INTERVIEW I

DATE: June 9, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: SOLIS HORWITZ

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE E. MULHOLLAN

PLACE: Mr. Horwitz's office, Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Tape 1 of 2

M: Let's just identify you for the transcriber's benefit. You're Solis Horwitz, and your last government position in the Johnson Administration was as the assistant secretary of defense for administration.

H: Right.

M: You left that post, I believe, last fall. Is that correct?

H: No. I left that post at the end of January of this year.

M: Oh, you stayed through the administration.

H: Let me say this: I had intended leaving right after the elections. However, being so close to the election, I decided to stay until the end of the administration. When Mr. Laird was appointed secretary of defense he asked me, first of all, to stay on, but then when I said that I was not going to stay on, that I had a commitment to the University in this coming year, to at least remain until my successor had qualified. So I remained until the end of January; I think it was the twenty-ninth of January of

1969. Then Mr. Laird asked me to undertake a special project for him. So I really stayed in the Pentagon until the middle of March.

M: So you're really rather newly back here.

H: Well, no. I commuted for a year and was here every Friday. But full-time I'm very new, beginning around the middle of April.

M: When did your first contact with Mr. Johnson take place, back when you worked for the Senate Armed Services Committee in the late 1940s?

H: No. My first contact with Mr. Johnson was a very casual one when I was general counsel of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1950-1951, when Mr. Symington was the administrator. One afternoon I met then Senator Johnson for the first time in Mr. Symington's office.

M: Was this a casual meeting, or was there some issue involved?

H: No. It was very casual. I think the two senators, what became the two senators, were about to go out for a golf game.

M: It was about as casual as you can get.

H: Really about as casual as you could get.

M: Well, now, you had worked for the Senate Armed Services Committee for a while, had you not?

H: That was later when I went to work for Mr. Johnson.

M: I see.

H: I never worked directly for the Senate Armed Services Committee. I did and was on the payroll for some time for the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Mr. Johnson being the chairman. Mr. Johnson had a number of payrolls, and we used to get shifted around from one payroll to the other payroll depending upon where we were principally putting our efforts. Senator Johnson did not believe in keeping his people in firm compartments. Gerry Siegel, George Reedy and I worked on about everything that he had. One day I was doing appropriations when he was chairman of State Justice Judiciary Subcommittee; the next day I was working Preparedness; the next day I was working Space, and the next day I was Democratic Policy.

M: So, the payroll was where it was convenient.

H: The payroll was just where he could manipulate, best use his funds.

M: How did your association, your fairly close association, with him get started?

H: Well, after the Eisenhower Administration came on and they announced their intention of abolishing the RFC, as general counsel I helped prepare that legislation and then decided that I did not want to remain with an organization that was going to go out of business. So I left the government in July of 1953. I took a long vacation, took six months, and I got to see something I had always wanted to see--the United States. I did it by car. And then I came back and was about to go into private practice when I was asked by Senators McClellan, Symington and Jackson to be minority counsel for the Army McCarthy hearings. So I spent some time there, and when that was completed I came back to Pittsburgh here to practice law.

M: Had Mr. Johnson had any part to speak of in those Army McCarthy

hearings?

H: I don't recall that he had anything to do with it. Let's see, when did he become minority leader, in 1953?

M: 1953.

H: He was Minority Leader. If he was doing anything he was operating with Senator McClellan, but we knew nothing about this. He was just not involved in the hearings themselves.

So I came back to Pittsburgh to practice law. I practiced law here, and was still practicing law here when I went down to Washington in early January, 1957. I stopped in to see Senator Symington, whom I had worked for in a number of capacities. At this particular time Senator Symington was very upset about President Eisenhower's actions with respect to Suez. Oh, I don't know, we began joking around in which I intimated I would go down to the UN and straighten the whole thing out, forgetting that he, like many of these politicians, is not very good on a sense of humor and takes things realistically. He said to me, "Well, if you'll go there, you'll come back here." And I said, "No, I would not." Then I went back.

About two weeks later I received a call from him, and he said that Senator Johnson, as chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee, had set up a three man committee, subcommittee of the subcommittee, to be chaired by Symington; Senator Johnson and Senator Bridges to be the other two members. They were going to do some work in connection with air power and aviation problems, particularly military

ones. He would like me to conduct the investigation for him. I said that I really didn't think I wanted to do this, but he said would I come down and talk to him about it, and talk to Senator Johnson about it? So I agreed to do that.

I went down to Washington, and I was taken over to the Capitol to see Gerry Siegel, who was then with the Democratic Policy Committee. I spent about an hour and a half with George Reedy and Gerry Siegel. When that was finished, about eleven-thirty, they said, or maybe a little later, "Let's go downstairs. The Senator's on the floor. If we can get him off, he'll want to talk to you in the secretary's office." So we went down to Felton Johnston's office, that is, George, Gerry and myself. Pretty soon the Senator came in, and he had made a long speech on the floor that morning and had gotten into a great deal of dialogue. He had the transcript with him, and, something I never saw him do again in all the years that I was with him, he was correcting the transcript while sitting there. Because after that, we always corrected the transcript. But he was, himself, correcting the transcript that morning.

George and Gerry and I just continued to talk until he'd be ready. And, of course, he was just listening to this conversation, really, is what he was doing. Finally, after about twenty, twenty-five minutes of our batting the breeze and his sort of half-listening, seemingly half-listening, he stood up and he said, "Would you like to come to work for the Policy Committee?"

M: That's not what you'd been called down there for.

H: Not what I'd been called down for. And I could see both surprise on Gerry's face and George's face that they had not been in on this at all either. And he said, "Would you be interested in coming to the Policy Committee?" I said, "Well, if I knew what the Policy Committee did, I might be able to answer." So he told me about the Policy Committee work and the fact that work was not limited. He said if I'd be interested to let him know, and then he would let me know.

So, I came back and sort of got more and more fascinated with the idea. I may say that Senator Symington was tremendously surprised. Everybody was tremendously surprised because this is not why I had been brought down, to discuss this matter. But Senator Johnson explained that he knew that Gerry was expecting to leave the following year, and he felt it would be a good idea to have a second lawyer in there to take over when Gerry left. And that's what subsequently happened.

M: Mr. Siegel already knew he was going to the Post at that point?

H: No. He knew that he was going to go into some sort of private life. As you know, Mr. Siegel did not go to the Post originally. He went to Harvard Business School first, and then came back when I got sick and left, and then went to the Post after that.

So, then I came down finally in March. I think it was around the end of March, March 25, something like that.

M: And then from there until . . .?

