

INTERVIEW XI

DATE: April 18, 1984
INTERVIEWEE: WALTER JENKINS
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette
PLACE: Mr. Jenkins' office, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

G: I want to ask you to start discussing in 1952 a little more about the LBJ Ranch. The first entry in this outline [1952 Chronology] is that LBJ is buying heifers. I know his ranching went through a long process of upgrading and learning and one thing and another, but evidently he started out right away buying cattle after he bought the Ranch.

J: He did, and immediately started upgrading those he'd bought to where he wanted to have a pure strain of Hereford Whiteface and I suppose, as you know, finally got that. At first he did not have all the Hereford Whiteface, he had some--

(Interruption)

--two or three strains to start out with, but he little by little culled them all out until he just had Herefords, except for some exotic animals which I think came later anyway.

G: Where did he learn about ranching in the early days, say in 1952?

J: I don't know. I don't know whether he knew anything about ranching or not. I've heard the foreman say that he had to follow him around and then go back around and undo the things that he did. (Laughter) The President would walk around and say, "I want you to water this field.

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I want you to move the cattle from this field over to this field," I don't know, whatever it was. What was the foreman's name?

G: Dale Malechek?

J: Dale Malechek. Malechek later told me, he said, "Some of those things were just as unranchlike as you can imagine. After he'd go back to Washington, then I'd go back and undo the things that were wrong that he did while he was down there." But he was not the greatest ranch foreman; I don't believe he claimed to be.

G: It took him a while to find someone of Dale's caliber I gather.

J: He worked on it. He had somebody else before Dale. Who was he? An older man. I don't remember, but he had a ranch foreman before Dale.

G: Did he depend on A. W. Moursund for advice in buying cattle?

J: Yes, a great deal, and a great deal on what to do with them after he bought them, because A. W. did know a lot about cattle. That had been his life. And he and A. W. in those years were very close.

G: Did he involve you at all in this aspect of his business, the buying and selling of cattle?

J: Only writing the checks and paying for them and keeping the records on them. No, I didn't know anything about ranching either.

G: Did you ever go to auctions with him and buy cattle?

J: No, and I don't believe he ever bought any at auctions. He may have. He bought them more in fifty or a hundred at a time from people who had prize herds that were friends of his.

G: Now, I want to go into a little more detail about the--

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- J: Just as sort of a funny happening. I don't know that it happened in 1952. I guess it didn't, but early. He wanted a prize bull. You've probably heard this story. But Mr. Bridwell [?] in Wichita Falls, the Bridwell ranch was supposed to be one of the very best in the whole United States. So he decided he wanted a Bridwell bull, and he went finally to Wichita Falls and picked out with, I don't know, A. W.'s or somebody's help, a prize young bull that I think cost ten thousand dollars. I believe that was [the amount], that's the figure he used anyway in all his talking about it. Before the Bridwell bull had been on his ranch long enough to be of any use, it jumped over the fence and in doing so caught its private parts on the fence and broke them. (Laughter) That was one of the real tragedies of his life was that ten thousand-dollar animal that he had to feed the rest of its life without any production whatever ever coming from him. We used to laugh about that, but it really wasn't funny. It was a tragedy. But he made so much over that bull you wouldn't believe.
- G: That's amazing. Did he spend much time at the Ranch in the early fifties or is this something that came later?
- J: He spent as much time as he could there all the time after he bought it. First in redoing it, rebuilding the house. All of us have carried those water pipes until we hurt, because he was going to make it green. He bought all those water pipes and we'd go out there and carry them from one spot to another; I have very vivid memories of those activities. Including him, I don't want to imply that he wasn't doing it.

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G: Would you do this on a weekend, say?

J: Yes.

G: Early in 1952 Price Daniel announced that he was going to oppose Senator Connally. What do you recall about that race? What was LBJ's reaction to it?

J: Very much to stay away from it because he had two [friends running]. Actually Price Daniel was a closer friend, but Tom Connally certainly had been an associate longer and perhaps more intimately in legislative matters and in committee matters and so on.

G: Had he worked well with Connally?

J: Not always. Connally was not the kind of a person to work well with somebody he considered sort of a lieutenant junior grade, and he did consider Mr. Johnson that way I think, at least in the earlier years when he first came to the Senate, and I think felt like he ought to call the shots pretty well. You know, Mr. Johnson never was one to let anybody call all the shots. They didn't always work together well, but they had a very healthy respect for each other, I think.

