INTERVIEW II

INTERVIEWEE: MRS. DOROTHY JACOBSON

INTERVIEWER: T. H. BAKER

April 23, 1969

Tape 1 of 1

B: This is a continuation of the interview with Mrs. Jacobson. Ma'm, you mentioned very briefly in the previous tape that early in your career at the Agriculture department at Secretary Freeman's request you had looked into the Food for Peace Program. And I believe you also mentioned that in '61 there, was the beginning of this idea of changing that program from just a surplus disposal agency to an arm of foreign policy.

J: Yes.

B: Was then, from there on, this idea worked out deliberately and consciously?

J: Oh, yes. I think I'd broaden it a little bit from the "arm of foreign policy" unless you take foreign policy very broadly, because there had been,of course, some reflection of foreign policy even in the food disposal programs. And the Congress was constantly imposing political restrictions on the countries to whom we could send food, as it still does now.

B: We had that problem with the extensions in '64 and '66.

J: Yes, but while they developed and constantly were intensified--they existed even earlier. The country I suppose most in need of food that was dropped from the program on this account was Egypt--the UAR. But further than saying only an arm of foreign policy, you might say to use the food donations and food agreements as an agency or another tool for development, assuming that assistance in development is part of our foreign policy, which I believe it is, then your broader arm of the foreign policy covers it.

B: Were Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson, after him, especially interested in this concept of self-help feature?

J: Yes. I think they both emphasized it. Probably because I was a little closer to it later, I would say that President Johnson emphasized it more. This was also partly probably due to the fact that as the years progressed, we began to look more critically at the programs to see whether they had done any permanent good, whether the food had done anything other than feed stomachs for a short time.

B: Of course, the surpluses diminished, too.

J: Yes, the surpluses diminished, only in part, however, because of the food shipments, but also because of the acreage restrictions--the philosophy had changed under the new administration in 1961--to make greater use of those restrictions.

B: What was the State department's attitude toward the self-help idea? One could imagine a possible conflict of interest there--the State department is trying to keep other nations happy, and you are in effect telling them to get to work and discipline themselves.

J: I would say insofar as AID was the agency of State in these dealings, and it was supposed to be, they were in pretty general agreement with the position of Agriculture when we began to insist on self-help provisions. Now they didn't always agree at the technician level as to what self-help measures were necessary. Agriculture naturally tended to emphasize self-help measures relating to Agriculture. AID grew more and more to emphasize measures relating to Agriculture as the years progressed, but they were likely to consider more that education, health--these--factors were also important; and written into the amendments to PL-480 that we finally got through late in '66 was the specific statement that population planning

ought to be a part of the self-help. That incidentally was put in by the Congress, and not by the administration.

B: That idea originated in Congress?

J: Oh, yes. In fact, the words "family planning," which are now respectable but which weren't only a few years ago, frightened the administration when it was proposed in the Congress as late as 1966.

B: It was considered a pretty dangerous political idea.

J: Yes. Everyone in all of the departments that were working together believed this was important. We didn't want to jeopardize PL-480 by putting it in the bill, so when it was first proposed to us we were slow to respond. But Congressman Todd was the one who originated this. He was not on the Agriculture Committee, but he appeared before the House Agriculture Committee, got it written into the bill. Before the bill was through, the committee itself had written it in in three more places, and I believe that aside from some little legislation dealing with the District of Columbia, this was the first general legislation in which those words were used at the federal level.

B: Did you ever try in Congress in '64 and again in '66 when PL-480 was being extended to remove those limitations on aid to countries trading with North Viet Nam?

J: Oh, yes. The administration drafts all went in without them, and the committee put them in immediately.

B: Was that just a foregone conclusion, just politically impossible?

J: Oh, hope springs eternal, you know. But I guess those of us who were realistic recognized that the best we could do was to try to temper them, in which we were sometimes successful.

B: In implementing--

J: By saying, for example, "This should be the rule, unless the President shall specifically declare that it is in the interest of the United States to do this." Now, we did get this in in one or two places. The best we could do was to get the committees in the Congress to say, you might say, to the President: "All right, if you must do this we want you to be on record with regard to the specific country in time. And unless you're willing to stick your neck out that far, you're prohibited from doing this."

B: What was Mr. Johnson's reaction to that kind of wording?

J: He didn't like it. Neither did President Kennedy. There were parts of these wordings that were put in that they both regarded as unconstitutional, as violating the separation between the Executive and the Legislative branches. But that didn't matter. I think that the basic reason why we could never get a long term extension to PL-480 was not that the Congress thought conditions would change so that we'd need new law, but they felt that whenever this bill has to come up, we get a chance at it again; and the administration, knowing that it's coming up soon, is going to pay attention to it. So it was the committee's desire to conserve its own power that was the major factor in this.

B: Does that kind of thing ever get frustrating for someone in the administration?

J: Always frustrating. You just have to learn to live with it, I think.

B: Work within that framework?

J: Work within that framework. And I think the Department of Agriculture has had so much experience with that--the people involved in it--I think compared to the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture is much more practiced in doing this. I remember when we were all called to testify on East-West trade under PL-480, and whether or not we had conformed in

letter and in spirit to all the restrictions against trading with Communist countries in strategic or other materials. The State department, I remember, asked Agriculture to take the lead in the testimony, and they would be there to answer questions. This wasn't before the Agriculture Committee, but I think it was because they felt that we were a little more experienced in yielding to the idiosyncrasies of the Congress.

