INTERVIEW IV

DATE: January 19, 1977

INTERVIEWEE: D. B. HARDEMAN

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Maury Maverick, Jr.'s residence, San Antonio, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

H: Okay, let me mention this now because I may never think about it again. A person that might have a little note on Johnson that you haven't got now is a former Princeton professor named John J. Corson, C-O-R-S-O-N. I think he lives in Alexandria, Virginia now or Arlington or northern Virginia, and I think he's a consultant now. But he's had a distinguished teaching career. He's an expert on bureaucracy and upper managerial bureaucracy, written some books on it. I think Brookings published one of them. But anyhow, Jack Corson was the deputy to Aubrey Williams. He told me this story which I didn't write down because it really didn't pertain particularly to me. But I don't know whether you have [this story] in your files, and I don't know the story. But I was looking for a job in 1937. When did LBJ become head of the NYA, 1937?

G: No, that was in 1935.

H: 1935. So it was announced, as I recall, on Friday that the National Youth Administration in Texas would be headed by a state legislator, or former state legislator maybe, named DeWitt Kinard, K-I-N-A-R-D, of Port Arthur, who was a good friend of mine. So I jumped for joy because I thought

DeWitt would give me a job. It's very distinct and clear in my mind. Well, nothing was ever heard of DeWitt Kinard again, and early the next week Lyndon Johnson was named head of the NYA. So something happened over the weekend and I don't know what it was. But Jack Corson told me this story. I knew him when he was at Princeton.

He said, "Aubrey Williams was out of town and a situation came up involving the Texas NYA. We were in a jam. Aubrey came back into town and came by the office briefly. I told him that we had a mess in Texas. I didn't know what to do about it. Aubrey said, 'I'm busy. I'm leaving town. I've got to catch that train. You go to Sam Rayburn and see what his advice is.' I went to see Mr. Rayburn, and Mr. Rayburn said, 'Yes, I know what you ought to do. Dick Kleberg has or has had a young boy, young fellow, working for him and he'd be just the right man for you. His name is Lyndon Johnson. Check him out.'"

I'd like for you to talk to Corson because he would remember the details. It wasn't important for my project so I didn't explore it any further.

G: Perhaps it was Corson rather than Williams who ended up appointing Lyndon Johnson.

H: He worked it out apparently, yes. But it's just something that might be worth your checking out. Corson I believe is a management consultant, living in northern Virginia. John J. Corson.

G: Sure.

Let's start at the end and get the story on the last time LBJ saw Sam Rayburn alive.

H: Okay. In the last weeks of his life, Mr. Rayburn would come and go from I would call it a coma. He'd be very lucid; he'd be very talkative perhaps, and then he would slip away and he would be totally incommunicative. He would be like he was in a coma. You never knew. One morning the nurse and myself were with him. Three of us: H.G. Dulaney, John Holton, and myself, took turns about staying up all night at the hospital. One of us was there every night. This particular night I was on, and he usually would wake very early in the morning. So we were there.

He said belligerently, "Give me a cigarette." So I lighted a cigarette for him. Before I got it lit he had drifted off, so I went ahead and smoked the cigarette. In just a few minutes he opened his eyes and said, "You never did give me that damn cigarette." But that's the way it was. He'd drift in and out. He might be out for a couple of hours or a couple of minutes. There was no way of predicting it.

John Connally came up. Rayburn was supposed to make a speech out at the Veteran's Hospital on November 11, and of course couldn't make it. So John Connally took his place and came by to see him. He said to John, "John, I'm mighty sick, or "I'm a mighty sick man." John said, "Yes, I know you are, Mr. Speaker. But we're doing everything we can to make you well again." So he was very lucid when John was there.

A couple of days later, and I don't know the date, but you can check that out, LBJ--Vice President Johnson then--flew in and landed

the helicopter on the school grounds, which was across the street from the little hospital in Bonham. He came over there. There were a number of people in Rayburn's room at that particular time. Vice President Johnson went over to the bed, and he took Rayburn's hand in his two hands and he said, "Hello, pardner." Rayburn was in a coma; he didn't respond at all. So the Vice President leaned over very close to him, still holding his hand in his two hands, and said, "Hello, pardner," and Rayburn showed no sign of recognition. LBJ straightened up and he had the most grief-stricken look on his face. He was a shattered man as he straightened up. As I was telling Mrs. Johnson the other night, it was the first time that he had accepted the fact that he had lost Sam Rayburn. The look on his face, I never saw at any other time in his life. But he was a shattered man. He sort of turned on his heel and walked out, got on the helicopter, and went away. That was the last time he saw him alive. He knew he was terminally ill. In fact, the Vice President was the first person that alerted me to the fact that he thought something was materially wrong with Rayburn.

G: What did he say?

H: The Speaker came back from the July 4 vacation and he said, "The damnedest thing happened to me while I was at home. I got the worst crick in my back. I went to Dr. [Joe] Risser in Bonham and he gave me some shots and it didn't help any. I went back and I said, 'You got to do better than that. I've got a bad case of lumbago,'" which nobody today ever hears about. But to the old-timers, lumbago

was a big thing. And he said, "I've got this [backache]." Well, those of us on the staff thought it was lumbago or a backache or something.

But I went out to a party at Judge Gene Worley's house. LBJ was at the party. I said something to him. He was telling with great hilarity about getting Rayburn to go to Dr. Janet Travell, Kennedy's back physician, down at the White House. He finally convinced the Speaker that he ought to let Dr. Travell examine him and see what she could do for him. So she started giving him shots in the back. He started putting on his pants standing up, and she bawled him out: "Don't you ever do that! Let me show you how to put your pants on. Sit down and put them on one leg at a time and then stand up and draw them up." That made him mad and he said, "Ain't any woman alive going to tell me how to put my britches on!" (Laughter)

So the Vice President said--I said something about I hope his lumbago gets better or something--"Well, D.B., I think in a week or so we'll know whether it's lumbago or whether it's something much more serious." So he sensed that something was wrong. Well, then he began to lose weight and he couldn't eat; he lost his appetite. Dr. Walter Judd, the Republican congressman from Minnesota, told people, "Of course, I haven't examined him, but I have been a victim of cancer for many years myself." I don't know how many operations he'd had for skin cancer. He said, "All the appearances to me are that he has cancer."

But he went to either Walter Reed or Bethesda, and I've got to check this out. They gave him every kind of exam on earth: X-rays; he took barium, and all this business. He came back and he said that they told him, "We don't know what's wrong with you but we'll tell you one thing, there's nothing organically wrong with you." So I have been told--and this is something else, a little detail to check out--he went out and had supper that night with the Bob Bartleys, his nephew who was on the FCC. I've been told that when he walked in he laid his hat down and he said, "Well, thank God I don't have cancer."

So the staff has never known whether he ever [knew]. He told me one time, "My brother thinks I've got cancer of the gut. Well, Dr. Risser said that all the Rayburns die of cancer at very old ages." Well, they didn't all die of cancer, but many of them died of cancer. Four or five in the family, of his brothers and sisters, did die of cancer at very old ages, up around eighty. So John Holton and myself and H.G. Dulaney, we've talked for hours debating the question as to whether Rayburn ever accepted the fact that he had cancer. We don't know. John Holton says that the only time Rayburn ever referred to it was when he was in Baylor Hospital in Dallas. He said, "John, do you know what's wrong with me?" He said, "No, I don't,Mr. Speaker. Why don't you ask your doctor?" Well, he never asked the doctor.

The best indication, as I was telling Mrs. Johnson the other night, that Rayburn knew he was terminally ill, W.B. Ragsdale,

"Rags" Ragsdale of the U.S. News [and World Report], who was a friend of his of many years standing, made an appointment to go to Bonham and interview him. He had to wait ten days until Rayburn was well enough to see him. So Rayburn was lying on a cot out on the back porch, the sun porch, when the tape recorder was going. Rags got through with his questions and then he said, "Well, now, Mr. Speaker, that's all I have. Is there anything you'd like to say?" He said, "Yes, there is, Rags." Then he spoke a long paragraph, sort of a peroration. This is in U.S. News, January of 1962, I believe. It's a marvelous interview and the last part of it is a distillation of Rayburn's philosophy, in which he said, "98 per cent of the people in this world are mighty good people, and if you'll meet them halfway, they'll meet you halfway." And he went on in that vein. I said, "Rags, did you have the feeling when he was saying that that he knew this was probably his last interview and that this was the end?" Rags said, "There was no question in my mind that he knew what he was doing."

But he never gave us an indication--we were with him every day--of accepting the fact that he was seriously or terminally ill, and I just don't know.

G: Let me ask you one thing about that LBJ visit to the hospital down there. Did LBJ say anything to you on the way in or on the way out expressing his feelings, before or after that visit?

H: When he came in I met him at the door to the hospital. He appeared to me to be emotionally disturbed. He said something that I couldn't

hear distinctly. I thought he just kind of muttered, "God bless you," or something like that, which was quite uncharacteristic of him. When he left, I don't think he said a word to any of us. I think he was so deeply moved that he didn't say anything. [That's] my recollection of it. Of course, it's been fifteen years. But I could very easily forget it. My recollection is that his face was so grief-stricken that he just turned and walked out of the hospital, and nobody tried to interrupt him or stop him. Everybody understood the depth of his feelings. So I don't think he said anything as he left. Coming in he was uncommunicative. He wanted to see Rayburn; that's the reason he was there. So he just kind of stalked into the hospital, went over to Rayburn, and took his hand in his hands. I have the intuition that he knew Rayburn was dying, but it really hadn't hit home until he found that he had had his last word with Rayburn, he would never again have a conversation with Sam Rayburn. Then it really hit.

G: Did Mr. Rayburn have a corresponding mental decline before he went in the hospital? Was he at all senile?

H: He never declined mentally. His mind was just as bright the last time he was lucid. Two days before he died Henry Gonzalez was elected to Congress. I got the Dallas News about six o'clock in the morning, and there was the news of Henry's election. So I went in. The old man had wasted away to nothing. I don't suppose he weighed seventy pounds when he died. To change his bed we'd pick him up in our arms, just like you would a baby, he was that light.

But I went in to him and I said, "Mr. Speaker, Henry Gonzalez was elected yesterday. He won by about ten thousand votes." In his last days Mr. Rayburn would speak very low. He always did speak low. It made him mad to have to repeat himself. That was one of his characteristics, that he'd just puff up when you said, "What did you say, Mr. Speaker?" He'd just kind of puff up in anger. He mumbled something and I said, "I didn't understand you, Mr. Speaker." So he puffed up and he raised his voice, "I said what was the percentage?" Two days before he died he wanted to know what Henry Gonzalez' winning percentage was.

(Interruption)

G: Let's get back to some of the earlier years. One of the things we were talking about before we turned on the machine was Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn as opposites. You mentioned in particular LBJ's love of gadgets versus Mr. Sam's abhorrence of gadgets. Do you want to elaborate on that again?

H: Well, Rayburn really would have been happier in the nineteenth century, when you didn't have all of this impedimenta of modern living. He was totally lacking in mechanical ability. He couldn't even unlock a door. He was a terrible driver; he was a very dangerous driver. He was much more at home on a horse than he was in an automobile. I mentioned the telephones. When they put in the dial phones in the Capitol, he wouldn't let them put a dial phone on his desk. He made them leave the old-style telephone on his desk so he could pick up the phone and talk to the operator and get her to get the

number. He told H.G. Dulaney to have the second phone taken out of the Rayburn Library to save money, and said, "Hell, I can't talk over but one phone at a time." H.G. said, "Mr. Rayburn, you'll be wanting to make a call and somebody will have the phone tied up and then you'll be mad." But Rayburn's idea was to keep life as simple as possible.

