INTERVIEW VIII

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INTERVIEWEE: SAM HOUSTON JOHNSON

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: The Alamo Hotel, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

J: Refreshing what I've already said about the--here's the most important part of the thing. Number one, you gave me the article about 1952, how it got started on that. I discussed with you about his taking the lead then and going on radio.

G: Actively campaigning for [Adlai] Stevenson.

J: Actively campaigning for Stevenson. Now, I don't know whether you've got his speech that he made on the air or not, on radio--

G: I think we do.

J: --but you have it up there anyhow. Now, Lady Bird came by the house and told me that Lyndon wanted me in Washington, so I went up there shortly after the election in November in which Eisenhower was elected. Then along in about December was when it really began to jell. Lyndon himself hadn't decided at the time and hadn't taken any--he was there to see who was going to be the Democratic leader. He had urged [Richard] Russell to do it, you see, and he was very sincere in urging Russell to do it, very close to Russell and all that.

But going back before that, you'd have to take it in 1950--well, it would be 1951, because the election was held in 1951 after he'd served only two years in the Senate. Anyhow, after two years--of

course, I wasn't up there with him at the time, I was down in Mexico--Senator Bob Kerr, through some maneuvering and all, got him elected assistant leader in 1951, after the election in 1950. All right, now that made him assistant leader. I went up there in 1951, of course. When John Connally quit, well, then I went up there. That picture up there is dated--in my office in there--June 1. I went up there in April, something like that.

I want to explain something to you about that picture that's in my bedroom there, because there's something that I hate to tell you about it, but my conscience makes me tell you about it, because I don't like her, never did like her. But Liz Carpenter and Les wrote an article back there that was published in Collier's magazine. That picture in the bedroom there is the picture of the cover of the Collier's magazine. And it said, "Can Lyndon do what Truman did?" Because he'd just been named head of the [Armed Services] Preparedness [Investigating] Subcommittee. Now, for history's sake, because Merle Miller's been up here interviewing her some time ago--he hasn't been back and I'm not worried about it. But Merle Miller wrote in his book [Plain Speaking] that Truman didn't want the committee to be named after him. Well, I say he could have very easily prevented it by saying he wouldn't serve if he didn't want the committee named after him. I know the operation. I said, "Now, the reason my brother, knowing him [the way] that I do, didn't want the committee named the Johnson Committee [was] because he was a freshman when the committee was formed and the Korean War was going on." Well, Lyndon, having

served in the House, and others, had learned that you don't jump in and try to tell everybody how to run their business, you see, and expect to get along with the Senate. So he was directly opposite.

He was on the Armed Services Committee. Well, there were several members. [Millard] Tydings was the chairman of the Armed Services Committee but was succeeded--he was the first one that named Lyndon on the committee, Senator Tydings. He was later defeated in 1950, I believe, or 1951. Anyhow, that [sub]committee was to do the same thing that the Truman Committee did, you see. Well, the Truman Committee, investigating war contracts and all that, brought him to national attention for the [vice] presidency in 1944. So he [Lyndon] had it called Preparedness Subcommittee, later known as the Watchdog Committee. But it was a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. Well, there's a thousand subcommittee chairmen [inaudible], of course.

But that's the tactics he used, you see, and I'm showing you now how it paid off, because he was young--let's see, Lyndon was elected in 1948, so Lyndon was about forty-three or forty-four years old then and maybe there was one or two that was younger, like [Hubert] Humphrey was elected in 1948, too. So his not calling it the Truman [Johnson] Investigating Committee, they called it the Watchdog Committee or the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, just like that. That meant Russell was really over [it] finally, but that didn't amount to anything. Kind of independent. But it was a subcommittee.

So then of course the committee was composed of Lyndon as chairman and then the next man on there was [Estes] Kefauver, a Democrat; the next one on it was Lester Hunt, I believe. That's three, and I forget the fourth. It was a committee of seven and next was Styles Bridges, a Republican, and [Leverett] Saltonstall, a Republican, and I forget the other one, as far as that's concerned. But of course that was during the Truman Administration, the Korean War. But you didn't read much publicity about the Preparedness Subcommittee. The reason I'm making this comparison is history will recall that the Truman Committee investigating the different war agencies during the war did not--and I explained this to Merle Miller--endear him to President Roosevelt. The investigation was all right, but releasing it publicly, why, it didn't endear him to him. Then I've told you before because of what Truman might have said, that he didn't want to be vice president. Why, I don't know if I've told you how that would work or not, or whether it was Merle Miller, I've talked to so many people about that, but I'll repeat it if you'd like. Here's the thing, this is important and I think I might have told you, but I don't--

G: You did go into the distortion here and how Truman was actually--

J: Well, it won't take but a minute anyhow.

G: The names were switched around.

J: The chairman of the Democratic National Committee was Bob Hannegan from St. Louis. That's the [T. J.] Pendergast machine, you see, and all that. I told you about the switch on that. But if you'll note

the history there, that Roosevelt had said he'd take Bill Douglas or Harry Truman and they switched the names. They said they'd take Harry Truman and if you can't get Harry Truman, well, they'll take Bill Douglas.

When Lyndon got [to be] chairman of this committee, Truman was still in office; he had become president. So most of the reports on the Korean War which the committee was set up to investigate, Lyndon would clear it with the secretary of defense, which was formed during the Truman Administration, and the other agencies, air force and army and navy and things like that. So that endeared him to President Truman, that he wouldn't start lambasting his administration unless first going to him and seeing if he could correct these mistakes that had been made. Now, that's important for that, because that article there said, "Can he do what Truman did?" from the Johnson Committee, the Watchdog Committee, to vice president and then to president. Well, he did do that identically, but it was done in a different way.

Now, Lyndon and President Truman I don't think--well, a better way to put it, being fair to President Truman, was that he was a hell of a lot closer to President Roosevelt than he was to President Truman because of this. But when President Roosevelt died, why, then Lyndon was a member of Congress, then it didn't--I mean it was kind of a downstep. He was closer to Roosevelt than Rayburn was. Now, Rayburn was closer to Truman than Lyndon was and so forth. But he got what he wanted from President Truman. First with--I remember being there many

times when he would get the Speaker to intervene, too, for him if he wanted something.

G: With Truman?

J: Yes.

G: Can you recall a particular occasion?

J: Well, I'd say in different talks to different cabinet members and things like that, the Speaker told me that he would throw in--the Speaker being behind him. If I start recalling the different instances--well, I will recall one: Tom Clark. Of course he was appointed head of the antitrust division [of the Justice Department] by Roosevelt, but then when he got to be elevated on to other positions as attorney general and things, Tom Clark thanked Lyndon for it. He said, "Don't thank me. Go thank Speaker Rayburn for it and thank Tom Connally and others. You know you've got my support. Go thank the others." He wanted Tom to start off--"Well, I'm already for you, but you go thank these others I had to persuade for you." You see, that's exactly what he meant, but if he was that blunt or not, I don't know. I don't think he was, but that's what he meant, to me, because I heard it.

Now, that's one instance, and then if you read Merle Miller's book, he asked President Truman what was the biggest mistake that he ever made in his life, and he said, "The appointment of Tom Clark as attorney general and to the Supreme Court. That is the worst mistake I ever made. He was no-good s.o.b." It's in Merle Miller's book.

G: Yes, I've read it.

J: I thought he'd use something else, but it tickled me that he did do that. I had my own personal reasons on that, of course.

Anyhow, the thing of it is that by working of all the subcommittee reports--and they number into, I don't know, I've lost count of them--they were all unanimous. And that's something that I don't think had ever happened before. I'm not--well, I can say for sure that it never happened before in the history of the Senate.

G: Let me ask you about his majority leadership. We were going to talk about 1953 and the significance of that year, when he became--

J: That's what I'm talking about, how he got to be majority leader.

G: Well, but then we've gone into that in previous interviews, though.

J: Yes.

G: But what I'm really wondering is when he became Democratic leader, he became chairman of the Democratic Policy Committee. Did he make any changes there when he took over that? How did he use the Policy Committee?

