what it was, was just not a very good one, that Mr. Johnson or somebody just didn't understand the nature of convention politics, relied too heavily on congressional support, and just got beat way before the convention started by the Kennedy group.

H: Well, a losing ball team always looks bad. A winning ball team buries its mistakes. I think that's true. I never did believe there was a chance for Johnson to be the presidential nominee in 1960; I didn't think that was in the cards. Second, Kennedy's strategy was set very early and, in retrospect, very wisely. Ted Sorensen told me in 1958, I think, that their strategy was simply the Roosevelt strategy of 1932 and that was to start so fast and go so hard that they would be way out in front at an early date. And I said, "Well, there's always the danger of a front-runner being shot at by everybody." He said, "Yes, there is. And our strategy is to be so far in advance that although they're shooting at us, they can't hit us." That's exactly what happened. He had an exceptionally able team; they had unlimited resources which they were willing to spend; they had a very attractive and able candidate.

And Johnson was in a box. He was the majority leader of the Senate, and there were about a half dozen senators who wanted to be nominated. They were naturally jealous. They were not about to promote Johnson's candidacy in any way. So Johnson, if he aroused the jealousy of these competitors for the nomination too greatly, they

might ruin his leadership in the Senate and make him fall on his face as majority leader, which would eliminate him from the race. Furthermore, the party would not have the record that he thought they ought to have made in Congress in order to run a winning campaign in 1960. He was in a terrible bind. Now, my own opinion is that it was not in the cards in 1960 for him to be nominated. If he had been free like Jack Kennedy to forget the Senate and just campaign--I don't think the time was right, I don't think a Texan could have been nominated, I don't think Lyndon Johnson could have been nominated if these other things hadn't been present. I do think that, quite understandably, Johnson relied, as any politician must rely, on the people that he knows, and those were the senators and congressmen. I think also that being new to national politics, convention politics, that he did perhaps overestimate in one state and another the power of ex-senators or present senators to deliver. It's sort of a myth, I've always thought, that members of Congress have very much influence normally in a state in the selection of convention delegates. They have the prestige and they have the office, but when it comes to selecting delegates, your local politicians and your state officials many times take the position that, "Well, now, that senator and that congressman, they got theirs. Now let them stay out of this. This is ours!" But even with that, he could not, in my judgment, have overtaken Kennedy.

B: Curious that Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson did not realize the difference between congressional politics and convention politics.

H: Well, no, I don't think so. They were skilled in one and they were amateurs in the other. Rayburn understood handling a convention after it met, but Rayburn had never been out in a nationwide campaign rounding up delegates for anybody.

B: How active was Mr. Rayburn in the pre-convention strategy for Johnson?

H: I thought only to the extent when people would come in from out in one of the states and all, he would put in a plug for Johnson to try to help him and so forth. But he did make some trips. He went to Detroit and it seems to me to a midwest meeting. He went to Albuquerque I think to a New Mexico state meeting. He did some traveling for Johnson in key spots to try to assist Johnson, but again he was not able to take off too much time either. I think he did everything that was asked of him along that line, but Rayburn had never managed a campaign in his life, including his own. You have a different cast of characters at a convention. There are many men at conventions, in those days certainly, that maybe had never been to one of these hundred dollar dinners, or maybe they had met Rayburn or Johnson when he spoke out at Laramie, Wyoming or something, but it would have been a casual relationship.

Then one of the things in the West and other places besides the West, Pennsylvania for example, I think everybody underestimated the power of Catholics in party machinery in different states. But there were many Catholics who had gone West who, as their forebears had found, politics was a way to climb rapidly. And the Democratic Party in place after place, the local leaders or the state leaders were

Catholics who very much felt the desire to break the myth about a Catholic being president of the United States, which was of great assistance to Kennedy. But never underestimate the attractiveness of Jack Kennedy as a candidate. He was a most attractive, decent, able man. If his name had been Jones and he'd had no money and he had been a Seventh Day Adventist, he still would have been a formidable contender, in my opinion. He was a very attractive man.

B: You went to the convention in Los Angeles in 1960. Can you trace the story of what you saw and did there?

H: Oh, that's such a minor little facet. There are five hundred and fifty-five official versions already, and none of them saw more than one little facet of the operation.