I went in a secondhand store there in Bonham and there was a twenty-one-year-old kid in there who went to East Texas [State] University. He said, "I had a famous visitor this morning." I said, "Who was that?" He said, "I was here by myself, and I looked up and this little bald-headed man was walking up the steps. I recognized him. It was Sam Rayburn. He came in and I said, 'What can I do for you?' He said, 'I'm looking for a secondhand stopper for a bathtub. I found one. He said, 'How much?' and I said a quarter. He paid me the quarter and I introduced myself. He knew my father. When my dad got back I said, 'Sam Rayburn was in here and he bought a secondhand stopper for the bathtub, paid me a quarter. But you're not going to get the quarter; I'm saving that for my little boy.'"

But it was that kind of simplicity, where President Johnson loved the grandiose and the spectacular. Mr. Rayburn said he said to LBJ once--and of course, as you well know, he loved LBJ--"Lyndon, I don't run around and yell and wave my arms half as much as you do and I think I get just as much done." (Laughter) So this was the difference in the nature of the men.

G: But contrasting particularly his attitude toward the telephone with LBJ's.

H: Well, LBJ was the first man I knew of that had a thirty-two push button thing on his desk, you know, just all sorts [of gadgets]. And LBJ lived to use the phone. One of his assistants was working in the Democratic Policy Committee. He was working on his dissertation, and he was there about midnight one night, he said, and the phone rang. He picked up the phone; it was LBJ in Nevada or someplace, and he said, "What's going on?" You know, there wasn't any business to transact, but he just couldn't resist using that telephone to phone. He couldn't think of anybody else to phone so he phoned the policy committee office and there just happened to be a staff assistant in there.

You know, this love of airplanes--Rayburn didn't like flying. He finally got used to it when his sister, Miss Lou, was dying of cancer. But he had flown with Eisenhower in 1945, right after World War II, when Eisenhower, who didn't know where he was born, finally was convinced that he was born in Denison. He went to Denison for a homecoming. Rayburn flew down with him on a military plane and didn't like it. So he wouldn't fly until Miss Lou got sick, and to see her he had to fly. So he got used to it. But he was disturbed about people drinking on the plane and getting unruly. He's responsible for the CAB putting in the rule limiting alcohol to two drinks. When he got back to Washington, he called them and just raised holy hell about people getting drunk on the

plane. So that rule, that's one of his legacies, the two-drink limit on airplanes today.

But they were different generations. They were just different men. LBJ loved--my experience with him was--the brand-new, the modern. Rayborn loved the old.

G: One more story I want to get you to tell is that story of Speaker Rayburn coming back from the Senate, "that place," and talking about LBJ using two phones.

H: Oh, well, this was very late in his life. Rayburn seldom went over to the Senate. He wouldn't go over there to eat if he could avoid it. He had a disdain for the Senate. He said, "Can you imagine an outfit that doesn't have any rules?" He referred to the Senate as "that place." He thought their legislative workmanship was very poor compared to that of the House. Part of it was the ancient rivalry between the House and the Senate. But nevertheless, on this occasion he went over to the Vice President's office for some reason. He came back and he was really irked. He said, "I'm never going over to that place again. I'm never going to his office again. I went over there to talk to him, and the whole time I was there he had two telephones, one on each shoulder, and he was carrying on two conversations at the same time, and me sitting there, cooling my heels. I went over there, damn it, to talk to him. Why he didn't tell those assistants, 'Don't you put any calls through until I get through with this conversation,' I don't know. But I'm not ever going back over there." But it was that kind of a relationship.

He loved LBJ, but LBJ would irk him with some of his mannerisms.

He told me another story about LBJ going down with Rayburn in Rayburn's car at night, down Pennsylvania Avenue. LBJ had the Washington Star, and he had the light on and was reading it. He said, "Lyndon, turn that light out." And LBJ went on reading. And he said, "Lyndon, turn that light out! It gets in George Donovan's [?] eyes." George Donovan was the chauffeur. "It gets in George's eyes. Makes it hard for him to drive." LBJ kept reading the paper. Rayburn said he said, "Goddamn it, Lyndon, turn that light out!" Johnson flipped the light off. (Laughter) But it was that kind of a relationship.

He was a fierce defender of Johnson. Anybody say anything against Johnson, why, you had to tangle with Rayburn. He might bawl Johnson himself out, but he defended Johnson against one and all.

G: Why do you think he was so loyal to LBJ and thought so highly of him?

H: Well, he admired his mastery. He said, "I love a master of anything." He believed in Johnson's goodness. He knew he was the absolute master of his business.

G: Did he ever talk about LBJ's skill in the Senate or his mastery in the Senate?

H: Oh, I don't think I can talk about it specifically. But LBJ would come over to the Board of Education when he could; I don't know how often because I wasn't there that often myself, but once, twice, maybe three times a week, depending on the business. He kept his

own bottle of Cutty Sark over at the Board of Education. He wouldn't drink Rayburn's whiskey. He had to have Cutty Sark. So he kept his bottle of Cutty Sark in a drawer of Rayburn's desk. He would sit over in the southwest corner of the room in one of these big Turkish chairs that the Capitol is famous for. Rayburn said one time, "By God, he tells us every little detail of what went on in the Senate, and I don't want to hear that much about the Senate." But LBJ would tell what they'd done, the maneuvers they had. I remember one time he said, "Jake Javits has the most brilliant mind in the Senate and he drives everybody up the wall." He would evaluate men and issues.

G: Do you recall any of these evaluations?

H: Well, one time he said that Tom Hennings, a senator from Missouri, who was, I guess you would have to say, an alcoholic; he was drunk most of the time, whether he was an alcoholic or not. But when he was sober, I remember one time that LBJ, who was majority leader then, said he has the most brilliant constitutional mind in the Senate. It was Tom Hennings in one of the great shows of mental brilliance in the history of the Senate [who killed] the Bricker Amendment [which] had I think sixty-two co-authors, sixty-one co-authors. Tom Hennings sobered up and attacked the Bricker Amendment so brilliantly that he not only killed it, but he killed it for all time. It was never revised, never reintroduced, and here it had nearly two-thirds of the Senate as co-authors. But Tom just stripped all the flesh off of the bones in a brilliant show, one of

the most brilliant exhibitions of mental power, I guess, in the history of the Senate.

G: What about Richard Russell? Did you ever hear LBJ talk about him?

H: No, I never did hear him talk about Richard Russell. I was in the room out at Phoenix; I was the advance man on the Phoenix meeting for LBJ. I was in his room. He got in at night. The next morning I was in his room while he was eating breakfast off a coffee table, and C.R. Smith, the president of American Airlines, came in while LBJ was getting dressed. He said, "Lyndon, I think you and Jack [Kennedy] are making a mistake. You ought to be talking about and taking credit for the Kerr-Mills bill for medical aid for the aged. You're not talking about that but you ought to be." Senator Johnson was walking back and forth in the room buttoning his shirt, and said, "No, C.R. No. Nope. That bill is a fraud. That bill doesn't do anything. That's a fraud, and we oughtn't to brag about it. It's a subterfuge. It won't get the job done." I remember that quite distinctly. Smith was in the room and brought the subject up.

G: Did he say why it didn't do the job?

H: Well, it just didn't.

G: Just not adequate.

H: They had four years of it. It was a window dressing. Johnson recognized it before it even went into operation for what it was. It bought some time. What it did, it bought some time for the medical profession, the Kerr-Mills bill.

G: We were talking about the Johnson-Rayburn friendship and the ingredients for this relationship. Do you think it had much basis in the fact that personally they were close? Rayburn was often a guest in the Johnson home, watched the family grow up and this sort of thing?

H: Well, I interviewed Senator Johnson then. I interviewed him on Rayburn at one time and made some notes of it. In fact I transcribed it, I think. I didn't have a tape recorder but I transcribed it. One of the things he said--I can't remember it; I'll be glad to give you that--"At every critical moment of my mature life, Sam Rayburn has been there." This is subject to correction because I'm working from memory now, but I do have this written down. Don Bacon has it. [He said], "When Lynda was born, the first person we called was Sam Rayburn. Every critical moment of our mature life, he's been first in our thoughts." Rayburn was very much like a father. His attitude toward Johnson was a mixture of one of very mature respect and at the same time, the attitude of a forgiving parent toward Johnson.

In 1959 I drove down here to spend the fall, at his direction, in Bonham. So he told me to bring him half a case of Virginia Gentleman Bourbon, which he couldn't get in Texas, and a half a case of Haig and Haig Pinchbottle Scotch, which he drank. So I had that case of whiskey in my trunk. I came by way of Iowa to see a friend of mine and then on down to Bonham. I drove in the back yard and Rayburn walked out on the little platform, back of the sun porch. I pulled into the back yard and he didn't say, "Hello,

how was your trip, come in." First thing he said to me, "Did you bring the whiskey?" Then he said, "Lyndon Johnson, Homer Thornberry, and Frank Ikard have been here three days and they drank every damn drop of my whiskey." Then he said, "Get out and come in." But the first thing on the top of his mind was the whiskey. The house was dry as a result of Lyndon Johnson, Frank Ikard, and Homer Thornberry.

This to me was an amusing incident. Eisenhower was getting ready to go to India. So Mr. Rayburn told me, "Lyndon Johnson called me and said Eisenhower wants the leaders to come up there. He's going to brief us on the trip to India. I told him, 'I ain't going. He ain't going to tell us a damn thing that ain't been in the newspapers.'" "No, Mr. Speaker, you've got to go. This is a presidential command. You've got to go," so forth. "I've arranged for General Curtis LeMay to send his plane down and they'll take us to Washington. It's got all these gadgets in it, the latest things," so forth, so on. And Rayburn said, "Lyndon, we can fly tourist on Braniff from Dallas for sixty-three dollars." "No. No. No. We're going to have Curtis LeMay's plane."

I don't know whether I drove him. I guess H.G. Dulaney did the driving. Anyhow, I went with him to Carswell Air Base in Fort Worth. We pulled up to the gate and the air force, with the usual caution, didn't have one KC-135 tanker there, they had <u>two</u> of them standing by. Of course, those things are a block long. So as we pulled up there, Rayburn saw those two gigantic planes there. Because Eisenhower had commandeered General LeMay's plane to take it to India,

the Air Force had to fill in. Here were these two gigantic planes there waiting for the Senator and the Speaker. Mr. Rayburn looked at that and said, "Well, I hope they're big enough to suit Mr. Johnson."

(Laughter)

So we got in there and there were colonels all over the place. You couldn't find anything less than a colonel. They were all shaking with apprehension. You had to climb a ladder to get in the tanker. They had some chairs bolted in the middle of the plane. Mr. Rayburn said he climbed up in that thing, and here were these uncomfortable chairs bolted in the middle of this thing. He turned to one of these full colonels and he said, "Where are the cows?" He said, "Sir, I don't understand you." He said, "This is the biggest goddamned barn I was ever in." (Laughter) So they rode to Washington and he said, "It was cold. The noise was so great you couldn't talk. It was a miserable ride. We could have gone on Braniff." So they went up there and Eisenhower didn't keep them twenty minutes, I don't think.

This has nothing to do with President Johnson, but George Donovan the chauffeur and John Holton went down to the White House with them. They figured he'd be in there with the President for a couple of hours so they went on to get some breakfast. Eisenhower didn't give them any breakfast; he gave them a hot roll and coffee, I think. So he went out. There was no limousine. He was pacing up and down, getting madder by the minute outside the White House. One

of the reporters asked him, "Why do you think your limousine isn't here?" AP made a story out of this; it was published. He said, "Well, maybe they got more to eat for breakfast than we did." (Laughter) So he said Eisenhower asked him, "How was your trip, Mr. Sam?" He said, "Terrible!"