J: Well, the answer will have to be did he make any changes, first, I don't remember what changes he made. Number one, the first change was he kept his chairmanship himself because [Ernest] McFarland was defeated. So he took that over. Then what members he put on there, I guess he had three important committee chairmanships when he became majority leader. He had the Democratic--well, we call it the Majority Policy, but he had Minority Policy Committee and the Minority Steering Committee and that. He was what you call the Democratic leader, even if he was a minority leader. He had the Steering Committee, the

Democratic Caucus Committee, and the Democratic Policy Committee. Well, the Steering Committee [was] the one that met and decided what members would go on what committee, regardless of whether the Republicans were in control or not, what Democrats would go on what committee. So Hubert Humphrey wanted to be chairman of one of those after he saw that he couldn't win the leadership against us, of course--and I don't think he intended to. I told you about how I blew his name up on that. Lyndon didn't name him chairman of anything, as far as I know--and I do know--he didn't, because he named himself the chairman of the Policy Committee and chairman of the Steering Committee and chairman of the Caucus Committee, which all other leaders had always held. Like he said, "If I give you part of my control, that means I can't keep everything in line." So I don't know what members served on there, but every decision made was unanimous in all those committees.

G: Well, on the Policy Committee it would have been Russell and Kerr and [James] Murray and Lister Hill and Earle Clements.

J: Well, you have a list of them.

G: Do you have any reflections on any of these people and how they worked with your brother? Of course, you've talked about Senator Russell, but not so much about Senator Kerr or--

J: He worked very close with Senator Kerr; [he] was one of his best friends, because if it hadn't been for Senator Kerr in 1951 he wouldn't have been on as assistant leader, from what I hear. But I wasn't up there at that time, in 1951.

G: Did they generally decide things in advance before the Policy Committee meetings and just sort of affirm what had already been worked out ahead of time or--?

J: Well, I think that, knowing the way Lyndon always worked, regardless of the stuff about his dictatorial leadership, you know, but the reason they recall he got the thing is if there were any senator on any of these committees that objected to something going on in the Policy or the Steering Committee or something, he would work that out with them. And he might deviate to that senator's wishes or something like that, but as far as open disagreement, fights within his own committee, they didn't develop because he either compromised on them beforehand or they did what he wanted them to do. But there weren't any conflicts that I recall. Of course, the man there who would know about those--George Reedy would know about it; he was with the Policy Committee. Bobby Baker would know all about everything on out.

G: When your brother took over as Democratic leader, he I guess was dealing initially with Senator [Robert] Taft and that was Senator Taft's last year. He had cancer and died. How did he work with Senator [William] Knowland as opposed to Taft?

J: I've already told you that. Didn't I tell you about it?

G: Well, you talked briefly about it, but would you say Senator Knowland was more partisan? Was he more difficult to work with?

J: Well, let's go back to the difference between Senator Taft and Senator Knowland. Senator Taft was majority leader and Lyndon was minority leader and they were practically tied, the numbers were equal. [Wayne]

Morse was the difference, you know. Well, anyhow, Eisenhower called the two leaders, Taft and Lyndon, of the Senate, down there for a meeting shortly after he became president, of course. Then at that time, as they walked out, well, then Senator Taft realized and said at the time the lack of knowledge, overall knowledge, that President Eisenhower had of the government, you see.

G: He said that to your brother?

J: Yes. And he said, "Lyndon, it's going to be up to you. I'm dying of cancer." And I think that Lyndon was about the only one of the senators that he told that to. Maybe some others. But I know it wasn't generally known then, because he wasn't on crutches and he hadn't been to the hospital.

So then I forget when Senator Knowland took over as acting majority leader. That probably was in 1954; it could have been in the latter part of 1953, I'm trying to think. Well, starting out, Senator Taft was the Mr. G.O.P.; [he was] called that throughout the nation at the time. And of course Eisenhower came in at the last to be with them, with the help of Nixon double-crossing Earl Warren. I don't know whether you're familiar with that one or not. But, anyhow, then there wasn't any great love lost between Eisenhower and Taft, you see. I'm not saying that Taft wasn't a loyal leader or anything, but he cooperated and manuevered. Any legislation which would come up, why, Senator Taft and Lyndon would agree to it, mutual agreement on when to bring it up.

Now, the thing of it is that when Knowland became acting leader, which I believe was in 1953, to be frank with you, as I recall it, well, right at the very first, Lyndon went to Senator Knowland, the majority leader, and asked him a question, that several senators wanted to leave and be absent, as I recall, to make talks on Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. It could have been for some other reason. It was usually on Lincoln's [Birth]day they let the Senate adjourn for the Republicans to get out and make speeches on Lincoln's [Birth]day, and then Jackson-Jefferson Day [they'd adjourn for the Democrats]. But this might have been on something else. But they had an agreement that they wouldn't bring up anything controversial. All right, the next day, or when they convened, the first thing Knowland did was to call up a controversial bill.

G: Do you remember the bill?

J: No.

G: Was that the SBA bill with temporary controls? I know he did it on that and I was just wondering if--you know, after they abolished the RFC.

J: No, I don't remember the name of the bill. I don't think it was controversial, but it was something that these senators that were gone to make these speeches would be interested in. Whether it was RFC or WPA or what it was, these people would like to be heard on it. It wasn't just a routine matter; it was an important piece of legislation where everybody should have been there. So then when he brought that up, why, it was voted down. He said, "Bill Knowland, you lied to me.

You told me that you wouldn't do it and now you did." That's written up in the papers. So then he voted to recess Congress for so many days until they could get back in. That was the first time that that had happened.

G: He beat Knowland on that deal?

J: Obviously. And the Republicans voted with him on it; Taft did, too, as well as I recall. Anyhow, what was in the paper was this: as Knowland walked down--Taft was on his crutches, see; he was present--he said, "Now, Bill, you know you'd better play straight with Lyndon Johnson." So they made a Christian out of Knowland on that one thing, because he lost and [it] humiliated him, deeply humiliated. He thought he was more powerful than he actually was. And it was not that he was so arrogant, but if you watched him on the floor like I did, he had a kind of a little arrogance, particularly when he became acting leader and so forth.

But from then on after that there may be a few partisan fights, but only because there had to be. I mean, he being Republican leader and Lyndon being Democratic leader, you just didn't have to go to bed with him, but you fuss around a little bit like they do all the time, particularly over in the House of Representatives way back then when I first went up there. John Rankin would wait until everybody left the House of Representatives and he'd talk about the North. Made all of his speeches down South. Then [Vito] Marcantonio, he'd talk about the South and then they'd go out and have a drink together. Those things would go on. And maybe Knowland would tell Lyndon, "Well, I'm going

to really raise hell with you today on this." Lyndon said, "Go ahead, but I'll give it back to you." Then they'd go on. That's what goes on every day up there now, so that's not anything unusual. But I would say this, that from the minute that Knowland became acting leader and made that one mistake of lying to Lyndon, as he said it, well, then, Lyndon actually, with the closeness of the vote, their being tied, then he actually took over as leader.

G: Now, with Taft's death and Morse leaving the Republican Party and becoming an Independent--

J: That was in 1954, yes.

G: Well, it was 1953 I think.

J: No, it wasn't. It was 1954, I can tell you.

G: Really? Couldn't the Democrats have reorganized the Congress then?

J: They did.

G: That was 1955, though, that they--

J: Well, it was on account of the election in 1954.

G: But I know that--

J: See, they couldn't do it until--Morse couldn't do it until--or didn't do it. He was an Independent, more or less, wasn't exactly a Republican at the time in 1953 and 1954.

G: How did he work with your brother? They were on the Armed Services Committee together, I guess.

J: Matter of fact, I think Morse was the one that was on the Preparedness Committee with him. I'm not for sure. They worked together fine.

G: What was your impression of Wayne Morse back then?

J: Well, I wrote an article, a press release, for the weekly papers I didn't think Lyndon would sign. He [Morse] came down here to the University [of Texas] and I think it was him that said, "If Lyndon Johnson ever had a liberal thought, it would bring on a brain hemorrhage," or something like that. I don't know. He made a speech down here at the University. You know, he'd fought the confirmation of Clare Booth Luce for ambassador to Argentina or whatever country it was [Brazil]. So then he fell off of a horse up in Oregon and so she came out and said that he got kicked in the head by falling off a horse, or something, you know. So he came down here to Austin and made a speech at the University. He rambled around, you know, "If Lyndon Johnson ever had a liberal thought it would"--something, I forget his words now. Then I wrote a newsletter out and said, "I couldn't understand why he would say such a thing, that I hadn't said that he got kicked in the head by a horse, it was Clare Booth Luce. I didn't call him crazy, it was Clare Booth Luce." I had to put that part in that news release, you see. I didn't think Lyndon was going to approve it. So I got that one by him. You know, his weekly newsletter, I wasn't in charge of them, but everybody had a right to give their ideas and thoughts and I was always available for consultation on the weekly newsletter. So then I remember very definitely putting that in there in regard to his [speech]: "I don't know why he was down in Texas fussing at me. It wasn't me that said he was crazy, it was Clare Booth Luce that said he was kicked in the head by the

horse. I didn't say crazy." But you know what I mean. It got the thought over anyhow and I took great delight in that.