G: Did he play any role at all in the campaign of either man?

J: I don't think so. If he did I didn't know it.

G: Do you think he had a preference in his own mind? Of course, if Daniel came in, LBJ would be the senior senator.

J: I don't know. This is pure conjecture. If I were guessing I would have guessed that he would have liked to have seen Daniel win because Daniel would have been an immediate follower, would have been a person who would have looked up to him to everything that he did and asked

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his advice on everything, which when he got to the Senate he did do. And he might have liked to have had a person like that rather than one that was a little intransigent, who was kind of a difficult person to work with.

G: Of course with Daniel's election LBJ suddenly became the senior senator from Texas and at the same time I guess the Democratic leader. This would have been 1953.

J: Yes, he became the minority leader, not the majority leader, which I think surprised everybody. He hadn't been in the Senate very long himself, but there was just nobody else that was the person that both sides sort of looked to for leadership.

G: This does take us into 1953, which is ahead of our chronology, but as long as we're on the subject I want to ask you how did he ever hit upon the notion of calling it the Democratic leader rather than the minority leader?

J: He didn't like the word minority, and he felt that it was a very temporary word. He just thought Democratic leader was a better [title].

G: Do you think that was his own idea then?

J: I always thought so. I don't know that it's true. It may be somebody gave it to him or whispered it in his ear, but I don't know anything about it. I always assumed that it was something of his own preference.

G: The tidelands issue was heating up again in 1952 and LBJ made a speech on the floor on March 10. Do you recall his efforts there on the tidelands this year?

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J: Yes, although he did not, I don't think, take the real leadership in this, because I don't think he felt that he was as qualified as, say, Price Daniel--that had been his life as [Texas] attorney general and governor and whatever--and maybe some of the senators from Louisiana. I don't remember whether it was Russell Long or who, but there were several people who had made a real fight on the tidelands. He went right with them and voted with them and stood with them and made speeches with them, but he did not place himself as a leader in the debate or anything like that.

G: My impression is on the tidelands that he and Rayburn were more willing to--

(Interruption)

Were he and Rayburn more inclined to compromise on the tidelands issue than, say, Price Daniel?

J: Yes, I think so.

G: Can you give me the background of that?

J: Well, I don't know that I can give you the background or not, but to the best of my memory those that had put so much into it and felt so strongly about it didn't feel like compromising a bit. I think Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson, who were close to them but on the other hand also were put into positions of leadership with a party that was closely taking an opposite position, felt like they didn't want a divisive issue that might split the party. I think they were willing to compromise to keep as much for the states as they could possibly get, which I guess is the way it ended up.

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G: Did they try to get Daniel to come around to their perspective on that, do you know?

J: I don't know. I'm sure they did.

G: Okay. I have an episode here on the bottom of page 5 [of the 1952 Chronology] that describes a young Iranian who served at Sheppard Air Base in Wichita Falls who wanted to stay in the country, and LBJ introduced legislation to accomplish that. Do you recall that incident and his interest in it?

J: No, I don't, but I know it must have been somebody in whom he was very interested, because he was extremely reluctant to do private bills. I bet you you could count his private bills on those fingers. He did a few.

G: You know, you see in the Congressional Record I guess just hundreds and hundreds of private bills listed there.

J: That's right.

G: Why didn't he share this tendency?

J: Well, I think he felt that we had laws that should have been adequate to cover situations, and unless there was a real definite hardship that couldn't be remedied under the laws that already existed, why, that they ought to be able to be remedied, and there were a few cases where they couldn't be. He did introduce some private bills that I remember, but it was only in cases where he looked into them and felt like a real wrong had been done. I don't remember this one. I would imagine that somebody like Elmer Parish or somebody in Wichita Falls

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who had gone into the case and had really studied it told him that they felt a real injustice had been committed.

G: I want to ask you to go into the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee in some detail. I realize that you were working in a different capacity, but this is a list of some of the investigations that were under way and [tell me if there's] anything that you remember about some of these. One in particular that interests me is the investigation of the Allison Division in General Motors. Evidently some investigators went out there and made a preliminary investigation. For one reason or another it was decided not to write a report on it or issue a final investigative [report].

J: I don't remember why not, but I do remember that we sent investigators on the Allison Division and that there was a feeling at one point that it was worthy of investigation. But they must have not been able to sustain some of the charges that were made. A lot of their things came in letters from dissatisfied government employees, or ex-government employees, and they would assign these to the investigators, have them check them out, and in a good many cases they found that there was some justification for what was being said. I don't remember the details of it.

