INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: HERBERT JENKINS

INTERVIEWER: T. HARRI BAKER

PLACE: Chief Jenkins' office, Police Headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia

Tape 1 of 1

B: This is the interview with Herbert Jenkins, chief of police of Atlanta, Georgia. Chief of police since 1947, I believe, sir.

J: Yes, sir.

B: Sir, did you have any contact with Mr. Johnson before the mid-1960s, that is, when he was a senator and a vice president?

J: No. I never met Mr. Johnson until later years. Of course, I knew who he was through the news media and so forth, but I never had any personal contact with him.

B: That would apply even to his activities while he was vice president, as chairman of the Equal Opportunities Council?

J: No, I did not have personal contact. The first time I recall seeing Mr. Johnson was during the campaign, when he was running with Jack Kennedy for president. They ran a special train through the country, and he came through here and stopped over at the Terminal Station, and made a speech one night. [That] was the first time that I ever met him personally.

B: That was in the 1960 campaign?

J: Yes, sir.

B: Mr. Jenkins, did that require any unusual police precautions?

J: Well, yes, to the extent that there's a national political campaign on and one of the leading candidates was coming here to make a speech. It was very nice that he did it from the back of the train; all the security had to be in the railroad yard. It wasn't like if he had travelled any place. So we had an ample number of police on hand to see that things went smoothly, and it did go very smooth. He made a very good speech.

B: During the following years, the civil rights activity had become increasingly intense, and I know that Mayor Allen of Atlanta testified before the Congress on the 1963 civil rights proposals and testified in favor of the public accommodations and so forth.

J: I think Mayor Ivan Allen was the first mayor of a major city to publicly endorse the Civil Rights Act which was eventually passed in 1964.

B: Yes. And what I was going to bring about, sir, was did he confer with you about its effect on the city, from the police standpoint, before he did that testifying?

J: Well, we were experiencing, here, demonstrations, quite lengthy demonstrations. There was quite an agitation going on by the civil rights leaders that Dr. Martin Luther King was leading. And it started over lunch counters and restrooms, and had been . . . . (Interruption)

Well, of course, there was very much concern to the city and to the police department. We had grave responsibilities there. The business

people were very much interested, because if there's anything that paralyzes businesses, it's a demonstration or a riot, as you well know. That was before the days of the so-called riot. That was just demonstrations. It was generally peaceful, except it paralyzed the operation. And, of course, we discussed those things every day and every night. The Mayor and the Chief of Police were always on the firing line. We never hesitated. We'd move right out there in front.

And, of course, we thought at the time that we needed some assistance from the federal government, because, we had local people that was telling us, "I'd be glad to start serving Negroes if you order me to." Well, the state law prohibited it, and you had a strong feeling on the other side to maintain the status quo. And I certainly agreed with the Mayor a hundred per cent that the national Congress . . . we needed a federal law. We needed guidance. We needed them to say, "This is the law, and this is the way we go," whatever it was. And [we] had many discussions along that line. Of course, I can't speak for the Mayor, but he came to the conclusion that, "We're going to meet this head-on, and we're going to do the right, legal, decent thing, and we need some help from the federal government." So he testified before the committee.

B: As I gather, before then you had already taken considerable strides in that direction. This police force was integrated considerably before that, was it not?

J: Yes, in 1948. Of course, there had been discussions over a period of years, way back as far as 1933 or 1934. I was detailed as an aide to the Mayor, who at that time was James L. Key, and the discussion of Negro police was brought up often. And I recall, one time, there was a delegation of Negro citizens came to see him with the request that he employ Negro police. He told them that their request was a good request, but it couldn't be done at that time; we had to educate both the white and the Negro people to this point, and that he would help them with it, and when the time come, to come back, and he would employ Negro police.

After they left, he said to me that he was getting to be an old man and he'd never live to see it, but me, being a young police officer, chances are I'd have to work with Negro police, and I should be prepared to provide some of the leadership, which was a great help to me fifteen years later. The request had gained strength, and it was a demand to employ Negro police. In the meantime, I had studied the problem, and I came to the conclusion that there was a job for a Negro to do in law enforcement. Therefore, I recommended we employ Negro police. We moved into it in 1948.

B: Then, sir, on into the sixties, after the passage of the 1964 act and on into Mr. Johnson's presidency. Did the federal government, the national government, particularly the Justice Department, give you assistance in preparations, contingency plans, for possible demonstrations, this kind of thing?

J: Well, all during these years from that time, during this time, and in years to follow, this department always had a very good relationship with the U.S. Justice Department. We exchanged information; we worked together, particularly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney General's Office. We worked with them very closely.

B: Who, particularly in the Attorney General's office, did you work with?

J: Particularly Ramsey Clark. Well, even before that of course when Bobby Kennedy was attorney general, and then Mr. Katzenbach, and then Mr. Ramsey Clark. Of course, Mr. Clark was attorney general kind of at the end of the thing, when the riots and all started, and additional [inaudible]. I had more contacts with Mr. Clark than any of the others, because of the tense situation and the opportunity that I had. And then, in 1965, I was president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which put me further out in the national scene, rather than the local scene.

B: How effective was the Federal Community Relations Service which was established in these years?

J: Well, those things of course was a new approach. There was an awful lot of people that you was having to deal with that favored it; there was a lot that opposed it. You had a large group that wanted to hold on to the status quo, particularly in this part of the country. And, after all, it had been segregated for a hundred years, and there was many that thought the old system worked pretty good and didn't want any changes. So you had a lot of conflict there. But I think the federal government's leadership, in theory, in this thing took the right approach

and moved in the right direction. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, I know locally, gave us more relief than any other one thing that happened, because when they passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 making public accommodations available to all people, that really relieved our problem. It became a federal law that this should be done.

B: You were having sit-ins that winter prior to that here, I believe.

J: Oh, we had some rough sit-ins here that went on for weeks. We had to make a lot of arrests. There was very few convictions in most of those arrests because it was non-violent, but it really created turmoil and problems. But then when the Civil Rights Act that made public accommodations available for everybody [was enacted] then, generally, everybody that was for law and order accepted it, and we went from there.

B: Was it that easy? It seems to be, just from what I recall of reading the papers at the time. Atlanta seems to have, from that time on, had a remarkably good record of that kind of thing.

J: Well, again, you had the leadership here. Both the white and Negro leadership was working together. There was a good communication. They were trying to find an answer to this thing.

They had already come to the conclusion that the right thing to do was to make public accommodations available to all people, regardless of race, creed or color. Now the leadership, particularly the leadership provided by Mayor Allen and Mayor Hartsfield, had already set the stage for this. But the fact that there was a state law that required segregation put Atlanta in a rather complex position, because the attitude of the state government was to hold on to what you have

and don't change anything, and the city government was trying to change. That's where the real conflict comes. Then, when the federal government come along and says, "This is it. This is the law," then that relieved the situation. But the fact [was] that the city of Atlanta, and the leadership here, and the public officials was already prepared and adjusted, and we were for it.

B: When the leadership of Atlanta is praised, it usually includes the mayor, and the police force, and the newspapers. Do you share that opinion, too, with the newspapers, the Journal and the Constitution?

J: Well, I don't think there's any question about it. The news media is a very important part of the power structure. Maybe that's not a good term, but I don't know of any other thing to call it except the power structure, that is, the people that does the thinking, and really does some planning, and calling the signals which way we're headed. Well, after all, the news media can carry that message to more people overnight than the mayor could carry to them in ages.

B: Ralph McGill is usually given a great deal of the credit for this.