Of course, in 1954, why, he [Morse] ran and of course then he could still do what he wanted to do as to how--I don't recall whether he ran as an Independent in 1954 or as a Democrat in 1954, I'm not for sure. But I do know that I think that it could have been--only thing I know [is] that that one vote, that one thing changed the situation completely in the 1954 election in which he voted to organize and he got paid off for it with being assigned to the Foreign Relations Committee; that was what he wanted. Lyndon would have given him the whole damn thing if he'd have wanted it, but he just asked for the Foreign Relations Committee and that was how he got on there.

G: Was there also a problem in keeping Strom Thurmond in the Democratic Party? He'd been opposed, I guess, when he ran--

J: Well, when he came up; he wasn't up there at that time.

G: Well, in 1955 he contributed to that majority, that 49 to 47 Democratic majority.

J: Strom Thurmond did?

G: Yes.

J: Well, I don't recall--

G: But he'd been opposed by the Democratic Party in South Carolina and I was just wondering if your brother had to do anything for him to keep him voting with the Democrats in organizing the Senate.

J: I don't recall. He ran as a Democrat, so he had to be a Democrat or switch over to the Republicans. He switched now, but he wasn't at

that time. So I don't recall. If you're elected as a Democrat, you don't switch; they won't accept it, you see, otherwise we never could organize Congress. There's a lot of people that are Democrats [who] don't like what the Democratic chairmen are [inaudible] but it's an honorbound rule: if you're a Democrat, you vote Democratic in your organization. Now, if you meet at the caucus, and the caucus decides what to do--[the] Democratic caucus selects the majority leader and minority leader, whatever it is. They meet on January 2, I guess, and then on January 3 when Congress organizes and gets sworn in, they elect different leaders. But I don't recall anything about Strom Thurmond.

G: Well, I read a newspaper article that said that part of the formula of his majority, and one of the weakest portions, was these two men who in essence constituted the balance of power there, Wayne Morse on the left and Strom Thurmond on the right, and that he had to hold onto those two to keep his majority intact. I just wondered if you had any thoughts on [it].

Let me ask you about Charles Wilson, the secretary of defense. Do you remember his nomination hearings when he said, "What's good for GM is good for the country"?

J: Yes, I guess everybody in politics remembers that, because it was thrown up to him every time he ever opened his mouth.

G: But that was really in response to a question by your brother, wasn't it? Whether or not to divest himself of that GM stock that he had?

J: I don't know whether that was or not, but it was used several times in different things before, you know, being secretary of defense and then Lyndon being head of the committee, Armed Services Preparedness Committee, why, I think that he never lost that tag on him.

G: How did he feel about Wilson?

J: Well, he didn't have any--I don't recall. He dealt more with the secretary of the army; I think it was [Frank] Pace then, I don't know who it was. [Robert] Stevens, I think it was, secretary of that. I don't recall. You know, Bob Anderson was deputy secretary of defense, too.

G: They were good friends, I guess.

J: Yes. I don't recall any viciousness on the part of either one. I don't recall. When Lyndon became minority leader and Democratic leader during the entire Eisenhower Administration, I don't recall any out and out attacks openly on any member of the cabinet. I'm sure he laid off [Joseph] McCarthy, who was chairman of the Government [Operations] Investigating Committee, and that brought a lot of unfavorable comment from Drew Pearson as "Lying-down Lyndon." Because Pearson was urging Lyndon to attack McCarthy, and it brought about some criticism from some of the Democrats of Lyndon laying low. I recall this pretty much. I used to listen to some of the McCarthy hearings. Then I was going with a girl, a Republican secretary to a congressman from Illinois, and we had standing reservations for lunch at the Carroll Arms Hotel right there. She was a die-hard Republican. She had worked for McCarthy, so we had a table right across from his

every day at lunch. He was liable to come in flanked by a bunch of reporters, and things like that. So he'd gulp down three or four martinis, you know, there and then chase it off with brandy and go back to the committee. He was a--what's the name that was head of--that young man?

G: Roy Cohn.

J: Yes, Cohn. I think when he got in a little bit of trouble he ran to Lyndon for help. I remember he came in the office wanting to talk to Lyndon real quick; Lyndon was over on the floor all the time. But, anyhow, the thing of it is that I did recall Stuart Symington coming by the office and saying, "Well, Lyndon, you're scared to take him on. By God, I'm not." And Lyndon said, "Stuart, you'd better go slow on that fellow. Now is not the time." "Well, I've got him, Lyndon, and I'm going to pour it to him." Well, Lyndon didn't send me over there to listen to it; I just went over voluntarily. I wasn't in prison altogether; I mean I was in prison, but I had a key to get out on. So I went over and heard it. And then McCarthy just turned on a tape recording in which he recorded a statement made to Secretary of the Army Stevens, who they had been--I don't know what--well, anyhow, they recorded all he'd said, "Now we've got him by the balls, let's squeeze him," you know, the Secretary. That came out over the speaker.

G: Oh, really?

J: And it was frightening. Because [it was] the conversation that Symington had with Secretary of Army Stevens, a Republican. He was against McCarthy because McCarthy [Stevens] was investigating that

sergeant that he [McCarthy] had kept out of the army, you know that boy--

G: [David] Schine, was it?

J: Schine, yes. And so forth.

G: Well, now, who said, "Let's squeeze him"? Was that what McCarthy said or--?

J: That's what Symington told the Republican Secretary of the Army Stevens, "Now we've got him by the balls, let's squeeze him." And when that was over the loud-speaker, the reporters heard it, everybody started laughing and that practically busted the thing up. Then Symington runs back over to our office--you understand the reason I say our office, it was on the same floor as the Armed Services Committee, third floor of the Old [Senate Office] Building, which was not very far from ours. [Symington said], "Lyndon, I want some leadership." Lyndon said, "By God, you've got your leadership. You've got what was coming to you. You've got it. Now, goddamn it, you go ahead. I told you not to take on that s.o.b. He'll kill himself off if you leave him alone. But you want leadership, by God, you've got it." So then he went over to these different senators, say, Kerr and some of the others.

(Interruption)

Anyhow that one thing kind of strained the relationship between Lyndon and Symington, that one thing. Because he went around bitching to different senators, saying, "We need more leadership, we need more leadership," and all that.

G: I gather there were other strains later on, too.

J: I think you gathered right, but there wouldn't have been other strains later on if it hadn't been for this. This was the beginning. Oh, I think there might have been little strained things. You know who his wife was, don't you?

G: Symington's?

J: Symington's.

G: No.

J: Well, she was a great singer and it seems like her father had been a former speaker of the House, very society, you know. She was kind of informed. I can't think of her maiden name. You can check it but--[Evelyn] Wadsworth?

G: Yes.

J: I think it could have been Wadsworth. But she thought that--she didn't see any reason why her husband, a millionaire, you know, Symington was. What outfit was he with? A control [?] electrical company, I forget, boss of it. But he'd been secretary of air under Truman, you know. He'd been strong for us in the 1948 campaign. Of course, he was a strong Truman man, Symington was. But she couldn't figure why Stuart had to listen to Lyndon Johnson on anything. That happens in families, you know, and so forth. But I know when later on, the naming of the space and aeronautics committee, when the Space [Committee] was named after they passed that bill, we put Symington on it but didn't want to.

G: Why did he do it?

J: Well, he had a little pressure put on him. He didn't name him as one of the top people to succeed him. I think he was down at the bottom. Pressure was put on him by Phil Graham, that was it. I remember that one.

But these things, of course, Bobby Baker and George Reedy can tell you more about what actually happened over on the Senate than I can. The only thing I know is what Lyndon would--I didn't go over there and sit and listen to him all the time. I had enough on my hands listening to him at night and in the mornings. But I know what his reaction was to different pieces of legislation of different members, because I lived with him.

G: Right. One of the things I want to ask you about the McCarthy thing is your brother seemed to be very much committed to making sure that Senator [John] McClellan was there on any action that the Democrats took, and included in this. Why was this? Why was McClellan important to, let's say, the Democratic Party's action here with regard to McCarthy?

