INTERVIEW III

DATE:

June 9, 1976

INTERVIEWEE:

SAM HOUSTON JOHNSON

INTERVIEWER:

Michael L. Gillette

PLACE:

The Alamo Hotel, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

J: "Years later, when I was on Johnson's staff, Sam Houston felt only irritation when the Majority Leader was hailed in newspapers as the second most powerful man in Washington. He knew better." All right, that's quoting from Booth [Mooney's] book, [LBJ: An Irreverent Chronicle]\*, now. What I assume he meant by that was that I thought he was the most powerful. Well, he was. Let me explain to you. Eisenhower was president. He didn't know one damn thing about the operation of the government. All of his life he had only been in the army. Another thing, Eisenhower was really not the man in charge of the war; General George C. Marshall [was], and I knew that because I served later in the intelligence service, and I knew what was going on--psychological warfare. You see, General Marshall picked him up as a colonel and moved him over to Europe and made him a general. Why? Because Eisenhower had a good smile, [was] very diplomatic, and believed in carrying out orders.

Winston Churchill was trying to get us involved, to get us to help invade Africa. Every time he'd come to Washington to see

<sup>\*</sup> Mr. Johnson's readings are not always exact quotations from Booth Mooney's book.

Roosevelt, he would get to hurrying us up to help him. So then Roosevelt would say, "I've got a war over in the Pacific." Then he and Harry Hopkins would stay up all night drinking with Churchill. Then when he sent Eisenhower over there, Churchill, when he hadn't [inaudible] or even before, he would just call up Eisenhower and Eisenhower would run right straight there and sit and listen to Churchill for hour after hour. He kept Churchill appeased. It's no reflection on Churchill, he was a brilliant man. But that was his job. [Inaudible] caused directly of course from that, too much of that.

Now when Eisenhower became president, in the election of 1952, of course as you know, we supported Adlai Stevenson that year.

Eisenhower called for [Robert] Taft, who was the Republican [Senate] leader at the time, and Lyndon was minority leader, Democrat. And so they went in for a conference. Well, this hasn't been told yet, but I heard directly from Lyndon on it. As Taft and Lyndon walked out, Senator Taft told Lyndon, "You see what kind of a pickle we're in. He doesn't know a damn thing, really, about what goes on. Lyndon, it's going to be up to you. I'm dying of cancer, but that'll stay with Lyndon. You're the only man I'm going to tell. It's going to be up to you to run this country." So having that knowledge of background coming from Taft to Lyndon, no one else had that but me. Lyndon told me about it. Now to fully substantiate my belief in that, which I don't find any of this being put in the record, put in the newspaper, but I do have a pretty good memory.

So Taft and Lyndon--you see, they [the Republican and Democrats in the Senate] were 47 and 47, but Taft was just defeated by one vote, because Nixon could break the tie. You see what I mean, Taft would have to [inaudible]. But they had a gentlemen's agreement not to bring up anything unless they both knew about it, not to try to slide anything under the table, no trickery. All this stuff about Lyndon being trickery isn't [inaudible]. I know the man. Now, he was a politician and shrewd, but he did not have to tell the press and the world what he intended to do and have his enemies destroy it before he got started. So a lot of the members of the press and others thought that way, trickery. Well, the fact of it is, Lyndon had sense enough to keep his mouth shut and not brag on what he was going to do, just like this--now you take some of these people who have recently . . . why should the United States government start this, have open hearings on the CIA and the FBI and disclose all of our secrets to Russia? Like the Watergate thing. Why couldn't they hold those hearings behind closed doors? The Watergate destroyed America. It brought us way down. I predicted that, and can show you, back in 1973. I said that we'd have inflation--that's a matter of record in my speaking-that we'd have trouble in the Mideast. All that could come from [inaudible].

So then Lyndon was more popular with some of the Republicans like Margaret Chase Smith and some of the liberals than Taft was.

G: Why was this? Why did Margaret Chase Smith support him as much as she did?

- J: Well, they both believed alike on some of the programs, you see. She was not one of these old conservatives. There were several of the Republicans there that Lyndoon could command when he wanted to.
- G: It's been suggested, I think, that he would make a special effort to look after the interests of certain Republicans like her and, let's say, [William] Langer and some of the others who might vote with him on certain things. Do you have any recollections here?
- J: Oh, of course, of course. Now, you take it up in New Hampshire. We never had a Democratic senator from there, but he [Lyndon] was the closest friend Styles Bridges ever had. Styles Bridges became leader for a while. He was chairman of the Appropriations Committee under Eisenhower, and he was Lyndon's closest friend when he had the Republican control for his two years. Then, of couse, Lyndon became majority leader and everything went to him. But Eisenhower couldn't buy toilet paper without Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn's approval since 1955. They could hardly get enough there when Taft was in.

But here's what I'm getting to, and you don't have to have it in the [LBJ] Library, but it's been in the papers. Taft was coming to the Senate floor using his cane. But he named Bill Knowland to be acting majority leader. Lyndon went to Bill Knowland, Senator Knowland, and said, "I talked to my senators myself, and all they want is to go over and make speeches at the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner. Now, Bill, if you're going to bring up something controversial that I know these people would want to be heard on, I'll tell them not to go, keep them here." He said, "No, I won't bring up anything controversial."

Lyndon let them go for the speeches at the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner. The next day Knowland brought up one of the most controversial bills. You'll have to check <u>Time</u> magazine to see what it was; I don't remember that. But that's when Lyndon Johnson, for the first and only time, really blew his top on the floor of the Senate. Part of this was stricken from the record.

He got up, "Bill, you've lied to me. You don't do that on the Senate floor. You lied to me. You said you would <u>not</u> bring up anything controversial and now you have." Taft was on the floor in a wheel chair. This was the first time in history that this had ever happened, that is according to the press, and surprisingly Lyndon made a move to gain a minority [majority] to recess Congress, adjourn Congress, until the other people could get back. And damn near most of the Republicans voted <u>for</u> Lyndon, including Taft, according to <u>Time</u> magazine. Just like when I was being interviewed by Merle Miller, I said, "You can go back and look at these. I'm not making it up; I've checked." Taft said, "Bill, you've got to learn your lesson now. You've got to keep your word to Lyndon Johnson or he'll cut you to pieces." Bill Knowland, he did from then on out.

So of course after 1955, Lyndon became majority leader, but he always gave the Republicans a fair shake. Like he was very close to Styles Bridges. He was a leading Republican; he had seniority. He was chairman of the Appropriations Committee and other things. When he wanted something done when Eisenhower had control of Congress, Styles Bridges went out and got it done. Well, for instance, ask

Charlie Herring here; he was federal district attorney. Lyndon named him federal district attorney. So then Herbert Brownell decided that he would fire Charlie Herring. I called Charlie [inaudible] Jack Porter, who was the Republican national committeeman [inaudible] Lyndon's appointment and told Brownell that he had to name someone else. You see, the federal district attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president; not the judges, they serve for life. That's a very important custom.

Well, I was over there when a little [inaudible] came out in the paper that said Jack Porter had conferred with Brownell about naming a new district attorney who would be Russell Wine of San Antonio.

Charlie ran and he showed me--we were in the same building--and I said, "Well, we can wait for it any day, Charlie." So one day Charlie and I were having a cup of coffee. Maurine Ray, who was Charlie's secretary at that time and later she became secretary to Governor [John] Connally, came over to the Washington Club trying to find her boss. "Well, here it comes," I said. "Now, Charlie, what you do"--this was the administrative office of the Attorney General himself, the one that handles administrative personnel--"he's going to ask you to resign, and it's customary for someone to resign in that kind of position. That patronage goes to the senator, who will name a Republican. You tell him no, you're going to wait and talk to Lyndon about it.

Well, I went back. I was on the other end of the line, and this fellow [inaudible] asked him to resign. Charlie told him that he

would have to talk this over with Lyndon. "But he doesn't have anything to do with it, Mr. Herring. It's customary that everybody resign when the appointment comes back." "I know that, but I'm going to have to talk it over with the Senator." Well, I didn't take it up with Lyndon because I knew what Lyndon would say: "Charlie, follow the rules." I knew that Lyndon would say, "Go ahead, Charlie, because this <u>is</u> the customary procedure." Hell, I don't follow Lyndon's rules. I liked to get in a little fight once in a while. I began to build up a pile of trouble.

All right. He had prosecuted more cases than any other district attorney in the United States and had the largest district. Now, the reason why that is is not unusual, because [his district included] the Mexican border, El Paso, Juarez, you know, [and] most of those cases they're prosecuting were just automatically deportation cases. That's the reason it looked good on paper. So I didn't mention it to Lyndon. Then I went up to the University [of Texas] and got a copy of a speech in which Herbert Brownell had said when he was speaking at the university that everybody that had done a good job would stay on, that he wasn't going to have a mass firing. Well, I know more about Brownell than that, that he wasn't just going to clean out the Department of Justice, because federal district attorney is a political job named by the senators, usually.

I kept that all under my hat, because I needed Homer Thornberry's support on it. So we were flying up--Lyndon had already gone to Washington--anyhow Homer and I went up on the same plane. I talked it

over with Homer. I said, "I know it's customary, Homer, but oh how embarrassing it's going to be for Charlie, because Brownell said he would keep them on if they had done a good job. Now, that's awful embarrassing to Charlie to think that he's being fired because he didn't do a good job." Homer bit for it.

Lyndon met us at the airport, picked us up. Lady Bird hadn't gotten to Washington, so we all went to Lyndon's home. Lyndon picked up about two dozen hamburgers, we had a couple of Scotches, and I brought it up my way. I said, "You know, Lyndon, I want to tell you that Charlie Herring had a call last month for his resignation." "Yes. All right." I said, "Homer and I were talking on the way up here that that would be a great reflection on Charlie to be fired. Charlie realizes, and I know you realize, too, that it's customary. But this is an unusual case, because Mr. Brownell said he was going to keep everybody on that had done a good job, and then to turn around and fire Charlie Herring, it would ruin him." Lyndon said, "Homer, what do you think about it?' "Sam Houston's right. We agree on it." Homer was backing me. If I hadn't talked to Homer before, he would have said, "Oh, I just don't know. Leave me out of this." Like I said in my book, Homer used to laugh at Lyndon's jokes before he ever got the point. I haven't seen Homer since then and I don't care.

But anyhow, the point of it is, Richard Nixon, the vice president, gave a party for the members of Congress, the leaders, in which Lyndon was head of the Democrats and other things. So Herbert Brownell came through to shake hands, and Lyndon came around, "Hey,

Herbert, I just want to tell you that any nomination that you send up from the Justice Department, there're not any of them going to get confirmed." That was a shock to hear him tell him, "Don't send up any nomination or anything. You won't get it through, because I control Congress." He didn't say "I control Congress," but it was assumed. Then Nixon turned up and said, "Lyndon, what is it? What have you done? Can I help you?" Lyndon said, "No, I can get it." Well, of course, Lyndon had to stop and think. He had more power than the Vice President. You see, Nixon had no power [under] Eisenhower. Ever since that Checkers speech, Eisenhower didn't trust Nixon, [but] he had to keep him on. But you know that probably. I've talked to Brownell in Acapulco about things like that.