But you know, Rayburn would have gone tourist from Dallas but not Senator Johnson. That was the difference, you know, one of the many differences in the men.

G: Do you think that Mr. Rayburn was more liberal than Lyndon Johnson? You're a great student of Texas liberals and conservatives.

H: Instinctively, I don't think so. The difference in the two men--Rayburn was an ultraconservative when he went to Congress. I mentioned to him one time that his career paralleled that of William E. Gladstone. They arrived at the different levels of their career at almost identical ages. Gladstone's ideological movement was from way over on the right to well over on the left. He moved leftward all of his life. And I said to Mr. Rayburn, "You've done that, too." He said, "Well, I never thought about that." He said, "When I came to Congress I was under the spell of Joseph Weldon Bailey. Bailey was very reactionary, but he was my hero. He was my boyhood hero and I idolized Joe Bailey. He was about the biggest-brained man I ever knew. And about the vainest man I ever knew. It took me several years to get loose from his ideas. But I was very, very conservative when I came to Congress because I was following Joe Bailey's lead."

But Rayburn was never a liberal. John McCormack, you know, would just eat you out if you called him a liberal. "Don't you call me that! Don't you ever call me that! Liberals are those people who want to own your mind. I'm a progressive. I'm not a liberal. Liberals want to control your mind. I'm a progressive." Rayburn said one time, "I don't care what you call me. You can call me conservative-progressive or progressive-conservative, as long as you have the word progressive in it." And that's what he was. Rayburn was not a liberal. He was not an ideologue to start with. He was a pragmatist.

But I think Johnson had a completely different situation. Johnson had to satisfy a very difficult statewide constituency. Rayburn could never have been elected senator, in my judgment, in Texas. Rayburn's district supported him in a way [and] he had a solid constituency in a way that Johnson never had as a senator.

Now Johnson had a solid constituency, in my judgment, in the Austin district at that time. I think Austin has changed a lot; the city of Austin's changed a lot. But the Austin district used to be a very staunchly, sturdily, liberal district, a progressive district. Then when all the lobbyists moved to town, why, it began to change. Then when you get on a statewide basis, Senator Johnson had a very different set of problems. Because after big oil arrived, Texas has become a very sharply divided state, as you know. In my book, Texas is basically a Republican state today, and was during much of his senatorial career. I think it's demonstrated that

Kennedy and Johnson carried the state by only twenty-five thousand votes, a very small margin, with all the appeal that that combination had for Texas. Texas went heavily for Eisenhower, landslided for Eisenhower both times.

So Senator Johnson had a very difficult balancing act. I have always thought that his instinct, his gut instincts, were very much on the populist side. A lot of my friends who didn't like LBJ would never agree to that. They thought he was a pawn of the oil and gas companies, and so forth. Certainly he befriended them. He helped them a whole lot. There's no question about that. But I don't think that he could have remained in the Senate and done otherwise. I don't think he could have been re-elected if he had followed another path.

Rayburn did, too. Rayburn knew what a rapacious bunch of people the big oil companies were, but he looked at it from a different point of view. Too many people in Texas derived their livelihood from oil and gas, from working for the companies, from working for the service companies, banking, selling things to the companies. He wasn't trying to help Sinclair or Gulf or Texaco. He was trying to help the people of Texas who had a livelihood involved, and the landowners and so forth. So that's why Rayburn carried water for the oil and gas people, just as [William] Proxmire carries water or Hubert Humphrey carries water for the dairymen in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Rayburn was doing the same thing, and Johnson was doing the same thing for parochial oil and gas interests.

G: When Lyndon Johnson was majority leader and Mr. Rayburn was speaker during the fifties, did you see any major philosophical differences on pieces of legislation that were considered by both houses that would indicate one was more progressive than the other?

H: Yes, there again I think it was because of the difference in their constituencies.

G: The civil rights legislation?

H: No, I don't think on civil rights. I think, if anything, Johnson was more audacious on civil rights legislation than Rayburn was. I think Johnson sensed the need for action before Rayburn did. I think he convinced Rayburn that we had to act. That's my feeling about it. I can't document it.

G: Well, one of the points that [Alfred] Steinberg has raised in his biography of Rayburn was that in 1956, with the administration bill proposing a civil rights commission, that while Rayburn managed to get it out of Howard Smith's Rules Committee in the House and get it passed by the House, LBJ effectively killed the bill by having it sent to the Judiciary Committee when it came over to the Senate. You know, that was the occasion where Paul Douglas went over to walk the bill over and it was already gone by the time he got there. Do you recall any of these circumstances here?

H: I wasn't there at the time.

G: Really?

H: I didn't get there until 1957. Before 1957 I don't know the maneuvering, so I just don't know anything about that. Now one point of

difference between Rayburn and Johnson was that Rayburn was much stauncher in his support of a moderate version of the Griffin-Landrum bill. He went with Stewart Udall and Frank Thompson and the moderate group. There were three versions of the bill. There was the Griffin-Landrum substitute. That's Bob Griffin that's in the Senate now, and Phil Landrum of Georgia; they were both in the House then. This was written, I always was told, by the National Association of Manufacturers. It was a puff, gut labor bill. They were trying to take advantage of the scandals in the Teamsters and other things that the McClellan Committee had dug up to really land some body blows on organized labor. There was the AFL version, the [John F.] Shelley substitute, which was window dressing. It was nothing but labor trying to sneak by without making any reforms. George Meany was then and is now, in my book, a gutless wonder. He presides instead of leads. Then there was the committee version, the Education and Labor Committee version, of which Frank Thompson and Stewart Udall were the principal architects.

The Griffin-Landrum amendment was adopted by the House by sixteen votes, I believe. The mean version was adopted by sixteen votes. Rayburn laid all of his prestige on the line. There were only four members from Texas that stayed with Rayburn and voted for the committee version, for the moderate version. They were Jack Brooks, Wright Patman, Clark Thompson--I don't know, I'd have to go back. But Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry that were with Rayburn every night in the Board of Education, they left him on that vote. He was more

deeply wounded by that than anything that I ever saw in the years that I was around him. He was really [hurt]. He said, "I feel like I've got a dagger in my back. They stabbed me in my back." He didn't know, but he was suspicious that Johnson might have helped to scare those guys into voting for self-preservation reasons, because the thing was very hot. Johnson didn't have a stake in it himself. But he wondered, he expressed this openly, if Johnson had maybe said to Thornberry and Ikard, "You know, you can't vote for that. You've got to vote for the Griffin-Landrum substitute."

Anyhow, that night, he refused to go to the Board of Education. He said, "Let them cool their goddamned heels down there." You know, he was giving them the treatment. He knew Thornberry and Ikard would be down there. He'd just let them sit there and worry as to whether the old man was coming down. He refused to go down there. We had a drink with him upstairs. He refused to go to the Board of Education that night.

G: Could the others get in without him?

H: Oh, they had keys. Some of them had keys. I don't know who had keys and who didn't.

So then the next night he had Lee Metcalf, Frank Thompson, Stewart Udall--I don't know, he had five or six of the guys that had stayed with him, and we had a drink down in the Board of Education. The others, Ikard, Thornberry, and these other people, didn't show up that night. I guess they were going to wait for him to invite them back. I don't know, that's just a surmise on my part. But

Rayburn said to this group, who'd never been in the Board of Education before, "I wanted to have a drink with my real friends. I feel like I've been among the Philippines"--he was talking about Philistines--"I feel like I've been among the Philippines." He said that deliberately, it was a play on words on his part.

So he told Lew Deschler--I happened to be in the room when he was talking about the conference committee--that he wasn't going to put anybody on the conference committee from the House that had voted for the Griffin-Landrum substitute. Lew Deschler said, "You've got to, Mr. Speaker. The House won't back you on that." He said, "Well, then by God, I'm going to have one of my boys on there, regardless of seniority." So he put Frank Thompson on the conference committee. That's when he and Frank became great loyal friends.

Frank would come to him during the prolonged conference committee, and Rayburn said, "Frank, don't you let that conference break up now. Don't you let that conference break up. You keep them talking. Just keep them talking. I don't care if you talk six months. Keep them talking! Something will give. But don't you let it break up, Frank. Make them talk. Just keep them talking. Keep them talking." And so they did.

Of course, Jack Kennedy was on the Senate side. That was one of the most interesting things I ever did in the years I was on the Hill. That was a very complicated bill and Mr. Rayburn didn't know anything about labor law and neither did I. But he said, "Now, I want you to familiarize yourself with the details of this thing. I

want you to get Senator Kennedy to put you in touch with his experts. You be prepared to brief me on the fine points of the controversies in this bill." So the two people that Senator Kennedy designated for me to work with were Ralph Dungan, who was then later in the White House and ambassador to Chile, and Archie [Archibald] Cox. Archie was the real labor expert, you know. The Supreme Court one day cited Archie Cox's articles three times in one day on labor cases. That was long before he was [the Watergate] special prosecutor.

So this thing went on and on and on. They came out of it with a very moderate bill that was acceptable and nobody's every offered to amend it. It's so fair that both labor and management have let it stand without any effort to amend it. But the House version was a very rough version. It was a bust labor version that was adopted in the House. Jim Wright might not be majority leader today; he might very well, probably would be United States senator, but for that bill. Jim had intended to vote against the Griffin-Landrum bill and Craig Raupe, who's Jim's assistant now and was his assistant then--Craig told me this story--made the mistake just before the vote of taking about three hundred angry telegrams from Fort Worth businessmen over to the speaker's lobby and showing them to Jim just before the vote. Well, Jim voted for the tough version. Then when Jim ran for the Senate the next year or the year after, he was narrowly defeated. Labor deserted him. Jim would be senator today. He's much better off where he is, so that was a defeat that was probably very beneficial for him.

I was told by the old-timers that there was more heat generated by the Griffin-Landrum bill than anything since the Marshall Plan maybe. Anyhow they said there was more heat generated by it than even on the Taft-Hartley Bill. The Amarillo Chamber of Commerce, for example, ran radio spots offering to pay for any telegram that people would send to their congressman or senator, urging the adoption of the Griffin-Landrum substitute. The heat was so bad. There was a young fellow from Georgia, first-termer, and the heat was so excruciating that this kid, Erwin Mitchell, a very fine young man, was taken to the hospital one night. They thought he had a heart attack. It was nothing but strain from the pressure he was under, and he developed shingles. The other members of the Georgia delegation led by old Carl Vinson were so unmerciful to this kid because he was voting wrong as they saw it, that he was a one-termer. Very fine young man. But the heat was excruciating. Of course the Teamsters had done everything on earth. The misdoings in the labor movement had been exposed by McClellan and his committee. This was the big push of management to try to really take advantage of labor. They turned [on] all the heat there was. Of course the Eisenhower Administration was in league with them.

That was a point of divergence. I think that Johnson was much more afraid of the heat on that bill than Rayburn was. But Johnson again had a statewide constituency. Labor was not important to Rayburn. Organized labor was not important to Rayburn in his district. The only organized labor of any consequence in his district

were the railroad brotherhoods, with which he had warred at one time, and then later they became his staunchest supporters. Johnson had a statewide constituency that probably was very strongly--as far as it had an opinion--for the Griffin-Laundrum bill.

G: Rayburn seemed to get along much better with [Ralph] Yarborough and other liberals in Texas than LBJ did. Is that accurate, do you think?

