

INTERVIEW I

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G: Well, let's start with your own involvement in the War on Poverty Task Force, describing at first where you were in HEW at the time and how you were drawn into the task force.

H: Well, I was associate general counsel of HEW, working only in part on matters related to what eventually came about in the Economic Opportunity Act. I think I got into the task force through Frank Mankiewicz. Frank, I believe, happened by chance to be in town from Peru and got drawn into discussions about this developing project. I may have gotten a phone call from him, or maybe somebody in HEW got a phone call from somebody, asking if I could be detailed to whatever was going on. So that's how I got into it. Frank and I knew each other from Los Angeles days for years. Where did we go? I guess it must have been to the Peace Corps [Building], and an ever-expanding group of people began to turn up. But that's how I got into it, yes.

G: Did you go to a formal meeting at first or was it simply--?

H: I really don't remember. I don't. I was excited, that's all I remember.

*** See Personal Papers of Harold W. Horowitz for correspondence and memoranda regarding the development of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

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G: Now I know there was a meeting, or I'm told there was a meeting at [Sargent] Shriver's house one weekend. Do you recall that at all? Did you happen to be there?

H: I noticed that in your materials. I was at one meeting at a Kennedy house, but I can't remember if it was Shriver's or Ted Kennedy's. Now that you mention it, it undoubtedly was Shriver's. It may have been that meeting and I guess I remember Ted Kennedy coming by. I think I probably was, but I'm not going to remember anything from that meeting unless you have some stimuli that might jog that.

G: Early on, right after Shriver was appointed, did the meetings tend to consist of people at the secretary, under secretary level, assistant secretaries, and then involve a lower level of people, people who were actually the technicians, the draftsmen, the planners rather than the cabinet, subcabinet level?

H: I cannot answer that from first-hand experience. Within the task force group, I guess we were just meeting constantly on one thing or another, but with slight exception, there were not people higher than assistant secretaries in that. Now [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan was there and--I don't remember what Jim Sundquist's title was, but those were the people in this constant discourse that was going on. And I guess we just all assumed that there were meetings at the cabinet level or the immediate subcabinet level that were going on, and I guess Adam Yarmolinsky must have been the link to that. Then he would come back--I assume that's the way it worked--with projects or whatever.

G: Was there any sort of protocol that you followed? Was rank recognized?

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H: No. No, that was one of the glorious things about it, it was just a bringing together of a lot of highly charged people with a marvelous mission.

G: Let me ask you to describe a typical day in the War on Poverty Task Force? You would go to, say, the Peace Corps Building in the morning?

H: Well, no. My typical day was to do my day's work at HEW. I don't know if all people were doing that, but my work on the task force was at night. It threw our car-pooling arrangements just utterly out of whack completely. I really had a logistical problem because I could no longer come and go--we lived out in Maryland--with the people I regularly rode with in HEW. So I don't remember what I was doing. I guess I was riding buses or something. No, I'd leave HEW at the end of the day with everybody else and hop on a bus and go over to the Peace Corps and start the second shift.

So when you'd finally get to the Peace Corps--well, what did happen? I can remember, for example, presentations. Experts would come in. There's a photograph in Shriver's book of the task force meeting, and in the background there were graphs and what have you. So what happened is somebody came in to give a presentation on unemployment or whatever it might have been, and people would ask questions. The thing I cannot recall is how it ever finally began to take shape. I think probably it began to take shape because the Labor Department bill and the HEW bill gave some structure to what people were up to.

G: Those were really the two cores of the--

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H: I think that's probably right. I mean Adam would be the person really to comment about that. But there were some true wild brainstorming sessions. Just what kinds of programs could be dreamed up.

G: Did Yarmolinsky generally head these sessions?

H: Yes. Yes. He would give assignments, to get papers written or what have you, and that was done to some extent on the basis of agency expertise. I remember, for example, I got an assignment to outline HEW programs that could somehow be built into an expanded manpower training program. I got in touch with one of the lawyers in the HEW legislative division, where Sid Saperstein and Ted Ellenbogen were, one of the young lawyers, and asked him to develop that catalog and got that material from him and turned it into a memo. And just people from all over the place were doing that sort of thing and just building files. That's the type of file I do not have, all of those internal documents before there was anything in draft.

The one other thing I remember about that time would be we'd be in a meeting with Adam, and he'd say, "Okay, I want that paper and we'll discuss that one at midnight." That was the way the thing was running, yes.

G: Had you thought much about poverty before the task force?

H: No. Certainly not as a student. I mean, just to the extent that I became aware of it in my career at HEW. I was an academician. I was teaching at the University of Southern California and, really, aside from a generalized liberal interest in the programs of the New Deal and the New Frontier, I had not thought about the question, no.