- G: Really?
- J: Oh, yes.
- G: What did he say about that?
- J: Oh, well, he didn't say anything about that. I'll go on and finish my story. What happened, Lyndon had this file, and then Styles Bridges went down and told Herbert Brownell what had happened: "We're going to need Johnson's help more than that, so leave Charlie Herring alone."

  And he was the only one that was kept on. This was just one of the few instances that involved me. So much for that. The thing of it is, I resented the fact that they would sack a man [?].

The thing of it was, Eisenhower was smart enough to know where the power was, who controlled the House and Senate: Lyndon and Rayburn, particularly on foreign policy. I think it's very important

for the Library to see that you get the recording made of Eisenhower. I'll tell you what it was. It goes back . . . in order to get my point through, so it would be [inaudible], so people can understand it. You see, before World War II, after World War I, sometime there, Congress passed [a law] that the United States cannot send arms and ammunition to any foreign nation. Now, Roosevelt, when he was president, sought to have that repealed. You see, I was up there and I know. So then he called the Foreign Relations Committee. Key Pittman, a Democrat, was in charge of that, but he didn't have much power. There was [Arthur] Vandenberg on there, there was [William] Borah on there, and there was Gerald P. Nye on that committee, I know.

Roosevelt called the men to the Oval Office and he mixed them a drink. When you went to the Oval Office with Roosevelt, you had to drink what he fixed. If he fixed an old-fashioned, you had to drink an old-fashioned, whether you wanted it or not. So he fixed them all an old-fashioned. He said, "Senators, the reason I got you down here, we've got to repeal the Embargo Act. We've got to serve notice on Hitler that we can, if we want to, come to the aid of Great Britain, France and Poland and others. We've got to do it before the Germans, because Hitler is watching right now what we're doing. And if we don't do it, there'll be war in less than thirty days." So then Roosevelt turned to his secretary of state, Cordell Hull. "Mr. Secretary, you are permitted now to show these senators what evidence that we have got that they're waiting on this decision." You know, the intelligence, he didn't have to [inaudible] all they want." [One

of the senators said], "We don't need it." I don't know whether it was [William] Borah or who. "We have our own intelligence." They walked out [inaudible] "Gentlemen, there'll be war in less than thirty days time." And in about three weeks, Hitler marched on Poland. But Hitler wouldn't have done that had he known we were going to get in. That's my belief, and I think it's been substantiated, clearly, by history. So that shows you the power of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in regard to war.

Now here's something. I broke my leg in 1957. I slipped on the dining room floor, and I had an operation, and it caused osteomylitis, so I had to live in a body cast for a year. The only thing I could do was use my arms, and I damn sure could talk. So I would write memos to Lyndon and [I was] looking at the news and reading the newspapers and keeping up with everything. I worked harder—I won't say worked harder but more effectively than I did by the desk up there, dictating to you about your having a new daughter, congratulations or something like that.

President Eisenhower was going to sign a peace treaty or something in Paris. I was sitting there, and I said, "You know, I think it would be wonderful if Lyndon would call Eisenhower and tell him we'll back him up." My wife's mother was there, and [she said], "Well, go ahead and tell him." Anyhow, I called up; Mary Margaret [Wiley Valenti] answered the phone and I said, "Mary Margaret, I'd like to talk to Lyndon." "Well, Sam Houston, he's having lunch at the Policy Committee." "Fine, honey, that's where I want him." He said,

"What is it? What is it, Sam Houston?" I said, "Lyndon, President Eisenhower's leaving at five o'clock this afternoon. I'd like for you to call him and tell him that the Senate will back him up." "All right. All right." Lyndon picked up the phone right before he left and said, "Mr. President, I want you to know that you are going over there for all America." "Thank you, Lyndon." [Lyndon] said, "Well, just a minute. Senator Walter George, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, would like to confirm it." [George] said, "Mr. President, what Lyndon just told you is go, we'll back you up."

I waited, of course, for the Huntley-Brinkley and Walter Cronkite news to come on, and not a goddamn word was said about it. It was big news. Woodrow Wilson, you know, started the League of Nations, but it failed. So then I called Lyndon. I said, "Lyndon, why didn't you do what I asked you to do?" He said, "Goddamn it, I did." I said, "There's nothing on the news." He said, "Well, that's not my fault then. [It's] Jim Hagerty, he didn't release it. He's not going to give me any credit [?]. I said, "Lyndon, he might." He said, "You know Jim"--the President's press secretary, you know--"he's not going to do that." I said, "Lyndon, it would be good for the country to know that what Eisenhower does, that he won't have any trouble out of the opposition, from the Democrats." He said, "Well, Sam, I think you ought to leave it [inaudible] that way. If Eisenhower doesn't want it released [inaudible], he knew the importance of this. He knew that we were behind him and that's all."

Anyhow, I called this fellow. I don't know whether he [Mooney] meantions that in the book or not; I haven't read that part. I called Booth Mooney and I said, "You know Bob Albright of the Washington Post?" Now he had a separate section there where the editorials are all printed called the "Outlook." So he called up Albright and told him what Lyndon had done and quoted me. My name was never mentioned, don't worry about that. If you ever get your name in the press, at that time they can start hitting at you. Anyhow, he brought out what Lyndon had done, and I mailed it air mail to Lyndon down at the Ranch. This was kind of a Christmas present, whatever you want to call it. Well, I'm getting there again.

We had no war during Eisenhower's administration. Why? Because as far as the country was concerned, we were united behind the President as far as foreign relations were concerned. Now if [J. William] Fulbright had done that to Lyndon, we could have closed out the Vietnam War in six months. Now, this is being real critical, I know. That's the reason why Booth figured--

- G: Do you remember that incident that he describes of you talking to

  Booth Mooney when he first came on the staff, and saying that you were
  there to watch, make sure that he was working for your brother and not
  for someone else?
- J: No.
- G: You don't remember that?
- J: I probably did. I won't deny it. It sounds about like me.

- G: While we're on the subject of Booth Mooney, let me ask you, did he play a role as a contact with H. L. Hunt later on?
- J: I got him the job.
- G: Can you tell me about that?
- J: I'm going to go ahead and read this here, and I'll get around to it.

  [Reading from Mooney's book again]: "From the time he was a little boy Sam Houston had walked in his brother's shadow. Although he obtained a law degree, he never hung out his shingle. When LBJ left his position with Representative [Richard] Kleberg, he was succeeded by Sam Houston. The younger brother tried"--and so forth. Well, I'm just going to go on and skip this part here. "In contrast to LBJ's relentless, endless reaching for power, Sam Houston was cheerful, convivial and cynical. He who liked to set up elaborate practical jokes and in his younger days had a great fondness for parties and girls and liquor. He was deadly serious, though, about anything affecting his brother's career but hardly anything about himself.

"A prime example of their different attitudes was provided by their respective experiences as members of the Little Congress. When eager-beaver LBJ entered the Washington scene as a congressional secretary, he found that organization in the hands of a small"--and it says [that] while Lyndon was elected speaker [of the Little Congress], I ran and was defeated. It goes on and says what I wanted to do was to be in charge of entertainment to New York.

Here's what happened. In 1937 my name was put in the pot to run for speaker. Lyndon Johnson was running for Congress then. Why in

the hell do you think I cared about going up there and running for Little Congress, a bunch of secretaries, when I thought I was as big as a congressman, to be frank with you, because I was signing all the mail, my name was on it? I had no opposition among the members of the House secretaries, and the Senate secretaries, they didn't come over and pay any attention. But Truman's aide, [Charles] Bremis, he decided to run against me. So then he brought over a carload of people from the Senate that had never been there before. I lost by about four votes, and I'm kind of glad I did. Then my manager, old Gore Henges [?] [inaudible] very intelligently and said, "Sam, you won by one vote." "Why?" He said, "Because none of those are eligible." You had to attend two meetings, you see, to be a member, "All of those were people that are not members of the Little Congress, so we can throw it all out." I said, "Hell, no, let them leave it like it is. I didn't want it in the first place."

Now, I began to think. I did want to be speaker to go up there [to New York] to meet [Fiorello] LaGuardia and be in charge. That's the payoff. That's when you get important, especially if it's [inaudible]. So I said, "Let's check the bylaws of the Little Congress." So we looked up a week ahead of time that we were going to change and elect an entertainment committee with a membership of five. Five members were selected and elected by me, and they, of course, made me chairman. That meant that we were in charge of all entertainment, everything. Then cut the Speaker out [?]. So of course I said, "We're going to have a hell of a good time."

So what I did, the first thing I did: the contract for taking the Little Congress to New York usually went to the Pennsylvania Railroad, because they go inside New York, in New York City, all the stops. So I just called the B&O man, the vice president, and I asked him if he wanted the contract. He was called to the phone, and he said, "Well, yes, we never have gotten it." I said, "Well, you might get it now, but it'll cost you." "What?" I said, "Well, if you don't know what happened, I'll tell you. Most of the people that go to New York, they come through Washington first and they see their senators and congressmen, and they ask the secretary what's a good railroad to take, which one, and what hotel to stay at. So I think you ought to pay if you get it, but I can award it to you. I think you ought to put a private dancing car on there, furnish the music--you can get a couple [inaudible] and we can dance all the way to New York." That didn't cost much money, so he fell for that and of course he got a contract [inaudible].

Then when we'd go up to New York to select the hotel, we went to the New Yorker Hotel, and they entertained us and dined us well, and the Pennsylvania, a bigger hotel. I decided that what hotel we stayed at wasn't so damn important if it's quieter, so I went to the Lincoln Hotel. No one had ever heard of it. I got it for fifty cents a night. They practically gave it to me. Then I got different people to give buffet luncheons for us. I knew the lobbyists. If I didn't I'd have had to turn it over to someone who did. [Inaudible] that furnished everybody with a pint of whiskey before we got home

[inaudible]. But in the assistance, the most it could cost you was \$12.50 for four days. He [Booth Mooney] goes on and says this about that I'm junketing around [and that] I took it as the social highlight of the decade.

[Reading from Mooney's book]: "By the time I knew him"--by the time he met me, you see--"the parties and girls were in the past."

And he came up there to work. [Inaudible] work for Lyndon [inaudible] because I said he did in my book. All the time [inaudible]. I'll tell you the reason why I put it in there later on.

So [the parties and girls were] a thing of the past. [Reading]: "However I soon came to understand that an extended absence from the office meant he had kicked loose from the traces and was off somewhere drinking more than he should. It was one segment of Sam Houston's life that his big brother could never fully control, although he tried. Drink was Sam Houston's only escape, and that only temporary, from LBJ's domination. But he always came back.

"When he was functioning, Sam Houston provided invaluable assistance to the Senator. More than any other man I have known he loved politics for its own sake. His greatest pleasure was to set up intricate, devious"—he shouldn't have said that, but maybe it's true—"schemes for bringing about the discomfiture of any Texas or Washington politician who dared to oppose his brother. He developed to a fine point the art of leaking to a few favored press correspondents the raw material for stories—which must never be attributed to him—that he hoped would damage the enemy and uplift his brother. He spent hours

on the telephone with Texas politicians to ensure that any brush fires springing up down there would be promptly extinguished. He dictated cogent, succinct memos to LBJ about political issues and how he thought they should be met.

