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INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER

Interviewer: Paige E. Mulhollan

September 19, 1968

M: Senator Hickenlooper, I'd like for you as a man who has been in the Senate for 25 years, if you can, to recall for me first conversations and acquaintances that you made with Mr. Johnson when he came to the Senate or even prior to that time, if you knew him as a Congressman.

H: Well, I first knew him in early 1947 when I organized the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as its first chairman, and he was a member of that Committee from the House. And he served on the Committee, we served together on the Joint Committee for a couple of years, and then he came over to the Senate.

M: Did he stay on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee after he came to the Senate?

H: No, he didn't. He, of course, came over; he didn't have the seniority when he first came to the Senate, because he came as a junior from the House and so he didn't go on the Committee when he came over to the Senate. But then of course I knew him in the Senate from my association with him as a member from the House on the Joint Committee.

M: I see. When Mr. Johnson became a Senate Leader, as Minority Leader and later as Majority Leader, how would you characterize his relationship with the Republican leadership, of which you were a part?

H: Well, I would say he was always considered to be a very worthy antagonist. He was a driver and a very forceful advocate of his

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particular point of view, whatever that might be.

M: Did he work closely with the Republican hierarchy?

H: Not if he could help it.

M: The Democratic critics once accused him of making divided government work by surrendering to President Eisenhower. Would you say that was--

H: No, I don't think so. I think he surrendered to expediency.

M: I see.

H: I think wherever he cooperated with the Administration, and any leader has to, regardless of his political affiliation, on occasions has to cooperate with the President of the country on many pieces of legislation. But Lyndon Johnson was first, last, and always a dedicated and completely uncompromising Democrat.

M: You think partisan politics was his overriding--

H: Oh, indeed.

M: --concern, then?

H: Indeed! Indeed!

M: Above personal opportunism?

H: Oh, no, I think personal opportunism was the controlling influence, but he was also a dedicated Democrat, and he used that vehicle in order to advance his own personal leadership and his personal influence.

M: I believe you were one of the joint sponsors of the Atomic Energy Control Bill in 1954. Did Mr. Johnson play any role in shaping that measure?

H: No.

M: Or in its passage?

H: No. Except I think he did not try to obstruct it, because it was a constructive bill to fit the Atomic Energy program into a more modern context.

M: Was there a liberal filibuster against the measure? Was that the measure against which some of the Democratic Liberals filibustered?

H: There was some filibustering against it, but as I recall it, it was not protracted.

M: And Johnson did not, to your knowledge, play a role in--

H: No, I think he didn't. I think he in the main went along as sort of a neutral on it, realizing that the law had to be changed. There had to be some changes made, and this was a radically different Law than the original Atomic Energy Act.

M: This is the one that provided for civilian control and allowed private--

H: Well, the original act provided for civilian control. As a matter of fact, set up the Atomic Energy Commission.

M: This one was the one that provided opportunity for private development?

H: The Act of 1954 which then Congressman Sterling Cole and I authored, he in the House and I in the Senate, took a little different tack on this Atomic Energy situation. We rewrote, in fact, we wrote a new bill, that's exactly what it amounted to, and we opened the gate for cooperation with other countries in the world with atomic capabilities, and we extended the right of civilian and private enterprise invasion into this field for [electric] power.

M: Has the Bill worked as you hoped it would?

H: Oh, yes, I think it has. There've been any number of amendments. I don't think there's been a session that we haven't amended it somewhat to fit itinerant situations and new situations that have come up. But there's been no basic change in the Act of 1954, such as there was in the Act of 1954 as compared to the Act of 1947.

M: One of the changes has provided for some measure of cooperation with our allies. Did Mr. Johnson take any position on that issue, as you remember it?

H: As I remember it, yes. He thought we should have reasonable cooperation with our allies, as a matter of mutual security and mutal defense.

M: And the final measure, I believe, provided for Congressional veto, as they called it, over such sharing. Do you remember his position in regard to that?