J: Well, I don't think there's any question that Ralph McGill developed early, and he's a typical southerner. But he saw the injustice in what was being done, I think. He developed a sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the Negro and his problem, and he went right down the line. He never hesitated, and he never looked back once he decided. And, frankly, I know personally Ralph McGill probably had as much influence on my thinking and my action, other than my immediate family and the Mayor, than any other person here.

B: Is that a personal influence you mean, sir? Not just through his editorials, but you knew him and talked to him personally?

J: Well, I knew Ralph McGill personally before the civil rights issue ever came up. I knew him personally and had been reading his articles over a period of years, and I had a great deal of admiration and respect for his ability to think, and his ability to get the right answer, and then to write it down. Then the civil rights movement was just one of the things that went right into that program, and it made it very easy for me to understand and follow it.

B: Did you have a personal relationship with Martin Luther King, Jr.?

J: Oh, yes. I mentioned in 1935 when there was a committee of people that came to see the Mayor at that time, Martin Luther King, Sr. was one of the people that was in that group. So I've known Dr. King, Sr., for many years. In fact, he'd been a personal friend of mine. I sought his advice, and he sought my advice on many problems of the day. And I knew Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. when he was just a teen-ager, used to see him around. But I don't recall much about him until he went to Montgomery.

B: The bus boycott?

J: Yes. Of course during that time his father was very much concerned about his welfare, and he talked to me on many occasions about his son's welfare and danger, the things he was going through. I talked to Junior on more than one occasion, and his father was very anxious for him to leave Montgomery and come back to Atlanta. He was getting a lot of threats, and there was some danger there.

B: That was one of the motives? His father believed that he could be better protected here?

J: Oh, yes. His father was really concerned for his life. I talked to his father on several occasions, and I talked to Junior on one occasion. And, of course, I was getting some information about the inquiries that were being made and other things. I had some idea. And I told Junior that he was in a dangerous position. His father was very frank, afraid that he'd never come out of there alive, and there was some reason for thinking that.

B: What was young Dr. King's reaction to that?

J: Well, I talked to him with his father, on more than one occasion, of the great danger and [that] he ought to consider maybe abandoning that project. But there's where I developed a lot of respect for King, Jr. He convinced me, then, that he was perhaps the most dedicated person that I've ever talked to. He recognized the danger. He recognized what he thought was the need to do what he was doing, and he was prepared to continue to carry it to the end, come what may. And if it took his life to do that, he was prepared to give it. I mean, that was the impression I gathered.

B: Even back there, that would have been in the late fifties?

J: Late fifties. Oh, yes. That's right. And then, of course, after that, I'd see him on many occasions, up until he was killed.

B: You know, one gets the impression, just from reading about it, that Dr. King, Jr. was kind of riding a whirlwind in the sense that Negroes, generally, and even some of the other people in the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference, were forever pushing him into a little more extreme acts. Is that a correct impression from your knowledge?

J: I think it's exactly right, particularly in recent years. Now back at the boycott, when the boycott started in Montgomery, and then later he came on back to Atlanta after they were successful there. He came back to Atlanta and lived here. He led the demonstrations on the sit-ins at the restaurants, and he was arrested several times along with a group. But, again, there was never any problems, as far as the police was concerned, with a group if Dr. King was leading it. Because I knew him and respected him. He knew me and respected me, and he didn't mind telling us in advance, "We've got to go into this store today and sit down. Now, you've probably got to arrest us." But there was understanding and cooperation and no problem. At that time, I think Dr. King was truly the leader. The Negro had a common cause that they could unite behind, and they did and they followed him. Now in later years, I don't think there's any question that the more militants put pressure on him constantly, and he was constantly under pressure to abandon his non-violent approach and become rougher.

B: I believe you must have also seen Stokely Carmichael's career from very nearly its beginning, because he was headquartered here in Atlanta for some time.

J: Oh, yes. Well, my first relation with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee that was organized here in Atlanta and South Carolina, for the main purpose of desegregating public accommodation--there was a fellow named Lonnie King, who is now the local president

of the NAACP here--but he was a student out of the university, not related to Dr. Martin Luther King. He was chairman of this committee, and worked with Dr. King and the other leaders during this period. But then along, I guess, in the early sixties . . . . Well, even back then, James Foreman was the head of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and that was the time that that organization really changed its course. And I publicly stated at that time that the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee had fallen into the hands of irresponsible leaders, one James Foreman, and it was now the Non-Student Violent Committee. And it was demonstrated right here in Atlanta at some restaurants. Then after a couple of years, James Foreman was the chairman of SNCC and then Stokely Carmichael took his place and became the chairman, and of course it moved a little further in the direction of abandoning their non-violent approach. Of course, Carmichael came in here and led a demonstration that developed the first so-called riot. We had street fightings and throwing of bottles here for two or three days, and Carmichael led that thing. Of course, he moved in and moved out. Then later he was indicted here by the grand jury.

(Interruption)

B: Would that be a reference to the 1967 riot?

J: Yes, that's right.

B: Did you ever discuss with Dr. King, Jr., these more militants and his relationship to them?

J: Not to a great length. Mayor Allen discussed them with him quite a bit. I had more discussions with Senior than I did with Junior. And of

course I gathered there was a little difference in opinion even between the father and the son, because Senior was trying to put on the brakes and slow the thing down, and Junior was leading it. And my conversation was more with Senior than it was with Junior.

B: Yes, I guess there would be, if nothing else, a kind of generation gap there between the two of them.

J: That's right.

B: A tangential question to this: one would assume that you probably had to put on extra police protection for all of these Negro leaders? [Were there] threats against their lives and so on?

J: Not too much, because during those periods of time, there was a lot of anonymous telephone calls; there was a lot of note writing and threatening. The Mayor and Chief of Police, along with the other leaders of the civil rights movement, was getting threats. But we never took that too serious. We didn't ignore it, or overlook it. We'd take what we thought was necessary precautionary measures, but didn't include a lot of personnel.

B: During those years, did your position here in Atlanta where many of these groups were headquartered put you in the position of being called on for advice by the Justice Department? For example, did anyone from the Attorney General's offices ever ask you for what was going on with these groups?

J: On many occasions. And of course, the FBI, part of the Justice Department, always tried to keep up with these activities. They had one or two men assigned here to keep up with it, and they made their

reports. Of course, we had two or three detectives that always tried to work with both groups. We'd try to have an informer in the Klan meetings, and we'd also have meetings with the civil rights people. This civil rights movement, at that time, was really coming from university center. You know, the university center here, there's six colleges, and it's reported to be the largest center of higher education for Negroes in the world. Much of that planning came from out there. And of course I was in contact with them, and on many occasions in conference with them.

B: Did this also involve things such as undercover informers within the civil rights groups?

J: Well, we always tried to have someone close enough to them where they could keep up with what they was doing. And of course even the news media, they tried to attend all the meetings that they could and get a pretty good report of it, and the Justice Department had people. Then later, the Army Intelligence and the Navy Intelligence got into it. We had people around here . . . .

B: Was that after the riots?

J: Yes. That was mostly after the disturbance in 1967.

B: I would assume that was because, after then, the military began to develop its contingency plans for handling riots and, therefore, needed some intelligence.

J: In the summer of 1967, of course, the United States Army was called in, had to be called in, in Detroit. Before the military was called in,

that all has to be cleared with the Justice Department, see, so that really put them into it more so.

B: Sir, you mentioned the FBI. This is a matter of some controversy. There have been stories about the relationship with the FBI--and, even Mr. Hoover himself--to Dr. King, Jr., and his group. And some people have even used the term "vendetta" in connection with that.

J: You'd like to have what I know about it and my thoughts on it?

B: Sure would.