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I got steeped in it when I went to HEW in 1961 because the lawyers were working with the innards of the various substantive programs, and I fell, among other things, at that time under Wilbur Cohen's spell, and I began to see the world the way Wilbur does. (Laughter)

No, I mean throughout this whole affair I was not a theorist. There were a lot of us like that. Jim Adler was not a theorist, I mean, people who could try to ask questions, try to synthesize.

G: Would you divide the task force into people like you and the theorists?

H: Yes, I think I would. I don't know, I'm not sure now who I would put in which category. I think Pat Moynihan was a theorist by whatever I mean by that term. [Sanford] Kravitz would be a supreme example of that. I'd put Jim, people like that, on the other side, hard workers, good minds, and just opening, continuing to peel the layers off the onion or whatever the simile ought to be, to just see to it there was a lot of information, a lot of ideas floating around.

G: How often did Shriver meet with the task force group?

H: I can't really be precise about that. It was often, but certainly not--I really don't know if the task--whatever the task force was, its membership from day to day was surely changing. So I don't know how often it ever met as a group. Maybe every time Shriver met with it it then met as a group. That's probably a safe generalization. But I really don't, I can't remember.

G: Who else from HEW was there working with the task force?

H: As I look back on it, that's one of the oddities. I think I was the only one, and that was really strange, because I was not a program

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person. As you saw from that material, when we got off into HEW-related matters, I ran right back over to HEW to talk about what the group was coming up with. I never did feel--I never did know at that time if I was being a traitor or what in seeking HEW's views on some of these questions in light of what was beginning to take shape. I just concluded it would be nonsense for me to purport to be the expert about how some special new OEO program would fit in with whatever HEW was doing twenty times as much in in the same field or something, you know.

G: I seem to get two different views here, that some task force members saw themselves as representatives of their agencies, and others saw themselves as just kibitzers more or less, who were there to contribute whatever ideas they had and that was it.

H: Well, I don't know. I wonder who the people were who thought themselves representatives of their agency. I never thought that.

G: Really?

H: No. I mean, I thought I had been detailed for this task, but I did not feel that that meant I could not communicate with HEW. I can't remember, but I'm sure I must have asked somebody at some point, "Is it all right if I show this draft to the people at HEW?" I hope the answer, if I asked that question, was "of course." This should be done well, and. . . .

G: Was there any general tendency to keep the program as it was developing under wraps until you had something reasonably firm and final?

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H: I think there was. I think there was. Because I remember the press was nibbling away at it all the time. Even when the bill was finally sent up, there was great care I believe taken to have that be done in some orderly way. What would have been the reasons for that? I don't know. Concern that other agencies would begin to snipe at it? Maybe that's what people had in mind. Or maybe just the notion that it would be a good idea to try to develop this without having a whole lot of external pressure. Probably both of those.

G: In terms of the point I raised a minute ago, [concerning] the task force members representing agencies, cabinet departments. There seems to have developed a friction between Moynihan and [Willard] Wirtz during this period. Was this because Wirtz felt that Moynihan was not sufficiently considered a Labor Department interest [?].

H: I am unable to respond to that. I just do not know.

Can I ask you a question, as we're moving along here with the organization of the task force? Do you have information now in all of this about how Mike Harrington and Paul Jacobs came to be involved in the project?

G: I was just going to ask you about some of the experts who came into this.

H: Oh, I see, because that's interesting stuff I think.

G: Well, Harrington had already written actively on the subject.

H: Yes. Oh, his book [The Other America], everybody had to read that. It's part of all this. But I was just wondering what the link was

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finally to bring him in. Maybe that was Frank Mankiewicz's doing, it could quite well be. And Paul Jacobs certainly I guess than Frank.

I remember one night when Paul had to fill out--what was it called--the government Form 57, the standard employment application form, the thing you fill out when you become an employee. I was standing right next to him, and he was asked to list three people--no, first he got to the question, "Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" and he wrote yes. He said, "I love to do this for government agencies, because so many people in government agencies have told me it makes their time worthwhile. They sit and they never get interesting answers to questions. Now somebody's going to have to look into this, because I answered yes." Then he got to the section where they were asked for references. [He wrote] "Honorable Robert Kennedy" and two others of similar stature. And he smiled and he said, "They're going to have fun with this one."

But Paul and Mike were the--what can you say about them? They were the yeast of that group. You know, when you have a brainstorming session, from them would come the really wild, wild notions, I mean things other people just wouldn't think of.

G: Did these notions have to do with community participation and things like that?

H: I can't remember it that specifically. I believe it was a good deal broader. I guess Mike Harrington must have had views on the whole notion of community participation. I can't remember. But Paul was different, he had a quirky view of everything, so it didn't matter

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what in the world he was talking about. I remember a big debate that he and Mike and others got into--what could it have been? Something about people getting into the Youth Opportunity Corps if they had criminal records. Whatever it was--but in any event--

G: There were some prohibitions there.

H: Yes, it must have been about that. I remember one of them made a statement which everybody found very surprising, but it was "you don't want those types in this program. They'll be carrying guns and everything."