B: I don't know whether this applies in agricultural legislation dealing with international affairs, but Agriculture, unlike State, has a kind of domestic clientele that is probably useful in handling Congress.

J: Yes. I know that it has long been said, including by me when I was teaching instead of trying to practice, that one of the problems of State was that it didn't have any clientele, or that its clientele was outside the United States. I suppose this is the major reason.

It has been my observation though that there's another factor. I don't know whether I mentioned this to you earlier. I think that the Department of State ought to have a U.S. desk. I think it ought to have more really top level people in State concerned with public opinion in the United States. Now, I realize that the Congress has been very restrictive about you can't advertise yourself or build up your own programs in the United States. I think there are some ways that the State department could give greater attention to trying to bukld up. I've told several of my friends in State this, and I think they sort of agree because they realize --I don't know if they know how and whether it can be done.

But basically of course they do have constituencies that are represented by public spirited organizations; they have foreign policy association, United Nation associations. And then they have some that go further, like SANE, and some of these others that are interested in foreign

policy. But the economic interest that has the clientele, you might say, or the constituency of Agriculture of Labor, they don't have as such.

B: Some of it of course must be personality. Secretary Freeman appears to have been very good at getting along with Congress.

J: Yes, he was very good at getting along with congressmen, partly because of his personality, partly because he recognized how important that was and was determined to go out of his way to do this; to just invite them for breakfast; to just do the little things, join with them in those interests that he had in common with them, even if ideologically perhaps he had little in common.

B: Somewhere along the line in this, things must have gotten awfully touchy within the Agriculture department's own areas. For example--this may be a layman's gross oversimplification--but among the things you're trying to do is build up food production in foreign countries in specific crops which are raised in America and which are exported to foreign countries. The various clienteles of the Agriculture department must have gotten at least crossways with each other occasionally.

J: We were helped in this problem for at least a couple of years by what looked like a very serious overall food shortage in the world.

B: The famine years of '66 and--

J: The concern lest there would be an eventual collision between population and food supply that would create more havoc than anyone cared to contemplate; that in order to prevent this, the less developed countries would simply have to increase their production. We were helped more--if you could get down to a real discussion with the farm organization leadership, and I've even done this in meetings with more than the leadership--by trying to present what figures we have in the studies that have been made

indicating that what does more for American agricultural exports than anything else is a higher standard of living on the part of the other people. What I used to try to do was to show them certain things in the trends: One, our biggest market has been the prosperous and the countries with growing prosperity in Western Europe. Look at what they're doing to their own agriculture. They're under the Common Market, developing more of their own, subsidizing their own production. In other words, you point out to the American farmers, "This market cannot grow very much; it may even decline."

But we studied the market for our products in the poor developing countries of the world. We found that our exports for cash to them of food products increased not proportionately to their increase in per capita income, but substantially more, because when a country that's food short gets a little increase in its income, it buys more food. And then you'd have to show them that in order to increase the per capita income in most of these countries, you simply had to increase the profitability of their agricultural sector because most of their people live in the agricultural sector. So except for the narrow immediate view applying to one or more commodities--in which case you could prove the opposite--but except for that, the long term interest of the American farmer and his export market coincides with an acceleration of the standard of living, which means the productivity, which means the agricultural productivity in the developing country.

B: Do you find this an effective argument?

J: Farmers could understand that.

B: And were willing to take what is a pretty long-range view?

J: Would take it, but the trouble with presenting this argument is that it

takes awhile. The demagogue can so easily say--to go back to the Guatemala case--we're helping them to raise more cotton to sell in competition with our cotton.

B: Let's see, this Guatemala case was [talked about] before the tape was turned on. You might explain.

J: I see. At one point when we were asked for our approval of a loan for the purchase of a very sophisticated modern cotton-picking machine in Guatemala, I was concerned about how this would look to our members of the committees in Congress who were from cotton-producing states and were worried about our cotton surpluses. At that particular point I tried to find out from our experts what else we could encourage in Guatemala, and the first suggestion I got was beef, about which we were having just as much trouble with exports. But again, you should show any beef producer that as far as the export of beef is concerned, there <u>really</u> you've got to have rising incomes, because until you get a pretty high income you don't buy beef. So it is not hard to prove to people that the long-run advantage is in raising the standards of living in these countries. One of the things you have to try to show them, I think, is that the long run at present rates of change is not many years away.

B: Yes, actually there have been fairly impressive improvements in many countries just in the Kennedy-Johnson years.

J: Yes, there were substantial improvements in some of those countries.

B: Of course, that brings up one of what I suppose was a major problem just about the time you were really getting ready to implement this self-help or short tether feature of the food program. India, a major population, had those two straight years of famine.

J: Yes, those two years of famine were, I suppose,a repetition of what India

had gone through countless times. The base of it was the first famine in this century--the worst drought--I should say the worst drought rather than the worst famine because the population was so much greater now than it was at the time of their last bad drought. So the famine part, I suppose, the threat gets worse.

But you mentioned two things there. You mentioned self-help and short tether. When Mr. Subramanian, then the Minister of Agriculture, was in the U.S. trying to get greater amounts of food during the first of the drought years, he was discussing with just a few of us the concern in India and the tremendous efforts they were making to improve their productivity, for which I think he personally deserves a lot of credit. He's a very active, effective person. And I made the comment, I said, "Perhaps, then, if all of this does bear fruit, you will look back and perhaps this new attitude in the Indian government of giving more of its resources to agriculture, of determining to develop more, will prove to be a silver lining in this drought; that perhaps because of the threat of famine your country will awaken to the need for agricultural development."