B: We're kind of hoping that some day someone would put all these like this one here together and get a version out of it.

H: Well, there will probably eventually emerge a semi-official version, just as there's a semi-official version of the smoke-filled room in the Blackstone Hotel that selected Warren G. Harding. But there are lots of loose ends there, if you go back and look at it. I don't think you'll ever have it all together.

Well, of course, Rayburn nominated Johnson. He was out there and he was meeting with people. A constant stream of people coming to his suite, or he was phoning people and doing everything that he could do to try to win over delegates for Lyndon Johnson. Once Lyndon Johnson had made his decision to enter, Rayburn of course approved of it and

did everything that was humanly possible on it. And he convinced me that he really felt that Johnson was the strongest candidate that the Democrats had because of the fact that he felt that there were millions of Republicans who didn't want Richard Nixon, but wouldn't vote for any other potential Democratic nominee. But he nominated Lyndon Johnson. He told me to prepare the elements of the nominating speech, which I did, and which he went over. And he told me what main points he wanted in it. I tried to put those in language and went back to him time after time and he would revise and insert something else and so forth and so on. Then he had me take the speech to Senator Johnson and go over it with him and Johnson approved it, I believe, without change of a word. So then this was mimeographed and distributed to the press. Then, of course, Rayburn couldn't read a speech by that time. One eye was out and the other eye he couldn't read with, so he gave what was a much better speech, a complete ad-libbed speech at the convention. But we released the formal speech. So there are two nominating speeches: one that the press carried initially and the other one that was actually delivered. Then he was on the floor of the convention all the time, you know, seeing people, advising, and conferring with people during that period.

Then Kennedy was nominated and that night we went back to the Rayburn suite and he did something I saw him do only two or three times--that is, to take a drink after dinner. He never wanted to have a drink after supper except on the rarest occasions. I don't remember who was in the suite that night. I think that J. T. Rutherford, the

congressman from the El Paso district; probably Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry; John Holton was there, I think--I'm sure he was there; Nick Kotz of the Des Moines Register Tribune was there; probably others--I just paid no attention to it.

But I have no recollection at that meeting which was just to have a nightcap. I know I went to bed that night absolutely convinced that the nominee for vice president was going to Stuart Symington. In my mind there wasn't any question about it from the conversations that had taken place. I do not recall any mention by anybody at that post-morten that night of the possibility of Johnson being the nominee.

B: Before you go any further, had Mr. Rayburn ever said anything about who might be the vice presidential candidate if Johnson had gotten the presidential nomination?

H: I don't recall if he did. I just don't recall the subject ever coming up. Oh, I'm sure he had speculated with a lot of people from time to time, but the nominee is entitled to his own choice. And I don't recall it ever coming up.

B: Anyway, you went to bed that night certain it was not going to be Johnson, probable that it would be Symington.

H: That's right. Then one of Mr. Symington's campaign leaders from his district came into the one where Nick Kotz and myself were staying. He's now the correspondent for the Des Moines Register here. At that time he was covering either the county courthouse or the statehouse in Des Moines for the Register. He's a very close friend of mine, so I invited him to go out with me with the understanding that he was there

as my friend and not as a reporter and would not write anything about the convention. So he had complete access to wander in and out just for the experience of watching a convention.

So this fellow came in and we couldn't get him into a taxi until about six o'clock in the morning. So we went to bed, thoroughly exhausted. About twelve-thirty there was a banging on the door and it was Hale Boggs and with him was Ed Foley, who was the under secretary of the treasury in the Truman Administration. Hale said, "Where's the Old Man? Where's the Old Man?" I said, "I don't know where he is; I haven't seen him today." He said, "I've got to see him right now." I was irritated, I said, "What's eating you?" And he said, "Well, Jack has offered Lyndon the vice presidential nomination and the Speaker has got to see to it that he takes it." I said, "Oh, you don't know what you're talking about! Stuart Symington has been chosen," or something. He said, "Oh, that was last night. Jack has made the offer, and I've got to see the Speaker and make sure that he--we've got to get Lyndon on the ticket to win." And I said, "Oh, I know where he is. Every convention the delegates from the congressional district have a breakfast; he's over at the Fourth District breakfast." Hale said, "The hell he is! He's not at any breakfast. Do you know what time it is?" I said, "No." He said, "It's twelve-thirty." This was twelve-thirty noon. And I said, "Well, I don't know. Go down to his suite and see if he's in there."