G: There have been some suggestions that the Allison investigation was hushed up. Would there have been any reason for that to be hushed up?

J: I don't think so, and I never knew Mr. Johnson to hush up anything.

G: Really?

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- J: Well, it may be it's conceivable that they might have decided that they were wrong, the people who had made charges, that they weren't justified.
- G: Was there a tendency among members on that subcommittee to leak things to the press? For example, you had [Estes] Kefauver on the committee, and he was in 1952 running for president. Did he have a tendency to make some headlines of his own?
- J: Maybe, although I'm not sure that we didn't have some intended leaks occasionally. George Reedy could tell you more about that than I could, I'm sure. You say it wasn't my department, although I worked fairly close with them, particularly on rubber. I worked on rubber.
- G: Did you? Good. There were a number, at least three reports on rubber.
- J: Mr. Johnson was very interested in the rubber situation.
- G: Well, let me ask you to analyze the rubber investigations since you did [work on them].
- J: The government was disposing of some of the plants that had been built at fairly expensive cost at a time when rubber was in short supply and we began to make synthetic rubber for the first time. Mr. Johnson felt some of the dispositions were not well conceived and should not be done, and I think he stopped the disposal of I don't know how many. There was more than one.
- G: I think the first report that the committee did resulted in stopping the sale of a plant in Akron, Ohio. Do you remember that one?

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- J: Yes. That wasn't the only one. There were others. Some of the rubber manufacturers were so mad at Mr. Johnson they just couldn't abide him.
- G: Is that right?
- J: General Tire especially. What's the old man's name that was going to beat him up in his office?
- G: Is that right? The president of General Tire?
- J: Yes. He came over. I can't think of it right now.
- G: He came up to the office, is that right?
- J: Yes.
- G: Well, it was his position that the government should sell this back to them at a loss, is that what the--?
- J: Well, I don't know about the loss situation, but they felt like they had worked out a deal, and then here came this young Turk throwing a monkey wrench into it, which should have been done.
- G: Were there other people in the rubber industry that agreed with some of these decisions?
- J: No, I think the industry as a whole were opposed to all of it. The industry was anxious to get the government out of the rubber business and get these plants turned over to private industry. There may have been somebody, I don't know, whether some of the little companies were applauding him or not, but certainly the big companies were not.
- G: Alcohol plants were another area. Did you work at all in these?
- J: Yes, it was all part of the same package. The alcohol plants were

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used in connection with the rubber plants, and I believe if I'm not mistaken the sale of some of them was stopped.

G: There's one, I think Schenley Distillers was going to buy a Kansas City alcohol plant, and that was modified. Do you recall anything related to that?

J: I recall the situation, but as far as details, no. We should have done this twenty years ago.

G: In a lot of these reports concerning rubber and strategic materials, alcohol, the Munitions Board was really criticized by the Preparedness Committee. Do you recall Mr. Johnson's attitude toward the Munitions Board?

J: Well, he felt the Munitions Board was approving a lot of these actions that they should not have been, from the point of view of national security.

G: Did he feel like it was dominated by industry or weighted too heavily toward private industry? How did he explain the fact that all of this had gotten by the Munitions Board?

J: I think just exactly what you said.

G: Is that right?

J: The wars were over, or at least the big war was over, and that the government was kind of wanting to get out of business and the industries were wanting to take it all back over, although they had been unwilling to do it when they had the chance.

G: Okay. Other investigations concerning the--
(Interruption)

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Some of the other investigations concerned conditions on those bases, the military bases. There was a report in 1951 that criticized Lackland Air Force Base, saying that the air force enlisted more men than it could process efficiently.

J: I remember that vaguely. They were enlisting them and just letting them sit there, cut grass. Cut grass with a bayonet, I believe.

G: There also were a whole series of investigations of military indoctrination centers and how their programs worked, what their facilities were like, and just the processing of these new recruits. They were Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Camp Chaffee; Fort Leonard Wood; San Diego Marine Corps Depot; Fort Ord.

J: I don't remember much about that. I just remember that some of the young men we had working for us went out to some of these bases and made some inspections. One of the guys that was an investigator is still around, Dan McGillicuddy. Have you talked [to him]?

G: I did see him.

J: He made some of these things.