His answer was, "That was the second awakening. The first awakening was our uncertainty of continued supplies under PL-480." In other words, this short tether had jerked them up first before the drought hit, and they had begun to develop.

B: Did you find governments of foreign countries involved in these activities generally cooperative?

J: Yes. My observations were rather interesting here. Aid recipients never like strings to aid because it makes them feel less sovereign. They want to decide for themselves. When we passed the self-help provisions and made them, if not completely, almost strings to getting food aid--we said

we would provide food aid to those countries determined to improve their own production. The people that we generally dealt with, which were generally the agricultural ministries, were at heart pleased about this string because it meant that they had greater strength within their bureaus of the budget in getting for agriculture a share of their government's resources.

Now, perhaps the Prime Minister might not have felt that way; perhaps the education ministry or whatever else they had might not have. But the people that we generally dealt with felt that this gave them an extra boost.

B: How extensive did your strings get? For example, we've been talking in general terms about the need for a country to improve its agricultural production. Did you get more specific and say, "What you need is a fertilizer plant or a tractor factory?" Did we as the United States go into details of their machinery?

J: Yes. The degree of the detail varied from country to country. For example, in some country, we might just say, "You have to take steps of this or that kind, as recommended by the World Bank to curb inflation." But for some countries--take India, of course, as the prime example-- the self-help provisions written in the PL-480 agreements were quite long and detailed. They not only said "Build a new fertilizer plant," but "Provide facilities so that by a certain year you will be producing at home so many tons of fertilizer; and provide for the use of foreign exchange in the interim so that each year you will be buying this much fertilizer to put on your land."

B: Were the proper agencies of the foreign countries involved in the drafting stage of this kind of specific requirement?

J: Yes, they always were. We would come up first with what we thought.

B: Did you find any tendency of foreign countries toward--for want of a better word--status seeking, wanting something spectacular like a new port or a tractor factory as opposed to something more down-to-earth like a--?

J: I think you always find that, but I think during this period that I'm speaking of--in the last four or five years--you had a growing recognition that the foundation of all of this in most of these countries had to be agriculture. I believe that ten and fifteen years ago they were more impressed with the glories of the steel mill, or even a nuclear reactor. I think that their growing populations, their continued need for more food, plus the emphasis that the U.S. gave and the emphasis given internationally by such agencies as FAO, was finally percolating.

B: One always hears as kind of an axiom that farmers are reluctant to change. Of course, what you're encouraging here is change and fairly rapid change. Did you find any sort of earthbound conservatism down at the level of the farmers themselves?

J: I think that phrase "farmers are reluctant to change" was overplayed. I think farmers are no more reluctant to change than anybody else under the same circumstances. I think at the time that farmers were more isolated they were less likely to change. The poorer a farmer is, the less likely he is to change, but I think this applies to all people. The more successful become more adventuresome. The more a farmer stands to risk what little he has--which was the case in this country for awhile and all over the world--the less he is willing to change.

For example, I think this applied to the kind of subsistence agriculture that we're concerned with. The poor subsistence farmer in most of these countries produced enough for himself and that's about all. He'd bury a little for a lean year. He didn't have a good marketing

system; he had no cheap credit. The rates of credit that most of these farmers still pay are astounding to me--rates nobody would pay in the United States. If he tried a new seed or a new method, certainly if he spent any money for fertilizer, he didn't know what was going to happen--maybe next year it would all fair. Maybe next year he wouldn't be able to support his family, or to feed them out of what he produced. So I think that his reluctance to change was due to his circumstances because when you provide changed circumstances, you find that the farmers, like those that adopted the new varieties in India and Pakistan and elsewhere, changed rather rapidly. They did this in Iran; they've done it in Turkey; and they've done it in these other countries. You provide them with credit, you provide them with a very little vague sense of security, you provide them with a demonstration plot along the road where the new method produces much better crops than the old, and they'll change.

B: There's another factor here, too, related to that, I suppose. Among the other things you're dealing with here are areas like allocation of capital, land distribution, the kind of thing that is the stuff of domestic politics in these other countries. Did you ever in the planning for this give any thought to the political repercussions within the other countries, whether or not you were either even indirectly aiding a certain party or group of parties?

J: I would say perhaps rather than concern for aiding a party or parties, we would think of concern for aiding a certain development, like we're afraid of and we shy away from, and we don't know enough about the right way to get land reform, I guess, to impose it upon anyone. But we do know and we do emphasize that you must give the producer himself--the farmer himself--a stake in the profits. Now, he might get that by guaranteed

prices; he may get it by not having to pay too much rent; or he may get it by owning the land--it varies from country to country.

But we have emphasized this incentive for the farmer, and varying from country to country, tried to suggest ways. A price level is one assured way, and it's the immediate way that most farmers, wherever they are, think about. We have emphasized, and we've done a lot in our self-help programs of helping them to organize good programs of supervised agricultural credit. Now, when you supervise credit, you not only lend the needed to produce by this new and probably more expensive method with a little better tools, but you have somebody there or available to show or teach the farmer how to use it so that the credit won't be wasted.

This helps a country to adopt a program of supervised credit. We sometimes make provisions that we sell the food we provide currency, and we will grant back a certain amount of this currency for the purpose of creating an agricultural bank, or cooperative developments in the agricultural areas to provide credit to the farmers under certain terms. So what we do, in a case like this--support what is absolutely essential to land reform in any country--is to give the poor fellow that gets the land a wherewithal to get credit to operate.