H: Well, no, I don't. You're referring to the provisions that any proposals for cooperation should be submitted 60 days or some such period before it went into effect. I don't think he opposed that. I don't recall that he did in any vigorous way. Lyndon Johnson's opposition, if it were real, could be very real and formidable indeed.

M: You served, I believe,with Mr. Johnson for some time on first, the Special Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space and later on the Standing Committee on Aeronautics and Space?

H: Yes.

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M: How would you characterize the contribution of his post-Sputnik investigations in regard to the contribution they made to our later space effort?

H: I think they were very helpful. I think those investigations realized the importance of our not, first, not abandoning the space field to the Russians or any other country as a matter of fact, and I think it laid the basis for the legislation that later set up the regular Committee on Space.

M: Do you recall that Mr. Johnson, as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council while Vice-President, played a role of leadership in the space program during that time?

H: I can't assess that, because I didn't come in contact with that Committee too much. Or with that Administrative program too much. I think he and his Commission cooperated, but you see, we set up a Space Committee, well I forget the year we set it up, but we set it up almost immediately after these investigations.

M: Did Mr. Johnson, as Vice-President, to your knowledge continue to play a role of leadership in the Senate, or in the House?

H: You mean in the Space Program?

M: No, generally speaking, did he still perform a liaison role between the Executive branch and the Congress?

H: Well, to some extent, but I think it was quite well-known, or considered at least, that he was somewhat restless because as Vice-President, he was relegated to more-or-less an inactive role in the leadership. And the Democrats themselves didn't accord him the leadership

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authority which he had had as Leader. And I think that was probably appropriate.

M: Do you think as President that he has paid adequate attention and placed adequate emphasis on the Space Program?

H: I think he has supported the Space Program. I think he has encouraged it, but I think he has had so many other things to think about that he hasn't devoted an unusual amount of time to prodding on the Space Program.

M: In your long service on the Foreign Relations Committee, do you remember that Mr. Johnson, while a Senate leader, played a major role in any foreign policy crises that arose during the Eisenhower years?

H: Well, he supported the Lebanon Resolution in the Eastern Mediterranean. He supported the strengthening of our armed forces, and I think he--well, I'm quite sure because I don't remember any adverse actions, but I'm quite sure he supported the maintenance of strength in NATO and gave the Eisenhower-Dulles program every reasonable support.

M: His relations with Secretary Dulles were satisfactory, as far as you know?

H: So far as I know, yes. They were cooperative.

M: Did you play any part in the briefings in the 1954 episode connected with Indo-China, which grew later into the Vietnam affair? At the time when the French were about to pull out, a meeting of Congressional leaders?

H: Yes, I did, mostly through the Foreign Relations briefings which we

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got through Secretary Dulles and others.

M: Do you remember then-Senator Johnson taking any position, definite position of one kind or another, during those briefings?

H: No, I don't. I don't remember any details on that at all at the moment.

M: In your opinion, since Mr. Johnson has been President, has he kept the Foreign Relations Committee adequately briefed on such things as the Tonkin Bay incident, as an example?

H: Well, of course, the Tonkin Bay incident happened and the Resolution resulted almost overnight. There was practically no interim period when any hearings were held that amounted to anything. Our ships had been assaulted, the President asked for this Resolution, and it was voted out of the Committee almost immediately and voted on the floor.

M: Did he call Congressional Leaders to the White House for consultation prior to the Resolutions?

H: Yes,yes!

M: Did you take part in those meetings?

H: I'd have to check my records. I don't recall now whether I did or not. I've been over there so many times on these things that I probably was.

M: Is the same true of other episodes such as the attack on Pleiku that resulted in our instituting air raids in the North; for example, did he again call Congressional leaders?

H: Yes, he called Congressional leaders frequently. He has called them very frequently.

M: As far as the Foreign Relations Committee is concerned, many--

H: But as a rule I may add, as a rule to tell the leadership what he had already decided.