H: And then from then until the end of 1959 I was with Senator Johnson.

M: What kinds of tasks were you generally concerned with for him?

H: Well, with all kinds of tasks, and depending upon the needs of the moment. It would depend on the task for the year. My first really big task for him was the Civil Rights Act of 1957, in which there were a number of problems that had to be resolved. As it became apparent that the bill was coming over from the House the big issue was with, the really fundamental issue--there were two of them really, that had to be faced--one was this whole question of criminal contempt, and the ability of the court to sentence a person to jail for criminal or civil contempt. The other one was, of course, Part Three.

M: That's the initiation of action by the Justice Department.

H: The initiation of action by the Justice Department. My first job in connection with this, I don't remember the exact time, [was] Senator Johnson asking me to go see Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming and discuss with him some ideas he had about the question of civil and criminal contempt and how it would be handled. I worked with Senator O'Mahoney and with Gerry, Ben Cohen, Jim Rowe. I suppose we drafted, oh, twenty-five or thirty different versions of this thing and were constantly trying to satisfy both sides, something that would be acceptable to the liberals and at the same time would get the assurance from Senator Russell that there would be no filibuster. In other words, something that Senator Russell and his cohorts could not vote for, but would not be so bad that they would

insist upon filibustering.

Senator O'Mahoney kept on introducing these various amendments one right after the other. It got rather ridiculous in many ways, because we didn't know which one we were supporting on any particular day. Finally, we worked one out. And the question was--we didn't want O'Mahoney introducing it again because he'd been attacked--how we would handle it. So Senator Johnson chose Senator Church, who was then a new Senator, to be the vehicle for doing this.

M: Church hadn't been involved before that time?

H: No. He had not been. We'd been getting [together], but he had not been really involved in the drafting of any of these. And really one of the most amusing things that ever happened took place with that, because there were two amazing facets of it. One was, of course, that Senator Church was to introduce this at a proper time and the proper time was to be determined, to be done during a speech to be given by Senator O'Mahoney, who was going to be interrupted by Church and yield to him so Church could make a suggestion. Well, everybody came into the Senate; O'Mahoney was there and Church was there, Johnson was there, several others, and of course the southerners with their representatives were there. O'Mahoney got up and began making his speech, and at a point where Church was to introduce it, Church didn't stand up. So O'Mahoney, who was an old artist at this, said, "What I have just said is so important I am going to repeat it."

M: Said the cue again?

H: So he went up and read his paragraph again. Once again Church didn't get up, and once again O'Mahoney said, "This is so important I will have to repeat it again." At this point Johnson got up, and he looked over at Church, and he pointed down like this.

M: Like an orchestra leader.

H: Just like an orchestra leader, just like an orchestra leader, and this time at the proper time Church got up and introduced this amendment.

Now we also needed some further histrionics here, and so Senator Pastore, who was one of the liberal leaders and whom we had worked with on this, said he would take care of it. So he got up in response to Church and started arguing against it, and started arguing against anything but jury trials for criminal contempt. He got up, he spoke for a few minutes, arguing against the Church amendment, and then said, "Wait, is that right? What I have just said?" And he started analyzing the correctness of this and decided, no, as a lawyer this was wrong, and completely shifted his position to come out fully in support of the Church amendment.

M: But all pre-planned?

H: All of this had been pre-planned. And [Pastore] did one of the most effective jobs that was ever done. The net result was, we were able to get into the bill the difference between civil and criminal contempt, whereby civil contempt remained with the court and criminal contempt could get a jury trial, or whatever. I don't

remember the exact details anymore. But this is the thing that went over to the House, and the House balked on.

Representative Keating, who is now our ambassador to India, came up with some sort of a crazy idea of if the sentence was less than forty-five days it could be by the judge; if it was more than forty-five days it had to be a jury. But we couldn't figure out was how did the judge know whether the sentence was going to be forty-five days or anything. I remember Senator Johnson coming in the little office in G-18 and saying, "Keating wants this . . ." and Gerry Siegel and I both hooting with laughter, that this was utterly ridiculous. Johnson turned to me and he said, "Can you put it in legal language?" I said, yes, I could put it into legal language and it wouldn't look too bad, but it was ridiculous. He said, "Put it in legal language, and we'll get the thing through." That was one issue.

M: How much orchestration did Johnson involve himself in directly in this type of thing? Did he go and see Church, for example? Did he go and see Pastore, or did you go?

H: Well, so far as Pastore is concerned, I am sure he saw Pastore alone, because I had no relations. So far as Church was concerned he was there and probably introduced this, but there were others of us present and knew what Church was going to do. We didn't know what Pastore was going to do. He did, because he said to us, "Now you just watch the little Italian dancing master and see what happens here." But he loved to keep things like this secret, you

know, this kind of thing. Very often he would worry us to death that he didn't have enough votes, say this and keep us working and pondering, and he had the votes in his pocket and knew it all the time. But he loved to keep you amused and keep you busy on this type of thing.

The other issue of course was Part Three, and that shows you sometimes how liberals knock themselves out. Part Three as it had come over to the House. I think all the lawyers working for it in the Senate, this includes Gerry, Ben Cohen, Jim Rowe, I can add some others such as Frank Graham of the Washington Post, were all convinced that it was unconstitutional as written. And so Ben Cohen, Gerry and I sat down and wrote a Part Three which was to be offered as an amendment in the Senate. After we wrote it the Senator directed us to take it to Senator Russell to see if he could swallow it to the extent of, while not voting for it, not filibustering against it. We took it down to Senator Russell, and he looked at it. He grimaced, said he didn't like it, but it was so much better than the one that had come over from the House that if we could get the liberals to accept it he would not filibuster.

So Gerry and I then took it, or rather Gerry did, over to Senator Douglas, who was then leading the liberal forces. Joe Rauh was there, and Joe Rauh turned it down off hand and said they wouldn't consider it, they wouldn't do anything. So they went on the floor of the House with a motion to strike Part Three, and I think this passed. The motion to strike passed by a vote that was

something like 72 to 18. It was at this point that the liberals now began to realize that Part Three was out, and they came back and wanted to get in the one that we had written. Senator Johnson said, "Blood has flowed since then with a vote like 72 to 18 and I can never get it in because they'll filibuster now."

M: They knew they had the votes? The southerners knew they had the votes against it by that time?

H: Oh, no. They didn't have the vote against it. They knew they had the votes against Part Three, Part Three as it existed. As to the modified one that we had written, it was sufficient basis for them to filibuster. And the net result, it did not go in. It has always amused me because it was the one that Mr. [Emanuel] Celler then picked up for subsequent legislation, and it is identical and became the law in 1964. But it could've been had in 1957.