G: Did LBJ ever go on any of these investigations?

J: Not on ones like that. He did go out and look at some of the rubber plants and some of the bigger ones, yes.

G: Did you ever go on any of the investigations?

J: I did, but I can't remember which ones. Actually one of my duties was sort of helping coordinate their work.

G: Is that right?

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- J: I guess on the flow chart it wouldn't show, but I did, getting their reports written and approved.
- G: Then you worked with Donald Cook, is that right?
- J: Yes.
- G: How partisan were these reports?
- J: I don't think they were extremely partisan. They were not certainly intended to be.
- G: Did the Republicans on the Preparedness Subcommittee want to investigate Democratic things and the Democrats want to investigate Republican [things]?
- J: I don't remember it that way. One of the most enthusiastic people about investigating was [Wayne] Morse. I think he was still a Republican in those days. He later became a Democrat. If I'm not mistaken, he was a Republican then. There's another Republican that--
- G: Styles Bridges was one.
- J: Bridges worked hand in glove with Mr. Johnson, was interested in it. I don't remember politics really coming into it much at all.
- G: Now, after the Republicans took over control of the subcommittee in 1953, I guess they had the majority staff. Did they change the focus of the investigations at that point?
- J: I don't know. I don't think they changed the focus, I think they were not quite as intense as we had been. I don't think they wrote as many reports and pushed as hard.
- G: They also seemed to have divided it up into a series of small committees on different issues rather than--I think they had Preparedness

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Subcommittee Number 5 and Preparedness Subcommittee Number 3. What was the purpose of this, do you remember?

J: I assume it was to keep from having all the members have to be involved in every activity. I can think of no other reason.

G: Did your state interests ever come in conflict with the interests of the preparedness investigation?

J: I don't think so, although there were two or three times that we did investigations. I can't remember just where. Lackland of course was one of them where there were investigations in Texas. I know one of them was in an ordnance plant out in East Texas.

G: Was it Longhorn?

J: Longhorn Ordnance, the only one there. I think Mr. Johnson tried his best not to let location concern him.

G: How interested in these investigations was he?

J: Extremely, especially at first. He devoted just nearly all of his time, went to all of the meetings. I don't want to imply that he got less interested, because I think he continued to be interested, but his duties otherwise became greater and greater as he moved along. He had to delegate more and more.

G: Did he himself ever generate ideas about what to investigate? Did he ever get together with you and say, "Hey, let's investigate this," or "Let's look into that"?

J: Not with me, but I know that he did with other members of the committee and with Don Cook. And Don Cook would come to him with suggestions and ideas that he would say, "Yes, by all means," or "No, I

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think maybe that's not going to be fruitful." It wasn't something he left over to someone else to handle.

G: He emphasized replacement of what he called the chair corps, the desk-bound officers. Do you recall that?

J: Yes, but it was after I wasn't as closely associated with it as I was at first. I don't recall the details of it.

G: Substandard housing and exorbitant rent for military personnel.

J: I remember that one came as a result of a multitude of letters complaining about conditions and costs, rent. There were two things: they weren't keeping their properties up, and they were still charging high rents for them.

G: Gambling near Keesler Air Force Base.

J: I sure remember that one.

G: Let me ask you to recall anything you can about it.

J: Well, I know we sent--I've forgotten who it was. Apparently the gambling at Keesler was rampant. I mean it was Las Vegas personified. They could go do anything in the field of gambling. Some of them reported the loss of several thousand dollars and so on. I don't know whether Don went down there or not, but several of the investigators did go down and reached the conclusion that there was not any effort being made by the local authorities to curb it. It was an interesting investigation because it was a little bit off the beaten path.

G: Do you recall the results?

J: Well, if I'm not mistaken, you can check me on this, but I think that

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it resulted in a halt, not a complete halt perhaps, but certainly a slowdown in the gambling activities in that area.

G: One of the most publicized investigations was that of the Moroccan Air Base construction where you had tremendous cost overruns and things of this nature. Do you remember that one?

J: Yes, I remember it. I don't remember details. I remember that they had planned to spend so much and spent a great deal more on everything that went on over there. Some of the things were costing a whole lot more than anybody felt they had the right to cost.

G: I think in one case LBJ criticized the wife of a military officer who was apparently helping to decorate or design or indicating what she wanted in some of the facilities there. Do you remember that?

J: I don't remember that. But it's very possible. I don't remember it.