"One of Sam Houston's great values to the Senator was his feeling for people as individuals rather than as masses of voters. LBJ's compassion for the oppressed and disadvantaged was on a broad, sweeping scale. Sam Houston's empathy with the underdog was direct and personal. He might not know what it meant to go to bed hungry, but he knew damn well what it was to have to wake up with a hangover. He instinctively put himself in the shoes of the feckless and the fearful.

"Sam Houston, who had been [there] often, figured that anybody on his brother's staff who took his job seriously and tried to work as hard as Lyndon demanded was an underdog and therefore deserving of sympathy and assistance. He extended both on an individual basis.

"His sympathy was liable to take the form of his inviting a down-in-the-mouth staffer out for a cup of coffee and 'a little talk.' His usual tactic was to explain that he knew his brother often acted like an unfeeling bastard but really wasn't one and had a full understanding of the great worth of that particular staff member. He would even go so far as to invent complimentary remarks about the employee's work which he attributed to his brother. He was as skilled as LBJ at laying on flattery with a heavy hand. 'Just let it slide off your back when he bawls you out' was Sam Houston's refrain on such

occasions. 'He forgets all about it in three minutes if you're doing a good job--and you damn sure are.'" Because I'm watching you.
"'Hell, you know he cusses me out worse than he does anybody else.'

"There was truth in what he said, although I had a feeling that the excoriations Sam Houston received from LBJ were window dressing for the most part. If the Senator castigated his own brother, why should any lesser member of the staff feel hurt or angry if he was accorded the same kind of treatment? When I taxed Sam Houston with this reasoning, he conceded with a grin that the thrust of my question was sound.

"'My brother's so busy doing his job that he doesn't have time to think about people's feelings,' he said defensively. 'I figure it's up to me to do anything I can to keep things smooth.'

"Anyway, his method worked most of the time. Sam Houston deserved high marks as a staff morale booster.

"He did it in other ways, too. He was consistently giving me, only after he grew to trust me, and other Johnson employees tips for suggestions that I might make to the Senator that would make him look good in the Senate or in the press. More than one memo proudly presented to LBJ by one or another of us had its genesis in a conversation with Sam Houston--invariably would take up--

"Johnson told me repeatedly that Sam Houston knew more about politics than he did, and I think in a way and to some uncertain extent this was true. Certainly he showed uncanny accuracy in predicting the political effects of actions taken by the Majority

Leader. LBJ was once quoted by John Cameron Swayze"--I don't know whether you remember John Cameron Swayze.

- G: Sure.
- J: "He was once quoted by John Cameron Swayze in a national telecast as saying that Sam Houston was his chief political adviser and 'always has been.'

"He was of course more than that. The implications of their blood relationship were inescapable. Johnson raged to others when Sam Houston went off on a spree. . . .

"After LBJ's heart attack Sam Houston came to the hospital..."
and all that. It goes on here and kind of covers me up. But then
here's where you get I said in my book [My Brother Lyndon] that
anybody that worked for Lyndon over thirty days deserved a Purple
Heart. [Inaudible]. I said that partly in jest but it was partly
[true]. I don't know how many Purple Hearts Lady Bird [has]. Goddamn, she gets one all the time.

Now the reason I'm bringing this up is because Lyndon didn't know what was coming in. When I signed my contract with Cowles, they asked me if I would [inaudible] with my book. And I said no. [Inaudible]. "Will he add anything?" "No." "All right, we'll take it. What do you want?" My agent spoke up and said, "We have an appointment tomorrow with Time-Life who own a book company, too." They said, "We'll meet their offer. Give us the first chance." Well, I went the next day to Time-Life and they said that I would have to submit a manuscript and go before the board of directors. I talked to Bob

Luce--no kin to the Luces, but he was chief [inaudible]. So I got back to my hotel. I began to think. I said, "Well now, here's Cowles Book Company. They had the chairman of the board there of Cowles Communications and of Look magazine. He promised me two covers. They didn't have to hesitate."

Then on Washington's Birthday I called back to Time[-Life] to get Luce's home number; I didn't figure they were working. I had seen him the day before, the twenty-first. I called there and asked if they could give me the home telephone number of Mr. Luce. They said, "Well, he came to work." I got him, and Luce said, "We decided that we would meet today." I said, "Well, I've decided to go with Cowles. They were ready on the spot. It doesn't make any difference." He said, "We'll give you more than Cowles." I said, "Well, what advances you give come out of the sale of the book. They've offered me thirty thousand dollars cash for each issue of the cover. So then I went to Look [inaudible] anything else." You see, my idea in writing the book—I think I told you about it—was to build up that Lyndon was not like Lyndon [?].

The only thing else I want to say about this is because--[reading from Mooney's book]: "He showed me some memos"--Lyndon showed Booth some memos--"and, in talking them over, [was apt to] say--accusingly it seemed to me--that the best ideas he got came from Sam Houston, crippled and sick [though he was].

"One idea the Senator did not like was his brother's insistence that Kennedy had his eyes fixed on 1960 and already had started a

campaign for the presidency. LBJ simply did not believe Kennedy could set his goals so high. He was too young, too inexperienced. Perhaps, he told me, the Massachusetts Senator would make another try for the vice presidential nomination. If he did so and won and served two terms with a Democratic president"--thinking himself, you see--"and LBJ did not speculate as to his identity, he probably would be ready for the top job [in 1968].

"After Kennedy was nominated and elected, proving at least in this instance the validity of LBJ's often-repeated declaration that his brother knew more about politics than he did, Sam Houston pulled out of the game. He was back on his feet, in a manner of speaking, but he got around with the utmost difficulty, so he decided to retire on disability."

Now, there are other things all throughout the book. I haven't read it, but you know [inaudible]. That's the only thing I've read because I didn't know. Now, about Booth. Yes, I did keep an eye on that, and I kept an eye on everything. [Inaudible].

You see, when Lyndon had the heart attack, he wasn't supposed to to live. Dr. [Willis] Hurst called me and Lady Bird up and told us that Lyndon had gone into a deep depression and said that he didn't know how to account for it and he wondered if Lady Bird or I knew what could have brought it on. I said, "Well, what went on in his room?" "Well, the nurse said that his chances for the presidency and his political career had ended." Lady Bird spoke up and said, "Well, he never had any idea of that ever." So the doctor asked me, and I said,

"I don't care to comment." And after Lady Bird left, I said, "Hell, he was born to be president! That's the only thing he ever had his eye on." Roosevelt offered him secretary of the navy, which I knew. He couldn't ever run for president as an ex-secretary of the navy, he had to keep around Congress. So then I went down and got Holmes Alexander to write--I think I might have told you about this--that his political career was just beginning.

Now, here's about Booth and H. L. Hunt. H. L. Hunt, of course, opposed the campaign in 1948. Most oil folks did, and Hunt's a radical old [inaudible]. He called up Lyndon at the Ranch and asked him to help him on income tax matters. Lyndon referred him to me. All right, he called me at my apartment and told me that Lyndon had asked him to call me. [He said], "You will find that I will do what I can, so Mr. H. L. Williford will be up there to see what you can do."

I called the head of Internal Revenue, General Donovan [?]--he used to be head of the Dallas [area?]--to get an appointment for Williford, who was Hunt's right-hand man. So Lyndon [said], "Don't mess with that old son of a bitch." I said, "Well, can't you at least hear him, give him that courtesy?" "No, but I'll tell you who will. I'm going out of town. I've got to get out of town." It was a small matter of charging off how he could give Mr. Williford a raise. It was no political influence; I just got him an appointment with the man that showed him how it could be legally done. So here comes Mr. Williford back: "I got it." It meant, oh, fifty or seventy-five dollars a year to him. He said, "Now what can I do for you?" I said,

"Nothing." "I can't do anything?" I said, "Nothing. He didn't come up here to [inaudible]. But here's something you can do. Sam Rayburn's having a hard time up there. I'll tell you what you can do. You can go back to the Mayflower. You deal with oil people and bankers that are opposing him. I don't want Hunt to come openly for Rayburn, because it would ruin him, but you can do this--and I want copies; give the secretary copies of the telegrams and of the telephone conversations that you are in." I worked his ass for three days. He signed some telegrams "H. L. Hunt, Hunt Oil Company." Then "H. L. Williford" and all that. So we worked his ass for that, and that's how we got in.

Later on, I got to coming to the office in 1959, sitting in the same office with Booth, a great big office there. [Inaudible]. Mr. Hunt came in and offered me a job. And I told him, "Hell, my brother wouldn't run for president with me working for you. That would cost him hell. But there's a many who will. He used to work with you people, by God, back there when he was pulling [?] for Lyndon, and he's capable." But I said, "You'd better clear it with Lyndon first. I'll get you an appointment." He had his new wife with him. So I called up Lyndon. "Lyndon," I said, "Mr. H. L. Hunt is here. He wants to come over and take up a little matter that won't take much of your time. He won't stay and all [?]. He's got a new wife and he's proud of her." "Oh, well, when can he be over here?" "They can be there in five minutes."

So he went in. He said, "Your brother said to clear it with [you] to hire Booth Mooney. He said, "Who recommended Booth Mooney?"
"Your brother." "Well, I'm not against anybody getting a better job as long as [inaudible], so it's all right."

Then Mr. Hunt called Booth down to the hotel. Meantime, Lyndon was getting ready to take a plane. He called up and ate my ass out just as good as--"What in the hell do you mean recommending Booth to work for that old son of a bitch? Now after we've just about got Booth trained to where he had become valuable, then you farm him out to H. L. Hunt." Well, fortunately he was going to catch a plane and he couldn't talk all day, or he would have. As long as you get him in a hurry he cusses you out and then hangs up: "I'll see you about that later." Then he'd forget about it later.

Booth came back after talking to Mr. Hunt. Booth was making about twelve thousand, I think, something like that. Hunt had offered him, I think it was fifteen thousand, maybe twenty thousand or something like that. So Booth came back. He'd had a couple of martinis, but I wasn't drinking. He said I had a couple of martinis with him every now and then, but that's not true. Anyhow, he was so excited. I said, "Well, Booth, we've got a problem. Lyndon knows about it." He said, "How's he know about it?" I said, "Mr. Hunt went over there, as I understand it"--I didn't tell Booth about [inaudible]--"and asked Lyndon first before he called you, and he's mad." So Booth said, "Well, so what?" I said, "Booth, if you don't clear it with Lyndon, you're not worth a damn thing to Hunt. You're being hired to watch

out for matters that come before the Federal Power Commission on the oil business." "Do you think if I turned him down he'd get mad?" "Well, I think I can fix it up for you. In the morning pick me up at Lyndon's at eight o'clock at home. You put in a call to Lyndon at the Ranch and tell him that Hunt has offered you a job for twenty thousand, and that you'd rather have Lyndon's friendship and work for five thousand than to work for old man Hunt without Lyndon's friendship for a hundred thousand." He picked up the phone right there. "Senator, Mr. Hunt offered me twenty thousand"--it was either fifteen thousand or twenty thousand--"but I'd rather work for you for ten thousand and have your friendship than to work for Hunt for a hundred thousand." Boy, that touched Lyndon. You see, he and Booth, Lyndon didn't like that five o'clock takeoff. Lyndon said, "What'd he offer you? Call him back and tell him I won't release you for under twenty-five thousand and five thousand more for expenses." [Mooney said], "Boy, Sam Houston, I am so [inaudible]. "I said, "Well, go ahead. Call Hunt back." "Oh, I ain't about to. I'm satisfied with the fifteen thousand that he already offered." "Oh, no, no," I said, "do what Lyndon says. Go ahead." I forced him to do it.