M: Rather than to consult?

H: I think that is a fair statement.

M: On the Foreign Relations Committee, a number of its members at least, have been critics of Mr. Johnson's foreign policy. Do you think the Foreign Relations Committee as an institution can be effective in that kind of criticism against Administration policy?

H: I'll put that in reverse English. I think the Foreign Relations Committee, when it indulges in divisive and diverse sharp criticism, can be harmful to American foreign policy, because it indicates to any opponent a lack of unity. Or it suggests the propaganda that an opponent can use of lack of unity. So it can be a very effective and can have a very adverse effect on the best interests of the United States.

If we, if the Committee could be quite <u>united</u> in its attitude, it could have a very beneficial effect. But unfortunately it has not been.

M: Do you think the famous televised hearings of 1966 fall into the category of having an adverse effect?

H: Yes, I do. Yes, I think they were harmful.

M: Do you think they influenced President Johnson's policy in any way?

H: No, I don't think they influenced his policy. I think they may have influenced Ho Chi Minh's policy, and the Russians' policy, and the Chinese policy.

M: In what way?

H: Well, by indicating that the United States was much more divided

than it was. I think they prolonged the war.

M: Do you think that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has a role of policy initiation in foreign affairs, such as your Amendment, I believe, to the Foreign Aid Bill of 1962, limiting aid in certain cases where nationalization took place?

H: I think periodically the Foreign Relations Committee has exercised a role. It did following World War II; and as you say, that's one illustration, the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment, which said we shouldn't give American taxpayers' money to countries that expropriate without adequate compensation the property of Americans. Also, another amendment which I thought was important myself, and that's called the Sabbatino Amendment. It was to counter what the Supreme Court did in what they call the Sabbatino Case. (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Receiver, et al.; U.S. Reports, 376 (1963), 398-472). That was the case where Castro had expropriated a shipload of sugar in Havana, had taken it to North Africa, as I recall, and sold it there. The money was remitted to New York, and was placed in the hands of Castro agents in New York. And the real owners of the sugar sued for the recovery of the proceeds on the grounds that Castro had violated International Law and had seized this property without adequate compensation. The Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction of it, or applied what they called the Act of State Doctrine. Said that they would not test the validity of the act of another, of a foreign state within its own territories. Well, I got the Sabbatino Amendment passed, saying that the Supreme Court should look into

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the matter, and that the foreign state had expropriated American property without complying with International Law [and] that the Supreme Court should so hold. And in effect it should have awarded this money to the American claimants.

M: But, generally speaking, you feel that the --

H: Now, those are just two illustrations that I have happened to have something to do with recently. With some frequency, the Foreign Relations Committee or members will originate policy, but in the main, they have an influence, I think, on the State Department and the Presidential office, in discussing potential policy with the Administration, then going forward if it approves and putting this policy forward as Administrative policy.

M: Has the current coolness between Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Senator Fulbright, and the Administration over Vietnam affected the capability of the Committee in performing its role, do you think?

H: I think very definitely yes.

M: Because of that, is it possible that you, as ranking Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee have acted as a link, perhaps, with the Administration, since you have generally supported the Administration policy in the Committee?

H: I've quite generally supported the Administration policy in foreign matters in the Committee, and in some way I have, along with others in the Committee, helped on occasions to swing the balance in favor of what we thought was sound policy for the American government and for the American people. In other matters, we haven't necessarily

prevailed. I mean, it just depends on what the majority of the Committee does.

M: You wouldn't say that perhaps the Administration and State Department have used the Republican leadership in the Foreign Relations Committee since they couldn't use the Democratic leadership?

H: I wouldn't put it that way. I would just say that the State Department and the Administration have used anybody on the Committee to further the program of the Administration. And it hasn't always worked.

M: No.

H: Don't misunderstand me. It hasn't worked all the time. But it's just perfectly natural the Administration will use Republicans or Democrats on the Committee if they can convince them that it's for the best interest that a certain program be put into effect. Now, there may be opposition on the Republican side, there may be opposition on the Democrats' side, and there usually is.