G: Almost as soon as the Republicans took over the majority and assumed the chairmanship of the committee, the first report was no longer unanimous. Kefauver filed a minority report.

J: I don't remember that, but I see it here.

G: Was it difficult to get all the members to go along earlier?

J: It may have been, but it never seemed to be. Mr. Johnson I think laid the groundwork. He went around to them and told them these things and showed them the reports and got their agreements so that when it came up in committee it was in enthusiastic support from everybody. It was an organization job on his part that they worked.

G: The reports seemed to have been well written. The writing was more

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sensational than you'd normally find in a government report. Now, how was this effect achieved?

J: Well, I just think we had people who were not the normal government-type people. We had lawyers and investigators who were not typically government people. I don't recall who wrote all the reports, but I think that they had to go through--you ought to see Reedy on this, but I think after they were written the first time they were rewritten by Reedy and then put a little sex into them.

G: Some of them almost seem like they had a detective writer's hand in there.

J: I don't know who that would have been.

G: Okay. Now, to what extent was the committee's or the Senator's interest one of publicity, getting publicity from this whole procedure?

J: Well, that's a tough question. I think he felt that if they were going to achieve anything they had to have some publicity. In other words, the results they were seeking would only be brought about if they were publicized and people kind of raised up in horror and said, "I can't believe this is happening." So, yes, I think he wanted publicity. I doubt that he was seeking it just for himself or other committee members, but I think he felt publicity was important to achieve the purposes that the committee was set up to serve.

G: In terms of generating popular support?

J: Support of what we were doing, yes.

G: Did he ever see publicity as an instrument for prevention as well?

J: Yes, I think so.

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G: Did he ever talk about that?

J: I don't remember.

G: Do you think he saw the Preparedness Subcommittee as a vehicle for highlighting his own political activities and enhancing his prospects?

J: He may have. I don't think he ever felt like his prospects were very great. I think he felt when he was the majority leader he had gone as far as he would ever go. I've heard him say so many times. I don't think he ever felt like he would be president or vice president. I think he felt like a man from Texas couldn't be. No one had ever been since the Civil War except Woodrow Wilson, and he just happened to be born in Virginia, grew up in the South.

G: You don't think then that he was preoccupied with publicity?

J: He wanted publicity because he felt like if he didn't get publicity and people didn't know about these things, not much would be done about them. If they were printed, publicized and furor was raised, there would be some action taken, which there was. I don't think he was seen to get his own name. He didn't need to.

G: A couple of other investigations: one, the reduction of military bands.

J: I wasn't involved in that one at all. I remember it being discussed that he felt like--I remember him saying that so many people were playing the Stars and Stripes that could be carrying a rifle, that every unit had a band. But I wasn't involved in that business.

J: Sports car races at air force bases. These were private sports car races that were put on and sold admissions to soldiers.

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J: I don't even remember that one.

G: How about the C-119 cargo plane contracts? This was where I think Fairchild was the initial contractor and then Kaiser-Frazer was a secondary contractor at a much higher cost. Do you remember that one?

J: Yes. Not in detail.

G: Anything else on the preparedness investigations that we haven't talked about?

J: Well, I certainly think that they did an outstanding job. I think it was one of the best jobs Mr. Johnson ever did on anything. I don't know that it did enhance his future prospects, but I doubt it. But it certainly enhanced his image.

G: I wonder if there were two different thrusts within the committee: one, say, Donald Cook's experience with SEC and financial expertise, focusing on budgets, overruns, waste and, say, Kefauver's [experience] coming from the crime and racketeering and all of his interest in that sort of thing, focusing on corruption and things of this nature. Were there two different--?

J: Yes, probably, although I don't think Kefauver was ever a prime mover in the Preparedness Subcommittee. He went along, he joined in, but he was never a leader in the committee, not like [John] Stennis was.

G: Did Kefauver tend to leak information to Drew Pearson or others?

J: Probably, although I don't know that.

G: Okay. Anything else on the Preparedness Committee?

J: No, I guess that's about it.

G: Do you think the staff was a good one?

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J: Yes.

G: Do you?

J: Mike--what's Mike's name?

G: Oh, [Harold M.] Devlin.

J: Mike Devlin. He's dead, isn't he?

G: Yes. Ashbrook Bryant replaced--

J: Is Ash alive?

G: Yes. He replaced Donald Cook in early 1952.