So, meantime, a couple of friends of mine from U.S. News banged on the door, and they of course got the story. So they came in and we

were still in our shorts, just lounging around on the bed. They stayed, it seems to me, like an hour, just speculating and talking. And I still didn't know anything about it, you see.

So we got dressed and were starving to death, so we didn't even go to the Rayburn suite; we went downstairs and had some scrambled eggs or something. Came back up to the suite and I suppose it was 2:30 by that time. And of course there was great confusion at this stage of the game, milling around, and nobody knew what was going on. The phone rang and my recollection is that I answered the phone, and he said, "This is Dave Lawrence. Is Sam there?" I said, "Oh, yes, Governor, he's right here." So I called the Speaker over, and the Speaker talked to him. Lawrence said to him, "You going to be there a little bit?" You see, the convention was meeting because of the time difference--I think five-thirty in the afternoon and this was, my recollection is, about a quarter to four. And said, "I want to come up there and get you to help me on some facts and things for my speech." The Speaker said, "Has that got to do with Lyndon?" And he said, "Yes, they told me to get a speech ready to nominate him, and a lot of facts I don't have. I need to come up and talk to you." Mr. Rayburn said, "Well, is that thing all set?" And Lawrence said, "I don't know. They just told me to get a speech ready."

So at a quarter to four, or some time thereabout, apparently Rayburn did not know whether the situation had jelled and that Johnson would be the Kennedy choice. And then whatever the record shows, I

think it was about four o'clock, Kennedy came on television and told the world that Johnson was his choice.

So Lawrence arrived with his executive secretary to write the the speech. And so two researchers, William C. Gibbens, who is now head of the Political Science Department at Texas A&M and was working on the Democratic Policy Committee under Johnson, and Dan McCrary, who was then a Congressional Fellow in Johnson's office who now works for Business Week here in town, they were the research fellows and they had the Johnson-cyclopedia, which was a loose-leaf notebook I'm told of everything Johnson had ever said and the facts and figures and all. So I went and tried to find them. And I found Dan McCrary, brought him back. And Dan McCrary and this executive assistant of Governor Lawrence found a typewriter and they used the room Nick Kotz and myself had and worked on a speech for Lawrence. Then they told me later they rushed around and located Lawrence and read it to him and he approved it, but Lawrence had bad eyesight, so then they had to find an oversized typewriter and retype it so he could see to read it.

By this time the clock was running and it was time for the convention. In the meantime Price Daniel said to me--his suite was adjoining Mr. Rayburn's and I had known Price for many years--Price said to me out in the hall, "You know, we've got to get some seconding speeches lined up, and I'll bet nobody's tending to that. Go down there and see Lyndon and ask him who he wants for seconding speeches. I think I ought to make one; I think Governor [James] Almond of Virginia ought to make one, and Bill Dawson ought to make one from

Chicago, and I don't know--Governor [John] Hickey of Wyoming ought to make one. Go down and get his suggestions."

So I went down and the Johnson suite was in complete uproar, but he was sitting in a chair. He was obviously tired. And I knelt down beside the chair and told him what Price Daniel had said. So he said, "That's right. You ought to have this one and you ought to have that one," and he said, "Whoever Price thinks we ought to have. I've got to go to convention; I won't know what's going on until they get up to speak. I won't know who's going to speak. Tell Price to go on and handle this and get it lined up." So I went back and reported that to Price Daniel. That's about what I personally saw.

B: Did you ever hear any talk afterward around this question of was Johnson at first reluctant to take it, or was Rayburn reluctant to have him take the offer, and if his mind needed changing, how it came about?