He called Mr. Hunt back and told him what Lyndon had said. He said, "Oh, I can see no reason [why not]. That makes no difference. That's all right." So that was how Booth got in. But just a minute. I said, "Booth, I don't love you that much just to get you the job. I want you to infiltrate that camp. I'd like to know, whenever you get a chance to brag on Lyndon Johnson to Mr. Hunt or some of the other

oil people that don't like [Lyndon], that's the reason I want you in the camp. Then I'm going to use you whenever I want to [inaudible]." He mentioned it [in his book]. So there I had Hunt [inaudible]; Booth was working there. He was actually working on Hunt's payroll but working for Lyndon Johnson if he needed him.

Now, I haven't gotten to the part where he quit working for Hunt, but I heard that he wrote a book condemning [Joseph] McCarthy, and old man Hunt loved McCarthy. But I never brought it up.

- G: Do you recall his role in, say, the 1960 campaign as, let's say, a messenger between your brother and Hunt, and Hunt urging. . . ? I believe he urged your brother to run, and then later on the business of the VP nomination. . . .
- J: I haven't gotten that far.
- G: I'd heard that Booth Mooney conveyed messages from Hunt to Lyndon Johnson.
- J: Well, you see, I retired in 1960. I told Lyndon in 1959, [inaudible] as I so often did, that he'd better watch Kennedy. He came there to see me, and there was a rerun of the investigation in which Bobby Kennedy was castigating [James] Hoffa. You could see Jack Kennedy passing Bobby Kennedy notes to ask Hoffa. Lyndon came by. I said, "There is your operation for president. That's what they're doing. See what they're doing to Hoffa?" "Well, what does that mean?" I said, "They know the Teamsters are Republicans and they are badgering the hell out of Hoffa just to let Walter Reuther and them know if you don't support their brother, by God, they'll do the same thing.

That's how he's going to control labor. He's not running [inaudible], Lyndon, he's already running for president. Goddamn it, go stop him!" "Well, old man Kennedy called me in 1956, said he was going to support me and put Jack on the ticket as vice president." [Inaudible]. "Oh, hell, Lyndon can't be [inaudible]."

Here's what Jack Kennedy did. He [Lyndon] said, "[Inaudible] years ago he [inaudible] was going to be against interest groups [?]."

"What did you tell him?" "I told him to always vote his interest groups [?]." "Don't you think he knew you'd say that? Lyndon, I'll swear if he can't suck you in. Flattery. I'll be goddamned. He doesn't know, Lyndon, that that daddy of his is the biggest crook in the country. [He] double-crossed Roosevelt. He got to be chairman of the SEC. He didn't make his money in whiskey; he made it in the stock market. Then when he got to be named head of the Court of St. James-ambassador-he came out for the Germans, said we couldn't stop them. That's why Roosevelt fired him. Now, this is the same goddamned thing. He found out."

So that's the reason I wrote the book, to get back at the Kennedys. I said the three most miserable years of his life were when he served as vice president. Now look at it. Why did Lyndon get mad [?]? He really wasn't mad. I could see that, but Lyndon couldn't see it. I know what he [inaudible] Kennedy. You know, Lyndon is not a man who could have his powers stripped and go on a social tour to Germany, come out and act as a [inaudible]. He liked action. Reason he took the vice presidency. I wasn't there. I had retired in

It was obvious to me that if he had turned him down, then he was about the only man that could assure Kennedy a chance. Then when Lyndon wanted to run, you see, in 1964, people would blame Lyndon for not being on the ticket. And another thing, in order to get Kennedy elected, you had to carry the South. They'd always been able to carry it. All right, these southern congressmen and senators thought Lyndon giving up the majority leadership would help them with Kennedy. They could come to him and get the [inaudible], [John] Stennis and that bunch, the southern senators. But instead of that, he named Bobby as his number-two man, and they never got a goddamn hearing, never got a hearing in any committee on anything. You can't name one goddamn law that either Jack, Ted, or Bobby ever got passed. I said this on the TV several times. So when I said that and I gave that to Jack Anderson, Lyndon didn't talk to me because [0. P.] Bobbitt, my brother-in-law, [inaudible] got along fine [?]. [Inaudible]. And I put some things in there. If Lyndon had praised my book, it would have hurt, but Lyndon began cussing me out before he even read the book, because I wouldn't talk to him unless. . . .

Now, here's the thing over here where Booth said . . . [looking through Mooney's book] which doesn't make any difference, because I never saw my brother since 1968. Here's what Lyndon said about me, now. I'm trying to find it. Understand, I've talked to Booth since this book was written; he came to the hotel. [Reading from Mooney's book]: "Publication of My Brother Lyndon created something of a stir although I, reading it with care, could find nothing especially

sensational. Sam Houston did not 'tell all' about his brother's political career or personal life. In fact, I considered it on the whole almost excessively protective.

"The book was largely made up of anecdotes about the Johnson boyhood, youth, of his ascent to power. . . .

"My Brother Lyndon hardly justified the jacket blurb that 'it adds up to a powerful, revealing document of personal and political history, illuminated by moments. . . . ' 'And it did prove beyond any doubt that Sam Houston really knew his brother a lot better that he knows me because he's been too damned busy with other matters to think about me. . . . '

"Two unsurprising facets of Sam Houston's thinking were made clear. He hated the Kennedys, especially Bobby. He adored his brother. Five years later, in speaking of the book, Sam Houston said he wrote it to 'bring out the greatness' of Lyndon Johnson and to 'get back at those who hurt my brother.'

"No doubt at the same time, Sam Houston frankly liked the money and enjoyed the notoriety. . . ."

Now this is where we're getting down to it. [Continues reading from Mooney's book]: "'No one knows more,' he ended his book, 'about the government of the United States than Lyndon Johnson, no one has a deeper concern for his country. And since he is not naturally a reticent man, it would be most uncharacteristic for him to remain silent.'" That's how I ended the book [My Brother Lyndon].

Now here's where I get [inaudible], and it really makes me. . . .

[Continues reading from Mooney's book]: "'We haven't heard the last of LBJ.'

"Sam Houston had heard the last, however, from his brother.

"LBJ made that clear to me when I visited him at the Ranch shortly before the book was published--although he had managed somehow to see a copy of the manuscript." He had. He assumed I wrote it because I wouldn't talk to him. He had seen a copy of the book. Lyndon hadn't [inaudible].

[Reading from Mooney's book]: "The book, he said, was filled with betrayed confidences and 'psychotic lies.' Sam Houston had shown himself to be ungrateful, disloyal, and probably not wholly sane."

That's where Booth quoted Lyndon. "He said the doctors at Scott-White Clinic in Temple, Texas, would testify that his brother appeared mentally unbalanced the last time [he was there]."

You know it's a funny thing, when this thing came out, I had records in Scott and White saying what was wrong with me. It definitely was not alcoholism [?] at all. I had them air mail that to me in case I would be questioned.

[Resumes reading from Mooney's book which at this point is quoting LBJ]: "'I don't see how Sam Houston could do it just for the money. He won't use the money anyway to pay up his bills or cover the [hot] checks. . . .'

"The former President turned sideways in the seat of the car he was driving to peer at me from beneath the absurdly long bill of the golf cap [he wore]. His mouth was a thin line, turned down sharply

at the corners. I was saddened by his expression of angry resignation and I tried to tell him, as I had promised Mrs. Johnson that I would, that I could not believe Sam Houston's book would be earthshakingly important. It would do no [lasting] harm, I argued. LBJ was not impressed. He went off again [about Sam Houston].

"'I wanted to give him up that time he got drunk at home and broke his leg when I was in the Senate,' he said. 'But Bird--she's always so [gentle and forgiving]--'" The least of the things [inaudible] to [inaudible] he came to the hospital . . . and it wasn't [inaudible], anyhow. "'[Bird] hoped we could do something with him. I tried, but it didn't work. Now he's done this to me.'

"He added a denial of newspaper stories that he had tried to stop publication of the book. He had never given any comment to the press about it and never would. He understood, he said, that the Kennedy Foundation 'owned a piece' of <a href="Look">Look</a> magazine and no doubt had arranged for publication of the excerpt to damage him." You see, this was before the book came out. In other words, he thought that the Kennedys had bought me off with [inaudible] and drink [?]. And everybody knows what I did to the Kennedys everywhere I could. But he was telling Booth this was just imagining. [Reading from Mooney's book again]: "This seemed so irrational to me, but I refrained from saying it. I was glad when he turned to other subjects I had come to discuss with him.

"Nothing about his remarks concerning his brother made me feel good as I recalled the many past years when Sam was so loyal. But

there was not, I realized, anything I could do. As LBJ and Sam Houston probably would have agreed, it was a family affair.

"Sam Houston had said many times to many persons, when for one reason or another he was in disfavor with LBJ, 'After all, he can't fire me from being his brother.'

"But that was what happened in the end. There was no reconciliation. When LBJ died his will contemptuously bequeathed the sum of five thousand dollars to Sam Houston.

"Some two years after his brother's death, Sam Houston was interviewed by a reporter for the <u>Austin American-Statesman</u>. At the end of the interview, he said fiercely, 'I don't want anything written that would hurt Lyndon,'" That was two years ago, and a good one.

Now the reason I brought this out is. . . . (Interruption)

When the Sputnik went up, I recall it was 1957. When Lyndon came to Washington, I was in [inaudible]. I had had my operation. I was [inaudible]. He went by to see Eisenhower and said we. . . . Let me explain this. People don't realize it, but Lyndon and Rayburn never adjourned Congress sine die. If they had adjourned it sine die, no one could call them back except the President. So in October when Sputnik went up, Congress, of course, was in recess. So he goes down to President Eisenhower and says, "We've got to do something." Anyhow, after he talked to President Eisenhower he came to my apartment, which was right in Washington. He said, "Oh, Sam Houston, the only thing he could talk about was two atomic submarines. He has no idea

about what's going on." And I said, "Well, what else--?" "Hell, I'm going to call Congress back right now." He picked up the phone and called Dick Russell and told him, "That son of a bitch doesn't know, by God, that whoever controls space is going to control the world." Then he picked up the phone and called Rayburn: "Let's get this thing back," and by God, Congress was back in less than a week; in less than a month the new space program had already started--less than a month later. Now, there is another book in there [inaudible] a presidential citation, in regard to that.

All right. Two weeks passed. I called up Lyndon. I said, "Lyndon, you haven't named the staff yet. It was so damned urgent to get the space bill, and here you haven't got it started. Don't you know the press is going to catch you?" "Sam Houston, I haven't found the right man." I said, "Lyndon, name someone. Goddamn, make it appear that you are anyhow," because he's going to get caught. [Inaudible] He said, "Well, have you got any suggestions?" I said, "Yes, Glen Wilson." "Well, who in the hell is he?" I said, "Lyndon, he's been working for you for a couple of years." We hired his wife to be his [LBJ's] secretary, and she wouldn't leave her husband because he was teaching at the University of Texas. "Well, what is he doing now?" "He's back there typing letters." "Typing letters, and you want me to hire him on the Space Committee?" "Yes. Lyndon, he's got every goddamn kind of degree you can think of. Just name it, he's got it: electrical [aeronautical] engineer, Ph.D. psychology, every goddamn thing." "Well, what's he typing letters for?" "I don't know

why. Walter just doesn't like him." He was a psychologist. The reason is Walter knew that Glen knew that he was homosexual. I didn't say that. I didn't know that till much later. So he said, "Well, all right." I said, "Just for window dressing, if for nothing else, then [inaudible]." "All right." Then the next day he called and told Walter to tell Glen Wilson to come to his office with a copy of his application and all of his [inaudible]. His wife wasn't working for us then. She called me and said, "Sam Houston, what is it for?" I said, "I don't know, but I think you'll find out pretty soon."