J: Well, number one, he was ranking man on the McCarthy committee. Number two, he was on the Appropriations Committee. That's two that I can recall; I don't know what other committee McClellan was on. I know that he was on Appropriations, which is a very important committee to be on, and on Government Operations he was the ranking Democrat, as I recall, on that. It was not anything unusual to be sure that the Democrats were there.

G: I was just wondering if he saw him as a particularly good adversary to McCarthy either because he was well known as being anticommunist, or because of the state he came from, or if there were any other factors here.

J: Well, that name McClellan never appeared very much. Of course he became very prominent later on when he took over, but the thing of it is he was a very important man and pretty high up on the Appropriations Committee and chairman of that investigating committee when Bobby Kennedy was after everybody, you know, became chief counselor of the McClellan committee. So I don't think Lyndon, to my knowledge, which is limited, interfered or tried to interfere or tried to run McClellan's committee or anything. Quoting from Drew Pearson, what happened in 1952 when the Republicans got in power in the presidency as well as in Congress, those two years, well, Lyndon, on foreign affairs in 1952, as well as all the way through, he had a very good working [relation]-ship with President Eisenhower. And I do say this, because it's true, Eisenhower considered him a fair man, you see, and he'd say, "Lyndon, you're going to be sitting where I am someday." Well, do you remember what Nixon said as to why he lost the race between Kennedy and Johnson?

G: No.

J: That's famous, you ought to remember that quote. Nixon was talking about his experience in foreign affairs, how he'd gone over there and pulled his shoe off and stamped it at Stalin and Lenin. They asked Eisenhower what Nixon did in foreign affairs, he said, "I don't know. I'll have to look it up."

G: "[I'll have to] think about it," yes.

J: "I'll have to think that one over." He wanted Kennedy and Johnson to win; he was for Johnson all the way. Why wouldn't he be? Sid Richardson, John Connally, all that. Why wouldn't he be? So we didn't have any trouble with President Eisenhower; he didn't have any trouble from us. And I think if you take 1957 [inaudible]. This is important for some reporter to look up, how many times Eisenhower during the eight years he was there, how many bills he vetoed that the Democrats passed. I don't recall very many, but I do recall this, that we did have a recession in 1957 and it was legislation--I can't remember what it was--that pulled us out of the depression. Of course like the papers were saying, like Booth Mooney's book [LBJ: An Irreverent Chronicle], that I was always mad because they called Lyndon the second most powerful man in Washington. I always thought he was the most powerful man, because [of] the way he manipulated Eisenhower.

G: Let me ask you about some of the legislation and your recollections here or your conversations with your brother about the tidelands bill, which I guess first came up after the 1952 election.

J: Price Daniel's the author, I believe, of the tidelands bill when he came to the Senate. Now, that was--let's see, [Tom] Connally retired in--

G: 1952.

J: 1952. He retired in 1952 and we brought Arthur Perry, who was the top man to Connally, to work for us. Actually he had the title of

administrative assistant, Arthur did. Price came up there. He had Horace Busby as his administrative assistant. You know who Busby worked for before. Lyndon, he worked for Lyndon. Then of course he had Jake Jacobsen next to Busby and I had a man that was very close to me by the name of Harry McAdams [?]. If you want to know who he is, he's now head of the Governors' Conference in Washington, D.C. But he was an old boy that came up there and wanted a job.

G: Harry McAdams, is that [his name]?

J: Harry McAdams. He left Congressman Young. When he quit Price Daniel he went to Congressman John Young and last year he was put then in charge of [Dolph] Briscoe's work in Washington. I'm going to tell this little story, but--

(Interruption)

Anyhow, in 1954 we had Dudley Dougherty running against [us]. A fellow by the name of Gooch [?], big fat fellow, came up there and asked me for a job on a patronage or something and I turned him down, told him we didn't have any. So I think he got on Martin Dies' patronage or something like that. Then Harry McAdams--these boys used to be pages together. Harry McAdams used to be a page in the [Texas] house and Gooch used to be a page or something [in the] state legislature. Anyhow, Dudley Dougherty sent Gooch and he's mad at me because I turned him down for a job or something. I didn't have any. And Harry McAdams came to me and said he wanted to work with us but then we didn't have a vacancy; at least Walter [Jenkins] didn't have one or something. And it came to whether he should go to work for the

congressman from Galveston at that time or Price Daniel. I told him to work with Price Daniel.

Then this fellow Gooch came up there and they ran into Harry McAdams at the Carroll Arms Hotel bar. So Harry said, "Well, what are you up here for?" "Well, I'm working for Dougherty. I'm up here to get something on Sam Houston Johnson. He's the one I'm after. His brother's not running the campaign, it's him," or something like that. So Harry said, "Oh, boy, I can help you on that." Then he ran over to me and said, "All right, now what do you want me to do? I'm in good with him." I said, "Well, you get him drunk tonight over there. Go through his damn briefcase. See what he's got." He got him drunk and went through the briefcase but couldn't find anything but a couple of dirty shirts and this Human Events thing.

I went to Jake Jacobsen, though, first and told him what I was going to use Harry for. So then he told this fellow, "Understand, I'm liable to lose my job. You know it is true that Price Daniel voted for Eisenhower and all that but, after all, Lyndon Johnson is the Democratic leader, and I'm liable to get fired if this thing ever gets out that I'm helping you. I might find out something that you might want, but I won't take a chance on talking over the phone to anybody except Dudley Dougherty's private telephone. I want his private number, where nobody will be on there except me and him."

So he got that and then he came to me and said, "Well, what do you want to feed him?" "I don't know yet. The only man in the bunch that's down there"--I attended the talkathon deal in Houston, you

know. There really wasn't anybody down there with him that had much brainpower but Harry Benge Crozier. I hate to say this, because it's bad, but politics is politics. He wanted to find out how we knew what was going on before they did, you see. And we didn't know; there were no leaks in his office. But it was just a general assumption as to what he would do, you see. It wasn't hard to figure out. But they thought it was a closed deal. And it was closed; we weren't getting anything out of their office. Lyndon wasn't paying much attention to Dougherty anyhow.

So I decided we ought to get rid of Harry Benge Crozier. He had a weakness for drinking and women. Harry McAdams had a cousin that had a house. We went out there and talked over the phone and met Dougherty in person. "Are you sure this is a private line? Are you sure now?" He said, "Yes." I told Harry to question to be sure, and [I said], "The best thing to do to save money, Harry, is to have him call you back on your number, 'You'd better call me back.'" So he did. He said, "Harry's got a girl friend in the Senator's office." He named her; I named her. "He gets drunk and calls her and tells her everything." How am I going to tell you what I told her? (Laughter) I made this one up, of course. But then Dougherty said, "That's exactly what I figured. That's exactly what I figured." He paid him off and let him go, Harry Benge Crozier. He was the only one that was writing anything that had any halfway truth in it that was damaging, that could have hurt.

Then after that went on, then Dudley couldn't stand the pressure of these talkathon deals, and I found out, or Lyndon found out, whoever found out, I don't know. But he decided it was about time for him to close up his campaign, the talkathon deal. So the Senate Reelection Campaign Committee, which my brother was chairman of also--I don't know which senator he had in charge--but we hired that bunch to go into Indiana or something to help the Democratic senators get reelected. So that closes that campaign up.

I never will forget Harry coming to me. Price Daniel's secretary was Pearl Reed, I believe was her name, a woman who had been with him since he had been [Texas] attorney general and all that. So then he came to me and said he couldn't get along with the girl, with her. I said, "Harry, that's the most important person in the world for you to get along with. It's not Jake Jacobsen." But I think she might have been an old maid or old widow or something. I said, "You start playing up to her. If you want to get a raise or things like that, you get her coffee, you pull"--Bill Moyers wasn't there at the time, but I mean act like a Bill Moyers. That's second [?] thinking on that, but that's pretty well what [?] he expected of Bill Moyers. And so then he got a raise, you know.