M: A case of the liberals beating themselves.

H: They beat themselves. And we had any number of instances during this point. So this was the first big task that I did work with Senator Johnson on.

M: What kind of a man was he to work for? There are stories of all kinds about his abuse of his staff and his abuse of associates and so on. Was that the case?

H: Well, let me say this. He was a tough man to work for. He was never explicit in his instructions to you, and he had an odd habit of how he made assignments. Assignments could come from the janitor or the messenger boy. Somebody whom he saw in the moment he thought

of something conveyed his message. So that sometimes you weren't sure what the assignment was because the guy didn't have any conception who was transmitting it. Fortunately, in the days in the Senate, Walter Jenkins was there, and Walter Jenkins usually knew so you could check it out with Walter and find out. He was tough on his staff. He expected a lot out of them. On the other hand, he could be very generous. For instance, every time we had a success in the civil rights business I got a raise. As a matter of fact I got a raise four times in one week during the civil rights.

M: Quicker than the personnel people could keep up with them. (Laughter)

H: That's right. It was quicker than . . . . I remember Bob Brinkworth, the dispersing officer, [said], "Well, I wish he'd make up his mind what you're salary is going to be." Because every day he could be very generous. He could be very abusive of his staff. I may say this, I didn't quite get the abuse that most of the staff got. For some reason or other, maybe because I was older, he tended to treat me with a great deal of sort of kid gloves and respect. I got some abuse, but this you get from everybody in this area, but not nearly to the extent as other people got it.

M: You mentioned quite a number of people that worked for him, his staff, Jim Rowe and Gerry Siegel and others. Who were his particular friends in the Senate that you noticed?

H: Oh, I really don't know. I mean these were staff people that worked. He was quite friendly with quite a lot of people in those days. I don't know. [Senator George] Smathers and he were very close friends. Pastore and

he were close friends. He got along very well with Tommy Kuchel. This is awfully hard to say.

M: No really close confidants that stand out?

H: Not within the Senate. Well, for close confidant within the Senate, yes, Senator Russell. I mean this was a man for whom he had the highest respect in every way and would consult with him on every turn. So Senator Russell really was a man for whom he had the highest admiration and respect.

M: What about the other staff people, maybe some that you haven't mentioned? Were there some that lingered on in the presidency that were important as early as the Senate?

H: When I was there on the Policy Committee staff it was Gerry Siegel who, while he did not serve at any time when he was president, was sought after for advice very much that I know of. And George Reedy, of course, George Reedy stayed with him all through the vice presidency and up until he needed that operation on his foot--becoming press secretary. Then he was away for a while, and then he went back in, you know, the last year. George was there. Now Jim Rowe was always coming back and forth. He would talk to people like Jim Rowe quite a bit, Jim Rowe's partner, Corcoran, Tommy Corcoran, Ben Cohen, very often on issues. But of course during the Senate days, Bobby Baker was there in full bloom.

M: Was Mr. Fortas already a close friend at that time?

H: Oh, yes. They had been close friends going back to the Roosevelt days.

M: What about Mr. [Clark] Clifford?

H: I really don't know. You see, I don't know when Johnson and Clifford became close. See, I had known Mr. Clifford for a long time, because he and Mr. Symington were very close because they both came from Missouri. They knew each other, and they were very close. And I believe that Johnson's closeness developed through that, the closeness to Clifford. I never heard much about relationships between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Clifford until Mr. Johnson became president.

M: I see. Are there other issues such as the Civil Rights Bill which stand out in your mind when Mr. Johnson and you . . .

H: Oh, yes. There are at least two other major ones that are of some import as senator. One was of course immediately following the adjournment of the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957. I was asked during that summer to go over to the Preparedness Subcommittee, which had sort of gotten kind of lethargic with nobody really looking after it, and get them stirred up and get them back on the ball. I wasn't there more than three or four days when the Russians put up Sputnik. That afternoon, this was a Friday afternoon, I remember this very [clearly].

M: I remember. I was waiting to get released from the Army, and I was wondering whether I was going to get released or not.

H: It was late on a Friday afternoon, and this really bothered me because I was going away for the weekend. It was one of those beautiful October weekends in Washington, and I was afraid. This

call came in from Texas. Gerry Siegel called me and said that he had just talked to the Senator from Texas and that he wanted me to immediately start investigating the status of our missile program and satellite program, and "Let's just start right away." This was about four-thirty in the afternoon. He had talked to Senator Russell, and Senator Russell said, "Preparedness should take this over rather than the main committee." So I said to Gerry, I remember saying to him, "Well, there goes one good weekend shot away." And Gerry said, "Well, you know, maybe if we get it started this afternoon we don't have to do anything till Monday."

So what we did was called over to the Pentagon and got them to arrange to set up a briefing for us for Monday morning. Of course on Monday we went over, and I laid down the things that I wanted and I got that started. We gave them three weeks to produce it. At the end of three weeks they produced the material, and it was sent around to the members of the Preparedness Subcommittee. Copies were sort of hand-delivered all over the country, and after the copies were delivered I got orders to set up a briefing for Senators Johnson and Russell and Bridges. There was an all-day set of briefings over at the Pentagon on that, and the following day there was a meeting held in Felton Johnston's office again. It was at that meeting that--meanwhile they had gotten some telephone votes because the Senate was out of session at the time--it was decided that they were going to have a full-blown investigation by the Preparedness Subcommittee.

M: Was this because Senator Johnson thought the briefing papers had been inadequate?

H: Well, no. He felt that we ought to go into it much deeper and get the people up and sort of make this public and get as much public knowledge as we could get. And he wanted his hearings right away. This was early in November, and he decided that he wanted eminent outside counsel. So he called his good friend Ed Weisl from Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett in New York and actually coerced him over the telephone to come and take it. And it was really a tough job because this was around November 4 or November 5, and he wanted hearings before Thanksgiving started. So Ed Weisl came down the following morning, and with Cy Vance and a couple of youngsters and I started working with them. I sort of became chief of staff to Ed Weisl in getting things organized. The first thing of course that I had to do was educate him into the problem.

And so we held the hearings in late November and we went night and day. He held the hearings in the morning, he held them in the afternoon, and he held them at night. I remember on one occasion Secretary [Donald] Quarles appearing at a night hearing in tails.

M: Oh his way or coming back from . . .