H: Oh, yes, I've heard different participants. This is all third-hand as far as I'm concerned. President Johnson said that the first person to mention to him the possibility of the vice presidency was Price Daniel. He said to him after the Kennedy nomination, "If that boy's half as smart as I think he is, he's going to offer you the vice presidential nomination and you've got to take it." Johnson said he told Price, "That's ridiculous; we've had too many harsh words out here and too much feeling; he'll never do that." Price said, "Well, if he's as smart as I think he is, he's going to do it." Then he mentioned it to Will Wilson, who had been our attorney general, and

Will said, "I hadn't thought of it, but it makes perfect political sense." So then he said he called Rayburn, apparently that night, at what time I don't know.

B: This is Daniel?

H: No, no. Johnson called Rayburn and told him what Daniel and Wilson had said. And Rayburn flared up and said, "Now, don't you do any damned fool thing. Don't you even think about anything until we talk it over," or--I don't know the exact words, but something to that effect.

So then according to Johnson's story, after Kennedy came to see him and made the offer which Johnson left open-ended, he said, "One thing you're going to have to do it persuade Sam Rayburn. He's definitely opposed to anything like this." He called Rayburn and told him that he thought he'd be hearing from Kennedy pretty soon. Well, Rayburn had gone to this--but I'm getting ahead of the story. Rayburn got up the next morning and went to this breakfast. John Holden went with him. They got back from the breakfast, John told me that he was not sure when, he thought some time maybe a little bit before noon. And when they got to the Rayburn suite. Rayburn looked down the hall and saw all these journalists down at Johnson's suite and he said, "What's going on down there? Oh, I bet I know what this is!" So apparently right after he got back to the suite, he got this call from Johnson.

Well, in the meantime, Hale Boggs and Tommy Corcoran were apparently about the first ones there to see Rayburn. Tommy Corcoran

had been walking the halls all that week and God knows how many weeks before--I don't know--pushing the idea of a Kennedy-Johnson or Johnson-Kennedy ticket. And he had many arguments for it either way. So he was talking to Rayburn. Then Hale Boggs went from our room down there; he and Ed Foley went down there. Hale said that they finally eased Tommy out of the room, and he and Foley got to talking to Mr. Rayburn, telling him, "Lyndon has got to accept this. It's the only way we can keep Nixon from being elected. Lyndon has got to take it!" and so forth. Then Ed Foley left the room and Hale kept on arguing with Mr. Rayburn. And Mr. Rayburn in the meantime had gotten a call from Kennedy, saying, "I want to come to see you." Mr. Rayburn said, "No, I'll come see you." Said, "No, I'm just above you. I'll be down there in a few minutes. I want to talk to you." And Kennedy didn't show up. So Mr. Rayburn said to Hale, "Go up there and see if that boy's coming down here."

So Hale went upstairs and here were the people raising hell about the offer to Johnson; Soapy [Mennen] Williams and Joe Rauh and Walter Reuther and I don't know who all was up there. They were raising hell with--arguing with Kennedy. So Hale said he said to him, "He's down there waiting; you can't keep him waiting. Now let's go down there." So they went out a back door and went down the fire stairs to the Rayburn suite. Kenny O'Donnell and Jack Kennedy and Hale Boggs. They got there and Kennedy said, "Shall we all talk?" And Hale said, "No, why don't you let Kenny and myself get better acquainted and the two of you talk?"

So he went in and talked to Mr. Rayburn alone. And Mr. Rayburn's version of the conversation was that he said to Kennedy, "Now, Jack, in the first place I want to say to you that Lyndon and myself don't want anything; we're not running for anything; we're not looking for anything." Meanwhile, while he was waiting for Hale to report on Kennedy, he said to John Holton, "John, I want to get off by myself and think a little bit." There wasn't any place to put him but in John's room which was down beyond ours. We couldn't get interlocking rooms. So John left him in his bedroom and said he didn't know how long he stayed there, maybe twenty minutes, and then came back to his suite.

Kennedy was talking to him and [Rayburn] said, "Now, Jack, as I think you know, I've been dead set opposed to this whole idea since I heard of it, but I've done some hard thinking about it and if you tell me. . . . In the first place," he said, "whoever you select, you be prepared to see to it that that convention nominates him and doesn't cut him up in the process." And he said, "Furthermore, Lyndon is a very active man and he likes to be doing things and the vice presidency is a terrible place for a man to be who's active and energetic. I don't think he ought to take it if he's just going to sit there as vice president. I've been opposed to this, but I want you to understand that we're not looking for anything and not wanting anything. But if you tell me that you're willing to tell the world he's your choice and you're willing to do whatever is necessary to get him nominated by that convention and if you tell me that you'll use him

every place that you can, on the National Security Council or any other thing that you can give him to do, and if you tell me that you don't think you can win this election without him on the ticket, then I'll withdraw whatever objections I've had to his taking it." And Kennedy said, "I tell you all those things." And Fred said that was it.