So then the next thing about Price was he came up to the Ranch, let's see, to talk to Lyndon. He just served as senator for two years. And [he] came up there--I never will forget this; it was real funny--and Lyndon and A. W. Moursund and myself [were there]. He wanted to get advice from Lyndon about whether to run for governor or

not. Lyndon didn't put himself open on that. Lyndon took him hunting--I'm sure it was out of season; as well as I recall it was--up on top of the mountain. They thought it was a big, old--well, he couldn't see any horns; it was dark, you know. Lyndon took a shot at it and missed. I bet he aimed it about a hundred miles away from the deer. A. W. did the same thing, missed. It looked like a doe, you know, [inaudible]. Turned around and gave it to Price Daniel, who was in the back seat of the car, handed the gun to him. Hell, he shot that thing and down she went, just like that. That's one thing about Price Daniel I've always admired: he didn't have any hesitancy in showing them that he had guts enough to kill a damn doe. It was illegal, you know [?]. So, anyhow, Lyndon and A. W. began to laugh and said, "Well, you missed her, Price, you missed her." And A. W. said, "Yes, yes." I said, "I bet her brother, by God, is going to be mad as hell at you, Price." I could see Lyndon and A. W. going up there the next morning--and they did, they went up there the next damn morning and picked up that [deer]. But it wasn't a doe; it had three little bitty horns on it. They had it mounted and sent to Price Daniel.

But coming back I was talking to Senator Daniel about what I thought about his running for governor and I said, "Well, I think if I were you I'd do it. I know what you're going through up here. My brother is minority leader and most of the people that come up here come to his office instead of yours except those that want to get something out of Eisenhower." I said, "If I were you, I would run, because if you get to be governor, you're not hiding behind Lyndon's

coattails. You're out on your own. If you lose, why, you've still got four more years in the Senate." So I talked him into running for governor. And he got elected. So that's about all.

G: Anything more on the tidelands?

J: Well, he passed the tidelands, but it was in cooperation with Lyndon. He shared the credit with Lyndon on it. Of course Lyndon had always been for the tidelands, so we had a very good working relationship with Price even though he had supported Eisenhower, but Price was a Democrat and he was smart enough to know who was leader.

G: I imagine your brother had considerably more influence with the other senators than Price Daniel, though, on that bill. I'm just wondering if you recall any arguments that he used or persuasion that he used in getting that majority to pass the tidelands.

J: Well, let's see, you don't recall it, but that bill didn't pass--what year do you have it passed in? 1955?

G: 1955.

J: 1956, isn't it?

G: Well, I think it passed before that, didn't it?

J: Well, the depletion allowance is what I'm thinking about, that bill.

G: I think the natural gas bill passed in 1956, too, but it was also brought up this session.

J: Well, I know in 1955 the big bill was up there. John Connally was up there on it when Lyndon had his heart attack, you see. Then I remember Lyndon told John to be sure and register as a lobbyist and John didn't do it. All that procedure was going on up there in 1955, and I

went up there. I wasn't working for Lyndon at the time, but I went up there because he said to come up there and I didn't know what he wanted, never did find out what he wanted with me. And then I stayed on through. But then they got Connally, as you know, for attempted bribery of Senator [Francis] Case. I mean he was accused of it, but then Elmer Patman here, a lawyer representing the Sun Oil Company, took the blame for it and got a year's suspended sentence with a fine, jail. Did I tell you about that one?

G: Yes.

J: Did I tell you about the head of the Sun Oil Company calling him up? Oh, well, hell, this is good. The Sun Oil Company--I can't think of the fellow's name, but I'll try to think of it and tell you later--the head of it out in Caliifornia called him up after he had been fined and gotten a year's suspended sentence in jail, all suspended. But then he called up Elmer, "Elmer, I think you understand that because of all of this publicity about you and other things that your usefulness is bad, we can't use you." Of course, I wasn't with Elmer when--I didn't know Elmer too well. He was a nephew of Wright Patman. He practiced over at the Railroad Commission. He said, "Well, that's just what you think. You're not only going to keep me on your payroll, but you're going to raise it five thousand dollars or you and I both are going to the penitentiary. I'm not going to take this rap alone." (Laughter) He got that raise and as far as I know he's still on there. I don't know. Makes a funny story, but it did come that

way. So you know why Elmer left, "You've done a good job and things like that but we can't use you." He said, "That's what you think."

All right, what other questions?

G: How about the Alaska-Hawaii statehood bills that were coming up then? I think they were first introduced in 1953 separately and I think--

J: They weren't anything that I recall to get any worked up about.

G: Yes. I understand that John Burns was rather insistent that Hawaii go first and a lot of southern Democrats were opposing--

J: Well, Alaska went first and Hawaii was the last.

G: Yes.

J: The reason why they took that decision, I don't know of any particular reason as long as you become a state. It might have been some personal reason or something involved or something like that, I don't know. It may have been on account of--both passed. I think there was maybe two-years difference in it, a couple of years.

G: I know one of the occasions in which your brother split with the Eisenhower Administration was when Ike tried to cut the air force budget by about five billion and your brother came out against it, opposed it. Do you remember that, the circumstances there?

J: No, I don't, I don't recall that as being a breaking with Eisenhower. I do recall his breaking, though. If you have it there that that was it, well, leave it at that, but that's not my recollection.

G: Well, I think it was just opposition. I'm not trying to say that there was a permanent split.

J: I can't think of it right now. Nicaragua or Guatemala--

G: Intervention down there?

J: Something that Eisenhower did. Then I was questioned about that by Holmes Alexander and we had been criticized for going along with Eisenhower too much, so we decided then that we should break off a little bit at this time. So Holmes Alexander, I got with him to do a story. He's a columnist. That's the first time that Lyndon Johnson had opposed the President on any major thing was what he did in Guatemala or something down there. Lyndon Johnson's going to do this and going to do that. So then I had heard Lyndon mention something about that, riding to work with him or something. I thought that he would break off on that issue. So I can't remember, I think it was in 1956 or something like that. We were getting criticized about going along too much, but, you see, we went along with Eisenhower as long as he did what we wanted him to do, except on foreign policy deals.

But, anyhow, the thing of it is he wrote the story up and I said, "Before you print it, why, let me go over and talk to him about it." And I did. But in the story we said that--you know, these columnists have to get the story in a week ahead of time or something like that for it to be effective. Lyndon, I showed him what was written and he said, "Do I have to do it just like that now?" I said, "I think it's better to do it now [inaudible]." So then I told Holmes, "He will do it, so go ahead." Then Thruston Morton came in there with some stuff explaining [?] Lyndon and he tore it up in his face. He was representing the State Department at that time, liaison man. So that was what I recall as kind of a definite break in the wave a little bit.

G: And you think that was with regard to the Guatemala--?

J: It's some revolution going on in South America.

G: That would have been the one, I think.

J: And then we let Mr. [John Foster] Dulles know that we weren't just taking everything he said for granted on foreign policy. So I know of that one instance. Now, to me, that was the first time that we had openly [disagreed]. We might have thought of evasion [?] and things like that for the record, I don't remember. I do remember this one instance, though.

G: One thing that the files seem to reflect and that is that the Eisenhower Administration seemed to have a practice in appointing a commission's members, where it had so many Republicans and so many Democrats, that they'd appoint Democrats who were really more inclined to be Republicans and who [had] voted for Eisenhower, of course, in 1952. How did the Democrats fight this sort of thing?

J: I don't know where you're getting your information. What are you basing it on?

G: Well, I think in the Policy Committee minutes there's some discussion of this, that the administration was tending to do this and perhaps, say, they ought to oppose it. Also, if you might remember expanding the Tariff Commission. The administration tried to expand the Tariff Commission from six to seven members and make it a majority party-controlled thing rather than a--they defeated that.

J: Well, I'll put it to you this way, it may be several of those things there. But you know we held, after that [first] two years,

confirmation or rejection of anybody named before the Senate, and they usually were ones that Lyndon liked, they got along with him. That meant the judges, too. Of course, there were two years that they had control with the Senate, but then they tried to get rid of Charlie Herring at that time when they had control and Lyndon didn't let them; they kept him on.

G: Didn't?

J: As district attorney here. So I'll say this. I don't think anybody got confirmed by the Senate without--well, I know they didn't get confirmed without Lyndon's approval, period. Then there may be some that he might not have liked, but then [he] figured that, well, after all, he is president. Now, if they were really anti-Democratic too much, why, they didn't get through. I think he would come nearer approving an out-and-out Republican than he would a former Democrat, a turncoat. That's my thinking. But I don't--

G: Did he get along pretty well with Mrs. Hobby?