M: This may sound like a difficult question. It is, I suppose, but it's something that future historians will no doubt ask. Who do you feel has made the decisions regarding foreign policy during the Johnson Administration? Has President Johnson been in control, so to speak, of the decision-making process?

H: Yes. Yes.

M: You think definitely?

H: I don't think there's any question about it.

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M: Relying on his advisors and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has been the one who made the decisions?

H: I think he listens to Secretary Rusk and I think he admires Secretary Rusk, as I do. I frankly admire Secretary Rusk greatly. His vast cumulative knowledge of foreign affairs and foreign matters. It doesn't mean, necessarily, that I agree with him all the time. But I think the President--President Johnson has a great respect for Secretary Rusk; I think he has a great respect for General [Earle] Wheeler in the Armed Services; I think he listened to Secretary McNamara with whom I was not always in agreement (laughs) although I wasn't on the Armed Forees Committee. But I think in the main he listens to these advisers, and tries to sift out what he believes to be the sound advice, and then acts on it and decides. I think he issues the orders. I think he runs the show. So when they talk about Rusk's program, it's not Rusk's program, it's Lyndon Johnson's program.

M: How would you characterize what you feel to be Mr. Johnson's views on Vietnam, generally? Has he been an influence for escalation, or for caution, or which direction?

H: I personally feel that he believes that we entered into a program which was initiated actually under President Kennedy when we sent fighting troops in there. That we had entered into a program and committed ourselves to supporting the political independence and integrity of South Vietnam. That he believes in that very thoroughly, and thinks that he has to carry through on it. And it's carried us to some rather violent heights.

M: Do you think he has listened more frequently to those who are sometimes called "hawks" than he has the "doves," or the other way?

H: Well, I don't know that anybody who is not in daily contact with him can give a good assessment of that. I mean, I don't think it would be necessarily a reliable assessment. But I think he has looked at the entire picture and examined all the details and torn away the newspaper chaff and the biased reporting that comes in, biased on both sides I may say, not on one side or the other exclusively, and then makes up his own mind. So I don't know just which side he listens to more. If you want to divide something up into "hawks" and "doves," I suppose one could say that he has listened to or decided in favor of more, rather than less, military action.

M: His program from Europe he describes frequently as building bridges to the East. Do you feel he has pushed strongly for the various parts of that program, such as the Consular Treaty and air travel to Russia and things of this nature?

H: I think he has been groping for some kind of what we might call an Eastern abutment to this bridge, but the foundations have been a little weak over there, and the bridges have collapsed all the time.

M: Do you think the Czechoslovakian invasion will delay for a substantial length of time any moves in this direction?

H: Well, it's created an awful lot of confusion and concern in the minds of a lot of people that would like to see relations bettered all the time. In fact, I think most of us would like to see relations between the East and West bettered. But every time they seem to be getting a little bit better, then the Russians pull the rug out from under civilization.

M: The East-West Trade Bill, so called, has been bottled up in Congress now for some time. Has Mr. Johnson made any direct efforts, to your knowledge, to break that bill free?

H: I think so. I think he's tried to put pressure on Congressional committees and others to act on it.

M: Would the same be true for the Non-Proliferation Treaty now under consideration?

H: Well he made every effort on that in the Committee, and that was voted out day before yesterday.

M: You believe he will continue to make every effort to get that to a vote before he leaves the Presidency?

H: I think he wants to. I think that's one of the trophies he wants to hang up in his trophy room--is this treaty (laughs). Personally I don't see that there's any great rush about it. I don't. I think they can pass on it next year just as well as this year, but the Administration has lobbied that Treaty with as much vigor as anything I've ever seen them lobby, and they're experts and past masters at lobbying.

M: You have cooperated with the Foreign Relations Committee leadership, I believe, in certain of these measures, such as the Consular Treaty. Do you feel that the Johnson record in building bridges has been a positive one up until the current time?