J: Well, I have no secrets. First, let me say I've been a great admirer of Mr. Hoover's, J. Edgar Hoover, for forty years. I think, perhaps, Mr. Hoover contributed as much or more to good law enforcement in this nation in the last forty years than any other man, and I've really been a supporter of him and a friend of his through these years. But he never did quite adopt to all the changes that was going through the country, I didn't think. There came a time when the relationship between he and I was a little bit strained. In 1965, I was president of IACP and I called on Mr. Hoover, had a very nice visit with him, and in that conversation, he was extremely bitter. In that he was bitter at three people: first, Quinn Tamm [who] had formerly been an assistant to Mr. Hoover. Then in 1961, or 1962, I was on a committee of three that persuaded Quinn Tamm to retire from the FBI and become executive director of IACP, which was our organization. And Mr. Hoover--that's really what he was talking to me about, about Mr. Tamm--was very bitter towards Mr. Tamm.

B: Is that T-A-M, sir?

J: T-A-M-M. In that conversation, he must have talked for an hour or more. But there was three people there: Quinn Tamm, Bobby Kennedy, and Martin Luther King. He was as bitter towards those three people as anybody I've ever seen.

B: He and Attorney General Kennedy had had a much publicized dispute over the use of electronic surveillance.

J: Yes. I knew that there was some conflict between the two, or some disagreement, because there had been some publicity on it. But again, for instance, when we desegregated the schools here in Atlanta in 1962, that got a lot of national publicity, and that's where I first met Tom Johnson. Tom Johnson came from the Macon paper up here to cover that thing, and there was news media from all over the world here, during this occasion. It was given a lot of attention, because it had been said by many that this must not be permitted in Atlanta, because as Atlanta goes, so goes the South. So it received a lot of attention. But the day came that we integrated the schools, and there was no problem. It worked off very smooth. And the first telephone call I had that morning, after the schools had been integrated, was from Bobby Kennedy, who was attorney general at that time, and [he] congratulated us.

I had been in contact with him prior to that time [about] any assistance that he could give. He sent various representatives here to keep up with what was going on and see if he could be of any assistance and there was really no difference in opinion, as far as I could tell, between Bobby Kennedy and the Mayor and the U.S. Justice

Department and me and the police department. We were working for the same things. Mr. Hoover never quite agreed with that. See, there were differences there.

Then sometime prior, the summer before, I think, of my visit with Mr. Hoover in 1965, Dr. Martin Luther King had publicly called on the Justice Department to provide more protection for he and some of his people who were being threatened, and was rather critical of Mr. Hoover and the FBI. That's when Mr. Hoover had his well-known interview, you know, where he publicly called Martin Luther King the biggest liar in the nation. That received a lot of publicity. Well, it was a few months after that, that I was visiting with Mr. Hoover, when he was expressing his unhappiness with these three particular people.

B: Was there any justification in Dr. King, Jr.'s charge about the FBI in the South? There are those who say that because the FBI has to maintain such close relationship with local law enforcement officers, that it had not been as aggressive in civil rights matters as it could have been.

J: Well, really, I don't have enough information to know what the conversation and what the problems were between Dr. King and the bureau to make a statement on it. Because I know the demands were there, and Dr. King felt that, perhaps, he was a national figure and should have national protection, because he was moving over the country. But when he was in Atlanta, and mostly through his father, any time that they thought they had an unusual threat or were disturbed, we never hesitated

to send the local police and we'd go along with them. But when they left the city limits, we didn't go. We'd leave them at the city limits, see, and meet them at the airport and things of that kind.

Of course, we had Negro police. It wasn't much of a problem. If they called, and said, "Look, we've got trouble," well, we'd just send two Negro detectives, and they'd go out there and stay all day and all night if necessary.

B: Plain-clothesmen?

J: Well, we used both. We used both. If it was more desirable to use plain-clothesmen, why, [we did.] But we had a good relationship. And again, that's why the Negro police and the Negro detectives was most helpful to us, because they were the same color, and they could go right in there with them, see.

B: Did Mr. Hoover's bitterness against Dr. King, Jr., lead him into excesses? For example, I've heard stories about attempts by the FBI to bug meetings of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and so on.

J: Well, again, I don't know what all happened there. I know, after Dr. King had publicly criticized the FBI and Mr. Hoover had publicly excoriated Dr. King, that certainly everybody that was interested read those things and was familiar with it. And what effect it had on the bureau, I don't know. I do know that sometime at a later date--and again, we had a good relationship with the local FBI agents. We never had any secrets from them; we'd tell them anything we knew, and apparently they'd tell us anything they knew. It was a good relationship.

On more than one occasion, I'd have somebody in this department say to me, "One of the FBI agents suggested to us last night that Dr. King and a lady, or a woman, was in a certain room in a certain hotel, and suggested we might want to go out and look in on it or raid the place." And, of course, we didn't subscribe to that kind of action.

B: I've heard stories of a tape, presumably made by the FBI, involving that sort of thing.

J: I never heard a tape. I don't know, there may be. I don't know about that. I do know on one occasion Captain Howard Baugh, who was a Negro captain in this department--he was a detective at that time--told me that an agent had told him that Dr. King was in this particular hotel room at this particular time with a white lady and suggested he ought to raid the place. Captain Baugh told me that after this conversation he went straight to this room and knocked on the door, and when he did, they opened the door, and he walked in. Dr. King was there and there was a white lady there and there was a dozen other people there, but they was having a meeting, that kind of thing.

B: That's a curious kind of relationship. To get back to Mr. Johnson, whom we've sort of forgotten here, in the 1964 campaign, did Mrs. Johnson's special train come through Atlanta? I know it came through Georgia, but I don't remember whether it hit Atlanta or not.

J: I don't recall. I remember that Senator and Mrs. [Herman] Talmadge met her some place and the train came through, but I don't remember it stopping here. It might have. I don't recall.

B: I was asking because, again, I wondered if it required any kind of unusual police activity to . . . .

J: I don't recall any at this time.

B: Mr. Johnson, during his presidency, spoke in Atlanta, did he not?

J: Oh, yes. He came here and stayed a day and night. That was where I first had personal contact with President Johnson. That was after President Kennedy's death, and he was president of the United States at the time he came here. We met him at the airport and had a detail that worked with the Secret Service and stayed with him all the time he was here. I was very much impressed with him, because, when he landed at the airport, we had everything arranged for him to get in the motorcade and come on to Atlanta, come on downtown. But instead of getting in the car right then, he just turned and walked several steps to the fence where there were thousands of people. And, of course, that hadn't been planned. And I stayed right with him. I was in uniform, and I stayed right with him. He just went down this fence--it was about four foot high--just shaking hands with various people, speaking and moving on down the fence, and stopped and talked to some of them. And I was moving right along in front of him. Well, during this conversation, there was so much pressure from the large crowd of people being put on this fence, all the way down--even though it was a metal cyclone fence, there was a lot of pressure--all of a sudden the fence collapsed. And of course, the President had his hand on the fence, and so did I. And when it collapsed, it collapsed slowly, just kind of pushed us back, and we moved back with it. But

there must have been forty or fifty people, men, women and children, that just fell right at our feet. And of course that was a real tragedy. But again, President Johnson just touched me with his arm and said, "Move on, move on, move on." So we just moved right on down the line. He kept speaking to people. And there was enough police, civil service, and other people back here to help these people that had fallen. But it didn't faze him; [he] just moved right on doing what he was doing, see.

B: Does that kind of thing just drive a policeman crazy, from the security standpoint, that incident with the fence?