H: Coming back from a White House dinner. So, when these hearings were completed we had the question of writing a report, and it became known as the seventeen-point report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, on what we had to do with our defensive structure. Then the next thing we did on that was to create the Special

Committee on Astronautics [Aeronautics] or whatever, I've forgotten, the Special Committee which was chaired by Senator Johnson. It was this committee which drafted the legislation creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and creating a Senate Committee on Space and Aeronautics.

We tried at that time in the Senate to create a joint committee with the House to avoid overlap, but the House wouldn't buy it. It was rather interesting. I sat in a preliminary meeting before the conference between Mr. McCormack of the House and Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Johnson finally said to him, "Why are you so opposed to this joint committee? You know, we could save money, effort and all of this." And McCormack looked at him and he said, "Lyndon, we've been friends for a long time. Look, we've got a Joint Atomic Energy Committee. You ask any newspaperman to name the senators on it. They can name them. Unless the chairman is from the House they don't know a single member from the House."

M: Well, that is true of all joint committees.

H: This is true. And he said, "This is why you can't sell a joint committee in the House."

M: That's interesting.

H: Oh, it was fascinating. I mean it was really fascinating for this kind of an insight.

M: Did Mr. Johnson during the course of these very intensive committee hearings demonstrate any particular attitude that stands out in your mind toward the uniformed military? Was he generally tolerant, generally critical, anything in particular?

H: No, it was rather more on individual people than on anything else. He didn't have a general attitude of criticism nor a general attitude of praise. You see, the problem is you couldn't have a general attitude, and one of the things that bothers me now is attempts to express things in general attitudes. You really can't categorize the military. I can tell you this after nine years living intimately with them. They run the spectrum from here to here all the way.

M: Just like all other groups of people.

H: JUst like all other groups of people, and like all others groups of people they tend to coalesce to protect themselves at particular times when attacked. But really there is no real uniformity of attitude.

M: Certainly the critics and admirers, alike try to give them one.

H: That's right. They try to give them one. They don't have it. I don't know of any weapon system that doesn't have its opponents within the military. The Air Force still doesn't like carriers, and you can go all along going down the line. You have these issues that are there, and I think Mr. Johnson was quite well aware of this.

M: You said there was a third, or another, issue.

H: Yes. Well, the other set of issues was the labor issues in both 1958 and 1959. The Senate did pass a very excellent labor bill in 1958, but the House wouldn't buy it. So in 1959 the House took up the labor issue and passed the Griffin-Landrum Bill. The Griffin-

Landrum Bill came over to the Senate. Let me go back a minute before that. I may say in 1958 we had worked a great deal with Senator Kennedy.

M: I was going to ask about that.

H: We'd worked a great deal with Senator Kennedy, who was in charge of the bill, and particularly Ralph Dungan, who was on the Labor Committee staff and who was working principally for Senator Kennedy. We had gotten through, I don't remember the specific issues any more, but a lot of the problems that are still open. We had gotten a satisfactory resolution on the floor of the Senate. I think so far as my knowledge of watching it that this was Senator Kennedy's finest activity on the floor. He was so much better in 1958 than he was in 1959.

M: Because of the distraction of the campaign?

H: Probably coming up. I don't know. But probably because of other forces that had developed. The Griffin-Landrum Bill had stirred up a lot of issues. McClellan had come out with his testimony on racketeering in labor unions, and so there was a different climate. But Senator Kennedy did a remarkably good job. I remember Senator Johnson was tremendously pleased with the results that had been accomplished.

M: Did they work closely together during that time, Johnson and Kennedy?

H: Yes, on the labor bill they worked very closely together. As a matter of fact, we used to sit for hours on end up in my office

with Ralph Dungan and George Reedy, Arthur Goldberg, and myself and Gerry. Gerry had already gone, so . . . .

M: Kennedy men and Johnson men working together. There was a sort of an interesting prelude.

H: Oh, yes. They were working together. Of course, Arthur Goldberg in those days was not wholly a Kennedy man. I mean, this was before anything had emerged in the 1960 campaign.

M: Dungan always was?

H: Dungan always was, yes. But, yes, but this was the point. Dungan would come up for help in drafting and stuff like this and working it, and George Reedy of course, you know, knows more about labor than anybody, really does. And out of these meetings came out a very fine bill in 1958.

Well, in 1959 we had all kinds of [inaudible] into the bill, and perhaps one of the most amusing things that has ever happened to me happened in connection with that bill. There was a stack of amendments about two feet high, and among them was Senator McClellan's amendment for a bill of rights for labor. We understood it was going to come up toward the end, and so nobody was prepared when one night while they were debating this bill Senator McClellan, about eight o'clock, called up his amendment. And lo and behold it got passed. Johnson got on the scene and tried to undo it, but they couldn't do anything about it. So it got solidified by a motion to table, a motion to reconsider. Nobody really understood the thing or knew what was in it, and nobody had expected it to come up

because this was to be one of the big issues and was to be left till last.

Well the following morning I got awakened real early, oh, along about five o'clock. [It was] Senator Johnson. This is the only time he ever did this with me; he was notorious for doing this with George Ready, Gerry, Walter. This was the only time he ever did this with me, and he said, "Solis, I have been talking to Senator Russell, and Senator Russell thinks we passed an FEPC bill last night. Will you take a look at it?" So I went in the next morning and I took out the bill and I asked Jim Wilson, whom you may know, I don't know; he's a young lawyer from Austin, to take a look at it. We started reading it, and I'd pretty much come to my conclusion when Jim Wilson [was] reading it. Jim had the loudest laugh of any man I have ever heard in my life. I've never seen anybody who enjoyed laughing as much as Jim did, and all of a sudden Jim leaned back and just let out this roar. He said, "Yes, they have passed an FEPC bill."

M: McClennan would be up there in a moment if he thought that.

H: So Jim and I started dictating memoranda, Jim from the political point of view and me from the legal-constitutional point of view, so that the Senator would have either one that he needed. The Senate was in session. Johnson was sitting on the floor, and Jim and I walked down to the floor and we took the two memoranda over to Senator Johnson. Meanwhile, I might just throw in this

parenthetically: the only southerner who had voted against this, because he was very pro-labor, was Olin Johnston of South Carolina. And Strom Thurmond had already been on the radio down in South Carolina telling how a labor sucker was Olin. So he took this down to Senator Johnson and he read it. We had a couple of copies. He gave one copy to Senator Russell, sat in back of him and he gave it to Senator Russell. Senator Russell read it, and I was standing right there, and Senator Russell said, "I thought this was it."