So then what went on that afternoon, I've told you what little I know about it, but at some place, which I now think was when Rayburn and Holton went down to Johnson's suite, Rayburn said to Mary Margaret Wiley something about, "Whose bedroom is this?" And she said, "This is mine." He said, "We want to use it." So they went in there.

Bobby Kennedy had arrived, so they went in apparently there and the two of them talked. Mr. Rayburn's version of it was that Bobby Kennedy said to him, "Things are just coming all to pieces up there. These people are upstairs there with Jack and they're raising hell about Lyndon being on the ticket, and they're saying that they won't contribute to the campaign and that they'll sit on their hands and they won't work if he's on the ticket. It's just awful. I don't know what's going to happen." Mr. Rayburn said Bobby's hair was hanging down in his face. He said, "Well, now, listen, Bobby, I want to say this to you. Lyndon and myself are not talking to but one man, and that's your brother." He said, "I'll tell you what I told your brother," and he repeated his conversation with Jack Kennedy. And he said Bobby Kennedy sort of straightened up and slapped his leg and said, "Well, that's it. I'm going back and tell Jack it has got to be

Lyndon." Now, that's Rayburn's version of the Kennedy conversation. And as near as I've been able to pinpoint it, it took place down in the Johnson suite. But this is all third-hand.

B: That visit from Robert Kennedy is apparently the source of the allegation or the rumor that the Kennedy camp was trying to back-pedal or some of the Kennedy people weren't--

H: I've always felt Bobby was trying to back-pedal, that Bobby didn't want him on the ticket, which lends credence to the theory that Jack Kennedy had decided on Johnson and hadn't even told Bobby about it. Maybe he'd made up his mind sometime before the convention that he had to have Johnson, but probably knowing how Bobby felt about Johnson-- Bobby did not have the urbaneness that Jack Kennedy had about personal attacks and so forth, Bobby was younger, Bobby just did not have the urbanity of his brother, so he undoubtedly deeply resented the attacks that had been made during the campaign. Jack Kennedy could overlook them. Jack Kennedy was the candidate, Jack Kennedy was a broader-gauged man, and so perhaps he knew how deeply Bobby felt and rather than argue with Bobby, he wouldn't even tell his brother, his closest friend, what he decided. And Bobby probably genuinely was fearful of labor and the liberals boycotting the campaign, you know, it was quite a legitimate fear. So whether Jack Kennedy sent Bobby down there or whether he even knew that Bobby was there, I doubt. I'll never know, but I rather doubt that Bobby was there in behalf of anybody but himself. You get in a fast-moving situation like that, there's not time to know what the other fellow's doing even if he is your brother

and your campaign manager. It was everybody for himself in a fast-moving situation like that.

B: At any rate the ticket ended up Kennedy-Johnson.

H: It ended up Kennedy-Johnson.

B: And you did some advance work in the campaign.

H: Primarily for Johnson. There was only one meeting involved with Kennedy.

B: Tell a story you told me the last time about the El Paso trip, Kennedy in his hotel room.

H: Well, they were to rendezvous there. Kennedy had been out in the Northwest and California and he was flying in from California to meet Johnson in El Paso. Johnson was coming in from the Ranch; they were to meet on Sunday night. And they were to have a rally with local leaders, a breakfast with local leaders, the next morning. Then they would step right out of the hotel onto a platform where there's a big public square and address the crowd there. Then they would get on the plane and start a circular trip of Texas. At the end of that trip, this was to include the famous, now famous, Kennedy confrontation with the Protestant ministers in Houston. And at the end of the trip Johnson was to spin off and go to New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and I don't know where from there. Kennedy was going on to St. Louis and back East.