He walked in there, and Lyndon said, "Sam Houston says you've got a Ph.D. He says that you've got a degree in electrical engineering, and all that. What the goddamn hell you doing here? You don't have much sense if you've got that and you're working here." He said, "Well, my wife was working. I was teaching school, and I just wanted to work for you, Senator." Lyndon said, "I can't understand a man that's got all that [education] and then is working for me." "Well, I just wanted to." "Well, all right." He called George Reedy in his office. "Hereafter I want it to be know he is Dr. Wilson." Oh, Lyndon asked me what kind of title should it be. I said, "Coordinator for Scientific and Technical Information," or something like that. I made up the title. It was a funny goddamn title.

Anyhow, he gave it to the press that Glen Wilson was the first one that we hired. Then we hired Colonel [Kenneth] BeLieu, who had been working for Senator Stennis on the Armed Services [Committee]. Then we hired Colonel BeLieu to be chief of staff. Put Glen on, of

course, and then Ken BeLieu was so effective I put him in as chief of staff. He became over everyone, over the Preparedness Subcommittee [inaudible]. He goes to Walter. You had to stand in line to get Walter to sign Lyndon's name. I've seen that back before the time [inaudible] came here. I said, "Hell, this is pretty simple. Just go ahead and sign his goddamn name and get it over with. Unless it's real important, you can always have someone fake his signature." So Colonel BeLieu was chief of staff of Preparedness, and he was over everything.

Now, you got that tape on?

- G: Yes.
- J: Cut it off.
   (Interruption)
- J: All right. I was in Acapulco, and I was worried about Lyndon, what would make him go down in history as a great man. Because let me tell you something, you might run to be a member of the state legislature, you might pull a little shenanign or make a little progress [?] or something to be elected to state [office]. You might vote for oil depletion or something to get elected to Congress. You might take a shortcut to get elected to the Senate. To get elected to president, that's as high as you can go. No man--and I know that--would want, when he gets to be president, you're immensely wealthy, your memoirs, anyplace you go, you're entertained, you don't need anything. As president, you've got it. What do you want? You want to go down in history as being a great man, to be remembered, you understand?

So I'm sitting here at Las Brisas Hotel. I took a plane from there to the Maria Isabel [?] Hotel in Mexico City. I called Barry Bishop, my friend for over twenty-five years. He was down there representing the Dallas News when I worked in Mexico. Then when he quit I got him a job with the State Department. That's another story, but he was my friend. I went to the Maria Isabel Hotel. I said, "Barry, I've got a story for you. [Inaudible], Lyndon Johnson is going to be a world leader. As far as I know that Library is endowed for at least a couple of hundred million. As far as I know. Don't have no proof of it. [Inaudible]. So what Lyndon is going to do is to use that library and devote the rest of his life to work for peace throughout the world. Regardless of whether it's Humphrey or Nixon, naturally he will work with the next president. He will invite world leaders to come--Harold Wilson, or this one, and that one--and lecture and give talks at this library. Understand now, he will do it with the permission of the government. He is not going to take anything away from Humphrey or Nixon. I'm sure that they recognize it and it's okay. Then I'm sure that they will reciprocate and ask him to come to their countries. So there you are, Barry. Lyndon Johnson will become a world leader right away. Bring it back. I want to see your [article]." "All right." I'd change it around, you know. All right. It was all in the Chicago paper. I took a plane back.

Well, I had a call. Then about the time I thought it would be printed, I called up Willie Day [Taylor].

Tape 2 of 2

J: [Inaudible] I figured about the time it'd be there. I called up
Willie Day from Acapulco. I said, "Honey, I gave Barry Bishop a story
for the Chicago Tribune. Has it come out yet?" "It came out this
morning: 'Lyndon Johnson to Become a World Leader According to Brother,'"
and she described it. I said, "Honey, have you shown it to the
President?" "Oh, yes, he's just elated [?] over it." "Go get it now.
I want you to read it to me over the telephone. It's costing me, but
I want to see if it was changed in any way." She went in to get it,
[came back] and said, "He took it with him to show it to Lady Bird."

Then everything began to spark up around the White House, according to what Dr. [William] Voss said, and George Reedy, and everyone else said. Now that is what I had planned.

Now he [LBJ] called--he didn't call, but Dr. Voss called and invited me up there for Thanksgiving in 1968. No, I didn't want to. Mike Howard, and that, but usually Dr. Voss was the one on the inside. He communicated for Lyndon and they knew he was my best friend. He could handle me more than anyone else. I've got more tapes and conversations with Dr. Voss since he's been up there with Nixon than anybody knows about. He's been in on every move that Agnew made. He was traveling with Agnew when Agnew got [inaudible]. Voss said, "Boy, he was doing [inaudible]."

G: Really?

J: Oh, hell, that's the reason my phone was tapped and [inaudible]. I

haven't even started that. Let me take this. I don't want to bring it up now.

So I declined. Then he called up the owner of the hotel, Colonel Bamstedder [?], and invites him to come. He comes up to my room. He says, "Sam, I know that you're going to leave here, but I've been invited by the President to come and [inaudible]. I want to see him. It'll be the highlight of my life for me." And I didn't want to see him. I wanted him to [inaudible].

But anyhow, the Secret Service met me in San Antonio with John Bamstedder [inaudible] and we went to Fiesta. Dr. Voss said, "Sam, you have really started"--I don't want this to ever be released unless I give permission, and I don't think I ever will. Anyhow, Dr. Voss said, "You have really started something, but you have got to be with him to give him that necessary support. He can't do it without you." That seems braggadocio; that's the reason why I say I didn't want [inaudible]. [Inaudible]. "I just don't want to be tied up [inaudible] all the time." I don't know. "But I'm telling you, he cannot do it without you. This was your idea." In other words, he'd brag on me more than Booth Mooney did. "Well, Doctor, I might later on. I'll think about it."

So I had a call from the President if he could come over there with Colonel Bamstedder. He took Colonel Bamstedder in his office and gave him--I don't know, he left with a whole handful of [inaudible]. He got what he wanted, and Lyndon said, "I want to thank you very much for taking care of my brother." He did that and went on back.

That night was Thanksgiving dinner. Of course instead of sitting me next to Lady Bird--you've got pictures of it; they were taking snapshots--he helped me to a chair next to him. Everything in the country was going through my mind at that time. So then we had dinner. I said, "Lyndon, what did you think about the article in the Chicago Tribune that said you would become a [world leader]?" "I haven't read it, Sam Houston. I haven't got time to read those goddamn releases that you give out." [Inaudible]. I didn't bring up the subject anymore. I never laid eyes on him. I never talked to him. Never talked to him, never wrote him, never laid eyes on him from that time.

I went back there and told Dr. Voss what had happened. He said, "Well, Sam, I can't ask you to overlook it. I know how you feel." The next morning Dr. Voss--he stayed at the guest house, you see--came down and woke me up about eight o'clock; usually I'm awake anyhow. He said, "I just wanted to tell you that the President has gone to San Antonio to be checked over at the hospital." I said, "Well, is he sick?" "Oh, no, it's just a regular checkup. He'll be gone a couple of hours. Sam, I expect you want to leave [inaudible]."

I came to Austin, and I took a plane back to Acapulco. It tore me up there that how could I make him a world leader when he would act like that. I knew he had read it; he showed it to Lady Bird. But I never spoke to him. Even when I broke my leg up there before I was writing this book and things, he was wanting to send Mike Howard up there and get a helicopter to come to Manmouth Hospital in New Jersey

to bring me down, pay up my debts and everything, put everything in order.

So when he was dying here, which I knew, he told Rebekah he wanted to see me. I went to the hospital. They hired a psychiatrist, Dr. [Robert] Zapalac. I'd been drinking, but that wasn't it. Anyhow, the purpose of it is, my sister wanted to get me to go out and see Lyndon. I guess to make terms with him. So Dr. Zapalac--I don't know whether you've ever been to a psychiatrist or not, but anyhow, I would read his mind. Before he even got ready to ask me, I would know what goddamn questions he'd ask, and he'd laugh. I said, "I know what it is now. You want to convince me the proper thing to do is to go see my brother before he dies. Now, Doctor, it is supposed to be over the book deal and everything. Now before I have any more conferences with you, I want you to take that book and read it damn thoroughly. If you come back and you think there's anything there that would hurt his reputation that I did wrong, I'll go see him, I'll go. But you read it; then I'll go."

He came back to me and said, "He ought to be crawling on his knees to get you here, to see you. Now, Sam Houston, will you give me your permission to go and talk to him? Will you give me your permission to write?" "Why? He'll think I sent you." He said, "No, I won't tell him."

I sat down. I called [inaudible]; I called Chief Mills [?] on something. I thought that Nixon was trying to get J. Edgar Hoover to get back in Lyndon's files, and all that kind of stuff. I passed it

on to Chief Mills on my power of attorney. You know, when the Pentagon Papers came out, I called Holmes Alexander of McNaught Syndicate. You ought to read it. Sam Houston knows what happened and showed him how [Robert] McNamara had planned it with Bobby Kennedy, all that, how to shift the blame on the war so Bobby Kennedy would run for president against--you see what I mean? I said, "Now, here Ted Kennedy said that he doesn't mind the Pentagon Papers even it it hurts his brother. He knows there is not a goddam thing in there that McNamara would have put that would hurt his brother." I called up, sent that to Holmes Alexander, and then went all over. The entry is "Lyndon Johnson's war is Nixon's depression." The fact that Lyndon [inaudible].

I moved on in the hotel here. [Inaudible] was an evangical man named Wayne [inaudible]. He's a businessman that owns a motel, the Mount Vernon. He called me up: "There's a young fellow here that wants to meet you." "All right, bring him down." He didn't bring him down because he walked in [?]. He was a minister of his own [inaudible] who had been invited to go to this community church holding a revival. This was the night of the election that he came. Understand this, I bet Dr. Zapalac a carton of cigarettes six months before the election that Nixon would carry every state but Massachusetts. That is a matter of record. That day Dr. Voss--he was with Nixon, you see; I'll tell you how come him to stay on--called me. He called me all the time. You see, he traveled with Agnew. He was the only doctor that had worked with Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson, and I'll tell you

how I remembered that one, but [inaudible]. So I said, "Well, how many states do you think you're going to lose?" "Well, up here we figure five." "Well, without cheating [?] I believe you're wrong. You're going to lose Massachusetts." "Why?" I said, "Because the Kennedys are going to put everything they've got to make that go Democrat. They don't give a damn about [George] McGovern being elected president or anything else. They want Massachusetts to go Democratic so it'll be a token, that you can see Massachusetts is liberal and they own the state." That's simple to me. I said, "Now, it may be close in Minnesota, because [Walter] Mondale is from Minnesota, and Hubert [inaudible]. They may be able to carry that state. Now, West Virginia, with John D. Rockefeller IV, [he] can buy that up, but I don't think so. And South Dakota, they know McGovern so there's nothing there. And of course [inaudible] that everybody knows." Anyhow, that was it.