J: Oh, yes. Oh, God, yes. Her father served with my father in the legislature, Oveta Culp Hobby. She used to be parliamentarian in the [Texas] House. I used to go with her sister a little bit down there. I worked at the bank and I had to babysit with the Lieutenant Governor [William Hobby, Jr.]. He was born down there and I was down there working at the bank. I came in late from my date with Lynn Culp, that was her sister. She wouldn't let her go out with me in Houston, thought I was late. And we'd change that kid's diapers. Then they had a big suite at the Lamar Hotel and usually she got back to me this

way: if I had a date with her sister, we usually had to babysit for that kid, about a year or two old.

But, anyhow, as far as I know--of course, you know Liz Carpenter came up there and represented Mrs. Hobby when she was secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, you know. So, too, in charge of the WACs, she had a good reputation, and able. They never had any--I guess that if you're going to talk about relationships, I imagine his relationship with Republican cabinet members was probably closer to her than he was anybody else that I know of. Well, Bob Anderson, who was secretary of the treasury, was probably the closest. Or when he was under secretary of defense.

G: I had a memo here I wanted to ask you about very--

J: You haven't showed me any of my memos and you said you were going to show them to me. That's what I've been wanting to see, some memos, and you haven't brought me anything--

(Interruption)

--that you might find interesting. He was operated on for cancer in 1953, skin cancer.

G: Was this on his hands?

J: Yes. And, oh, it was such a hush-hush deal, you know, around the office. Oh, oh, don't mention it, you know. It was on his hand, skin cancer. Goddamn it, in Wichita Falls, he held it up and announced it, by God: "I just got out of the hospital at Scott and White. I had a little skin cancer here." And there nobody was talking about it or anything else. Lyndon's funny. He said, "Lady Bird told Mama about

it and had us all worried. It wasn't anything but just burned a couple or three warts off or something that could cause skin cancer." But when we got to Wichita Falls--the reason I was looking over this thing, I saw Wichita Falls--he came out and I don't know--so it's Wichita Falls in [inaudible]. But it was [in] Wichita Falls he said, "By the way, you want to know why I got this bandage? I'll tell you. I just got out of Scott and White Hospital, I was operated on for skin cancer and I can't shake hands with you very much like I used to. But it'll be over with in a little while and I just wanted to explain to you why I can't shake your hand." But it was so quiet down there, everybody was just--um, um, that was the joke of the year for 1953. Anyhow, that was--

Well, in 1953 he covered every city that it shows here: Lubbock, Paris, Marlin, Waco, Gonzales, Cuero, Sinton, Corpus [Christi], McAllen, Houston, Austin, Lockhart, [inaudible], Dallas, El Paso. I think that we were making his schedule--you'll see there in that film. I want to see if you can locate John Cameron Swayze's film up there. You'll see a picture of me and Lyndon going over his schedule.

G: Did you make any of those trips with him?

J: Oh, no. No, you think I'm passing out literature? Hell, I never--not unless I had to. I remember one time with the helicopter deal at Dallas when he was closing up his campaign at a football field, I stepped up there for something and he hollered over there, "Sam Houston, Sam Houston, come here and start handing out some of these cards. What the hell are you doing up there?" He used to say that

Sam Houston used to say that his fame in life was that when he was a little boy he wanted to be Grandmother's girl and a Baptist preacher. You know, it's bad enough to be in the office with him, right next to him, but living right next door to him at home is bad, but then to travel with him, I either slipped out or worked it some way, I either had a cold or something, or maybe he didn't think I was up to it. Anyhow, I can truthfully or honestly say I didn't want to and I don't think I was forced to. Now, it's different in the White House. If I wanted to go to Hawaii, well, that was different. I would call Mike Howard up, you know, Secret Service agent, and ask him how long he thinks that the President would be in Hawaii and when he was getting back. "Well, what do you want to know for?" I said, "Well, I was thinking on taking a little trip someplace. [I'll] be back and I just wanted to know what time." He'd go back and report that to Lyndon, which I knew he would, and they would put me on the manifest to go to Hawaii.

(Laughter)

But anyhow--

G: Well, was he as insistent back then on having the podium with a certain height and speaking from--you know, with all of these specifications like he became later?

J: I never heard that being uttered. He might have developed that. He had the height.

G: But I've heard that he--

Tape 2 of 2

G: I think that was in Austin at Wooldridge Park in 1946.

J: At Wooldridge Park, for re-election. Hardy Hollers campaigned against us for Congress in 1946. Now, let me give you the background. Lyndon stood at the polls as the one most--polls were taken for governor in 1946. Well, he outranked Beauford Jester and--who was the other man, the [Texas] attorney general, Grover Sellers?--for governor. He stood at the top of the poll. Then each one of them came to him and asked him. For some reason, Lyndon never had the desire to be governor. Well, I know why obviously.

G: Why didn't he?

J: Well, he--at that time you just served two terms and you were through. Now, the same thing applies: why didn't he become secretary of the navy when Roosevelt offered it to him in 1942? [It] was that after you serve there, you're through. See, now as governor, you usually go--if you can make it to the Senate, that's fine, but that's about the stopping point. But he preferred Washington, more exciting, more things going on worldwide and all. But he was looking for 1948 to take on Pappy [W. Lee] O'Daniel. That was what he was doing. So then when he was ranked at the top of the polls and that, why, then he played it that, "Well, Beauford, I won't run if you'll support me for the Senate in 1948," and [the same with] Grover Sellers. I think that's the attorney general back at that time, I think that's him, from up at Sulphur Springs, I'm not sure. But anyhow that was it.

Well, then the money began to flow in here to Colonel Hardy Hollers. It was from oil money. At that time it was before he got tied up with oil. At first, you know, they were all against him.

G: Well, why were they against him?

J: I think he voted one time about something against them.

G: Really? But he had gotten the Big Inch [pipeline] down here during the war.

J: Well, regardless of what he'd gotten, he said something about--he voted against them once or something. They tried to--he had this idea, I can tell you the facts of this, that he for some reason, and I never discussed it with him much, there's something about--frankly, it's hard to say it, but there's just something about the oil man that Lyndon just never did take to. Now, he might have taken some money when he was running for president or something like that, but just something. You see, he didn't discover oil until, but there's something about the embar--oh, I know and I can show you several instances where he wouldn't even see some of them.

G: I get the impression that he was much closer to the independent oil producers than the major oil producers, like the--

J: Well, all the major oil companies opposed him every time that I can remember and then maybe this--but anyhow they sent a lot of money up here from Houston, the oil companies did and the [inaudible] and they put it up, all that was necessary, to try to defeat him for re-election to Congress in 1946. They had this fellow that owns--the Drakes, the people that owned the Calcasieu Lumber Company here, you

know, Bill Drake, William Sherman Drake. I guess he still owns Calcasieu or whatever it is, but I don't know that. Anyhow, they began to add Taylor Construction Company and that was brought out. Mr. [T. J.] Taylor, [Sr.] or Tommy had formed a construction company and got the contracts over here or something, called it Taylor Construction Company, I think just because it came from Taylor or something. But they were bringing that out. Brought out about the Dillman Street home belonging to George Brown, you know. And they turned on the damnedest campaign you ever saw. Ads in the paper all the time and Hardy Hollers had an unlimited amount of money. Dan Moody, the former governor, of course, was supporting him. And that campaign, it was dirty; it was the dirtiest campaign I guess that they ever waged. Crookedness, radio stations, I think that was it, and then the Dillman Street home, the tie in with the Browns, anything they could think of, they brought out. Then even people like me--when I was drinking, you know, I'd be in the Tavern, you know, people would come say, "I don't care what he did, I'm still for him." That kind of thing. "Even if he is crooked, I'm for him." That kind of stuff, my close friends. It was that kind of a campaign.

So then he came down, he got the [records of the] money, to show where the money came from to purchase the radio station. Of course, ten thousand [dollars] came from Lady Bird, but then Lyndon borrowed ten thousand from the American National Bank. I know where all that was. He had the cancelled checks, every damn thing, what he paid for the home and everything, had everything up on the platform with him.

I didn't go there. I stayed--I knew what was coming. Lyndon landed at the airport and they called him out at Dillman Street and asked him, the Austin paper or something. He said, "Goddamn it, leave me alone. If you want a statement, just say that I'm out here with my mother working on the speech I'm going to deliver tonight." That's what he said to the press; that was all. Well, I was out there, but I knew it was hot. So I didn't go down to hear it; I stayed home to record it.