B: Does the Agriculture department have sole control of the use of the counterpart funds?

J: Oh, no. It doesn't have really control at all. It has influence. In writing up the agreements, a certain amount of what is done with the local currency is written into the agreement--"so much for U.S. uses." After that perhaps our Agricultural Research Service will have something to say about some of the agricultural research that is going to be done with these funds. But the Embassy will use it for Embassy funds; and

other agencies will use it. And much of it has to be appropriated for use, because the Congress at one time decided that the administration shouldn't be able to use this local currency or the repayments in local currency without appropriations.

B: Most of the actual operating of this was done on the scene by the Agricultural attaches attached to the embassies. Is that the chain of command?

J: The attache checks on the operation of PL-480. Generally speaking, he is on the negotiations which are done under the ambassador, usually in the country concerned. The negotiating instructions are formulated after an interchange between the mission itself and the agency in Washington, and they are formulated only after you can get agreement. We've talked about State and AID and Agriculture. Always you must get agreement from the Bureau of the Budget, and quite usually Treasury. You don't want to leave the Treasury out because as the balance of payments became more and more of a problem, the position that Treasury took became more important. Sometimes AID and State and Agriculture would all want one thing, and Treasury would say, "No, that's too hard on our balance of payments."

B: Did the White House, either in the sense that Mr. Johnson or the staff there, get involved in any of this, at the operational type level?

J: Not at the operational type, but in the negotiations one of the innovations of President Johnson was when he wanted to personally approve all PL-480 agreements, which he did do during most of the time that he was in, not right from the beginning, but after he got concerned and we got a new law passed. I would say this didn't happen before we got the new law.

B: Was his approval generally pro forma, or did you ever get one back asking for more details or something like this?

J: Sometimes he just didn't approve. And sometimes, as far as I know, to a certain extent I think the Bureau of the Budget's recommendations, the Director of the Budget--I know we'd arrive at general agreement, and the Bureau of the Budget was always in on this; occasionally we'd get a White House representative.

B: Who would it usually be, incidentally?

J: Ed Hamilton for awhile--he came more often than anyone else. He was really, I guess, under the Security Council, under Walt Rostow. He'd come over and he'd be there as an observer. And whenever there was a real controversy--some of the negotiations I'd never get in on, because there was no problem--if it got to be bad enough, I would learn about it and my counterparts would learn about it; and if we really had to have an inter-agency session, I'd always call Ed or someone from the White House to make sure that somebody near the top or the Bureau of the Budget was over.

Then we'd come up with an agreement. We'd get it all drafted, and it officially was signed. This request to the President for approval was signed by the Administrator of AID and Secretary Freeman. Then it would go to the White House and wait for approval. Now sometimes it would be held up by the Director of the Budget--they'd recheck everything. But sometimes I know, after they'd send it in, we'd hear nothing. This was usually the case in regard to big and important deals like with India, Pakistan. The President would take a personal interest when he had been talking to some head of state or some important person of a country of real foreign policy importance, and he'd be concerned with what we could do--not only India and Pakistan generally, but, say, more recently in Indonesia. So he took a very personal interest in some of these.

B: Would it be fair to say that Mr. Johnson's general reaction was to give

more than Agriculture originally recommended?

J: No.

B: Was there any pattern to his--?

J: Generally, it was to be stricter. Not so much as applied to quantities--that would depend somewhat on the state of our supply--but on strict self-help measures. That was his tendency.

B: Did the Viet Nam war create a special interest in this kind of--?

J: We had two problems in Agriculture, specifically in Agriculture, relating to Viet Nam. One was of course the tremendous PL-480 shipments, primarily of rice. I say "primarily" of rice; we shipped everything else that they needed, whether it was canned chicken or what. But rice was what they needed in volume, and rice was what we had least of. The rice crops in the United States, as well as in the world, seem to vary more than wheat, let us say. We can't count on these things. We have strict quotas. And there are important people from the two great rice states, Texas and Arkansas, and you had some pretty important people from Arkansas concerned about rice as well as Texas.

B: You mean Congressmen?

J: McClellan, Wilbur Mills, Fulbright.

B: Poage in Texas?

J: Yes. So you see--Poage's district wasn't rice, I guess. Poage was cotton. At any rate, we had to provide rice. Now, more people in the world like rice than like wheat. We taught a lot of Indians to eat wheat, as we did the Japanese. But in Viet Nam, you had to get rice to them. So Viet Nam had the priority in our rice. And we practically for a year or two stopped any other PL-480 donations other than Viet Nam.

B: When would that have been?

J: The last two-three years. Now, last year Viet Nam had some surpluses of

rice in certain areas. Viet Nam used to be one of the biggest exporters of rice in the world. They got some of the new varieties here last year, and they had some very good crops. In some areas they were able to ship to Saigon. Quite often the point was you had to get the rice to Saigon. Maybe they had enough rice somewhere, but you couldn't get it in, or the Viet Cong had taken it or something. But they needed rice to eat, and they needed rice to keep the price down--to minimize inflation.

Then we had a major attempt at the department providing technical assistance to develop agriculture, as part of what you might call "the third war," or a part of the pacification. We have anywhere from seventy to more than a hundred agriculturalists in South Viet Nam, very carefully chosen, very well trained--I think they all got the language--to go out and help them in every aspect of improved agriculture. We've had some good success stories. We had one man lost at Hue during the Tet Offensive--a young agricultural extension agent from somewhere out West.