J: Ash was a good man but not near as seasoned as Don Cook was.

(Interruption)

--might be the justification, that airmen who hadn't flown for years were still drawing flight pay on going out once a month and flying for twenty minutes or something to justify their getting it. But the older officers who didn't fly anymore and would never fly were continuing to draw flight pay. I don't remember what came of it, but I know some of the people in the air force were very much opposed to it because it was going to result in a cut in their salary. All of the air force officers were drawing it.

G: Did LBJ have good rapport with, say, the secretary of the air force and the secretary of the navy and that level?

J: He had good rapport then, yes. He had good rapport with Vandenberg. He liked Hoyt Vandenberg very much. He was not always popular with the routine generals and admirals and so on because I think they thought sometimes he was cutting into their personal domains.

G: In 1952 Shivers of course took control of the [Texas] Democratic Party.

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J: Right. Temporarily.

G: And marched it out of the Democratic column.

J: Right.

G: What was LBJ's reaction to all of this?

J: He didn't like it at all, biding his time until he could take it back or some group that felt like he did could take it back. And of course, as you know, they did.

G: Do you know the background of it?

J: Well, just what are you asking?

G: Well, in particular I think he and Rayburn seemed to feel that Shivers had misled them. They had helped Shivers I think get recognized as the head of the delegation or his delegation seated, et cetera.

J: Yes, there isn't any question about it. I'm sure that was the year that they sat on their hands and [were] the only ones that didn't stand up when Truman was introduced at the national convention, was it not? When Truman was introduced the whole convention stood up, and Texas sat there. I think they were embarrassed to death, everybody else was that was anywhere near Texas. We had an extreme conservative delegation at the national convention that year.

G: Do you think that Shivers did mislead Rayburn and Johnson on his intention that year?

J: I think that he did. I don't think he ever intended that he would actually--of course they knew Shivers enough to know that he was not going to be a flying liberal but I don't think they ever felt that he would lead the group away from the party itself. Mr. Johnson and

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Allan Shivers were always fairly good friends and respected each other quite a lot as leaders and so on, but they were very seldom on the same side of a political problem.

G: Was he afraid of Shivers at all, do you think?

J: I don't think afraid is the right word. I think he was afraid of Shivers' popularity and his ability to lead people and get them to follow him.

G: Do you think he thought that Shivers would run against him?

J: I don't think he ever had that feeling. I never heard it voiced. Shivers, as far as I know, never indicated any interest in coming to Washington.

G: There was a lot of talk that Shivers might run in 1954, you know.

J: Right. There was conversation but not from Shivers, I don't think. I think just some of the people, some of his cohorts, wanted to see the strongest person they could think of run.

G: In April LBJ issued a statement really blasting Truman's seizure of the steel mills.

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J: I just think he felt it was a dangerous precedent to seize any one segment of industry or the economy or anything else.

G: Was he genuinely upset by it? Do you recall his reaction?

J: Yes, he was. He wasn't given to issuing statements very often. Mr. Johnson was never a statement issuer unless he felt something pretty strongly.

G: Did he feel any repercussions from Truman as a result of this?

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J: I never saw any reason to think so.

(Interruption)

G: Eddie Weisl, Jr. returns from the Pacific to become a judge advocate in Washington.

J: Ed Weisl was just bound and determined to get him back and talked to Mr. Johnson on every occasion he could possibly. He talked to every admiral or every person he could think of. He almost turned the town upside down to get Eddie back, to the point where Mr. Johnson finally decided he had to do something for him. Eddie had done so much for him, both in Preparedness Committee and other things, Space.

G: By this time in 1952 what had Weisl done for him, though?

J: Well, he'd been, along with Abe Fortas, just his closest adviser all the way through.

G: Is that right?

J: Just about number one. He really respected Ed Weisl and he leaned on him. He came to Washington to be counsel to what committee, Space?

G: I think that's right.

J: I guess that's the Space Committee.

G: But here in 1952 would he have relied on Weisl for advice in a certain area? Would it be legal advice? Would it be political? Would it be foreign policy or what would it be?

J: Not foreign policy, but certainly political and legal and just general advice on nearly everything. He considered Weisl about one of the wisest persons he was associated with.

G: Well, what did you do to get Eddie Weisl, Jr. back?

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J: He did something he rarely did, just talk to the Secretary and to the Chief of Staff and everybody else concerned, got them to order him back.