H: Yes, that's right. I think a lot of it was personality. Johnson and the liberals--a lot of their fighting, it seemed to me, was not on an ideological basis, but it was over personalities. You know, Senator Johnson made a mortal enemy out of Frankie Randolph over [the 1956 state convention]. You can make more lifelong enemies out of these silly state conventions than any other way, and they're inconsequential. What difference does it make, normally, as to what a state convention does or doesn't do? But you know, she'd been elected national committeewoman and because they wouldn't seat her rump delegation, she stayed with her delegation. There again, instead of reacting like a pro, which she was, she reacted like a woman who had been offended and insulted, and they were lifelong enemies. They need not have been. They were working the same side of the fence.

But yes, Rayburn was much more tolerant. I don't know the origin of the antagonism between Johnson and Yarborough. I talked to Walter Jenkins about this. We talked about it for about two hours one time soon after I went to Washington. He didn't know how

it came up. I think it was two guys in the same back yard. There just wasn't room for both of them. They were both from Austin. They were both ambitious. There was a personality difference there. I don't know. There may very well have been other things.

Go back to this business of Johnson's progressivism. I have never known, but I have always had the belief that Johnson very quietly voted for Dr. Homer Rainey in 1946. I have no proof of that. Lady Bird would know. But I've never followed up. But Paul Bolton and myself [went to see him]. LBJ was in Seton Infirmary one time in early 1946 for I don't know what, pneumonia I guess. He told me that he'd had pneumonia eight times. This was in 1957, I think that he told me he'd had pneumonia so many times. We went out to see him. I was managing the Rainey campaign; I had just taken over the management of the Rainey campaign. We were talking about the campaign in the hospital room. He never did say, "Well, I'm for him," or "I'm going to vote for him," or anything. But I came out of that visit with him with the very strong suspicion that he was going to very quietly vote for Homer Rainey. I've never followed up on it. It's of no consequence. I certainly wouldn't have ever mentioned it while he was alive because there are still people around that hate Rainey even though he's been gone thirty years.

But I think his basic philosophy--leave out what he had to do politically--was best expressed in that "We Shall Overcome" speech to Congress. I think that was the true Johnson. I think his instinct for the little man, his instinct for the liberal or the progressive

approach, was the natural Johnson. The fight on Leland Olds, the things for the oil industry, these were things that people have to do to stay in office. But I think every time he had a chance to put in a lick for the little guy, he did.

G: Let's talk about their relationship with Texas conservatives now, particularly Allan Shivers. Do you think that LBJ was able to get along with Shivers more than Mr. Rayburn was?

H: Well, he made an effort; Rayburn made no effort. Rayburn despised him and I suspect Johnson did, too.

G: What was the genesis of the Rayburn-Shivers conflict?

H: Well, they didn't really know each other but to Rayburn, Shivers was a turncoat and an ingrate. A man that will take all the honors from the Democratic Party and then support the Republican for president in Rayburn's book was a son of a bitch. And he made no bones about it.

G: I've heard that there was some instance of deception, too, where he didn't keep his word.

H: Well, this thing intensified. He told me one time, "You know I'm not going to have a single book in my library that has Allan Shivers' name in it." I said, "Mr. Speaker, you're as bad as the Russians, going around cutting names out of history books." He laughed at that, but he was half serious.

No, Rayburn and all of his family, or most of his family, had voted for Rainey. They didn't make any noise about it, they just went in and voted for him. But it was an instinctive vote, like

Rayburn always voted for Yarborough. He'd get mad as the devil at Ralph Yarborough, just furious at him, but he always voted for him. And Ralph Yarborough told him the time Ralph was elected--Rayburn pulled a cutie on that thing. Bill Blakley had been a long-time friend of Rayburn's and had given a substantial amount of money to the Rayburn Library, and a lot of Rayburn's organization was working for Bill Blakley. But they kept saying in the press that Rayburn was winking at his organization to go for Blakley. Well, Rayburn wasn't; Rayburn was staying neutral, staying out of it completely. He told them, "Now, you cut that out now. Don't get me involved in this race, damn you! I'm staying neutral. They're both my friends. Ralph's my friend and Bill Blakley's my friend, and I'm staying out of it. I'm having no part of it. But you quit trying to involve me." Well, they kept on. The Austin American ran a front-page column that Buster Cole was out working for Blakley [and] Rayburn was secretly. Well, it infuriated Rayburn.

Rayburn was a great friend of Walter Hornaday, the Dallas News correspondent, although he hated the News with a passion. He loved Walter Hornaday and it was mutual. So Sarah McClendon was always lurking around. Rayburn had a very aggressive relationship with Sarah. He didn't hesitate to bawl Sarah out and to tangle with Sarah, and yet they were good friends. But when Sarah would get too aggressive, why, he'd let her have it. Well, he was irked at the Blakley people. This was a few days before the election. So he was out in the speaker's lobby talking to Walter Hornaday and he

saw Sarah trying to eavesdrop. Rayburn took advantage of this situation and he said, "Well, Walter, I'm staying out of this race. This is just between you and me. You can't print this. Now, this is q.t. This is just between you and me, but I have already voted absentee for Ralph Yarborough." He said it loud enough to make sure Sarah heard it. Well, Sarah rushed to the telephone and phoned the Austin American. It came out all over the state: Rayburn has voted absentee for Ralph Yarborough. Ralph told him, "That meant 200,000 votes to me." But Rayburn leaked it deliberately and then, of course, at the press conference denounced eavesdroppers and people that were horning in on his private conversation and so forth. But he did it so Sarah could hear it.

G: Did he ever talk to you about that? Did he indicate that that was what he had done?

H: Oh, yes, he told me that. Oh, sure, sure. He told me about it. He told me what he'd done. I wasn't there.

G: Excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt you.

H: No, he told me what he had done. Sure, because I wasn't there at the time he did this. But he did it deliberately. He trapped Sarah into eavesdropping and printing it. This was his way of getting the message to the people of Texas that he had voted for Ralph Yarborough and still be able to disclaim it, as he was a victim of eavesdropping. But it was just a political finessing that he did. But Ralph said it meant 200,000 votes to him. I don't know whether it did or not.

But the Shivers thing, of course Allan then came along in the fight in 1956, when LBJ finally had his confrontation with him and beat him. I think it was then, or maybe it was in the 1952 campaign, that Allan Shivers compared Sam Rayburn to Santa Anna. Allan Shivers said something about Rayburn always put his party ahead of his country. Well, that put Shivers in the class with Richard Nixon. Allan Shivers and Richard Nixon were the only two people that ever challenged Rayburn's patriotism, and neither one was ever forgiven. You could call him every name in the book, but you could not question his patriotism and ever be forgiven. That's one thing he wouldn't take from anybody. And he never forgave Nixon and he never forgave Shivers. You just don't question a man's patriotism. That's something you don't do in politics. That was the unforgiveable sin. So when he said Rayburn put his party ahead of his country, that was the end of the road.

G: Well, how much of LBJ's favorite son candidacy and showdown with Shivers in 1956 was at Rayburn's urging?

H: Only thing I know about it--I wasn't there, I was in Goliad at the time that this happened. Bob Cantrell is the editor of the Bonham Favorite, a friend of mine since 1929. Bob told me that Mr. Rayburn phoned him one day and said, "Bob, could you come out here? I've got a little squib for you." So he said he went out to the Rayburn home. Rayburn had an old used envelope on which he'd scribbled some things. He said, "I favor Lyndon Johnson for favorite son and head of the Texas delegation," and some other words that are in the

G: It's fascinating.

H: Yes, it is fascinating.

Senator Johnson, when I interviewed him, told me that he lived in the basement of the old Dodge Hotel when he was up there as an employee of the House. A bunch of the kids had rooms there because they were cheap and the hotel was close by. I had an office in that same basement after I left the Hill. Senator Johnson said it was damp down there and he said, "I've had pneumonia eight times in my life. I've been susceptible to pneumonia, pulmonary troubles, all my life." So he said, "Some of the kids found me there. I was unconscious, and they got me to the hospital. When I came to after"--I think he said four days, I've got this written down in the interview; Don Bacon has the transcription of it. "When I came to and opened my eyes a little bit, sitting over in the chair was a dumpy, bald-headed man, had a vest on. He was nodding; he'd dropped off to sleep. He had a cigarette in his hands and ashes were all down his vest." And that was Sam Rayburn. He said, "I had met him with my father a time or two, but I didn't know him. There he was, sitting in my hospital room. He owed me no obligation, but he heard that here I was, a country boy from Texas in Washington with no family, new in Washington, all by myself there. He heard that I was in the hospital and he came over to see after me. That was the formation of our friendship." It went on from there.

G: Was that characteristic of Mr. Rayburn?

H: Oh, yes.

G: Really?

H: Oh, yes. He used to say, when he was sworn in as speaker, "I want you to know that my door is open at all hours of the day and night to any one of you on either side of the aisle on any personal problem you may have. My door is open to all Democrats on any political problem you may have." And he meant it.

Ben Jensen was the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee, from Iowa. When Rayburn doubled Henry Clay's record, Ben Jensen made a speech to the House. He said when he first came to Congress as a Republican congressman from Iowa, his first public action, he offered an amendment to some bill. He had the thing screwed up. Somebody raised a point of order on him. He realized he had made a fool of himself on his first showing before the House and he knew how important that was. He said he heard a voice to his left side, and he said, "Jensen, Jensen, ask for unanimous consent to withdraw your amendment and we'll help you write it so it will be okay." He looked around and the Speaker had left the chair and come down on the floor to help a freshman Republican out of a hole. That's in the Congressional Record. Jensen said, "That's what I think of the man." He said, "I did that. I didn't know what to do. I asked for unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment. I drew it down and they helped me to rewrite it so it wouldn't be subject to point of order."

My favorite Rayburn story, I think, is a true one. I talked to the father involved. This appeared in Life magazine originally. It

was a New York Times reporter named Deak [?], his nickname was Deak, Lyman, L-Y-M-A-N. He ended up as vice president of Republic Aircraft Company, up in Connecticut. I read this story and then Deak Lyman came in the office one time and I asked him about it and he verified it. Lyman didn't know Mr. Rayburn. He would go to the Speaker's press conferences, but he was a very junior New York Times reporter. He had a thirteen-year-old daughter that died. He said the next morning, the doorbell rang and he went to the door and there was Sam Rayburn. He said, "Of course, I had met Mr. Rayburn, but I didn't know him really." He said, "Mr. Speaker, I'm amazed to see you here." "Well," he said, "I came by to see what I could do." "Well," he said, "Mr. Speaker, I don't think there's anything. I think we have all the arrangements made." "Well," he said, "have you had your morning coffee?" And he said, "No, sir, we've been too busy." He said, "Well, I can at least make the coffee." So he said he came in the house and made the coffee. He said, "Mr. Speaker, I thought you were having a leaders' meeting at the White House this morning." "Well," he said, "we were, but I called them and told them I couldn't come. I had a friend that was in trouble." Deak Lyman said that's exactly accurate.

Certainly I think his greatest quality was compassion. He was a very compassionate man. He was a very sentimental man beneath all that gruffness. He was a very sentimental individual, but he concealed it with that crustiness.

(Interruption)

The extraordinary drive and energy that both Rayburn and Johnson had, that was one of the qualities that Rayburn admired most in Johnson, that Johnson outworked everybody. Rayburn used to say, "If the fellow at the desk next to you outworks you, he's going to beat you." And Rayburn himself--it would be late in the afternoon, we'd all be tired--he'd say, "What you got?" "Well, Mr. Speaker, we've got two or three letters here, but we'll go over them tomorrow." "Let's do it now." He wouldn't put it off till tomorrow. "Let's do it now."

G: Do you think he worked his staff as hard as LBJ worked his?