B: Killed in the Tet Offensive?

J: Well, we guess--maybe they know now whether he was killed. Maybe he's one of those they dug up, but at the time they just knew he disappeared. He was there. Somebody who later escaped saw him there at the time of the siege. I guess there's a possibility that he may still be alive, I don't know. But he had never done anything other than be a county agent--help farmers to farm--in Viet Nam as well as here.

We picked some of the best people we had. We just pulled them out of this agency and that agency, wherever they needed.

B: Yes, we found it took awhile. It took awhile to select from among the eager ones the ones that we thought would be best suited and who could pass the language aptitude tests and who passed all the other strict tests,

etc.

B: How cooperative did you find the Vietnamese government at the national and provincial level?

J: Freeman was over there a couple of times. Whenever he talked to officials there, they seemed to be very cooperative. They seemed to look forward to this. I can't tell you, because I don't know, how this worked in the provinces where they were. We found some difficulties for awhile with officialdom, both theirs and ours, that were not agriculture-oriented. I suppose it was probably conflict over priorities--in a situation like that, you might find that.

B: Our officialdom that you've mentioned, was that primarily military or State?

J: AID. I don't know too much about this. I know that we had to work very hard in arguing with what our experts thought. We argued with our AID experts. What our experts thought would have to be the pricing and the purchasing arrangements that would give the Vietnamese farmers the incentive to produce for all they were worth. This may have been an academic argument, I don't know.

Some day I think there will be--I hope there will be--a very interesting story written about our attempts to achieve land reform. I'd have to look up some of my files here on this. Most of this was secret at the time. I don't know what it is now. But it was well known that we had--we sent a man over from Agriculture, a specialist in land reform who had participated in the land reform in Taiwan and in Korea, to join with a specialist under AID and make a surbey and make recommendations on land reform. This must have been three-four years ago. It was when things were really getting pretty tough.

They came back and they wrote a recommendation that was kept rather quiet at the time--and still is quiet I believe--to the effect that the single most important thing that the government of South Viet Nam could do to win the hearts and minds of all these people in the boondocks that supposedly didn't know--they just wanted to be left alone, they were neither for the government or for the Viet Cong--was to implement a real land reform program becuase according to these men, the one thing they all wanted was their own land.

This was accompanied by several things--a documentation as to how much land there was, a recognition that the Vietnamese government itself had a lot of land left over from the French that had never been distrubuted; that most of the landlords in these critical areas were gone from there, probably in Paris, and therefore wouldn't be around to object. But these two men in their report finally said not only would this be the thing we could do that would most win the hearts and minds of these peasants, but unless we did it we would lose their hearts and minds. The Viet Cong were going around there and giving them titles to the land that they were on that might have no good legal basis or any other kind of basis, but that at least had psychological basis.

Well, this intrigued some of us and we got to work on it. We had some meetings over in State in the middle of the night. I remember one meeting lasted until 1:00 a.m. We had some experts in land reform discussing this. I personally thought it might work, you know, and I was persuaded that perhaps this was the last chance to try it, but it got bogged down.

B: Where?

J: I'm not sure all of the places that it got bogged down. The AID officials in South Viet Nam said it wouldn't work. Our boys said it had to work.

Our people said, and this was before we poured in these newer hundreds of thousands of men--before we went that far--our boys said we could finance part of this and it would be a cheap way to help win the war. They worked out a plan for eventual purchase on the part of the peasants who got the land. There were all kinds of plans. The head of our Agricultural Development Service, Dr. Matthew Drosdoff, who is now up at Cornell and who had spent some time in Viet Nam, I think he had spent about three years there, was pretty sold on it. So was I. I being sold on it in theory--I had never been in Viet Nam, but it sounded good to me--would have liked to have seen some attempt at it.

Freeman said that Ky had told him he'd like to put into effect the plan of land reform. He thought it would be the best politics he could think of. I don't know where it got bogged down. I don't know whether it was visionary or impossible, you know, but it was very interesting--. And since that got sort of folded away and buried, every six or eight months somebody would come out with an article. General Lansdale would come out, several other people would come out with articles; and in there you'd find that if they could have won the heart of the rank and file by giving them their land--you know, every now and then you see this, so I don't know.

B: Was it ever brought to the attention of Mr. Johnson?

J: Yes, I think Mr. Johnson knew about it. And I think he had especially asked Komer to look into this, because just before Komer left for Viet Nam, he wanted some figures, I recall. I remember I stayed up all night and tried to get him these figures because I couldn't reach anybody else. I don't know if I did a very good job either--I've never heard about it since. I think he had specifically asked Komer to look into it.

Some day the strings of all of this may be pulled together, and it might be interesting.

B: To give a clue, will the files related to this be in the Agriculture department, that is, so far as you know about the files?

J: Some of them may be, but I don't know. I think I have at home a copy of the first report that these two men made--the Cooper-Hewes Report, as we called it. Larry Hewes was the man from Agriculture, and Cooper was the AID man.

I just happened to run into Larry Hewes the other day. He's retired from Agriculture and is working for the World Bank now, and we sort of commiserated with each other about our--

B: You must have speculated, more specifically, about where it got stopped. For instance, did anyone suspect the State department feared antagonizing the Ky government?