G: Well, there was also the question I understand of whether you would get those people in the Job Corps that had a reasonable chance to be helped as opposed to those that were pretty much lost causes.

H: Yes. That was a major theoretical issue.

G: As someone expressed it, the cream of the crap.

(Laughter)

H: Yes, that was at a time when I learned something from Paul. I can't remember the context, but he was talking then about a black kid who once said to him that he wanted to be--I don't know--an astronaut or a brain surgeon, and Paul interpreted what that kid was really saying to him, and it was all in the context of who ought to be recruited into the Job Corps.

G: Was Saul Alinsky at all brought into the discussions? Or did you read Alinsky's work on the--?

H: Saul Alinsky's thinking was abroad, I know that, but I can't be more specific than that. I get a little mixed up here, because he was

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involved with the McCone Commission. Whatever memory I might have had of him in this has somehow been wiped away by the fact that those other documents happen to be in the same carton, and I was reading through them. But I can't remember. It might have come from somebody like Mike Harrington, I suppose. Alinsky, what was the name of his project in Chicago? [Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council] It was a community participation project. What I'm recalling must have occurred during this time with the task force.

G: Now, the task force had to move around to certain locations, didn't it? You really didn't have office space of your own.

H: No.

G: Do you recall the different offices that you had?

H: Oh, I do, yes. For a while we were in the Peace Corps [Building], that was really crowded. I think Douglas Kiker, who wrote that article, I remember one time when he was up there, and I remember my wife was up at the office. To the extent this was not being done in a public fishbowl, everybody then had a great laugh afterward because he was at a typewriter with other people around. He was just mixed in that whole frenetic group. There just wasn't room. Then we moved to the Court of Claims [Building], and that was glorious. God, that was marvelous. Do you know that building? I haven't seen it since it's been refurbished.

G: Now isn't that the one that you had to move out of because it was about to collapse?

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H: Yes. Yes. Well, it was terrible. Then we learned that it had been condemned or something. That was a great building, huge offices with giant ceilings. I don't remember how long we were there. Then we moved down--or at least the part I was with--we moved down the street, whatever the street is that the Court of Claims is on, down south a couple of blocks in some building, whatever it was, and just had our offices.

G: By then were you working during the daytime on this, or were these still evening--?

H: I guess I must have been, yes. I hadn't thought of that. I guess at some point my own personal schedule changed and I started going to HEW afterward. Because I still had a lot of stuff just to keep flowing at HEW.

G: Now, you and Murray Schwartz presented this one paper, presumably a number of others. Can you recall how that would be hashed out? Would it be like a seminar? Would other people critique your work or would you exchange ideas?

H: I do not recall. I just don't know.

G: Okay. Did you have any evidence of White House involvement in the planning of the legislation?

H: I did not, no. My guess is that Adam was that link and channeling us in whatever direction we should go.

G: Was the President in a hurry to get the legislation and to get the message?

H: Again, I have no information--

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G: You didn't feel any sense of pressure to--?

H: Oh, there was a sense of pressure, but I don't know what the source of it was. Yes, I think that very early on there was a date stated on when they wanted to have the bill be offered.

G: I think it was something like February or March [1964] or so.

H: Yes, but where that date came from I don't know.

G: Do you think the people who sat on the task force felt that the existing agencies and departments were not doing enough for the poor, were not really focusing their efforts on the impoverished?

H: I have to be careful in generalizing about that. My own view was that I was committed to HEW. It was a very important part of my life. I certainly did not feel that HEW was failing in its mission, but I got caught up also in the prospect of a new program that somehow was going to make changes that other programs had not managed to change. But I'm sure there were people who were less co-opted than I had become in my little brief time in Washington and who felt you really had to shake up the entire executive establishment.

G: Did you sense this within the task force?

H: Yes, sure. Sure.

G: On the other hand, did you feel a tendency on the part of some of the people with agencies, that they needed to secure their own turf, that this new organization was really encroaching on the--?

H: I think that feeling was part of the earlier feeling. You can take a look at any large bureaucracy and just automatically conclude that it's not doing its job well and it's going to be very jealous if other

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people begin to poke around into the same area that it covers. I think they're part of the same thing, and certainly people were of that view. As I say, I was perhaps too naive to have that view. I don't know.

G: Did [Anthony] Celebrezze want to run the poverty program?

H: I don't know about Celebrezze; certainly there were people in HEW who felt that that was the logical place for it to be located. I assume Wilbur must have felt that way.

G: Did you attend meetings at which one or the other would argue?

H: No. No. The only place I find hints of that now is in these documents. There was that statement in the Labor Department response, and you might find that, at least in part, in the HEW response.

Maybe I could try a generalization about what people I knew in HEW were saying. It would be better not to create this new agency and give it operational functions and give it this bizarre coordination function, but place it in some established entity such as HEW. But we understand there are political reasons for what is being done, and there's no point battling that. So let's get on about it. I think that was the point of view.