H: No. Miss [Alla] Clary told me a story. Rayburn used to stop as he would leave in the afternoon. He had two offices: he had the speaker's office over by the House floor; then he had what we call the back office, back next to the Republican leader's office. [He] had a suite back there that took care primarily of his district business and his social affairs. Then I was back there, but I was the only one that shuttled between the two offices.

So Miss Clary told me this story. She and LBJ had a love-hate relationship through the years. She said that LBJ was over there with Mr. Rayburn late one afternoon. Mr. Rayburn used to stop as he went out and turn and face all the staff and say, "Now, I'm leaving, but don't take the skin off my heels getting out behind me." So he did that, and here was tall LBJ and short Sam Rayburn. They stopped at the door and he turned around and said, "Now, I'm leaving for the day, but don't take the skin off my heels getting

out behind me. You go over to Lyndon Johnson's office nine o'clock at night, the whole staff is there working." And that irked Miss Clary. She said, "Yes. If they were as efficient as we are, they could leave at five o'clock, too." LBJ got furious and stormed out. (Laughter)

But the difference I thought--of course, I was not familiar with the working of the Johnson office--Rayburn was a man who would never make work. He had a disdain for congressmen who were always stirring up their districts, sending them questionnaires. He'd say, "Hell, any way a questionnaire comes out, it's going to be sixty-forty. And then you have to vote. You're going to make at least 40 per cent of them mad. You ask for their opinion and then you flaunt it. Hell, I'd rather argue with them after I voted instead of before and after."

He wanted a small staff. I asked Senator Johnson, "What are his limitations? What are Rayburn's faults?" He said, "Well, there are two: number one, he has no idea in this modern world of how to use a staff, no idea. He uses it in a different way from almost everybody in Congress, but I'm not sure he doesn't know how to use it. He runs his office out of his back-ass pocket." And the second thing was, "He never plans ahead and anticipates emergencies and tries to head them off. He takes them as they come down the pike. He doesn't plan way in advance." I thought after that interview, well, he saves a whole lot of time, because a lot of these things never happen.

He wanted a small staff; he kept a small staff. I was talking to somebody not long ago about this. They said, "How many people did he have?" I said, "Well, in the front office he had John Holton and the receptionist." He had two in the front office. In the back office at the time I worked for him, which was at the end of his career, he had Miss Clary, who kept his social engagement book and took care of his academy appointments, the West Point and Annapolis appointments, he had a stenographer and myself in one room. There were three of us in one room. Then there was his office. Behind there was a tiny office and he had two stenographers there. He had three stenographers, Miss Clary, and myself. He had five in the back, and two in front. He had a total staff of seven. I bet the Speaker today has sixty people. And he didn't want any more.

I had a funny experience there. There was a fellow that was in Congress, came to Congress with Hale Boggs in 1940. Both of them were defeated at the end of their first term. The fellow's name was Jake Davis from Ohio. So, Mr. Rayburn got him a job with Jimmy Forrestal in the Navy Department. Jake went on to become president of the Kroger grocery company. Well, I came in one day and in our office there was Mr. Rayburn over in the corner with Hale Boggs and this other fellow. I was introduced to him as Jake Davis. I didn't know him. Hale said, "Could you use a very bright young Princeton graduate to help you on some of your work if he worked here for free this summer, when he gets out of the Navy? Could you

use him?" I said, "I sure could put him to work." So Mr. Rayburn said, "Okay, that's fine. That's fine."

Well, a month or two passed. One of the girls in Hale's office came over and brought this very bright young guy, he was then about twenty-five I guess. It was Jack Davis. He just gotten finished his Navy training and so forth, so he came there to intern in our office. I had a double-desk like this. I put him over here facing me. Well, I introduced him to Mr. Rayburn. He said, "Well, I'm glad to know you," so forth and so on. Well, a couple of days later John Holton came back to our office just dying laughing. He said, "The Speaker came in this morning and he said, 'I'm really disappointed. I just didn't think D.B. would do something like that.' I said, 'What's that, Mr. Speaker?' He said, 'I just didn't think he would do it. He put somebody on my payroll without talking to me about it.'" (Laughter) He said, "Mr. Speaker, that's Jake Davis' boy. You said he could work here for free. Jake's paying all of his expenses. He's working in your office for free. You told Jake you'd be glad to have him." Mr. Rayburn decided I had put him on the payroll without talking to him about it.

Well, he got to be very fond of Jack. When I had to leave for a period, I'd give Mr. Rayburn a daily briefing on the news. He couldn't read. One eye went blind in 1959 and then the other eye got worse and worse. So I'd try to give him a daily briefing. I didn't always succeed. But Jack filled in and gave him the daily briefings while I was out of town. They got to be great friends.

But he didn't want a big staff. The more people you had around you the more likely they were to get you in trouble, he figured.

G: Did he intimidate his staff the way LBJ seems to have intimidated some of the people [who worked for him]?

H: Oh, no. His staff people were his family. He treated them like they were brothers and sisters.

G: Well, am I correct in assuming that LBJ seems to have intimidated some of his?

H: I guess he intimidated some of them. He had a mercurial nature, as I knew him. In fact, Hale Boggs came back from a leadership meeting one time and he said, "You know, I think I've got as mercurial a temperament as that president." Of course, Hale and LBJ were very fond of each other. The families were very intimate friends. I said, "Yes, Hale, you sure do have." And he did have. I told Lindy [Boggs] what he had said. Lindy was out in the other office. Lindy said, "You go back in there and tell him that he's neither rich enough or important enough to afford such a temperament." (Laughter) Then Hale did get mad when I told him what Lindy had said.

I worked with LBJ a number of times through the years. But you would hear these stories about him, you know, getting upset with somebody, and then turn around and they'd find a color television console at home when they got home that night. It was one of those off-and-on relationships, apparently, working for him. My own feeling about him was that the people who stood up to him got along with him best, that he respected the people.

John [Nance] Garner was like that. Garner tested the metal of a man the minute he met him. Lew Deschler was twenty-five years old and he had just come to work as a clerk for Speaker [Nicholas] Longworth. Longworth and Garner were, Mr. Rayburn said, the deepest friendship he ever saw in Congress. Here was Garner, uneducated, rough, uncouth. Longworth was educated in the finest schools and finishing schools, and played the violin in the courts of Europe, an aristocrat from the word go. He and Garner were inseparable. They just adored each other. They never agreed on anything in their lives.

But he said that Garner said to him one morning--[he was] just a kid from Ohio--"Why the hell did you tell Nick Longworth so and so?" He said, "I didn't tell him that, Mr. Congressman." "The hell you didn't! You sure as hell did!" He said, "Mr. Congressman, I did not tell Speaker Longworth that." "Goddamn it, don't you lie to me! I know you told him that!" Deschler said, "I've got a hot German temper. I slammed the desk in front of me. I said, 'Goddamn you, don't you tell me I'm a liar! I didn't tell Nick Longworth that.'" Garner leaned back and said, "Young man, you've got a lot of spunk." He said, "Garner was my greatest supporter from that moment on." There's a letter in the Rayburn files, scribbled in handwriting, in pencil I believe, "Dear Sam, why don't you get Harry Truman to put Lew Deschler on the Supreme Court. Cordially yours, John Garner."

But Garner would test people. That was a mannerism of his. I always had the suspicion that LBJ did that with a lot of people. I can't vouch for it, but I've heard the story that he said to Vance Hartke--maybe the reason I remember it is because I'm so sympathetic to the story. He grabbed Vance Hartke one time. He was mad at him about something. He grabbed him by the shirt. He said, "Vance, don't you ever forget you were in way over your head when you were mayor of Terre Haute!"

(Laughter)

H: If he didn't say that to Hartke, he should have. That was one Democrat I was glad to see defeated. He was a disgrace to the party.

Of course I was never [his employee], except when I was out doing advance work for him in 1960, and he always treated me just fine, aggravating sometimes, but he was never disrespectful in all the dealings I had with him. But he got a delight, it seemed to me, out of coming in and trying to undo your most carefully-laid plans. That was sort of a stratagem of his.

G: Do you have an example here?

H: Well, he'd come in and he'd want to rearrange everything. After you had finally gotten the mayor's wife and the county judge's wife to agree to ride in the same car when they hadn't spoken for ten years, he'd come in and he'd start making [trouble]. "Let's do this, let's do that." You'd have to stand firm with him.

He got into Phoenix. I did advance work for him in El Paso. Kennedy had an advance man out there and I went out there. Well,

first of all in the 1960 campaign I had charge of the state of North Carolina. We had eight stops in North Carolina. I took two carloads of young guys and dropped them off, one at each stop. They started up at the Virginia border and came through the Piedmont and ended up and spent the night in Charlotte. Then I leapfrogged to New Orleans. There was a guy from George Smathers' office there. We handled the arrangements for the end of the train trip and the parade and affairs at the end of the Friday night train trip in New Orleans. Then I went out to El Paso. Kennedy flew in from California and Johnson flew in from the Ranch. They rendezvoused and started on a circle of Texas. Then Kennedy spun off to St. Louis and north, and Johnson went back to New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and on up in the Pacific Northwest.

I might reminisce just a little bit about that. In El Paso Kennedy was late getting in and so was Johnson. It was Sunday night and there were only twelve policemen at the airport so we didn't want a crowd. We didn't try to get a crowd there; we didn't want them. But when the planes were late, it was on the radio and television and everybody in town got their shoes on, put the kids in the car, and went out to the airport. We had an enormous crowd. They almost caved in the roof of the airport. So many people got up on the roof that the police had to clear them off. All they had to restrain them was one rope, this huge crowd.

Senator Johnson arrived first. There was a whole bunch of Texas congressmen and so forth on the plane. To hold the crowd

somebody got a flatbed truck. I never did know who did that. These people got up and made speeches to the crowd just to hold them for Kennedy's arrival. Kennedy finally got in; he was about two hours late. He got in and we had a convertible for him to take him downtown to the hotel.

Tape 2 of 2

H: So, we got Kennedy and started over to his convertible, the Sheriff and the Chief of Police, and I don't know, several people. Kennedy broke loose--the crowd was yelling at him--and started toward the crowd. When they did the crowd surged forward and broke the rope. I think they estimated there were twelve thousand people out there by that time. Well, the Chief of Police grabbed Kennedy bodily and rushed him over, sort of threw him in the convertible, and just bawled the hell out of him: "Don't you ever do that again! You're going to get some children trampled to death, Senator. Now, you do what your managers tell you to do. Don't you ever do that again!" He really bawled the hell out of Kennedy. He said, "The crowd surges forward like that and somebody drops a baby and that baby would be stomped to death. There's no way you can save him." Kennedy said, "Well, you learn as you go along."

So they radioed back that there were about three or four thousand people down in the square in front of the hotel. Got down there--they were holding the elevator--and the police formed a cordon around Kennedy and Johnson, locked arms around them and just pushed them in

through the crowd, into the elevator, and upstairs. Kennedy had the suite at the north end of the hall and Johnson had the suite at the south end of the hall. Rayburn had a suite right under Johnson. So LBJ said to me, "Go down and tell Jack to come down here; ask him to come down here. The Speaker's coming up and we want to tell him what to say about the oil depletion allowance when he goes to Texas tomorrow."

So I went down to the Kennedy suite. Kenny O'Donnell wasn't there. Somebody told me he had run off to Juarez. So Kennedy was there. He had a guard on the door but he was in there all by himself, sitting in the suite in a chair in the middle of the living room. There was a basket of fruit there. Then what they always had for Kennedy was Heineken beer. I always thought the Wisconsin brewers were going to find out about it and he would lose Wisconsin. But he always had Heineken beer in the room. Kennedy was sitting there reading some clippings. He had a bunch of white grapes in his lap and he'd pluck a grape and eat it, reading this clipping. I said, "Senator, Senator Johnson would like for you to come down to his suite. The Speaker is on the way up and they want to talk to you about what to say about the depletion allowance." He said, "All right. All right," and he went right on eating grapes and reading these clippings.