The Kennedy advance man got out there, Tom Whalen got out there, and I went out to Arizona and New Mexico. John Holton was in charge of the Albuquerque stop for Johnson, and Max Edwards, who was an

assistant secretary of the interior most of these last eight years, was in charge of three little towns in eastern New Mexico. I took Phoeniz and Tucson and got another assistant to work on Tucson. Then I flew back to El Paso to try to help on the arrangements there. Tom Whalen and myself worked on that trip.

Well, they had a terrible feud going on in El Paso between Woodrow Bean, the county judge, and the Mayor, who later was ambassador to Costa Rica under Kennedy. They wouldn't even use the same restroom and it was a terrible feud. Each faction would try to grab the advance men, you know, and kidnap them. But, anyhow, there was nothing scheduled for Sunday night and we decided we did not want an airport crowd because six or twelve policemen were all that we could get for the airport. So we didn't want a crowd out there to meet them because we couldn't control it, being Sunday night.

Well, Johnson was an hour or so late getting in. And then Kennedy was an hour and a half or so later getting in. The radio and TV were carrying the news about this and I think everybody in El Paso was listening to the news and they said, "Well, let's get our shoes on and get the kids in the car and go to the airport." So we ended up with a crowd of about ten or twelve thousand people. All we had up was a rope to keep people back. Well, the Johnson plane got in and to kill time and try to hold the crowd, which by that time, you know, here it is! They got a flatbed truck, and everybody on the Johnson plane, I think congressmen and so forth, got up and made a speech to the crowd to kill time, including Johnson and Lady Bird and so forth.

So Kennedy finally arrived. I was with Kennedy and I said, "Senator, your convertible is over here," and there were police officials there and all. And so he said, "All right." We started over toward it and here was this crowd. So Kennedy decided to go over there to greet his well-wishers. They were screaming and cheering. The Latin Americans liked Kennedy very much. He sort of broke and walked away from us before we knew what has happening, walked toward the crowd and the crowd surged and broke the rope. We were terrified because a child can get trampled to death in a situation like that very easily. We were afraid some people would be killed. So the people sort of moved in and sort of held the crowd back and got Kennedy over to his car and went on into town. I was told later that the Chief of Police really bawled Kennedy out and said, "You came close to getting people killed out there tonight, and from here on I hope you do what people tell you to do. Don't ever do anything like this again." And Kennedy said, "Well, I just made a mistake. I'll know better next time."

We got to the hotel and there was an enormous crowd there. We heard on the police radio going in that there was a big crowd out in the square and that the hotel lobby was full. So we rolled up there and they got out of the convertible and the police and several of us threw out hands around them, a cordon around them, and surged through the crowd right in through the door. The elevator was being held for them, and we just go them onto that elevator in a hurry and got them up to their suite. They were on the same floor. Mr. Rayburn was down

on the floor below. The lobby was full of screaming, shouting people. So they said, "What's the next thing?" or something, I don't remember clearly, but I said, "Well, I think you ought to go down to the mezzanine and say a few words to the crowd in the lobby." "How do we get down there?"

Well, the elevators were jammed and then I realized I had goofed. I had never envisioned this possibility, so I had not reconnoitered the fire stairs. It was the only way to possibly get down. They were on the seventh floor or something. So we ducked down the fire stairs, not knowing whether some of these doors would be locked or not, and we walked all the say down those fire stairs and suddenly came out on the mezzanine. And they leaned over the balcony of the mezzanine and said a few words to the crowd.

So then we got on back upstairs. Kennedy went to his suite, and I went to the Johnson suite and the Senator said, "Go down there and tell Jack to come down here. The Speaker's on the way up here and we're going to talk to him about what to say about the depletion allowance tomorrow."

I went down to the Kennedy suite, and there was a guard on the door, but nobody in the suite with him. I heard Kenny O'Donnell had cut loose and gone over to Juarez. Senator Kennedy was sitting in the middle of the living room and his suitcase was just lying open on the bed in the bedroom. He was sitting there reading some long clipping. They had put a basket of fruit in his room and he had a bunch of white grapes on his lap. He was sitting in this chair kind of pulled out in

the middle of the living room, reading this clipping, and plucking a grape and eating it along the way. I told him, "Senator, I'm so-and-so, and Senator Johnson would like for you to come down right away to his suite; the Speaker's on the way up to talk about the depletion allowance."