Well, Dr. [Earl] Yeakel called me. I saw him at the [inaudible]. He called me and said--because I was supposed to go over to his house. He's the one that delivered the Pat [Nugent children], you know and all that. I was supposed to go over to his house to listen to the returns. But he had switched parties [?]. He was having a big party over at his son's house--fifty people there at the party. I said, "Hell, I'm going to sit here. I thought we were going to have a quiet place at your house. I want to listen to the returns. I don't want to get with any crowds anywhere. That's no place for me." So I sat here with this preacher.

Well, of course it came out as I predicted, campaigning, and he came back. He left, of course, and then he came back [inaudible]—to the Vietnam War. [Henry] Kissinger and Nixon had settled the war. Then it comes to Sunday, April 1. You see March 31, 1968, Lyndon took himself out of the running for re-election. This was [inaudible]. I said, "Brother Neil [?], when you go to church this morning you pray for those that didn't come back." I said, "My brother's a casualty; he hasn't died yet." [Inaudible], but he came back at me. Then he said, "Why don't you come to church? Why don't you?" I said, "I haven't been to church in a long time. Just pray for him." "Oh, I might, but"—something like that.

I had a different bed then. I had one with [inaudible]. I've bought me a new bed. But he damn near fell down getting out of there when I said "I might." He stumbled, I'm not kidding. It was hard getting out. "I can't come with [?] your schedule tonight." I told him it was the anniversary of the first time I met him [inaudible] gone to church [inaudible].

I said, "Well, I want to pray for those that didn't come home."

I said, "You people don't approve much of the Vietnam War and my

brother. That war started in 1953. You had then Mr. [John Foster]

Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower, who proposed the SEATO agreement. What is

the SEATO agreement? It said any countries in Southeast Asia that are

attacked by a foreign enemy, we will come to their rescue, and Vietnam

is in Southeast Asia. My brother was leader of the Senate at that

time and it takes two-thirds to ratify it, so I can't say he could be

blamed for it because he was against it. He could have killed it, but he had always believed that a president should be in charge of foreign policy. I know a little bit, but I want to tell you this. Let's take Texas history, you can understand that better. Let's take up the Alamo. Every man there fought for it. General Sam Houston was marching, coming in. If those boys in the Alamo had surrendered, Santa Anna could have overtaken General Sam Houston and won the war. But instead they died, they fought; every one of them fought until General Sam Houston had defeated him at the Battle of San Jacinto and at the Alamo [?]."

"That's the same damn thing that would have happened in Vietnam and let me tell you why. We had a commitment there with Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Now, what would have happened to America if we had gone against those former Presidents' and the Congress' commitments? What would have happened to America, and what's going to happen to the Mideast? You know the Mideast is blowing up right now." It had by that time. "If we pull out of Vietnam, what would be our neighbor down south? You know the Monroe Doctrine; I'm quoting you the rule. If [there is] any attack on any country in the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine says we will come to their aid, and it has kept Germany, England, everybody else out. But if we break that commitment in Vietnam, where do we stand? No country will trust us. So, here's what happened. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and President Nixon: eleven long years to build up the South Vietnamese to be able to defend themselves. Whether they'll hold or not, I don't know.

Eleven years since it began." You can have a copy of my speech sometime if you want it; it's on tape.

I said, "I've been with my brother. Now, let's see, are they different? I talked it over with him. I told him, 'Lyndon, we've got to get in or get out.'" This is, again, what I said Lyndon should say, but it's not what he did. I said, "I talked it over with my brother. He said, 'Sam Houston, you have to realize that we have over half a million American soldiers over there. We cannot bomb Hanoi or mine their harbor at Haiphong with over five hundred thousand American soldiers [in South Vietnam], because we're facing retaliation if I [inaudible]. We've got to take it easy until we can train and withdraw our troops.'" I said, "Now President Nixon has not changed my brother's policy one bit. When he could, he gradually withdrew fifty thousand, and fifty thousand, and we got it down to forty thousand American troops only. Then he started the bombing of Hanoi and mining the harbor. So that is a little bit different."

That's the first speech I ever made in church, and now I bet you I've made . . . I've covered America. If you're a Christian first and an American second, it doesn't make a good goddamn--I can't say that in church--whether you're a Republican or a Democrat.

Here's what I said up in Canada. I was invited up there, and I've been invited to, oh, Kansas City, all over Arkansas, [inaudible]. I'll tell you about it again. Anyhow, they heard I was up in Seattle, the chaplain of the Parliament there in Vancouver invited me to speak in Canada and to be introduced to Parliament there [inaudible]. So he

said--before it happened--"What do you think about us Canadians?" I said, "You know, Canada's just lying there, and you're our closest--we never had any trouble, but I'd like to tell you something, while I'm up here and while I have it on my mind. You know, years ago, a hundred and forty years ago, we signed the Monroe Doctrine. That promised protection to Canada. You Canadians are part of the Western Hemisphere, and you are included in the Monroe Doctrine. Now, what did you Canadians do for us when we got in the war? Here's what you did: 'All you draft deserters and draft dodgers, come on up here and have a good time. We'll protect you!' You got them up here, damn it, keep them up here! You understand that?" Boy, it hit them. That's in print. I said it.

But, you know, it's a funny thing . . . you sit down, I can see you coming. People read my book and they try to find fault and try to trap me and all of that. And then when you're on television--I guess I've been--covered the air [?] Kansas City or Phoenix or real funny thing. They just wanted to see me personally. "Ask me anything you want to. [Inaudible]. If I attempt to evade your question, it's because I don't know the answer." It's real funny. And another point, "The reason I'm up here to say what I think now is that I couldn't say this a few years ago, because people would think that my brother had sent me up here to say this. Then I couldn't say it. If I'd have made a mistake, I'd have had [him] calling me, cussing me out. But he's no longer here [?]. I never ran for a political office and never will and never intend to, so there is nothing I can't say.

I don't care what you write about. It doesn't make any difference to me what you write. You can't hurt me. There have been stories written about me: oh, my God, I'm a great man, then I'm nothing but a sucker for alcohol [?]. Okay, I can take it. It doesn't make any difference to me. You press people need as many prayers as anybody else. Y'all built up the credibility gap about my brother. We won't go into that. It's always in the end, and boy, I get [inaudible]. They just don't know--I'm not bragging--but I have been up there for forty years when power was made, long before Ford came up. There's no man living that's been in Washington longer than I have around power: Rayburn, Johnson, leadership, all that stuff, and presidents, and been in on it."

"Well, what about the assassination?" "Well, what about it?"
"Well, I read in some--" I said, "I know what you read. You read
that probably Lyndon Johnson could have conspired to it. He was the
only one that had to gain by it, profit from it. They've got this
attorney general, [James] Garrison, down there in Louisiana. He tried
to [inaudible]. Let's say this: a president and a vice president,
they go out together. Someone takes a wild shot accidentally and
kills the president. Who are you going to blame? The blame will
probably go to the vice president. They haven't even solved the
Lincoln assassination yet, to my knowledge. They're still bringing up
things on it. The only thing my brother did, he did name the Chief
Justice, Earl Warren. He did name Gerald Ford, your president. It
was a unanimous decision. Now, if you people think, or if President

Ford thinks, because he signed that [the Warren Commission], [it was] unanimous. I think you ought to call them back and reinvestigate it, because I think there were some doubts in my brother's mind about it, but we never talked about it."

This stuff about the investigation of Watergate, oh, my God, I've said--I've got a copy of it there--that Watergate could wreck America, that we'd have inflation, that we'd have an oil crisis. This was 1973. I said it on Easter with Brother Cook [?] in 1973 that Watergate could wreck America, bring all this stuff out in the public. What did it do? Ford made the blunder of the century when he pardoned Nixon. Why did he do it? Because he had a job to do, and he had General [Alexander] Haig and Kissinger right there. Now, I don't say that he had made a deal with Nixon to pardon him. No. I do say that it hurt the image of America. That's something like some Latin American might do, let a man off. I said, "I don't think they would have sent Nixon to the penitentiary. They might have reprimanded him. I'll bet before this thing of the impeachment came up, [inaudible], 'Accept the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Step aside, Mr. President, and let the Vice President take over. Don't go down. You're going down, but don't tear America down with you. Don't do it'"

That's a little synopsis of not near--oh, I spoke down at the Rotaries and high schools and [inaudible]. I don't get paid much. They sent me a contract--the Speakers Bureau--a signed contract after the story came out in <a href="Parade">Parade</a> magazine. I don't know whether you read it or not, the cover there where Lloyd Shearer said, "Lyndon's brother

has quit drinking and now turned to religion." That was in <u>Parade</u> magazine, Lloyd Shearer, picked up everywhere.

But they called me, gave me a signed contract, the president of the American Speakers Bureau, the largest in the country, the one that [Sam] Ervin and [Samuel] Dash, all these people were speaking for. I put my signature on that, it's effective. I called him up when he sent that to me and I said, "I have some things to say in 1976 [?] that will be more effective if you get me an engagement up there at Harvard. I know, because Dr. Gallagher [?] is backing me. [Inaudible]. It'll be more effective later on." I can show you the contract from the Speakers Bureau already signed. I said, "I don't want you to be able to control what I might say. [Inaudible] when I get through with it." Now, that's about it.

Now, this will be the other night [inaudible]. They couldn't get me to come out of the car. [Inaudible]. They led me in. I'm not particularly fond of John Connally, but I do think he's got more brains than Carter has. I don't want him; I want a man that can be just as mean as hell, stubborn as hell. Stubbornness is a good quality; it's not a bad quality. Goddamn, who wants a mealy-mouth, grinning fool to play the part? I want a man, goddamn, to be stubborn, to say, "Mr. Brezhnev, you can go so far and that's as far as you can go." I don't know, what about Kissinger? What about him? Now let me tell you this. Take the Pentagon Papers. Take Mr. [Daniel] Ellsberg. Let me show you. There's a man, Ellsberg. He stole top secret papers. Has he ever denied it? No. He would be taken to the

chairman of the National Security Administration [Council], Dr. Kissinger. Why didn't Dr. Kissinger, head of the National Security, pick up the phone to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and get him to arrest the man for stealing top secret papers? But he did not. He let it leak. About three days before they made any move, and then [inaudible].

And then what happened? What happened after that? They formed the Plumbers to go out there in the psychiatrist's office to get an excuse to throw it out of the court. Who was the judge that threw it out? The one who was offered the head of the FBI under Nixon threw it out on that [inaudible]. What does robbing the psychiatric office have to do with stealing the papers? And the case was thrown out after that.