G: How about the Justice Department? Did you see any evidence of Robert Kennedy's involvement or advocacy of any of the particular components?

H: Just juvenile delinquency, I mean through the juvenile delinquency people who were there. But again, I have no personal information.

G: He didn't necessarily come to the meetings?

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H: Not that I recall. If there was anything from him, certainly the place it finally would have gotten in would be through Norbert [Schlei] and the drafting team.

G: Let me ask you to recall that large meeting that you described earlier, March 3, with [Robert] Weaver, Wirtz, Shriver.

H: The only thing I can recall is my amazement at finding myself there.

G: Where was it held?

H: Well, I don't remember. That note we had suggested it was in the Peace Corps. But it was a large room and a very large table, and it was just sprinkled with cabinet officers. I really couldn't get over that. I sat next to Wilbur, I remember that, but no, I can't remember any of the details.

G: Was there a lot of give and take, do you recall?

H: As I recall, there was a lot of frank talk about why this may be a bad idea, et cetera. I don't remember who would have presided. It must have been Shriver, I suppose, who would have presided at the thing. I'm sorry. It would be nice to have a tape of that meeting, wouldn't it? Does Wilbur have any recollection of that?

G: I haven't talked to him about this yet.

H: I see. Yes. Yes. I bet he will. But according to these materials, we must have distributed a draft of the bill at that meeting I guess. So that would have given an agenda.

G: Do you think that various components of the program were evaluated in terms of their appeal to Congress?

H: Sure.

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- G: Do you recall any that were discarded because they were not politically [feasible]?
- H: I don't remember discarding any. I can remember the effort to build in something rural. And indeed--I can't remember now--there may be something in here, something from the Department of Agriculture to begin with about the need for that. But at one point I remember we were all roaring with laughter. I mean, this is a little drafting group trying to come up with a title that would indicate that we were interested both in urban and rural matters, and that's the way it ended up. Of course the point was, well, if you're covering everything, then what's the need to say both urban and rural are being included in this. But it was thought indispensable to get the rural notion right out front there.
- G: There was a land reform provision that was ultimately deleted from the final act.
- H: Was that in the bill as originally written?
- G: Yes, it was. It was.
- H: I don't remember that.
- G: I don't know if it made it all the way to the Hill or not, but I know it was proposed.
- H: There were loan programs, but what do you mean by land reform? Do you have any more detail of it?
- G: Well, it was essentially a provision for grants that would enable the purchase of large farms to be divided up and--
- H: Oh, yes! Well, I won't look for it now, but, yes--

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G: You know, fifteen hundred dollar loans or something to--

H: Yes, that's where the teeny-tiny loan program was, yes. I don't remember that, but that's intriguing. I wish I could think of some marvelous background of that and where it came from.

G: Now, of course another consideration was whether or not to have just a massive jobs program.

H: Yes.

G: This is something that Moynihan says that he favored that was discarded because of monetary considerations. Do you remember that at all?

H: No. No, I can't comment on that. We ended up with some--I mean, there was something called community work training I think in Title I, but apparently from what you say at a good deal lower level than Moynihan wanted.

G: Now, let me ask you about the task force and its consideration of community action. Did the task force look at some of the community action type programs that had been established, HARYOU-Act, the President's [Committee on Juvenile Delinquency]?

H: Yes. Yes, let's see, who would be some of the--a name that I don't recall seeing in any of your lists was David Hackett. Or maybe it's in your list. He was head, I think, of the juvenile delinquency program and it may be he who brought in the people. But I remember it was [Paul] Ylvisaker--who would have been some of the other names? That was the Gray Areas? There was a Ford Foundation project at the time, maybe that was HARYOU. I can't recall. But there may have been

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people from all such programs who were there participating in discussions. Kravitz. I don't know where membership in the task force ends and outside expert begins. But I can recall just sitting around, being part of a group sitting around a table with someone who would describe how all that was supposed to work, community participation, whatever that meant.

G: Was community action actually designed to work under local government or within the framework of local government, or rather to bypass it?

H: Well, that was truly a lovely theoretical question. I think if you go back to that original HEW bill of February 2, you'll find it structured I believe the way all HEW legislation was structured, and [it] would be working within established governmental lines of one sort or another. But then the argument was that what needs to be done here is break free of all of that, get the federal government into direct linkage with smaller not-now-existing enterprises within cities, because the typical federal-state-local chain of command was stifling. And there were just questions raised then. Can you really seriously propose that for Chicago? That kind of thing. Yes, there were doctrinal discussions of that sort. And all that business had ended up in Title II about having community action organizations. I guess they were direct recipients of grants. That was deliberate. It may have been a bad idea, but it was surely deliberate.

G: What was your own attitude on the--?