H: I think a claim has been made that it's a positive one, but I don't, I'm not sure that it's so beneficial. I think it probably may be

a little on the plus side, but it's not nearly as much on the plus side as the Administration would like to claim. We got into the Test Ban Treaty which had been proposed under the Eisenhower Administration, but at the last minute over there, our negotiators went to Russia and let the Russians put a clause in there that we couldn't use atomic energy for peaceful purposes by way of explosions if any debris would float over any other country. And that practically blocked what we called the "Plowshare Program." That is the Program of digging harbors, things of that kind.

M: And this was in the Kennedy Administration, was it not?

H: Yes, I guess so. I forget just the years, four or five years ago.

M: '62 or '63.

H: I know I refused to go to Moscow for the signing of that Treaty, because while I was for the Test Ban Treaty that the Eisenhower Administration had proposed and the Joint Committee had proposed, I did call a halt in my own mind to the inclusion of this new element, that we couldn't use it for peaceful purposes, such as, I say, digging harbors or canals, or something of that kind, with atomic explosives.

M: In that regard, some of the leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission during the Eisenhower years, Mr. [Lewis] Strauss and later, Mr. [John] McCone were generally believed to be opposed to agreements with the Soviet Union banning nuclear test. Is that your understanding or your remembering?

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H: No--well--that is a very complicated situation. I don't think they were either of them opposed to proper agreements with safeguards, but we always emphasized the necessity of inspection to keep the Russians from violating their agreements. And, of course, they violated so many of the agreements that we haven't been able to trust them, or shouldn't be. And that was the only stumbling block--was the question of inspection.

M: Do you ever remember Mr. Johnson taking any position on agreements of this kind, either for or against, in those years?

H: No, I don't. I think undoubtedly he did, but I don't recall at the moment.

M: I think he opposed Mr. Strauss for confirmation for Secretary of Commerce.

H: Yes, and that's one of the worst of his many--one of the worst deeds he ever did. There was absolutely no excuse for that. Strauss was a great patriotic American and a highly able man. And for purely personal reasons and political reasons at the last minute, Lyndon Johnson, who was supposed to be a friend of Strauss', went against him on the floor. And it was just enough to tip the votes against Strauss by about 2 votes, as I recall.

M: You don't think that his opposition to Strauss was based on some position Strauss had taken as Atomic Energy--?

H: Oh, no, not at all. No, I think it was purely national politics in the Democratic party.

M: What did you think--

H: He thought he'd--I think he thought that he'd curry some favor with certain people for the Presidential candidacy.

M: In line with that, what did you think when you heard that Lyndon Johnson had accepted the Vice-Presidential nomination?

H: I was surprised.

M: You did not think he would accept such a position?

H: Well, knowing the fact that--knowing that we, most of us thought we knew, that there was a lot of hostility between John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and then to have Lyndon play second fiddle to Jack Kennedy surprised a lot of people.

M: Do you think after the assassination and Mr. Johnson's becoming President that the Kennedy staff which remained with Mr. Johnson was generally loyal to Mr. Johnson, or perhaps not so helpful?

H: I have no way to gauge that. I think there was probably a lot of venomous antagonism on the part of the Kennedy people. Because I think it was ample in--I think this galled them a great deal that if it hadn't been for Lyndon Johnson, Jack Kennedy never would have been elected. That Lyndon Johnson was <u>really</u> responsible for the election of Jack Kennedy by holding certain Southern states. And I think that galled the Kennedy people, and I think it created a lot of friction. Now how deep that went, or how extensive it was in the personnel, I don't know, but it was pretty generally known around her that that was the situation.

M: One area about which we haven't talked at all is Latin America, and I think that's been one of your primary areas of interest.

In regard to that, did you play any role in the events connected with the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965?

H: Yes, I was in the leadership conference in the White House with the President the afternoon the decision was made to send the troops in.