J: It disturbs you. It disturbs you, first, that the President gets in this kind of position and goes over and speaks to these people. Because those of us in law enforcement know that a hundred per cent security and a hundred per cent freedom is impossible. Now, to get a hundred per cent security you got to almost limit his freedom. So when he enjoys his freedom, he also takes, along with it, certain risks.

B: Had you gotten more than the usual amount of threatening calls and letters before that trip?

J: I don't recall. At that time, I don't recall many, many threats. I know the next morning, when we came out of the hotel downtown, there was a fire in one of the buildings adjacent, and the Fire Department came out, and just as we were leaving, the President was out speaking to some people. When this little incident occurred, of course, the Secret Service and his other advisers kind of urged him to move rapidly. So he got right in the car and got right on out from there.

I don't recall many threats. And then from there, from the hotel back to the airport, on many occasions, he'd stop the parade, stop the car, get out and speak to people and move on. And of course I talked with the Secret Service about that. That was much safer than if it'd been planned, because didn't anybody know--he didn't know--so here's a place he wants to stop. Nobody knew that he was going to stop, so [he'd] just get out and talk a little while and get in the car and move on before anybody knows it, which is a lot safer than a planned tour of that kind.

B: Is the Secret Service easy to work with?

J: Oh, yes. Well, I've worked close with the Secret Service since the days of Roosevelt. Roosevelt used to come here, you know, quite often.

B: Moving on in time a little bit: by the later sixties, as you said earlier, what had been disturbances began to verge on riots. In 1966, the summer of 1966, I believe, Atlanta had what is described as a near-riot that was stopped by the personal intervention of Mayor Allen. Is that correct?

J: Well, that was the time that Stokely Carmichael came here and led the demonstrations over on Capitol Avenue and created a disturbance. And the Mayor performed a--again, he took some risk himself. But he moved right out in front, got up on top of an automobile, and talked with the people that was causing the disturbance. He believed [that] to a certain extent [if you] meet with the people that had a complaint, face to face, you'd come nearer to finding a solution. He was trying to do that. But with all the agitation that Carmichael was stirring up at

the time, he wasn't able to talk to them very well, because they turned the car over that he was standing on; he had to jump from there. But he did a great job in meeting the issues head-on, doing the right thing. Whatever your problem are, "Well, let's talk about it and find the right answer." Then he'd see that it was done.

B: In these years, did your force begin to develop any contingency plans for rioting, as opposed to just sit-in and marches, [those] kinds of disturbances?

J: Well, a sit-in, a demonstration, we know that could develop into fights, conflict, riot, call it whatever you want to. The potential for danger was always there, on both sides, because there was a white group that wanted to resist it. Back to start with, that's where the greatest threat came from, the white group that was going to prevent this. We always had that threat, and we was always aware of it, and we took what we thought was the necessary measures to prevent it.

B: Was this white group specifically the Klan?

J: Well, the Klan was always involved. Generally, I don't think it was so much Klan members as you might say it was Klan sympathizers, the people that was thinking in the same terms as the Klan was talking. That doesn't necessarily mean they were Klan members.

B: Were you getting help from the federal government in preparing for this kind of possibility?

J: You'd get good cooperation and information. There was no action taken. You could get an FBI agent to go with you any place you wanted to, and he would observe, but that's all he would do. There was no action taken.

They took the position that this is a local responsibility, and I took the same position. I accepted that.

B: Then in the summer of 1967, was this what you were talking about earlier? Was Carmichael involved in 1966, too?

J: 1966. I believe it was 1966. Yes, it was 1966 instead of 1967.

B: Then in the summer of 1967, there was another near-disturbance, starting out at the Dixie Hill Shopping Center?

J: Right. Carmichael was here in 1966, that was the next day after Labor Day of 1966, and we had the riot, the problem on Capitol Avenue, and that's where Mayor Ivan Allen did a great job in helping control it. Then, overnight, it drifted from there to North Boulevard, and the next two nights, on North Boulevard we had a lot of brick-throwing and some fire-bombs thrown. In fact, we had some ten or twelve windows broken from business places. But, again, the police was right in the middle of it; Mayor Allen was right in the middle of it, and I was there. If a brick was thrown and broke a window, we stationed a police officer right there. If a fire-bomb was thrown, we was there to put it out right quick, see that the Fire Department put it out. So there was no burning, and there was no looting, that had gone on in many places here, because we thought we was there prepared and did prevent it. Then by that time, it was getting fall of the year, and it quieted down.

The next May, of 1967, there was an episode in Dixie Hill, where there was some brick-throwing and a few fire-bombs thrown, and we had a large detail of police there for several days. On one occasion, they

was throwing fire-bombs at police--and we had both white and Negro police in there--and on one occasion, the police shot at this crowd where the fire-bombs was coming from. One person was killed, and three more was injured. Then from there [it] went on into various investigations, but from that point it quieted down, and that was the last disturbance we had. Then of course by that time, it was beginning to spread all over the country. Then in July of that year was when the President appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

B: During the disturbances here in 1966 and 1967, did you try to get Dr. King, Jr., or any of the other more moderate Negro leaders, to try to use their good offices to help you calm things down?

J: Well, again, the episode on Capitol Avenue, one of the first things that Mayor Ivan Allen did was have his office notify this committee of Negro leaders that included Dr. King, Sr. and many others that they discussed these problems with, and had them to come immediately to the scene. They was there supporting and backing up Mayor Allen in his activities to try to cool it and quiet it.

B: Another example of the generally good communications between the racial groups you've had.

J: And the pre-arrangements that the Mayor had made with this committee, so when he had problems, all he had to do was call them and they came. They were right there, stayed with him to help quiet it down.

B: As you said, sir, shortly after that, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was named, and you were appointed, I assume, as the police representative.

J: Well, I was the only policeman on the commission, and I was the only one from the South on there. I was highly honored and delighted of the opportunity, and it was certainly the greatest challenge and great experience I've ever had.

B: I can imagine. How were you notified of your appointment, sir?

J: I had a call at home about five o'clock in the afternoon from Ramsey Clark, and Ramsey said, "The President's appointing a commission on civil disorders, and he thinks maybe they should have a policeman on there, a police chief on there. We're discussing the thing now. If it comes to that point, and he asks for my recommendations, I'm going to recommend you. Will you be available?" And I said, "Well, not only be available to be on it, but be honored. But I'll have to clear it with Mayor Allen before I give you a definite answer." He said, "Well, sure, talk with him, and I'll talk to Mayor Allen." Then he said, "This thing is being discussed. We're in a meeting now. The President hasn't made a final decision, but he will make a final decision in the next three hours. I may not can get in touch with you, but you be sure and tune in television stations at ten o'clock, because whatever we develop, he's going to announce it."

Then about eight o'clock, I had a call from one of the secretaries in the President's office. And again, it wasn't definite. He said this was being discussed, and he wanted to know if I would be available, and so forth, and so on. Then at ten o'clock that night, the President went on the air and made his report and also identified and announced the members of the commission, and, of course, named me on there.

Then the next day, next morning, I received a telegram from President Johnson, thanking me for agreeing to serve and [saying] that the meeting would be held the next day, which was Saturday, in the White House.

B: Had you known Attorney General Clark well before this?

J: Well, I had been on the Attorney General's Advisory Committee. You know, the Attorney General had a committee of a half a dozen police chiefs that worked with LEAA and other things, and I'd been on that committee for two or three years and had met with him often.

B: Then you went up to Washington the next Saturday, and the whole group met with the President?

J: On Saturday, we met there at ten o'clock Saturday morning, the first meeting. That's when I met the other members of the commission. They were all there. We met the President. We was in a meeting there all day at the White House and had lunch there and then finished the meeting that evening.

B: Did the President or Attorney General Clark outline to you what he expected you to do?