H: Well, you know, again, I was not a deep thinker about this subject. I was carried away with the notion that we're going to break free of

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this old traditional way of doing things. Just because it was new, or new to me, it was terribly attractive. I remember debates about whether you bypassed the governor's office, and that got all mixed up. I don't remember how it finally ended up, but I guess the governor finally had to approve grants or something like that. But it was the same thing, which was we don't want to get entangled in state politics or local politics. I found that very attractive, although if I'd sat back to reflect on it, maybe then I would have wondered if it was just a little bit too much of a reaction. I think people in HEW were rather astonished with that.

G: Really? Can you recall any specifics here?

H: No, no. Just people noting the fact that this was a new kind of relationship with the federal government to local entities with regard to the administration of federally-funded programs.

G: How much of this was designed to deal with the problems of segregation in the South and the possibility that in the southern one-party, white-dominated system, you might have to bypass it in order to get to the poor, the blacks?

H: That's a very good question, and I really don't remember that as a special element, although as you mention it it just had to be there, just had to be. What I recall was of a more generalized sort, which was it is simply self-evident that going through the state and local hierarchy is not going to create a froth of ideas and expansive approaches to things and drawing people in who have never been drawn in before. That's the old way of doing it. And that argument has

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perfect applicability then if you're worried about southern politics.

But I can't remember anybody saying this is a way to slice through.

G: On the other hand, you had a situation in Chicago where, as Mayor [Richard] Daley testified, the program would work his way there. Did the people who worked on community action feel that the local power structure would take over the program essentially?

H: I certainly had no view of that, and I really can't generalize, but I'm sure the people who were program people and worrying about this were interested in devising some kind of a mechanism here so that that would not happen. Because that was their agenda.

G: But when Mayor Daley was testifying, even before the legislation was enacted, he said this is the way it's going to work in Chicago.

H: Well, I guess there are some realities that. . . .

G: Did you foresee the conflict that surfaced with community action?

H: Did I personally? No. Did other people foresee what it would generate? I wouldn't be a bit surprised if Sandy Kravitz would have. If that statement of his that I've mentioned before was really a statement of his views, this was a pretty radical notion for its time.

G: In your case, though, it was not that you favored a different concept. You favored community action as it evolved, you simply didn't anticipate the degree of confrontation?

H: I think that's correct. You know, I don't know when community action first got in. It was in that original HEW bill and it was probably there then from the very beginning, in nascent form if not otherwise. Being brought into that task force and given the heady experience that

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was for me, I was just delighted to be a part of trying to bring it into being I think, and I probably didn't stop to think about is this really a good idea. But, no. I would phrase that slightly differently. I thought it was a good idea, but I didn't go to the next stage to ask myself is it really a good idea. I surely thought it was.

G: If you were designing community action at this point, how would you do it differently?

H: Well, I'm not enough of a student of this. I still think that was a good notion. Maybe you need this sort of thing. After all, there wasn't that much money involved. Maybe you need this sort of thing just to keep the regular establishment honest, I don't know. The result was, in Los Angeles--we left Washington in 1964. We left in the summer--no, the bill had not even passed I guess when we left. But we came back to Los Angeles and began to see community action concepts developing here, and that was a good thing. There were suddenly people getting involved in programs that just didn't exist before.

In the area of social programs, I suppose I have a very naive view of it, but the more the better as far as I'm concerned, and that's what we had. I wonder if there would have been such a thing as a legal services program had [there not been] that notion of the community action program, just thinking about new forms of governmental programs. If you didn't have that, would the legal services program ever have emerged from all of that? I don't know. I don't

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know. There was legal aid before, voluntary charity, relatively benign in what it did. And then there were legal services programs which OEO funded, and it was a different view of what the role of that type of a program could be. I have no hesitation in saying I think that was a--well, I don't want to get carried away, but that was a magnificent development in social programs in the United States I think to have something--and it never would have happened, I would imagine, if you didn't have all of that buzzing around that the notion of community action programs created.

G: Did the task force members envision community action as a way for local communities to develop their own programs?

H: Oh, communities may be local people, you know. Yes. Now I'm sounding like Sandy.

G: Others have cited the development of community leaders, of new indigenous leaders as being one of the advantages of community action.

G: Well, that's a really long-range look. I don't know that I could claim to have ever seen that in what we were all talking about. Yes. I wonder if in fact that has happened.

In Los Angeles the local community action agency finally fell on hard times. Maybe that's just inevitable with charges of corruption and what have you. But it was a well-known, free-swinging constructive agency here in what was called Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency, EYOA. A man named Joe Maldonado [?] ran it. I thought that was a fine addition to the arsenal in the city of Los Angeles.