M: Was this one of those times, as you mentioned earlier, when you were called in to be told what was going to be done rather than asked what should be done?

H: I don't [think] there's any question but what the decision to send the troops in had been made a little before that, because while we were there in the White House, the telephone was open most of the time to the Dominican Republic with Tapley Bennett, the Ambassador, on the other end of the wire and that's when he told the President that they were then shooting through the Embassy at that time, and the people were hiding behind walls on the polo grounds, and that evidently the Commies had succeeded in taking control of the mob and were running the show.

M: Did the President at that time mention the danger of a Communist infiltration of the rebel--?

H: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

M: This was common knowledge?

H: It was common, yes, common.

M: Do you recall that any of the advisers there opposed the decision to intervene strongly?

H: Yes, I think so. I don't want to mention them, because I'm not absolutely clear in my own mind at the moment. I think there were two that did. Two members of the Senate who were also members of the Foreign Relations Committee. They thought they ought to let them settle their own affairs. Well, almost everybody else thought that the Dominican Republic would go Communist in another four or five days, and would kill a lot of Americans and other foreigners there.

M: You shared that latter feeling?

H: I shared that, yes, myself.

M: In regard to the rest of Latin America, has Mr. Johnson changed--I believe you were at Punto del Este in the early part of the Kennedy Administration, were you not?

H: Yes.

M: Do you believe that Mr. Johnson has actually changed the Kennedy concept of the Alliance for Progress?

H: I don't think so. He has supported the Alliance for Progress. I think any slowing down of the Alliance for Progress program has been largely the fault of the Latin Americans themselves. These countries, they have been very dilatory in assuming and accepting the responsibility that was supposed to be theirs in connection with their own surveys and industrial operations and political responsibilities, and so on.

M: But Mr. Johnson has maintained a consistent interest in these programs?

H: He has maintained an interest in the programs and I think he's supported them.

M: Why do you think that?

H: Of course that program was started by--again started by Eisenhower in 1960 in Bogota. And in the Inter-American Bank Program. I happened to be at Bogota when we started that. Then the next January or February, it branched into the so-called Alliance for Progress, which was a vastly increased dollar-program.

M: In regard to the Latin American problem, Mr. Johnson had some prior interest before becoming President and do you think he has continued to make Latin America a primary area of concern as opposed to other areas of the world?

H: Well, I think his Latin American interest was largely Mexico.

M: You mean before he was President?

H: Yes. And I'm not aware that he was acutely interested in other countries of Latin America. Aware of them, yes, conscious of them, but before he became President, his chief interest was becoming President and in the internal politics of the United States.

M: Do you think domestic politics have affected his conduct of foreign policy greatly?

H: Yes, I think so. I think his determination to spend vast amounts of money in this country among the people who cast the greatest number of votes has diminished his real attention and purpose in connection with the knitting together of international affairs.

M: Do you think that he has made decisions in foreign policy in some

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cases based on the effect they might have in domestic politics?

H: Oh, I think so, yes.

M: Could you give an instance of that?

H: Yes, I think he's made decisions in connection with South Africa which I think are not wise.

M: In cooperating with the United Nations trade restrictions?

H: Well, yes, in those sort of things. Rather, I don't agree with the apartheid, the so-called South African social and political scheme of division which they have down there between the Blacks and the Whites and the Coloureds and the Indians. I don't necessarily agree with that--that is, I don't approve it. But I think there are other ways and if we would cooperate with them a little bit, they would gradually work themselves into a very satisfactory situation and solve their problems. But I think to appease certain interests in this country, certain groups, that the Administration has gone the wrong way on that.

Same way with Rhodesia.

M: Why do you think that President Johnson lost the so-called consensus that he apparently had in his first year or two of the Presidency, which ultimately resulted in his decision to withdraw?