J: The President did, in great detail. I was very much impressed with not only what the President of the United States knew about what was going on, but what must be done and how clear it was. He made it very clear that he had selected this commission on the recommendations of various people. He wanted a complete, in-depth study made. And he made it clear that this commission would have priority over all other commissions, and if there's any individual that you need to help, any witness, even staff members, all other branches of government would be

instructed to give us assistance. Of course the main theme of this was review, as to what had happened, and what was happening. His instructions to the commission was that we must determine what happened, why it happened, and what must be done to keep it from happening again and again. And of course Ramsey Clark was there, and Mr. [Cyrus] Vance was there, who had just come back from Detroit, and that group was all in the meeting.

B: Did you go to work immediately then?

J: We started immediately having meetings in the office building adjacent to the White House. And the commission met, in the next three months, for twenty full days and listened to the witnesses from all over the country, everybody that was interested and had any information.

B: Did the commission members really do a lot of the work in that massive report that you put out?

J: They did a lot of work. Of course, Dave Ginsburg was executive secretary, and he assembled a staff of more than a hundred people there right quick, and most of these staff members were drafted from other organizations. You couldn't have set up an organization like he set up, go out and recruit people, so what he did was borrow them from the FBI, from the Justice Department; he borrowed people from other places. And they did a fantastic job in the investigation and preparing reports.

The commission, the full commission, spent a lot of time, because we'd meet, usually, two days a week. If we were going to meet, we'd start at nine o'clock in the next morning. We'd meet all day, and most of the time just have a sandwich and a Coca-Cola at the table, never

leave it until about six o'clock. Then we'd adjourn for a couple of hours and go into a dinner meeting and stay there till eleven o'clock. And the next day do the same thing; except you didn't have the dinner meeting. At five o'clock everybody'd go home.

But the entire commission spent an awful lot of time and asked a lot of questions from everybody that we could get before us for the first twenty days. Then, the first of December--the President had instructed the commission to provide him an interim report and a final report in twelve months. [We] had a year to do it. Well, the first of December, the commission made the decision at that point--it was widely debated and discussed, but it was, as I recall, a unanimous decision--[that] if this report that the commission's going to make is going to be effective in preventing disorders, it can't wait until the end of next July to do it. You've got to do it in the spring, and it can't be piecemeal; it's got to be complete. So the commission decided then to make one report, to make it complete, and the deadline must be March 1, 1968.

So for the next three months, the commission spent twenty-three full days writing, reading, rewriting, discussing, amending the report, and every section of that report was read at least one time, and some of it, six times, to the entire commission. We'd take a section and read it. Some members of the commission would object to this or object to that and want to change this. Then we'd tell the writers to go back and rewrite it and do this. The next time we'd meet, we would go through the thing completely.

B: Did you have a kind of special responsibility for what became the section on the police and the community?

J: I wouldn't say a special responsibility, but I was closer to the people that was making investigations and writing the section on administration of justice, police management, and that kind of thing. Because I said to the other members of the commission, "Really, my knowledge is very limited in health, education, welfare, housing, and employment. Generally, I have some strong feelings about that, but how you do all of it, I'm not sure, so to a great extent, I'll depend on other members of the commission. But when it comes to running a police department, getting along with people in the enforcement of law and the administration of justice, I have strong feelings about it and have discussed it at some length." And generally, there was nothing went in that section that I didn't think should go in there. If I'd been writing it by myself, there wouldn't have been much change in that.

B: How was that section received by your fellow police chiefs?

J: Well, it was highly controversial.

B: That's why I asked. (Laughter)

J: And we knew at the time that it was controversial. But I was very much convinced [that] the investigations made and what was said in that report, I believe, was true facts. I was convinced then that it was a good report, that it was necessary, that it had to be said, and a year and a half later, I'm convinced that time will make it a great document.

B: Did you find yourself having to defend that section, say, at meetings of the chiefs association or something?

J: Well, there were lots of people that would like for me to defend it, but I refused to defend it. Here's a report that's the most complete thing that I've ever seen. I subscribe to it. I support it 100 per cent. Now, the report speaks for itself. Before you criticize it, read it, and read it in its entirety. And I issued a copy of it to every member of this department, like I had other publications. I say, "Read it! After you've read it, write me on a piece of paper what you object to and what you would have said in place of that."

B: That's interesting. What kind of reaction did you get from that?

J: First place, if you have him to make a report, you commit him. He may not even read the damn thing, but if he gives you a report that I've read it and I have no objections, you've got him committed to help do it, see. And, of course, some of them do that. But the purpose of having a report is to be sure that he reads it. Some of them are critical; some of them make suggestions that they would've done otherwise. Perhaps the thing that was misunderstood more than anything else we said in the report was that white racism was probably the greatest contribution to this thing.

B: I was going to ask you about that.

J: Well, that's misunderstood. The way I understand it, I don't think there's anybody would honestly deny that racism is a problem. I was questioned about that before Kiwanis Clubs and a lot of places, and I said, "Well, read the whole chapter, and then get off and look at it.

I think it's true! And let me remind you that racism comes in two colors, both black and white." Of course black racism has had more attention since the report was out than it did beforehand.

B: When you were preparing the report, was the white racism issue controversial among the members of the commission? Was there a great deal of debate about it?

J: Oh, yes. Oh yes. There was a lot of debate about it, a lot of discussion about it. The proposition of open housing was debated very much, at some length, among the members of the commission. But then, when the thing was completed . . . . Because every member of the commission had an opportunity to read this, and to substitute what he wanted to substitute--this line, this paragraph, or this sentence, or this section even, "This is what I want." And a lot of them wrote whole sections on it. But then that'd come back to the whole commission, and you'd discuss it at some length. And really, there was very little voting done. But when you came back and you had three or four sections on the same subject, which section are you going to take? You go around the table, and everybody expresses their opinion, and when you get through, you'd find that there was seven or eight [who] want to go with this one, and there's only two or three that don't want to go to it. Well, they'd never force the issue; they'd just go ahead and put that section in.

B: Some of the commissions similar to that one end up with what amount of minority reports. Was there ever any chance of that in your commission?

J: There was discussions all through this thing, all through the commission hearings, about minority report, under the assumption that there would be a minority report. There was once or twice that one or two members mentioned to me, "We ought to get out a minority report right now, because we don't think this thing is going as far and as fast as it should. We ought to have a report right now. There's now but three or four of us that would sign it, but the others would just have to be left out." Well, that never materialized. There was always a thought that at the end there would be a minority report, there'd be some members . . . . And I don't think possibly any member of the commission agreed a hundred per cent with every word in there. But then when it was put together, [we said,] "This is what we've discussed and this is what we've done. Now, any member of the commission is invited to sign this and endorse it. If you don't want to, then you sit down and write whatever minority report you want, with whatever member." Well, you never could get two that could agree what the minority report ought to be! (Laughter) See? So you wind up, and everybody signed the report.

B: Which made your report more effective, not having a minority report.

J: Very definitely so. But there, Ginsburg and Governor [Otto] Kerner, really, they didn't try to dictate to the thing, but they would put it in such a position that if you don't want to do this, then what are you going to do? You can do it separate; you can make a minority report, but then they couldn't get another one that would completely agree with the minority report. So who wants just one person to make a minority report?

B: By and large, though, did the commission members work together pretty well? Were there any rigid or serious divisions among you?

J: No, I don't think [so]. It was the most congenial, it was the most capable and dedicated group of ten members. I created an awful lot of admiration and respect for the ability, and the sincerity, and the determination of every member of the commission, without exceptions. Of course there was times there that the thing pretty well lined up, that here's a group that's going--and the simple term was liberal and conservative, that didn't fully describe it, but anyway--here's a group that's liberal and here's the more conservative group, and you'd [...] always wind up there wouldn't be more than four, at the most, on the conservative side. See?