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- G: Did the task force think that the poor themselves ought to plan and run the programs?
- H: Well, that's the way it read, and I guess the answer is yes if you're talking about being part of the enterprise that would run the programs. Maybe some people had an even grander vista in mind, which was that somehow you'd get the professionals out of it completely. I don't know. I can't remember that, but that's quite possible. I mean, that might be the ultimate. That may be part of Alinsky's ultimate thinking.
- G: Another idea that comes up in the task force discussions seems to be a three element decision-making group that would consist of community people, of local governmental representatives, and social services, things like that. Did you see this as a formula at all?
- H: No, that's more specific than any of my thinking ever went. I was learning. I was not a teacher in that, I was learning about what the concept of community action was.
- G: To what extent was the Peace Corps experience responsible for community action? There had been a good deal of community organization [in the Peace Corps].
- H: I'm unable to respond to that. I mean, I would speculate that that must be one element that made this all appeal to Shriver, Frank, people like that.
- G: Now, let me ask you to describe the drafting committee on the one hand versus the community action people on the other. Was the drafting committee a group that worked on all parts of the legislation in

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addition to community action or all other parts, or was it simply a group that worked on the community action proposal?

H: No, it was the entire bill. I guess at some point there must have been a basic document just plotting out what was going to be in the bill. That was what these bull sessions were about all the time, should this program be in or not, and somebody else would dream up a new program and argue it ought to be included, et cetera. And that began to take shape. Then [there was] discussion about, well, which one should come first in the bill, et cetera. At some point that got organized enough that the time came to start to attempt a draft. Norbert was then asked to take on the responsibility to draft it. I don't know how long I was around the group before that drafting group was put together. It would just be a wild guess how long it was.

But when we went to work it was with a basic framework of the statute before us, and as I mentioned before, each of us in the drafting group was assigned a chunk of the bill to come up with the first draft. I had been sitting in on all of these discussions of community action and what have you and came from HEW, which of all government agencies I guess was most closely involved with the sorts of things that community action programs would include. I can't remember, but I must just naturally have inherited Title II then as the chunk I would do. I don't remember who did the other pieces of it. But then there was a meeting finally of the drafting group when the pieces were there, and then Norbert just set us to work and we started on page one and said, "Okay, here's the preamble." We'd just

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talk it through word by word and make changes in whatever the first draft of the preamble was. So that was the way that the drafting group worked.

G: You have done an essay or paper on the evolution of the Community Action [Program]. But let me just ask you for the record here, the phrase maximum feasible participation, what did you mean by that?

H: Just what it sounds like. It's a marvelous question, where did those words finally come from? My records can demonstrate chronologically when those words appeared. We can narrow it down to sometime in a period of a few days. Who was the actual author of them? I don't know. I think I was, but there's no way I can demonstrate that. What was meant by it? As I say, I think precisely what those words say. The notion was to the maximum feasible extent that you would have whatever is meant by participation of the people involved in whatever a community action program was.

G: But I mean, did you see in terms of a percentage, say 30 per cent or 60 per cent?

H: No. That's the glorious thing about statutory drafting or writing contracts or things like that, you can fall back on words like maximum and reasonable and feasible and what have you and fend off questions about what that means specifically. What it would mean if you were trying to administer it, I think, would be that there's got to be some demonstration that you made all good faith efforts to have participation of the people involved in the programs, and that going farther than that just wouldn't make much sense. You considered other ways of

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doing it and rejected them because somehow that would not advance effectuation of the program. It could have an operational meaning in a grant application, for example, I think. Now that I think of it, that's a nice question. It would be interesting to look at grant applications and see how the agency viewed what people were saying with regard to compliance with that provision. What did that actually come to mean in an operational sense? By golly, there's a dissertation in that I think.

When we got back to Los Angeles, both my wife and I were closest to legal services programs, and we saw this working there. What that broke itself down to was to have people on the board who were potential clients of the program. Whether that was full-scale compliance with the concept, I don't know. But I'm sure that's the general form that it took all over the place, as you'd make up a board of directors. Then you'd have the pros in to run the program with that quasi-lay board watching. I don't know whether OEO ever issued any regulations to try to define that more specifically.

G: I think ultimately there was a formula that--

H: Is that right? Well, that's interesting, yes.

G: Let me ask you, did you have any feeling for what the White House attitude toward community action was during this period?

H: I did not, no.

G: Do you think that Lyndon Johnson favored the idea?

H: I have no way of knowing. I would find some significance in the fact that it was in that HEW bill. That certainly did not spring fullblown

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from anywhere. I imagine the Budget Bureau must have asked that that bill be drafted and must have included that concept.

G: What did the task force members think of LBJ?

H: That's a good question. I don't know that I could generalize for you. Surely I cannot recall conversations of that sort now. I mean, I can talk about my own individual view from my perspective. I guess having been caught up in this, I thought the New Deal was here again and I was very pleased.

G: Johnson was known to feel on occasion that OEO was full of Robert Kennedy partisans who really didn't like him, LBJ. Do you think there's any validity to that?

H: I [have] no information. We left, of course, before the bill was drafted. I never did see OEO become an operating agency, and so who the forces were there and to whom they were loyal, et cetera, I just don't know.