So then Lyndon Johnson did one of the cutest tricks I have ever known. He took a copy of it, and he gave it to Hubert Humphrey. Hubert just started beaming from ear to ear. Of course, this was the most remarkable thing, because this was not only funny on the part of the southerners. They of course didn't want an FEPC on them. They wanted to stymie the amendment. On the other hand, the liberals were opposed to the bill of rights, and they were down the line to labor that they would never support it. But how in the hell did they now come up and argue against an FEPC bill which they had been pushing for years. So Hubert went around shaking hands with every southern Senator, congratulating them on having passed an FEPC bill. Well, really, there was pandemonium. Senator Byrd, this was the old man you know, who had this high squeaky voice to begin with, he just got himself into a fit. You would hear his high squeaky voice about this, and Strom Thurmond running around, "What do you

mean FEPC bill?" Out of all of this here was Olin Johnston appearing the great hero, the only man who'd voted against the FEPC bill--

M: The only man who'd voted against it?

H: --from the South.

Well, and here was the damn thing locked in. You needed two-thirds to take it out. McClellan was furious. He didn't realize that his people had gotten him into this trap, and how they'd gotten into it I don't know. An FEPC bill was perfectly obvious to anybody who read the damned thing. How they got themselves into this trap we don't know. Anyway, it ended up by Johnson getting McClellan and Joe Clark of Pennsylvania to sit down and rewrite a damn thing which would be satisfactory to both sides, which it took them a couple of days to do. But they finally did, and they almost by unanimous consent got it substituted for the provision they had in there.

M: He worked with Joe Clark closely at that time?

H: Not particularly. Joe was representing the liberals.

M: I was going to say, that's one of the senators who, as is said, he never got along with very well.

H: Well, let me say this. That's right. They didn't get along very well. As you know, Joe Clark never got along well with anybody. Johnson started out when Joe Clark was elected trying to get along with Joe Clark. As a matter of fact, he made him one of the two floor managers for non-contested legislation, you know the routine legislation which is always a way of breaking a senator into the

hierarchy of the Senate. I remember they set up Joe and Talmadge, they came in at the same time, to do this job.

But you couldn't ever get Joe to see things when he got excited. He always did things to his own regret. Such as he would put up an amendment which he needed for his record. But this was no problem, this you can always do and you can always have. But Joe would insist upon a record vote, and Johnson would say to him, "You don't want a record vote because you haven't got two votes here." And so then Joe would get defeated 92 to 4, in one instance 97 to 1. He couldn't even get anybody else to support him. So this was one reason they fundamentally never got along. But I think fundamentally the difference lay not in themselves as individuals, but in the fact that [to] Johnson, the Senate was an institution. It was an institution to be working and to join together and manipulate, and Joe Clark never felt anything other than being an individual senator. He never felt part of the institution.

M: And that wouldn't have made Johnson happy at all.

H: And that wouldn't make Johnson happy, and Joe just wasn't happy with Johnson to do it. Yet I don't know anything that Joe Clark got through in those days that he didn't get through without the help of Lyndon Johnson.

M: How about Mr. Johnson and the administration during this period? To your knowledge was he in close contact, in close cooperation with President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles or any of the--.

H: I don't know about Secretary Dulles, but he certainly saw the President a great deal. He attended meetings with the President, and remember in those days he tried to get a legislative program through. If the President wanted something, if he thought it worthwhile or he could modify it, he would try to get a program through. After all, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was an Eisenhower recommendation, and a lot of the legislation. There was a great deal of effort, and Johnson's attitude always was, "We've got a divided government and we've got to make it work."

M: He didn't feel like he was surrendering to the administration?

H: No, no. Because if he didn't like what they had in their bill, he modified it and he changed it and he bargained and he compromised. He didn't feel there was any need to do this. He felt that the best thing that could happen to the Democratic Party was that it assume a responsible position.

M: Then you, you said a little while ago, left his employ in 1959?

H: At the end of 1959. I was not feeling well. I knew an election year was coming up, and I just didn't think I could take the pressures and I left. I may say one other thing. He was on one of his great youth kicks at that point, and he was surrounding himself with a lot of smart kids, but kids who just didn't have any background or stuff. I knew that if they make mistakes, the senior people would get hell for it, and I just decided that what I ought to do is get back into private life at that point.

M: Why was he doing this?

H: Can we can off the record for a minute?

M: You can restrict this forever. I'll be happy to turn this off.

H: Well, frankly, we noticed very interestingly that when Johnson became fifty years of age he went on this youth kick. I think this was just basic fear that people get, very common among people when they get to be fifty, to want to retain their youth and surround themselves with very young people. This was something he really never got over.

M: No, his White House staff was young.

H: He never got over, and I may say is probably one of the reasons he had a great deal of trouble.

M: Yes, an awful lot of people believe that all of his trouble was coming from the time when Walter was no longer there and George Reedy was no longer there.

H: That's right. One by one his senior people departed and he replaced them with very young people. One of the reasons his senior people were leaving was exactly his putting these young kids into these positions which they didn't know how to handle. I mean, they were smart enough all right, brilliant enough, brilliant kids.

M: Sure, but you've got to have some perspective.

H: But they didn't have any knowledge of people. They didn't have any knowledge or background and this fundamentally was there.

M: So you weren't involved in the 1960 campaign episodes You were back in private life at that time.

H: Well, then I got very involved in the 1960 campaign. I went into private practice. In the meantime the convention was held. Johnson was nominated for vice president. I wrote him a letter congratulating him and pointing out that I understood very well that he just had to take it. I was one of the few people who really understood the situation. See, he was in a terrible bind if he turned it down.

M: Explain that.

H: Well, the bind was this, and it was a very terrible bind. If he was asked and he turned it down and Kennedy lost, then he would have been blamed for the loss of the election because what they were looking for was Texas.

M: Yes.

H: And he was probably the only one who could carry Texas. All right. On the other hand, if Kennedy won and he had turned it down, it was difficult for him to be majority leader. And in any event, when the majority leader is from the same party as the president, he really doesn't have the power that Johnson had as majority leader. So he was left in a real dilemma and real bind. He really couldn't turn it down.

The next thing I knew I got called. Let's see, we were talking to Walter, and Walter said, "Do you want to participate in any way in the campaign?" I said, "I'll participate if I can help." And so I got a call from Jim Rowe, and Jim said, "Mike [Myer] Feldman is heading up the research unit. We'd like you to

go in and work with Mike." And so I went in the beginning of September first, maybe even August, to work with Mike Feldman handling the research activities of the Democratic National Committee. We worked during the campaign.

M: Worked on through the election?

H: Yes.

M: Then when you came back into government did you come back in with any kind of direction with Mr. Johnson, or was it entirely Mr. McNamara's . . . ?