H: I think those who oppose the war in Vietnam and want to pull out of Vietnam, which would mean abject surrender in my book if we pulled out under present circumstances, I think those who advocate that have made a great deal of a point on that and have convinced a lot of people that Lyndon Johnson is a murderer. By that I mean

that he's murdering American boys in Vietnam by not just pulling out of Vietnam. I think that's an unjust criticism or attitude, because I think he feels very deeply the losses in Vietnam. I think he has got that responsibility on his shoulders and on his mind a great deal. But I think that has contributed more than any other one thing to the lessening of approval of him and for the criticism that goes around.

M: Were you surprised when he announced on March 31 that he would not seek another term?

H: Yes, I was, frankly. I was very surprised.

M: You believed that he would stick it out and try again to--?

H: Oh, I thought he'd--no, I thought he'd be a candidate again. Yes.

M: You've served in the Senate now through all of four Presidential terms and part of another one, five Presidencies, Would you care to play the game of President-ranking?

H: (long pause). Oh, I don't think I would. They're all so different.

M: How would you estimate Mr. Johnson as President, generally?

H: Well, I think he's--he has a great knowledge of the legislative process. Through his experience. He knows a lot about how to handle legislative attitude. Much more than any other President. But he has a certain amount of, well, some call it abrasiveness, or dogmatic direction to members of Congress and others as to what they should do, and so on, and that creates a certain amount of resentment in an independent body such as the Congress. I think he's very able; he has a lot of capabilities, but sometimes he's lacking, I think, in a little finesse. (laugh). As most, as most

Presidents are on occasion.

M: Do you think perhaps our successors, the ones who make use of the material that we are gathering in this Project on which I'm working, will perhaps judge him more kindly than his own generation or his own contemporaries?

H: Oh, I think when history is written, it'll show that under his Administration some remarkable steps have been taken toward social rearrangement in this country, as well as economic bankruptcy, and if we don't do something pretty soon, we're going to have economic trouble in this country. Very great trouble. Because we're heading for something right fast. But he also has taken a lot of people under the dependency wing of government, and he's offering them more and more keep without working, and things of that kind, and that appeals at election time.

M: You would think his greatest weaknesses as President then are in the realm of fiscal policy?

H: Well, I don't know about weaknesses. Because it may be strength at the polls, from a political standpoint.

M: I see.

H: But I do feel that he is one of those people who seem to say, "Well, I don't care too much what happens to the future economy of this country as long as the borrowed money keeps flowing in and we can spend it for bread and circuses."

M: You're on the Banking and Currency Committee?

H: Yes.

M: Has Mr. Johnson presented a program in regard to our balance of payment problem, in your view, which is a sound one?

H: Well, it's so confused that I don't know what the program is. If there is--there are programs presented but on this proposal to increase the surtax by ten percent and to cut down six billion dollars in expenditures; they wanted the increased taxes, but they fought like everything against the mandatory cutdown of six billion dollars in spending. They didn't want to stop spending. So what consistent or understandable fiscal policy is involved, I'm still a little bit hazy about. I don't know for sure.

M: Is there anything regarding the Johnson Administration, before we have to break off here, that you would like to get a chance to say? [interrupted by telephone] Or any recollections that you have that you'd like to add to what we've already--?

H: While I disagree from a political standpoint with many things that this Administration has done, I disagreed with many things that President Kennedy did or failed to do [interrupted by telephone].

As I said a minute ago, while I disagree on occasions with President Johnson, and as I disagreed on occasions with President Kennedy, I have a respect for President Johnson and his ability to get things done. He can get a lot of things done. Many of the things he has had done I don't agree with and wish he hadn't done, but he can get 'em done. And I have respect for him from that standpoint. I don't disrespect a man simply because we

disagree. If it's an honest disagreement.

M: You've been very kind in giving me your time, and I thank you very much for participating in the program.

H: Right. You're very welcome.

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
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Gift of Personal Statement

By Bourke B. Hickenlooper

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

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Signed Bourke B Hickenlooper

Date Nov 14 1969

Accepted Harry J Middleton - for
Archivist of the United States

Date March 12, 1975