G: [Ralph W.] Yarborough ran against Shivers that year for governor. Did LBJ get involved at all in that race, even quietly?

J: No. I never knew him to get involved even quietly in any nomination, Democratic. He got involved as much in mine as he did any, but he never got involved in mine.

G: There was of course a Russell-for-president effort in 1952 and there was also a Rayburn-for-president boom, small one, I guess.

J: Very small.

G: Did Rayburn discourage that?

J: Yes.

G: Did he?

J: But [Richard] Russell did not. I went to the convention in 1952 for Russell. So did John Connally. And in 1956 also.

G: Let me ask you to recall everything you can about the Russell candidacy and Russell's hopes.

J: I'll get 1952 and 1956 mixed up because they were very much the same. 1956 was a lot better. Both John and I took leaves of absence to work in the Russell activity, and we worked in the headquarters out in Chicago. It was sort of a waste of time. I believe outside of the South he got some support in Arizona. I don't know if he got any more. I may be wrong, but I think that was all, the South and Arizona. But that's where we got Booth Mooney. He was from my hometown and had

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worked for Coke Stevenson in the [1948] Senate campaign, bitterly strongly against Mr. Johnson. I had to have a PR man in my campaign, and he was the only one that lived in that district so he worked in my campaign. He called me and asked if they'd let him work for Russell in Chicago. I talked to the Senator and said, "Yes, he's an able fellow," so I told him, "Come on up." He started out working for Russell. That's how he got into our activities, working for Russell in Chicago.

G: I never knew that. I'll be darned. Well, who was heading up the Russell campaign? Who was making the decisions?

J: I'm not sure that Mr. Johnson wasn't. He certainly wasn't in the front line, but he had an awful lot to do with it.

G: Really? Do you recall in particular his role?

J: He was advisory in quiet and so on, but he was so glad to have anything that he was connected with--worked with it and for it and so on.

G: Do you think he encouraged Russell to run at the outset or was Russell enthusiastic about it on his own?

J: I think Russell was enthusiastic about it. I think Mr. Johnson did encourage him, not on the thought that he could win, but on the thought that he could be perhaps a mover and shaker at the convention itself if it got deadlocked, which didn't happen.

G: Do you recall anything about the convention itself and Russell's reaction, or LBJ's reaction for that matter, to the fact that it went for [Adlai] Stevenson?

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J: I think they both preferred it go for Stevenson than for Kefauver. In fact I know they did. All I recall is making lists of delegates and Russell appearing before them and making talks and so on, us arranging for them. John ought to see you; he had so much to do with things like this. He was actually running the Russell headquarters. I was helping him.

G: In talking to delegates how important was it that Russell was a southerner? Did this keep delegates from other parts of the country from supporting him?

J: I think it hurt, yes. I think they respected him but didn't think he could win. I think they respected Russell everywhere. Kind of like our fight in 1960; they all liked Mr. Johnson, but nobody thought he could win.

G: Do you think this experience embittered Russell? Did it make him a more regional political figure?

J: I don't know.

G: Do you think he felt that his party wouldn't nominate him because he was from the South?

J: I doubt it. I don't think he ever really expected he was going to be nominated. I think he was just kind of having a good time. What year did he and Mr. Johnson go to the NATO conference in Paris?

G: It was mid-fifties; wasn't it 1956 or something like that?

J: Yes. I don't know, something. He was just as happy as a lark on that trip. He had more fun than anybody.

(Interruption)

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G: I was going to ask, how did you end up working for the Russell campaign to start with? Was it your own idea or were you drafted?

J: I was glad to do it, but Mr. Johnson wanted us to if we were willing.

G: Do you recall how he presented it to you?

J: He said, "If you all agree with me that it would be helpful to work for Russell, I'd like for you to do it." I said, "I'd like to do it, too."

G: Were you two the only staff members that worked on the campaign?

J: It seems to me like we were not, but I can't remember who else it was.

G: How about Reedy, would he have--?

J: No, I don't think Reedy ever went. I don't think so.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XI

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In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Beth Jenkins, of ~~Austin~~ ^{Dallas}, Texas, Executrix of the Estate of Walter Jenkins, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted with my father, Walter Jenkins, on August 14, 1970, August 24, 1971, September 23, 1976, May 13, August 12 and September 16, 1982, January 18, July 22, September 22 and October 6, 1983, and on April 18, April 25, July 12, July 19, and August 30, 1984, in Austin, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

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