And here's another one of those people while you're at it. You know [E. Howard] Hunt and [G. Gordon] Liddy, members of the CIA? Who are they working for? [Inaudible]. Let me go back a minute on Kissinger. Who was his principal aide? Colonel Haig. He was promoted to a four-star general suddenly. Then he was moved in as chief of staff of the White House and headed it. Liddy and Hunt, I was in psychological warfare so I had the same thing that they had. Used to be OSS, you know, [inaudible]. Why did they go down? What good did it do to rob the Democratic National Committee? Hell, you could write them and you couldn't ever get off their goddamn mailing list. Hell, I said I know of people who write and ask questions, say I'll be kept on the list, anyhow provided they give them just what they want, they can file it, keep them in the files. They couldn't get off. You

write Lyndon Johnson letters [inaudible]. But I say why? These men, trained to rob a safe of a foreign country--they're trained to do that--and they put a white tape on the door of the Watergate where a nigger porter can see it when he gets off the elevator. Why did they want to be caught? Why tape it? That's never been explained about that. And who was working for who? Can you answer any of those things? Have you ever thought of that like that? Well, that's something to think about.

- G: It sure is.
- J: Now, President Ford passed the investigation. I heard him before the Rules Committee. He said he wouldn't pardon Nixon--he didn't use the word Nixon, but to that effect--because people wouldn't stand for it. I heard him, in the full Rules Committee of the Senate. Chairman [Howard] Cannon asked him the question, and that's what he said. Then they asked him, after he became president, what would he do. He said he would wait for the [Leon] Jaworski report. Did he wait for it? Suddenly overnight he had a rating of 70 per cent at that time, and when he pardoned him, it dropped to 50. There were only three United States senators out of a hundred that voted against Ford for confirmation, and only thirty-five congressmen out of four hundred and thirtyfive that voted against his confirmation. That's thirty-eight members of Congress out of five hundred and thirty-five. What man ever had more backing than that? And then came the pardon. I can't answer those questions.

But you know if you catch a little old girl and a poor old man and that little [inaudible] there, and oh boy, oh boy. "They shouldn't be on the payroll." Hell, congressmen put men's wives on the payroll that never come to the office, sons, relatives, brothers-but I worked for my living. I didn't get on the payroll for a long damn time. It was free and finally they decided it was better to put me on there. I didn't get top salary anyway.

Now I've gotten all that stuff out of my system. Now let's get back to your--

- G: Okay. One of the things I want to ask you about that you mentioned on your "Capitol Eye" interview was in response to a question regarding kangaroos. You mentioned kangaroos from Australia, and I was just wondering if you were thinking of the story when your brother was down there with Ed Clark and had seen some kangaroos. Can you tell that story about wanting to bring them back to the Ranch?
- J: I heard about it. I don't know the full story. I'd just as soon you not get me around a kangaroo. You can get me off of that.
- G: But it sounded like you were making a reference to that story.

Let's see, you talked about Booth Mooney. Another thing I wanted to ask you about that we didn't talk about last time on tape, but we were just getting started, was George Brown. You were emphasizing the importance of George Brown as a close friend of your brother and an ally. You had some remarkable memories of their early association when Brown was working for another man. Can you recall that?

J: Oh, I can recall it all. I told you about how A. J. McKenzie made the bond that got the contract on Buchanan Dam before Lyndon ever came to Congress. As a matter of fact, as far as I know--and I do know that George and Herman Brown [inaudible]. I don't even think that they supported Lyndon in his first race for the Congress.

Now, the contract on Buchanan Dam. James P. Buchanan was the chairman of the [House] Appropriations Committee, and he got the first appropriation to build the dam. The original contract for Buchanan Dam was to McKenzie and the Brown brothers before Lyndon ever came to Congress.

Now to get back to it, A. J. McKenzie was president of the Chamber of Commerce. He built [inaudible]. He was a lobbyist in Congress, had been there. Well, he didn't get along with Maury Maverick since I had known him, so he came toward me. You see, Lyndon wasn't in on that at the time. I had contacts with everybody there. I had been working for Dick Kleberg. You see Dick Kleberg voted Republican more than he did Democrat, but people didn't know it. So what I would have to do in order to get something done, I would have to do it personally, go down and entertain and things like that, to get something done. Roosevelt's people in the Interior Department, they weren't crazy about Dick Kleberg. He wouldn't do anything for them. So I introduced McKenzie to the people in the PWA, personal friends of mine that I knew. So then we became very close. He would always come up, stay at the same hotel, we'd go to New York together.

Finally, we were sitting there, this girl and me and McKenzie.

[We were] sitting there, and he said, "Well, Sam, I won't be needing you anymore. I want to tell you I appreciate all you've done in the past." "I haven't done anything except lead you around, make the contacts." "Well, we elected a new man to Congress now, and I talked to George and Herman and [inaudible]." I didn't know them; I just knew they were his partners. "They're going to hire the Congressman's campaign manager, Ray Lee, so from here on out, why, it'll be taken care of." This girl I was with started laughing. I said, "Mac, don't you know that's my brother?" "No, I did not. Goddamn, I don't know. I said it already." [Inaudible]. I said, "Well, good, I don't give a damn about Congress [?]." So anyhow everyone sits down.

So Lyndon came to Congress. A. J. McKenzie wrote [inaudible]. George Brown, Herman Brown had never been to Washington, to my knowledge. [Inaudible]. So we had a party at the Shoreham Hotel. Lyndon and Bird were invited. Senator Welly Hopkins, former senator, and his wife and daughter, and I was there with [inaudible], my date. My sister was there, Rebekah, with her date, and two or three others were there. We were all at the Shoreham Hotel. Lyndon and Welly Hopkins were over to the side, talking politics. Uncle Mac [inaudible] asked for burgundy. "All right, everybody be quiet. Let's all dance. Let's all have a good time." Lyndon, of course, he'd prefer to talk politics. Mac didn't know better, and he said, 'Now, y'all quit talking over there. Let's all join in for a [inaudible] now, and let's all dance." Lyndon got up, and Bird, and walked out. I said,

"Uncle Mac, goddamn. Why did you have to [say that]?" "Well, it's my party, and I don't want to have Lyndon [talking politics]." I said, "You didn't want to insult the Congressman, my brother. I'm not caring about that, when you're going to have to work with him in Austin. To sit down and insult him is the same as saying, 'Shut up, by God, and we'll dance.' You don't do that." "Well, at my party they don't get over there and talk politics. We all have a good time." I said, "Yes, but. . . "

Lyndon went back and told George Brown, "Don't ever send that son of a bitch up here again."

- G: Was Brown working for McKenzie or were they partners?
- J: They were partners, McKenzie and Brown Brothers was the name of the corporation that got the original contract. He was the man that could put up the bond. You had to raise a several million dollar bond before you could get a contract.
- G: I see. So he really had more money.
- J: The Browns didn't have the money, but McKenzie did, and of course the contract was gotten before Lyndon ever came to Congress. And then with the contract deal, and I don't blame them, is an extension. They have written in there to where you can negotiate a new contract, and they had been negotiating. The original contract wasn't gotten by Lyndon, but people think he did, and [inaudible]. The only thing Lyndon did, he gave him warning that he was going to build these dams all up and down here if he could get the money. Harold Ickes turned him down on some. He went to Roosevelt, and he got Roosevelt to give

him more. These dams up here, none of them would have been built if it hadn't been for Lyndon Johnson and because of Roosevelt. Ickes was the head of PWA, but he didn't want it done. He turned one or two of them down and made Lyndon fight it right on through to Roosevelt. And it so happened that the Brown brothers naturally renegotiated the contract.

(Interruption)

- G: I'm sorry. You were relating the telephone conversation--when I interrupted--between Lyndon Johnson and George Brown, telling him not to send McKenzie up anymore.
- J: He didn't come back up after that, and then they worked out an agreement. McKenzie got out.
- G: I believe last time you said that he told Brown that if he wanted to get anywhere to split with McKenzie, or something.
- J: "Don't send that son of a bitch back up here." I heard it, I was in his office.
- G: That evidently brought your brother and Brown closer together?
- J: It damn sure couldn't tear them apart to split up McKenzie and Brown.

  McKenzie probably didn't care any. He didn't know how powerful it was going to make them, how far he was going. He was just interested in the dam. But then George Brown came to Washington. I met him, a very likable man. And there were some others that in 1948 they weren't very anxious for Lyndon to go right into the Senate. They wanted him to stay in Congress.
- G: He was safer, I guess, the seat was.

J: Well, he was there where he could help them more. It was just purely a business proposition, that's all. Of course, the naval base in Corpus Christi naturally came to Herman Brown. You see, I'm aware of all the work they got [inaudible]. They owned the Big Inch, Little Inch, Middle Inch, all that pipeline, all that stuff [inaudible], and all that. Herman died; George was always . . . every little thing Lyndon [inaudible]. You see, a lot of these big oil people and all of his friends I just happened to observe because usually different things happen on his birthday or something like that. George Brown comes even though my brother is gone. But some of these other people that I know, some of these other people that promised money for the [LBJ Memorial] Grove, they haven't supported him, and the Rebekah Baines Johnson Home, they haven't. "Fine, we're going to continue to keep that going. We're going to build that grove."

You ask me how do I know. I say, "I've [inaudible] most of the things, and I've seen a lot of them. I was there." But the man who knows, you haven't even thought to ask, the man that handled his finances, the man who was with him, handled everything [inaudible], he lives in Austin, Donald Thomas. How did I know that a lot of these people were on the Memorial Grove? Don Thomas told me. How did I know about the Rebekah Baines Johnson Home here? Donald Thomas. He was managing all Lyndon's estate, you know, emergencies. [Lyndon] called him to come out there the day he died. Something happened that day. I never asked Donald what it was. There was shock when Lyndon called [?]. He didn't tell me, but I got it from another person.

Lyndon had gotten hold of some information. I heard some information [inaudible]. Now if you want to, you ought to call Don Thomas. He turned it down . . . Dr. [Joe B.] Frantz.

- G: He said he'd see me.
- J: I asked him if he would, and he said he would. Because I think that he can give you an honest. . . . He said this. He said Dr. Frantz wanted to interview him. At the time, way back there, you know, he didn't feel like he could talk about anything as long as Lyndon was alive, and things like that. I said, "Don, I think you know more, were closer to him, than any man, anybody here. You could see what was in his mind when he'd lose his temper. You were there all the time. I wasn't there anymore. I know there are a lot of things that you know that you don't want to say, but you can hold it up as long as you want to. It can't be used until you give permission to." "Well, if you say so, Sam, why, I'll do it." I said, "I tell you that because I'm interested in the facts in the Library. I am. I'm interested in the truth about Lyndon." I said that in my book: no man loved America more than he did. And I told you some of his weaknesses, and he had some.

But about his finances. Do you want me to tell you how we got the radio station, KTBC?

- G: Sure.
- J: Funniest thing. Is that tape on?
- G: Yes.
- J: This is off the record. Cut it off.

## (Interruption)

I think that really he wasn't born where he'd watch those little things. My daddy didn't have any money particularly, but we weren't stingy, you know, anything like that. I think he acquired that after he married Bird. She'd watch every penny. He got that and he used to wear cheap suits. I think he picked up that saving and the business from Bird, because she was tight as hell. She'd send Zephyr [Wright] to the store to get groceries, and Zephyr would come back, and if there was five or ten cents short, Bird would know. So then Zephyr would say, "I don't know, it was just something I got. It added up right." Finally Zephyr said, "Take that dollar and keep it." Anyhow, no, he picked up to watch money and all that part, he got that from Bird.