B: Who would those have been, sir?

J: Well, of course John Lindsay was the mayor of New York; Otto Kerner was the governor of Illinois . . . .

B: Well, I meant, who would you have classified as on the conservative side? The list of members of course is published in the report.

J: Well, that's difficult to identify. I was very fond of Tex [Charles B.] Thornton. He was an extremely capable man, and he's a liberal businessman, but if you're going to say who holds back, then of course he was the one that would lead that.

B: Were there others in that group?

J: Well, on some issues he'd have three or four with him, or half a dozen. On some points he wouldn't have anybody, or maybe one or two. But Fred Harris and John Lindsay and Kerner was the real liberal leaders. And

of course there was Roy Wilkins and myself that usually went right along with that group. Most of the time Senator [Edward] Brooke would be right along with you, and most of the time Congressman [James] Corman would be right along with us, and most of the time, [William] McCulloch was with--I'd say McCulloch and Thornton was the two conservative members on the commission.

B: What about Mr. [I. W.] Abel of the steelworkers and Katherine Graham Peden?

J: Well, Miss Peden, Katherine Peden--of course, the labor man, Mr. Abel, his views are well-known, and he is liberal on certain points, and on some points, he's not so liberal. Miss Peden, I was very much impressed with her. She is one of the most gracious, well-informed ladies I have ever known. I would call her a southern liberal [from the] border state of Kentucky. But again, when you put a brand on me as a liberal, then you get right down and ask me certain questions, I back off. See!

B: I think most people understand that those terms are, at best, a convenience. Did Mr. Johnson see the members of the commission at any time while the work was in progress?

J: Well, I was under the assumption . . . . Now, the only time that I talked to the President was the first day. I spent the day there and listened to him all day, and I was very much impressed. I thought he gave us good instructions and good support. We had lunch there. We met Lady Bird. And, again, I ran into my friend Tom Johnson. I had forgotten he was here as a rookie reporter that time. But he remembered

me. I had a very nice visit with him and learned a lot of things. Tom was most helpful to me.

And after that time, I never did see the President anymore. But I got the very strong impression, in fact, pointed sometimes, because Kerner, the chairman, would say, "I talked to the President," or, "I'm going to talk to the President," or, "I think I ought to talk to the President about this." And of course Ginsburg, I assumed, in the conversation, was in close contact with the President's assistants. Now my assumption was that even though I had no personal contact with the President, the chairman, Otto Kerner; David Ginsburg, the executive director; and Fred Harris, the senator from Oklahoma--I had the impression from the beginning all the way through that they were close in contact with the President, and the President was being informed just as to what progress we were making. Because on one or two occasions there were certain witnesses we wanted before the committee that they just didn't have time to come. They'd say they would, and then they'd put it off and there'd be a remark, the Chairman would say, "Well, I have to go over to the White House and get the White House to invite him." And the next week he'd be there!

B: Did Attorney General Clark, himself, work closely with the commission?

J: Very close. He was there on several occasions. He was always available, and I talked with Ramsey Clark several times.

I know on one occasion Ginsburg asked every member of the commission, to start with, early in the investigation, that he would appreciate it if we would just give him a note or a letter as to what our

thinking was and which direction--things that we ought to look at, and so forth, and so on. Well, of course, I don't think there were very many submitted one, but I submitted a three-page letter. I sat down and wrote what I thought ought to be done, and I carried it to the Mayor's office, and said to his aides there, "Now, this is what I think ought to be done, and I want you to look it over, and I want to add anything that Ivan thinks we ought to add in there. If there's anything you've got doubts about, let's talk about it." So they made a few suggestions, and we added to it, and I submitted it. The only person other than the executive director that I gave the copy to was Ramsey Clark.

B: Then, sir, after your report was finished, Mr. Johnson's reaction to it, at least his public reaction, was cool, to say the least.

J: That was discussed at some length, but it never disturbed me. For the simple reason [that] I knew what we was doing was controversial. And at that time, I assumed that the President had been informed as to the course the thing was taking, not through me, but through other members. I assumed that he knew the course it was taking, and if he'd had any strong feeling in the determination to change the course of it, I think it would have been heard, at least. But it was very obvious to me that, "The President knows the direction we are moving, and he hadn't attempted to guide it in any way. Let it go if that's the way we think it ought to go." Now that was what I thought was happening, and I believe that's what happened.

Then after the report was out and it was controversial, Mr. Johnson, at that time, presumably was a candidate for re-election. The next year was election year, and I presumed he was a candidate, would be a candidate, and everybody did. I could thoroughly understand. My commission's made this report; it's not a hundred per cent acceptable; it's controversial, so why get involved in it. We've made a study; here's what they've said. Here it is; read it and don't comment on it. Because I had the same thing in a smaller way. I sent a lieutenant, a captain, out to do a job. He and I talk about what the problems are and what we're going to do, and he goes and do it. Well, then if it boomerangs, my job is to protect him and bring him back and make the thing go ahead and work. But don't just jump up there and say, "Look, this is exactly right. This is black and white. This is it. Now, you take it, see." So I thought that [was] the reason that he didn't comment, and I understood it, and agreed with him. If I'd been in his place, I wouldn't have!

B: Did you hear from Mr. Clark about his opinion of the report?

J: Well, again, I kept close to Mayor Ivan Allen and Ramsey Clark. They both knew what I was doing, and what I was thinking, and the way we was traveling. And any discussion about it happened before the report came out, because they knew what was going into the report and what we was doing. They supported me a hundred per cent.

B: Did you ever discuss with your friend Tom Johnson, the President's reaction to the report?

J: No. I haven't seen Tom since then. I've had some notes from him, but I haven't [seen him.] What I appreciated about Tom is--as I say, he came here as a cub reporter back at that time, and, really, I didn't remember him. He remembered me, because it was during this time. When he told me who he was, of course, I remembered him. What I appreciated about Tom--and Tom told me this--this is no secret, but don't repeat it. It's off the record. Because he was there when all this discussion was going on, and he said, "Frankly, there was a list of fifty chiefs of police submitted to the President as possible people to select to go on the committee." And Tom said to me frankly, "There never was but one considered. The only question considered was whether or not there should be a chief of police on there. And if there should be a chief of police on there, it should be you." That was the only discussion. So I appreciated that information.

B: Yes, that's quite a compliment. To move to to another subject, did you get involved in helping the Attorney General's office draft what became the 1968 omnibus crime act, the Safe Streets Act? I ask because I know you had been on his chief's committee and back in 1964 had been on the Advisory Panel on Grants.

J: Nothing more than on more than one occasion I was in close contact at that time not only with Ramsey Clark, but with two or three people who was running it. Right off hand, I don't--Courtney Evans . . . .

B: Courtney Evans, he's in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

J: I stayed in close contact with Courtney Evans. The guy from New York, Murphy, Patrick Murphy, he was the assistant, and I discussed with them,

and of course was very much in accord. I wouldn't say that I had anything to do with the writing of it, but I discussed just what they were writing, and it had my full support.

B: I gather that, as the city police chief, you approve of the idea of individual grants, rather than the block grants to the states?

J: Well, that was quite a controversial thing in the commission. Because John Lindsay [was] from New York, and I was from Atlanta, we wanted the cities to be able to go directly to the federal government and deal with them, and I'm convinced that that must eventually be the way that it's done. Because, again, Governor Kerner was the governor of Illinois, and he took a completely different view on that. We had a lot of discussion on it, that, in fact, before a city could get federal assistance in emergencies, they have to apply to the state, and the state must send in the Guard, and the state must declare that so forth and so on. Well, you have such a conflict between the attitude of the state government and the attitude of the city government, particularly in Atlanta, that it would create an impossible situation.