H: I don't really know. It really wasn't Mr. McNamara either. It was Cy Vance. Of course, that brings us right back to Mr. Johnson, because he was responsible for Cy Vance in a good many ways. But Cy Vance, right before, a few days before inauguration, after he was already down spending time learning the ropes, had dinner with me one night. He said that Mr. McNamara had asked him to take over the responsibility of reorganizing the department and setting up a unit whose sole task would be to look at the organization and management of the department. Mr. McNamara wanted to go to work right away with it, and Cy Vance said that the only person that he knew who could start to work right away with enough knowledge and background that wouldn't require six months' to a year's preparation was me, and therefore he would like very much to have me take on that post.

I didn't want to go back. I had, at this time in Washington, a very good connection for law practice, and I was not too anxious about

this. So I talked to my partners, and they said, "Well, you can give them six months. We think you ought to do it." They were all good solid Democrats to begin with, so they thought I ought to do it. So I told Cy that I'd come in for six months and that's what happened.

M: Six months turned into eight years.

H: Yes.

M: Had you given the Kennedy people a pretty good account of the activities that you conducted during the first administration?

H: During the first three years, yes. Yes.

M: Did Mr. Johnson ever evidence any interest in what you were doing while he was vice president?

H: Not to me, certainly not. He knew what we were doing. He knew from Mr. McNamara what was happening.

M: But you didn't have much contact?

H: I didn't have much contact. As a matter of fact, [it was] a very interesting relationship. Mr. Johnson, I don't think, was ever quite happy with me for leaving.

M: He was that way sometimes.

H: He was that way sometimes, and so we had very little personal contacts. As a matter of fact, I was not forgotten, but it was almost a practice not to deal, for him [not] to deal directly with me. But I always knew when he had said something to me for my views, my knowledge to do it. I may say that I did have, when he was vice president, one act very much for him, because George Reedy at this time asked me to do it and I knew that it had to be

for him. That was in connection with the 1963 session, the motion to amend Rule 22, in which we laid out a complete procedure for him to follow and how he should rule on every issue as it came up.

The reason for this goes back to 1959. After the session of 1958 was over we knew that a . . . . There had been a filibuster fight in 1957, and following that Mr. Johnson and about sixty-two other senators had put in a modified amendment of Rule 22 to take away the constitutional majority requirement. And I began to think of that after the session closed in 1958 it would be coming up with the new Congress in 1959. I wanted to avoid, if at all possible, a long and tendentious debate on the issue of whether the Senate was a continuing body. So I thought up the idea of instead of having the liberals under Senator Anderson come in with this foolish piece of business which really doesn't mean anything--

M: But then they'd do it every session.

H: --which doesn't mean anything, whether it's continuous or not. It's a meaningless thing, it's one of those standing on principles that gets you absolutely nowhere, that Mr. Johnson ought to take the leadership. That Mr. Johnson should pick up his amendment from the year before and introduce it on the opening day and take the leadership in the fight.

I wrote this proposition to George Reedy, who was in Texas, and he took it up with Mr. Johnson. And Mr. Johnson said, "Prepare the papers." So what we were really prepared to do, strangely enough, was for him to put in his amendment and then allow Anderson

to move to modify that amendment by reducing it from two-thirds to 60 per cent, and Johnson was perfectly willing to take 60 per cent, and get rid of the issue. Well, we prepared the papers, and Johnson sold this as an idea to Mike Mansfield and Dirksen and Kuchel. The four of them then offered this at the opening day session. However, Anderson still insisted upon putting in his thing, and it got slaughtered, but really slaughtered. It got slaughtered so badly that his subsequent motion to amend the 67 per cent to 60 per cent got slaughtered too, which would not have happened if he had done what we wanted to do.

M: Was that another case of the liberals beating themselves?

H: That was another case of the liberals beating themselves. It hasn't been modified to this day because of this, but it could have been done in 1959. We had it all laid out to do it. So that when Johnson became vice president he then wanted and had to rule on these various issues, so we had laid down a whole program for him. This was one thing we did. In this I know the request came directly from him because George said, "He wants you to give him a memorandum." And so I did. But ordinarily throughout all of his term as president, with the exception of a few times that I saw him over at the White House and sitting in at meetings in which he talked to me direct and we talked direct, most of the assignments that I got from him came from various people. I would know by the way they came that they were coming from him, but he would never come direct.

M: Waht about your job in the Defense Department generally? How far had the management revolution, as they called it then, gone when Mr. Johnson suddenly was thrust into the presidency? Was it fairly substantially complete by that time?

H: It was fairly substantially complete to the extent that the things we were doing he picked up for the whole government.

M: Yes, the PBBS and . . . .

H: The PBBS and the various things. He said, "What they have done over in Defense you are now going to do with the rest of the government."

M: But this is a Johnson decision to broaden it out?

H: Oh, yes, it was very definitely a Johnson [decision]. I don't know whether Kennedy would have ever broadened it out or not. I just have no way of knowing this. I know he was tremendously pleased with what Mr. McNamara was doing, but this was typically a Johnson decision.

M: Did Mr. Johnson determine any changes in the Defense program generally as he became president? Was there a break from the Kennedy . . . ?

H: No, no. There was great continuity. I think both of them just followed Bob McNamara's recommendations pretty much. They may have made minor changes, but by and large I think they both consistently followed Bob on this.

M: What about your particular circumstances? You became assistant Secretary in 1964. Was this already in the works, this new position?

H: Well, let me say this. This was a position that Cy Vance wanted to create. He talked about it when he was secretary of the army, he talked about it when be became deputy secretary of defense. There were no vacancies, however. All of the jobs were filled. He had talked to McNamara about it, and according to what Cy said, McNamara said, "At the proper time, I'll do it, but right now there are no vacancies." And, of course, at that point I was reporting directly to McNamara, so there was no problem.

M: It was a matter of title, not . . .

H: It was a matter of title, a matter of honor more than anything else, because when Cy went to the Army I no longer reported to the General Counselor, I reported directly to the Secretary and the Deputy. So nothing was said about it. Then McNamara decided to transfer Civil Defense in early 1964 to the Army. This had been part of our original plan when we took over Civil Defense. This left one of the assistant secretaryships vacant, and so sometime in March McNamara said to me. "Prepare the papers for your nomination as assistant secretary. I'm going to create this post. Bring me . . . ." Then told me what he wanted, and he said, "Give me the papers." We got the papers ready and they went over. They didn't go over; he held them on his desk. I never knew why. And he held them on his desk for close to three months. I never understood why. Now, I've always felt that maybe he was a little afraid that Johnson would turn him down because he was still mad at me for leaving him.