So then he starts out, and he has Mother on the platform, and Lady Bird, and he told them, "There's a gang out to get me. There's Houston money being shipped in here, the PUP Gang: Petroleum, Utilities and Power [Packers]." Damn, he came down on them, the best speech he ever made in his life. "They've been trying to get me to get in an argument, chasing--they even had that old, long, tall jack rabbit from Georgetown"--that meant Dan Moody, you know. "Even this fellow here who owns the lumber company who was named after a Yankee general, William Sherman," you know, Drake. And he got hot and laid it on. "And if any of you [question me], come up here and look me in the eye and shake hands with my mother." Oh, boy, he poured it on. I never heard a man in my life, and I've heard many of them speak.

G: Was that when he had all his records up there and--?

J: "Any of you all question me, come on up here and look them over." He had every damn record of every check, everything he had. "Come on up here now and look them over; they'll stay here as long as you want to, if you question my honesty." He called them the PUP Gang and he said,

"That's Petroleum, Utilities and Power that's after me." He cussed everybody out he could think of. Said, "Even that long, tall jack rabbit from Georgetown"--that's Dan Moody; he let him have it. That's still funny. I'd give a million dollars if I hadn't lost it. Somebody stole it from me in New York.

G: But a copy was not made before you lost it? There's not another copy anywhere that you know of?

S: I had all these things--to be frank with you, I had my trunk stored out here at Major Frank's [?] house when I left to go to Mexico or something. When my sister was moving I had it stored, and then he came and told me he was going to have to retire. I said, "No, don't retire. Wait, because I'm up here at the Ranch with Lyndon now." This is 1967, and I said, "I know he's not letting me out here for nothing. I'm probably going back to Washington with him. If you'll just stay and keep it to yourself, why, then when I get back to Washington--I'm going back with him I'm pretty sure. I know he wouldn't be having me out here for nothing--then I'll get you appointed lieutenant colonel and transfer you to London." So I did that.

Then they came by and picked up my trunk, stored it at his house with all my papers and confidential stuff. It was shipped to London. Then I got in the White House. Then I told Colonel Frank [inaudible] but he went and put them in a new trunk and shipped them to me at the White House. I turned it over to the people at the White House to organize it all, and they did a pretty good job on it, put it on tape. And I played it up there in my room and I had used it to--I

said, "Lyndon"--and he talking about the war, everything, you know--"Give me fifteen minutes because I've got this tape made." And you couldn't help but hear that speech and get fired up. I mean, fighting mad, getting back to the real Lyndon Johnson that I knew. But I never did get a chance to use it and I took it with me up to New York and sent the recording machine down to--I was writing my book, you know. And they had this tape on there and then they erased it or did something with it. But the old records that that came from may be around in some of my stuff, I don't know where it would be stored, seems like somebody told them to keep them in that trunk. I don't remember throwing those away. I wonder if my sister Rebekah would have them. Seems like somebody told me she had a bunch of old records.

G: That your sister had some?

J: Oh, it would be--she'd put it in the garbage, I guess, if it belonged to me. But seems like I had them in--you see, I had a big trunk full of all my private papers dating from way back, including that Collier's article. I kept everything since I was in law school, every clipping about Lyndon, anything like that. I couldn't destroy anything. Like I've got a whole batch of stuff up there at Johnson City, a carload of stuff that I haven't even gone through yet. But that was some of the savings that I had from the White House. But then I moved down here and my little nephew had a house here and he said he'd store it for me in his house. I had all the tapes of my book that I had made, written, in there, and he rented the house, and somebody broke in there--well, the boy that rented the house had stolen all my cassette tapes,

because they could be used to play with. You ought to hear that Aunt Jessie [Hatcher] recording, oh, boy, that was a humdinger!

G: Was it?

J: Oh, God almighty, that was the best. Oh, God! But that was the best speech that I ever heard.

(Interruption)

The point of it is that that was I think [inaudible]. Now, of course, furthermore, in that campaign, he had Gene Autry down here. Funniest damn thing in the world. He had a rally in North Austin, East Austin, South Austin and West Austin, four different rallies. They did one speech then [at the opening of the campaign] and went back to Washington, and then [he] came back at the close of the campaign and they had Gene Autry down for four different rallies in town. And I'm telling you it kept me chasing [inaudible] to attend those. He had a police escort, you know, but, hell, I had to park my car. But Gene Autry would be singing--what's his song?--and, by God, Lyndon would get out--Gene would get the crowd all worked up--"That's enough, Gene," and then he would just start taking over. Oh, it was funny! It was humorous to watch. "That's all right, Gene, they're through with you now," and then he'd tell them something. "You're through. Get off the stage now. Now let me tell you something, I want [inaudible]." He was a most earthy speaker when he wanted to [be]. He was a showman.

Oh, it made me cry to see him on television when he was president, reading these damned old things that nobody cares about. First

thing, I attribute Bill Moyers and anybody else around there for exposing Lyndon, coming in to him when he had had a hard day at the Oval Office, then to come and appear on [television], tired and reading something out that he had done, you know. Hell, I'd even turn him on [?]. Like when I moved in the White House in 1967 to think about the campaign, I said, "The first thing I'm going to do if I have any influence is to install the biggest fan money can buy, the government can buy, in the East Room. Then when he gets up there and starts reading his speech, I'm going to turn that damn fan on and blow it away when he holds a press conference." I said, "That's one thing I can do. The second thing to do is that Yuki, that dog, is pretty smart. I'm going to train Yuki to get up there and snap at those papers, throw them away from him where he will have to talk."

But, anyhow, I've been asked that question many times on TV about what was his best speech. That was a thrill of course, but what thrilled me I think the most in all the years, including the presidency--I wasn't up there too [much], I was up there off and on, maybe a couple of years, something like that, more or less--was when he was notified in 1952 that Senator [Ernest] McFarland, the [majority] leader, would not be back until the last week of Congress. This was about two weeks before the session was over. McFarland was due back that Monday or something but he called in and said he was going to have to stay out in Arizona to campaign and that Lyndon would have to take over. Well, that was the first time that he had taken over

actually as acting leader. But when he did, he went in the bathroom and vomited.

G: Is that right?

J: That's right.

G: Was he nervous, do you think?

J: I guess so, so I went over there with him, rode over there on that little train with him. And this was at the close of the session. And I went in the family gallery.

G: What was he saying in the car on the way over?

J: Not very much. He hadn't read what was coming up, you know, things like that. Reading that going over, you know, something like that. But the thing of it is--

(Interruption)

Well, then, he was nervous. I don't remember much of a conversation going on, except thumbing through stuff, you know. But then, as you know, the majority leader starts the proceedings. Then I remember Senator Taft taking after him. Damn, Lyndon shot back so damn quick before Taft could even finish asking the question. And [Bourke] Hickenlooper, I remember him asking something and Lyndon insulted him in a nice way, or a bad way. It didn't make any difference. Every one of those Republicans--this is right about the close of the session, about a week; he had that for about a week. I was sitting there with George Reedy when they had night sessions. I said, "George, do you see what I see?" He said, "What is it?" "He loves this. McFarland will never get it back, I can tell you that." I used to be

out there at the house when McFarland was there and Lyndon would tell him what he should do, and he said, "Lyndon, why don't you do it?" Lyndon said, "No, you're the leader." Lyndon was a behind-the-scenes worker usually, but when you throw him in that damn ring there--I said, "Mac will never get it back now. He's tested the water and his strength." He just took those Republicans on unprepared on certain measures. I thought he was unprepared, but it just so happened he knew more about it than they did on it.

I think that the way he handled that campaign in 1946, that speech, and then that first time that he became acting leader, that one time over there, those two will stick in my mind forever, because he was six foot three but he was about ten foot tall. I'm not stretching it there. And he shocked the whole Senate; I mean he brought them to a shock [?]. Then from then on, from that minute on, the impression that he made [from] that day on [with] both the Democrats and Republicans has lasted forever. Because, anyhow, when McFarland came back the last week, he never got it back. Senator So-and-so, Lodge [?], asked Senator McFarland a question and then Lyndon would jump up and [say], "Will the Senator from Arizona yield to me to answer?" And McFarland would sit there. Any senator that would ask McFarland a question, "Will the Senator from Arizona yield to me for that?" It was just really the funniest thing, because he had gotten used--

G: McFarland was defeated in that campaign, too.

J: Yes, but he was still senator, you see, until--the campaign hadn't been held until November. This was probably in July.

G: I see. Well, I'll see what I can find in the [Congressional] Record on that.