B: Yes, I was going to say, by that time the governor of Georgia was Governor [Lester] Maddox, whose views on this issue are hardly those of you and Mayor Allen.

J: That's right.

B: Which, I assume, that's not an unusual circumstance in many states, particularly in the South.

J: Well, this may be a part that I want you to hold for two years before you release it, but I'll tell you facetiously. I don't get in

controversy, and I don't want to criticize people in office, but I told Governor Kerner--we was having a hot debate on this, and Governor Kerner was pointing out how Illinois and Missouri had an agreement. If they needed assistance, one national guard would cross the line and help the other, and so forth, and must come through the states. And I said, "Well, if Atlanta was in Illinois, that'd be fine, Governor. I'd agree with you. But just imagine Governor [Lester] Maddox and Governor Lorene [Lurleen] Wallace of Alabama sending in their National Guard to rescue Atlanta! That frightens me worse than a riot does! (Laughter)

B: I can see your point!

Do you believe that the city police forces, or police forces generally, need federal assistance, which is the basic issue?

J: I am definitely committed to that. I'm on the record--I've been there a good many years--arguing to that point. I've had the chief of police, John Layton, in Washington, interrupt me in one of those LEAA meetings to ask me if I was advocating a national police force. Well, certainly I'm not advocating a national police force. But I am convinced that the problems in the city are so great, and it's not just city problems. Now, we have the responsibility, but these problems are national, and cities are in trouble. I say, and I insist, that the time must come when the federal government will say to every city, "If your police department meets the minimum standards in police recruitment, police training, police management, and police pay, that the federal government will contribute 50 per cent of your annual budget." I believe that. And John says, "You're trying to create a national police force."

I'm not! I think it ought to be managed here, but you've got to have guidelines. The only way you can have uniformity in law enforcement, the only way you can have uniformity in training, particularly in civil rights matters, you've got to have minimum standards, guidelines. Then if a police department meets these, then they can get financial help. If they don't meet it, then they go on on their own.

B: In connection with this, did you ever discuss the possiblitity of revamping the FBI's police academy to better suit the needs of local police forces?

J: Well, the FBI Academy is one of the great training institutions in the nation, I think. And I think it serves a good purpose. And I say the same things--just recently the state of Georgia has installed a state academy, and, finally, we got them to agree that they will take any rookie police officer and take him in there and give him the recruit training free of charge to the city. And that serves a good purpose. We send all our people out there for two weeks basic training, and they train them the basic police management and procedure and the law. But they don't get into this social activity, the social field, that I'm convinced must be a part of law enforcement. Now, the FBI don't get into that.

B: That's why I asked, because that seems to be the issue.

J: I'm not so sure that this is the place for it. I think the basic training they give--and every time I have an opportunity, we send a man to them. But like this state training. We send a recruit out there for two weeks, and they give him good basic training, but it's not

complete. When he gets through, we bring him back to this department. We put him in our training program and keep him there for four weeks, and then we go into all these social activities and things that we are following here. Well, that's necessary. It's true in Atlanta, when it might not apply to the administration in Macon. Or, at least, Valdosta, Georgia would not subscribe to it. They don't want it, see. So that's something that has to be applied locally.

Let me say at this point, because that's one of the points that I become a controversial figure in police circles [about,] because they say I'm too far in left field. But again, the local leadership in Atlanta, in 1965 Mayor Ivan Allen appointed a Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency--this was before you had any so-called riots--to study the causes and the cures of crime in Atlanta and to see what could be done to correct it. Well, that was really a select group. Griffin Bell, the federal judge, chaired the thing, and he had the president of Emory University and Georgia Tech and all these people, and they made an in-depth study. They came back and they said, in no uncertain terms, now in 1965, that crime and poverty are twins that cannot be separated. To improve one, you've got to improve the other. The next paragraph, they said that they found deep resentment and hostility between the police and the residents of poor Negro neighborhoods, and this must be corrected, and the way to correct it is for the police department to employ community service officers to work in these communities. In reality that put the police department in the field of social welfare. Well, at that point is where I accepted

part of the responsibility. Most police chiefs still haven't accepted it. But I think it is necessary, and I just say that because that is why I've moved this far to the left in this direction, because I'm convinced that it is the right thing to do. And the leadership of this town agrees with it.

B: Sir, did the death of Dr. King, Jr., in the spring of 1968 create, from the police standpoint, any particular problems in Atlanta?

J: Well, of course, as you know, there was riots all over the country. Washington come nearer burning at that point than it had before or since. We had our problems here, and we had our threats here, and of course the body was brought back here to lay in state. [There was] mourning for four days. Then they had the funeral, which was one of the biggest performances of its kind, I think, that has ever existed. We had some fifty thousand visitors from all over the world, along with these people. But it was smooth; it operated very well. But again, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Negro leadership in this town was determined that this is a time of mourning in honor of Dr. King, and it doesn't call for any demonstrations or disturbances, and it must not happen. There we had good help, good assistance from the people there. Of course, we had a small group of black militants that these civic leaders couldn't control. But we had a Negro captain with fifty police officers that just surrounded them and did control them.

B: Was there ever any possibility that Mr. Johnson would come to the funeral? Did the Secret Service contact you about whether or not he could?

J: No, there was never anybody told me that he would be there, including the Secret Service people. It was more in the stage of rumor, maybe it was a semi-official rumor. There was always a possibility that he would come. Of course, the Vice President was here; Ramsey Clark was here, and senators and congressmen. Walk down Auburn Avenue, and look over there, and there would stand--on one occasion I looked over there, and there stood Governor [George] Romney. Standing by another post, there was Senator [Jacob] Javits. Looked over on this side, and there stood [Nicholas] Katzenbach. I mean, that's the kind of gathering you had here. And there were so many people that couldn't possibly get into the church. The church was full, and it was filled up for two blocks around. By the way, that was the last time that I saw and talked to Bobby Kennedy.

B: What did you talk about on that occasion?

J: Well, I just greeted him, because he was one of the few people that we'd had threats on, and other things. I assigned a police captain to meet him and his party, and they stayed with him. I met John Lindsay and Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller's party. I stayed with them, walked with them in the parade.

B: Was that because of threats on them?

J: No, because I'd become such a great admirer of Lindsay. I'd been on the commission, and he was coming here. He'd called me up the day before the funeral and said, "I don't want to add to your problems, but I want to come to the funeral." I said, "Well, John, come on, beause from the reports I'm getting, there's going to be a hundred

thousand people here. Everybody's coming." And he said, "That's good. If there's that big a crowd, you can't control it. All you can do is just guide it, so I'll see you." (Laughter)

B: He must be the world's all-time expert on crowds, being mayor of New York.

J: He's a great fellow.

B: Difficult job. Did you see Dr. King, Sr., on that occasion?

J: Oh, yes. Well, I saw him that night. I went to his house. I was in a meeting here at the station, at nine o'clock, when we got the message that young King had been killed in Memphis. Well, after the meeting, it was probably midnight or after, I went by and talked with his wife at home, and put half a dozen Negro police on duty out there and kept them out there. Then [I] went on to King, Sr.'s house, talked with him, and left a couple of officers there, and kept them there during the funeral.

B: Had Dr. King, Sr., resigned himself to that kind of thing? As you said earlier, you'd been worried about him since the Montgomery days.

J: Well, he was shook up, but it didn't come as a surprise. I mean, he'd been prepared for it over a long period of time.