J: Oh, sure, that was suspected. But we didn't--AID, in its reports, the AID officials there, some of them, came out and said--now, we had Ky's direct statement to Freeman, he'd like land reform, but this of course doesn't mean anything necessarily. We had been told, and whether they put it in writing or not, that the political support in the provinces for the existing government came from the landlord groups. This was disputed. And our problem--certainly my problem--was my awareness of the fact that you can't judge a plan by how good it looks unless you know all the circumstances. I tried to learn as many of the circumstances as I could, but I knew that I saw only a part of the picture.

B: Is any extensive amount of land in Viet Nam still owned by French interests directly?

J: No, I don't think by French interests. I think that they're by the heirs

of the French interests. Of course, French investors must own some. But I just recall the surveys that these men made. Of course, they all said this when you pinned it down, when you discussed this with others who had been experienced in Southeast Asia. At least I was impressed that even though South Viet Nam may be a little country, it has got tremendous variations in the extent to which there is, or in most cases is not, a feeling of nationalism, the general attitude. However, our people would always insist, our land reform people, that for people on the land, they always wanted to own the land, wherever they were, that this was a universal longing.

--Telephone interruption--

I didn't have too much to do directly with the Kennedy Round. Let me conclude with what you need here on the Kennedy Round by saying that, generally speaking, the Department of Agriculture's position was trying to get adequate recognition for trade relations with regard to agricultural products in an overall negotiation that tended to have most of its concern with manufactured non-agricultural products. And we had to be concerned about tariff concessions, both in terms of our own economy and in terms of the public relations and our constituency. It was a problem. We partly succeeded.

Now, to the relations with FAO and the State department, because the two were merged. The State department has by right and logic and tradition the responsibility for negotiating with not only other countries, but international organizations. But because at one stage President Truman delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture relations with FAO, that is still a part of the picture. Now Agriculture, because of the nature of the subject, would have something to do with it anyway. But there has been,

I understand, somewhat of a bureaucratic problem between State and Agriculture with regard to the U.S. policies toward FAO. This one of the aspects of my work that was extraordinarily interesting to me, partly because I was interested in the jurisdiction, because I had been interested in international organizations long before I knew anything about agriculture, and because it was my responsibility to be the U.S. delegate. Usually what happened--and still happens--is that if the representative of the Department of Agriculture is of reasonably high rank, he is the delegate to FAO meetings. The alternate is from State, or AID possibly, although generally State. And the State department is supposed to have enough advisers there to keep the Agriculture representative from making a bad mistake, and to keep them doing something positive.

I had no trouble with the State department in this. I was the U.S. delegate for a little more than four years to these meetings. And the State department apparently would say the same thing about me, because they have quite repeatedly said that our relations with FAO and our influence on FAO had increased substantially during those four years. There was a low point about the time I took over in this area.

B: Incidentally, the mechanics you've described there sound like State doesn't mind having an Agriculture figurehead as long as the man from Agriculture doesn't do much. I gather that you were no figurehead.

J: No, I wasn't a figurehead. I sometimes convinced them to do what they might not have done otherwise. On one occasion, and this happened early, I was able to achieve for them a goal that they had not instructed me to achieve, but I knew enough to do anyway and that they said couldn't be done.

B: What was that?

J: This was the first FAO conference I ever attended. I was the chief delegate, but it was the year they had these international food and agriculture, population--they had all these committees, and they all made reports. The President had set up this. And I had to come back for a weekend because I was the chairman of a government committee on food and agriculture. I came back from Rome for this, and flew back on Monday. I got there Monday noon after an all-night flight. And the Counselor of Embassy, who came out to meet me said, "You know what happened this morning? They passed the Cuban resolution."

I said, "Well, I hope we fought it." I didn't know it was coming up. I didn't know which Cuban resolution, but I assumed it was a bad one.

He said, "Well, you know, the startling thing was the U.S. delegate didn't oppose it! The alternate who was in the chair at the time who was a State department man didn't talk against it."

I said, "This is outrageous!" They read the resolution to me, and it was a resolution that FAO should call upon all member nations--it was made after Cuba had made this bitter anti-American speech--should call on all nations to give their aid without regard for political or economic considerations. I could see why a Cuban would bring that up. I said, "We had to oppose this."

"Well, he didn't--he said it was going to pass anyway."

I said, "Didn't anyone oppose it?"

"Yes, the Norwegian did, and the UK did, but when they didn't get support from the United States, they all faded away." This was unbelievable! It was my first conference, but I thought this was outrageous. I had orders to go back to Washington, but I felt kind of bad--I'd have at least made a speech.

So I served notice when I got back--this was at a commission, they meet in commissions first, and then they meet in plenary, but they never change what's done in commissions supposedly. So it was going to come up the next day, and I immediately tried to find out what I could do to reverse this in spite of the fact--this was so absurd to me; I didn't know--. I just assumed what our policy ought to be in this. I had no instructions on this. This wasn't related to Agriculture.

Well, out at a Japanese cocktail party that night I tried to figure out what to do and didn't learn much. I got home real tired, you know--traveled all night. Well, at 2 o'clock in the morning our own time, the State department had me on the phone. They had just got the message. "What the blankety-blank happened?"

I said, "I'm still trying to find out."

They said, "Well, we know you weren't there, but there is one thing you must do, even if it's embarrassing. You must get written into the record that the United States opposes this."

I said, "Well, of course, that, but I'm going to get it changed."

"Oh," they said, "You can't do that!"

I said, "Why can't I? Do you object?"

"Oh, no, but it can't be done. It never can be done. We tried to do it in ECOSAC, and we had an expert there, and you can't do that. But you must get us on record."

B: Excuse me, I have to ask for our poor transcriber--Ecosac?