Well, of course LBJ couldn't stand it. He came loping down the hall in about two minutes. "Come on, Jack. Come on. You can't keep the Speaker waiting. You can't keep the Speaker waiting. We

want to tell you about the oil depletion allowance. Come on." "All right, Lyndon," went right on reading, very lackadaisical, eating grapes. Senator Johnson started walking up and down, throwing his shoulders back, saying, "I've got a crick in my back. I've got a bad crick in my back." Kennedy looked up and said, "I think you're cracking up. If you do, where do you want me to send it?"

(Laughter)

G: Did that amuse LBJ?

H: He just kind of brushed it off. Kennedy, when he got through--he went right on, finished his clipping--then he got up and they went away.

Let's cut this off. I just want to tell you a little background story.

(Interruption)

G: Did they brief Mr. Kennedy on [the oil depletion allowance]?

H: I don't know. I wasn't in the meeting. I assume that Mr. Rayburn and Senator Johnson talked to Kennedy about what to say about the oil depletion allowance the next day.

The second day they started on their circle of Texas. The second night was when Kennedy talked to the preachers in Houston, that very crucial thing.

So then LBJ came back to Arizona. John Holton and myself were at Albuquerque. We were instructed to put the Johnson party up at a very lush motel about twelve miles out from town. It was owned by some of his friends, I don't know, Texas oil people or something.

We did, a beautiful place, but very inconvenient, being that far out. So John was in charge of the Albuquerque meeting but I didn't stay for it. I left early the next morning and I went on to Arizona. John handled the stops in New Mexico. No, it was in Arizona, I think. John told me that one of the parts of the Albuquerque meeting, they were having, I don't know, Pioneer Days or something, a parade, and LBJ was to ride a horse. He jumped on this horse and he split his britches all the way down. Well, they had to rush twelve miles out and twelve miles back to bring him another pair of pants, because he had gashed his britches all the way down. (Laughter)

So he came into Phoenix. We took him to the hotel. I had goofed on that. They were at the Westward Ho Hotel. I simply goofed; I failed to check out whether it was unsegregated or not. That's the first thing an advance man should do, but I had forgotten to do it. I guess in my subconscious I figured in Arizona there was no problem. So the day before they got in, it suddenly dawned on me, "You haven't checked out the segregation problem." So I went to the manager and I said, "Look, I should have done this the day I got here, but it slipped my mind. Are all your facilities unsegregated? Are they all open to blacks in case we have a black in the press corps or a black on the liaison office or something?" He said, "They can stay here. They stay here all the time." I said, "What about your dining room?" "No problem. No problem." I said, "What about the beauty shop and the barber shop?" "No problem." I said, "What about the bar?" "Oh, no! Now they can't use the bar.

They'll be having fist fights in there if you let them go in the bar." "Oh, God," I said, "Well, we're going to have to cancel our reservations. We're going to have to go out and rent a motel. Then we can do what we please in the motel. We'll just rent the whole motel for the night." "Oh, don't do that, don't do that. We've been turning people away." I said, "Well, I can't help it. But you can't have any segregated facilities." "Oh, my God," he said, "I don't think we can let them in the bar. Let me get my directors together." Well, they met and they decided that they could go in the bar.

But we got in there and I made the mistake of--you should never let a candidate see the instructions for the party. They have no business seeing it. You know, you prepare mimeographed instructions for the party with the room assignments, the meals, what time to have your luggage in the lobby the next day, where the cars will be parked for the motorcade, the ABCs of logistics. But Senator Johnson got hold of one of them. He said, "What are these rooms costing?" I said, "I haven't the vaguest idea, Senator. I didn't even ask. It doesn't make any difference. It's the only place we can stay anyhow." "What do you mean?" I said, "Well, I got it unsegregated yesterday. This is the first time they've ever opened up the bar to blacks." "What do you mean? I don't know what you're talking about." I said, "Well, you know, your party can't stay in a hotel that has any segregated facilities." "I never heard of such a thing." I said, "Senator, now you've been around politics. You

know this full well." "That's foolishness. I never heard of such a thing. I never heard of such a thing." Well, I got back to Washington and mentioned this to Jim Rowe, who was his campaign manager. He said, "Oh, good God, if I've been over that with him once, I've been over it twenty times. He just wants to be difficult."

Well, LBJ came in soon after the nomination and he said, "You're going to head up my speech-writing team. I want you to get a bunch of people together. Who are you going to have? Who are you going to have?" I said, "Well, Jack Fischer, the editor of Harper's. I think Jack would be good. And I think Doctor [Walter Prescott] Webb would be good." I mentioned four or five. "That's fine. Get them. Get them alerted." I said, "David Cohen [?] would be great." I called David Cohen. David said, "Oh, great God, why can't Lyndon plan in advance? I'm leaving for Copenhagen tomorrow on a business trip, going to be gone six weeks. I'd love to do this. But damn it, I can't cancel all these engagements I've got at this late date. Why didn't he mention it a couple of weeks ago that he had this in mind?" I said, "I don't know. He just grabbed me in the office and told me this." David said, "Well, it's just too late. I can't do it."

So Jim Rowe came in the office and I told Jim Rowe. [He said], "Oh, why won't he leave this campaign alone? I've already got a speech-writing team set up! It's already functioning! We'll elect him if he'll just leave us alone!" (Laughter) So that never did come into fruition.

G: Some hard feelings developed between Jim Rowe and LBJ in that campaign. Do you know what it was?

H: No, I never heard that. I had never heard that.

Well, Jim, you know, is a very blunt guy. He probably told him he couldn't do something, and they probably got in an argument. Because Jim is a very forthright guy.

Jim told me a great story on himself when he was FDR's assistant. He was then with FDR one day. He said, "Mr. President, we've got to do so—and—so. We've got to do so—and—so. We've got to do so—and—so." FDR leaned back and blew a smoke circle and said, "Jim, when did the people elect you president?" A real squelch.

(Laughter)

H: But no, I had never heard that there was ever any rift between them. They had been friends for so long.

Now that I'm thinking about it, I seldom ever went over to the Senate. I don't suppose I was in LBJ's office four times. But I went over there for some reason one time. Ronnie Dugger was in town working on his book. LBJ mentioned that to me. I hadn't seen Ronnie. He mentioned that to me. He said, "Here's a report I've just gotten on his interview with Bill Douglas." He had anticipated everything Ronnie was doing and had them reporting to him before Ronnie got out of their office. You know, that planning.

You know the story about what he did to Coke Stevenson when Coke Stevenson went to see the Secretary of State in 1948, when he was running against Stevenson. I don't know all the details of it,

but it's a matter of public record. But anyhow, LBJ was making a big deal about the fact that he knew about foreign affairs and Coke Stevenson didn't. That was stinging Stevenson so he made an appointment to see the Secretary of State; I think it was General [George] Marshall. It was a secretary of state in 1948. So LBJ was prepared for him. He had photographers; he had timekeepers; he had the whole business.

So Coke Stevenson went in to see the Secretary of State. He was in there, I think it was a minute and forty-seven seconds. It was just to shake hands. But Stevenson was going to play that up, you know, that he had had a briefing on foreign affairs. So LBJ just hammered him over the head. He got briefed on foreign affairs in one minute and forty-seven seconds! Stevenson should have left it alone. He came out the loser on that proposition. But it was this massive attention to detail.

I mentioned this to Harry Middleton and he didn't know anything about it, but he said he would try to find out about it. I don't know whether you've ever run into it. One time, it was soon after he became vice president, Walter Jenkins had a cocktail party. I went out to it, and I had just gone to work for Hale Boggs. The Vice President came across the floor just glowering, and I knew there was trouble ahead. He walked up to me and he said, "I'll kick your ass up between your shoulders." I said, "What have I done this time?" He said, "You wouldn't come to work for me." I said, "You never offered me a job." He said, "Walter Jenkins said you weren't

going to work, you were going to finish the Rayburn biography. And then you go to work for Hale Boggs instead of me." I said, "Senator, you never offered me a job. I didn't plan, but Hale told me he'd give me plenty of time to finish the book." He said, "Well, you could have come to work for me and I would have helped you finish the book. I'll turn Mary Margaret [Wiley Valenti's] diary over to you, about why I took the nomination for vice president." Well, I never followed up on it. I rode back on the plane and sat by Senator Johnson and Douglass Cater from Austin to Washington, a seven-hour trip. I sat by the two of them and heard him give Doug Cater, in play-by-play, his version of taking the vice presidency.

But I never did follow up on the diary and I never asked Mary Margaret whether she kept a diary. She did tell me the last time I saw her that the famous Phil Graham version--she did say that Mr. Rayburn came down to the Johnson suite, which was a madhouse at that moment, and Bobby Kennedy arrived, and that--I think it went this way--Mr. Rayburn said to her, "Who's bedroom is this?" She said, "It's mine." He said, "Can we use it for a few minutes?" So he and Bobby Kennedy went in the room, and just the two of them were together in that room. I heard Mr. Rayburn's version of that.

Bobby Kennedy at the time they talked--and I didn't know at that time where it was. Mr. Rayburn said, "Bobby said to me--he had that hair hanging down in his face--'Oh, it's just terrible upstairs, labor and the liberals. If Senator Johnson is the nominee they're not going to contribute money and they're going to walk out

and they're going to sit on their hands.' I said to him, 'Now, Bobby, we ain't talking to but one person and that's your brother. I told your brother when I talked to him this afternoon that we weren't running for anything. We didn't want anything. We weren't asking for anything. I had been very much opposed to any idea of Lyndon taking the vice presidential nomination. But I told your brother that if he told me that he had to have him on the ticket to win, if he told me that he'd use him every way that he could on the National Security Council and other things he'd give him to do, and if he'd get up and tell the world that Lyndon was his choice and he was willing to fight for his nomination, then I withdraw my objections. Your brother said, "I tell you all those things, and he <u>is</u> my choice and I'm going to see that he's nominated."'" He said Bobby slapped his leg and said, "Well, Mr. Speaker, that does it. I'm going back upstairs and tell Jack it's got to be Lyndon."

I never heard him mention what Phil Graham had in his memorandum about Bobby suggesting that Senator Johnson become chairman of the [Democratic] National Committee. That to me is so absurd that it would have been laughed out of court. I think the Phil Graham memorandum is sheer imagination. I don't trust a bit of it.

G: This was supposedly proposed or suggested by Bobby Kennedy in a meeting with Mr. Rayburn, John Connally, and perhaps one other person, maybe Graham or Jim Rowe, someone like that, in, I think, Mrs. Johnson's bedroom.

H: I don't know. I never heard a mention of it from Rayburn. You know, it could have happened and he just never mentioned it. It could have happened, because Rayburn never mentioned to me the call that Johnson made to him the night that Kennedy was nominated. According to Senator Johnson, this thing started with Will Wilson who said to Price Daniel, "If this boy is as smart as I think he is, he's going to ask Lyndon to run on the ticket with him and Lyndon's got to do it." Price said, "I hadn't given it a thought, but I think you're right." So Price then mentioned it to Senator Johnson and Senator Johnson called Sam Rayburn.

Well now, after we got back to the hotel, it was Tiger [Olin E.] Teague, I think, Frank Ikard, Homer Thornberry, and I took to the convention with me Nick Cox, who was then on the Des Moines Register. Nick shared my room. I worked it out with the Speaker that Nick would agree not to do any reporting but that he would see the back-stage thing. Nick is now in Washington, won every prize there is to win. He's won the Pulitzer Prize, the Sigma Delta Chi prize, and he's the only man ever to win the Raymond Clapper award twice in a row. Nick was there that night. We were having drinks, one of the few times I ever saw Mr. Rayburn drink after supper. Usually when he had his food that was the end of his drinking. But that night he took a couple of drinks. Nick and myself had the room--he had a bedroom and living room; we couldn't get any interconnecting rooms. He had these two rooms, and Nick and myself had the room next to him. Then John Holton had the room next to us.