Well, anyway, one day in June, after fully three months, McNamara called me over for something. I remember Dave McGiffert was sitting there, and he said, "By the way, the President is going to appoint you to the assistant secretary." He had finally talked to him, and so I figured, "Well, here, we'll go through the rigamarole again." And that day, damn it, this was the funniest thing that I ever heard of, because George Reedy called me that afternoon and said, "Get a biography over here right away because he's going to announce it this afternoon." This was the same day. So it went up there on a Thursday afternoon, and the next thing I knew I got a call from Senator Russell, and Senator Russell--well not Senator Russell but his man who is now on the Court of Military Appeals. What's his name?

M: I don't know. We've talked to him, I think.

H: Great guy. I'll think of him in a minute. He said, "The Senate is going to hear your nomination next Thursday." I said, "But it hasn't been lying there a week." And he said, "The Senator says everybody knows you. Come on up on Thursday." So it worked very fast once McNamara talked to him.

M: He waited until the right time.

H: But seemingly he waited until the right time.

M: How much direct contact, then, did you have in the course of your job with the President?

H: Very little. Very little direct contact at all. It was not the kind of a job that required direct contact. I had a lot of

special assignments, but they always came from McNamara or Vance or later Nitze at the request of the President. "He wants us to do this." "Will you do this?".

M: What about with White House staff people? Did you have a particular person you worked with over there?

H: Oh, I worked with any number of them. I worked with Joe Califano. I worked with DeVier Pierson. I worked with Harry McPherson. I worked with, oh, what's his name, the newspaper guy?

M: Moyers?

H: Not Moyers.

M: Christian?

H: Not Christian. No, he was never a press representative. He was . . .

M: Oh, Kintner.

H: Not Kintner, but you're getting close. Oh, he was a magazine writer for years.

M: I'm not identifying him as a magazine writer. I'm sure the name's familiar. Well, it'll come to us. What about the staff relationship? You mentioned a while ago that some of these young people without . . .

H: Well, the staff I dealt with were serious staff and able staff, mature staff. Joe Califano never pulled any funny business with me because after all I raised Joe Califano from a pup.

M: Yes. He came over there while you were there.

H: While I was there, and I made room for him in my own set-up. He came as a special assistant, so Joe never pulled any of the stuff that he pulled on many other people on me. I've got no complaints against Joe. My relationships with Harry McPherson were always excellent because they went back to the days when we worked together for the Senator, as Senator, and we always got along beautifully. I never had any problems with anybody over in the White House. They never gave me any problems.

M: Did you do any more of these sort of special, personal tasks that were passed to you through Jenkins or Reedy or somebody?

H: Well, as I say, usually these were things that called for a quick answer, and I would tend to get this sort of thing.

M: Nothing drawn out?

H: No, and the only other thing I did directly for him, which came direct, was I sat on the Telecommunications Commission as the Defense representative. But this was one, you know, where people were designated by name, and so I had that appointment from the President.

M: But he didn't give you any instructions as to what you were to do or what he wanted?

H: No, no.

M: Did you get a chance to watch with any closeness the relationship over the long pull between Mr. McNamara and Mr. Johnson? That's occasioned quite a bit of question and criticism and speculation.

H: No, I have never known anything that would justify this speculation, really.

M: You mentioned how much he relied on his . . .

H: Now, I know this. I know this, that I knew pretty well their relationship as long as Cy Vance was deputy, because Cy and I are extremely close and Cy would tell me many things. One thing about McNamara, his deputy always knew everything that he knew because he always regarded his deputy as a true alter ego.

M: The mark of a good administrator, one of the marks.

H: Yes, and he reported to him everything. So the relationships I think were always good. This is my own guess, and I don't know because after Cy left, while I became very close to Paul Nitze I didn't have quite the same relationship with Nitze as I had had with Cy or with Gilpatric. I mean they're different type people. Although Nitze told me many things, but never quite the same way. I just think that McNamara himself got a little discouraged.

M: After all, it had been a long time.

H: Well, he believed, you know, that nobody should serve more than five years anyway.

M: Said that when he took office.

H: Yes, and I think he's right. It's a job that takes perfect toll. Now you can have other jobs there and be there a longer time, but the two top jobs I don't think you can handle for more than five years.

M: I don't want to cut you off. Are there any subjects about which we haven't talked that you think are important to add here?

H: No.

M: Anything that you thought of later that you may have omitted from the Kennedy tape?

H: No. I can't think of very much.

M: Well, you thought of quite a lot.

H: As a matter of fact, I just finished correcting the tape last Thursday, the Kennedy tape.

M: So it's fresh on your mind?

H: So it's fresh on my mind. It's been laying on my desk for about eight months, and I finally [corrected it.] We have this business of moving and changing life and everything and the excitement, and I couldn't do it while I was still in Washington. I kept on putting it off, and then last Thursday I came in here fully determined to clean it up and send it back. So the Kennedy tape is very fresh in my mind.

M: Well, I hope we get our transcript to you as quickly as eight months. I think the bottleneck on getting those transcripts out is fantastically slow.

H: Great business.

M: But you've been very helpful, and it's been very interesting to hear particularly these late senatorial experiences. We certainly appreciate your time.

H: Well, you're quite welcome.

Tape 2 of 2

H: Maybe I ought to tell you something about my job as assistant secretary for administration.

M: Yes.

H: Because it was largely a misnomer, and I think deliberately designed by Mr. McNamara to be a misnomer. It was a peculiar job because it had a series of somewhat unrelated functions put together. First of all, I took over the actual administration of the office of the secretary of defense. This had been running around loose not being under any assistant secretary. A scandal had developed over the use of funds in which at least one guy, two guys went to jail, and a third guy was indicted but later acquitted. But his job was terminated.

M: I'm not familiar with this. This is during the Kennedy years?

H: Let's see. It's either the end of the Kennedy years or the beginning [of the Johnson years.] Well, this is what led to the discussion of the creation of my job, so it happened during the latter part of the Kennedy years, I would say. This as a matter really went back into the Eisenhower years. It had been going on for some time without anybody really top supervising, relatively minor stuff, but it really isn't worth discussing. So I took over the administration, but there I got myself a deputy who was the ace man in the administration of the government and bothered very little about it. The only job I really ever performed is that I had to appear before the Appropriations Committee and justify

the Secretary's budget. But I was relieved of most of this.

Now the second thing I had was my old Office of Organization and Management Planning. That came in. Now, you see, this is entirely different from anything that [Idar] Rimestad has because this really is the Secretary talking about it.

M: I don't think anybody in the State Department has that job as a matter of fact.