J: Economic and Social Council of the U.N., where they had experienced State department people. So I told them of course I'd get the record changed, but that I was going to get the resolution changed. And I worked all during the rest of the conference. I tried first one thing in the

commission. I tried to win friends and influence people. I finally got the Africans concerned--Cuba had them solidly with them, but I finally pointed out to them that the U.N. had asked everybody to refrain from aiding Rhodesia because of political considerations and so on. The Cubans had to begin modifying their resolution, saying this didn't apply to Africa, and I eroded it away for about a week. When it finally came up in plenary, they said you never debate what the commission recommends. But I hadn't been able to change the commission, so I started the debate. And we had a debate. And after every time I'd talk, the British said, "We will vote with you, but we won't speak because we're so worried about this African situation." I tried to get supporters. I did get Turkey to support it and several others. We finally got it changed by a unanimous vote with one abstention--Cuba!

B: How about that!

J: So the State department thought I was all right.

B: From then on, you didn't have too much trouble with them.

J: From then on--and this was early in the game, you see. But I was determined that this was so--and the Cuban--they had sent their U.N. man down there. He's a good speaker apparently. I don't understand Spanish, but in the translation he was saying the same old Commie line. You know, it has been the same for twenty-five years.

At any rate, what I was going to say was that I don't think I was a figurehead. I think that occasionally when we started out with different points of view, they would win, and occasionally I would win. But I think we were always agreed on the position to take. And I think the relationship with FAO substantially improved.

B: Incidentally, did you hear from Mr. Johnson about your success in getting

the resolution changed?

J: I don't think Mr. Johnson ever knew about this, but I got a very nice congratulatory telegram at least signed, "Rusk." I don't suppose it ever got high enough to get to the President.

B: Is the FAO really an effective organization? Is the United States just trying to sort of carry it along until the time it can be, or--?

J: The FAO is effective and could be more effective in spurring agricultural development. It can do things that we can't do for the simple reason that a developing country with [a] great inferiority complex and a great regard for its sovereignty will take advice from an international body of which it's a member when it cannot take advice, particularly from imperialist Uncle Sam, you know. So we can do things through the FAO that we couldn't do otherwise. I think it has done pretty well for an infant organization, growing like Topsy, set up twenty some years ago for the purpose of being a forum for researchers and technologists that has swung over to a mission for development, really.

It faces some serious problems, which I think it has in common with all international organizations. The basic problem is what do you do about the one-member-one-vote deal! We supply a third of the financing; we have one vote, the same as little Gambia with 300,000 people. At some point this is going to have to be resolved.

Now, what I tried to do, and to whatever extent that I accomplished anything there, I think was based on this way to get around it. We had been badly beaten at the conference, even on the floor I understand. I wasn't there at the conference in '63. In '65 was my first conference. I tried to win the support for the policies that we supported on the grounds that there was a common interest in accelerated agricultural

development of the poor and developing countries; that it was to our interest and to their interests. I didn't try to ever say, "You ought to vote this way, or we'll cut down our contributions." I tried to make them see that to the extent that they set the rich world against the poor world, their organization was bound to fail. But to the extent they could bring out the common goals, it could succeed. And you can generally get most of them to agree. I think, however, there is politics there as there is everywhere. There are special interests, your own and everyone else's. And unless you take this slightly longer term view, you could end up in an exercise in futility. But I think it could do a tremendous job.

And I think the United Nations' system, by perhaps giving a greater attention to the kind of cooperation that we can get in economic affairs, would have a little background of strength to hopefully counterbalance the trouble they have in the political sphere. This vote on Cuba was a very interesting exercise, you know. It took that couple of weeks, The Cuban resolution when it passed had solid African, solid Latin American votes. They can carry anything. This was an educational exercise more than it was a political exercise.

B: To make a radical shift in subject, did you do any politicking in 1968?

J: Yes, I did. I tried to do what I could.

B: To start, incidentally, with the spring, was there any serious effect within the Agriculture department when Mr. Freeman and Mr. Schnittker got off in different directions, one for Humphrey and one for Kennedy?

J: Well, everybody was <u>so</u> shocked when Schnittker came out for Kennedy, it just couldn't figure what the reason was. Some people thought they knew what it was. I suppose it was his position on Viet Nam. Although I

talked over most things with Schnittker, I never brought this subject up because I didn't want to say what I would have had to say if he had asked about it. So we never talked about it.

B: What you would have had to say would have been something about loyalty, I presume?

J: What I would have said was simply that if my conscience had compelled me to do a thing like that, it would have compelled me to resign first. This is obvious. And yet I felt here's a man with four boys, a family, and probably I shouldn't say that. Maybe he couldn't resign, you know. So I decided I wouldn't talk about it.

What happened was that there was a silence on the subject, and there was a silence on the part of most of us who took a different position. Most of us were for Humphrey. With regard to Schnittker, we didn't talk with him so much about anything from then on. The guy was kind of a loner after that. Freeman made a crack in staff meeting about it--a humorous crack, the best thing he could do, morale-wise and everything, he made some crack. But he made this at the time he told us what the President's directive had been after that.

B: That was the directive about no public comments?

J: Yes. Now I had hoped to take an active part in the campaign. I wanted to take it, of course, for Humphrey. I took an active part, but it was early morning meetings every day of the week, working on policy and strategy and trying to help write these. Some of them had some help, some didn't.

B: Were you working with Secretary Freeman on this?

J: Yes.