John says that that morning they went over to a meeting or a breakfast with all the people from the Fourth Congressional District in another hotel. When they came back there was a great deal of commotion down at LBJ's suite. Mr. Rayburn said, "What the hell is that?" "Oh," he said, "I bet I know what that is." The TV people were there and the newspaper people.

The night before we were sitting around the suite talking. It was the consensus of opinion among the congressmen and others in the room there, it was just unanimously conceded that Stuart Symington was going to be the vice presidential nominee. Rayburn didn't say a word. I don't know at what moment it was, but anyhow, LBJ said that he called Mr. Rayburn and told him what Price Daniel had said. He said, "Now damn it, Lyndon, don't you do anything rash now. Don't you do anything, by God, until we talk again." That was the night before. So then when Kennedy called and said, "I want to come to see you," then LBJ called Sam Rayburn and told him Kennedy was coming to see him and what it was. He said, "Don't you do anything."

So, John said after LBJ called him that morning--no, I guess it wasn't that morning. I guess they came back from the breakfast and Rayburn saw that commotion, then LBJ got him on the phone--it was by then afternoon--and told him what Kennedy had said and said, "I told him he would have to convince you. He'll be coming to see you."

So then Hale Boggs came by and banged on my door. Hale was with Ed Foley, used to be under secretary of the treasury under Truman.

"Where is the boss?" We were still asleep. We had had one of Rayburn's main constituents on our hands, dead drunk, until five in the morning. We finally poured him in a taxi and sent him off. So we were out of it. I said, "I think he's at breakfast. I think he was going to a breakfast." He said, "Breakfast, hell! Do you know what time it is?" I said, "No." He said, "It's quarter after twelve."

Well, Hale's version of it was we got together Arthur Krock, who was tidying up his memoirs or papers to put in the Princeton Library. One time Hale got Arthur Krock, Tommy Corcoran and myself, and he tried to get John Holton, who was going to be out of town, to compare notes on the events surrounding the nomination. Hale said, "Ed [Foley], when the boss finally arrived, was in there with Tommy Corcoran. Tommy Corcoran had been walking the halls for the whole convention. He had come out in an article in Look magazine for Lyndon Johnson. This infuriated Joe Kennedy, who called him an apostate Catholic. So Tommy was walking the halls for a Johnson-Kennedy, or Kennedy-Johnson ticket, either way. So he was, I guess, the happiest man in Washington when the ticket finally worked out. So Hale said he went in there and Tommy was giving the Speaker all the wrong arguments about why Lyndon should take the nomination. So he said, "I finally got Tommy out of there, and Ed started talking the wrong way. I knew how to talk to the Speaker. So I said, 'Ed, I want to talk to him by myself,' and I got Ed out of the room. I turned it on about, 'Mr. Speaker, you just can't stand being responsible

for giving this country eight years of Richard Nixon.' I knew that would sting him worse than anything else."

When Hale left, the Speaker came out and said to John, "John, I want to get off by myself and think a little bit." There wasn't any place to put him except in John's bedroom so he took him down to his bedroom. John said he thinks he was there about twenty minutes. It was sitting in that bedroom that he planned his course of action as to what to tell Kennedy.

Well, Kennedy didn't show up and didn't show up. Hale was back with the Speaker. The Speaker was getting itchy. Kennedy had called him and said, "I'm coming down to see you." He said, "No, I'll come up to see you. You're the nominee." "No, Mr. Speaker, I want to come down and see you. I'm just on the floor just above you." Well, Kennedy didn't show and didn't show. He said to Hale, "Hale, go up there and see if that boy's coming down here." So Hale went up the fire stairs. Here were Joe Rauh and all the liberals, Walter Reuther, Roy Reuther, all screaming and yelling and threatening. He said to Jack Kennedy, "Jack, come on. The Speaker's getting restless. Come on. We'll go down the backstairs here."

So he and Kenny O'Donnell and Hale went down to the Speaker's suite. Kennedy said, "Shall we all talk?" Hale said, "No, why don't you and the Speaker talk and let Kenny and myself get better acquainted." He didn't know O'Donnell well at all then. So they stayed outside while Rayburn was in private with Kennedy. He told Kennedy what I've said, "I've been dead set against this. I knew

how miserable the other people have been in the vice presidency. I've been dead set against it. But if you tell me you've got to have him on the ticket to win, tell me you'll use him all you can, and that you'll tell the world he's your personal choice, and that you're determined to have him nominated, then I'll withdraw my objections."

So that's the combined version from LBJ and from Sam Rayburn of how the thing worked out. But then to follow this up, at a quarter to four the phone rang. I answered the phone in the Speaker's suite. He said, "This is Dave Lawrence." I said, "Yes, Governor." He said, "Is Sam there?" I said, "Yes, sir." "Mr. Speaker, it's Governor Lawrence of Pennsylvania." "Yes, yes, yes, yes." And I could hear Governor Lawrence. He said, "Sam, I need some help on a speech. I'm going to send my man over there to get some help on a speech." He said, "Is that to do with Lyndon?" He said, "Yes, they told me to get a nominating speech ready." Mr. Rayburn said, "Is that thing set?" He said, "Mr. Speaker, I don't know. They just told me to get a speech ready. I don't know whether it's set." Well, about fifteen minutes later Kennedy came on televison and said Johnson was his choice. That's how up in the air it was until the last minute.

So they sent a guy over to work with Bill Gibbons, who worked for Johnson's [Democratic] Policy Committee--no, I take it back, Dan McCrary [?], who's now an associate editor of Business Week, who was an intern in Johnson's office. They used our bedroom to write the nominating speech. Then Governor Lawrence was nearsighted or

something, so then they had to find an oversized typewriter and retype the speech so he could see to read it. But that's how up in the air all this was. They met; Kennedy gave his acceptance speech. It was broad open daylight, about five o'clock in the afternoon, when he gave his acceptance speech, because they were catching prime time in the East. It was just a madhouse. Nobody knew what was going on. It was just back and forth.

G: Let me ask you another point here. There's some indication that Sam Rayburn also had links with the Kennedy people through the Massachusetts delegation and his friends in the Congress, particularly McCormack and Tip O'Neill. And that here was another channel for negotiating a possible Kennedy-Johnson ticket. Have you [any recollection of that]?

H: I don't think so. Because there was bad blood between McCormacks and the Kennedys. You see, if I'm not mistaken, they had already defeated the nephew, Eddie McCormack, once or twice. Now, McCormack was very loyal to Kennedy after he was president. Hale said one of the first things I had to learn in politics is that Irish Catholics not only are not natural allies, they usually are mortal enemies. They didn't get along with each other. I think it was sort of the lace curtain-shanty Irish division involved there somewhere. Tip O'Neill, while he had been in Congress twelve years at that time, was not a prominent member of the House at that time, and as far as I know, had no close links to Rayburn. I knew Tip at that time,

but I never remember him having any links to Rayburn other than he knew him and would speak to him.

G: You have no recollection of them sitting down together before the balloting and talking about this possibility?

H: Never, never, never. Now, I don't know. Tip, of course, got along with the Kennedys fine, because he succeeded Jack Kennedy in that district. But McCormack and the Kennedys were not bosom buddies at all. Their friendship, such as it was, developed after McCormack became speaker, and his loyalty to President Kennedy was a party loyalty rather than a personal, I think. I think they got to be good friends, but they were not political allies before.

The Kennedys played a very independent game. The first time I met Jack Kennedy was at the 1956 convention, the night that [Estes] Kefauver defeated him for the vice presidency. Steve Mitchell, the Democratic chairman, was my very close friend. His son was my closest friend. I was with them as we came out of the convention hall. Steve was not national chairman then; he had given it up in 1954. Paul Butler was the chairman. Steve and his wife and his younger son, Tony, and myself, we bumped into Jack Kennedy. Steve said, "Boy, that was a swinger today, Jack. That was really a cliff-hanger today." Kennedy said, "Yes, it sure was. It was awful close. Very confusing." Well, I don't remember the details, but Foster Furcolo was the nominee for governor when Kennedy was running for re-election. He refused to be on a television with Furcolo or something like that. So Steve said, "Jack, do you want some good fatherly advice?" He

said, "I sure do, Steve." He said, "Go back to Massachusetts and try to get some Democrats elected besides yourself." He said, "That's damn good advice, Steve."

But they played a very independent game. It was a personal game that they were playing at that stage.

G: Let me ask you about that occasion in 1956. Speaker Rayburn is credited with having thrown the VP nomination to Kefauver by recognizing Missouri and this sort of thing.

H: Yes, I have read that. I was on the floor at the time. I was with Albert Gore when his name was still [in nomination]. In fact, Texas was going to vote for him, maybe did vote for Albert Gore at first.

G: Gore's people were the ones that were swinging to Kefauver.

H: Well, I remember telling Senator Gore, who was a good friend of mine at that time--we were having a cup of coffee under the stands--"Senator, I don't think you can get the nomination and if you keep Kefauver from having it, I think it's going to hurt you a lot in Tennessee, a great deal in Tennessee." He said, "I think you're probably right." Well, there was so much pandemonium on the stage, and the tally machines broke down so nobody knew who was ahead. The tally machines couldn't keep up with the changes. Tom Hennings was on a chair in the Missouri delegation just screaming his head off, "You can't go for Kennedy. He's voted wrong on every farm bill we've ever had up in the Senate. You can't go for Kennedy." And they swung over.

It was going so fast I don't remember all the moves, but one of the key recognitions, in my mind, was when Mr. Rayburn recognized Governor Raymond Gary of Oklahoma, which I think they swung to Kefauver. Well, I have never taken that as any kind of a design on Rayburn's part. Raymond Gary lived right across Lake Texoma. His home county adjoins Rayburn's district and they had been friends for years. Gary was a good friend of mine. He lived in Madill, Oklahoma. I have always thought that he recognized Raymond Gary because he was a close personal friend. But I have read these stories about John McCormack yelling to Rayburn what to do, this, that or the other. I just don't know. But I have never given much or any credence to the fact that Rayburn deliberately swung it one way or the other. He was not impressed with Kennedy. He was not impressed with Kennedy until the first television debate with Nixon.

G: Really, what was his reaction to that?

H: He said, "He was in the House here and he made absolutely no impression on us. A nice young man, but rumpled suits and hair hanging down in his face that needed cutting, spindly legs, and he had that yellow complexion like he had that Pacific fever. He was running around after the girls all night long. He just made no impression at all on us." But he was loyal. When he was nominated, why, he was going to be for him. But he watched the first television debate. They said he turned off the set and said, "My, God, the things that boy knows." From that time on, why, Kennedy was like a son to him. He had grown up, and Rayburn hadn't realized it. He had matured.

G: Were you there when he turned off the set and he said that?

H: No, I was not there. I heard that story. I was not there. He was in Bonham, I think, at the time.

G: Do you know who the source was?

H: I don't know who the source was. You know, I didn't write these things down a lot of them.

G: That's fascinating.

H: But he couldn't have been more solicitous about Kennedy from that time on. He was much impressed with him, and it was a two-way street. When Kennedy flew down to see Mr. Rayburn--I was telling Lady Bird about this the other night--when he came out of the hospital, one of the news reports said there were tears in his eyes and his voice was choked up, so uncharacteristic of Kennedy. He said, "They don't make them like that any more." Quite uncharacteristic of Kennedy. But there was a very deep friendship between the two of them after the thing.