He very coolly said, "All right," and went back to reading and plucking a grape. He kept on doing that and I was standing on one foot and then another. And in just a minute here came Senator Johnson, just walking seven league boots down the hall. Came in and said, "Come on, Jack, come on, Jack! The Speaker's on the way up. Don't keep him waiting. Can't keep him waiting. Come on, Jack!" He looked up at the Senator very coolly and said, "All right, in a minute," something like that, and went on back to reading his clipping. So Senator Johnson--of course they were all tired--was walking back and forth in the living room and throwing his shoulders back. "I've got some kind of a crick in my back." Kennedy looked up very coolly and said, "I believe you're cracking up. If you do, where do you want me to send it?" And so Kennedy put the clipping in his pocket and they disappeared and went on down the hall.

B: Did you forego the rest of the Texas trip with them?

H: No, I went on to Phoenix.

B: Anything else stand out in your mind about the campaign?

H: When we first went out as advance men on that first trip, I felt that Bobby and the national committee were going to give as little money as possible to the Johnson advance men. I wasn't sure that was the case,

but I kind of raised my eyebrows about it, because they did not give us an air travel card or a telephone--well, I take it back. I was given a telephone credit card, but no airplane travel card. We were going to have to pay for the airplane travel and then they gave us expense money. Then any excess expenses we had to submit a voucher or memorandum to the national committee. I thought this was a very strange proceeding although I had heard that they were in bad financial shape. While air travel cards are abused in campaigns, it's the really sensible way to expedite travel, rather than wait to pick up the ticket, and so forth. So I wondered whether they were just short of money or whether maybe they were not going to be as liberal with the Johnson advance men as they were with other--I didn't know. Well, I think maybe it was just newness on their part because when I got to El Paso, the Kennedy advance man had been sent out and they hadn't even given him a telephone credit card. So he used mine, and they hadn't given the other advance men telephone credit cards, and so they all took my number down and God knows how much was charged to that one number. So looking back on it now, I don't believe there was an intentional discrimination, but I did wonder about it at the time. I don't think there was. Later on, as they got into the campaign, why, they loosened up like previous campaigns.

D: Did you have any unusual trouble in coordinating the two candidates' activities?

H: No, because as far as--I worked in that trip out in the Southwest and John Holton and myself went out to Chicago and advanced the appearance

of Senator Johnson in Chicago the last week of the campaign. I think it was on a Friday, pretty sure it was Friday before the Tuesday election. John and myself went out sometime in advance, not knowing how efficient the [Richard] Daley machine was. We were staying down at the Morrison because the Johnson luncheon Mayor Daley gave and had all the ward leaders in to hear Senator Johnson was to be at the Morrison. We stayed at the Morrison first and it was such a wretched hotel that we moved to the Sherman. Picked up the paper one day and Kennedy was working the suburbs of Chicago. He stayed out of downtown Chicago, but he was making shopping centers and all that on the west side. It said that the Kennedy party was staying at the O'Hare Inn at O'Hare Airport. Well, Senator Johnson was to land at the military section of O'Hare Airport, coming in from Missouri and places down South. So we said, "Well, you know he's going to be here--get in at midnight and then he'll be taking off the middle of the afternoon. Might be sensible to stay out there and not bring that whole entourage into town, checking them in and checking them out. Let's go out and see what it's like."

So John and myself went out there and we got there just as the Kennedy party was coming out of the O'Hare Inn and loading up in their car to take off. They had checked out of the hotel. So we went in and we liked the set-up, so we just moved in right after them. But we had nothing to do with the Kennedy people, there wasn't any avoidance, but we just had no business with them. And they loaded up and we saw some of the reporters and other people and said hello to them. The

situation was very friendly. There was no sign whatsoever of friction; I don't think there was any friction at that stage of the game. Each one was covering different cities and so forth.

B: How efficient was the Daley machine?

H: I think John and myself went out about ten days ahead of time--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II

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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of D. B. Hardeman

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Maury Maverick, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, Executor of the Estate of D. B. Hardeman, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on February 26, March 12 and April 22, 1969 at Washington, D.C., and on January 19, 1977 in San Antonio, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

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