B: Did you ever face this knotty question of the relationship of Mr. Johnson

to Humphrey's campaign?

J: Yes, of course you couldn't help this. And I don't know the inside story of this. I know what I thought, I felt, and my husband didn't always agree with me so I don't know. My judgment was that the President was ready to assist in whatever way he thought was appropriate and Humphrey wanted. And I felt that Humphrey was too uncertain to ask for the kind of help he should have asked for earlier. Now, that's just my judgment. I think if Johnson had come out earlier and stronger for Humphrey it would have helped. I think that the President would have come out earlier and stronger for Humphrey if Humphrey had asked for it.

B: Is that sort of a clash of prides?

J: No--Well, I think in part, but I think on Humphrey's side--I don't want to presume to judge people's motives--but I think Humphrey was really beset and pestered and pecked at by the hawks and the doves and the owls. And I think some of the people pretty close to him had opinions that Johnson would hurt him more than he would help. I don't think Humphrey felt this, but I don't think Humphrey was sure. I've never discussed this directly with Humphrey. We've skirted around it. My judgment is probably not very good on this, but this has been my feeling.

B: Was there a time there late in the campaign when you thought you had won?

J: The first week after the convention, I felt pretty hopeless, and then it didn't get any better during the second week. And in the third week it hardly began to get better. No, I was very uncertain at heart. I did feel that if the campaign had gone on possibly two-three more days, another week--we were obviously on the upswing. Or you can just as well say if Humphrey had started the kind of campaign he finally did a little earlier. But I also know that some of the things he had ready and wanted to do, we didn't have the money for. The money came in at the last minute.

B: You know, if I'm insulting your ethics, please slap me down. The Agriculture department has rather large resources of men and information. Can they or are they used in this kind of situation?

J: There is no insult to my ethics on that. The vast numbers of men that are in the boondocks where they could help, are in what we call ASCS-- the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. They can be used to a limited extent. My experience is, and this is based on never having been directly involved in that agency, but having worked rather closely with the people that are at the top, that they are used on agricultural issues that have a political slant; that they are used on occasion--but not necessarily directed from headquarters--to support a congressman who is for the right agricultural program. And to a certain extent--this is on the record--it's bipartisan. A North Dakota Republican will get supported just as much by them because he's for the programs and the policies as perhaps a Minnesota Democrat would. I don't believe they're really used in a presidential campaign to any significant extent.

Now let me add another thing. They are political appointees. They have terms, but they're limited. They presumably don't expire until December or something like this. They know if the party changes they'll be replaced. What do you do? What does the individual do? Nobody at the department is telling them, "You go out and campaign for a Democrat because you might lose your job." Some of them shore themselves up; some of them are Republicans. This is a fact of life. But I will have to say that they are used for the programs--for example, a wheat referendum. And is this education, or is it propaganda? The department believes this is a good program. It wants to make sure the farmers understand it. If the department presents it or the ASCS committeeman presents it, is he

going to present it in a favorable way? Sure he is, even if the Farm Bureau doesn't. So add that to it.

B: I've just about run out of questions. Is there anything you think we should cover, or anything you would like to add to this kind of record?

J: I think we've covered a lot here.

B: I think it has been most informative. Do you want to essay an evaluation of Mr. Johnson for posterity?

J: Yes. I think Mr. Johnson was probably, certainly the greatest President--let me say parenthetically I think Truman did a tremendous job--in my memory. I think he was a man of tremendous courage and great ability; that he certainly lacked some sort of public relations ability, but I don't think that lack was the major reason for the reaction against him.

And I'm not ready to say that the Viet Nam war was the major reason for the reaction against him, although this touched it off. I think what the communications media did was tremendously important, and I think that some important columnists, the communications people, some of the academic radicals, never gave him a fair chance in the public mind. However, he was not particularly skillful in handling this kind of thing, which is part I suppose of his makeup.

I think that he will go down as a very great President who could not overcome this, whatever it is, this combination of things--the Viet Nam doves, the power of communications and what TV can do when it shows you people getting beaten in Chicago or shot in Viet Nam, and shows only one side, and what kind of emotions can be stirred up. I, personally, although I've been a friend and supporter of Hubert Humphrey's for certainly twenty-five years, would rather have seen Lyndon Johnson President for the next four years than anyone else I know.

B: Public image aside, did you find Mr. Johnson an attractive man personally?

J: Personally, yes.

B: Again, it is said by many that Mr. Johnson does well with women. Is that correct?

J: I never had a chance to know the President as well as I would have liked to. I spent very little time with him, three or four occasions, once or twice when he was Vice President, and I admired him very much then. I didn't know very much about him except his reputation and what Hubert Humphrey told me about him at the time of the convention in '60. All the time of his presidency and of my appointment--I saw him and talked with him before I was appointed, which was a very pleasant conversation. I met him once with V. R. Sen, when the Director General of FAO and the Assistant Secretary of State was involved in international organizations.

B: Sen?

J: Sen--an Indian who had been the Director General for some time. We had such an interesting talk there that the President, who had decided to give us twenty minutes because he was with the head of an international organization, sent back the aide who came to tell him his next appointment was waiting. We spent another forty minutes there. That time was very interesting, I enjoyed it very much. Dr. Sen was very pleased, and the President said one or two nice things about me to him, which of course flattered me. On two or three other occasions, so that I can't say that I got to know him personally well enough--my admiration for him is the way he performed

B: Anything else?

J: That's about all I can say. I wish you luck.

B: Thank you very much.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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