G: You didn't sense any of this in the community action group, however, is that correct?

H: No. Now that I think back on it, I'll bet it was there, but I just wasn't astute enough to detect it.

G: Do you recall arguments within the community action discussions about one type of program or another? Did Moynihan and Dick Boone argue or [David] Hackett and Sandy Kravitz and Fred Hayes? Was there much give and take?

H: Yes. Oh, yes. I can't remember specifics, but the answer is yes.

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That was a highly charged--I want to say intellectual atmosphere, that perhaps refines it too much. It was an idea-filled experience, yes.

G: But did the question of conflict and the role of the poor in running the programs or--?

H: Oh, I don't remember that ever being an issue.

G: What sorts of things would they argue about?

H: Well, let me see if I can recall. Unfortunately I can't remember specifics, but I do remember there were discussions about whether a particular kind of program ought to be in or out, with strong argument about that. Really what they would have been though, I can't remember. No, I can't.

G: Moynihan in his book, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, asserts that after the legislation was submitted, the original task force members returned to various departments and the most forceful community action advocates presided over a radicalizing of the community action structure. What do you think of that?

H: Well, there's one question. What would and what would not be a radical view of community action? But assuming you came to terms with that, I don't know that I would agree with that description exactly. People returned to their agencies, but I don't know that if they had not returned to their agencies, anything would have been different. I mean there was a concept, and that concept took hold. It was written as faithfully as possible into the bill as we could do it. So I don't know that it took later concerted effort on a narrow little band of

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people then somehow to turn it into something that it wasn't designed to be in the future.

G: You drafted the community action provisions, therefore you saw the way it was when it was submitted to Congress, and since you're one of the people that he alludes to as having presided over the radicalization--

H: Yes. Well, I don't know what to make of that, because we left before anybody turned it into an agency. I have to be very careful here. I cannot testify to what actually went on in OEO when the group that started to run Title II--was Jack Conway the first director of Community Action?

G: Yes.

H: Yes, what happened when that occurred. I have no information. But my comment would be that I don't know that anything that happened thereafter was contrary to the original conception. Yes. I have a feeling I'm making lots of really naive remarks here, and that may be one as well. I mean, there may have been things going on that make that statement look foolish.

G: Well, your documents surely seem to support that.

H: But I mean, that's what I'm relying on, is what we tried to state from the very beginning. Maybe the point is that people really tried to do what the legislation said, and that that came as a surprise to a lot of people. That's possible.

G: But you weren't shocked when you saw the way the program was set up afterwards?

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H: No. No. No, not after you heard all those discussions about "are you really going to try to go into the middle of Chicago and have a direct federal-funding relationship with some quirky agency right under the Mayor's nose?" I mean, not when people were talking about the possibility of that happening.

G: Now with regard to the Job Corps, initially there was a proposal that the military would play a much larger role. Do you recall how that was--?

H: What was that? God, I do remember discussions of that, but I'm afraid I can't remember. Is it possible that there were concerns just about the appearances of that? There may well have been, yes.

G: The Job Corps was also proposed initially for men, and I understand that Edith Green was one who immediately [objected].

H: Yes. I don't recall it. We saw in that Labor Department--I think it was the Labor Department comment on the bill wondering why it was limited to men. So it was not only her idea I guess, unless she planted the idea with the department. No, but I cannot recall any background to that.

One of the questions that you had in there was the issue of who named it the Job Corps finally, and I tried to recall that. The one person who'd come to mind who might have had a hand in that would be Vern Alden. Have you talked with him or have other people?

G: Yes.

H: Did he own up to it?

G: Gee, I'd have to go back and look.

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H: Oh, I see. Okay. Yes. Was he the first director of the Job Corps?

G: Well, he never actually assumed the job. He was in charge of I guess planning that phase of it, but--

H: Yes, yes. That's the time I remember I guess is that planning, yes.

G: Now, there was some indication that pre-school education was discussed among the task force members, but there was no provision for Head Start or anything like this either in Title II or another title of the bill. Why not?

H: There are varying possible explanations for that. In order to look into that, I want to go first to the original HEW bill and see if pre-school education was in there, and if it was, then track it through all those subsequent drafts to see what happened to it. My first guess would be that there was a more general reference to education, and the notion was that would pick up everything. That may not be a good answer.

G: There was a program in West Virginia I think at the time called Even Start that the President's Commission on Juvenile Delinquency--

H: I don't recall that. I don't know where Head Start comes from as a term either, but--well, we'd really have to pause now and go through that statutory language to find it. But even if we did, I'm not sure I could give you any better answer other than that I thought what we tried to do was just sweep education in. Of course, that got in trouble, because nobody wanted federal general aid to education and had to be careful then how it would be phrased.

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G: Did HEW want to administer those components of the poverty program that dealt with education?