J: Well, that would be the last part of 1952 on that. It's not so much the substance of what he did, you would have had to have been there seeing him make them sit down, and they wished they had never asked him a question. Of course he continued that, you know, when he became leader in his own right. Oh, that was a regular occurrence from then on. He got really boring after that, but I'm saying my first impression, because then very--I don't know--let's see, he had Earle Clements as assistant leader, then he [Clements] was defeated by Thruston Morton and then he chose [Mike] Mansfield. Like I said in my book, he never had anybody that he thought was smarter than he was, or that had any great influence. I didn't say it about Earle Clements, I said it about Mansfield. I never did like Mansfield. I'm ready for that son of a bitch to retire. Good for the country.

G: Didn't he appoint [J. William] Fulbright to the Foreign Relations Committee?

J: He didn't appoint Fulbright.

G: Fulbright was already on?

J: Oh, hell, yes. You see, Fulbright first was a congressman, but he had been in the Senate long before Lyndon was. Hell, no, he didn't appoint him.

G: I thought that Senator [Theodore Francis] Green was on that committee and that he--

J: Senator Green was on the committee. Well, Senator Tom Connally was chairman, then Green succeeded him, then [Walter] George succeeded Green, and Fulbright succeeded George. Is that pretty good? Now, do you want me to go back before Connally? We had [William] Borah--well, we had Key Pittman during the war, Borah, [Burton] Wheeler, [Gerald] Nye on the Foreign Relations Committee. They all got beat, every damn one of them, on account of the World War--only survivor of that bunch is when Roosevelt called them in and told them they had to repeal the Embargo Act, that we were going to have war--you haven't heard my speech on that, have you? That we legislated ourselves into the war, and said, "I've made this speech. Let it work out [?]."

G: I think we have that in one of our earlier tapes.

J: I might have. But, anyhow, [Arthur] Vandenberg got up the next day and he asked the Lord for forgiveness for his stupidity. And that made him the big man. The other, Bill Borah, Wild Bill Borah, he wasn't wild anymore. He got either defeated or he retired before defeat. But Vandenberg stayed on and on, and so forth. But the rest, Roosevelt called them down there, you know. He had Vice President [John Nance] Garner to bring them down, and he mixed them cocktails; you had to have a Manhattan or you didn't get a drink, because Roosevelt would--yes, it was a Manhattan--fix his own Manhattan. But then he told them about the decision that would be made today would be made whether or not we'd have World War II or not. "Hitler is looking at us right now. If you don't repeal the Embargo Act, there will be war in less than thirty days. Hitler will march on Poland." What the

Embargo Act meant at that time of course was whether or not we could ship arms and ammunition to foreign powers at war, whether we could do that. It'd passed after World War I; we'd passed a law stating that we could not send arms and ammunition to any country engaged in a foreign war. Well, of course that stood and then we couldn't--at that time up there, it was about as bad as it is now. I was up there. [There were] so many internationalists [isolationists], you know, and then--can't recall it--Congress there was very against us getting into the war. But had Hitler known, as most historians have said, that we were going to get in it, he wouldn't have attacked. Then he turned to Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and said, "Mr. Secretary, what you're doing is serving notice on Hitler that he can march." So then we had it, and of course Roosevelt--

(Interruption)

All right, now here's the situation.

(Interruption)

This is what happened about World War II. After World War I was over with--and I think what brought this legislation on was the Civil War in Spain. But, anyhow, we passed the law stating that the United States of America could not ship arms or ammunition to any foreign country when they were at war. All right, now, Hitler had already had his bloodbath and everything and [was] getting ready to march. Now, we had had Ham [Hamilton] Fish, congressman from, actually, President Roosevelt's own district, that was over and received a decoration from Roosevelt [?], and I forget the other members of Congress that had

[inaudible]. Of course, you had your Wheelers, [Charles] Lindberghs, and all that saying there would be no war. And the sentiment of the people was to stay out of war and we shouldn't intervene in anything.

Now, Hitler had joined up with old Mussolini down there. He didn't have any sense; the only battle he had ever been in was Ethiopia, but he sounded like he was a big fighter. Then they signed a non-aggression agreement with Stalin, Germany did. All right. Now, Hitler knew what Poland could do and other countries, Maginot line, you know, all that in France there. He'd already lined up Stalin, non-aggression, lined up Italy. Now, he'd built up his military forces, which we knew. Then the only thing that he was waiting for before he declared war was what the United States was going to do. And we had a bunch of congressmen and senators, like the same bunch that fought Lyndon in the Vietnam War, same type practically.

So the Senate Foreign Relations Committees have all said that the foreign policy is to be, in our Constitution, solely the President's [responsibilty], with the advice of the Senate, you see. So the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate--[it's] called Foreign Relations [in the Senate] and in the House it's called Foreign Affairs Committee, but only the Senate had anything to do with treaties and things like that, you see. So Roosevelt asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was headed by Key Pittman, Democrat--they can't blame it on being a Republican Senate, because it wasn't; it was a Democratic Senate. They had a majority on the Foreign Relations Committee; it was Democrats. Then it was stalled--it had been repealed

in the House, as I recall, but then it stalled in the Foreign Relations Committee. He said, "Unless you can repeal this, bring this piece of legislation out repealing that former law"--which stated we could not do it--saying, "Now give us the right to if we want to," you see. That didn't mean that we would, but it meant if we wanted to.

(Interruption)

So then they said no. Roosevelt said, "You just don't know what you've done." So they turned around to the Secretary of State, which was Cordell Hull. At that time we didn't have the CIA, you see, we had the army intelligence, of course, always have had, navy and so forth. There wasn't no air force at that time, separate, you know. The air force was part of the army. All right, he said, "Mr. Secretary, I'll permit you"--you see, all these documents that Roosevelt had, the Secretary of State had, were top secret documents that we had obtained through the embassy in Berlin and through other embassies. How we obtained them, I don't know and don't give a damn, but anyway, "You are permitted now to give these senators this information." They turned around and said, "We don't need your information, Mr. President. We have information of our own that there will be no war." Vice President Garner said, "Well, Mr. President, that's the way it is." He said, "Gentlemen, I'm telling you, there'll be war in less than thirty days and I'll have to call you back. You don't know what you've done." You can check the records on that and you'll find I'm right.

Then Lyndon and I left town--Congress was going to adjourn--and we left town and we went to the Greenbrier Hotel in West Virginia. We started out to Texas, you see, but we never got there. Lyndon was keeping in touch with Tommy Corcoran and the others there at the White House. And before you knew it--I don't know, you've heard of Charlie Marsh, haven't you?

G: Yes.

J: He was in on the deal, too. So he sent me up to New York to the World's Fair to interview people on what was going on and what their thoughts were, you know. I just wanted to get out of it anyhow, so I went on up to New York. Anyhow, we had war and just practically a few weeks after that. Then of course Congress went back. But then Roosevelt devised the Lend-Lease Bill, you see, and we leased, oh, what was it? Bermuda, I think, and the Azores or something. He devised something that we would trade ten destroyers for that. So the Lend-Lease, you know, [we would] give them ten destroyers. Roosevelt devised that which didn't have to have the approval of Congress.

I don't know how many laws he went around, but I am thoroughly convinced, there's no question in my mind but what he didn't promote Pearl Harbor himself, Roosevelt. I've been in the intelligence service, psychological warfare, myself, and I've never been told that, understand, but thank God for Pearl Harbor, because we wouldn't be here today if it hadn't [happened]. That's the only thing that brought us together, only thing, was the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, [1941], and on December 9 Congress declared war,

Roosevelt went on the air. I was the head of the National Youth Administration for eleven states in Memphis, Tennessee. And he said, "We'll build fifty thousand planes and ships." Because with all of our stuff there, you think that we didn't know that those planes were taking off? Then we arranged, to just completely fool the Japs, for a conference with the [Japanese] Ambassador at that time. Now, we didn't alert--well, I think Admiral [Husband] Kimmel and General [Walter] Short knew it, because we did move some of our ships but we weren't supposed to have known about it. Moved just enough without Japan thinking about it. Then gave shore leave, just to let them sneak up on us. That was planned. I don't know the history books, whether that will ever be revealed or not. I'm saying I'm not the only one that possessed that opinion. I didn't originate it altogether. So then you had people fighting to get to draft boards, you know, joining in. And there was some--the air was wrong out there [?]. I walked on that damned old thing, I didn't like it anyhow.

But, anyhow, that was it. What other questions? Is there anything else?

G: I think this is a good stopping point.

J: All right.

G: You want to stop and--?

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview VIII

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