B: Sir, I'm nearing the end here. By the 1968 presidential campaign, this whole issue of law and order became an issue of national debate. Do you feel that that issue was blown out of proportion in the presidential campaign?

J: I wouldn't say it was blown out of proportion, because crime is on the increase in this nation. It's a serious problem, the riots and

other things that come along with it. I think the great danger, the great tragedy, of the whole thing is--because I'm a hundred per cent for law and order, and I think most everybody [is.] But the great tragedy and the danger is that we have different opinions as to what is law and order. What is your definition of law and order? So that's the danger, that so many people think law and order mean for you to behave and [if you] don't, put him in jail. But it don't apply to me and my crowd.

B: You agree generally with Mr. Clark's position? Because he, himself, and his ideas were the center of a good deal of this controversy.

J: Certainly I agree with Clark, because I believe the same thing, and we've applied it here. Our policy has always been, first, spelled out in clear, live language by Ivan Allen, and I've supported it a hundred per cent and still do. His theory is, and our theory is--and I think Clark was doing the same thing. Again, you get into definitions of words and approach, but the general thought is that there's things that needs correcting. The minority, the Negro group, has certain legitimate complaints that must be met head-on and must be corrected. We're going to do everything that is humanly possible in this city to make life more livable for the citizens of this city. We believe that every person has a right to a job to make an honest living for himself and his family, and we think he has a right to expect a decent house to live in, and we're going to do everything we can to assist him and to help him to accomplish these things. Once we've done all we can and have accomplished all we have, then this brick-throwing and bomb-

throwing is not going to be tolerated. We're going to use whatever force is necessary to stop it. But before we do that, we're going to do all these other things, and make every effort, and give every assistance. But then, we're not going to wreck the ship. Now, that's what I think Ramsey Clark was saying. The question is how you approach these things.

B: Some have said that perhaps it would be better to have a tougher man, or a tougher sounding man, as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, if only for morale purposes.

J: Again you get back to definition. What do you want, and who are you serving? He's got to serve all the people. I've got to serve all the people, and I want to serve all the people. Forty-six per cent of the citizens in Atlanta are Negro. Well, the first ten years I was chief of police, we didn't pay much attention to them.

The real key to the thing, I think, came out of the Texas decision in 1945, when the U.S. Supreme Court held that the white Democratic primary, as we knew it in the South, was unconstitutional. Because then Hartsfield, who was mayor of the city, and I discussed this at great length. It's not given much attention, but here's the key to the thing. You can take a ballot and give it to a person, and that person can use that ballot as a ticket to sit on the front seat anywhere he wants to sit, if he knows how to use it. And I think that's the key to it.

B: A lot of the criticism has also been directed at the Supreme Court decisions on police procedure.

J: That's where I become controversial with the police. I'm not one of those that share in that criticism, because I've studied law all of my life. Thirty-eight years I've been in this department, and I've constantly studied the law, not in a deep way, but how does the law apply to the police. And all of my studying and teachings that I've had over the year[s] led to the Supreme Court. Everything is debatable and controversial and can be amended, and so forth and so on, until you get to the Supreme Court, and that's the end of the line. What the Supreme Court thinks the law is and says the law is, that is the law. And there's no appeal from it. That's it. I accept that without question. And I believe that's the way it must be.

Well, then, years later, when they get into all this controversy where the courts have started ruling on civil rights matters and our local state leaders are saying that's not the law, well, now, I don't subscribe to that. The Supreme Court can't make a mistake. There might be in error, and they may correct it later, but when they make a decision, I support it a hundred per cent, and I have no criticism.

B: From a practical standpoint, are there procedural requirements, those that are now established in the various cases--Wade, Miranda and so on--do those hamper police work?

J: I don't think so, and again, that's debatable. Really, the Escobedo and the Miranda case is the one that's most generally discussed. The other is the Mallory case that came out of Washington, the Mapp case that came out of Ohio about searches and seizures. But, really, what the Escobedo and the Miranda case did, it's been misunderstood and

it's been exaggerated by many police. All it did was put a limit on custodial interrogation. Well, I understand the problem. Because, if you have a suspect, put him in jail, and he'll help you prove that he's not guilty or help you prove somebody else is guilty. That's the quickest and easiest way for the police to handle a case, by necessity. And that's the reason police have moved into it.

Now you mustn't do that. Under this ruling, you've got to make out your case; you've got to determine the facts; you've got to make out your case; then take the man into custody and prosecute him. Well, it requires more time, more effort, more money, and more detectives. Where one detective maybe could clear up a case, now it may take four or five weeks to make up the case before you take the man into custody. And there's where I come back and talking about federal guidelines; they're no stronger federal guidelines possible to be issued to police departments than the Supreme Court decision. That is the guideline; we must follow it. Then I say they must come along and make their financial contribution to help us operate this police department, particularly where their own federal guidelines has made it more expensive and requires more time and effort.

B: Sir, I've about run out of questions. Is there anything else you think ought to be included in this kind of record?

J: Well, I'm happy to say that I've had the pleasure of knowing, of meeting and talking to, on more than one occasion, all the presidents since President Roosevelt, on up to President Johnson. And I had occasion to visit on several occasions in the White House. Once, with

the commission, and I was invited to participate in the White House Conference on Civil Rights before that. I've always been impressed, and I thoroughly believe, that President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson are the most dedicated, conscientious public servants that I've ever run across. And I don't mean to--I think the other people are just as dedicated, but the times that I was in the White House, it was so obvious to me that both of them was fully conscious of the great responsibility of that position, and they accepted every bit of it with all the dedication that was possible. And I was proud for them and proud of them.

Again, I think history will show that Lyndon Johnson probably had a better understanding of the average person, and the poor person, and had done more for the have-nots than anybody, certainly since Roosevelt.

B: Anything else you'd like to add?

J: Unless you've got some other questions?

B: I can't think of any. I wasn't aware you had participated in the White House Conference on Civil Rights.

J: On two occasions. The first one was . . . .

B: In the Truman years?

J: No. No. Both of them was under President Johnson, but there was two conferences on civil rights. The White House conference to achieve these goals, a planning session, and then the White House Conference on Civil Rights to achieve these goals.

B: To Fulfill These Rights was the second one?

J: Yes. I attended and participated in both of those. I think [I was] the only chief of police in attendance. I don't recall seeing any of the others. There might have been others.

B: Was that, again, at the White House invitation?

J: Yes. It was a White House invitation, but Morris Abram, who is now the president of Brandeis University, was an Atlanta lawyer here for many years, and Morris was one of my good friends and good advisers. Morris' thinking probably has as much influence over my activity as any outsider. He was co-chairman of that, and even though I got an invitation from the White House, I'm satisfied Morris invited me.

B: Sir, I do have one question. It really is probably too early to ask this question, but has the Southern Christian Leadership Conference had considerable leadership difficulties since Dr. King's death?

J: That's difficult for me to answer, because we haven't had any problems here. There's a struggle in . . . . Well, there's one Hosea Williams that's really a black militant, that's right up there fighting. I think, the present chairman, [Ralph] Abernathy, is trying very hard to follow in Dr. King's philosophy, and of course Hosea and some of the others are trying to make it more militant. But certainly, watching it on national television, and its action over the country, the leadership has weakened considerable. I don't think there's anybody to take Dr. King's place.

B: Well, I think most people assume that he was that organization.

J: That's right.

B: Sir, I don't have any more questions. If you don't have anything more to say, I think we're done.

J: Well, this is something you can talk about a long time, but this is about all the time you and I have this morning. I appreciate your coming by and enjoyed meeting you.

B: Thank you.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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