- G: But he was awfully generous, though, in gift giving, always buying gifts for friends.
- J: Yes. Bird didn't know about it all, I could tell you that. I have seen him slip Zephyr or Don [?] an extra ten-dollar bill, "but don't tell Lady Bird about it, just hand that to"--if they worked late. Oh, yes, he didn't mind, he was scared of Lady Bird on that money, because he wanted to make her think that he was just as good as businessman as she was, and he was a hell of a lot better.

The only misfortune, financially, he had was with A. W. Moursund. Lyndon [inaudible]. Whereas my father would make mistakes, Daddy never did trust A. W. Moursund's father, or his grandfather and my grandfather. Grandpa Sam didn't like Anton [?] Moursund, who was the

father of A. W., Sr. All right. Now, the Moursund boys--there's John, Harold, A. W., and Maxine, the girl--their mother was a Stribling, a very rich woman. She and my mother went to Baylor University together. I used to play with the kids all the time. None of them was Lyndon's age; they were all my age. The oldest one was my age, John. So Moursund never did like Daddy, Daddy never liked him, and they were just political enemies. See, Lyndon liked to say, "Daddy can't get along with them, but I can get along with them." Do you see what I mean? He was warned about A. W., but he wanted to show that he could do something that Daddy couldn't do: get along with them. A. W. took him for a screwing of about four million dollars, so I've been told, and I think you know who I was talking to.

But anyhow, [inaudible], but he [Thomas] won't tell you that, because it's not [inaudible]. I'd say he's a fellow that doesn't talk much--he doesn't even talk to me much, very little, but he's thoroughly honest and truthful. I was talking to him. He came to pick me up the other day to go to the baptismal, you know. It had rained, and he came by and picked me up and I rode up with him to the christening of the baby. And then I told him that I'd--in fact, he asked me something about whether I was going to be back up there, going to stay up there. I said I was going to have an interview with you. He said that at one time I think he said Dr. Frantz or someone like that asked him to interview, but he didn't feel like he should talk then. I said, "Well, Don, the thing of it is, you know him better in the latter years than anybody. You were his closest friend. He would

discuss things with you that he wouldn't discuss with any living friend, because he understood you and you understood him, and you were by far the closest one of anybody here. He trusted your judgment and your legal ability and your friendship."

So if I had to name anyone who was Lyndon's closest friend in his last years, there's no question but what it was Don Thomas. when you're dying and living up there at that goddamn Ranch, you get pretty lonely thinking about it, so you kind of have to have somebody. So I expect Don . . . well, I know he realized he was a sick man, and whenever he would call, Don would come up, and then Lyndon could put it on Don's shoulders, because he knew Don wouldn't tell it. So if I had to name one. . . . You see, in trying to select the closest friend [inaudible] in his years. I can say this, that Don was a lawyer and made money. He worked his way through law school running elevators or something when he came up here. He came from somewhere in East Texas. He came up a self-made [man]. Ed Clark, he informed me of all of that. Lyndon would have loved this. Everett Looney was a good lawyer in the firm of Looney, Clark and Moorhead, and Don worked for them. Of course, Ed Clark, I don't want to talk about him. I never did like him, but [inaudible]. But he was a former secretary of state under Governor Allred. [Inaudible]. I'm just saying this as an example; I'm not accusing Ed Clark about it. I'm just talking about lobbyists in general. All right, you're a member of the legislature. I go to you: "You want to make money? Introduce a bill

outlawing the chiropractors." [Inaudible]. "Let's [inaudible] legislation." You see, I don't know this happened.

- G: Just an example, yes.
- J: All right. You come from a little old county up there, doesn't make any difference, but you'd like to be entertained at the Austin Club and get to go out to dinner, kind of be in on the social [inaudible], you understand. Ed can get your name in the paper: "John Jones from East Texas has introduced a bill to outlaw the chiropractors." [Inaudible]. Allred was governor, and Ed Clark had been assistant attorney general under Jimmie Allred, secretary of state under Allred, and then practiced law. So this bill comes up on the chiropractors. "Mr. Clark, I have been authorized by the Chiropractic Association to represent us before the [Texas] House of Representatives on this chiropractor [bill]." "Well, I don't know. That goddamn fellow is pretty hard, he's pretty damn vicious [?]. I don't think I can do it because there's more than one representative up there." You see, I'm making all this up, but it kind of explains about it. "You're going to need help to take care of all of that." "Well, how am I going to do all that?" Any dumb bastard--doctors are the dumbest people in the world. [Inaudible] anything about finances, doctors don't know a dam thing except to cut out your appendix and charge you five hundred dollars before you get the money. "I think it's all right, but it's going to take a lot of time." "Don't worry. That doesn't make any difference. This bill will cripple us. It'll make us sign so many doctor forms. . . . " "Well, if I get it done, it'll cost you two

thousand dollars. I don't know how I'm going to do it, but I'll--I know everybody [inaudible]." "We don't care." "In a couple of weeks we'll call up the hearing, and then I'll appear before you, and then it's thrown out [inaudible]."

That's the way they worked. I got more hell from my sister about Jake Jacobsen [inaudible], but I liked him. Very personable man. But I don't know, there was just something about me, but goddamn it, I hate to see someone--I'm not crazy about John [Connally], but I hate to see a man get a raw deal. I have not seen or talked to John in--I don't know, last time I think I saw John was at Lyndon's funeral, and then just to see him.

So then what? Now, Jacobsen didn't start out with Lyndon Johnson. He came up when Price Daniel was elected senator. He wasn't the top man for Price; Horace Busby was the first. Then Jake was just [inaudible]. But he shook hands with everybody [inaudible].

So then when Price ran for governor--I'm the one that talked him into that--he came up to talk to Lyndon about it. He said, "You ride back with me. I want to talk to you alone without your brother." I said--I never will forget it--"Senator, what is it?" "I want to talk to you, Sam, to see whether you think I should run for governor." I said, "Why? You don't like being senator, do you? And I know why, because nobody comes to see you, because they want to see Lyndon Johnson, the majority leader. Here you're nothing, because Lyndon's controlling it, and they won't bother going to you when they can go to Lyndon. I mean, that's just plain it, isn't it, Price?" He said,

"Yes." "But you still have two more years on your term in the Senate, so go ahead and run for the governor. You'll still have two more years." You see what I mean? Until then Jake was his top man at that. And then [later], of course, John [Connally] defeated Price, among several candidates [for governor]. Price served with Lyndon and John [inaudible] John Connally. And naturally if he won over an enemy, if you know a man is your enemy and then you win him over on your side, it's just like taking two votes off and putting two on.

So, I'm sure that when John was the governor that he treated Jake nice, though they had been enemies.

And he [Jake] worked up to counsel to the President, a few months, he built up a big financial deal with Connally [?]. Then, of course, when he got in with the milk fund campaign, who was the man in power? Connally, as secretary of the treasury. Who was the closest man to Nixon? Connally, before [inaudible]. So [inaudible] Connally. Not that John was a fool, but I mean what happened, when you go up there and [inaudible] Milk Producers: "[Inaudible] two hundred thousand dollars if we can contribute to Nixon's campaign." "Now, John, the House of Representatives and the Senate are going Democrat. They're going to [inaudible]. Now, if you can get Mr. Nixon or whoever [inaudible] that money, we'll just give it to Nixon [?]." You see, what I mean?

- G: Yes.
- J: So then John says back, "Well, I'm next in line, secretary of the treasury. I'm going to check. Hey, Carl, ask Mr. Secretary, what's

happened to H.R. such-and-such?" "Oh, we're going to fight it." See? Described the bill. "Yes, that's going through. We're considering it. It'll be passed." And he checked with so-and-so. He picked up the phone, called everybody up, [inaudible]. Anyhow, [inaudible], and then he got contributions for Milk Producers to President Nixon. What do you do? Go back to your people: "How did he do it?" "Oh, goddamn [inaudible] like hell." You say it's easy. "Oh, no, don't ever tell [inaudible] employee that they didn't have to do a damn thing [inaudible]. Goddamn, I had to [inaudible]. The committee, I had to work for them four days." [Inaudible] He'd change, you know. One time he said [inaudible].

Now what happened, if you go according to what had happened with me--[inaudible] Milk Producers [inaudible]. "We want to help you financially." Well, I'm not going to believe what a man's offering. You see what I mean? "Don't worry, my friend. When we get in the goddamn campaign, don't think I won't be at your door when we need it. Just remember, goddamn, I have a goddamn good memory. So if we get in the campaign and need money, I'll be tapping on the door, but not now." So when he offered to John, John said, "Ah, some other time." And I said, "That's it. First I said to quit gambling on the goddamn thing, and then I turned right around, contradicted myself, and said I'd bet a hundred thousand dollars..." I said, "I visited that state before, and I've seen it happen."

G: That was an interesting account of what probably happened.

J: Well, I'm not trying to sell you on anything, but to me, that is it.

And then, of course, to go around and make a deal to get plea

bargaining to display this crap on Connally to keep from serving

twenty years, that proves that.

Well, my sister didn't like John, my older sister didn't, I think because he didn't invite her to the Governor's Mansion often enough, or some crap like that. I called to get back at--I was hitting at Jake Jacobsen. I said, "Hell, I didn't hit at him hard enough. Look, that son of a bitch missed going to the penitentiary as far as I'm concerned. He did ruin John's career, and I'm trying to build it back up, honest to God. That's what's right." Don't think I'm trying to become a preacher to reform the whole world, because I'm not, I can't. But anyhow, those things . . . it was an opportune time. I didn't bring it up; they brought it up themselves. And I firmly do think John would be a better man than Ford. He knew more than Ford.

They asked me what qualifications. I said, "First, don't bring him." [Inaudible] maturity [?] [inaudible]. It couldn't have been a better setup if he'd put me on there with [inaudible]. I said, "Stuart [Long], the Civil War is over." And that was true about Carter. [George] Wallace was the man that they wanted to get rid of. And it so happened that Carter got it, and they think nothing will happen to [inaudible]. [Inaudible] and promote someone, and it gets out of hand. And now that Carter's a fresh face but [Edmund "Jerry"] Brown just didn't get in there soon enough. Now, the question of it is, Henry Jackson, of course, is out; he's going to run for

re-election, so he wants to know who can help him the most in getting re-elected, running with Carter as president, you know, [inaudible]. I know what I'd do if I was old man Brown, Pat, I'd call up Jackson. [Inaudible].

- G: Yes, you told me that.
- J: I'd do that to him, and I'd carry old [Morris] Udall plumb out of there. I said in Arizona, "[Inaudible]. Arizona is somewhat like Texas. Y'all here are as confused as we are as to what's going on. And I want to pay tribute. There's no use in coming into Phoenix and the home state of [Barry] Goldwater without giving him credit for what he's done. He's the best campaign manager that Lyndon Johnson ever had. You're all going to get our votes, because down South they [inaudible]."

Now what else? Have you got anything else?

G: Well, I was going to suggest that we continue maybe tomorrow, or when you have time.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview III

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of

Sam Houston Johnson

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, we, Alfred and Peggy Staehely of Austin, Texas, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all our rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on April 13, and 14, 1976 in Johnson City, Texas, on June 9, 15, and 23, 1976 in Austin, Texas, on July 13 and August 26, 1976 in Austin, Texas, and October 1 and November 18, 1976 and on March 31, 1978 in Austin, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

- (1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
- (2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcripts.
- (3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tapes.
- (4) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.
- (5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

NOV. 10, 1993

Chudy Thukamp

June 16, 1992