H: As a matter of fact, at one time there were discussions, before Rimestad was appointed, about my going over there with the same authority in this field as they have, except Mr. Rusk wouldn't buy it.

M: That's one of the things the State Department needs.

H: I know, but before Mr. Katzenbach went over Mr. Ball tried to sell this idea, and Mr. Rusk wouldn't buy it. Mr. McNamara had said he'd let me go if Mr. Rusk would buy it because he thought it was very badly needed there, but he also bet that it would never happen. So we had the Office of Organization and Management Planning. With that I had held a second assignment prior to becoming assistant secretary. President Kennedy in late 1962 created the National Communications System, growing out of the Cuba business whereby the State Department had been unable to reach some of its people in Latin America. His design was to design where we could put all of the long line communications together and be able to use them mutually across the government. Since 80 per cent of those assets are in the

Defense Department, Mr. McNamara was given the job as executive agent to set it up, and I became his deputy for that purpose. And this job went over. So I was the Director of the National Communications System.

Then Mr. McNamara said that he wanted to create a system of inspection, of an inspection capability, and so the Office of Inspection Services was created and put under me. So I was the Inspector General at all top levels for the department. Then when Mr. Morris came on to become assistant secretary for manpower he told Mr. McNamara that he did not believe that security policy was a manpower function. And you've got to agree with him that it isn't, particularly the industrial security program that was there. Mr. McNamara didn't know what to do with that, so he assigned that to me. So I had the industrial security program. Then because of my position in National Communications System it became apparent that I had to get into defense communications. Although that was a responsibility of Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics it really didn't belong there, because the procurement problem was not much. So I kept on as a side issue, getting involved in defense communications and more and more involved in intelligence work.

As a matter of fact, the last year under Mr. Clifford and Mr. Nitze, they wanted to convert my job to fundamentally intelligence and communications, get rid of some of the things I had other than Organization and Management, the Inspection Service.

But we had a problem. The House wanted to use one of the assistant secretaryships for health and medical. They didn't want it, but they were afraid of announcing what they were doing [because they would] get some problems with Mr. Mendel Rivers. And so as a matter of fact all they did is Mr. Nitze issued an order that no paper in the intelligence field was to come to him except through me. So in fact I then became--communications--the assistant secretary for communications and intelligence.

M: This is a fascinating interplay of administrative development there in that job.

H: Yes, but this was done. As a matter of fact Mr. Laird--as I said I did a job for Mr. Laird, and I reiterated this recommendation. Mr. Laird has taken an interim step of appointing my successor special assistant for intelligence and communications.

M: That's a transition towards your . . .

H: This is the transition towards what I'm doing, following some studies that they are making. So this is in there. But among my administrative jobs was, of course, the security of the Pentagon.

M: And that brings you to the very <u>real</u> problem that the . . .

H: To the real problem that we reopened this discussion on, the question of setting up an apparatus for handling situations of this type. And situations not only at the Pentagon, but anywhere else where use of armed forces might be required. One of the principal things that came out of my office was the problem of

making the Army the executive agent for setting up a system, particularly for the handling of matters in the twenty-five largest cities in the country, and the preparations and plans which were prepared.

M: When did that begin? Was that before Watts or did this grow out of Watts?

H: Well, this really grew out of Watts and Cleveland. Hough.

M: Hough, yes. So that comes in 1966 then?

H: It really comes in 1966, although it's after 1966 that we began real planning. Although the really significant years are 1967 and 1968. But I was supposed to be in charge for the Secretary in connection with the riot that was held in front of the Pentagon. It really didn't require too much work on my part because the Secretary, personally, was there every minute of the time, and you couldn't do anything without his permission. He was in direct communication with the President on almost every move he took. But it is in connection with that and Cy Vance's reports on Detroit that we developed the principles of limited force and keeping force to a minimum and this sort of thing.

M: Now, were you involved in the Detroit [riot]? Did your contingency plans operate in Detroit?

H: No, Detroit was before we had contingency plans.

M: That would be in 1967.

H: Early 1967.

M: Yes. But after that then you started developing detailed plans?

H: Oh, the Army developed detailed plans. We had a council that was set up under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of the Army, on which I sat representing the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs sat, and then later we brought the General Counsel in to sit. We had representatives from each of the services plus the Justice Department.

M: On that march on the Pentagon, that's one of the allegedly best-handled of all of them.

H: Oh, there's no question about it.

M: Was it just a matter of intricate planning that made it come off so successfully?

H: Oh, in great measure it was. Plus the fact that we had our troops trained. We had them . . . (Covers microphone) I want to tell you. We had our troops so damn well-trained that these little flower girls would go up and grab the soldier by the balls, you know, and start stroking, and these kids never moved.

M: Just stand there.

H: Just stand there and behave.

M: How much force did you have alerted for that? How much did it take?

H: We had a lot of force available in the city. We had about, I don't know, three of four thousand in the Pentagon itself, and

we had others that we could bring in from a distance.

M: Did you get to begin a training program that you described here on a fairly wide basis?

H: Oh, yes. All of our active combat troops stationed in the United States now get, as a definite part of their training, the handling of riots.

M: And that began--?

H: Yes. And this also extends to the National Guard and the reserve troops. [They] get a definite, now, definite prescribed course in handling of riots and violence. This is also extended to the Air Force and the Navy land installations.

M: By the time you had this set up, now, in 1968, the only subsequent riot was in Washington.

H: Yes. But of course a tremendous program has been worked out between the Army and the Air Force for the lifting of the troops and bringing them in and getting them out.

M: What about the Washington 1968 episode, the Resurrection City and then the riots?

H: Well, the Resurrection City, we had troops there, but very little was required. It required very little. They were able to keep that one down pretty much. That was intended to be a peaceful operation, and it was peaceful. It was a messy operation, but it was never intended to be violent, nor did they intend to use violence. It was too close after the death of Martin Luther King, who stood for non-violence, for his leaders to go for it.

The situation that took place right after the assassination of Martin Luther King of getting troops in and handling them was well-handled during . . .

M: I was going to say, that is probably, I guess, the only chance to test the mechanisms that you had set up.

H: Yes. I think the fact that it quieted that [quickly.] The things only lasted two days. We didn't have time to prevent anything from happening because it happened the night after Martin Luther [King] was killed. You didn't have any time to get troops in, except the few National Guard you have in the District of Columbia.

M: Which is not many.

H: Which is not many.

M: Okay, is there anything else you want to add to this story?

H: No.

M: I'm glad we put this back on. You know, I'm particularly interested in the background of the . . .

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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