Of course, Rayburn had been a very good friend of Joe Kennedy, back in the New Deal days. Rayburn went down to the swearing in of the Kennedy cabinet. Here was Stewart Udall with all of his children, and Bobby with all of his children, other cabinet members. So Rayburn said, "I pushed them up to the front so they could see their daddies take the oath of office. I left. I walked out the door and somebody said, 'Hello, Sam.'" This eye, I've forgotten which one it was, but this was the only one he had any sight in and he couldn't see. He said, "Who's that?" "Joe Kennedy." "Oh,"

he said, "Joe, I didn't see you. Joe, go on in there. I'll tell you one thing, there ain't any race suicide in this outfit." (Laughter) All those kids, fifty kids in the cabinet families. But he really was sold on Jack Kennedy after he got to know him and got to working with him.

He and LBJ went down to Palm Beach in between the election and the taking of office and had a session with Kennedy. Mr. Rayburn said they both told Kennedy to keep his hands off of the fight to enlarge the Rules Committee in the House. That was a family affair and to keep out of it. They'd take care of it. Well, he didn't do it. He just muddied the water up. They had a meeting down at the White House. Rayburn and Johnson again told him to leave it alone. But Kennedy ignored them and he picked up the phone and phoned Harold Cooley, the dean of the North Carolina delegation. We had only one vote out of North Carolina. He called Harold Cooley and said, "Harold, help me out. Get some of those boys and come on over and help me out." Well, he no sooner hung up the phone than Harold Cooley called a meeting of his delegation and said, "The President is putting the heat on me." And it was in the Washington Post the next morning.

Kennedy didn't help a damn bit. He just muddied the water up. Then Stewart Udall started calling western Republicans threatening to cancel out some of their Interior Department projects and that got in the paper. He didn't change a damn vote. They were no help at all. They wouldn't pay any attention to Johnson and Rayburn.

They'll deny that, but in my judgment--I was there step by step; I kept a diary of the thing all the way through--it was something that outsiders couldn't help on. The lobbies couldn't help on it and in my judgment the White House couldn't help.

Nevertheless, Johnson and Rayburn knew this was an internal matter and it was best left alone by the President, by outsiders. Anyway, Rayburn went down there and Caroline was just a little thing. He said, "She's walking around with her hands on her hips, up and down the halls of that baronial mansion there." She waddled up to Rayburn, looked up and said, "You haven't got any hair!" He said, "I sure don't and I'm getting along just fine. How are you getting along?" He said, "I guess growing up with all those hairy Kennedys, she didn't know what a man without any hair looked like." (Laughter)

Jackie took a picture of Mr. Rayburn fishing off the pier that's just a scream. He is the dumpiest, funniest-looking thing. He has a rain hat pulled down over him. He looks like something the dogs dragged in. Jackie slipped up behind him and took a picture of him and then autographed it and had it framed and sent it to him. It's really a treasure.

G: I think the inscription says, "The fish don't have a chance," and then Jack Kennedy added to that, "Neither does the House of Representatives," or something.

H: That's right. They both autographed it.

Well, Rayburn said she impressed him as the most frightened little bird. She seemed so timid, just sort of scared of her shadow. He liked her, but he said she seemed just ill at ease, just sort of staying back in the shadows, which is not the way she came out eventually.

G: Rayburn's increasing liking of Jack Kennedy during the 1960 campaign was paralleled by his dislike for Kennedy's opponent, Richard Nixon.

H: Well, he had a very deep dislike of Nixon personally, as well as an apprehension about him being in the White House.

G: Did he ever talk to you about this?

H: Oh, yes. He talked about Nixon. I made an appointment for Earl Mazo to interview Rayburn when he was writing his Nixon book. You know, the liberals got mad at Earl about that book because it was a fair book. I still think it's the best thing ever done on Nixon. Rayburn didn't go off the record at all. He told Earl--and it's in the book, it's in the 1959 version; I haven't looked at the 1968 version, but it's in the 1959 version of the book--I'm sure Rayburn didn't say off the record because Earl is a very reputable journalist, that Nixon had the cruelest face he'd ever look into. He said, "That ugly jaw sticking out and those little chinkquapin eyes." He said, "I've served with over thirty-five hundred men and women and he has the cruelest face I've ever looked into. When he was elected to the Senate I said, 'Good riddance, I don't want him ever to darken the door of this House again.'" That's in the book.

I saw Nixon at his very best one time. LBJ got an idea. There were forty-seven senators and the Vice President--and at that time you had only ninety-six senators--that had served with Rayburn in the House. So he would have a ceremony and they would give Rayburn a silver tray with his name engraved on it. Each man would have his name engraved on it. He invited me to come to the ceremony in the old Supreme Court chamber. Dick Russell had an artist friend in Atlanta, so they sent him a photograph of Rayburn and he painted a painting of Rayburn, which was pretty good except he got the jaw too long. LBJ had color reproductions made and gave everybody there one of them.

So, I thought this was kind of sadistic of Senator Johnson, but he called on Richard Nixon to speak. Well, everybody knew about the dislike of the two men for each other, but Nixon responded beautifully. He didn't lower himself; he didn't perjure himself; he talked academically about Rayburn's tenure. He set a record that would never be exceeded in all probability, his knowledge of the rules. He never did say "I love him," or "he's my buddy," never any falsity about it. I was standing about four feet from Richard Nixon and I thought he handled himself magnificently. I thought Senator Johnson put him in a very tough spot. But Nixon handled it manfully. My liking for Nixon increased as a result of that experience.

Another little thing as to how confusing this whole game of politics is, with all this uproar going on up in the hotel about the nomination and so forth. Price Daniel had the suite right across

the hall from us, Price and Price Junior. Price said to me, "D.B., I don't think anybody's doing anything about getting seconding speeches lined up for Lyndon. My God, we've just got about an hour. I think the Governor of Virginia ought to make a seconding speech. I think I ought to make one. I think Bill Dawson of Chicago ought to make one." I said, "Go down and see Lyndon and see who he wants to second his nomination." So I went down the hall and here's utter pandemonium in that suite. Senator Johnson's sitting in the chair, just kind of like this, hunched down. I knelt down on the floor beside him. I told him what Price had said. He suggested several names and said, "Now, this is out of my hands. I can't do anything about this. You tell Price he's got to handle it. I don't want to know anything about it. I've got to leave the convention hall. I won't know anything about this, so you tell him to get it all lined up." Well, he did, but then a bunch of people started going up on the platform making seconding speeches that hadn't been invited.

So months passed. The Vice President was in office. Somebody on the staff, I don't remember who it was, called me and asked me if I had a list of the people who seconded his nomination. They wanted to write them a letter in appreciation. I named the ones I could remember, but I said, "I don't know, because there were people that I never heard of getting up there seconding the nomination. I don't know who all seconded it. Why don't you get the transcript from down at the [Democratic] National Committee?" They

had that all taped. He said, "Well, they said it wouldn't be ready for six months. We've already gone several months." This had gone six or eight months then. So I suppose they finally got the list and wrote them all a letter, but that's how loose-jointed these things are.

G: Chaotic.

H: Just chaotic. Senator Johnson didn't know who had seconded the nomination.

G: Did you get the feeling that neither Speaker Rayburn nor Senator Johnson trusted Vice President Nixon?

H: I can't speak for Senator Johnson because I never heard him discuss--well, I take it back. I take it back. One time. I never heard him discuss Richard Nixon before he was nominated for vice president. It just never came up. I didn't see that much of Senator Johnson. I'd go months without seeing Senator Johnson or being around him. But this same night out at Walter Jenkins's house, when he told me, "I'll let you use Mary Margaret's diary about what actually took place that day."

I said, "Mr. Vice President, I sat by you and Doug Cater on the plane coming back from Austin, and I heard you talk about it for hours. But there's one unanswered question that I have that I've never had a chance to ask you and that you didn't touch on in your conversations with Doug Cater. What was the key element in your decision to take the nomination? What was the straw that broke the camel's back?" "Well," he said, "you know I didn't want to be vice

president. I loved being majority leader. That job I knew from stem to stern. I knew how to handle it. I knew how to run the Senate. I enjoyed running the Senate. I had power and I liked to use power. I liked that. And I knew what the vice presidency was, because I had watched John Garner suffer in it for eight years. So I knew what it was. I was able to rule out all the considerations, but there was one I kept bumping up against all that day, and I could never get around that. It boiled down to this. I said to myself, 'All right now, Lyndon, if you do what you want to do and you remain as majority leader after your presidential nominee has told you that he wants you and he's got to have you to win the election, and you turn him down and do what you want to do, and it should turn out that he's right and you're responsible for giving this country eight years of Richard Nixon, I could never live with that.'"

G: Do you think he ever had the consideration that if he declined to go on the ticket and Kennedy won, that Kennedy might have enough power to have him replaced as majority leader? Did he ever express that?

H: That doesn't ring true to me.

G: He never expressed that?

H: I don't think Kennedy would ever have tried it. I think on the other hand Kennedy would be so anxious to have him there as majority leader, because he knew Johnson well enough, they had worked together long enough, that he knew that Johnson would be loyal to a Democratic president and would help him get his programs through the Senate. So I don't think he would ever have tried that.

Remember this, too, there's another side to this now. Mr. Rayburn--I never talked to LBJ about this--told me in 1959 that LBJ said that Joe Kennedy had been sounding him out on the idea of a Johnson-Kennedy ticket. Well, in this meeting with Arthur Krock I raised this point. I mentioned this. Of course, Arthur Krock was close to Joe Kennedy for thirty years. He's the one that twisted arms to get Kennedy the Pulitzer Prize. There was a close family connection there for many years. So I said, "Mr. Krock, Speaker Rayburn told me that LBJ said to him that Joe Kennedy in 1955 was talking to him about the ticket of Lyndon Johnson for president, Kennedy for vice president." He said, "I heard that. Joe Kennedy was on the Riviera. He phoned me about something else during the period when this rumor was around. I mentioned it to him. I said, 'Joe, the rumor's going around Washington that you have been talking to Lyndon about a Johnson for president, Kennedy for vice president ticket. I want to know about it.' He said, 'Arthur, I know that rumor's going around, but there's nothing to it. When it comes to the Kennedys, it's the White House or the shit house and nothing in between.'" So I don't know. I just don't know what the truth of that situation is. Maybe Kennedy was feeling him out or something. I don't know what it is.

G: That's interesting.

H: But, you see, Johnson had also known Joe Kennedy from New Deal days. You know, Johnson was the man who would think of all sorts of possibilities, but if I had been in Johnson's shoes I wouldn't

have worried about Kennedy trying to displace me as majority leader. In the first place, I don't think Kennedy would have had any desire to displace him. In the second place, I think that's, again, outside interference where the Senate would tell him to go jump in the lake. I don't think they would have heeded his wishes. Even a powerful president like FDR was [not?] able to elect Alben Barkley. He really didn't elect Alben Barkley; it was Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, his own stubbornness defeated him for majority leader by one vote. Pat Harrison and Theodore Bilbo hated each other. When this race came up they said to Bilbo, "Come on, vote for your fellow Mississippian, for God's sakes." He said, "Well, I don't want to. He's no good. But I will vote for him if he'll ask me to." And Harrison refused to ask him to. So Bilbo voted for Alben Barkley and elected him. But FDR turned on the heat. [He was] very powerful in office at that time, very powerful. He couldn't swing it.

This is housekeeping. It's like interfering between a man and his wife. You'd better leave it alone. You can't do anything but mess it up.

G: Well, that's really fascinating. I don't want to take up too much of your time today.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview IV]

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