H: I don't remember specifically, but I have no doubt that that was so. That was a good example of the issue of whether you should work through established agencies or not. I suppose there were various people who had various views about the Office of Education and what you'd be getting into if we did it as distinguished from a new agency.

G: Now, an adult education provision was added to the bill. Do you recall that and how that came under discussion?

H: No, I don't, but my guess would be that that sort of thing would come in after the draft bill was circulated to the departments, and some department must have noted that it would be a good idea to have that in there specifically.

G: How about the work-study program? Now this was something that was administered by--

H: --by HEW. You could probably derive an answer to that question by just looking at the chronology of the bills I think, but I don't remember.

G: Do you remember anything about the formulation of the VISTA program?

H: No. No, I don't. That was a Peace Corps analog I guess. I guess other people must have done that.

G: Did you have any role at all in the legislative aspect, getting the bill approved?

H: You mean working on the Hill?

G: Right.

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H: Just one memorable event, and no, other than that I did not. I remember a trip I took with Adam to see Congressman [Phil] Landrum. I mean, later on Landrum lowered the boom on him. I can't remember now exactly why. But we went up to talk about the church-state question. I can't remember the detail of it, but it was a marvelous, marvelous discussion. Would he have been arguing that parochial schools should be in on this? It seems unlikely given that he was from Georgia, but I can't. . . . But anyway, we were trying to explain why not and just going through a whole First Amendment analysis. He was not interested in a First Amendment analysis, whatever the purpose of that discussion was. But I always remember that I could not imagine a more improbable pair than Phil Landrum and Adam Yarmolinsky, and I was sitting in on their jousting with each other. But it must have been after the bill was sent up I guess.

G: Was it pretty much give and take or one-sided?

H: Yes. Yes. I wish I could remember better who was on what side. I mean, Adam was certainly defending what we had in the bill, trying to slice non-public educational enterprises out of aid to education. So what that would have made Landrum's position, I wish I could remember.

G: Now Hugh Carey on the other side, with a large Catholic constituency, was very interested in parochial schools. Did you work with him at all?

H: No. He was on the Education and Labor Committee also I think, wasn't he? No, I cannot remember meetings with him. Although now that you

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mention it, is it possible that the meeting I remember was with Carey and not with Landrum?

G: It could have been Landrum. I think that each had concerns.

H: Okay. Well, because it would have made more sense to have Carey want the bill to have all that in there and Adam have been delegated to explain to him why it couldn't go in. Maybe there were two meetings.

G: Any recollection on Edith Green's response?

H: No. Any recollection I'd have with Edith Green would be all mixed up with recollections of her and HEW matters that I was involved in, because she was, of course, very close to the department. No, so I have nothing on this.

G: Is there anything else with regard to the formulation of the program?

H: Well, let's see. No, I can't think of anything.

G: Do you know how Landrum happened to become the sponsor of the bill?

H: I can't remember now, but I remember it was considered to be somewhat of a triumph I think. But I can't remember the background.

G: Do you have any recollection of Adam Yarmolinsky's exclusion from the program just as the legislation was being voted on by the Congress?

H: Yes. That was after we left Washington as I recall, so it's just whatever I read about in the paper. What did provoke that? That was Landrum who extracted that promise that Adam wouldn't be there or something?

G: Yes.

H: He was supposed to be the deputy director, I think.

G: Well, that's all part of the question, yes.

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H: Oh, is it? Yes. Yes.

G: Is there anything else that we haven't covered that you can think of?

H: No, I think not. I must say, I have enjoyed this. I've never had this experience before, just trying to relive times like that, yes.

G: We deeply appreciate it.

(Interruption)

I was asking you about Sargent Shriver and his leadership.

H: Yes. I quickly developed a tremendous respect for him. I guess he continued to run the Peace Corps while all of this was going on, carrying two jobs. He communicated a zeal, a devotion, a reckless use of his energies, that was infectious. In those early days around the Peace Corps, there was an electric atmosphere. If that's true he certainly gets credit, if one's looking for credit, for having created that.

G: You felt that Shriver was really committed to battling poverty?

H: Well, I assumed I guess that in light of what he was doing in the Peace Corps, that he was committed to the mission of the Peace Corps and that he carried that same mission over to this job. That may be an incredibly romantic view of what was happening, but that's the way I felt and I think a lot of people felt that way and felt really privileged then to become a part of it. That's really what it was all about I think, and that accounted for other people's devotion to that task. When you think about it, everybody who was involved in it had to have selfish concerns that were being advanced as well. It was what was going on, one, in Washington at the time, and there was all

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the matter, "What is that task force up to?" and "Nobody will talk," and everything. You felt that you were a part of an exciting time and doing something that other people envied. Sure, surely that was a part of it. I mean, I ate it up, there's no doubt about it. But I still felt I was part of a destined mission to add to what my department, HEW, was committed to in some quantum leap in dealing with these problems, yes.

G: Well, I thank you.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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